@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.503 → 0.28.504

package/dist/mcp/direct-chat-channel.js

@@ -35121,6 +35121,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // safety control, so mutations require explicit confirmation.
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "docker-hygiene",
+    description: "Manager-side docker hygiene on Docker-isolated hosts (ENG-8401): off = no-op, reap-superseded = after a successful agt-runtime retag, remove the prior untagged agt-runtime images that retag orphaned (Layer 1), full = reap-superseded plus a daily dangling-only image+builder prune (Layer 2). agt-runtime:latest and the just-pulled image are never removed and -a/--volumes are never used. Read host-side via hostFlagStore (getString); ships dark.",
+    flagType: "enum",
+    allowedValues: ["off", "reap-superseded", "full"],
+    // Declared safe value is `off`: this flag introduces NEW janitorial behaviour
+    // (the pre-flag compiled behaviour is "never reap"), so off preserves fleet
+    // behaviour on rollout. Not `sensitive` — weakening it (full → off) only stops
+    // cleanup; it relaxes no safety/enforcement control. No envVar by design: this
+    // gate is flag-managed only, with no operator env override.
+    defaultValue: "off",
+    // New host-side reader (ENG-8401): its consumer lands in the agt-cli build
+    // this PR publishes (auto-publish patch-bumps from npm's current 0.28.503 →
+    // 0.28.504), so a flip only takes effect on hosts running >= that version.
+    // Best-effort reach estimate only; not part of the schema fingerprint.
+    since: "0.28.504"
+  },
   {
     key: "composio-hitl-mode",
     description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls and route them to Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card). Since ENG-7828 enforce ALWAYS routes to a Human Approval card by default; set hitl-approval-routing=off to make enforce a hard block with no approval instead. Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",

package/dist/mcp/origami.js

@@ -41012,6 +41012,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // safety control, so mutations require explicit confirmation.
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "docker-hygiene",
+    description: "Manager-side docker hygiene on Docker-isolated hosts (ENG-8401): off = no-op, reap-superseded = after a successful agt-runtime retag, remove the prior untagged agt-runtime images that retag orphaned (Layer 1), full = reap-superseded plus a daily dangling-only image+builder prune (Layer 2). agt-runtime:latest and the just-pulled image are never removed and -a/--volumes are never used. Read host-side via hostFlagStore (getString); ships dark.",
+    flagType: "enum",
+    allowedValues: ["off", "reap-superseded", "full"],
+    // Declared safe value is `off`: this flag introduces NEW janitorial behaviour
+    // (the pre-flag compiled behaviour is "never reap"), so off preserves fleet
+    // behaviour on rollout. Not `sensitive` — weakening it (full → off) only stops
+    // cleanup; it relaxes no safety/enforcement control. No envVar by design: this
+    // gate is flag-managed only, with no operator env override.
+    defaultValue: "off",
+    // New host-side reader (ENG-8401): its consumer lands in the agt-cli build
+    // this PR publishes (auto-publish patch-bumps from npm's current 0.28.503 →
+    // 0.28.504), so a flip only takes effect on hosts running >= that version.
+    // Best-effort reach estimate only; not part of the schema fingerprint.
+    since: "0.28.504"
+  },
   {
     key: "composio-hitl-mode",
     description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls and route them to Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card). Since ENG-7828 enforce ALWAYS routes to a Human Approval card by default; set hitl-approval-routing=off to make enforce a hard block with no approval instead. Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",

package/dist/mcp/slack-channel.js

@@ -35290,6 +35290,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // safety control, so mutations require explicit confirmation.
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "docker-hygiene",
+    description: "Manager-side docker hygiene on Docker-isolated hosts (ENG-8401): off = no-op, reap-superseded = after a successful agt-runtime retag, remove the prior untagged agt-runtime images that retag orphaned (Layer 1), full = reap-superseded plus a daily dangling-only image+builder prune (Layer 2). agt-runtime:latest and the just-pulled image are never removed and -a/--volumes are never used. Read host-side via hostFlagStore (getString); ships dark.",
+    flagType: "enum",
+    allowedValues: ["off", "reap-superseded", "full"],
+    // Declared safe value is `off`: this flag introduces NEW janitorial behaviour
+    // (the pre-flag compiled behaviour is "never reap"), so off preserves fleet
+    // behaviour on rollout. Not `sensitive` — weakening it (full → off) only stops
+    // cleanup; it relaxes no safety/enforcement control. No envVar by design: this
+    // gate is flag-managed only, with no operator env override.
+    defaultValue: "off",
+    // New host-side reader (ENG-8401): its consumer lands in the agt-cli build
+    // this PR publishes (auto-publish patch-bumps from npm's current 0.28.503 →
+    // 0.28.504), so a flip only takes effect on hosts running >= that version.
+    // Best-effort reach estimate only; not part of the schema fingerprint.
+    since: "0.28.504"
+  },
   {
     key: "composio-hitl-mode",
     description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls and route them to Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card). Since ENG-7828 enforce ALWAYS routes to a Human Approval card by default; set hitl-approval-routing=off to make enforce a hard block with no approval instead. Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",

package/dist/mcp/telegram-channel.js

@@ -35616,6 +35616,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // safety control, so mutations require explicit confirmation.
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "docker-hygiene",
+    description: "Manager-side docker hygiene on Docker-isolated hosts (ENG-8401): off = no-op, reap-superseded = after a successful agt-runtime retag, remove the prior untagged agt-runtime images that retag orphaned (Layer 1), full = reap-superseded plus a daily dangling-only image+builder prune (Layer 2). agt-runtime:latest and the just-pulled image are never removed and -a/--volumes are never used. Read host-side via hostFlagStore (getString); ships dark.",
+    flagType: "enum",
+    allowedValues: ["off", "reap-superseded", "full"],
+    // Declared safe value is `off`: this flag introduces NEW janitorial behaviour
+    // (the pre-flag compiled behaviour is "never reap"), so off preserves fleet
+    // behaviour on rollout. Not `sensitive` — weakening it (full → off) only stops
+    // cleanup; it relaxes no safety/enforcement control. No envVar by design: this
+    // gate is flag-managed only, with no operator env override.
+    defaultValue: "off",
+    // New host-side reader (ENG-8401): its consumer lands in the agt-cli build
+    // this PR publishes (auto-publish patch-bumps from npm's current 0.28.503 →
+    // 0.28.504), so a flip only takes effect on hosts running >= that version.
+    // Best-effort reach estimate only; not part of the schema fingerprint.
+    since: "0.28.504"
+  },
   {
     key: "composio-hitl-mode",
     description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls and route them to Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card). Since ENG-7828 enforce ALWAYS routes to a Human Approval card by default; set hitl-approval-routing=off to make enforce a hard block with no approval instead. Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",

package/dist/{persistent-session-4PVEGHA5.js → persistent-session-AB4SAH5B.js}

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ import {
   writeDirectChatSessionState,
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
-} from "./chunk-GBSMIV4P.js";
+} from "./chunk-HEUDF73X.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 export {
   EGRESS_BASELINE_DOMAINS,
@@ -79,4 +79,4 @@ export {
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-4PVEGHA5.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-AB4SAH5B.js.map

package/dist/{responsiveness-probe-PNKFXRVF.js → responsiveness-probe-O4SCSCKC.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   paneLogPath
-} from "./chunk-GBSMIV4P.js";
+} from "./chunk-HEUDF73X.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 
 // src/lib/responsiveness-probe.ts
@@ -662,4 +662,4 @@ export {
   readAndResetSlackReplyBindingClassifications,
   readAndResetSlackReplyTargetClassifications
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-PNKFXRVF.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-O4SCSCKC.js.map

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@integrity-labs/agt-cli",
-  "version": "0.28.503",
+  "version": "0.28.504",
   "description": "Augmented Team CLI — agent provisioning and management",
   "type": "module",
   "engines": {