@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.853 → 0.28.854

package/dist/{chunk-6BA2US4B.js → chunk-FHOLG6VL.js}

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import {
   parseEnvIntegrations,
   shellQuote,
   summarizeUnanswerablePane
-} from "./chunk-XCAI3GSF.js";
+} from "./chunk-2E2NKILK.js";
 import {
   BIND_FAILURE_QUARANTINE_THRESHOLD,
   INTEGRATIONS_SECTION_END,
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ import {
   sessionTranscriptDir,
   worseConnectivityOutcome,
   wrapScheduledTaskPrompt
-} from "./chunk-WUXQVP7A.js";
+} from "./chunk-4Z4GFQAD.js";
 import {
   parsePsRows
 } from "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
@@ -6566,7 +6566,7 @@ function exchangeFailureKind(err) {
 }
 
 // src/lib/api-client.ts
-var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.853" : "dev";
+var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.854" : "dev";
 var lastConfigHash = null;
 function setConfigHash(hash) {
   lastConfigHash = hash && hash.length > 0 ? hash : null;
@@ -10924,4 +10924,4 @@ export {
   managerInstallSystemUnitCommand,
   managerUninstallSystemUnitCommand
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-6BA2US4B.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-FHOLG6VL.js.map

package/dist/{claude-pair-runtime-CJXQTVSC.js → claude-pair-runtime-63TA3LT5.js}

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ async function spawnPairSession(session) {
     return { ok: true };
   } catch {
   }
-  const { resolveClaudeBinary } = await import("./persistent-session-YGK7YHPR.js");
+  const { resolveClaudeBinary } = await import("./persistent-session-N4DJ4VXZ.js");
   const claudeBin = resolveClaudeBinary();
   const pairEnv = {
     ...process.env,
@@ -373,4 +373,4 @@ export {
   startClaudePair,
   submitClaudePairCode
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=claude-pair-runtime-CJXQTVSC.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=claude-pair-runtime-63TA3LT5.js.map

package/dist/lib/manager-worker.js

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ import {
   safeWriteJsonAtomic,
   setConfigHash,
   tripClass
-} from "../chunk-6BA2US4B.js";
+} from "../chunk-FHOLG6VL.js";
 import {
   getProjectDir as getProjectDir2,
   getReadyTasks,
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ import {
   takeZombieDetection,
   toOpencodeModel,
   writeEgressAllowlist
-} from "../chunk-XCAI3GSF.js";
+} from "../chunk-2E2NKILK.js";
 import {
   ACCOUNT_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_FILENAME,
   AnchorSessionClient,
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ import {
   subagentActivityAgeSeconds,
   sumTranscriptUsageInWindow,
   transcriptActivityAgeSeconds
-} from "../chunk-WUXQVP7A.js";
+} from "../chunk-4Z4GFQAD.js";
 import {
   reapOrphanChannelMcps
 } from "../chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
@@ -13000,7 +13000,7 @@ var pendingDayRolloverReset = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
 var dayRolloverInboundHold = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 var INBOUND_HOLD_EPISODE_GAP_MS = 12e4;
 async function channelInboundActivityAgeSecondsFor(codeName) {
-  const { newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-NGWO3JK3.js");
+  const { newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-GYE5MIVB.js");
   const newest = newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs(dirname11(paneLogPath(codeName)));
   if (newest === null) return null;
   return Math.max(0, Math.floor((Date.now() - newest) / 1e3));
@@ -13668,7 +13668,7 @@ var agentRestartTimezoneInputs = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 var lastVersionCheckAt = 0;
 var VERSION_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1e3;
 var lastResponsivenessProbeAt = 0;
-var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.853" : "dev";
+var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.854" : "dev";
 function resolveBrewPath(execFileSync2) {
   try {
     const out = execFileSync2("which", ["brew"], { timeout: 5e3 }).toString().trim();
@@ -15258,7 +15258,7 @@ function flushRestartedAgentDiagnostics(hostId, codeNames) {
   if (codeNames.length === 0) return;
   void (async () => {
     try {
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-YGK7YHPR.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-N4DJ4VXZ.js");
       await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
         host_id: hostId,
         agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics(codeNames, quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor)
@@ -15400,7 +15400,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
     }
     try {
       const { detectHostSecurity } = await import("../host-security-6PDFG7F5.js");
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-YGK7YHPR.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-N4DJ4VXZ.js");
       const diagCodeNames = [...agentState.persistentSessionAgents];
       const agentDiagnostics = diagCodeNames.length > 0 ? collectDiagnostics(diagCodeNames, quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor) : void 0;
       let tailscaleHostname;
@@ -15569,7 +15569,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
         collectPanelessActivityProbes,
         getResponsivenessIntervalMs,
         occupancyQualificationClassifications
-      } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-NGWO3JK3.js");
+      } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-GYE5MIVB.js");
       const probeIntervalMs = getResponsivenessIntervalMs();
       if (now - lastResponsivenessProbeAt > probeIntervalMs) {
         const probeCodeNames = [...agentState.persistentSessionAgents];
@@ -15686,7 +15686,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
           collectResponsivenessProbes,
           livePendingInboundOldestAgeSeconds,
           parkPendingInbound
-        } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-NGWO3JK3.js");
+        } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-GYE5MIVB.js");
         const { getProjectDir: wedgeProjectDir } = await import("../scheduler-engine-NDP36U7O.js");
         const wedgeNow = /* @__PURE__ */ new Date();
         const liveAgents = agentState.persistentSessionAgents;
@@ -15842,7 +15842,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
     }
     try {
       const { scrapeMcpFailedBannerCount } = await import("../pane-mcp-banner-scraper-JA437JIB.js");
-      const { probeSessionAuth } = await import("../session-auth-dead-4UZR5655.js");
+      const { probeSessionAuth } = await import("../session-auth-dead-K6B6D3WR.js");
       const observations = [];
       const pendingCacheCommits = [];
       const modelApiErrorReportingOn = hostFlagStore().getBoolean("model-api-error-reporting");
@@ -20055,7 +20055,7 @@ async function handleRestartDoorbell(agentId, requestedAt, restartReason) {
       try {
         const freshId = rotateSessionForWedge(codeName);
         consecutiveWedgeCycles.delete(codeName);
-        const { parkPendingInbound: parkForRestart } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-NGWO3JK3.js");
+        const { parkPendingInbound: parkForRestart } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-GYE5MIVB.js");
         const { parked, deadLettered } = parkForRestart(codeName, /* @__PURE__ */ new Date());
         const parkNote = parked > 0 ? `, ${parked} inbound parked` : "";
         const deadNote = deadLettered > 0 ? `, ${deadLettered} undeliverable dead-lettered` : "";
@@ -20093,7 +20093,7 @@ async function handleRestartDoorbell(agentId, requestedAt, restartReason) {
     void api.post("/host/restart-ack", { host_id: hostId, agent_id: agentId, restart_requested_at: requestedAt }).catch((err) => log(`[restart-lane] ack failed for '${codeName}': ${err.message}`));
     void (async () => {
       try {
-        const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-YGK7YHPR.js");
+        const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-N4DJ4VXZ.js");
         await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
           host_id: hostId,
           agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics([codeName], quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor)
@@ -20139,7 +20139,7 @@ async function respawnAgentAfterMcpStop(codeName, reason) {
     }
     try {
       const hostId = await getHostId();
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-YGK7YHPR.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-N4DJ4VXZ.js");
       await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
         host_id: hostId,
         agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics([codeName], quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor)
@@ -20775,7 +20775,7 @@ async function processClaudePairSessions(agents) {
     killPairSession,
     pairTmuxSession,
     finalizeClaudePairOnboarding
-  } = await import("../claude-pair-runtime-CJXQTVSC.js");
+  } = await import("../claude-pair-runtime-63TA3LT5.js");
   for (const pairId of pendingResp.cancelled_pair_ids ?? []) {
     log(`[claude-pair] sweeping orphan tmux session for pair ${pairId.slice(0, 8)}`);
     const killed = await killPairSession(pairTmuxSession(pairId));

package/dist/mcp/direct-chat-channel.js

@@ -31462,6 +31462,110 @@ var HOURLY_BY_REGION = {
 };
 var KNOWN_PRICING_REGIONS = Object.keys(HOURLY_BY_REGION);
 
+// ../core/dist/guardrails/enforcer-registry.js
+var GUARDRAIL_ENFORCERS = [
+  // ---- Enforced: this definition has its own enforcement point -------------
+  {
+    id: "email.domain_restrict",
+    mechanism: "enforced",
+    stage: "live",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "enforceEmailDomainGuard runs at the top of both agent-egress paths; internal_only with zero verified domains takes an explicit AUDITED no-op branch rather than failing open silently."
+  },
+  {
+    // MEASURED, and it corrects a claim ADR-0080 makes about this definition.
+    //
+    // The ADR reports calendar as `enforced` + `stage: 'shadow'`, blocked by
+    // ENG-5868 (caller identity is not threaded to `callIntegrationTool`). Read
+    // literally that says an org cannot get redaction today, and that is not
+    // what the code does. `decideCalendarRedactionMode` (calendar-policy.ts) is
+    // FAIL-CLOSED: with the caller unresolvable it returns `redact`, not
+    // pass-through. `redactCalendarToolResponseIfNeeded` then calls
+    // `applyRedactionToResponse` for every response whenever `config.stage` is
+    // `enforce`. So an org that sets the stage gets real redaction — ENG-5868
+    // costs the control its PRECISION (it cannot spare the principal), not its
+    // ability to act.
+    //
+    // The stage is therefore per-ORG configuration, which ADR-0080 decision 1
+    // is explicit is the effectiveness axis the static union deliberately does
+    // not carry. `effectiveCalendarEnforcement` in the CLAUDE.md renderer owns
+    // it, and since ENG-10104 caps `enforce` to `warn` whenever the org's stage
+    // is not `enforce`.
+    id: "calendar.confidentiality",
+    mechanism: "enforced",
+    stage: "live",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/calendar-confidentiality-guard.ts",
+    effect: "at config.stage=enforce, redacts summary/description/attendees/location out of calendar read responses; at shadow/warn it writes a would_redact audit row and returns the response unchanged."
+  },
+  // ---- Delegated: read by another definition's enforcement point -----------
+  //
+  // Both can block, because their owner's point is live — which is the question
+  // `guardrailCanBlock` asks and the right answer to it. It is NOT the whole
+  // story for these two, and the gap has its own ticket: the org's email guard
+  // STAGE is threaded into the prompt shape for `email.domain_restrict`'s id
+  // alone (`host-runtime.ts`, the ENG-7829 fix), so a row of either id stored at
+  // `enforce` on a shadow-stage org still renders under "must comply" with
+  // nothing capping it. That is the effectiveness axis, not the mechanism one —
+  // ENG-10110.
+  {
+    id: "email.require_approval",
+    mechanism: "delegated",
+    ownedBy: "email.domain_restrict",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "routes a send to an approver instead of letting it leave."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "email.mail_rules",
+    mechanism: "delegated",
+    ownedBy: "email.domain_restrict",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "gates mail-rule creation/modification on the same egress path."
+  },
+  // ---- Advisory: seeded, applied, rendered — and read by nothing -----------
+  //
+  // These are NOT dead config. They are presented to operators in the console
+  // and to agents in CLAUDE.md, three of them under a heading that promises the
+  // violation is blocked. Listed individually rather than as a wildcard so that
+  // fixing one is a one-line diff from `advisory` to `enforced`.
+  //
+  // The ticket is ENG-9800, not ENG-9874. ENG-9874 catalogued these and is
+  // closed; a closed ticket tracks nothing, which is the same shrug an absent
+  // one would be. ENG-9800 is the open sweep that owns making them real.
+  {
+    id: "require-approval-for-actions",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: `Rendered to agents as "violation blocks the action". Nothing reads it. The ENG-8562 incident is this guardrail's promise, unkept.`
+  },
+  {
+    id: "data.pii_access",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: "Rendered as Enforced with block_export semantics; no export path consults it."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "data.credential_access",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: "Rendered as Enforced with block_read/block_write; no credential path consults it."
+  },
+  { id: "comm.social_posting", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "compliance.audit_all", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "no-external-network", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "no-pii-in-output", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "restrict-file-access", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "schedule.operating_hours", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "spend.hourly_limit", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.allow_list", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.block_list", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.financial_txn", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "working-hours-only", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" }
+];
+var BY_ID = new Map(GUARDRAIL_ENFORCERS.map((e) => [e.id, e]));
+
 // ../core/dist/provisioning/frameworks/claudecode/agent-rules.js
 var MAX_AGENT_RULES = 8;
 var MAX_AGENT_RULE_CHARS = 200;

package/dist/mcp/index.js

@@ -24011,6 +24011,110 @@ var HOURLY_BY_REGION = {
 };
 var KNOWN_PRICING_REGIONS = Object.keys(HOURLY_BY_REGION);
 
+// ../core/dist/guardrails/enforcer-registry.js
+var GUARDRAIL_ENFORCERS = [
+  // ---- Enforced: this definition has its own enforcement point -------------
+  {
+    id: "email.domain_restrict",
+    mechanism: "enforced",
+    stage: "live",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "enforceEmailDomainGuard runs at the top of both agent-egress paths; internal_only with zero verified domains takes an explicit AUDITED no-op branch rather than failing open silently."
+  },
+  {
+    // MEASURED, and it corrects a claim ADR-0080 makes about this definition.
+    //
+    // The ADR reports calendar as `enforced` + `stage: 'shadow'`, blocked by
+    // ENG-5868 (caller identity is not threaded to `callIntegrationTool`). Read
+    // literally that says an org cannot get redaction today, and that is not
+    // what the code does. `decideCalendarRedactionMode` (calendar-policy.ts) is
+    // FAIL-CLOSED: with the caller unresolvable it returns `redact`, not
+    // pass-through. `redactCalendarToolResponseIfNeeded` then calls
+    // `applyRedactionToResponse` for every response whenever `config.stage` is
+    // `enforce`. So an org that sets the stage gets real redaction — ENG-5868
+    // costs the control its PRECISION (it cannot spare the principal), not its
+    // ability to act.
+    //
+    // The stage is therefore per-ORG configuration, which ADR-0080 decision 1
+    // is explicit is the effectiveness axis the static union deliberately does
+    // not carry. `effectiveCalendarEnforcement` in the CLAUDE.md renderer owns
+    // it, and since ENG-10104 caps `enforce` to `warn` whenever the org's stage
+    // is not `enforce`.
+    id: "calendar.confidentiality",
+    mechanism: "enforced",
+    stage: "live",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/calendar-confidentiality-guard.ts",
+    effect: "at config.stage=enforce, redacts summary/description/attendees/location out of calendar read responses; at shadow/warn it writes a would_redact audit row and returns the response unchanged."
+  },
+  // ---- Delegated: read by another definition's enforcement point -----------
+  //
+  // Both can block, because their owner's point is live — which is the question
+  // `guardrailCanBlock` asks and the right answer to it. It is NOT the whole
+  // story for these two, and the gap has its own ticket: the org's email guard
+  // STAGE is threaded into the prompt shape for `email.domain_restrict`'s id
+  // alone (`host-runtime.ts`, the ENG-7829 fix), so a row of either id stored at
+  // `enforce` on a shadow-stage org still renders under "must comply" with
+  // nothing capping it. That is the effectiveness axis, not the mechanism one —
+  // ENG-10110.
+  {
+    id: "email.require_approval",
+    mechanism: "delegated",
+    ownedBy: "email.domain_restrict",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "routes a send to an approver instead of letting it leave."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "email.mail_rules",
+    mechanism: "delegated",
+    ownedBy: "email.domain_restrict",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "gates mail-rule creation/modification on the same egress path."
+  },
+  // ---- Advisory: seeded, applied, rendered — and read by nothing -----------
+  //
+  // These are NOT dead config. They are presented to operators in the console
+  // and to agents in CLAUDE.md, three of them under a heading that promises the
+  // violation is blocked. Listed individually rather than as a wildcard so that
+  // fixing one is a one-line diff from `advisory` to `enforced`.
+  //
+  // The ticket is ENG-9800, not ENG-9874. ENG-9874 catalogued these and is
+  // closed; a closed ticket tracks nothing, which is the same shrug an absent
+  // one would be. ENG-9800 is the open sweep that owns making them real.
+  {
+    id: "require-approval-for-actions",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: `Rendered to agents as "violation blocks the action". Nothing reads it. The ENG-8562 incident is this guardrail's promise, unkept.`
+  },
+  {
+    id: "data.pii_access",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: "Rendered as Enforced with block_export semantics; no export path consults it."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "data.credential_access",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: "Rendered as Enforced with block_read/block_write; no credential path consults it."
+  },
+  { id: "comm.social_posting", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "compliance.audit_all", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "no-external-network", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "no-pii-in-output", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "restrict-file-access", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "schedule.operating_hours", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "spend.hourly_limit", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.allow_list", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.block_list", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.financial_txn", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "working-hours-only", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" }
+];
+var BY_ID = new Map(GUARDRAIL_ENFORCERS.map((e) => [e.id, e]));
+
 // ../core/dist/provisioning/frameworks/claudecode/agent-rules.js
 var MAX_AGENT_RULES = 8;
 var MAX_AGENT_RULE_CHARS = 200;

package/dist/mcp/origami.js

@@ -38167,6 +38167,110 @@ var HOURLY_BY_REGION = {
 };
 var KNOWN_PRICING_REGIONS = Object.keys(HOURLY_BY_REGION);
 
+// ../core/dist/guardrails/enforcer-registry.js
+var GUARDRAIL_ENFORCERS = [
+  // ---- Enforced: this definition has its own enforcement point -------------
+  {
+    id: "email.domain_restrict",
+    mechanism: "enforced",
+    stage: "live",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "enforceEmailDomainGuard runs at the top of both agent-egress paths; internal_only with zero verified domains takes an explicit AUDITED no-op branch rather than failing open silently."
+  },
+  {
+    // MEASURED, and it corrects a claim ADR-0080 makes about this definition.
+    //
+    // The ADR reports calendar as `enforced` + `stage: 'shadow'`, blocked by
+    // ENG-5868 (caller identity is not threaded to `callIntegrationTool`). Read
+    // literally that says an org cannot get redaction today, and that is not
+    // what the code does. `decideCalendarRedactionMode` (calendar-policy.ts) is
+    // FAIL-CLOSED: with the caller unresolvable it returns `redact`, not
+    // pass-through. `redactCalendarToolResponseIfNeeded` then calls
+    // `applyRedactionToResponse` for every response whenever `config.stage` is
+    // `enforce`. So an org that sets the stage gets real redaction — ENG-5868
+    // costs the control its PRECISION (it cannot spare the principal), not its
+    // ability to act.
+    //
+    // The stage is therefore per-ORG configuration, which ADR-0080 decision 1
+    // is explicit is the effectiveness axis the static union deliberately does
+    // not carry. `effectiveCalendarEnforcement` in the CLAUDE.md renderer owns
+    // it, and since ENG-10104 caps `enforce` to `warn` whenever the org's stage
+    // is not `enforce`.
+    id: "calendar.confidentiality",
+    mechanism: "enforced",
+    stage: "live",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/calendar-confidentiality-guard.ts",
+    effect: "at config.stage=enforce, redacts summary/description/attendees/location out of calendar read responses; at shadow/warn it writes a would_redact audit row and returns the response unchanged."
+  },
+  // ---- Delegated: read by another definition's enforcement point -----------
+  //
+  // Both can block, because their owner's point is live — which is the question
+  // `guardrailCanBlock` asks and the right answer to it. It is NOT the whole
+  // story for these two, and the gap has its own ticket: the org's email guard
+  // STAGE is threaded into the prompt shape for `email.domain_restrict`'s id
+  // alone (`host-runtime.ts`, the ENG-7829 fix), so a row of either id stored at
+  // `enforce` on a shadow-stage org still renders under "must comply" with
+  // nothing capping it. That is the effectiveness axis, not the mechanism one —
+  // ENG-10110.
+  {
+    id: "email.require_approval",
+    mechanism: "delegated",
+    ownedBy: "email.domain_restrict",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "routes a send to an approver instead of letting it leave."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "email.mail_rules",
+    mechanism: "delegated",
+    ownedBy: "email.domain_restrict",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "gates mail-rule creation/modification on the same egress path."
+  },
+  // ---- Advisory: seeded, applied, rendered — and read by nothing -----------
+  //
+  // These are NOT dead config. They are presented to operators in the console
+  // and to agents in CLAUDE.md, three of them under a heading that promises the
+  // violation is blocked. Listed individually rather than as a wildcard so that
+  // fixing one is a one-line diff from `advisory` to `enforced`.
+  //
+  // The ticket is ENG-9800, not ENG-9874. ENG-9874 catalogued these and is
+  // closed; a closed ticket tracks nothing, which is the same shrug an absent
+  // one would be. ENG-9800 is the open sweep that owns making them real.
+  {
+    id: "require-approval-for-actions",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: `Rendered to agents as "violation blocks the action". Nothing reads it. The ENG-8562 incident is this guardrail's promise, unkept.`
+  },
+  {
+    id: "data.pii_access",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: "Rendered as Enforced with block_export semantics; no export path consults it."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "data.credential_access",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: "Rendered as Enforced with block_read/block_write; no credential path consults it."
+  },
+  { id: "comm.social_posting", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "compliance.audit_all", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "no-external-network", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "no-pii-in-output", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "restrict-file-access", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "schedule.operating_hours", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "spend.hourly_limit", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.allow_list", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.block_list", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.financial_txn", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "working-hours-only", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" }
+];
+var BY_ID = new Map(GUARDRAIL_ENFORCERS.map((e) => [e.id, e]));
+
 // ../core/dist/provisioning/frameworks/claudecode/agent-rules.js
 var MAX_AGENT_RULES = 8;
 var MAX_AGENT_RULE_CHARS = 200;

package/dist/mcp/slack-channel.js

@@ -32309,6 +32309,110 @@ var HOURLY_BY_REGION = {
 };
 var KNOWN_PRICING_REGIONS = Object.keys(HOURLY_BY_REGION);
 
+// ../core/dist/guardrails/enforcer-registry.js
+var GUARDRAIL_ENFORCERS = [
+  // ---- Enforced: this definition has its own enforcement point -------------
+  {
+    id: "email.domain_restrict",
+    mechanism: "enforced",
+    stage: "live",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "enforceEmailDomainGuard runs at the top of both agent-egress paths; internal_only with zero verified domains takes an explicit AUDITED no-op branch rather than failing open silently."
+  },
+  {
+    // MEASURED, and it corrects a claim ADR-0080 makes about this definition.
+    //
+    // The ADR reports calendar as `enforced` + `stage: 'shadow'`, blocked by
+    // ENG-5868 (caller identity is not threaded to `callIntegrationTool`). Read
+    // literally that says an org cannot get redaction today, and that is not
+    // what the code does. `decideCalendarRedactionMode` (calendar-policy.ts) is
+    // FAIL-CLOSED: with the caller unresolvable it returns `redact`, not
+    // pass-through. `redactCalendarToolResponseIfNeeded` then calls
+    // `applyRedactionToResponse` for every response whenever `config.stage` is
+    // `enforce`. So an org that sets the stage gets real redaction — ENG-5868
+    // costs the control its PRECISION (it cannot spare the principal), not its
+    // ability to act.
+    //
+    // The stage is therefore per-ORG configuration, which ADR-0080 decision 1
+    // is explicit is the effectiveness axis the static union deliberately does
+    // not carry. `effectiveCalendarEnforcement` in the CLAUDE.md renderer owns
+    // it, and since ENG-10104 caps `enforce` to `warn` whenever the org's stage
+    // is not `enforce`.
+    id: "calendar.confidentiality",
+    mechanism: "enforced",
+    stage: "live",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/calendar-confidentiality-guard.ts",
+    effect: "at config.stage=enforce, redacts summary/description/attendees/location out of calendar read responses; at shadow/warn it writes a would_redact audit row and returns the response unchanged."
+  },
+  // ---- Delegated: read by another definition's enforcement point -----------
+  //
+  // Both can block, because their owner's point is live — which is the question
+  // `guardrailCanBlock` asks and the right answer to it. It is NOT the whole
+  // story for these two, and the gap has its own ticket: the org's email guard
+  // STAGE is threaded into the prompt shape for `email.domain_restrict`'s id
+  // alone (`host-runtime.ts`, the ENG-7829 fix), so a row of either id stored at
+  // `enforce` on a shadow-stage org still renders under "must comply" with
+  // nothing capping it. That is the effectiveness axis, not the mechanism one —
+  // ENG-10110.
+  {
+    id: "email.require_approval",
+    mechanism: "delegated",
+    ownedBy: "email.domain_restrict",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "routes a send to an approver instead of letting it leave."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "email.mail_rules",
+    mechanism: "delegated",
+    ownedBy: "email.domain_restrict",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "gates mail-rule creation/modification on the same egress path."
+  },
+  // ---- Advisory: seeded, applied, rendered — and read by nothing -----------
+  //
+  // These are NOT dead config. They are presented to operators in the console
+  // and to agents in CLAUDE.md, three of them under a heading that promises the
+  // violation is blocked. Listed individually rather than as a wildcard so that
+  // fixing one is a one-line diff from `advisory` to `enforced`.
+  //
+  // The ticket is ENG-9800, not ENG-9874. ENG-9874 catalogued these and is
+  // closed; a closed ticket tracks nothing, which is the same shrug an absent
+  // one would be. ENG-9800 is the open sweep that owns making them real.
+  {
+    id: "require-approval-for-actions",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: `Rendered to agents as "violation blocks the action". Nothing reads it. The ENG-8562 incident is this guardrail's promise, unkept.`
+  },
+  {
+    id: "data.pii_access",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: "Rendered as Enforced with block_export semantics; no export path consults it."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "data.credential_access",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: "Rendered as Enforced with block_read/block_write; no credential path consults it."
+  },
+  { id: "comm.social_posting", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "compliance.audit_all", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "no-external-network", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "no-pii-in-output", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "restrict-file-access", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "schedule.operating_hours", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "spend.hourly_limit", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.allow_list", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.block_list", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.financial_txn", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "working-hours-only", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" }
+];
+var BY_ID = new Map(GUARDRAIL_ENFORCERS.map((e) => [e.id, e]));
+
 // ../core/dist/provisioning/frameworks/claudecode/agent-rules.js
 var MAX_AGENT_RULES = 8;
 var MAX_AGENT_RULE_CHARS = 200;