@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.611 → 0.28.613

package/dist/bin/agt.js

@@ -40,10 +40,10 @@ import {
   success,
   table,
   warn
-} from "../chunk-6L5WLLVR.js";
+} from "../chunk-D7EV77TB.js";
 import {
   readDirectChatSessionState
-} from "../chunk-DD6NRRYC.js";
+} from "../chunk-JRL7754L.js";
 import {
   AnchorSessionClient,
   CHANNEL_REGISTRY,
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ import {
   requiredMcpWildcard,
   resolveChannels,
   serializeManifestForSlackCli
-} from "../chunk-2ASO4HVN.js";
+} from "../chunk-ZQXXK7JC.js";
 import "../chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 
 // src/bin/agt.ts
@@ -4909,7 +4909,7 @@ import { execFileSync, execSync } from "child_process";
 import { existsSync as existsSync10, realpathSync as realpathSync2 } from "fs";
 import chalk18 from "chalk";
 import ora16 from "ora";
-var cliVersion = true ? "0.28.611" : "dev";
+var cliVersion = true ? "0.28.613" : "dev";
 async function fetchLatestVersion() {
   const host2 = getHost();
   if (!host2) return null;
@@ -6089,7 +6089,7 @@ function handleError(err) {
 }
 
 // src/bin/agt.ts
-var cliVersion2 = true ? "0.28.611" : "dev";
+var cliVersion2 = true ? "0.28.613" : "dev";
 var program = new Command();
 program.name("agt").description("Augmented CLI \u2014 agent provisioning and management").version(cliVersion2).option("--json", "Emit machine-readable JSON output (suppress spinners and colors)").option("--skip-update-check", "Skip the automatic update check on startup");
 program.hook("preAction", async (thisCommand, actionCommand) => {

package/dist/{chunk-6L5WLLVR.js → chunk-D7EV77TB.js}

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import {
   expandTemplateVars,
   isolationMode,
   parseEnvIntegrations
-} from "./chunk-DD6NRRYC.js";
+} from "./chunk-JRL7754L.js";
 import {
   BIND_FAILURE_QUARANTINE_THRESHOLD,
   INTEGRATIONS_SECTION_END,
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ import {
   resolveConnectivityProbe,
   worseConnectivityOutcome,
   wrapScheduledTaskPrompt
-} from "./chunk-2ASO4HVN.js";
+} from "./chunk-ZQXXK7JC.js";
 import {
   parsePsRows
 } from "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
@@ -6030,7 +6030,7 @@ function exchangeFailureKind(err) {
 }
 
 // src/lib/api-client.ts
-var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.611" : "dev";
+var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.613" : "dev";
 var lastConfigHash = null;
 function setConfigHash(hash) {
   lastConfigHash = hash && hash.length > 0 ? hash : null;
@@ -9505,4 +9505,4 @@ export {
   managerInstallSystemUnitCommand,
   managerUninstallSystemUnitCommand
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-6L5WLLVR.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-D7EV77TB.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-DD6NRRYC.js → chunk-JRL7754L.js}

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import {
   rotateDailySession,
   sessionFileExists,
   todayLocalIso
-} from "./chunk-2ASO4HVN.js";
+} from "./chunk-ZQXXK7JC.js";
 import {
   reapOrphanChannelMcps
 } from "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
@@ -4349,4 +4349,4 @@ export {
   stopAllSessionsAndWait,
   getProjectDir
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-DD6NRRYC.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-JRL7754L.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-2ASO4HVN.js → chunk-ZQXXK7JC.js}

@@ -3638,7 +3638,14 @@ var AGENT_DIRECTED_NOTICE_KINDS = [
   // written for the machine. The user learns the same fact from the connect card
   // in that conversation flipping to its connected state, so showing this row as
   // well would say it twice, the second time in prose aimed at an agent.
-  "integration_connected"
+  "integration_connected",
+  // ENG-8745. The offer RESULT receipt (not the offer card — that one is
+  // written for the human and is how they decided). Its content opens "Your
+  // offer was ACCEPTED", carries an `[offer_result]` machine tag, and closes by
+  // instructing the agent what not to do ("do not re-raise it yourself"). The
+  // human needs none of it: they are the person who tapped the button, and the
+  // card swapped under their finger to say so.
+  "offer_result"
 ];
 var AGENT_DIRECTED_KIND_SET = new Set(AGENT_DIRECTED_NOTICE_KINDS);
 
@@ -4119,6 +4126,29 @@ var KANBAN_NUDGE_ACTIONABLE_STATUSES = ["todo", "in_progress"];
 
 // ../../packages/core/dist/feature-flags/registry.js
 var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
+  {
+    key: "impersonation-enabled",
+    description: "Kill switch for admin impersonation (ENG-9080), filed during the 18 Aug cross-tenant identity incident. ON (default) = impersonation works as today. OFF = both halves of the flow refuse: the mint route stops issuing redeem URLs, and \u2014 the half that actually matters \u2014 the REDEEM route refuses before it inserts the nonce or calls generateLink, so a URL that was already issued cannot still mint a session. Redeem tokens live REDEEM_TTL_SECONDS = 300, so gating only the mint route would leave five minutes in which new sessions keep appearing after an operator believes they have stopped it. Evaluated as a GLOBAL stage value, read UNCACHED on the redeem path (see readImpersonationEnabled): a kill switch that takes a cache TTL to bite is not a kill switch. Containment only \u2014 it does not fix the underlying defect that redeem writes the target's cookies into whatever browser context opens the URL (ENG-8923 / ENG-9020).",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Declared safe value is `true` = impersonation available, i.e. today's
+    // behaviour, so merging this changes nothing until an operator flips it.
+    //
+    // NOTE the asymmetry with the other gates in this file, and it is
+    // deliberate: their safe direction is "off / don't do the new thing"
+    // because they gate NEW behaviour. This one gates EXISTING behaviour, so
+    // the no-op default is `true`. The READ direction is where the safety lives
+    // instead — an unreachable flag store resolves to DISABLED, not to this
+    // default. See readImpersonationEnabled for that argument.
+    defaultValue: true,
+    // Enforcement gate (ADR-0022 section 4): re-enabling impersonation is
+    // "relaxing a security control", exactly the mutation that must not happen
+    // on a single unguarded write. The emergency direction (turning it OFF)
+    // costs one confirmation, which is the right price.
+    sensitive: true
+    // Deliberately NOT public. A browser has no business evaluating whether
+    // impersonation is available; both consumers are server-side route
+    // handlers.
+  },
   {
     key: "at-rest-v2-writes",
     description: "ADR-0061 A2\u2192arm cutover (ENG-8944, parent ENG-8764). Gates whether the at-rest writer (encryptSecret/encryptAtRest) emits the v2 AAD-bound envelope when a DecryptContext is supplied; OFF (default) = the legacy v1 envelope (pre-ADR-0061 behaviour). Resolved FLEET-WIDE and process-global via setV2WritesArmed at the API + webapp + cron bootstrap seams, so ONLY the stage value applies \u2014 per-org overrides do not (the crypto writer carries no request/org context). Ships dark. Flip on only once every reader parses v2 (fleet-wide since release A1) AND the re-seal engine can re-seal v2 blobs before any AUTH_ENCRYPTION_KEY rotation (slice 5b). Reversible without redeploy: clearing it returns the writer to v1 within the flag cache TTL; already-written v2 blobs stay readable.",
@@ -11934,4 +11964,4 @@ export {
   minutesSinceLocalMidnight,
   peekCurrentSession
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-2ASO4HVN.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZQXXK7JC.js.map