@junghanacs/entwurf 0.20.1 → 0.22.0

package/mcp/entwurf-bridge/dist/pi-extensions/lib/codex-fresh-preflight.js

@@ -0,0 +1,519 @@
+import * as crypto from "node:crypto";
+import * as fs from "node:fs";
+import * as path from "node:path";
+import { parse } from "smol-toml";
+import { checkCodexSocketFile, realCodexProtocolOpener, resolveCodexDefaultSocketPath, } from "./native-push/codex-ws-client.js";
+export const CODEX_PREFLIGHT_HINT = {
+    "codex-birth-unit-missing": "the Codex SessionStart birth unit is absent, drifted from its recorded digests, or unsafely owned; run `entwurf install-codex-birth`, then `entwurf doctor-codex-birth`",
+    "codex-birth-trust-missing": "the vendor has recorded no trust receipt for this birth declaration, so the hook is declared and never runs; open a visible plain Codex, answer its prompt with `Trust all and continue`, send one first turn, then `entwurf doctor-codex-birth`",
+    "codex-mcp-hand-missing": "the Codex user config does not expose the managed entwurf bridge; run `entwurf install-codex-mcp`, then `entwurf doctor-codex-mcp`",
+    "codex-visible-identity-missing": "Codex tui.status_line does not include thread-title; run `entwurf install-codex-statusline`, then `entwurf doctor-codex-statusline`",
+    "codex-app-server-unavailable": "the operator-owned Codex app-server default socket is absent or unsafe; start it with `entwurf codex-app-server` from a detached tmux session (one that is NOT where you work), then retry",
+};
+export const CODEX_LAUNCH_CWD_PREFLIGHT_HINT = {
+    "codex-launch-cwd-undecided": "Codex has recorded NO decision for the directory this sibling would start in, so the window would open on the vendor's folder-consent screen and WAIT for a human instead of running its first turn — no rollout, no callback, and nothing to address; either launch in a directory this Codex has already been answered for, or open a plain `codex -C <dir>` there once and answer it, then retry",
+    "codex-launch-cwd-untrusted-ancestor": "this directory sits inside a project the operator marked `untrusted`, and on this rail the vendor does not offer a consent screen for that — it refuses the startup outright with `pass the repository root explicitly with --cd`, so answering a prompt at this directory would only reproduce that error; launch at that untrusted project's own root instead, or change that project's recorded decision",
+};
+export const CODEX_CALLER_PREFLIGHT_HINT = {
+    "codex-caller-title-missing": "this Codex caller's tui.terminal_title does not include thread-id, so the multiplexer reports no pane title naming this thread and there is no caller seat to open the sibling beside; run `entwurf install-codex-terminal-title`, then `entwurf doctor-codex-terminal-title` (an explicit placement.tmuxSession skips this check entirely, because it never needs the seat)",
+};
+/**
+ * The unit's paths are the operator's own, derived from the SAME environment the installer
+ * reads — never a system location and never a flag. A preflight that resolved them any other
+ * way could pass while the installed unit sat somewhere else.
+ */
+function unitPaths(env) {
+    const home = env.HOME?.trim() ?? "";
+    const codexHome = env.CODEX_HOME?.trim() || path.join(home, ".codex");
+    const dataHome = env.XDG_DATA_HOME?.trim() || path.join(home, ".local", "share");
+    const unitRoot = path.join(dataHome, "entwurf", "codex-birth");
+    return {
+        hooksFile: path.join(codexHome, "hooks.json"),
+        helperDir: path.join(unitRoot, "helper"),
+        stateFile: path.join(unitRoot, "install-state.json"),
+    };
+}
+const CODEX_MCP_ENV_VARS = [
+    "CODEX_HOME",
+    "ENTWURF_DIR",
+    "PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR",
+    "ENTWURF_META_SESSIONS_DIR",
+    "ENTWURF_META_MAILBOX_DIR",
+    "ENTWURF_META_SENDERS_DIR",
+    "ENTWURF_META_RECEIVERS_DIR",
+    "TMUX",
+    "TMUX_PANE",
+];
+function isSafeOwnedFile(file, expectedUid, executable = false) {
+    try {
+        const stat = fs.lstatSync(file);
+        return (stat.isFile() &&
+            !stat.isSymbolicLink() &&
+            stat.uid === expectedUid &&
+            (stat.mode & 0o022) === 0 &&
+            (!executable || (stat.mode & 0o111) !== 0));
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+function isSafeOwnedDir(dir, expectedUid) {
+    try {
+        const stat = fs.lstatSync(dir);
+        return stat.isDirectory() && !stat.isSymbolicLink() && stat.uid === expectedUid && (stat.mode & 0o022) === 0;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The unit's own ownership state, read as the digest inventory it is. Bytes that merely
+ * EXIST prove nothing: the launcher codex is about to exec must be the one this unit
+ * published, so every recorded member is compared to its recorded digest before a sibling
+ * is opened. No digest is computed for the VENDOR here — that is a different axis below.
+ */
+function closureDriftedFromState(paths, expectedUid) {
+    // The directory holding the state carries the state's authority: anyone who can write it
+    // can replace the inventory every digest below is compared against.
+    if (!isSafeOwnedDir(path.dirname(paths.stateFile), expectedUid))
+        return true;
+    if (!isSafeOwnedDir(path.dirname(path.dirname(paths.stateFile)), expectedUid))
+        return true;
+    if (!isSafeOwnedFile(paths.stateFile, expectedUid))
+        return true;
+    let state;
+    try {
+        state = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(paths.stateFile, "utf8"));
+    }
+    catch {
+        return true;
+    }
+    if (state.schema !== "codex-birth-install-state/v1" || state.status !== "installed")
+        return true;
+    if (state.hooksFile !== paths.hooksFile || state.helperDir !== paths.helperDir)
+        return true;
+    const digest = (file) => {
+        try {
+            return crypto.createHash("sha256").update(fs.readFileSync(file)).digest("hex");
+        }
+        catch {
+            return null;
+        }
+    };
+    if (typeof state.hooksSha256 !== "string" || digest(paths.hooksFile) !== state.hooksSha256)
+        return true;
+    const members = state.helperFiles;
+    if (!Array.isArray(members))
+        return true;
+    // Exactly the closure the installer publishes: a short inventory would leave a member
+    // nothing compares, which is the same hole as not checking digests at all.
+    const named = members.map((raw) => raw?.path);
+    const expected = [
+        "codex-birth-launch.sh",
+        "meta-bridge-hook-codex.ts",
+        "lib/meta-session.ts",
+        "lib/native-push/codex-ws-client.ts",
+        "lib/session-id.js",
+        "entwurf-capabilities.json",
+    ];
+    if (named.length !== expected.length)
+        return true;
+    if (expected.some((name) => !named.includes(name)))
+        return true;
+    if (named.some((name, index) => named.indexOf(name) !== index))
+        return true;
+    for (const raw of members) {
+        const member = raw;
+        const rel = member.path;
+        if (typeof rel !== "string" || rel.length === 0 || rel.startsWith("/") || rel.split("/").includes("..")) {
+            return true;
+        }
+        if (typeof member.sha256 !== "string" || digest(path.join(paths.helperDir, rel)) !== member.sha256)
+            return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+function birthMissing(paths, expectedUid) {
+    const launcher = path.join(paths.helperDir, "codex-birth-launch.sh");
+    const directories = [
+        path.dirname(paths.hooksFile),
+        paths.helperDir,
+        path.join(paths.helperDir, "lib"),
+        path.join(paths.helperDir, "lib", "native-push"),
+    ];
+    if (directories.some((dir) => !isSafeOwnedDir(dir, expectedUid)))
+        return true;
+    if (!isSafeOwnedFile(paths.hooksFile, expectedUid))
+        return true;
+    const closure = [
+        [launcher, true],
+        [path.join(paths.helperDir, "meta-bridge-hook-codex.ts"), false],
+        [path.join(paths.helperDir, "lib", "meta-session.ts"), false],
+        [path.join(paths.helperDir, "lib", "native-push", "codex-ws-client.ts"), false],
+        [path.join(paths.helperDir, "lib", "session-id.js"), false],
+        [path.join(paths.helperDir, "entwurf-capabilities.json"), false],
+    ];
+    if (closure.some(([file, executable]) => !isSafeOwnedFile(file, expectedUid, executable)))
+        return true;
+    try {
+        const parsed = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(paths.hooksFile, "utf8"));
+        const events = parsed.hooks?.SessionStart;
+        if (!Array.isArray(events) || events.length !== 1)
+            return true;
+        const group = events[0];
+        if ("matcher" in group || !Array.isArray(group.hooks) || group.hooks.length !== 1)
+            return true;
+        const hook = group.hooks[0];
+        if (Object.keys(hook).sort().join(",") !== "command,timeout,type")
+            return true;
+        if (hook.type !== "command" || hook.command !== `'${launcher}'` || hook.timeout !== 30)
+            return true;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return true;
+    }
+    return closureDriftedFromState(paths, expectedUid);
+}
+/**
+ * The vendor's own receipt for THIS declaration, read and never written. The key the vendor
+ * writes is `<declaration path>:<event>:<group>:<handler>`; the value must be a
+ * `trusted_hash` of the shape `sha256:<64 hex>`. What this asserts is that a receipt EXISTS
+ * for our declaration identity — never that the hash is correct, which only the vendor can
+ * say, and never by launching Codex to find out.
+ */
+function trustReceiptMissing(config, hooksFile) {
+    const hooks = config.hooks;
+    if (hooks == null || typeof hooks !== "object" || Array.isArray(hooks))
+        return true;
+    const state = hooks.state;
+    if (state == null || typeof state !== "object" || Array.isArray(state))
+        return true;
+    const entry = state[`${hooksFile}:session_start:0:0`];
+    if (entry == null || typeof entry !== "object" || Array.isArray(entry))
+        return true;
+    const digest = entry.trusted_hash;
+    return typeof digest !== "string" || !/^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(digest);
+}
+function readConfig(env) {
+    try {
+        const text = fs.readFileSync(path.join(env.CODEX_HOME?.trim() || path.join(env.HOME ?? "", ".codex"), "config.toml"), "utf8");
+        const value = parse(text);
+        return value && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value) ? value : null;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+function mcpMissing(config) {
+    const servers = config.mcp_servers;
+    if (servers == null || typeof servers !== "object" || Array.isArray(servers))
+        return true;
+    const entry = servers["entwurf-bridge"];
+    if (entry == null || typeof entry !== "object" || Array.isArray(entry))
+        return true;
+    const server = entry;
+    if (Object.keys(server).sort().join(",") !== "command,env,env_vars")
+        return true;
+    const envVars = server.env_vars;
+    if (!Array.isArray(envVars) ||
+        envVars.length !== CODEX_MCP_ENV_VARS.length ||
+        envVars.some((name, index) => name !== CODEX_MCP_ENV_VARS[index]))
+        return true;
+    const env = server.env;
+    if (env == null || typeof env !== "object" || Array.isArray(env))
+        return true;
+    const serverEnv = env;
+    return (server.command !== "entwurf-bridge" ||
+        Object.keys(serverEnv).join(",") !== "ENTWURF_BRIDGE_NATIVE_HOST" ||
+        serverEnv.ENTWURF_BRIDGE_NATIVE_HOST !== "codex");
+}
+function visibleIdentityMissing(config) {
+    const tui = config.tui;
+    if (tui == null || typeof tui !== "object" || Array.isArray(tui))
+        return true;
+    const statusLine = tui.status_line;
+    return !Array.isArray(statusLine) || !statusLine.includes("thread-title");
+}
+/** `[tui].terminal_title` membership, the exact axis `entwurf doctor-codex-terminal-title`
+ * judges. Same shape as `visibleIdentityMissing` and a DIFFERENT key: `status_line` is what a
+ * human reads inside the TUI, `terminal_title` is what the multiplexer reports back as
+ * `#{pane_title}`. Neither substitutes for the other. */
+function callerTitleMissing(config) {
+    const tui = config.tui;
+    if (tui == null || typeof tui !== "object" || Array.isArray(tui))
+        return true;
+    const terminalTitle = tui.terminal_title;
+    return !Array.isArray(terminalTitle) || !terminalTitle.includes("thread-id");
+}
+/**
+ * The CALLER-side capability, pre-mutation and synchronous.
+ *
+ * Synchronous because it reads one config file and nothing else: there is no app-server axis
+ * here and there must not be one — whether the operator's app-server is up says nothing about
+ * whether a caller's pane can be found, and asking would make a placement check fail for a
+ * delivery reason.
+ *
+ * Call it only when the anchor will actually be USED — a codex caller that named an explicit
+ * `placement` never consults the title, so refusing it for a missing `thread-id` would be a
+ * refusal for an unused capability.
+ */
+export function codexCallerFreshPreflight(env) {
+    const config = readConfig(env);
+    if (config === null || callerTitleMissing(config))
+        return "codex-caller-title-missing";
+    return null;
+}
+/**
+ * The launch directory's own capability, pre-mutation and synchronous — and DELIBERATELY NARROWER
+ * than the vendor's own decision, because the leaf that decides here reads one TOML file while the
+ * vendor asks its app-server. Read this whole comment as the scope statement it is: what follows
+ * says what this answers, and then says what it refuses to claim.
+ *
+ * WHY THE AXIS EXISTS. `[source rust-v0.153.4]` a fresh call always passes `--remote`, so the TUI
+ * resolves `AppServerTarget::Remote` and startup ALWAYS runs `check_directory_trust` on the `-C`
+ * value (`tui/src/lib.rs:1699-1725`). Nothing on that path consults the approval or sandbox policy
+ * (`tui/src/onboarding/directory_trust.rs:33-130`), which is why the
+ * `--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox` token this argv already carries does NOT cover it:
+ * approvals and folder consent are two different gates. A directory with no recorded decision
+ * renders the consent screen and blocks, and a blocked TUI has started no turn — no rollout, no
+ * birth, no callback, and the caller waits out its whole timeout on a window that is merely
+ * waiting to be answered. `[측정 2026-09-16]` the two release-gate runs that failed launched in
+ * `…-2zznHl` and `…-kSsoAn`, neither of which had an entry; the two that passed launched in
+ * `…-db65N2` and `…-pBXxOJ`, both of which did. Unattended, the failure is silent.
+ *
+ * THE THREE VENDOR OUTCOMES THIS LEAF MODELS, in the vendor's own order
+ * (`tui/src/config_update.rs:290-371`, `ProjectTrustHost::Remote`):
+ *
+ *   1. A DIRECT decision on the exact cwd starts a turn, and BOTH recorded answers do. `trusted`
+ *      returns before any screen (`:346-354`); a saved `untrusted` is explicitly skipped for a
+ *      remote target — `if target.uses_remote_workspace() && trust_level == Some(Untrusted) {
+ *      continue; }` (`onboarding/directory_trust.rs:94-96`), and `uses_remote_workspace()` is
+ *      exactly `matches!(self, Self::Remote { .. })` (`tui/src/lib.rs:307-309`). Refusing a
+ *      deliberate `untrusted` would be entwurf inventing a policy the vendor does not have.
+ *      The key is the exact cwd — `cwd_keys = vec![cwd_key]` (`:290-296`), no root marker, no git
+ *      root, no parent, all three of which exist only on the Local host. `[측정 2026-09-16]`
+ *      `~/.codex/config.toml` carried a trusted `/tmp` and still recorded two separate
+ *      `/tmp/entwurf-codex-fresh-live-*` entries, one per run a human answered.
+ *   2. With NO direct decision, an enabled PROJECT LAYER consents on the directory's behalf
+ *      (`trust_level.is_none() && disabled_project.is_none() && project_layers.any(no
+ *      disabledReason)` → `Ok(None)`, `:346-354`). Those layers come from the app-server's
+ *      `ConfigRead { include_layers: true }` answer, which this leaf does not have. A layer that
+ *      is present but DISABLED is a fourth outcome — the vendor preserves an unknown or untrusted
+ *      project layer as disabled rather than dropping it, and that path falls through to the
+ *      screen — and this leaf cannot tell the two apart either. So wherever a layer could exist at
+ *      all it answers `null`, which folds both outcomes into "proceed".
+ *   3. With no direct decision and NO layers, a cwd inside an explicitly `untrusted` ancestor is
+ *      not a consent screen at all: the remote branch returns an ERROR
+ *      (`"remote project directory is inside an explicitly untrusted project; pass the repository
+ *      root explicitly with --cd"`, `:357-371`). That is a different failure with a different
+ *      repair, so it gets its own reason — answering `Trust` at the child would only reproduce the
+ *      same vendor error. Note the vendor's own precondition there is `project_layers.is_empty()`,
+ *      which is why this reason is only reachable after step 2 has found no layer anywhere.
+ *
+ * WHAT THIS LEAF IS FOR, AND WHAT IT IS NOT. It is NOT equivalent to the vendor's judgment and
+ * must not be described as asking "the same question": it reads the operator's own `config.toml`,
+ * while the vendor reads an EFFECTIVE config — system, managed and cloud layers merged around that
+ * user layer (`config/src/loader/mod.rs:258-290`, `:430-460`) — through its app-server.
+ *
+ * That gap is affordable because NOTHING HERE REFUSES A LAUNCH. `freshCall` prints what this leaf
+ * saw and opens the window anyway: the consent screen is self-repairing when a human is there, and
+ * one answer teaches the vendor the directory for good. The one caller that treats the answer as a
+ * precondition is `smoke-codex-fresh-live`, where nobody is at the keyboard and a named
+ * precondition is worth more than a callback timeout — that gate owns one directory, answered
+ * once.
+ *
+ * So read a non-null answer as "the vendor will probably stop here, and this is the repair", never
+ * as a verdict. Absence is not evidence either way, and every case this leaf cannot see resolves
+ * to `null`.
+ */
+export function codexLaunchCwdFreshPreflight(env, launchCwd) {
+    // THREE NON-ANSWERS, AND EVERY ONE OF THEM PROCEEDS. Each is a case where this leaf holds no
+    // evidence about what the vendor will do, and a refusal without evidence is exactly the false
+    // refusal this axis promises not to produce:
+    //
+    //   - A RELATIVE directory. It cannot match a stored key here, but the vendor does not give up
+    //     on one — it asks its app-server for a cwd and joins (`config_update.rs:203-224`), so the
+    //     joined path may well be answered. In production this branch is unreachable anyway: the
+    //     shared cwd leaf already refuses a non-absolute request as `cwd-not-absolute`, which is a
+    //     better reason than anything this axis could give.
+    //   - NO READABLE USER CONFIG. A missing `config.toml` is not "no decisions": the vendor loads
+    //     an empty user table and merges system, managed and cloud layers around it
+    //     (`config/src/loader/mod.rs:258-290`, `:430-460`, `:520-610`), any of which can carry the
+    //     decision or the layer that starts the turn.
+    //   - NO `projects` TABLE. Same reason: it says the USER layer records nothing, not that the
+    //     effective config does.
+    if (!path.isAbsolute(launchCwd))
+        return null;
+    const config = readConfig(env);
+    if (config === null)
+        return null;
+    const projects = config.projects;
+    if (projects == null || typeof projects !== "object" || Array.isArray(projects)) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const table = projects;
+    const levelOf = (key) => {
+        const entry = table[key];
+        if (entry == null || typeof entry !== "object" || Array.isArray(entry))
+            return null;
+        const level = entry.trust_level;
+        // An unrecognised value leaves `trust_level` as `None` on the vendor side too, and `None`
+        // with no project layer is precisely the case that renders the screen.
+        return level === "trusted" || level === "untrusted" ? level : null;
+    };
+    // Outcome 1: a direct decision, either answer.
+    if (levelOf(launchCwd) !== null)
+        return null;
+    // Outcome 2: a PROJECT LAYER may consent with no entry at all, and this leaf cannot enumerate
+    // layers — they come from the app-server's `ConfigRead { include_layers: true }` answer. What
+    // it CAN decide is the negative: a `.codex` anywhere from the directory upward is the only
+    // place such a layer comes from, so when none exists the vendor's `project_layers` really is
+    // empty and the two remaining outcomes below are computable. Where one could exist, answer
+    // `null`.
+    //
+    // EXISTENCE, not ownership, and the weaker predicate is the load-bearing one. The vendor
+    // admits a layer on its own terms — an unknown or untrusted one is preserved as a DISABLED
+    // layer, not dropped — and none of that consults owner/mode/symlink safety. Asking for a
+    // safely-owned directory here would let a layer the vendor sees go unseen by this leaf, which
+    // would then synthesise an `untrusted-ancestor` refusal for a launch the vendor was going to
+    // run. That is the false refusal this axis must never produce, so the check is the widest
+    // thing that still means "a layer could live here".
+    //
+    // The operator's own CODEX HOME is excluded, and excluding it is what keeps this axis from
+    // being a no-op: `~/.codex` is an ancestor of nearly every directory anyone launches a sibling
+    // in, and it is the USER config root rather than a project layer — the vendor names those
+    // apart (`layer.name.dotCodexFolder` for a project, the home for the user layer). Counting it
+    // would answer `null` for every path under `$HOME` and the check would never fire in real use.
+    const codexHome = path.resolve(env.CODEX_HOME?.trim() || path.join(env.HOME ?? "", ".codex"));
+    for (let dir = launchCwd;;) {
+        const candidate = path.join(dir, ".codex");
+        if (candidate !== codexHome && fs.existsSync(candidate))
+            return null;
+        const parent = path.dirname(dir);
+        if (parent === dir)
+            break;
+        dir = parent;
+    }
+    // Outcome 3: no layer anywhere and an explicitly untrusted ancestor — the vendor's own
+    // precondition for that branch is exactly `project_layers.is_empty()`, which the loop above
+    // has now established. It is reported as its own failure because its repair is to launch at
+    // that root, never to answer a prompt at the child.
+    //
+    // The MATCH IS NOT THE VENDOR'S and is not claimed to be. The vendor compares path URIs
+    // (`LegacyAppPathString` → `PathUri::starts_with`, segment-aware, fail-closed on encoded
+    // separators); this compares plain strings on a separator boundary. Where the two could
+    // disagree — a key or a cwd that is not a plain POSIX path — this answers `undecided` rather
+    // than `untrusted-ancestor`. Be exact about what that buys: BOTH are refusals, so this is NOT
+    // the launch-permissive direction. What it weakens is the SPECIFIC-ERROR claim — the ancestor
+    // reason names another directory as the repair, and naming the wrong one is worse than saying
+    // "no decision here". Neither vendor outcome on this branch starts a turn, so the guarantee
+    // above is untouched either way.
+    const plainPosixPath = (value) => !value.includes("%") && !value.includes("\\") && !value.split("/").some((seg) => seg === "." || seg === "..");
+    if (plainPosixPath(launchCwd)) {
+        for (const key of Object.keys(table)) {
+            if (levelOf(key) !== "untrusted" || !plainPosixPath(key))
+                continue;
+            if (launchCwd === key || launchCwd.startsWith(key.endsWith("/") ? key : `${key}/`)) {
+                return "codex-launch-cwd-untrusted-ancestor";
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return "codex-launch-cwd-undecided";
+}
+const DEFAULT_APP_SERVER_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;
+function withTimeout(promise, timeoutMs) {
+    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+        const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error("codex app-server exchange timed out")), timeoutMs);
+        promise.then((value) => {
+            clearTimeout(timer);
+            resolve(value);
+        }, (error) => {
+            clearTimeout(timer);
+            reject(error);
+        });
+    });
+}
+/**
+ * A bounded real initialize/liveness exchange over the app-server's own JSON-RPC. The inode
+ * check above only proves a socket FILE with the right owner and mode exists — a dead
+ * app-server's stale socket a new process has not reclaimed yet passes that check identically
+ * to a live one. Only a real connection plus a real `initialize` round trip distinguishes them.
+ * Any failure — refused/hung connection, a response that never lands within the bound, or a
+ * reply the transport itself rejects — answers identically: not live. This is deliberately not
+ * `probeCodexThread`: preflight asks "is the app-server there to talk to", never "is a specific
+ * thread loaded", so it carries no thread id and no retry/backoff policy.
+ */
+async function appServerIsLive(socketPath, openProtocol, timeoutMs) {
+    let protocol;
+    const opening = openProtocol.open(socketPath);
+    try {
+        protocol = await withTimeout(opening, timeoutMs);
+    }
+    catch {
+        // The bound expired (or the connect failed), but a slow open can still LAND afterwards.
+        // Nothing else holds that handle, so a late success would leave a live connection to the
+        // operator's app-server open for the rest of this process. Close it when it arrives —
+        // the answer stays "not live" either way; this only refuses to leak.
+        void opening.then((late) => {
+            try {
+                late.close();
+            }
+            catch {
+                // best-effort: the socket may already be gone.
+            }
+        }, () => {
+            // The open failed; there is nothing to close.
+        });
+        return false;
+    }
+    try {
+        await withTimeout(protocol.request("initialize", {
+            clientInfo: { name: "entwurf-fresh-preflight", title: "entwurf-fresh-preflight", version: "0" },
+            capabilities: { experimentalApi: true, requestAttestation: false },
+        }), timeoutMs);
+        return true;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+    finally {
+        try {
+            protocol.close();
+        }
+        catch {
+            // best-effort: the socket may already be gone.
+        }
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Async because the app-server axis now performs a real bounded protocol exchange, not just an
+ * inode check (see `appServerIsLive`). Every other axis stays synchronous filesystem/config
+ * work; only the last `await` point can suspend.
+ */
+export async function codexFreshPreflight(env, deps = {}) {
+    const paths = deps.unitPathsOverride ?? unitPaths(env);
+    // A relative root would make the declaration's launcher path — the very string the vendor
+    // keys its trust receipt to — depend on this process's cwd.
+    if (!path.isAbsolute(paths.hooksFile) || !path.isAbsolute(paths.helperDir) || !path.isAbsolute(paths.stateFile)) {
+        return "codex-birth-unit-missing";
+    }
+    if (birthMissing(paths, deps.operatorUid ?? process.getuid?.() ?? -1)) {
+        return "codex-birth-unit-missing";
+    }
+    const config = readConfig(env);
+    // The vendor receipt is a SEPARATE reject from our bytes: perfect bytes the vendor will
+    // not run and absent bytes are two different repairs, and folding them would send the
+    // operator to the installer for something only they can answer in their own Codex.
+    if (config === null || trustReceiptMissing(config, paths.hooksFile))
+        return "codex-birth-trust-missing";
+    if (mcpMissing(config))
+        return "codex-mcp-hand-missing";
+    if (visibleIdentityMissing(config))
+        return "codex-visible-identity-missing";
+    const socketPath = resolveCodexDefaultSocketPath(env);
+    const socket = (deps.checkSocket ?? checkCodexSocketFile)(socketPath);
+    if (!socket.ok)
+        return "codex-app-server-unavailable";
+    const live = await appServerIsLive(socketPath, deps.openProtocol ?? realCodexProtocolOpener, deps.appServerTimeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_APP_SERVER_TIMEOUT_MS);
+    return live ? null : "codex-app-server-unavailable";
+}

package/mcp/entwurf-bridge/dist/pi-extensions/lib/entwurf-fact-provider.js

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
  * a same-gid socket exists would be half a lie. Both leave the normal output;
  * one diagnostic carries the fact. (pi + same-gid socket = the normal merge.)
  */
-import { isOutOfSocketDomainGardenIdConflict, resolveFactList, } from "./entwurf-facts.js";
+import { isOutOfSocketDomainGardenIdConflict, resolveFactList, UNOBSERVED_PEER, } from "./entwurf-facts.js";
 import { observePeerFacts } from "./entwurf-peer-observe.js";
 import { isLivenessSupported } from "./entwurf-v2-contract.js";
 import { FRESH_CUT_PRESCRIPTION, listAllMetaIdentities, } from "./meta-session.js";
@@ -130,9 +130,29 @@ export async function listEntwurfFacts(deps) {
     // 4. resolveFactList over CLEAN inputs only. Its throws (duplicate identity /
     //    unprobed in-domain citizen) are impossible wiring invariants — left to
     //    fire as the last line of defense, never caught here.
+    //
+    //    A peers surface may bound observation to its SAME newest rendered rows. Receiver
+    //    observation can inspect process state and historical Claude markers, so doing it
+    //    for every retained record made bounded text grow linearly with history. The generic
+    //    provider stays unbounded when no limit is supplied. Either way the full clean
+    //    identity/probe arrays reach the core: certification, duplicate detection,
+    //    diagnostics, liveness, and the machine payload remain complete. Only an observation
+    //    not performed becomes `unobserved`.
     const cleanIdentities = identities.filter((i) => !conflictGids.has(i.gardenId));
     const cleanProbes = probes.filter((p) => !conflictGids.has(p.gardenId));
-    const facts = resolveFactList(cleanIdentities, cleanProbes, deps.observe ?? observePeerFacts);
+    const observe = deps.observe ?? observePeerFacts;
+    let selectedObserve = observe;
+    if (deps.observationLimit !== undefined) {
+        if (!Number.isSafeInteger(deps.observationLimit) || deps.observationLimit < 0) {
+            throw new Error("listEntwurfFacts: observationLimit must be a non-negative safe integer");
+        }
+        const observedGardenIds = new Set([...cleanIdentities]
+            .sort((a, b) => (a.gardenId < b.gardenId ? -1 : a.gardenId > b.gardenId ? 1 : 0))
+            .slice(Math.max(0, cleanIdentities.length - deps.observationLimit))
+            .map((identity) => identity.gardenId));
+        selectedObserve = (identity) => (observedGardenIds.has(identity.gardenId) ? observe(identity) : UNOBSERVED_PEER);
+    }
+    const facts = resolveFactList(cleanIdentities, cleanProbes, selectedObserve);
     // 5. #50 C4 demotion: a record-less socket is a diagnostic, not a listing
     //    section. One diagnostic per socket (subjects aggregate at render, F8);
     //    the message is liveness-keyed so same-state sockets group into one line.

package/mcp/entwurf-bridge/dist/pi-extensions/lib/entwurf-peers-render.js

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@
  *     socketPath rows — the pre-record socket-scan worldview) is gone with the
  *     `controlDir` it exposed. Socket paths are dispatch-internal transport.
  */
+/** Human rows and expensive provider observations share this one presentation budget. */
+export const ENTWURF_PEERS_RENDER_LIMIT = 32;
 // `receiver` and `transcript` are OBSERVED facts, not routing (#101): they say what was
 // found on disk for this citizen, and a caller still asks entwurf_v2 what may be done
 // about it. They earn a column because for every claude-code row `liveness` reads
@@ -102,7 +104,7 @@ function renderDiagnosticLines(diagnostics) {
     }
     return lines;
 }
-function compactLines(lines, max = 32) {
+function compactLines(lines, max = ENTWURF_PEERS_RENDER_LIMIT) {
     if (lines.length <= max)
         return lines;
     const omitted = lines.length - max;

package/mcp/entwurf-bridge/dist/pi-extensions/lib/entwurf-v2-contract.js

@@ -110,13 +110,12 @@ export function isLivenessSupported(backend) {
 }
 // ── Native-push backend domain (봉인 2/4) ───────────────────────────────────
 // A backend whose liveness is measured by the SEPARATE native-push adapter rail (a
-// live app-server conversation probe — antigravity's LS gRPC), NOT a control
-// socket. This domain is DISJOINT from LIVENESS_DOMAIN_BACKENDS: an agy session
-// is `unsupported` on the socket FACT axis (entwurf_peers) yet fully
-// measured + deliverable on the native-push axis. The two are separate rails on
-// purpose — check-entwurf-facts pins both sets and asserts their intersection is ∅
-// (a backend can never be in both domains).
-export const NATIVE_PUSH_BACKENDS = ["antigravity"];
+// live vendor app-server target probe), NOT a control socket. This domain is DISJOINT
+// from LIVENESS_DOMAIN_BACKENDS: an Antigravity or Codex session is `unsupported` on
+// the socket FACT axis (entwurf_peers) yet independently measured on the native-push
+// axis. The two are separate rails on purpose — check-entwurf-facts pins both sets
+// and asserts their intersection is ∅ (a backend can never be in both domains).
+export const NATIVE_PUSH_BACKENDS = ["antigravity", "codex"];
 export function nativePushSupported(backend) {
     return NATIVE_PUSH_BACKENDS.includes(backend);
 }