@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.358 → 0.28.360

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
@@ -34185,6 +34185,16 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
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  // be in the browser-exposed public map.
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  public: true
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  },
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+ {
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+ key: "opencode-live-view",
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+ description: "opencode-native Live View / Diagnostics (ENG-7927): the agent Diagnostics tab renders a structured session transcript (messages + tool calls + reasoning) for opencode agents instead of the tmux pane, by polling GET /admin/agents/:id/opencode-transcript (which SSM-reads a redacted snapshot the manager writes) ~every 3s for a bounded window. Boolean gate; ships dark; when OFF the route returns feature_disabled and opencode agents show the static diagnostics snapshot. Claude Code agents are unaffected (they keep the tmux pane).",
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+ flagType: "boolean",
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+ defaultValue: false,
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+ // Read client-side by the Diagnostics tab (usePublicBooleanFlag), so it must
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+ // be in the browser-exposed public map. Additive viewer gate (like
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+ // admin-live-pane): not sensitive.
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+ public: true
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+ },
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  {
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  key: "github-backup",
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  description: "Org-level GitHub daily auto-backup (ENG-7646, ENG-7582 Part 2). Rollout kill-switch; ships dark. The enterprise ENTITLEMENT is enforced separately via plans.github_backup (getPlanForOrg); this flag only stages rollout on top of that entitlement.",
@@ -34771,6 +34781,19 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
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  // deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
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  sensitive: true
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  },
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+ {
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+ key: "email-guard-require-approval-enabled",
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+ description: "Platform enable-gate for the email-domain guardrail REQUIRE_APPROVAL stage (ENG-7939). When ON for an org, a scope at email_guard_stage=require_approval routes a send to a non-allowed domain into Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card) instead of a hard block: the rollout UI unlocks the option and the write routes accept require_approval. When OFF (default) the write routes reject require_approval and the UI shows it as not yet available, so no scope can select it. Structurally also depends on hitl-approval-routing being on (the approval broker fails closed to a hard block when routing is off). Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.",
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+ flagType: "boolean",
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+ // Declared safe value is `false` (require_approval is unselectable / inert). A flag-DB read
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+ // error degrades here, so a flags outage can never start routing customer email through a
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+ // half-wired approval path - the fail-closed direction. No envVar: net-new control with no
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+ // pre-flags env gate to migrate (ADR-0022).
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+ defaultValue: false,
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+ // Ungates a stage that changes how real customer email is handled (block becomes approval),
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+ // so it is a deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
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+ sensitive: true
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+ },
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  {
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  key: "slack-reply-binding",
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  description: "Slack reply-target binding (ENG-7396 / WS2, cross-thread reply routing): the model names which inbound it answers (inbound_id) and the server resolves the destination from its own verified record. shadow = classify + count only, routing unchanged; warn = same routing plus a tool-result note so the model self-corrects; enforce = route a bound reply to the registry thread and REJECT a reply whose target matches no inbound this process delivered. The channel server can't evaluate flags, so the manager materializes the resolved value into the AGT_SLACK_REPLY_BINDING spawn env (the operator/canary override, ADR-0022). Ships shadow.",
@@ -39948,6 +39948,16 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
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  // be in the browser-exposed public map.
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  public: true
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  },
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+ {
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+ key: "opencode-live-view",
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+ description: "opencode-native Live View / Diagnostics (ENG-7927): the agent Diagnostics tab renders a structured session transcript (messages + tool calls + reasoning) for opencode agents instead of the tmux pane, by polling GET /admin/agents/:id/opencode-transcript (which SSM-reads a redacted snapshot the manager writes) ~every 3s for a bounded window. Boolean gate; ships dark; when OFF the route returns feature_disabled and opencode agents show the static diagnostics snapshot. Claude Code agents are unaffected (they keep the tmux pane).",
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+ flagType: "boolean",
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+ defaultValue: false,
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+ // Read client-side by the Diagnostics tab (usePublicBooleanFlag), so it must
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+ // be in the browser-exposed public map. Additive viewer gate (like
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+ // admin-live-pane): not sensitive.
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+ public: true
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+ },
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  {
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  key: "github-backup",
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  description: "Org-level GitHub daily auto-backup (ENG-7646, ENG-7582 Part 2). Rollout kill-switch; ships dark. The enterprise ENTITLEMENT is enforced separately via plans.github_backup (getPlanForOrg); this flag only stages rollout on top of that entitlement.",
@@ -40534,6 +40544,19 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
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  // deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
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  sensitive: true
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  },
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+ {
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+ key: "email-guard-require-approval-enabled",
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+ description: "Platform enable-gate for the email-domain guardrail REQUIRE_APPROVAL stage (ENG-7939). When ON for an org, a scope at email_guard_stage=require_approval routes a send to a non-allowed domain into Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card) instead of a hard block: the rollout UI unlocks the option and the write routes accept require_approval. When OFF (default) the write routes reject require_approval and the UI shows it as not yet available, so no scope can select it. Structurally also depends on hitl-approval-routing being on (the approval broker fails closed to a hard block when routing is off). Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.",
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+ flagType: "boolean",
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+ // Declared safe value is `false` (require_approval is unselectable / inert). A flag-DB read
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+ // error degrades here, so a flags outage can never start routing customer email through a
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+ // half-wired approval path - the fail-closed direction. No envVar: net-new control with no
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+ // pre-flags env gate to migrate (ADR-0022).
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+ defaultValue: false,
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+ // Ungates a stage that changes how real customer email is handled (block becomes approval),
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+ // so it is a deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
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+ sensitive: true
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+ },
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  {
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  key: "slack-reply-binding",
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  description: "Slack reply-target binding (ENG-7396 / WS2, cross-thread reply routing): the model names which inbound it answers (inbound_id) and the server resolves the destination from its own verified record. shadow = classify + count only, routing unchanged; warn = same routing plus a tool-result note so the model self-corrects; enforce = route a bound reply to the registry thread and REJECT a reply whose target matches no inbound this process delivered. The channel server can't evaluate flags, so the manager materializes the resolved value into the AGT_SLACK_REPLY_BINDING spawn env (the operator/canary override, ADR-0022). Ships shadow.",
@@ -33867,6 +33867,16 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
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  // be in the browser-exposed public map.
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  public: true
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  },
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+ {
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+ key: "opencode-live-view",
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+ description: "opencode-native Live View / Diagnostics (ENG-7927): the agent Diagnostics tab renders a structured session transcript (messages + tool calls + reasoning) for opencode agents instead of the tmux pane, by polling GET /admin/agents/:id/opencode-transcript (which SSM-reads a redacted snapshot the manager writes) ~every 3s for a bounded window. Boolean gate; ships dark; when OFF the route returns feature_disabled and opencode agents show the static diagnostics snapshot. Claude Code agents are unaffected (they keep the tmux pane).",
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+ flagType: "boolean",
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+ defaultValue: false,
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+ // Read client-side by the Diagnostics tab (usePublicBooleanFlag), so it must
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+ // be in the browser-exposed public map. Additive viewer gate (like
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+ // admin-live-pane): not sensitive.
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+ public: true
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+ },
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  {
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  key: "github-backup",
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  description: "Org-level GitHub daily auto-backup (ENG-7646, ENG-7582 Part 2). Rollout kill-switch; ships dark. The enterprise ENTITLEMENT is enforced separately via plans.github_backup (getPlanForOrg); this flag only stages rollout on top of that entitlement.",
@@ -34453,6 +34463,19 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
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  // deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
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  sensitive: true
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  },
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+ {
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+ key: "email-guard-require-approval-enabled",
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+ description: "Platform enable-gate for the email-domain guardrail REQUIRE_APPROVAL stage (ENG-7939). When ON for an org, a scope at email_guard_stage=require_approval routes a send to a non-allowed domain into Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card) instead of a hard block: the rollout UI unlocks the option and the write routes accept require_approval. When OFF (default) the write routes reject require_approval and the UI shows it as not yet available, so no scope can select it. Structurally also depends on hitl-approval-routing being on (the approval broker fails closed to a hard block when routing is off). Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.",
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+ flagType: "boolean",
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+ // Declared safe value is `false` (require_approval is unselectable / inert). A flag-DB read
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+ // error degrades here, so a flags outage can never start routing customer email through a
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+ // half-wired approval path - the fail-closed direction. No envVar: net-new control with no
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+ // pre-flags env gate to migrate (ADR-0022).
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+ defaultValue: false,
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+ // Ungates a stage that changes how real customer email is handled (block becomes approval),
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+ // so it is a deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
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+ sensitive: true
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+ },
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  {
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  key: "slack-reply-binding",
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  description: "Slack reply-target binding (ENG-7396 / WS2, cross-thread reply routing): the model names which inbound it answers (inbound_id) and the server resolves the destination from its own verified record. shadow = classify + count only, routing unchanged; warn = same routing plus a tool-result note so the model self-corrects; enforce = route a bound reply to the registry thread and REJECT a reply whose target matches no inbound this process delivered. The channel server can't evaluate flags, so the manager materializes the resolved value into the AGT_SLACK_REPLY_BINDING spawn env (the operator/canary override, ADR-0022). Ships shadow.",
@@ -34217,6 +34217,16 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
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  // be in the browser-exposed public map.
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  public: true
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  },
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+ {
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+ key: "opencode-live-view",
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+ description: "opencode-native Live View / Diagnostics (ENG-7927): the agent Diagnostics tab renders a structured session transcript (messages + tool calls + reasoning) for opencode agents instead of the tmux pane, by polling GET /admin/agents/:id/opencode-transcript (which SSM-reads a redacted snapshot the manager writes) ~every 3s for a bounded window. Boolean gate; ships dark; when OFF the route returns feature_disabled and opencode agents show the static diagnostics snapshot. Claude Code agents are unaffected (they keep the tmux pane).",
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+ flagType: "boolean",
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+ defaultValue: false,
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+ // Read client-side by the Diagnostics tab (usePublicBooleanFlag), so it must
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+ // be in the browser-exposed public map. Additive viewer gate (like
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+ // admin-live-pane): not sensitive.
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+ public: true
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+ },
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  {
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  key: "github-backup",
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  description: "Org-level GitHub daily auto-backup (ENG-7646, ENG-7582 Part 2). Rollout kill-switch; ships dark. The enterprise ENTITLEMENT is enforced separately via plans.github_backup (getPlanForOrg); this flag only stages rollout on top of that entitlement.",
@@ -34803,6 +34813,19 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
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  // deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
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  sensitive: true
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  },
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+ {
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+ key: "email-guard-require-approval-enabled",
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+ description: "Platform enable-gate for the email-domain guardrail REQUIRE_APPROVAL stage (ENG-7939). When ON for an org, a scope at email_guard_stage=require_approval routes a send to a non-allowed domain into Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card) instead of a hard block: the rollout UI unlocks the option and the write routes accept require_approval. When OFF (default) the write routes reject require_approval and the UI shows it as not yet available, so no scope can select it. Structurally also depends on hitl-approval-routing being on (the approval broker fails closed to a hard block when routing is off). Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.",
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+ flagType: "boolean",
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+ // Declared safe value is `false` (require_approval is unselectable / inert). A flag-DB read
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+ // error degrades here, so a flags outage can never start routing customer email through a
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+ // half-wired approval path - the fail-closed direction. No envVar: net-new control with no
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+ // pre-flags env gate to migrate (ADR-0022).
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+ defaultValue: false,
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+ // Ungates a stage that changes how real customer email is handled (block becomes approval),
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+ // so it is a deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
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+ sensitive: true
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+ },
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  {
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  key: "slack-reply-binding",
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  description: "Slack reply-target binding (ENG-7396 / WS2, cross-thread reply routing): the model names which inbound it answers (inbound_id) and the server resolves the destination from its own verified record. shadow = classify + count only, routing unchanged; warn = same routing plus a tool-result note so the model self-corrects; enforce = route a bound reply to the registry thread and REJECT a reply whose target matches no inbound this process delivered. The channel server can't evaluate flags, so the manager materializes the resolved value into the AGT_SLACK_REPLY_BINDING spawn env (the operator/canary override, ADR-0022). Ships shadow.",
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ import {
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  writeDirectChatSessionState,
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  writeEgressAllowlist,
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  writePersistentClaudeWrapper
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- } from "./chunk-HTBXOXPI.js";
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+ } from "./chunk-Z7QR2YEJ.js";
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  import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
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  export {
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  EGRESS_BASELINE_DOMAINS,
@@ -77,4 +77,4 @@ export {
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  writeEgressAllowlist,
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  writePersistentClaudeWrapper
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  };
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- //# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-LFCRKYPY.js.map
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+ //# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-7XG63YFS.js.map
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  import {
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  paneLogPath
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- } from "./chunk-HTBXOXPI.js";
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+ } from "./chunk-Z7QR2YEJ.js";
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  import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
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  // src/lib/responsiveness-probe.ts
@@ -437,4 +437,4 @@ export {
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  readAndResetSlackReplyBindingClassifications,
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  readAndResetSlackReplyTargetClassifications
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  };
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- //# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-DUO2RA6D.js.map
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+ //# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-JV6PRDKD.js.map
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "@integrity-labs/agt-cli",
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- "version": "0.28.358",
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+ "version": "0.28.360",
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  "description": "Augmented Team CLI — agent provisioning and management",
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  "type": "module",
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  "engines": {