@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.611 → 0.28.613

package/dist/{claude-pair-runtime-SZM65MVE.js → claude-pair-runtime-3UQ63455.js}

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ async function spawnPairSession(session) {
     return { ok: true };
   } catch {
   }
-  const { resolveClaudeBinary } = await import("./persistent-session-JWBUD6RZ.js");
+  const { resolveClaudeBinary } = await import("./persistent-session-U7PE7ZDB.js");
   const claudeBin = resolveClaudeBinary();
   const pairEnv = {
     ...process.env,
@@ -373,4 +373,4 @@ export {
   startClaudePair,
   submitClaudePairCode
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=claude-pair-runtime-SZM65MVE.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=claude-pair-runtime-3UQ63455.js.map

package/dist/lib/manager-worker.js

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ import {
   safeWriteJsonAtomic,
   setConfigHash,
   tripClass
-} from "../chunk-6L5WLLVR.js";
+} from "../chunk-D7EV77TB.js";
 import {
   getProjectDir as getProjectDir2,
   getReadyTasks,
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ import {
   takeZombieDetection,
   toOpencodeModel,
   writeEgressAllowlist
-} from "../chunk-DD6NRRYC.js";
+} from "../chunk-JRL7754L.js";
 import {
   ACCOUNT_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_FILENAME,
   AnchorSessionClient,
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ import {
   subagentActivityAgeSeconds,
   sumTranscriptUsageInWindow,
   transcriptActivityAgeSeconds
-} from "../chunk-2ASO4HVN.js";
+} from "../chunk-ZQXXK7JC.js";
 import {
   reapOrphanChannelMcps
 } from "../chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
@@ -11287,7 +11287,7 @@ var pendingDayRolloverReset = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
 var dayRolloverInboundHold = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 var INBOUND_HOLD_EPISODE_GAP_MS = 12e4;
 async function channelInboundActivityAgeSecondsFor(codeName) {
-  const { newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-GJEX44DE.js");
+  const { newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-K6DGNTXA.js");
   const newest = newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs(dirname9(paneLogPath(codeName)));
   if (newest === null) return null;
   return Math.max(0, Math.floor((Date.now() - newest) / 1e3));
@@ -11926,7 +11926,7 @@ var agentRestartTimezoneInputs = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 var lastVersionCheckAt = 0;
 var VERSION_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1e3;
 var lastResponsivenessProbeAt = 0;
-var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.611" : "dev";
+var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.613" : "dev";
 function resolveBrewPath(execFileSync3) {
   try {
     const out = execFileSync3("which", ["brew"], { timeout: 5e3 }).toString().trim();
@@ -13233,7 +13233,7 @@ function flushRestartedAgentDiagnostics(hostId, codeNames) {
   if (codeNames.length === 0) return;
   void (async () => {
     try {
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-JWBUD6RZ.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-U7PE7ZDB.js");
       await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
         host_id: hostId,
         agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics(codeNames, quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor)
@@ -13341,7 +13341,7 @@ async function pollCycle() {
     }
     try {
       const { detectHostSecurity } = await import("../host-security-6PDFG7F5.js");
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-JWBUD6RZ.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-U7PE7ZDB.js");
       const diagCodeNames = [...agentState.persistentSessionAgents];
       const agentDiagnostics = diagCodeNames.length > 0 ? collectDiagnostics(diagCodeNames, quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor) : void 0;
       let tailscaleHostname;
@@ -13464,7 +13464,7 @@ async function pollCycle() {
         collectPanelessActivityProbes,
         getResponsivenessIntervalMs,
         occupancyQualificationClassifications
-      } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-GJEX44DE.js");
+      } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-K6DGNTXA.js");
       const probeIntervalMs = getResponsivenessIntervalMs();
       if (now - lastResponsivenessProbeAt > probeIntervalMs) {
         const probeCodeNames = [...agentState.persistentSessionAgents];
@@ -13570,7 +13570,7 @@ async function pollCycle() {
           collectResponsivenessProbes,
           livePendingInboundOldestAgeSeconds,
           parkPendingInbound
-        } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-GJEX44DE.js");
+        } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-K6DGNTXA.js");
         const { getProjectDir: wedgeProjectDir } = await import("../scheduler-engine-NDP36U7O.js");
         const wedgeNow = /* @__PURE__ */ new Date();
         const liveAgents = agentState.persistentSessionAgents;
@@ -13726,7 +13726,7 @@ async function pollCycle() {
     }
     try {
       const { scrapeMcpFailedBannerCount } = await import("../pane-mcp-banner-scraper-JA437JIB.js");
-      const { probeSessionAuth } = await import("../session-auth-dead-LBRWZQPW.js");
+      const { probeSessionAuth } = await import("../session-auth-dead-RPMWBVBH.js");
       const observations = [];
       const pendingCacheCommits = [];
       const modelApiErrorReportingOn = hostFlagStore().getBoolean("model-api-error-reporting");
@@ -17215,7 +17215,7 @@ async function handleRestartDoorbell(agentId, requestedAt, restartReason) {
     void api.post("/host/restart-ack", { host_id: hostId, agent_id: agentId, restart_requested_at: requestedAt }).catch((err) => log(`[restart-lane] ack failed for '${codeName}': ${err.message}`));
     void (async () => {
       try {
-        const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-JWBUD6RZ.js");
+        const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-U7PE7ZDB.js");
         await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
           host_id: hostId,
           agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics([codeName], quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor)
@@ -17266,7 +17266,7 @@ async function respawnAgentAfterMcpStop(codeName, reason) {
     }
     try {
       const hostId = await getHostId();
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-JWBUD6RZ.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-U7PE7ZDB.js");
       await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
         host_id: hostId,
         agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics([codeName], quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor)
@@ -17862,7 +17862,7 @@ async function processClaudePairSessions(agents) {
     killPairSession,
     pairTmuxSession,
     finalizeClaudePairOnboarding
-  } = await import("../claude-pair-runtime-SZM65MVE.js");
+  } = await import("../claude-pair-runtime-3UQ63455.js");
   for (const pairId of pendingResp.cancelled_pair_ids ?? []) {
     log(`[claude-pair] sweeping orphan tmux session for pair ${pairId.slice(0, 8)}`);
     const killed = await killPairSession(pairTmuxSession(pairId));

package/dist/mcp/direct-chat-channel.js

@@ -30142,8 +30142,12 @@ function busyAckNoticeText() {
   return "\u{1F6E0}\uFE0F I'm in the middle of something right now \u2014 I'll follow up on this as soon as I'm free.";
 }
 var GIVE_UP_SIGNAL_MAX_AGE_MS = 30 * 60 * 1e3;
-function turnFailedNoticeText() {
-  return "\u26A0\uFE0F Something went wrong on my side and I couldn\u2019t finish that. Sorry \u2014 send it again when you get a chance and I\u2019ll pick it straight up.";
+function turnFailedNoticeText(failureClass) {
+  const cause = failureClass === "overloaded" ? "the service I run on is overloaded right now \u2014 nothing to do with you or what you asked for" : failureClass === "server_error" ? "something upstream of me is failing right now \u2014 nothing to do with you or what you asked for" : null;
+  if (cause === null) {
+    return "\u26A0\uFE0F Something went wrong on my side and I couldn\u2019t finish that. Sorry \u2014 send it again when you get a chance and I\u2019ll pick it straight up.";
+  }
+  return `\u26A0\uFE0F I couldn\u2019t finish that \u2014 ${cause}. Sorry \u2014 send it again when you get a chance and I\u2019ll pick it straight up.`;
 }
 function oldestPendingMarkerAgeMs(dir, now = Date.now(), opts) {
   if (!dir) return null;
@@ -33928,7 +33932,14 @@ var AGENT_DIRECTED_NOTICE_KINDS = [
   // written for the machine. The user learns the same fact from the connect card
   // in that conversation flipping to its connected state, so showing this row as
   // well would say it twice, the second time in prose aimed at an agent.
-  "integration_connected"
+  "integration_connected",
+  // ENG-8745. The offer RESULT receipt (not the offer card — that one is
+  // written for the human and is how they decided). Its content opens "Your
+  // offer was ACCEPTED", carries an `[offer_result]` machine tag, and closes by
+  // instructing the agent what not to do ("do not re-raise it yourself"). The
+  // human needs none of it: they are the person who tapped the button, and the
+  // card swapped under their finger to say so.
+  "offer_result"
 ];
 var AGENT_DIRECTED_KIND_SET = new Set(AGENT_DIRECTED_NOTICE_KINDS);
 
@@ -34872,6 +34883,29 @@ registerTriggerSource(videoRenderTriggerAdapter);
 
 // ../core/dist/feature-flags/registry.js
 var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
+  {
+    key: "impersonation-enabled",
+    description: "Kill switch for admin impersonation (ENG-9080), filed during the 18 Aug cross-tenant identity incident. ON (default) = impersonation works as today. OFF = both halves of the flow refuse: the mint route stops issuing redeem URLs, and \u2014 the half that actually matters \u2014 the REDEEM route refuses before it inserts the nonce or calls generateLink, so a URL that was already issued cannot still mint a session. Redeem tokens live REDEEM_TTL_SECONDS = 300, so gating only the mint route would leave five minutes in which new sessions keep appearing after an operator believes they have stopped it. Evaluated as a GLOBAL stage value, read UNCACHED on the redeem path (see readImpersonationEnabled): a kill switch that takes a cache TTL to bite is not a kill switch. Containment only \u2014 it does not fix the underlying defect that redeem writes the target's cookies into whatever browser context opens the URL (ENG-8923 / ENG-9020).",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Declared safe value is `true` = impersonation available, i.e. today's
+    // behaviour, so merging this changes nothing until an operator flips it.
+    //
+    // NOTE the asymmetry with the other gates in this file, and it is
+    // deliberate: their safe direction is "off / don't do the new thing"
+    // because they gate NEW behaviour. This one gates EXISTING behaviour, so
+    // the no-op default is `true`. The READ direction is where the safety lives
+    // instead — an unreachable flag store resolves to DISABLED, not to this
+    // default. See readImpersonationEnabled for that argument.
+    defaultValue: true,
+    // Enforcement gate (ADR-0022 section 4): re-enabling impersonation is
+    // "relaxing a security control", exactly the mutation that must not happen
+    // on a single unguarded write. The emergency direction (turning it OFF)
+    // costs one confirmation, which is the right price.
+    sensitive: true
+    // Deliberately NOT public. A browser has no business evaluating whether
+    // impersonation is available; both consumers are server-side route
+    // handlers.
+  },
   {
     key: "at-rest-v2-writes",
     description: "ADR-0061 A2\u2192arm cutover (ENG-8944, parent ENG-8764). Gates whether the at-rest writer (encryptSecret/encryptAtRest) emits the v2 AAD-bound envelope when a DecryptContext is supplied; OFF (default) = the legacy v1 envelope (pre-ADR-0061 behaviour). Resolved FLEET-WIDE and process-global via setV2WritesArmed at the API + webapp + cron bootstrap seams, so ONLY the stage value applies \u2014 per-org overrides do not (the crypto writer carries no request/org context). Ships dark. Flip on only once every reader parses v2 (fleet-wide since release A1) AND the re-seal engine can re-seal v2 blobs before any AUTH_ENCRYPTION_KEY rotation (slice 5b). Reversible without redeploy: clearing it returns the writer to v1 within the flag cache TTL; already-written v2 blobs stay readable.",
@@ -38105,7 +38139,7 @@ function armTurnFailureWatch(args) {
         return;
       }
       lastTurnFailedNoticeAt.set(args.sessionId, now);
-      const ok = await postDirectChatNoticeMessage(args.sessionId, turnFailedNoticeText());
+      const ok = await postDirectChatNoticeMessage(args.sessionId, turnFailedNoticeText(failure.failureClass));
       if (!ok) {
         lastTurnFailedNoticeAt.delete(args.sessionId);
         process.stderr.write(

package/dist/mcp/origami.js

@@ -40266,7 +40266,14 @@ var AGENT_DIRECTED_NOTICE_KINDS = [
   // written for the machine. The user learns the same fact from the connect card
   // in that conversation flipping to its connected state, so showing this row as
   // well would say it twice, the second time in prose aimed at an agent.
-  "integration_connected"
+  "integration_connected",
+  // ENG-8745. The offer RESULT receipt (not the offer card — that one is
+  // written for the human and is how they decided). Its content opens "Your
+  // offer was ACCEPTED", carries an `[offer_result]` machine tag, and closes by
+  // instructing the agent what not to do ("do not re-raise it yourself"). The
+  // human needs none of it: they are the person who tapped the button, and the
+  // card swapped under their finger to say so.
+  "offer_result"
 ];
 var AGENT_DIRECTED_KIND_SET = new Set(AGENT_DIRECTED_NOTICE_KINDS);
 
@@ -40763,6 +40770,29 @@ registerTriggerSource(videoRenderTriggerAdapter);
 
 // ../core/dist/feature-flags/registry.js
 var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
+  {
+    key: "impersonation-enabled",
+    description: "Kill switch for admin impersonation (ENG-9080), filed during the 18 Aug cross-tenant identity incident. ON (default) = impersonation works as today. OFF = both halves of the flow refuse: the mint route stops issuing redeem URLs, and \u2014 the half that actually matters \u2014 the REDEEM route refuses before it inserts the nonce or calls generateLink, so a URL that was already issued cannot still mint a session. Redeem tokens live REDEEM_TTL_SECONDS = 300, so gating only the mint route would leave five minutes in which new sessions keep appearing after an operator believes they have stopped it. Evaluated as a GLOBAL stage value, read UNCACHED on the redeem path (see readImpersonationEnabled): a kill switch that takes a cache TTL to bite is not a kill switch. Containment only \u2014 it does not fix the underlying defect that redeem writes the target's cookies into whatever browser context opens the URL (ENG-8923 / ENG-9020).",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Declared safe value is `true` = impersonation available, i.e. today's
+    // behaviour, so merging this changes nothing until an operator flips it.
+    //
+    // NOTE the asymmetry with the other gates in this file, and it is
+    // deliberate: their safe direction is "off / don't do the new thing"
+    // because they gate NEW behaviour. This one gates EXISTING behaviour, so
+    // the no-op default is `true`. The READ direction is where the safety lives
+    // instead — an unreachable flag store resolves to DISABLED, not to this
+    // default. See readImpersonationEnabled for that argument.
+    defaultValue: true,
+    // Enforcement gate (ADR-0022 section 4): re-enabling impersonation is
+    // "relaxing a security control", exactly the mutation that must not happen
+    // on a single unguarded write. The emergency direction (turning it OFF)
+    // costs one confirmation, which is the right price.
+    sensitive: true
+    // Deliberately NOT public. A browser has no business evaluating whether
+    // impersonation is available; both consumers are server-side route
+    // handlers.
+  },
   {
     key: "at-rest-v2-writes",
     description: "ADR-0061 A2\u2192arm cutover (ENG-8944, parent ENG-8764). Gates whether the at-rest writer (encryptSecret/encryptAtRest) emits the v2 AAD-bound envelope when a DecryptContext is supplied; OFF (default) = the legacy v1 envelope (pre-ADR-0061 behaviour). Resolved FLEET-WIDE and process-global via setV2WritesArmed at the API + webapp + cron bootstrap seams, so ONLY the stage value applies \u2014 per-org overrides do not (the crypto writer carries no request/org context). Ships dark. Flip on only once every reader parses v2 (fleet-wide since release A1) AND the re-seal engine can re-seal v2 blobs before any AUTH_ENCRYPTION_KEY rotation (slice 5b). Reversible without redeploy: clearing it returns the writer to v1 within the flag cache TTL; already-written v2 blobs stay readable.",

package/dist/mcp/slack-channel.js

@@ -34317,7 +34317,14 @@ var AGENT_DIRECTED_NOTICE_KINDS = [
   // written for the machine. The user learns the same fact from the connect card
   // in that conversation flipping to its connected state, so showing this row as
   // well would say it twice, the second time in prose aimed at an agent.
-  "integration_connected"
+  "integration_connected",
+  // ENG-8745. The offer RESULT receipt (not the offer card — that one is
+  // written for the human and is how they decided). Its content opens "Your
+  // offer was ACCEPTED", carries an `[offer_result]` machine tag, and closes by
+  // instructing the agent what not to do ("do not re-raise it yourself"). The
+  // human needs none of it: they are the person who tapped the button, and the
+  // card swapped under their finger to say so.
+  "offer_result"
 ];
 var AGENT_DIRECTED_KIND_SET = new Set(AGENT_DIRECTED_NOTICE_KINDS);
 
@@ -35208,6 +35215,29 @@ registerTriggerSource(videoRenderTriggerAdapter);
 
 // ../core/dist/feature-flags/registry.js
 var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
+  {
+    key: "impersonation-enabled",
+    description: "Kill switch for admin impersonation (ENG-9080), filed during the 18 Aug cross-tenant identity incident. ON (default) = impersonation works as today. OFF = both halves of the flow refuse: the mint route stops issuing redeem URLs, and \u2014 the half that actually matters \u2014 the REDEEM route refuses before it inserts the nonce or calls generateLink, so a URL that was already issued cannot still mint a session. Redeem tokens live REDEEM_TTL_SECONDS = 300, so gating only the mint route would leave five minutes in which new sessions keep appearing after an operator believes they have stopped it. Evaluated as a GLOBAL stage value, read UNCACHED on the redeem path (see readImpersonationEnabled): a kill switch that takes a cache TTL to bite is not a kill switch. Containment only \u2014 it does not fix the underlying defect that redeem writes the target's cookies into whatever browser context opens the URL (ENG-8923 / ENG-9020).",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Declared safe value is `true` = impersonation available, i.e. today's
+    // behaviour, so merging this changes nothing until an operator flips it.
+    //
+    // NOTE the asymmetry with the other gates in this file, and it is
+    // deliberate: their safe direction is "off / don't do the new thing"
+    // because they gate NEW behaviour. This one gates EXISTING behaviour, so
+    // the no-op default is `true`. The READ direction is where the safety lives
+    // instead — an unreachable flag store resolves to DISABLED, not to this
+    // default. See readImpersonationEnabled for that argument.
+    defaultValue: true,
+    // Enforcement gate (ADR-0022 section 4): re-enabling impersonation is
+    // "relaxing a security control", exactly the mutation that must not happen
+    // on a single unguarded write. The emergency direction (turning it OFF)
+    // costs one confirmation, which is the right price.
+    sensitive: true
+    // Deliberately NOT public. A browser has no business evaluating whether
+    // impersonation is available; both consumers are server-side route
+    // handlers.
+  },
   {
     key: "at-rest-v2-writes",
     description: "ADR-0061 A2\u2192arm cutover (ENG-8944, parent ENG-8764). Gates whether the at-rest writer (encryptSecret/encryptAtRest) emits the v2 AAD-bound envelope when a DecryptContext is supplied; OFF (default) = the legacy v1 envelope (pre-ADR-0061 behaviour). Resolved FLEET-WIDE and process-global via setV2WritesArmed at the API + webapp + cron bootstrap seams, so ONLY the stage value applies \u2014 per-org overrides do not (the crypto writer carries no request/org context). Ships dark. Flip on only once every reader parses v2 (fleet-wide since release A1) AND the re-seal engine can re-seal v2 blobs before any AUTH_ENCRYPTION_KEY rotation (slice 5b). Reversible without redeploy: clearing it returns the writer to v1 within the flag cache TTL; already-written v2 blobs stay readable.",
@@ -36974,8 +37004,12 @@ function giveUpNoticeText(reason = null) {
   }
   return "\u26A0\uFE0F I couldn't read your last message \u2014 please resend it.";
 }
-function turnFailedNoticeText() {
-  return "\u26A0\uFE0F Something went wrong on my side and I couldn\u2019t finish that. Sorry \u2014 send it again when you get a chance and I\u2019ll pick it straight up.";
+function turnFailedNoticeText(failureClass) {
+  const cause = failureClass === "overloaded" ? "the service I run on is overloaded right now \u2014 nothing to do with you or what you asked for" : failureClass === "server_error" ? "something upstream of me is failing right now \u2014 nothing to do with you or what you asked for" : null;
+  if (cause === null) {
+    return "\u26A0\uFE0F Something went wrong on my side and I couldn\u2019t finish that. Sorry \u2014 send it again when you get a chance and I\u2019ll pick it straight up.";
+  }
+  return `\u26A0\uFE0F I couldn\u2019t finish that \u2014 ${cause}. Sorry \u2014 send it again when you get a chance and I\u2019ll pick it straight up.`;
 }
 function turnRetryingNoticeText() {
   return "\u23F3 Still working on this \u2014 things are running slower than usual on my side. I\u2019ll reply as soon as I have it.";
@@ -39367,6 +39401,91 @@ async function runOrRetry(fn, opts) {
   }
 }
 
+// src/slack-socket-reconnect.ts
+var RECONNECT_BASE_DELAY_MS = 1e3;
+var RECONNECT_MAX_DELAY_MS = 3e4;
+var SOCKET_OPEN_TIMEOUT_MS = 3e4;
+var CONNECT_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 15e3;
+var SOCKET_DOWN_ALERT_AFTER_MS = 3 * 6e4;
+function reconnectDelayMs(attempt, opts = {}) {
+  const base = opts.baseMs ?? RECONNECT_BASE_DELAY_MS;
+  const max = opts.maxMs ?? RECONNECT_MAX_DELAY_MS;
+  const random = opts.random ?? Math.random;
+  const safeAttempt = Math.max(1, Math.min(Math.floor(attempt), 30));
+  const ceiling = Math.min(max, base * 2 ** (safeAttempt - 1));
+  const floor = Math.min(base, ceiling);
+  return Math.round(floor + random() * (ceiling - floor));
+}
+function redactSocketUrl(text) {
+  return text.replace(
+    /([?&])(ticket|token|app_id_key)=[^&\s"']*/gi,
+    (_m, sep2, key2) => `${sep2}${key2}=<redacted>`
+  );
+}
+function describeWebSocketError(err) {
+  const parts = [];
+  const e = err ?? {};
+  if (typeof e.message === "string" && e.message) parts.push(e.message);
+  const cause = e.error;
+  if (cause && typeof cause === "object") {
+    if (typeof cause.message === "string" && cause.message && !parts.includes(cause.message)) {
+      parts.push(cause.message);
+    }
+    if (typeof cause.code === "string" && cause.code) parts.push(`errno=${cause.code}`);
+  }
+  if (typeof e.code === "number") parts.push(`code=${e.code}`);
+  if (typeof e.reason === "string" && e.reason) parts.push(`reason=${e.reason}`);
+  if (typeof e.wasClean === "boolean") parts.push(`wasClean=${e.wasClean}`);
+  if (parts.length === 0) {
+    const type = typeof e.type === "string" && e.type ? e.type : typeof err;
+    const ctor = err && typeof err === "object" ? err.constructor?.name ?? "Object" : typeof err;
+    return redactSocketUrl(`no detail available (${ctor}, type=${type})`);
+  }
+  return redactSocketUrl(parts.join(" "));
+}
+function isWebSocketOpen(ws) {
+  return ws?.readyState === 1;
+}
+function createReconnectScheduler(deps) {
+  const now = deps.now ?? Date.now;
+  const setTimer = deps.setTimer ?? ((fn, ms) => setTimeout(fn, ms));
+  let pending = false;
+  let attempt = 0;
+  let downSince = now();
+  return {
+    schedule(reason) {
+      if (deps.shouldStop() || pending) return;
+      pending = true;
+      if (downSince === null) downSince = now();
+      attempt += 1;
+      const opts = {};
+      if (deps.baseMs !== void 0) opts.baseMs = deps.baseMs;
+      if (deps.maxMs !== void 0) opts.maxMs = deps.maxMs;
+      if (deps.random !== void 0) opts.random = deps.random;
+      const delay = reconnectDelayMs(attempt, opts);
+      deps.log(
+        `slack-channel: Socket Mode reconnecting in ${delay}ms (attempt ${attempt}, ${reason})`
+      );
+      const timer = setTimer(() => {
+        pending = false;
+        if (deps.shouldStop()) return;
+        deps.connect();
+      }, delay);
+      timer.unref?.();
+    },
+    noteOpen() {
+      attempt = 0;
+      downSince = null;
+    },
+    downForMs(connected) {
+      if (connected) return null;
+      return downSince === null ? null : now() - downSince;
+    },
+    attempts: () => attempt,
+    isPending: () => pending
+  };
+}
+
 // src/turn-initiator-marker.ts
 import { writeFileSync as writeFileSync7, readFileSync as readFileSync9, mkdirSync as mkdirSync5, renameSync as renameSync2 } from "fs";
 import { dirname as dirname4, join as join12 } from "path";
@@ -42678,7 +42797,7 @@ function armSlackTurnFailureWatch(args) {
       const posted = await postSlackTurnNotice({
         channel,
         threadTs: args.threadTs,
-        text: turnFailedNoticeText()
+        text: turnFailedNoticeText(failure.failureClass)
       });
       if (!posted.ok) {
         lastSlackTurnFailedNoticeAt.delete(conversationKey);
@@ -43136,10 +43255,12 @@ function formatLastActivity() {
   return `${kindLabel} ${ago}`;
 }
 function buildAgentStatusReply(codeName) {
-  const connected = currentWs != null && !isShuttingDown;
+  const connected = isSocketConnected();
   const dot = connected ? "\u{1F7E2}" : "\u{1F534}";
   const state = connected ? "online" : "offline";
-  const connectivityLine = `${dot} *${state}* \u2014 Socket Mode ${connected ? "connected" : "disconnected"}. Last activity: ${formatLastActivity()}.`;
+  const downMs = socketDownForMs();
+  const downSuffix = !connected && downMs !== null ? ` for ${Math.floor(downMs / 6e4)}m \u2014 inbound is dead` : "";
+  const connectivityLine = `${dot} *${state}* \u2014 Socket Mode ${connected ? "connected" : `disconnected${downSuffix}`}. Last activity: ${formatLastActivity()}.`;
   const sessionState = readAgentSessionState(SLACK_AGENT_DIR);
   return buildAgentConfigReport({ codeName, connectivityLine, state: sessionState });
 }
@@ -43150,9 +43271,16 @@ function statusRuntimeConfig() {
 }
 async function computeSlackOwnChannelLiveStatus() {
   const checked_at = (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString();
-  const connected = currentWs != null && !isShuttingDown;
+  const connected = isSocketConnected();
   if (!connected) {
-    return { level: "down", checked_at, reason: "Socket Mode disconnected" };
+    const downMs = socketDownForMs();
+    const forSuffix = downMs === null ? "" : ` for ${Math.floor(downMs / 1e3)}s`;
+    const sustained = downMs !== null && downMs >= SOCKET_DOWN_ALERT_AFTER_MS;
+    return {
+      level: "down",
+      checked_at,
+      reason: `Socket Mode disconnected${forSuffix}${sustained ? " - inbound Slack is DEAD (outbound still works, so this is invisible from outside)" : ""}`
+    };
   }
   const { id, authFailed } = await getBotUserId();
   if (id) {
@@ -43679,7 +43807,7 @@ async function handleSlashCommandEnvelope(payload) {
       );
       return;
     }
-    const connected = currentWs != null && !isShuttingDown;
+    const connected = isSocketConnected();
     const dot = connected ? "\u{1F7E2}" : "\u{1F534}";
     const state = connected ? "online" : "offline";
     const pong = `${dot} pong - \`${codeName}\` is ${state} (manager \u2022 ${(/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString()}). Last activity: ${formatLastActivity()}.`;
@@ -45751,6 +45879,47 @@ async function resolveUserEmail(userId) {
 }
 var currentWs = null;
 var isShuttingDown = false;
+var clearOpenWatchdog = null;
+function clearOpenWatchdogFor(ws) {
+  if (currentWs !== ws) return;
+  clearOpenWatchdog?.();
+  clearOpenWatchdog = null;
+}
+var reconnectScheduler = createReconnectScheduler({
+  connect: () => connectSocketModeSafely(),
+  log: (line) => process.stderr.write(`${line}
+`),
+  shouldStop: () => isShuttingDown
+});
+function isSocketConnected() {
+  return !isShuttingDown && isWebSocketOpen(currentWs);
+}
+function scheduleReconnect(reason) {
+  reconnectScheduler.schedule(reason);
+}
+function armOpenWatchdog(ws) {
+  clearOpenWatchdog?.();
+  const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+    if (currentWs !== ws) return;
+    if (isShuttingDown || isWebSocketOpen(ws)) return;
+    process.stderr.write(
+      `slack-channel: Socket Mode did not open within ${SOCKET_OPEN_TIMEOUT_MS}ms - abandoning it
+`
+    );
+    currentWs = null;
+    clearOpenWatchdog = null;
+    try {
+      ws.close();
+    } catch {
+    }
+    scheduleReconnect("open timeout");
+  }, SOCKET_OPEN_TIMEOUT_MS);
+  timer.unref?.();
+  clearOpenWatchdog = () => clearTimeout(timer);
+}
+function socketDownForMs() {
+  return reconnectScheduler.downForMs(isSocketConnected());
+}
 var acquiredLockPath = null;
 var stopLockHeartbeat = null;
 async function seedMutedChannelsFromApi() {
@@ -45801,14 +45970,27 @@ async function connectSocketMode() {
   if (isShuttingDown) return;
   const res = await fetch("https://slack.com/api/apps.connections.open", {
     method: "POST",
-    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${APP_TOKEN}` }
+    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${APP_TOKEN}` },
+    // CodeRabbit, #4655. Without a deadline a hanging fetch is the one failure
+    // this whole change does not cover: it never rejects, so the retry chain is
+    // never entered, and no socket exists yet so the open watchdog does not
+    // apply either. The process ends up with nothing pending and no attempt in
+    // flight — the incident's shape, reached a different way. A timeout turns
+    // the hang into a rejection, which the retry chain already handles.
+    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(CONNECT_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS)
+    // CodeRabbit, #4655. Without a deadline a hanging fetch is the one failure
+    // this whole change does not cover: it never rejects, so the retry chain is
+    // never entered, and no socket exists yet so the open watchdog does not
+    // apply either. The process ends up with nothing pending and no attempt in
+    // flight — the incident's shape, reached a different way. A timeout turns
+    // the hang into a rejection, which the retry chain already handles.
   });
   const data = await res.json();
   if (isShuttingDown) return;
   if (!data.ok || !data.url) {
     process.stderr.write(`slack-channel: Socket Mode connection failed: ${data.error}
 `);
-    if (!isShuttingDown) setTimeout(connectSocketModeSafely, 1e4).unref?.();
+    scheduleReconnect(`apps.connections.open ${data.error ?? "failed"}`);
     return;
   }
   const ws = new WebSocket(data.url);
@@ -45820,7 +46002,17 @@ async function connectSocketMode() {
     return;
   }
   currentWs = ws;
+  armOpenWatchdog(ws);
   ws.onopen = () => {
+    if (currentWs !== ws) {
+      try {
+        ws.close();
+      } catch {
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+    clearOpenWatchdogFor(ws);
+    reconnectScheduler.noteOpen();
     process.stderr.write("slack-channel: Socket Mode connected\n");
     recordActivity("connect");
     void setBotStatus(":large_green_circle:", "Active");
@@ -46466,15 +46658,35 @@ async function connectSocketMode() {
 `);
     }
   };
-  ws.onclose = () => {
-    if (currentWs === ws) currentWs = null;
+  ws.onclose = (evt) => {
+    if (currentWs !== ws) return;
+    clearOpenWatchdogFor(ws);
+    currentWs = null;
     if (isShuttingDown) return;
-    process.stderr.write("slack-channel: Socket Mode disconnected, reconnecting...\n");
-    setTimeout(connectSocketModeSafely, 5e3).unref?.();
+    process.stderr.write(
+      `slack-channel: Socket Mode disconnected (${describeWebSocketError(evt)})
+`
+    );
+    scheduleReconnect("close");
   };
   ws.onerror = (err) => {
-    process.stderr.write(`slack-channel: WebSocket error: ${err}
+    process.stderr.write(`slack-channel: WebSocket error: ${describeWebSocketError(err)}
 `);
+    if (currentWs !== ws) {
+      try {
+        ws.close();
+      } catch {
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+    clearOpenWatchdogFor(ws);
+    currentWs = null;
+    try {
+      ws.close();
+    } catch {
+    }
+    if (isShuttingDown) return;
+    scheduleReconnect("error");
   };
 }
 function shutdown(reason, exitCode = 0) {