@holmes-lab/holmes-kit 0.35.1 → 0.35.3

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Files changed (35) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +72 -0
  2. package/README.md +6 -3
  3. package/dist/.build-id +1 -1
  4. package/dist/holmes/cli/approve.js +9 -2
  5. package/dist/holmes/cli/doctor.js +21 -2
  6. package/dist/holmes/cli/init.d.ts +2 -0
  7. package/dist/holmes/cli/init.js +37 -1
  8. package/dist/holmes/cli/runtime-binding.d.ts +16 -0
  9. package/dist/holmes/cli/runtime-binding.js +62 -2
  10. package/dist/holmes/governance/approval-grants.d.ts +7 -0
  11. package/dist/holmes/governance/approval-grants.js +8 -2
  12. package/dist/holmes/governance/approval-queue.d.ts +5 -0
  13. package/dist/holmes/governance/approval-queue.js +14 -3
  14. package/dist/holmes/governance/autonomy.d.ts +10 -1
  15. package/dist/holmes/governance/autonomy.js +66 -14
  16. package/dist/holmes/guardrail/risk-classifier.js +32 -3
  17. package/dist/holmes/guardrail/write-verb-word.d.ts +13 -0
  18. package/dist/holmes/guardrail/write-verb-word.js +55 -0
  19. package/dist/holmes/hooks/pre-tool-use.d.ts +2 -0
  20. package/dist/holmes/hooks/pre-tool-use.js +32 -9
  21. package/dist/holmes/mcp/approval-policy.d.ts +4 -1
  22. package/dist/holmes/mcp/approval-policy.js +5 -4
  23. package/dist/holmes/mcp/elicit-approval.d.ts +0 -2
  24. package/dist/holmes/mcp/elicit-approval.js +3 -4
  25. package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/review-evidence.d.ts +1 -2
  26. package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/review-evidence.js +4 -12
  27. package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/spec-approval.d.ts +2 -2
  28. package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/spec-approval.js +18 -11
  29. package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers.d.ts +1 -9
  30. package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers.js +7 -7
  31. package/dist/holmes/mcp/harness-attestation.d.ts +10 -1
  32. package/dist/holmes/mcp/harness-attestation.js +70 -3
  33. package/dist/holmes/mcp/operator-recovery.js +4 -1
  34. package/dist/holmes/mcp/server.js +6 -3
  35. package/package.json +1 -1
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {
35
35
  Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
36
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  exports.createSpecApprovalHandlers = createSpecApprovalHandlers;
37
37
  exports.readProjectFile = readProjectFile;
38
- // @implements A-SPEC-718, A-SPEC-551.1, A-SPEC-551.2, A-SPEC-627.1, A-SPEC-622, A-SPEC-100.2, A-SPEC-128, A-SPEC-132, A-SPEC-133, A-SPEC-151, A-SPEC-188, A-SPEC-189, A-SPEC-244, A-SPEC-245, A-SPEC-729
38
+ // @implements A-SPEC-718.1, A-SPEC-718.2, A-SPEC-718, A-SPEC-551.1, A-SPEC-551.2, A-SPEC-627.1, A-SPEC-622, A-SPEC-100.2, A-SPEC-128, A-SPEC-132, A-SPEC-133, A-SPEC-151, A-SPEC-188, A-SPEC-189, A-SPEC-244, A-SPEC-245, A-SPEC-729
39
39
  // @implements A-SPEC-631, A-SPEC-733
40
40
  const fs = __importStar(require("node:fs"));
41
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  const compat_impact_1 = require("../../spec/compat-impact");
@@ -89,6 +89,10 @@ function createSpecApprovalHandlers(context) {
89
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  // id helps no one — the standard refusal handles it).
90
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  let elicitExpiredMs;
91
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  let risk;
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+ // @implements A-SPEC-532.3 — which grading rule handed this seal to the operator (said in the refusal).
93
+ let autonomyNote = '';
94
+ // @implements A-SPEC-532.4 — the declared direction of a gate change sealed without the owner (said in the ledger).
95
+ let sealedDirection = '';
92
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  let subject;
93
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  // @implements A-SPEC-732 (round 2) — the digest a person or the autonomy grade decided on; the
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  // seal must be built from that same content.
@@ -179,9 +183,17 @@ function createSpecApprovalHandlers(context) {
179
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  })();
180
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  if (noIntake)
181
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  risk = 'hitl';
186
+ if (autonomyOn && risk === 'hitl') {
187
+ const rule = noIntake ? 'requirement-without-intake' : (0, autonomy_1.specApprovalAutonomyReason)(target.spec, resolver([target.spec]), below);
188
+ if (rule !== null)
189
+ autonomyNote = `\n[autonomy: this seal is the operator's — ${rule} (${(0, autonomy_1.autonomyRuleMeaning)(rule)})]`;
190
+ }
182
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  if (autonomyOn && risk === 'auto') {
183
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  approveResolved = { approval: autonomousApproval(below?.map((s) => s.id)), source: 'autonomous' };
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  decidedSubject = targetSubject;
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+ const direction = (0, autonomy_1.declaredGateDirection)(target.spec);
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+ if (direction !== null)
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+ sealedDirection = ` [gate change sealed without the owner — declared ${direction}]`;
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  }
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  else if (autonomyOn && !(0, autonomy_1.requiresAutonomousApprovalPrompt)(target.spec, below)) {
187
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  // @implements A-SPEC-551.1 — autonomous mode does not turn an ordinary HITL request
@@ -193,7 +205,7 @@ function createSpecApprovalHandlers(context) {
193
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  // The MODEL text is capped BEFORE the server markers are appended (round-2): a ~185+ char
194
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  // title pushed '(재봉인)' past the dialog's 200-char summary cap, dressing a re-seal (the
195
207
  // more consequential act) as a first approval. The cap cuts the title, never the marker.
196
- const out = await tryElicit('spec-approve', a.id, `${a.id} — ${target.spec.title.slice(0, 120)}${resealing ? ' (재봉인)' : ''}${noIntake ? ' (triage 기록 없음)' : ''}`, autonomyOn ? 'autonomous-approve' : 'queue');
208
+ const out = await tryElicit('spec-approve', a.id, `${a.id} — ${target.spec.title.slice(0, 120)}${resealing ? ' (재봉인)' : ''}${noIntake ? ' (triage 기록 없음)' : ''}`);
197
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  const presentation = out.kind === 'answered'
198
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  ? (out.decision.granted ? { kind: 'approve', reason: out.decision.reason } : { kind: 'deny', reason: out.decision.reason })
199
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  : out.kind === 'expired' ? { kind: 'timeout' } : { kind: 'unavailable' };
@@ -202,19 +214,14 @@ function createSpecApprovalHandlers(context) {
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  approveResolved = { approval: elicitApproval(out.kind === 'answered' ? out.decision.reason : undefined), source: 'elicitation' };
203
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  decidedSubject = targetSubject;
204
216
  }
205
- else if (decision.kind === 'approved' && presentation.kind === 'timeout') {
206
- approveResolved = { approval: autonomousApproval(undefined, 'timeout'), source: 'autonomous' };
207
- decidedSubject = targetSubject;
208
- }
209
217
  else if (out.kind === 'answered') {
210
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  // The human ANSWERED (deny/question/decline): the answer is the message, and no queue
211
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  // entry is filed — a decided request is not a pending one (REQ-246 visibility).
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  return { ok: false, reason: `spec_approve: 세션에서 거부됨 — ${out.decision.reason ?? '(사유 없음)'}. 사유를 해소한 뒤 다시 시도하십시오.` };
213
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  }
214
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  else if (out.kind === 'expired') {
215
- // @implements A-SPEC-718 — a direct in-session prompt may time out. Only an explicit
216
- // autonomous posture may turn that absence into a one-shot, audit-distinguishable grant.
217
- // OFF keeps the established fail-closed expiry + queue behavior.
223
+ // @implements A-SPEC-718.1 — a direct in-session prompt may time out. Silence is not a
224
+ // decision in any mode: the expiry is reported and the request stays in the queue.
218
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  elicitExpiredMs = out.waitedMs;
219
226
  }
220
227
  else if (out.kind === 'silent' && context.approvalAdapter().kind === 'host-gated-tool' && bindingOk()) {
@@ -244,7 +251,7 @@ function createSpecApprovalHandlers(context) {
244
251
  catch {
245
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  refusedGrants = '';
246
253
  }
247
- return { ok: false, reason: (elicitExpiredMs !== undefined ? (0, elicit_approval_1.expiredNotice)(elicitExpiredMs) : '') + refusedGrants + (context.approvalRouteNote?.() ?? '')
254
+ return { ok: false, reason: (elicitExpiredMs !== undefined ? (0, elicit_approval_1.expiredNotice)(elicitExpiredMs) : '') + refusedGrants + (context.approvalRouteNote?.() ?? '') + autonomyNote
248
255
  + 'spec_approve requires an out-of-band HOLMES_APPROVAL that COVERS this act — a request-payload approval is not a channel, and an expired or elsewhere-scoped token does not open this door (scoped approvals need kind "spec-approve"). (fail-closed)'
249
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  + context.refusalQueueHint(a.root, { kind: 'spec-approve', target: a.id, why: '스펙 봉인 승인', ...(subject ? { subject } : {}), ...(risk ? { risk } : {}) }) };
250
257
  }
@@ -392,7 +399,7 @@ function createSpecApprovalHandlers(context) {
392
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  ts: new Date().toISOString(),
393
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  actor: approveResolved.approval.actor,
394
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  kind: 'spec-approved',
395
- summary: `approved ${a.id} sealing ${digest}`,
402
+ summary: `approved ${a.id} sealing ${digest}${sealedDirection}`,
396
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  inputs: [a.id, digest],
397
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  rationale: approveResolved.approval.rationale,
398
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  authorization: (0, provenance_chain_1.authorizationRef)(approveResolved.approval.actor, approveResolved.approval.token),
@@ -406,15 +406,7 @@ declare function makeRawHandlers(store: SpecStore, opts?: ElicitOpts): {
406
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  root: string;
407
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  base?: string;
408
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  head?: string;
409
- since
410
- /**
411
- * A root the caller named that this process cannot read is the CALLER'S mistake, not a fault.
412
- * @implements A-SPEC-189 §10 (round 11)
413
- */
414
- ? /**
415
- * A root the caller named that this process cannot read is the CALLER'S mistake, not a fault.
416
- * @implements A-SPEC-189 §10 (round 11)
417
- */: string;
409
+ since?: string;
418
410
  }) => Promise<{
419
411
  requirementSemanticWarm?: {
420
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  tier: string;
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ exports.isHandlerRefusal = isHandlerRefusal;
38
38
  exports.unreadableAmong = unreadableAmong;
39
39
  exports.makeHandlers = makeHandlers;
40
40
  exports.collectDecisions = collectDecisions;
41
- // @implements A-SPEC-723, A-SPEC-720, A-SPEC-718, A-SPEC-703, A-SPEC-629, A-SPEC-628, A-SPEC-599, A-SPEC-603, A-SPEC-604, A-SPEC-605, A-SPEC-606, A-SPEC-607, A-SPEC-608, A-SPEC-609, A-SPEC-610, A-SPEC-611, A-SPEC-612, A-SPEC-613, A-SPEC-614, A-SPEC-615, A-SPEC-616, A-SPEC-617, A-SPEC-618, A-SPEC-621, A-SPEC-622, A-SPEC-624, A-SPEC-625, A-SPEC-627, A-SPEC-713, A-SPEC-732, A-SPEC-754
41
+ // @implements A-SPEC-718.1, A-SPEC-718.2, A-SPEC-723, A-SPEC-720, A-SPEC-718, A-SPEC-703, A-SPEC-629, A-SPEC-628, A-SPEC-599, A-SPEC-603, A-SPEC-604, A-SPEC-605, A-SPEC-606, A-SPEC-607, A-SPEC-608, A-SPEC-609, A-SPEC-610, A-SPEC-611, A-SPEC-612, A-SPEC-613, A-SPEC-614, A-SPEC-615, A-SPEC-616, A-SPEC-617, A-SPEC-618, A-SPEC-621, A-SPEC-622, A-SPEC-624, A-SPEC-625, A-SPEC-627, A-SPEC-713, A-SPEC-732, A-SPEC-754
42
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  const operator_recovery_1 = require("./operator-recovery");
43
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  // @implements A-SPEC-643
44
44
  // @implements A-SPEC-642
@@ -812,7 +812,7 @@ function makeRawHandlers(store, opts) {
812
812
  // other failure mode (no channel, wrong kind, a throwing elicitor) is `silent`, whose refusal
813
813
  // stays byte-identical to the pre-elicitation one — nothing is ever worse than before the
814
814
  // channel existed.
815
- const tryElicit = async (kind, target, summary, timeoutBehavior = 'queue') => {
815
+ const tryElicit = async (kind, target, summary) => {
816
816
  // @implements A-SPEC-540.1 — operator opt-out: with HOLMES_ELICIT=off the server never shows the
817
817
  // in-client prompt, folding to the byte-identical `silent` (refuse+enqueue) path so claude/agy/
818
818
  // codex all converge on one out-of-band surface (holmes-kit approve). Unset ⇒ unchanged.
@@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ function makeRawHandlers(store, opts) {
823
823
  if (!opts?.elicit || !elicit_approval_1.ELICITABLE_KINDS.has(kind))
824
824
  return { kind: 'silent' };
825
825
  try {
826
- return await opts.elicit({ kind, target, summary, timeoutBehavior });
826
+ return await opts.elicit({ kind, target, summary });
827
827
  }
828
828
  catch {
829
829
  return { kind: 'silent' };
@@ -845,11 +845,12 @@ function makeRawHandlers(store, opts) {
845
845
  // rides the existing seal path, but its actor names `autonomous:<client>` so an audit can tell a
846
846
  // self-approved seal from a human-approved (elicitation) or operator (env/grant) one. Single-use
847
847
  // by construction — it exists only inside this call, persisted nowhere.
848
- const autonomousApproval = (derivedFrom, source = 'immediate') => ({
849
- actor: `${source === 'timeout' ? 'autonomous-timeout' : 'autonomous'}:${opts?.clientName?.() ?? 'unknown'}`,
848
+ // @implements A-SPEC-718.1 — its only source is the grader's `auto`; an expired prompt never reaches it.
849
+ const autonomousApproval = (derivedFrom) => ({
850
+ actor: `autonomous:${opts?.clientName?.() ?? 'unknown'}`,
850
851
  token: crypto.randomUUID(),
851
852
  // @implements A-SPEC-587 — an upstream grade is DERIVED; the audit line names the A-SPECs it came from.
852
- rationale: `autonomous grant (${'HOLMES_AUTONOMOUS_APPROVAL'} enabled, ${source === 'timeout' ? 'in-session approval timeout' : 'spec grade auto'}${derivedFrom && derivedFrom.length > 0 ? ` — derived from ${derivedFrom.join(', ')}` : ''})`,
853
+ rationale: `autonomous grant (${'HOLMES_AUTONOMOUS_APPROVAL'} enabled, spec grade auto${derivedFrom && derivedFrom.length > 0 ? ` — derived from ${derivedFrom.join(', ')}` : ''})`,
853
854
  });
854
855
  // @implements A-SPEC-617, A-SPEC-100.2, A-SPEC-102.1, A-SPEC-133, A-SPEC-135, A-SPEC-141, A-SPEC-157, A-SPEC-160, A-SPEC-189, A-SPEC-191, A-SPEC-244, A-SPEC-245, A-SPEC-263.1, A-SPEC-497.1
855
856
  const reviewEvidence = (0, review_evidence_1.createReviewEvidenceHandlers)({
@@ -862,7 +863,6 @@ function makeRawHandlers(store, opts) {
862
863
  hasElicitor: () => Boolean(opts?.elicit),
863
864
  tryElicit,
864
865
  elicitApproval,
865
- autonomousApproval,
866
866
  resolveHandlerApproval: (root, approval, action, now) => resolveHandlerApproval(root, store, approval, action, now),
867
867
  refusalQueueHint: (root, request) => refusalQueueHint(root, store, request),
868
868
  });
@@ -14,7 +14,16 @@ export interface HarnessAttestation {
14
14
  harness?: string;
15
15
  reason?: string;
16
16
  }
17
+ /**
18
+ * @implements A-SPEC-751.3 — is `script` one of the operator runtime registry's own MCP dispatcher files, unchanged
19
+ * since its installation receipt. Measured 2026-10-04: A-SPEC-751 starts the server through
20
+ * `node <registry dir>/<harness>-mcp.js`; the walk below read that as a plain node script and stopped, so in-session
21
+ * approval was switched off on every workspace of a registered machine. Any read or parse failure is "no".
22
+ * Limit, stated: the receipt and the file are writable by the operator's own account — this shows the launcher is the
23
+ * installed dispatcher, not that the account is uncompromised (the trust the image check already rests on).
24
+ */
25
+ export declare function dispatcherVerifier(registryPath: string): (script: string) => boolean;
17
26
  /** Walk up from `pid` (the server's parent) through launchers to a harness executable. */
18
- export declare function attestHarness(pid: number, lookup: ProcLookup, maxDepth?: number): HarnessAttestation;
27
+ export declare function attestHarness(pid: number, lookup: ProcLookup, maxDepth?: number, isDispatcher?: (script: string) => boolean): HarnessAttestation;
19
28
  /** The live process table: `ps` on POSIX, CIM through PowerShell on Windows. Null when unreadable. */
20
29
  export declare function systemProcLookup(platform?: NodeJS.Platform): ProcLookup;
@@ -33,9 +33,10 @@ var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {
33
33
  };
34
34
  })();
35
35
  Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
36
+ exports.dispatcherVerifier = dispatcherVerifier;
36
37
  exports.attestHarness = attestHarness;
37
38
  exports.systemProcLookup = systemProcLookup;
38
- // @implements A-SPEC-732
39
+ // @implements A-SPEC-732, A-SPEC-751.3
39
40
  // In-session approval (a form, or the host-gated continuation) trusts the client that answers it. An
40
41
  // agent can start its own copy of this server, name itself `claude-code` and answer for a person
41
42
  // (measured, H7 round 1). So before offering either route, the server asks who launched it: the
@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ exports.systemProcLookup = systemProcLookup;
50
51
  const fs = __importStar(require("node:fs"));
51
52
  const path = __importStar(require("node:path"));
52
53
  const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process");
54
+ const node_crypto_1 = require("node:crypto");
53
55
  const HARNESS_EXES = new Set(['claude', 'codex', 'agy', 'antigravity']);
54
56
  const imageName = (image) => path.win32.basename(path.posix.basename(image)).toLowerCase().replace(/\.exe$/, '');
55
57
  /** `agy` and `antigravity` name the same harness. */
@@ -101,8 +103,66 @@ function isLauncher(args) {
101
103
  }
102
104
  return false;
103
105
  }
106
+ const NODE_PROGRAM_OPTIONS = new Set(['-e', '-p', '-r', '--eval', '--print', '--require', '--import', '--loader', '--experimental-loader']);
107
+ /** Quote-aware words of a process's argument string (the first is the executable). */
108
+ function argWords(args) {
109
+ const out = [];
110
+ const re = /"([^"]*)"|'([^']*)'|(\S+)/g;
111
+ for (let m = re.exec(args); m !== null; m = re.exec(args))
112
+ out.push(m[1] ?? m[2] ?? m[3]);
113
+ return out;
114
+ }
115
+ /**
116
+ * @implements A-SPEC-751.3 — the script a `node` process runs, or null when an option names a program or a preload
117
+ * (`-e`, `-r`, `--require`, `--import`, `--loader` …: such a process runs something other than its script).
118
+ * Options that take no program are stepped over; `--` ends options.
119
+ */
120
+ function nodeScriptOf(args) {
121
+ const words = argWords(args).slice(1);
122
+ for (let i = 0; i < words.length; i++) {
123
+ const w = words[i];
124
+ if (w === '--')
125
+ return words[i + 1] ?? null;
126
+ if (!w.startsWith('-'))
127
+ return w;
128
+ if (NODE_PROGRAM_OPTIONS.has(w.split('=')[0]) || !w.startsWith('--'))
129
+ return null;
130
+ }
131
+ return null;
132
+ }
133
+ /**
134
+ * @implements A-SPEC-751.3 — is `script` one of the operator runtime registry's own MCP dispatcher files, unchanged
135
+ * since its installation receipt. Measured 2026-10-04: A-SPEC-751 starts the server through
136
+ * `node <registry dir>/<harness>-mcp.js`; the walk below read that as a plain node script and stopped, so in-session
137
+ * approval was switched off on every workspace of a registered machine. Any read or parse failure is "no".
138
+ * Limit, stated: the receipt and the file are writable by the operator's own account — this shows the launcher is the
139
+ * installed dispatcher, not that the account is uncompromised (the trust the image check already rests on).
140
+ */
141
+ function dispatcherVerifier(registryPath) {
142
+ return (script) => {
143
+ try {
144
+ if (!path.isAbsolute(script))
145
+ return false;
146
+ const dir = fs.realpathSync.native(path.dirname(registryPath));
147
+ const real = fs.realpathSync.native(script);
148
+ if (path.dirname(real) !== dir || !/^(?:claude|codex|antigravity)-mcp\.js$/.test(path.basename(real)))
149
+ return false;
150
+ const st = fs.lstatSync(real);
151
+ if (!st.isFile() || st.size > 1024 * 1024)
152
+ return false;
153
+ const rows = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(dir, 'installation.json'), 'utf8')).files;
154
+ if (!Array.isArray(rows))
155
+ return false;
156
+ const digest = (0, node_crypto_1.createHash)('sha256').update(fs.readFileSync(real, 'utf8')).digest('hex');
157
+ return rows.some((r) => !!r && typeof r === 'object' && r.path === real && r.digest === digest);
158
+ }
159
+ catch {
160
+ return false;
161
+ }
162
+ };
163
+ }
104
164
  /** Walk up from `pid` (the server's parent) through launchers to a harness executable. */
105
- function attestHarness(pid, lookup, maxDepth = 8) {
165
+ function attestHarness(pid, lookup, maxDepth = 8, isDispatcher) {
106
166
  const chain = [];
107
167
  const seen = new Set();
108
168
  let cur = pid;
@@ -114,8 +174,15 @@ function attestHarness(pid, lookup, maxDepth = 8) {
114
174
  if (row === null)
115
175
  return { attested: false, chain, reason: 'the process table could not be read' };
116
176
  const harness = harnessOf(row.args, row.exe);
117
- const shown = harness ?? (exeName(row.args) || '?');
177
+ // @implements A-SPEC-751.3 — the receipted runtime dispatcher is a launcher; the chain records the hop as such.
178
+ const viaDispatcher = harness === null && isDispatcher !== undefined && ['node', 'nodejs'].includes(exeName(row.args))
179
+ && (() => { const script = nodeScriptOf(row.args); return script !== null && isDispatcher(script); })();
180
+ const shown = viaDispatcher ? 'dispatcher' : harness ?? (exeName(row.args) || '?');
118
181
  chain.push(shown);
182
+ if (viaDispatcher) {
183
+ cur = row.ppid;
184
+ continue;
185
+ }
119
186
  if (harness !== null) {
120
187
  if (typeof row.image !== 'string' || row.image === '') {
121
188
  return { attested: false, chain, reason: `the executable image of ${shown} could not be read` };
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {
34
34
  })();
35
35
  Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
36
36
  exports.operatorRecovery = operatorRecovery;
37
- // @implements A-SPEC-754
37
+ // @implements A-SPEC-754, A-SPEC-532.3
38
38
  const path = __importStar(require("node:path"));
39
39
  const unsafeDisplay = /[\u0000-\u001f\u007f-\u009f\u202a-\u202e\u2066-\u2069]/;
40
40
  function literal(value, platform) {
@@ -56,7 +56,10 @@ function operatorRecovery(root, target, operation, options) {
56
56
  return '';
57
57
  if (!command)
58
58
  return `\n[승인 대기 ${id}] The request was recorded. Use the installed approval UI; a path exceeds the safe command display limit. No truncated command is provided.`;
59
+ // @implements A-SPEC-532.3 — the resident surface is offered beside the one-off command (owner, 2026-10-04:
60
+ // "why am I still pasting commands"): one key per arriving request.
59
61
  return `\n[승인 대기 ${id}] 운영자: ${command} --grant ${literal(id, platform)}`
62
+ + `\nOr keep the approval surface open and decide each arriving request with one key: ${command} --watch`
60
63
  + `\nAfter official approval, retry ${operation ? display(operation) : 'the original MCP operation'} for target ${display(target)} in the same workspace. Do not retry until approval is available.`;
61
64
  },
62
65
  };
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
1
1
  "use strict";
2
2
  Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
3
3
  exports.HOOK_ENFORCED_TOOLS = void 0;
4
- // @implements A-SPEC-720, A-SPEC-718, A-SPEC-625, A-SPEC-564.1, A-SPEC-732, A-SPEC-734
4
+ // @implements A-SPEC-720, A-SPEC-718, A-SPEC-625, A-SPEC-564.1, A-SPEC-732, A-SPEC-734, A-SPEC-751.3
5
5
  const index_js_1 = require("@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/index.js");
6
6
  const stdio_js_1 = require("@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js");
7
7
  const types_js_1 = require("@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js");
@@ -49,12 +49,15 @@ const elicit = async (req) => {
49
49
  }
50
50
  };
51
51
  // @implements A-SPEC-732 (round 2) — who launched this server, asked once, on first need.
52
- const { attestHarness, systemProcLookup } = require('./harness-attestation');
52
+ const { attestHarness, systemProcLookup, dispatcherVerifier } = require('./harness-attestation');
53
+ // @implements A-SPEC-751.3 — the operator runtime registry's dispatcher is a launcher (it sits between the harness and
54
+ // this server on a registered machine); the path is the registry's fixed default, never taken from the request.
55
+ const runtimeRegistryPath = require('node:path').join(require('node:os').homedir(), '.holmes', 'runtime', 'bindings.json');
53
56
  let attested;
54
57
  const harnessAttestation = () => {
55
58
  if (attested === undefined) {
56
59
  try {
57
- attested = attestHarness(process.ppid, systemProcLookup());
60
+ attested = attestHarness(process.ppid, systemProcLookup(), 8, dispatcherVerifier(runtimeRegistryPath));
58
61
  }
59
62
  catch {
60
63
  attested = { attested: false, chain: [], reason: 'the process table could not be read' };
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "//": "@implements A-SPEC-209",
3
3
  "name": "@holmes-lab/holmes-kit",
4
- "version": "0.35.1",
4
+ "version": "0.35.3",
5
5
  "description": "Holmes-Kit — deterministic Agentic Software Engineering (ASE) harness with causal traceability (spec chain + D-CPG + RTM + phase guardrail)",
6
6
  "main": "dist/holmes/mcp/server.js",
7
7
  "types": "dist/holmes/mcp/server.d.ts",