@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.503 → 0.28.504

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@@ -4977,7 +4977,36 @@ var OAUTH_PROVIDERS = {
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  // products/commerce/analytics per CS-1427). Best-effort + idempotent: an
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  // unknown/unscoped name is logged and skipped by the proxy, and the
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  // toolAllowlist above still caps what is actually callable.
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- preEnableToolsets: ["courses", "products", "commerce", "analytics", "pages", "themes"]
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+ //
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+ // ENG-8392: `contacts` + `emails` were missing, so thirteen allowlisted
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+ // tools were unreachable by construction — list_tags, create_tag,
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+ // tag_contact, untag_contact, list_segments, create_segment,
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+ // update_segment (contacts) and list_broadcasts, get_broadcast,
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+ // create_broadcast, list_sequences, get_sequence, create_sequence
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+ // (emails). A customer agent was blocked on exactly those.
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+ //
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+ // These two ids are Kajabi's OWN spelling, not ours: the server names the
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+ // toolset in its rejection, e.g. `list_tags` returns
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+ // "The 'contacts' toolset is not active. Call enable_toolset with
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+ // name: 'contacts' to activate it first."
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+ // and `list_sequences` returns the same with 'emails'. Sourced that way
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+ // deliberately — a wrong id here is logged and SKIPPED by the proxy, so a
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+ // guess would look applied and change nothing.
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+ //
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+ // Why this went unnoticed for four rounds: `get_contacts_analytics` lives
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+ // in the `analytics` group, which we already pre-enable. So the contacts
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+ // family read as partly alive (you could see a site's contact count and
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+ // growth curve) while every tag and segment call failed.
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+ preEnableToolsets: [
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+ "courses",
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+ "products",
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+ "commerce",
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+ "analytics",
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+ "pages",
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+ "themes",
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+ "contacts",
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+ "emails"
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+ ]
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  },
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  "notion-cli": {
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  // Notion's public OAuth app. Tokens are workspace-scoped and long-lived —
@@ -9961,6 +9990,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
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  // safety control, so mutations require explicit confirmation.
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  sensitive: true
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  },
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+ {
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+ key: "docker-hygiene",
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+ description: "Manager-side docker hygiene on Docker-isolated hosts (ENG-8401): off = no-op, reap-superseded = after a successful agt-runtime retag, remove the prior untagged agt-runtime images that retag orphaned (Layer 1), full = reap-superseded plus a daily dangling-only image+builder prune (Layer 2). agt-runtime:latest and the just-pulled image are never removed and -a/--volumes are never used. Read host-side via hostFlagStore (getString); ships dark.",
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+ flagType: "enum",
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+ allowedValues: ["off", "reap-superseded", "full"],
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+ // Declared safe value is `off`: this flag introduces NEW janitorial behaviour
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+ // (the pre-flag compiled behaviour is "never reap"), so off preserves fleet
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+ // behaviour on rollout. Not `sensitive` — weakening it (full → off) only stops
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+ // cleanup; it relaxes no safety/enforcement control. No envVar by design: this
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+ // gate is flag-managed only, with no operator env override.
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+ defaultValue: "off",
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+ // New host-side reader (ENG-8401): its consumer lands in the agt-cli build
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+ // this PR publishes (auto-publish patch-bumps from npm's current 0.28.503 →
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+ // 0.28.504), so a flip only takes effect on hosts running >= that version.
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+ // Best-effort reach estimate only; not part of the schema fingerprint.
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+ since: "0.28.504"
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+ },
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  {
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  key: "composio-hitl-mode",
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  description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls and route them to Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card). Since ENG-7828 enforce ALWAYS routes to a Human Approval card by default; set hitl-approval-routing=off to make enforce a hard block with no approval instead. Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",
@@ -14778,4 +14824,4 @@ export {
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  stopAllSessionsAndWait,
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  getProjectDir
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  };
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- //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-GBSMIV4P.js.map
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+ //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-HEUDF73X.js.map