@iaforged/context-code 1.0.63 → 1.0.67

package/dist/src/commands/review.js

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-import { isUltrareviewEnabled } from './review/ultrareviewEnabled.js';
-// Legal wants the explicit surface name plus a docs link visible before the
-// user triggers, so the description carries "Context Code on the web" + URL.
-const CCR_TERMS_URL = 'https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-code-on-the-web';
-const LOCAL_REVIEW_PROMPT = (args) => `
-      Eres un experto revisor de código. Sigue estos pasos:
-
-      1. Si no se proporciona un número de PR en los argumentos, ejecuta \`gh pr list\` para mostrar las PR abiertas.
-      2. Si se proporciona un número de PR, ejecuta \`gh pr view <numero>\` para obtener los detalles de la PR.
-      3. Ejecuta \`gh pr diff <numero>\` para obtener el diff.
-      4. Analiza los cambios y proporciona una revisión de código exhaustiva que incluya:
-         - Resumen de lo que hace la PR.
-         - Análisis de la calidad y el estilo del código.
-         - Sugerencias específicas de mejora.
-         - Cualquier problema o riesgo potencial.
-
-      Mantén tu revisión concisa pero exhaustiva. Encamina tu atención a:
-      - Corrección del código.
-      - Seguimiento de las convenciones del proyecto.
-      - Implicaciones de rendimiento.
-      - Cobertura de pruebas.
-      - Consideraciones de seguridad.
-
-      Formatea tu revisión con secciones claras y puntos de viñeta.
-
-      Número de PR: ${args}
-    `;
-const review = {
-    type: 'prompt',
-    name: 'review',
-    description: 'Revisar una pull request',
-    progressMessage: 'revisando pull request',
-    contentLength: 0,
-    source: 'builtin',
-    async getPromptForCommand(args) {
-        return [{ type: 'text', text: LOCAL_REVIEW_PROMPT(args) }];
-    },
-};
-// /ultrareview is the ONLY entry point to the remote bughunter path —
-// /review stays purely local. local-jsx type renders the overage permission
-// dialog when free reviews are exhausted.
-const ultrareview = {
-    type: 'local-jsx',
-    name: 'ultrareview',
-    description: `~10–20 min · Encuentra y verifica errores en tu rama. Se ejecuta en Context Code en la web. Ver ${CCR_TERMS_URL}`,
-    isEnabled: () => isUltrareviewEnabled(),
-    load: () => import('./review/ultrareviewCommand.js'),
-};
-export default review;
-export { ultrareview };

package/dist/src/commands/rewind/index.js

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-const rewind = {
-    description: `Restaurar el código y/o la conversación a un punto anterior`,
-    name: 'rewind',
-    aliases: ['checkpoint'],
-    argumentHint: '',
-    type: 'local',
-    supportsNonInteractive: false,
-    load: () => import('./rewind.js'),
-};
-export default rewind;

package/dist/src/commands/rewind/rewind.js

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-export async function call(_args, context) {
-    if (context.openMessageSelector) {
-        context.openMessageSelector();
-    }
-    // Return a skip message to not append any messages.
-    return { type: 'skip' };
-}

package/dist/src/commands/sandbox-toggle/index.js

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-import figures from 'figures';
-import { SandboxManager } from '../../utils/sandbox/sandbox-adapter.js';
-const command = {
-    name: 'sandbox',
-    get description() {
-        const currentlyEnabled = SandboxManager.isSandboxingEnabled();
-        const autoAllow = SandboxManager.isAutoAllowBashIfSandboxedEnabled();
-        const allowUnsandboxed = SandboxManager.areUnsandboxedCommandsAllowed();
-        const isLocked = SandboxManager.areSandboxSettingsLockedByPolicy();
-        const hasDeps = SandboxManager.checkDependencies().errors.length === 0;
-        // Show warning icon if dependencies missing, otherwise enabled/disabled status
-        let icon;
-        if (!hasDeps) {
-            icon = figures.warning;
-        }
-        else {
-            icon = currentlyEnabled ? figures.tick : figures.circle;
-        }
-        let statusText = 'sandbox desactivado';
-        if (currentlyEnabled) {
-            statusText = autoAllow
-                ? 'sandbox activado (autorizar auto)'
-                : 'sandbox activado';
-            // Add unsandboxed fallback status
-            statusText += allowUnsandboxed ? ', fallback permitido' : '';
-        }
-        if (isLocked) {
-            statusText += ' (gestionado)';
-        }
-        return `${icon} ${statusText} (⏎ para configurar)`;
-    },
-    argumentHint: 'excluir "patrón de comando"',
-    get isHidden() {
-        return (!SandboxManager.isSupportedPlatform() ||
-            !SandboxManager.isPlatformInEnabledList());
-    },
-    immediate: true,
-    type: 'local-jsx',
-    load: () => import('./sandbox-toggle.js'),
-};
-export default command;

package/dist/src/commands/sandbox-toggle/sandbox-toggle.js

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-import { jsx as _jsx } from "react/jsx-runtime";
-import { relative } from 'path';
-import { getCwdState } from '../../bootstrap/state.js';
-import { SandboxSettings } from '../../components/sandbox/SandboxSettings.js';
-import { color } from '../../ink.js';
-import { getPlatform } from '../../utils/platform.js';
-import { addToExcludedCommands, SandboxManager } from '../../utils/sandbox/sandbox-adapter.js';
-import { getSettings_DEPRECATED, getSettingsFilePathForSource } from '../../utils/settings/settings.js';
-export async function call(onDone, _context, args) {
-    const settings = getSettings_DEPRECATED();
-    const themeName = settings.theme || 'light';
-    const platform = getPlatform();
-    if (!SandboxManager.isSupportedPlatform()) {
-        // WSL1 users will see this since isSupportedPlatform returns false for WSL1
-        const errorMessage = platform === 'wsl' ? 'Error: Sandboxing requires WSL2. WSL1 is not supported.' : 'Error: Sandboxing is currently only supported on macOS, Linux, and WSL2.';
-        const message = color('error', themeName)(errorMessage);
-        onDone(message);
-        return null;
-    }
-    // Check dependencies - get structured result with errors/warnings
-    const depCheck = SandboxManager.checkDependencies();
-    // Check if platform is in enabledPlatforms list (undocumented enterprise setting)
-    if (!SandboxManager.isPlatformInEnabledList()) {
-        const message = color('error', themeName)(`Error: Sandboxing is disabled for this platform (${platform}) via the enabledPlatforms setting.`);
-        onDone(message);
-        return null;
-    }
-    // Check if sandbox settings are locked by higher-priority settings
-    if (SandboxManager.areSandboxSettingsLockedByPolicy()) {
-        const message = color('error', themeName)('Error: Sandbox settings are overridden by a higher-priority configuration and cannot be changed locally.');
-        onDone(message);
-        return null;
-    }
-    // Parse the arguments
-    const trimmedArgs = args?.trim() || '';
-    // If no args, show the interactive menu
-    if (!trimmedArgs) {
-        return _jsx(SandboxSettings, { onComplete: onDone, depCheck: depCheck });
-    }
-    // Handle subcommands
-    if (trimmedArgs) {
-        const parts = trimmedArgs.split(' ');
-        const subcommand = parts[0];
-        if (subcommand === 'exclude') {
-            // Handle exclude subcommand
-            const commandPattern = trimmedArgs.slice('exclude '.length).trim();
-            if (!commandPattern) {
-                const message = color('error', themeName)('Error: Please provide a command pattern to exclude (e.g., /sandbox exclude "npm run test:*")');
-                onDone(message);
-                return null;
-            }
-            // Remove quotes if present
-            const cleanPattern = commandPattern.replace(/^["']|["']$/g, '');
-            // Add to excludedCommands
-            addToExcludedCommands(cleanPattern);
-            // Get the local settings path and make it relative to cwd
-            const localSettingsPath = getSettingsFilePathForSource('localSettings');
-            const relativePath = localSettingsPath ? relative(getCwdState(), localSettingsPath) : '.claude/settings.local.json';
-            const message = color('success', themeName)(`Added "${cleanPattern}" to excluded commands in ${relativePath}`);
-            onDone(message);
-            return null;
-        }
-        else {
-            // Unknown subcommand
-            const message = color('error', themeName)(`Error: Unknown subcommand "${subcommand}". Available subcommand: exclude`);
-            onDone(message);
-            return null;
-        }
-    }
-    // Should never reach here since we handle all cases above
-    return null;
-}

package/dist/src/commands/security-review.js

@@ -1,231 +0,0 @@
-import { parseFrontmatter } from '../utils/frontmatterParser.js';
-import { parseSlashCommandToolsFromFrontmatter } from '../utils/markdownConfigLoader.js';
-import { executeShellCommandsInPrompt } from '../utils/promptShellExecution.js';
-import { createMovedToPluginCommand } from './createMovedToPluginCommand.js';
-const SECURITY_REVIEW_MARKDOWN = `---
-allowed-tools: Bash(git diff:*), Bash(git status:*), Bash(git log:*), Bash(git show:*), Bash(git remote show:*), Read, Glob, Grep, LS, Task
-description: Complete a security review of the pending changes on the current branch
----
-
-You are a senior security engineer conducting a focused security review of the changes on this branch.
-
-GIT STATUS:
-
-\`\`\`
-!\`git status\`
-\`\`\`
-
-FILES MODIFIED:
-
-\`\`\`
-!\`git diff --name-only origin/HEAD...\`
-\`\`\`
-
-COMMITS:
-
-\`\`\`
-!\`git log --no-decorate origin/HEAD...\`
-\`\`\`
-
-DIFF CONTENT:
-
-\`\`\`
-!\`git diff origin/HEAD...\`
-\`\`\`
-
-Review the complete diff above. This contains all code changes in the PR.
-
-
-OBJECTIVE:
-Perform a security-focused code review to identify HIGH-CONFIDENCE security vulnerabilities that could have real exploitation potential. This is not a general code review - focus ONLY on security implications newly added by this PR. Do not comment on existing security concerns.
-
-CRITICAL INSTRUCTIONS:
-1. MINIMIZE FALSE POSITIVES: Only flag issues where you're >80% confident of actual exploitability
-2. AVOID NOISE: Skip theoretical issues, style concerns, or low-impact findings
-3. FOCUS ON IMPACT: Prioritize vulnerabilities that could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or system compromise
-4. EXCLUSIONS: Do NOT report the following issue types:
-   - Denial of Service (DOS) vulnerabilities, even if they allow service disruption
-   - Secrets or sensitive data stored on disk (these are handled by other processes)
-   - Rate limiting or resource exhaustion issues
-
-SECURITY CATEGORIES TO EXAMINE:
-
-**Input Validation Vulnerabilities:**
-- SQL injection via unsanitized user input
-- Command injection in system calls or subprocesses
-- XXE injection in XML parsing
-- Template injection in templating engines
-- NoSQL injection in database queries
-- Path traversal in file operations
-
-**Authentication & Authorization Issues:**
-- Authentication bypass logic
-- Privilege escalation paths
-- Session management flaws
-- JWT token vulnerabilities
-- Authorization logic bypasses
-
-**Crypto & Secrets Management:**
-- Hardcoded API keys, passwords, or tokens
-- Weak cryptographic algorithms or implementations
-- Improper key storage or management
-- Cryptographic randomness issues
-- Certificate validation bypasses
-
-**Injection & Code Execution:**
-- Remote code execution via deseralization
-- Pickle injection in Python
-- YAML deserialization vulnerabilities
-- Eval injection in dynamic code execution
-- XSS vulnerabilities in web applications (reflected, stored, DOM-based)
-
-**Data Exposure:**
-- Sensitive data logging or storage
-- PII handling violations
-- API endpoint data leakage
-- Debug information exposure
-
-Additional notes:
-- Even if something is only exploitable from the local network, it can still be a HIGH severity issue
-
-ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY:
-
-Phase 1 - Repository Context Research (Use file search tools):
-- Identify existing security frameworks and libraries in use
-- Look for established secure coding patterns in the codebase
-- Examine existing sanitization and validation patterns
-- Understand the project's security model and threat model
-
-Phase 2 - Comparative Analysis:
-- Compare new code changes against existing security patterns
-- Identify deviations from established secure practices
-- Look for inconsistent security implementations
-- Flag code that introduces new attack surfaces
-
-Phase 3 - Vulnerability Assessment:
-- Examine each modified file for security implications
-- Trace data flow from user inputs to sensitive operations
-- Look for privilege boundaries being crossed unsafely
-- Identify injection points and unsafe deserialization
-
-REQUIRED OUTPUT FORMAT:
-
-You MUST output your findings in markdown. The markdown output should contain the file, line number, severity, category (e.g. \`sql_injection\` or \`xss\`), description, exploit scenario, and fix recommendation.
-
-For example:
-
-# Vuln 1: XSS: \`foo.py:42\`
-
-* Severity: High
-* Description: User input from \`username\` parameter is directly interpolated into HTML without escaping, allowing reflected XSS attacks
-* Exploit Scenario: Attacker crafts URL like /bar?q=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script> to execute JavaScript in victim's browser, enabling session hijacking or data theft
-* Recommendation: Use Flask's escape() function or Jinja2 templates with auto-escaping enabled for all user inputs rendered in HTML
-
-SEVERITY GUIDELINES:
-- **HIGH**: Directly exploitable vulnerabilities leading to RCE, data breach, or authentication bypass
-- **MEDIUM**: Vulnerabilities requiring specific conditions but with significant impact
-- **LOW**: Defense-in-depth issues or lower-impact vulnerabilities
-
-CONFIDENCE SCORING:
-- 0.9-1.0: Certain exploit path identified, tested if possible
-- 0.8-0.9: Clear vulnerability pattern with known exploitation methods
-- 0.7-0.8: Suspicious pattern requiring specific conditions to exploit
-- Below 0.7: Don't report (too speculative)
-
-FINAL REMINDER:
-Focus on HIGH and MEDIUM findings only. Better to miss some theoretical issues than flood the report with false positives. Each finding should be something a security engineer would confidently raise in a PR review.
-
-FALSE POSITIVE FILTERING:
-
-> You do not need to run commands to reproduce the vulnerability, just read the code to determine if it is a real vulnerability. Do not use the bash tool or write to any files.
->
-> HARD EXCLUSIONS - Automatically exclude findings matching these patterns:
-> 1. Denial of Service (DOS) vulnerabilities or resource exhaustion attacks.
-> 2. Secrets or credentials stored on disk if they are otherwise secured.
-> 3. Rate limiting concerns or service overload scenarios.
-> 4. Memory consumption or CPU exhaustion issues.
-> 5. Lack of input validation on non-security-critical fields without proven security impact.
-> 6. Input sanitization concerns for GitHub Action workflows unless they are clearly triggerable via untrusted input.
-> 7. A lack of hardening measures. Code is not expected to implement all security best practices, only flag concrete vulnerabilities.
-> 8. Race conditions or timing attacks that are theoretical rather than practical issues. Only report a race condition if it is concretely problematic.
-> 9. Vulnerabilities related to outdated third-party libraries. These are managed separately and should not be reported here.
-> 10. Memory safety issues such as buffer overflows or use-after-free-vulnerabilities are impossible in rust. Do not report memory safety issues in rust or any other memory safe languages.
-> 11. Files that are only unit tests or only used as part of running tests.
-> 12. Log spoofing concerns. Outputting un-sanitized user input to logs is not a vulnerability.
-> 13. SSRF vulnerabilities that only control the path. SSRF is only a concern if it can control the host or protocol.
-> 14. Including user-controlled content in AI system prompts is not a vulnerability.
-> 15. Regex injection. Injecting untrusted content into a regex is not a vulnerability.
-> 16. Regex DOS concerns.
-> 16. Insecure documentation. Do not report any findings in documentation files such as markdown files.
-> 17. A lack of audit logs is not a vulnerability.
->
-> PRECEDENTS -
-> 1. Logging high value secrets in plaintext is a vulnerability. Logging URLs is assumed to be safe.
-> 2. UUIDs can be assumed to be unguessable and do not need to be validated.
-> 3. Environment variables and CLI flags are trusted values. Attackers are generally not able to modify them in a secure environment. Any attack that relies on controlling an environment variable is invalid.
-> 4. Resource management issues such as memory or file descriptor leaks are not valid.
-> 5. Subtle or low impact web vulnerabilities such as tabnabbing, XS-Leaks, prototype pollution, and open redirects should not be reported unless they are extremely high confidence.
-> 6. React and Angular are generally secure against XSS. These frameworks do not need to sanitize or escape user input unless it is using dangerouslySetInnerHTML, bypassSecurityTrustHtml, or similar methods. Do not report XSS vulnerabilities in React or Angular components or tsx files unless they are using unsafe methods.
-> 7. Most vulnerabilities in github action workflows are not exploitable in practice. Before validating a github action workflow vulnerability ensure it is concrete and has a very specific attack path.
-> 8. A lack of permission checking or authentication in client-side JS/TS code is not a vulnerability. Client-side code is not trusted and does not need to implement these checks, they are handled on the server-side. The same applies to all flows that send untrusted data to the backend, the backend is responsible for validating and sanitizing all inputs.
-> 9. Only include MEDIUM findings if they are obvious and concrete issues.
-> 10. Most vulnerabilities in ipython notebooks (*.ipynb files) are not exploitable in practice. Before validating a notebook vulnerability ensure it is concrete and has a very specific attack path where untrusted input can trigger the vulnerability.
-> 11. Logging non-PII data is not a vulnerability even if the data may be sensitive. Only report logging vulnerabilities if they expose sensitive information such as secrets, passwords, or personally identifiable information (PII).
-> 12. Command injection vulnerabilities in shell scripts are generally not exploitable in practice since shell scripts generally do not run with untrusted user input. Only report command injection vulnerabilities in shell scripts if they are concrete and have a very specific attack path for untrusted input.
->
-> SIGNAL QUALITY CRITERIA - For remaining findings, assess:
-> 1. Is there a concrete, exploitable vulnerability with a clear attack path?
-> 2. Does this represent a real security risk vs theoretical best practice?
-> 3. Are there specific code locations and reproduction steps?
-> 4. Would this finding be actionable for a security team?
->
-> For each finding, assign a confidence score from 1-10:
-> - 1-3: Low confidence, likely false positive or noise
-> - 4-6: Medium confidence, needs investigation
-> - 7-10: High confidence, likely true vulnerability
-
-START ANALYSIS:
-
-Begin your analysis now. Do this in 3 steps:
-
-1. Use a sub-task to identify vulnerabilities. Use the repository exploration tools to understand the codebase context, then analyze the PR changes for security implications. In the prompt for this sub-task, include all of the above.
-2. Then for each vulnerability identified by the above sub-task, create a new sub-task to filter out false-positives. Launch these sub-tasks as parallel sub-tasks. In the prompt for these sub-tasks, include everything in the "FALSE POSITIVE FILTERING" instructions.
-3. Filter out any vulnerabilities where the sub-task reported a confidence less than 8.
-
-Your final reply must contain the markdown report and nothing else.`;
-export default createMovedToPluginCommand({
-    name: 'security-review',
-    description: 'Complete a security review of the pending changes on the current branch',
-    progressMessage: 'analyzing code changes for security risks',
-    pluginName: 'security-review',
-    pluginCommand: 'security-review',
-    async getPromptWhileMarketplaceIsPrivate(_args, context) {
-        // Parse frontmatter from the markdown
-        const parsed = parseFrontmatter(SECURITY_REVIEW_MARKDOWN);
-        // Parse allowed tools from frontmatter
-        const allowedTools = parseSlashCommandToolsFromFrontmatter(parsed.frontmatter['allowed-tools']);
-        // Execute bash commands in the prompt
-        const processedContent = await executeShellCommandsInPrompt(parsed.content, {
-            ...context,
-            getAppState() {
-                const appState = context.getAppState();
-                return {
-                    ...appState,
-                    toolPermissionContext: {
-                        ...appState.toolPermissionContext,
-                        alwaysAllowRules: {
-                            ...appState.toolPermissionContext.alwaysAllowRules,
-                            command: allowedTools,
-                        },
-                    },
-                };
-            },
-        }, 'security-review');
-        return [
-            {
-                type: 'text',
-                text: processedContent,
-            },
-        ];
-    },
-});

package/dist/src/commands/session/index.js

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-import { getIsRemoteMode } from '../../bootstrap/state.js';
-const session = {
-    type: 'local-jsx',
-    name: 'session',
-    aliases: ['remote'],
-    description: 'Mostrar la URL de la sesión remota y el código QR',
-    isEnabled: () => getIsRemoteMode(),
-    get isHidden() {
-        return !getIsRemoteMode();
-    },
-    load: () => import('./session.js'),
-};
-export default session;

package/dist/src/commands/session/session.js

@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
-import { jsx as _jsx, jsxs as _jsxs } from "react/jsx-runtime";
-import { c as _c } from "react/compiler-runtime";
-import { toString as qrToString } from 'qrcode';
-import { useEffect, useState } from 'react';
-import { Pane } from '../../components/design-system/Pane.js';
-import { Box, Text } from '../../ink.js';
-import { useKeybinding } from '../../keybindings/useKeybinding.js';
-import { useAppState } from '../../state/AppState.js';
-import { logForDebugging } from '../../utils/debug.js';
-function SessionInfo(t0) {
-    const $ = _c(19);
-    const { onDone } = t0;
-    const remoteSessionUrl = useAppState(_temp);
-    const [qrCode, setQrCode] = useState("");
-    let t1;
-    let t2;
-    if ($[0] !== remoteSessionUrl) {
-        t1 = () => {
-            if (!remoteSessionUrl) {
-                return;
-            }
-            const url = remoteSessionUrl;
-            const generateQRCode = async function generateQRCode() {
-                const qr = await qrToString(url, {
-                    type: "utf8",
-                    errorCorrectionLevel: "L"
-                });
-                setQrCode(qr);
-            };
-            generateQRCode().catch(_temp2);
-        };
-        t2 = [remoteSessionUrl];
-        $[0] = remoteSessionUrl;
-        $[1] = t1;
-        $[2] = t2;
-    }
-    else {
-        t1 = $[1];
-        t2 = $[2];
-    }
-    useEffect(t1, t2);
-    let t3;
-    if ($[3] === Symbol.for("react.memo_cache_sentinel")) {
-        t3 = {
-            context: "Confirmation"
-        };
-        $[3] = t3;
-    }
-    else {
-        t3 = $[3];
-    }
-    useKeybinding("confirm:no", onDone, t3);
-    if (!remoteSessionUrl) {
-        let t4;
-        if ($[4] === Symbol.for("react.memo_cache_sentinel")) {
-            t4 = _jsxs(Pane, { children: [_jsx(Text, { color: "warning", children: "No est\u00E1 en modo remoto. Inicia con `context --remote` para usar este comando." }), _jsx(Text, { dimColor: true, children: "(presiona esc para cerrar)" })] });
-            $[4] = t4;
-        }
-        else {
-            t4 = $[4];
-        }
-        return t4;
-    }
-    let T0;
-    let t4;
-    let t5;
-    if ($[5] !== qrCode) {
-        const lines = qrCode.split("\n").filter(_temp3);
-        const isLoading = lines.length === 0;
-        T0 = Pane;
-        if ($[9] === Symbol.for("react.memo_cache_sentinel")) {
-            t4 = _jsx(Box, { marginBottom: 1, children: _jsx(Text, { bold: true, children: "Remote session" }) });
-            $[9] = t4;
-        }
-        else {
-            t4 = $[9];
-        }
-        t5 = isLoading ? _jsx(Text, { dimColor: true, children: "Generating QR code\u2026" }) : lines.map(_temp4);
-        $[5] = qrCode;
-        $[6] = T0;
-        $[7] = t4;
-        $[8] = t5;
-    }
-    else {
-        T0 = $[6];
-        t4 = $[7];
-        t5 = $[8];
-    }
-    let t6;
-    if ($[10] === Symbol.for("react.memo_cache_sentinel")) {
-        t6 = _jsx(Text, { dimColor: true, children: "Open in browser: " });
-        $[10] = t6;
-    }
-    else {
-        t6 = $[10];
-    }
-    let t7;
-    if ($[11] !== remoteSessionUrl) {
-        t7 = _jsxs(Box, { marginTop: 1, children: [t6, _jsx(Text, { color: "ide", children: remoteSessionUrl })] });
-        $[11] = remoteSessionUrl;
-        $[12] = t7;
-    }
-    else {
-        t7 = $[12];
-    }
-    let t8;
-    if ($[13] === Symbol.for("react.memo_cache_sentinel")) {
-        t8 = _jsx(Box, { marginTop: 1, children: _jsx(Text, { dimColor: true, children: "(press esc to close)" }) });
-        $[13] = t8;
-    }
-    else {
-        t8 = $[13];
-    }
-    let t9;
-    if ($[14] !== T0 || $[15] !== t4 || $[16] !== t5 || $[17] !== t7) {
-        t9 = _jsxs(T0, { children: [t4, t5, t7, t8] });
-        $[14] = T0;
-        $[15] = t4;
-        $[16] = t5;
-        $[17] = t7;
-        $[18] = t9;
-    }
-    else {
-        t9 = $[18];
-    }
-    return t9;
-}
-function _temp4(line_0, i) {
-    return _jsx(Text, { children: line_0 }, i);
-}
-function _temp3(line) {
-    return line.length > 0;
-}
-function _temp2(e) {
-    logForDebugging("QR code generation failed", e);
-}
-function _temp(s) {
-    return s.remoteSessionUrl;
-}
-export const call = async (onDone) => {
-    return _jsx(SessionInfo, { onDone: onDone });
-};

package/dist/src/commands/share/index.js

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export default { isEnabled: () => false, isHidden: true, name: 'stub' };

package/dist/src/commands/skills/index.js

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-const skills = {
-    type: 'local-jsx',
-    name: 'skills',
-    description: 'Listar las habilidades disponibles',
-    load: () => import('./skills.js'),
-};
-export default skills;

package/dist/src/commands/skills/skills.js

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-import { jsx as _jsx } from "react/jsx-runtime";
-import { SkillsMenu } from '../../components/skills/SkillsMenu.js';
-export async function call(onDone, context) {
-    return _jsx(SkillsMenu, { onExit: onDone, commands: context.options.commands });
-}

package/dist/src/commands/stats/index.js

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-const stats = {
-    type: 'local-jsx',
-    name: 'stats',
-    description: 'Muestra tus estadísticas de uso y actividad de Context Code',
-    load: () => import('./stats.js'),
-};
-export default stats;

package/dist/src/commands/stats/stats.js

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-import { jsx as _jsx } from "react/jsx-runtime";
-import { Stats } from '../../components/Stats.js';
-export const call = async (onDone) => {
-    return _jsx(Stats, { onClose: onDone });
-};

package/dist/src/commands/status/index.js

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-const status = {
-    type: 'local-jsx',
-    name: 'status',
-    description: 'Muestra el estado de Context Code, incluyendo la versión, modelo, cuenta, conectividad de API y estado de las herramientas',
-    immediate: true,
-    load: () => import('./status.js'),
-};
-export default status;

package/dist/src/commands/status/status.js

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-import { jsx as _jsx } from "react/jsx-runtime";
-import { Settings } from '../../components/Settings/Settings.js';
-export async function call(onDone, context) {
-    return _jsx(Settings, { onClose: onDone, context: context, defaultTab: "Status" });
-}

package/dist/src/commands/statusline.js

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-import { AGENT_TOOL_NAME } from '../tools/AgentTool/constants.js';
-const statusline = {
-    type: 'prompt',
-    description: 'Configurar la interfaz de la línea de estado de Context Code',
-    contentLength: 0,
-    // Dynamic content
-    aliases: [],
-    name: 'statusline',
-    progressMessage: 'setting up statusLine',
-    allowedTools: [AGENT_TOOL_NAME, 'Read(~/**)', 'Edit(~/.claude/settings.json)'],
-    source: 'builtin',
-    disableNonInteractive: true,
-    async getPromptForCommand(args) {
-        const prompt = args.trim() || 'Configure my statusLine from my shell PS1 configuration';
-        return [{
-                type: 'text',
-                text: `Create an ${AGENT_TOOL_NAME} with subagent_type "statusline-setup" and the prompt "${prompt}"`
-            }];
-    }
-};
-export default statusline;
-//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;charset=utf-8;base64,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

package/dist/src/commands/stickers/index.js

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-const stickers = {
-    type: 'local',
-    name: 'stickers',
-    description: 'Pedir pegatinas (stickers) de Context Code',
-    supportsNonInteractive: false,
-    load: () => import('./stickers.js'),
-};
-export default stickers;