@junghanacs/entwurf 0.20.1 → 0.22.0

package/pi-extensions/lib/codex-fresh-preflight.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,580 @@
+import * as crypto from "node:crypto";
+import * as fs from "node:fs";
+import * as path from "node:path";
+import { parse } from "smol-toml";
+
+import {
+	type CodexProtocolOpener,
+	type CodexRpcProtocol,
+	type CodexSocketFileCheck,
+	checkCodexSocketFile,
+	realCodexProtocolOpener,
+	resolveCodexDefaultSocketPath,
+} from "./native-push/codex-ws-client.ts";
+
+export type CodexPreflightRejectReason =
+	| "codex-birth-unit-missing"
+	| "codex-mcp-hand-missing"
+	| "codex-visible-identity-missing"
+	| "codex-birth-trust-missing"
+	| "codex-app-server-unavailable";
+
+export const CODEX_PREFLIGHT_HINT: Record<CodexPreflightRejectReason, string> = {
+	"codex-birth-unit-missing":
+		"the Codex SessionStart birth unit is absent, drifted from its recorded digests, or unsafely owned; run `entwurf install-codex-birth`, then `entwurf doctor-codex-birth`",
+	"codex-birth-trust-missing":
+		"the vendor has recorded no trust receipt for this birth declaration, so the hook is declared and never runs; open a visible plain Codex, answer its prompt with `Trust all and continue`, send one first turn, then `entwurf doctor-codex-birth`",
+	"codex-mcp-hand-missing":
+		"the Codex user config does not expose the managed entwurf bridge; run `entwurf install-codex-mcp`, then `entwurf doctor-codex-mcp`",
+	"codex-visible-identity-missing":
+		"Codex tui.status_line does not include thread-title; run `entwurf install-codex-statusline`, then `entwurf doctor-codex-statusline`",
+	"codex-app-server-unavailable":
+		"the operator-owned Codex app-server default socket is absent or unsafe; start it with `entwurf codex-app-server` from a detached tmux session (one that is NOT where you work), then retry",
+};
+
+/**
+ * THE CALLER AXIS, AND IT IS NOT THE ONE ABOVE. Everything above asks "can a Codex sibling be
+ * OPENED on this host" — birth unit, vendor trust, MCP hand, visible identity, app-server. This
+ * asks the opposite question: "can the Codex citizen DOING the opening be located", which is a
+ * fact about the CALLER's own config and is required no matter which backend it opens (#95
+ * lane B). Keeping them apart is the point: a Pi caller opening a Codex sibling needs the five
+ * above and none of this, and a Codex caller opening a Pi sibling needs this and none of those.
+ * Folding either into the other would refuse one operator for the other's missing repair.
+ */
+export type CodexCallerPreflightRejectReason = "codex-caller-title-missing";
+
+/**
+ * THE LAUNCH-DIRECTORY AXIS, AND IT IS A THIRD QUESTION AGAIN. The target axis asks "can a Codex
+ * sibling be opened on this host", the caller axis asks "can the Codex citizen doing the opening
+ * be located", and this asks "will the vendor START A TURN in the directory this launch names" —
+ * a fact about ONE directory rather than about the host or the caller, so it is the only axis
+ * that needs the resolved launch cwd and the only one that can pass for one call and refuse the
+ * next on an unchanged host.
+ */
+export type CodexLaunchCwdPreflightRejectReason = "codex-launch-cwd-undecided" | "codex-launch-cwd-untrusted-ancestor";
+
+export const CODEX_LAUNCH_CWD_PREFLIGHT_HINT: Record<CodexLaunchCwdPreflightRejectReason, string> = {
+	"codex-launch-cwd-undecided":
+		"Codex has recorded NO decision for the directory this sibling would start in, so the window would open on the vendor's folder-consent screen and WAIT for a human instead of running its first turn — no rollout, no callback, and nothing to address; either launch in a directory this Codex has already been answered for, or open a plain `codex -C <dir>` there once and answer it, then retry",
+	"codex-launch-cwd-untrusted-ancestor":
+		"this directory sits inside a project the operator marked `untrusted`, and on this rail the vendor does not offer a consent screen for that — it refuses the startup outright with `pass the repository root explicitly with --cd`, so answering a prompt at this directory would only reproduce that error; launch at that untrusted project's own root instead, or change that project's recorded decision",
+};
+
+export const CODEX_CALLER_PREFLIGHT_HINT: Record<CodexCallerPreflightRejectReason, string> = {
+	"codex-caller-title-missing":
+		"this Codex caller's tui.terminal_title does not include thread-id, so the multiplexer reports no pane title naming this thread and there is no caller seat to open the sibling beside; run `entwurf install-codex-terminal-title`, then `entwurf doctor-codex-terminal-title` (an explicit placement.tmuxSession skips this check entirely, because it never needs the seat)",
+};
+
+export interface CodexUnitPaths {
+	hooksFile: string;
+	helperDir: string;
+	stateFile: string;
+}
+
+export interface CodexPreflightDeps {
+	unitPathsOverride?: CodexUnitPaths;
+	operatorUid?: number;
+	checkSocket?: (socketPath: string) => CodexSocketFileCheck;
+	openProtocol?: CodexProtocolOpener;
+	appServerTimeoutMs?: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The unit's paths are the operator's own, derived from the SAME environment the installer
+ * reads — never a system location and never a flag. A preflight that resolved them any other
+ * way could pass while the installed unit sat somewhere else.
+ */
+function unitPaths(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): CodexUnitPaths {
+	const home = env.HOME?.trim() ?? "";
+	const codexHome = env.CODEX_HOME?.trim() || path.join(home, ".codex");
+	const dataHome = env.XDG_DATA_HOME?.trim() || path.join(home, ".local", "share");
+	const unitRoot = path.join(dataHome, "entwurf", "codex-birth");
+	return {
+		hooksFile: path.join(codexHome, "hooks.json"),
+		helperDir: path.join(unitRoot, "helper"),
+		stateFile: path.join(unitRoot, "install-state.json"),
+	};
+}
+
+const CODEX_MCP_ENV_VARS = [
+	"CODEX_HOME",
+	"ENTWURF_DIR",
+	"PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR",
+	"ENTWURF_META_SESSIONS_DIR",
+	"ENTWURF_META_MAILBOX_DIR",
+	"ENTWURF_META_SENDERS_DIR",
+	"ENTWURF_META_RECEIVERS_DIR",
+	"TMUX",
+	"TMUX_PANE",
+] as const;
+
+function isSafeOwnedFile(file: string, expectedUid: number, executable = false): boolean {
+	try {
+		const stat = fs.lstatSync(file);
+		return (
+			stat.isFile() &&
+			!stat.isSymbolicLink() &&
+			stat.uid === expectedUid &&
+			(stat.mode & 0o022) === 0 &&
+			(!executable || (stat.mode & 0o111) !== 0)
+		);
+	} catch {
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
+function isSafeOwnedDir(dir: string, expectedUid: number): boolean {
+	try {
+		const stat = fs.lstatSync(dir);
+		return stat.isDirectory() && !stat.isSymbolicLink() && stat.uid === expectedUid && (stat.mode & 0o022) === 0;
+	} catch {
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * The unit's own ownership state, read as the digest inventory it is. Bytes that merely
+ * EXIST prove nothing: the launcher codex is about to exec must be the one this unit
+ * published, so every recorded member is compared to its recorded digest before a sibling
+ * is opened. No digest is computed for the VENDOR here — that is a different axis below.
+ */
+function closureDriftedFromState(paths: CodexUnitPaths, expectedUid: number): boolean {
+	// The directory holding the state carries the state's authority: anyone who can write it
+	// can replace the inventory every digest below is compared against.
+	if (!isSafeOwnedDir(path.dirname(paths.stateFile), expectedUid)) return true;
+	if (!isSafeOwnedDir(path.dirname(path.dirname(paths.stateFile)), expectedUid)) return true;
+	if (!isSafeOwnedFile(paths.stateFile, expectedUid)) return true;
+	let state: Record<string, unknown>;
+	try {
+		state = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(paths.stateFile, "utf8")) as Record<string, unknown>;
+	} catch {
+		return true;
+	}
+	if (state.schema !== "codex-birth-install-state/v1" || state.status !== "installed") return true;
+	if (state.hooksFile !== paths.hooksFile || state.helperDir !== paths.helperDir) return true;
+	const digest = (file: string): string | null => {
+		try {
+			return crypto.createHash("sha256").update(fs.readFileSync(file)).digest("hex");
+		} catch {
+			return null;
+		}
+	};
+	if (typeof state.hooksSha256 !== "string" || digest(paths.hooksFile) !== state.hooksSha256) return true;
+	const members = state.helperFiles;
+	if (!Array.isArray(members)) return true;
+	// Exactly the closure the installer publishes: a short inventory would leave a member
+	// nothing compares, which is the same hole as not checking digests at all.
+	const named = members.map((raw) => (raw as Record<string, unknown>)?.path);
+	const expected = [
+		"codex-birth-launch.sh",
+		"meta-bridge-hook-codex.ts",
+		"lib/meta-session.ts",
+		"lib/native-push/codex-ws-client.ts",
+		"lib/session-id.js",
+		"entwurf-capabilities.json",
+	];
+	if (named.length !== expected.length) return true;
+	if (expected.some((name) => !named.includes(name))) return true;
+	if (named.some((name, index) => named.indexOf(name) !== index)) return true;
+	for (const raw of members) {
+		const member = raw as Record<string, unknown>;
+		const rel = member.path;
+		if (typeof rel !== "string" || rel.length === 0 || rel.startsWith("/") || rel.split("/").includes("..")) {
+			return true;
+		}
+		if (typeof member.sha256 !== "string" || digest(path.join(paths.helperDir, rel)) !== member.sha256) return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+function birthMissing(paths: CodexUnitPaths, expectedUid: number): boolean {
+	const launcher = path.join(paths.helperDir, "codex-birth-launch.sh");
+	const directories = [
+		path.dirname(paths.hooksFile),
+		paths.helperDir,
+		path.join(paths.helperDir, "lib"),
+		path.join(paths.helperDir, "lib", "native-push"),
+	];
+	if (directories.some((dir) => !isSafeOwnedDir(dir, expectedUid))) return true;
+	if (!isSafeOwnedFile(paths.hooksFile, expectedUid)) return true;
+	const closure = [
+		[launcher, true],
+		[path.join(paths.helperDir, "meta-bridge-hook-codex.ts"), false],
+		[path.join(paths.helperDir, "lib", "meta-session.ts"), false],
+		[path.join(paths.helperDir, "lib", "native-push", "codex-ws-client.ts"), false],
+		[path.join(paths.helperDir, "lib", "session-id.js"), false],
+		[path.join(paths.helperDir, "entwurf-capabilities.json"), false],
+	] as const;
+	if (closure.some(([file, executable]) => !isSafeOwnedFile(file, expectedUid, executable))) return true;
+	try {
+		const parsed = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(paths.hooksFile, "utf8")) as Record<string, unknown>;
+		const events = (parsed.hooks as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)?.SessionStart;
+		if (!Array.isArray(events) || events.length !== 1) return true;
+		const group = events[0] as Record<string, unknown>;
+		if ("matcher" in group || !Array.isArray(group.hooks) || group.hooks.length !== 1) return true;
+		const hook = group.hooks[0] as Record<string, unknown>;
+		if (Object.keys(hook).sort().join(",") !== "command,timeout,type") return true;
+		if (hook.type !== "command" || hook.command !== `'${launcher}'` || hook.timeout !== 30) return true;
+	} catch {
+		return true;
+	}
+	return closureDriftedFromState(paths, expectedUid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * The vendor's own receipt for THIS declaration, read and never written. The key the vendor
+ * writes is `<declaration path>:<event>:<group>:<handler>`; the value must be a
+ * `trusted_hash` of the shape `sha256:<64 hex>`. What this asserts is that a receipt EXISTS
+ * for our declaration identity — never that the hash is correct, which only the vendor can
+ * say, and never by launching Codex to find out.
+ */
+function trustReceiptMissing(config: Record<string, unknown>, hooksFile: string): boolean {
+	const hooks = config.hooks;
+	if (hooks == null || typeof hooks !== "object" || Array.isArray(hooks)) return true;
+	const state = (hooks as Record<string, unknown>).state;
+	if (state == null || typeof state !== "object" || Array.isArray(state)) return true;
+	const entry = (state as Record<string, unknown>)[`${hooksFile}:session_start:0:0`];
+	if (entry == null || typeof entry !== "object" || Array.isArray(entry)) return true;
+	const digest = (entry as Record<string, unknown>).trusted_hash;
+	return typeof digest !== "string" || !/^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(digest);
+}
+
+function readConfig(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): Record<string, unknown> | null {
+	try {
+		const text = fs.readFileSync(
+			path.join(env.CODEX_HOME?.trim() || path.join(env.HOME ?? "", ".codex"), "config.toml"),
+			"utf8",
+		);
+		const value = parse(text);
+		return value && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value) ? (value as Record<string, unknown>) : null;
+	} catch {
+		return null;
+	}
+}
+
+function mcpMissing(config: Record<string, unknown>): boolean {
+	const servers = config.mcp_servers;
+	if (servers == null || typeof servers !== "object" || Array.isArray(servers)) return true;
+	const entry = (servers as Record<string, unknown>)["entwurf-bridge"];
+	if (entry == null || typeof entry !== "object" || Array.isArray(entry)) return true;
+	const server = entry as Record<string, unknown>;
+	if (Object.keys(server).sort().join(",") !== "command,env,env_vars") return true;
+	const envVars = server.env_vars;
+	if (
+		!Array.isArray(envVars) ||
+		envVars.length !== CODEX_MCP_ENV_VARS.length ||
+		envVars.some((name, index) => name !== CODEX_MCP_ENV_VARS[index])
+	)
+		return true;
+	const env = server.env;
+	if (env == null || typeof env !== "object" || Array.isArray(env)) return true;
+	const serverEnv = env as Record<string, unknown>;
+	return (
+		server.command !== "entwurf-bridge" ||
+		Object.keys(serverEnv).join(",") !== "ENTWURF_BRIDGE_NATIVE_HOST" ||
+		serverEnv.ENTWURF_BRIDGE_NATIVE_HOST !== "codex"
+	);
+}
+
+function visibleIdentityMissing(config: Record<string, unknown>): boolean {
+	const tui = config.tui;
+	if (tui == null || typeof tui !== "object" || Array.isArray(tui)) return true;
+	const statusLine = (tui as Record<string, unknown>).status_line;
+	return !Array.isArray(statusLine) || !statusLine.includes("thread-title");
+}
+
+/** `[tui].terminal_title` membership, the exact axis `entwurf doctor-codex-terminal-title`
+ * judges. Same shape as `visibleIdentityMissing` and a DIFFERENT key: `status_line` is what a
+ * human reads inside the TUI, `terminal_title` is what the multiplexer reports back as
+ * `#{pane_title}`. Neither substitutes for the other. */
+function callerTitleMissing(config: Record<string, unknown>): boolean {
+	const tui = config.tui;
+	if (tui == null || typeof tui !== "object" || Array.isArray(tui)) return true;
+	const terminalTitle = (tui as Record<string, unknown>).terminal_title;
+	return !Array.isArray(terminalTitle) || !terminalTitle.includes("thread-id");
+}
+
+/**
+ * The CALLER-side capability, pre-mutation and synchronous.
+ *
+ * Synchronous because it reads one config file and nothing else: there is no app-server axis
+ * here and there must not be one — whether the operator's app-server is up says nothing about
+ * whether a caller's pane can be found, and asking would make a placement check fail for a
+ * delivery reason.
+ *
+ * Call it only when the anchor will actually be USED — a codex caller that named an explicit
+ * `placement` never consults the title, so refusing it for a missing `thread-id` would be a
+ * refusal for an unused capability.
+ */
+export function codexCallerFreshPreflight(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): CodexCallerPreflightRejectReason | null {
+	const config = readConfig(env);
+	if (config === null || callerTitleMissing(config)) return "codex-caller-title-missing";
+	return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The launch directory's own capability, pre-mutation and synchronous — and DELIBERATELY NARROWER
+ * than the vendor's own decision, because the leaf that decides here reads one TOML file while the
+ * vendor asks its app-server. Read this whole comment as the scope statement it is: what follows
+ * says what this answers, and then says what it refuses to claim.
+ *
+ * WHY THE AXIS EXISTS. `[source rust-v0.153.4]` a fresh call always passes `--remote`, so the TUI
+ * resolves `AppServerTarget::Remote` and startup ALWAYS runs `check_directory_trust` on the `-C`
+ * value (`tui/src/lib.rs:1699-1725`). Nothing on that path consults the approval or sandbox policy
+ * (`tui/src/onboarding/directory_trust.rs:33-130`), which is why the
+ * `--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox` token this argv already carries does NOT cover it:
+ * approvals and folder consent are two different gates. A directory with no recorded decision
+ * renders the consent screen and blocks, and a blocked TUI has started no turn — no rollout, no
+ * birth, no callback, and the caller waits out its whole timeout on a window that is merely
+ * waiting to be answered. `[측정 2026-09-16]` the two release-gate runs that failed launched in
+ * `…-2zznHl` and `…-kSsoAn`, neither of which had an entry; the two that passed launched in
+ * `…-db65N2` and `…-pBXxOJ`, both of which did. Unattended, the failure is silent.
+ *
+ * THE THREE VENDOR OUTCOMES THIS LEAF MODELS, in the vendor's own order
+ * (`tui/src/config_update.rs:290-371`, `ProjectTrustHost::Remote`):
+ *
+ *   1. A DIRECT decision on the exact cwd starts a turn, and BOTH recorded answers do. `trusted`
+ *      returns before any screen (`:346-354`); a saved `untrusted` is explicitly skipped for a
+ *      remote target — `if target.uses_remote_workspace() && trust_level == Some(Untrusted) {
+ *      continue; }` (`onboarding/directory_trust.rs:94-96`), and `uses_remote_workspace()` is
+ *      exactly `matches!(self, Self::Remote { .. })` (`tui/src/lib.rs:307-309`). Refusing a
+ *      deliberate `untrusted` would be entwurf inventing a policy the vendor does not have.
+ *      The key is the exact cwd — `cwd_keys = vec![cwd_key]` (`:290-296`), no root marker, no git
+ *      root, no parent, all three of which exist only on the Local host. `[측정 2026-09-16]`
+ *      `~/.codex/config.toml` carried a trusted `/tmp` and still recorded two separate
+ *      `/tmp/entwurf-codex-fresh-live-*` entries, one per run a human answered.
+ *   2. With NO direct decision, an enabled PROJECT LAYER consents on the directory's behalf
+ *      (`trust_level.is_none() && disabled_project.is_none() && project_layers.any(no
+ *      disabledReason)` → `Ok(None)`, `:346-354`). Those layers come from the app-server's
+ *      `ConfigRead { include_layers: true }` answer, which this leaf does not have. A layer that
+ *      is present but DISABLED is a fourth outcome — the vendor preserves an unknown or untrusted
+ *      project layer as disabled rather than dropping it, and that path falls through to the
+ *      screen — and this leaf cannot tell the two apart either. So wherever a layer could exist at
+ *      all it answers `null`, which folds both outcomes into "proceed".
+ *   3. With no direct decision and NO layers, a cwd inside an explicitly `untrusted` ancestor is
+ *      not a consent screen at all: the remote branch returns an ERROR
+ *      (`"remote project directory is inside an explicitly untrusted project; pass the repository
+ *      root explicitly with --cd"`, `:357-371`). That is a different failure with a different
+ *      repair, so it gets its own reason — answering `Trust` at the child would only reproduce the
+ *      same vendor error. Note the vendor's own precondition there is `project_layers.is_empty()`,
+ *      which is why this reason is only reachable after step 2 has found no layer anywhere.
+ *
+ * WHAT THIS LEAF IS FOR, AND WHAT IT IS NOT. It is NOT equivalent to the vendor's judgment and
+ * must not be described as asking "the same question": it reads the operator's own `config.toml`,
+ * while the vendor reads an EFFECTIVE config — system, managed and cloud layers merged around that
+ * user layer (`config/src/loader/mod.rs:258-290`, `:430-460`) — through its app-server.
+ *
+ * That gap is affordable because NOTHING HERE REFUSES A LAUNCH. `freshCall` prints what this leaf
+ * saw and opens the window anyway: the consent screen is self-repairing when a human is there, and
+ * one answer teaches the vendor the directory for good. The one caller that treats the answer as a
+ * precondition is `smoke-codex-fresh-live`, where nobody is at the keyboard and a named
+ * precondition is worth more than a callback timeout — that gate owns one directory, answered
+ * once.
+ *
+ * So read a non-null answer as "the vendor will probably stop here, and this is the repair", never
+ * as a verdict. Absence is not evidence either way, and every case this leaf cannot see resolves
+ * to `null`.
+ */
+export function codexLaunchCwdFreshPreflight(
+	env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,
+	launchCwd: string,
+): CodexLaunchCwdPreflightRejectReason | null {
+	// THREE NON-ANSWERS, AND EVERY ONE OF THEM PROCEEDS. Each is a case where this leaf holds no
+	// evidence about what the vendor will do, and a refusal without evidence is exactly the false
+	// refusal this axis promises not to produce:
+	//
+	//   - A RELATIVE directory. It cannot match a stored key here, but the vendor does not give up
+	//     on one — it asks its app-server for a cwd and joins (`config_update.rs:203-224`), so the
+	//     joined path may well be answered. In production this branch is unreachable anyway: the
+	//     shared cwd leaf already refuses a non-absolute request as `cwd-not-absolute`, which is a
+	//     better reason than anything this axis could give.
+	//   - NO READABLE USER CONFIG. A missing `config.toml` is not "no decisions": the vendor loads
+	//     an empty user table and merges system, managed and cloud layers around it
+	//     (`config/src/loader/mod.rs:258-290`, `:430-460`, `:520-610`), any of which can carry the
+	//     decision or the layer that starts the turn.
+	//   - NO `projects` TABLE. Same reason: it says the USER layer records nothing, not that the
+	//     effective config does.
+	if (!path.isAbsolute(launchCwd)) return null;
+	const config = readConfig(env);
+	if (config === null) return null;
+	const projects = config.projects;
+	if (projects == null || typeof projects !== "object" || Array.isArray(projects)) {
+		return null;
+	}
+	const table = projects as Record<string, unknown>;
+	const levelOf = (key: string): string | null => {
+		const entry = table[key];
+		if (entry == null || typeof entry !== "object" || Array.isArray(entry)) return null;
+		const level = (entry as Record<string, unknown>).trust_level;
+		// An unrecognised value leaves `trust_level` as `None` on the vendor side too, and `None`
+		// with no project layer is precisely the case that renders the screen.
+		return level === "trusted" || level === "untrusted" ? level : null;
+	};
+	// Outcome 1: a direct decision, either answer.
+	if (levelOf(launchCwd) !== null) return null;
+	// Outcome 2: a PROJECT LAYER may consent with no entry at all, and this leaf cannot enumerate
+	// layers — they come from the app-server's `ConfigRead { include_layers: true }` answer. What
+	// it CAN decide is the negative: a `.codex` anywhere from the directory upward is the only
+	// place such a layer comes from, so when none exists the vendor's `project_layers` really is
+	// empty and the two remaining outcomes below are computable. Where one could exist, answer
+	// `null`.
+	//
+	// EXISTENCE, not ownership, and the weaker predicate is the load-bearing one. The vendor
+	// admits a layer on its own terms — an unknown or untrusted one is preserved as a DISABLED
+	// layer, not dropped — and none of that consults owner/mode/symlink safety. Asking for a
+	// safely-owned directory here would let a layer the vendor sees go unseen by this leaf, which
+	// would then synthesise an `untrusted-ancestor` refusal for a launch the vendor was going to
+	// run. That is the false refusal this axis must never produce, so the check is the widest
+	// thing that still means "a layer could live here".
+	//
+	// The operator's own CODEX HOME is excluded, and excluding it is what keeps this axis from
+	// being a no-op: `~/.codex` is an ancestor of nearly every directory anyone launches a sibling
+	// in, and it is the USER config root rather than a project layer — the vendor names those
+	// apart (`layer.name.dotCodexFolder` for a project, the home for the user layer). Counting it
+	// would answer `null` for every path under `$HOME` and the check would never fire in real use.
+	const codexHome = path.resolve(env.CODEX_HOME?.trim() || path.join(env.HOME ?? "", ".codex"));
+	for (let dir = launchCwd; ; ) {
+		const candidate = path.join(dir, ".codex");
+		if (candidate !== codexHome && fs.existsSync(candidate)) return null;
+		const parent = path.dirname(dir);
+		if (parent === dir) break;
+		dir = parent;
+	}
+	// Outcome 3: no layer anywhere and an explicitly untrusted ancestor — the vendor's own
+	// precondition for that branch is exactly `project_layers.is_empty()`, which the loop above
+	// has now established. It is reported as its own failure because its repair is to launch at
+	// that root, never to answer a prompt at the child.
+	//
+	// The MATCH IS NOT THE VENDOR'S and is not claimed to be. The vendor compares path URIs
+	// (`LegacyAppPathString` → `PathUri::starts_with`, segment-aware, fail-closed on encoded
+	// separators); this compares plain strings on a separator boundary. Where the two could
+	// disagree — a key or a cwd that is not a plain POSIX path — this answers `undecided` rather
+	// than `untrusted-ancestor`. Be exact about what that buys: BOTH are refusals, so this is NOT
+	// the launch-permissive direction. What it weakens is the SPECIFIC-ERROR claim — the ancestor
+	// reason names another directory as the repair, and naming the wrong one is worse than saying
+	// "no decision here". Neither vendor outcome on this branch starts a turn, so the guarantee
+	// above is untouched either way.
+	const plainPosixPath = (value: string): boolean =>
+		!value.includes("%") && !value.includes("\\") && !value.split("/").some((seg) => seg === "." || seg === "..");
+	if (plainPosixPath(launchCwd)) {
+		for (const key of Object.keys(table)) {
+			if (levelOf(key) !== "untrusted" || !plainPosixPath(key)) continue;
+			if (launchCwd === key || launchCwd.startsWith(key.endsWith("/") ? key : `${key}/`)) {
+				return "codex-launch-cwd-untrusted-ancestor";
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return "codex-launch-cwd-undecided";
+}
+
+const DEFAULT_APP_SERVER_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;
+
+function withTimeout<T>(promise: Promise<T>, timeoutMs: number): Promise<T> {
+	return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+		const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error("codex app-server exchange timed out")), timeoutMs);
+		promise.then(
+			(value) => {
+				clearTimeout(timer);
+				resolve(value);
+			},
+			(error) => {
+				clearTimeout(timer);
+				reject(error);
+			},
+		);
+	});
+}
+
+/**
+ * A bounded real initialize/liveness exchange over the app-server's own JSON-RPC. The inode
+ * check above only proves a socket FILE with the right owner and mode exists — a dead
+ * app-server's stale socket a new process has not reclaimed yet passes that check identically
+ * to a live one. Only a real connection plus a real `initialize` round trip distinguishes them.
+ * Any failure — refused/hung connection, a response that never lands within the bound, or a
+ * reply the transport itself rejects — answers identically: not live. This is deliberately not
+ * `probeCodexThread`: preflight asks "is the app-server there to talk to", never "is a specific
+ * thread loaded", so it carries no thread id and no retry/backoff policy.
+ */
+async function appServerIsLive(
+	socketPath: string,
+	openProtocol: CodexProtocolOpener,
+	timeoutMs: number,
+): Promise<boolean> {
+	let protocol: CodexRpcProtocol;
+	const opening = openProtocol.open(socketPath);
+	try {
+		protocol = await withTimeout(opening, timeoutMs);
+	} catch {
+		// The bound expired (or the connect failed), but a slow open can still LAND afterwards.
+		// Nothing else holds that handle, so a late success would leave a live connection to the
+		// operator's app-server open for the rest of this process. Close it when it arrives —
+		// the answer stays "not live" either way; this only refuses to leak.
+		void opening.then(
+			(late) => {
+				try {
+					late.close();
+				} catch {
+					// best-effort: the socket may already be gone.
+				}
+			},
+			() => {
+				// The open failed; there is nothing to close.
+			},
+		);
+		return false;
+	}
+	try {
+		await withTimeout(
+			protocol.request("initialize", {
+				clientInfo: { name: "entwurf-fresh-preflight", title: "entwurf-fresh-preflight", version: "0" },
+				capabilities: { experimentalApi: true, requestAttestation: false },
+			}),
+			timeoutMs,
+		);
+		return true;
+	} catch {
+		return false;
+	} finally {
+		try {
+			protocol.close();
+		} catch {
+			// best-effort: the socket may already be gone.
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Async because the app-server axis now performs a real bounded protocol exchange, not just an
+ * inode check (see `appServerIsLive`). Every other axis stays synchronous filesystem/config
+ * work; only the last `await` point can suspend.
+ */
+export async function codexFreshPreflight(
+	env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,
+	deps: CodexPreflightDeps = {},
+): Promise<CodexPreflightRejectReason | null> {
+	const paths = deps.unitPathsOverride ?? unitPaths(env);
+	// A relative root would make the declaration's launcher path — the very string the vendor
+	// keys its trust receipt to — depend on this process's cwd.
+	if (!path.isAbsolute(paths.hooksFile) || !path.isAbsolute(paths.helperDir) || !path.isAbsolute(paths.stateFile)) {
+		return "codex-birth-unit-missing";
+	}
+	if (birthMissing(paths, deps.operatorUid ?? process.getuid?.() ?? -1)) {
+		return "codex-birth-unit-missing";
+	}
+	const config = readConfig(env);
+	// The vendor receipt is a SEPARATE reject from our bytes: perfect bytes the vendor will
+	// not run and absent bytes are two different repairs, and folding them would send the
+	// operator to the installer for something only they can answer in their own Codex.
+	if (config === null || trustReceiptMissing(config, paths.hooksFile)) return "codex-birth-trust-missing";
+	if (mcpMissing(config)) return "codex-mcp-hand-missing";
+	if (visibleIdentityMissing(config)) return "codex-visible-identity-missing";
+	const socketPath = resolveCodexDefaultSocketPath(env);
+	const socket = (deps.checkSocket ?? checkCodexSocketFile)(socketPath);
+	if (!socket.ok) return "codex-app-server-unavailable";
+	const live = await appServerIsLive(
+		socketPath,
+		deps.openProtocol ?? realCodexProtocolOpener,
+		deps.appServerTimeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_APP_SERVER_TIMEOUT_MS,
+	);
+	return live ? null : "codex-app-server-unavailable";
+}

package/pi-extensions/lib/compaction-send-guard.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/**
+ * compaction-send-guard — whether a control-socket `send` may call `pi.sendMessage`.
+ *
+ * Pi 0.85.1 has no public `ExtensionContext.isCompacting()`. Compaction is non-idle
+ * (`AgentSession.isIdle` = no agent run AND not compacting) but `sendCustomMessage`
+ * does not refuse it. A non-streaming `triggerTurn:true` send starts `_runAgentPrompt`
+ * while `compact()` is rewriting the session tree — the field path that can make
+ * compaction "풀린다" and still return `delivered:true` (#111).
+ *
+ * Public facts the resident can see, without reaching into `AgentSession`:
+ *   - `ctx.isIdle()`
+ *   - `ctx.signal` — `agent.activeRun?.abortController.signal`, undefined when
+ *     there is no low-level agent run. This is NOT `AgentSession.isStreaming`
+ *     (`_isAgentRunActive`). After `agent.prompt()` returns, `_handlePostAgentRun`
+ *     retry / auto-compaction / continuation keeps `_isAgentRunActive=true` while
+ *     `ctx.signal` is already undefined.
+ *   - `session_before_compact` / `session_compact` / `session_compact_failed`
+ *
+ * Terminal semantics, read from installed `agent-session.js`:
+ *   - `session_before_compact` fires AFTER the abort controller is set (manual
+ *     compact then awaits summarization auth — a real start-race window).
+ *   - `session_compact` is NOT guaranteed (only if the saved compaction entry is
+ *     found by summary-text match).
+ *   - `session_compact_failed` fires on cancel / abort / fail.
+ *   - `isIdle()` becoming true is the honest recovery for a missed success event.
+ *
+ * Auto-compaction can run inside `_handlePostAgentRun` while `_isAgentRunActive`
+ * stays true, so only the event flag can name that window `compacting`.
+ *
+ * Quiet unknown (`!idle && !hasAgentSignal && !armed`) is fail-closed as `busy`,
+ * not `compacting`: the public pair cannot tell manual-compact start race from
+ * branch summary, post-run retry, or continuation. Calling those `compacting`
+ * is a false claim. The start-race guarantee is still "do not call sendMessage".
+ *
+ * The predicate takes no send mode. Every mode is refused the same way.
+ */
+
+export const COMPACTION_SEND_REJECT = "compacting" as const;
+export const BUSY_SEND_REJECT = "busy" as const;
+export type CompactionSendReject = typeof COMPACTION_SEND_REJECT | typeof BUSY_SEND_REJECT;
+
+export type CompactionGuard = {
+	/** Armed by `session_before_compact`; disarmed by either terminal event or idle recovery. */
+	armed: boolean;
+};
+
+export type CompactionSendFacts = {
+	idle: boolean;
+	/** `ctx.signal !== undefined`. Not `AgentSession.isStreaming`. */
+	hasAgentSignal: boolean;
+};
+
+export function createCompactionGuard(): CompactionGuard {
+	return { armed: false };
+}
+
+export function noteCompactionBefore(guard: CompactionGuard): void {
+	guard.armed = true;
+}
+
+export function noteCompactionTerminal(guard: CompactionGuard): void {
+	guard.armed = false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * `null` = admit (caller may `pi.sendMessage`).
+ * `"compacting"` = event-armed compaction; `"busy"` = quiet unknown non-idle.
+ * Either way: do not call `pi.sendMessage`; do not emit `delivered:true`.
+ */
+export function compactionSendReject(guard: CompactionGuard, facts: CompactionSendFacts): CompactionSendReject | null {
+	if (facts.idle) {
+		// Idle means Pi is neither in an agent run nor compacting. Also recovers a
+		// missed `session_compact` so a later ordinary stream is not stuck refused.
+		guard.armed = false;
+		return null;
+	}
+	if (guard.armed) return COMPACTION_SEND_REJECT;
+	if (!facts.hasAgentSignal) return BUSY_SEND_REJECT;
+	return null; // live agent run — steer/followUp unchanged
+}