@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.358 → 0.28.360

package/dist/{chunk-HTBXOXPI.js → chunk-Z7QR2YEJ.js}

@@ -7628,6 +7628,16 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // be in the browser-exposed public map.
     public: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "opencode-live-view",
+    description: "opencode-native Live View / Diagnostics (ENG-7927): the agent Diagnostics tab renders a structured session transcript (messages + tool calls + reasoning) for opencode agents instead of the tmux pane, by polling GET /admin/agents/:id/opencode-transcript (which SSM-reads a redacted snapshot the manager writes) ~every 3s for a bounded window. Boolean gate; ships dark; when OFF the route returns feature_disabled and opencode agents show the static diagnostics snapshot. Claude Code agents are unaffected (they keep the tmux pane).",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Read client-side by the Diagnostics tab (usePublicBooleanFlag), so it must
+    // be in the browser-exposed public map. Additive viewer gate (like
+    // admin-live-pane): not sensitive.
+    public: true
+  },
   {
     key: "github-backup",
     description: "Org-level GitHub daily auto-backup (ENG-7646, ENG-7582 Part 2). Rollout kill-switch; ships dark. The enterprise ENTITLEMENT is enforced separately via plans.github_backup (getPlanForOrg); this flag only stages rollout on top of that entitlement.",
@@ -8214,6 +8224,19 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "email-guard-require-approval-enabled",
+    description: "Platform enable-gate for the email-domain guardrail REQUIRE_APPROVAL stage (ENG-7939). When ON for an org, a scope at email_guard_stage=require_approval routes a send to a non-allowed domain into Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card) instead of a hard block: the rollout UI unlocks the option and the write routes accept require_approval. When OFF (default) the write routes reject require_approval and the UI shows it as not yet available, so no scope can select it. Structurally also depends on hitl-approval-routing being on (the approval broker fails closed to a hard block when routing is off). Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Declared safe value is `false` (require_approval is unselectable / inert). A flag-DB read
+    // error degrades here, so a flags outage can never start routing customer email through a
+    // half-wired approval path - the fail-closed direction. No envVar: net-new control with no
+    // pre-flags env gate to migrate (ADR-0022).
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Ungates a stage that changes how real customer email is handled (block becomes approval),
+    // so it is a deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "slack-reply-binding",
     description: "Slack reply-target binding (ENG-7396 / WS2, cross-thread reply routing): the model names which inbound it answers (inbound_id) and the server resolves the destination from its own verified record. shadow = classify + count only, routing unchanged; warn = same routing plus a tool-result note so the model self-corrects; enforce = route a bound reply to the registry thread and REJECT a reply whose target matches no inbound this process delivered. The channel server can't evaluate flags, so the manager materializes the resolved value into the AGT_SLACK_REPLY_BINDING spawn env (the operator/canary override, ADR-0022). Ships shadow.",
@@ -10177,4 +10200,4 @@ export {
   stopAllSessionsAndWait,
   getProjectDir
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-HTBXOXPI.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-Z7QR2YEJ.js.map