@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.853 → 0.28.854

package/dist/bin/agt.js

@@ -40,12 +40,12 @@ import {
   success,
   table,
   warn
-} from "../chunk-6BA2US4B.js";
+} from "../chunk-FHOLG6VL.js";
 import {
   getProjectDir,
   isSessionResumeDisabled,
   readDirectChatSessionState
-} from "../chunk-XCAI3GSF.js";
+} from "../chunk-2E2NKILK.js";
 import {
   AnchorSessionClient,
   CHANNEL_REGISTRY,
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ import {
   serializeManifestForSlackCli,
   sessionFileExists,
   sessionTranscriptDir
-} from "../chunk-WUXQVP7A.js";
+} from "../chunk-4Z4GFQAD.js";
 import "../chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 
 // src/bin/agt.ts
@@ -5467,7 +5467,7 @@ import { execFileSync, execSync } from "child_process";
 import { existsSync as existsSync11, realpathSync as realpathSync2 } from "fs";
 import chalk18 from "chalk";
 import ora16 from "ora";
-var cliVersion = true ? "0.28.853" : "dev";
+var cliVersion = true ? "0.28.854" : "dev";
 async function fetchLatestVersion() {
   const host2 = getHost();
   if (!host2) return null;
@@ -6658,7 +6658,7 @@ function handleError(err) {
 }
 
 // src/bin/agt.ts
-var cliVersion2 = true ? "0.28.853" : "dev";
+var cliVersion2 = true ? "0.28.854" : "dev";
 var program = new Command();
 program.name("agt").description("Augmented CLI \u2014 agent provisioning and management").version(cliVersion2).option("--json", "Emit machine-readable JSON output (suppress spinners and colors)").option("--skip-update-check", "Skip the automatic update check on startup");
 program.hook("preAction", async (thisCommand, actionCommand) => {

package/dist/{chunk-XCAI3GSF.js → chunk-2E2NKILK.js}

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ import {
   rotateDailySession,
   sessionFileExists,
   todayLocalIso
-} from "./chunk-WUXQVP7A.js";
+} from "./chunk-4Z4GFQAD.js";
 import {
   reapOrphanChannelMcps
 } from "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
@@ -5431,4 +5431,4 @@ export {
   stopAllSessionsAndWait,
   getProjectDir
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-XCAI3GSF.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-2E2NKILK.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-WUXQVP7A.js → chunk-4Z4GFQAD.js}

@@ -177,6 +177,137 @@ ${AGENT_RULES_SECTION_END}
 `;
 }
 
+// ../../packages/core/dist/guardrails/calendar-policy.js
+function parseCalendarGuardStage(raw) {
+  if (raw === "warn" || raw === "enforce")
+    return raw;
+  return "shadow";
+}
+
+// ../../packages/core/dist/guardrails/enforcer-registry.js
+var GUARDRAIL_ENFORCERS = [
+  // ---- Enforced: this definition has its own enforcement point -------------
+  {
+    id: "email.domain_restrict",
+    mechanism: "enforced",
+    stage: "live",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "enforceEmailDomainGuard runs at the top of both agent-egress paths; internal_only with zero verified domains takes an explicit AUDITED no-op branch rather than failing open silently."
+  },
+  {
+    // MEASURED, and it corrects a claim ADR-0080 makes about this definition.
+    //
+    // The ADR reports calendar as `enforced` + `stage: 'shadow'`, blocked by
+    // ENG-5868 (caller identity is not threaded to `callIntegrationTool`). Read
+    // literally that says an org cannot get redaction today, and that is not
+    // what the code does. `decideCalendarRedactionMode` (calendar-policy.ts) is
+    // FAIL-CLOSED: with the caller unresolvable it returns `redact`, not
+    // pass-through. `redactCalendarToolResponseIfNeeded` then calls
+    // `applyRedactionToResponse` for every response whenever `config.stage` is
+    // `enforce`. So an org that sets the stage gets real redaction — ENG-5868
+    // costs the control its PRECISION (it cannot spare the principal), not its
+    // ability to act.
+    //
+    // The stage is therefore per-ORG configuration, which ADR-0080 decision 1
+    // is explicit is the effectiveness axis the static union deliberately does
+    // not carry. `effectiveCalendarEnforcement` in the CLAUDE.md renderer owns
+    // it, and since ENG-10104 caps `enforce` to `warn` whenever the org's stage
+    // is not `enforce`.
+    id: "calendar.confidentiality",
+    mechanism: "enforced",
+    stage: "live",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/calendar-confidentiality-guard.ts",
+    effect: "at config.stage=enforce, redacts summary/description/attendees/location out of calendar read responses; at shadow/warn it writes a would_redact audit row and returns the response unchanged."
+  },
+  // ---- Delegated: read by another definition's enforcement point -----------
+  //
+  // Both can block, because their owner's point is live — which is the question
+  // `guardrailCanBlock` asks and the right answer to it. It is NOT the whole
+  // story for these two, and the gap has its own ticket: the org's email guard
+  // STAGE is threaded into the prompt shape for `email.domain_restrict`'s id
+  // alone (`host-runtime.ts`, the ENG-7829 fix), so a row of either id stored at
+  // `enforce` on a shadow-stage org still renders under "must comply" with
+  // nothing capping it. That is the effectiveness axis, not the mechanism one —
+  // ENG-10110.
+  {
+    id: "email.require_approval",
+    mechanism: "delegated",
+    ownedBy: "email.domain_restrict",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "routes a send to an approver instead of letting it leave."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "email.mail_rules",
+    mechanism: "delegated",
+    ownedBy: "email.domain_restrict",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "gates mail-rule creation/modification on the same egress path."
+  },
+  // ---- Advisory: seeded, applied, rendered — and read by nothing -----------
+  //
+  // These are NOT dead config. They are presented to operators in the console
+  // and to agents in CLAUDE.md, three of them under a heading that promises the
+  // violation is blocked. Listed individually rather than as a wildcard so that
+  // fixing one is a one-line diff from `advisory` to `enforced`.
+  //
+  // The ticket is ENG-9800, not ENG-9874. ENG-9874 catalogued these and is
+  // closed; a closed ticket tracks nothing, which is the same shrug an absent
+  // one would be. ENG-9800 is the open sweep that owns making them real.
+  {
+    id: "require-approval-for-actions",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: `Rendered to agents as "violation blocks the action". Nothing reads it. The ENG-8562 incident is this guardrail's promise, unkept.`
+  },
+  {
+    id: "data.pii_access",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: "Rendered as Enforced with block_export semantics; no export path consults it."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "data.credential_access",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: "Rendered as Enforced with block_read/block_write; no credential path consults it."
+  },
+  { id: "comm.social_posting", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "compliance.audit_all", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "no-external-network", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "no-pii-in-output", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "restrict-file-access", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "schedule.operating_hours", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "spend.hourly_limit", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.allow_list", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.block_list", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.financial_txn", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "working-hours-only", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" }
+];
+var BY_ID = new Map(GUARDRAIL_ENFORCERS.map((e) => [e.id, e]));
+function guardrailCanBlock(definitionId) {
+  return resolveCanBlock(definitionId, (id) => BY_ID.get(id));
+}
+function resolveCanBlock(definitionId, lookup) {
+  const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  let id = definitionId;
+  for (; ; ) {
+    if (seen.has(id))
+      return false;
+    seen.add(id);
+    const entry = lookup(id);
+    if (!entry)
+      return false;
+    if (entry.mechanism === "enforced")
+      return entry.stage === "live";
+    if (entry.mechanism !== "delegated")
+      return false;
+    id = entry.ownedBy;
+  }
+}
+
 // ../../packages/core/dist/provisioning/platform-storage.js
 var PLATFORM_STORAGE_RULE = "Store durable, reusable work you build (repeatable procedures, recurring responsibilities, scheduled automation, orchestration scripts) through the Ninjafy platform tools, never as loose local files, unless the user explicitly requests a different destination. Platform artifacts are versioned, reviewable, and survive re-provisioning; loose local files are wiped on the next provision rebuild, reach no one else, and bypass review. Ephemeral scratch files for the task at hand are fine on disk.";
 
@@ -1033,11 +1164,13 @@ function renderOverriddenGuardrailBullet(g) {
 function effectiveCalendarEnforcement(g) {
   if (g.definitionId !== CALENDAR_CONFIDENTIALITY_DEF)
     return g.enforcement;
-  const stage = typeof g.config?.["stage"] === "string" ? g.config["stage"] : "shadow";
+  const stage = parseCalendarGuardStage(g.config?.["stage"]);
   if (stage === "enforce")
     return "enforce";
   if (stage === "warn" && g.enforcement !== "enforce")
     return "warn";
+  if (g.enforcement === "enforce")
+    return "warn";
   return g.enforcement;
 }
 function effectiveEmailEnforcement(g) {
@@ -1075,7 +1208,10 @@ function buildGuardrailsSection(guardrails) {
     return "";
   const isOverridden = (g) => !!(g.overrideApplied && g.overrideReason?.trim());
   const overridden = active.filter(isOverridden);
-  const normal = active.filter((g) => !isOverridden(g));
+  const notOverridden = active.filter((g) => !isOverridden(g));
+  const canBlock = (g) => guardrailCanBlock(g.definitionId);
+  const advisory = notOverridden.filter((g) => !canBlock(g));
+  const normal = notOverridden.filter(canBlock);
   const enforce = normal.filter((g) => g.enforcement === "enforce");
   const warn = normal.filter((g) => g.enforcement === "warn");
   const logOnly = normal.filter((g) => g.enforcement === "log");
@@ -1102,6 +1238,10 @@ function buildGuardrailsSection(guardrails) {
     blocks.push(``, `### Logged (observability only)`, ``);
     blocks.push(logOnly.map(renderGuardrailBullet).join("\n"));
   }
+  if (advisory.length > 0) {
+    blocks.push(``, `### Advisory (policy only \u2014 not enforced by the platform)`, ``, `Follow these as operator instructions. No platform control backs them, so`, `never say an action was blocked, held for approval, or audited on their`, `basis \u2014 say you are declining, and why.`, ``);
+    blocks.push(advisory.map(renderGuardrailBullet).join("\n"));
+  }
   if (overridden.length > 0) {
     blocks.push(``, `### Approved exceptions (an operator override applies - follow the adjusted policy)`, ``);
     blocks.push(overridden.map(renderOverriddenGuardrailBullet).join("\n"));
@@ -13972,4 +14112,4 @@ export {
   peekCurrentSession,
   readDailySessionPin
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-WUXQVP7A.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-4Z4GFQAD.js.map