@holmes-lab/holmes-kit 0.35.1 → 0.35.3
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +72 -0
- package/README.md +6 -3
- package/dist/.build-id +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/cli/approve.js +9 -2
- package/dist/holmes/cli/doctor.js +21 -2
- package/dist/holmes/cli/init.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/init.js +37 -1
- package/dist/holmes/cli/runtime-binding.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/runtime-binding.js +62 -2
- package/dist/holmes/governance/approval-grants.d.ts +7 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/approval-grants.js +8 -2
- package/dist/holmes/governance/approval-queue.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/approval-queue.js +14 -3
- package/dist/holmes/governance/autonomy.d.ts +10 -1
- package/dist/holmes/governance/autonomy.js +66 -14
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/risk-classifier.js +32 -3
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/write-verb-word.d.ts +13 -0
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/write-verb-word.js +55 -0
- package/dist/holmes/hooks/pre-tool-use.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/holmes/hooks/pre-tool-use.js +32 -9
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/approval-policy.d.ts +4 -1
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/approval-policy.js +5 -4
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/elicit-approval.d.ts +0 -2
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/elicit-approval.js +3 -4
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/review-evidence.d.ts +1 -2
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/review-evidence.js +4 -12
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/spec-approval.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/spec-approval.js +18 -11
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers.d.ts +1 -9
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers.js +7 -7
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/harness-attestation.d.ts +10 -1
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/harness-attestation.js +70 -3
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/operator-recovery.js +4 -1
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/server.js +6 -3
- package/package.json +1 -1
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@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@ exports.SESSION_AUTONOMY_MARKER = exports.AUTONOMY_ENV = void 0;
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exports.isHighRiskPath = isHighRiskPath;
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exports.descendantAspecs = descendantAspecs;
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exports.specApprovalAutonomy = specApprovalAutonomy;
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exports.declaredGateDirection = declaredGateDirection;
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exports.autonomyRuleMeaning = autonomyRuleMeaning;
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exports.specApprovalAutonomyReason = specApprovalAutonomyReason;
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exports.requiresAutonomousApprovalPrompt = requiresAutonomousApprovalPrompt;
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exports.sessionAutonomyActive = sessionAutonomyActive;
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exports.projectDefaultAutonomy = projectDefaultAutonomy;
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@@ -45,7 +48,7 @@ exports.autonomyBanner = autonomyBanner;
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exports.autonomyMarkerShouldPrune = autonomyMarkerShouldPrune;
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exports.versionBumpKind = versionBumpKind;
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exports.releaseAutonomy = releaseAutonomy;
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// @implements A-SPEC-532.1, A-SPEC-718
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// @implements A-SPEC-532.1, A-SPEC-718, A-SPEC-532.3, A-SPEC-532.4
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// Whether a spec approval may be sealed AUTONOMOUSLY by the agent, or must still ask a human through
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// the MCP elicitation TUI. The governance chain (REQ→H→A→T→CPG + RTM + taint + phase gate) already
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// forces quality structurally, so a low/mid-risk spec self-approving under an explicitly-enabled
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@@ -155,40 +158,89 @@ function descendantAspecs(spec, all) {
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* or no A-SPEC at all (unknown scope) → human. The two-argument call keeps the old answer.
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*/
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function specApprovalAutonomy(spec, resolveParent, descendants) {
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// @implements A-SPEC-532.3 — one walk: the verdict is "no rule fired", so it cannot disagree with the rule's name.
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return specApprovalAutonomyReason(spec, resolveParent, descendants) === null ? 'auto' : 'hitl';
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}
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/**
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* @implements A-SPEC-532.4 — the declared direction of a gate change: `gate-behavior: tightens — …` (nothing refused
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* before passes after) or `gate-behavior: wording — …` (no input changes side). Owner decision 2026-10-05: these are
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* sealed autonomously; any other gate change asks the owner. The word is the first of the reason, read
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* case-sensitively, and must be followed by white space or a dash.
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*/
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function gateDirection(spec) {
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const raw = spec.frontmatter?.breaking_change;
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if (typeof raw !== 'string')
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return null;
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const m = /^\s*gate-behavior\s*:\s*(tightens|wording)(?=[\s—–-])/.exec(raw);
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return m ? m[1] : null;
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}
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function declaredGateDirection(spec) {
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return spec.type === 'A-SPEC' ? gateDirection(spec) : null;
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}
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/** @implements A-SPEC-532.3 — one plain clause per rule name, for the refusal a person reads. */
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function autonomyRuleMeaning(rule) {
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if (rule.startsWith('files-to-touch-gate-file'))
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return 'Files to Touch names a gate or governance file and the spec declares no tightening-only or wording-only gate change';
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if (rule === 'breaking-change-gate-behavior')
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return 'the gate change does not declare its direction as tightens or wording';
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if (rule.startsWith('breaking-change-'))
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return rule === 'breaking-change-undeclared' ? 'breaking_change is not declared' : 'the breaking_change grade is not one the grader knows';
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switch (rule) {
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case 'upstream-without-aspec': return 'no A-SPEC exists beneath it yet, so its scope is unknown';
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case 'upstream-has-human-aspec': return 'an A-SPEC beneath it is the operator\'s to seal';
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case 'architecture-document': return 'a C-SPEC or ADR is a decision';
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case 'files-to-touch-empty': return 'Files to Touch names no path, so its scope is unbounded';
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case 'files-to-touch-root-only': return 'Files to Touch names only root-level files';
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case 'requirement-without-intake': return 'the requirement was never admitted through requirement_triage';
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default: return 'the spec kind is not one the grader knows';
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}
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}
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/**
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* @implements A-SPEC-532.3 — the first rule that hands this seal to the owner, or null when none does. Measured
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* 2026-10-04: two gate specs were refused with the generic out-of-band sentence and neither the session nor the owner
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* could tell which rule had fired.
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*/
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function specApprovalAutonomyReason(spec, resolveParent, descendants) {
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switch (spec.type) {
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case 'T-SPEC':
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return
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return null; // tests are low risk
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case 'REQ':
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case 'H-SPEC': {
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const below = (descendants ?? []).filter((s) => s.type === 'A-SPEC');
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if (below.length === 0)
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return '
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return below.every((a) =>
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return 'upstream-without-aspec'; // unknown scope stays human
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return below.every((a) => specApprovalAutonomyReason(a, resolveParent) === null) ? null : 'upstream-has-human-aspec';
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}
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case 'C-SPEC':
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case 'ADR': // @implements A-SPEC-571.1 — a decision is the human's to seal
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return '
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return 'architecture-document'; // architecture / structural constraint — the owner's exception
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case 'A-SPEC': {
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const grade = breakingGrade(spec);
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if (grade === null
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return '
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if (grade === null)
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return 'breaking-change-undeclared';
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// @implements A-SPEC-532.4 — a gate change that declares tightening or wording passes the grade rule and the
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// gate-file rule; an undirected one, and a gate file under any other grade, do not.
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const directed = grade === 'gate-behavior' && gateDirection(spec) !== null;
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if (!directed && !AUTO_GRADES.has(grade))
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return `breaking-change-${grade}`; // gate-behavior, or unrecognised
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const paths = (0, scope_judgment_1.fttPathTokens)(spec.sections['Files to Touch'] ?? '');
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// @implements A-SPEC-556.1 — no path tokens (prose-only / empty FtT) is an UNCONSTRAINED scope:
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// the enforcer imposes nothing, so the spec can write ANYWHERE incl. the gate. Never self-approve.
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if (paths.length === 0)
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return '
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-
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return 'files-to-touch-empty';
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const gateFile = paths.find(isHighRiskPath);
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if (gateFile !== undefined && !directed)
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return `files-to-touch-gate-file: ${gateFile}`; // gate/governance/taint file
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// @implements A-SPEC-654 — a ROOT-level file is project-wide configuration (the test runner, the
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// manifest, the ignore policy): admitting it at the gate was the point of that slice, but grading
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// it auto would be a widening nobody asked for. A spec earns self-approval only when it also names
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// a directory-scoped surface — the same doubt `paths.length === 0` already encodes.
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if (!paths.some((p) => p.includes('/')))
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return '
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return
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return 'files-to-touch-root-only';
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return null;
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}
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default:
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return '
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return 'unknown-kind'; // unknown kind: fail-safe to human
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}
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}
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/**
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@@ -197,7 +249,7 @@ function specApprovalAutonomy(spec, resolveParent, descendants) {
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* `specApprovalAutonomy(...) === 'hitl'`: an upstream REQ/H-SPEC with no implemented A-SPEC is
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* not identified as high-risk yet, so autonomous mode queues it without interrupting the agent.
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* Architecture, an explicitly high-risk A-SPEC, and an upstream document leading to either remain
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* visible to a human;
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* visible to a human; a prompt that is not answered is held (A-SPEC-718.1).
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*/
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function requiresAutonomousApprovalPrompt(spec, descendants) {
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switch (spec.type) {
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@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ exports.classifyArchitectureReversal = classifyArchitectureReversal;
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exports.classifySecret = classifySecret;
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exports.classifyBlastRadius = classifyBlastRadius;
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exports.assessRisk = assessRisk;
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// @implements A-SPEC-125.1, A-SPEC-627, A-SPEC-728, A-SPEC-737, A-SPEC-747, A-SPEC-753
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// @implements A-SPEC-125.1, A-SPEC-627, A-SPEC-728, A-SPEC-737, A-SPEC-747, A-SPEC-753, A-SPEC-747.1, A-SPEC-226.1, A-SPEC-226.2
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const fs = __importStar(require("node:fs"));
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const path = __importStar(require("node:path"));
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const shell_argument_roles_1 = require("./shell-argument-roles");
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@@ -391,6 +391,22 @@ const REMOVAL_VERB_RE = /\b(rm|rmdir|unlink|git\s+rm|git\s+mv|mv|cp)\b/i;
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// 240 000 of them). A later `>` inside an already-scanned token can only see a suffix of it.
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const CLOBBER_AX_RE = (0, linear_match_1.redirectTokenTester)(new RegExp(String.raw `\.ax/(${PROTECTED_AX_ALT})\b`, 'i'));
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const CMD_PROTECTED_AX_RE = new RegExp(String.raw `(^|[\s'"=(/])\.ax/(${PROTECTED_AX_ALT})(/|\b)`, 'i');
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// No boundary after the child either: under a separator the text does not show, `mvq.ax/specsq/tmp/z` is `mv .ax/specs /tmp/z`.
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const PROTECTED_AX_ANYWHERE_RE = new RegExp(String.raw `\.ax/(?:${PROTECTED_AX_ALT})`, 'i');
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/**
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* @implements A-SPEC-226.1 — does the text name a protected .ax path. The pattern above asks for white space, a quote,
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* `=`, `(` or `/` before `.ax/`, so a path glued to an expansion was not one: `rm${IFS}-rf${IFS}.ax/specs/…` and
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* `rm$IFS-rf$IFS.ax/specs` were allowed while `rm -rf .ax/specs/…` was refused (shipped through 0.35.1; measured
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* 2026-10-05). Only tightens: everything the old pattern matched still matches. One linear pattern test.
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*/
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function namesProtectedAx(text) {
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// @implements A-SPEC-226.2 — the spelling counts wherever it appears. A-SPEC-226.1 kept "a spelling that continues a
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// longer file name" out, and its re-review (2026-10-05) passed removals through exactly that door: `rm -f $-.ax/specs/…`
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// (dash), `rm -f $X:t.ax/specs/…` (zsh), `P=q.ax/specs; mv ${P#q} /tmp/gone`, `echo mvq.ax/specsq/tmp/z | tr q ' ' | sh`,
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// `sed -n w.ax/ledger/p.jsonl /dev/null`. The text cannot tell a longer file name from a prefix the shell removes, so
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// it no longer tries; 226.1's three rules are subsumed. Cost, stated: `backup.ax/specs` is judged as the store.
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return CMD_PROTECTED_AX_RE.test(text) || PROTECTED_AX_ANYWHERE_RE.test(text);
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}
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/**
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* Normalize a command string for protected-path matching: collapse `//` runs and `./` segments so
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* `./.ax//ledger/x` matches the same rules as `.ax/ledger/x` (adversarial probe: those forms slipped
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}
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// File-mutating shell verbs beyond redirect/removal: these WRITE a target path, so a protected path
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// as their argument is the same governance breach as `>` or `rm` (probe: tee/cp/install slipped).
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// A-SPEC-747.1 rules 1–5 (count a verb only as a shell word) are NOT implemented: the independent review of the first
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// build (2026-10-04) showed the exemption for a verb inside a longer file name passes real writes whenever the shell
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// splits a word the text does not (`cp${IFS}a${IFS}.ax/specs/x.md`, a custom IFS, text re-parsed by `sh -c`). The
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// `\b…\b` test stays; `docs/install-guide.md` beside an .ax path is still refused, on purpose, until a rule exists
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// that the shell cannot split around.
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const WRITE_VERB_AX_RE = (0, linear_match_1.headThenTail)(/\b(?:tee|cp|install|dd|ln|mv|rsync)\b/i, SEG, new RegExp(String.raw `\.ax/(?:${PROTECTED_AX_ALT})\b`, 'i'));
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// An interpreter one-liner naming a protected path: `node -e "...appendFileSync('.ax/ledger/...')"`,
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// `python3 -c "open('.ax/ledger/...','a')"`. Read-only one-liners are not distinguishable from writes
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const READ_ONLY_GIT = new Set([
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'show', 'log', 'status', 'diff', 'ls-tree', 'ls-files', 'blame', 'cat-file', 'rev-parse',
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'merge-base', 'describe',
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// @implements A-SPEC-747.1 — `git check-ignore -v .ax/state/…` was refused (measured); it only reads.
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'check-ignore',
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]);
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/** Is `t` a spelling of the long option `--<full>` that getopt_long accepts (an unambiguous prefix of `min`+ letters)? */
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function longOption(t, full, min) {
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const FOR_HEAD_RE = /^for\s+[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*\s+in\b/;
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const SUBSTITUTION_RE = /\$\(|`|<\(|>\(/;
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const OUTPUT_REDIRECT_RE = />(?!\s*(?:\/dev\/null\b|&\d))/;
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/** An output redirect whose target word holds an expansion (`> ${P#q}`, `>> "$f"`, `` > `x` ``). Linear: one word after `>`. */
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const COMPUTED_REDIRECT_RE = />[>|&]?[ \t]*[^\s;|&<>$`]*[$`]/;
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function clausesAreReads(clauses, isRead) {
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let inLoop = false;
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for (const raw of clauses) {
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* @implements A-SPEC-226
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*/
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function shellWritesProtectedAx(ncmd) {
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if (!
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if (!namesProtectedAx(ncmd))
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// @implements A-SPEC-227 — the ledger exemption is cancelled here, not inside the restore check,
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// because it is a property of the TARGET rather than of the command shape.
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else if (sawCd && OUTPUT_REDIRECT_RE.test(c))
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// @implements A-SPEC-226.2 — an output redirect whose target is computed is not a read here: the re-review passed
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// `P=q.ax/ledger/p.jsonl; echo x > ${P#q}` (the protected spelling in the text, the write through an expansion).
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if (COMPUTED_REDIRECT_RE.test(c))
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return false;
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1565
|
});
|
|
1537
1566
|
}
|
|
@@ -1594,7 +1623,7 @@ function classifyReversibilityAsWritten(action) {
|
|
|
1594
1623
|
const ncmd = [...new Set([flat, asWritten, bySegment, ...outputTargets])].join('\n');
|
|
1595
1624
|
// @implements A-SPEC-737 — one reason served all four channels, so an interpreter READ was refused as
|
|
1596
1625
|
// a "removal command" and the author could not tell what to change. Each channel names itself.
|
|
1597
|
-
const axChannel = REMOVAL_VERB_RE.test(ncmd) &&
|
|
1626
|
+
const axChannel = REMOVAL_VERB_RE.test(ncmd) && namesProtectedAx(ncmd)
|
|
1598
1627
|
? 'removal, move or copy command targets a protected .ax governance path'
|
|
1599
1628
|
: CLOBBER_AX_RE.test(ncmd) ? 'output redirection writes into a protected .ax governance path'
|
|
1600
1629
|
: WRITE_VERB_AX_RE.test(ncmd) ? 'file-writing command (tee/cp/install/dd/ln/mv/rsync) targets a protected .ax governance path'
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* Whether `text` names one of `verbs` as a shell word, rather than as letters inside another word.
|
|
3
|
+
*
|
|
4
|
+
* Measured 2026-10-04: `\bverb\b` matched `install` in `docs/install-guide.md` and `ln` in `grep -ln`, so read-only
|
|
5
|
+
* commands were refused as file writes. A verb occurrence still counts in every spelling a shell runs it under
|
|
6
|
+
* (`cp`, `/usr/bin/install`, `'cp'`, `cp.exe`, `--to-command=tee`, `rsync-ssl`); only two shapes do not:
|
|
7
|
+
* a. the word is a single-dash option cluster of letters and digits (`-ln`, `-rm1`);
|
|
8
|
+
* b. inside the word the verb is followed by `/`, or the word ends in a file extension other than `.exe`.
|
|
9
|
+
* Callers keep their own matching for what the verb targets — this answers only "is there such a verb at all", so a
|
|
10
|
+
* caller's verdict is removed only when the whole text holds no counting occurrence. One pass: a word's shape is read
|
|
11
|
+
* once however many occurrences it holds.
|
|
12
|
+
*/
|
|
13
|
+
export declare function namesWriteVerb(text: string, verbs: RegExp): boolean;
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
"use strict";
|
|
2
|
+
Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
|
|
3
|
+
exports.namesWriteVerb = namesWriteVerb;
|
|
4
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-747.1
|
|
5
|
+
/** A shell word ends at white space or at one of `;|&()<>`. */
|
|
6
|
+
function isBreak(code) {
|
|
7
|
+
return code === 32 || code === 9 || code === 10 || code === 13 || code === 11 || code === 12
|
|
8
|
+
|| code === 59 || code === 124 || code === 38 || code === 40 || code === 41 || code === 60 || code === 62;
|
|
9
|
+
}
|
|
10
|
+
/**
|
|
11
|
+
* Whether `text` names one of `verbs` as a shell word, rather than as letters inside another word.
|
|
12
|
+
*
|
|
13
|
+
* Measured 2026-10-04: `\bverb\b` matched `install` in `docs/install-guide.md` and `ln` in `grep -ln`, so read-only
|
|
14
|
+
* commands were refused as file writes. A verb occurrence still counts in every spelling a shell runs it under
|
|
15
|
+
* (`cp`, `/usr/bin/install`, `'cp'`, `cp.exe`, `--to-command=tee`, `rsync-ssl`); only two shapes do not:
|
|
16
|
+
* a. the word is a single-dash option cluster of letters and digits (`-ln`, `-rm1`);
|
|
17
|
+
* b. inside the word the verb is followed by `/`, or the word ends in a file extension other than `.exe`.
|
|
18
|
+
* Callers keep their own matching for what the verb targets — this answers only "is there such a verb at all", so a
|
|
19
|
+
* caller's verdict is removed only when the whole text holds no counting occurrence. One pass: a word's shape is read
|
|
20
|
+
* once however many occurrences it holds.
|
|
21
|
+
*/
|
|
22
|
+
function namesWriteVerb(text, verbs) {
|
|
23
|
+
const re = new RegExp(verbs.source, verbs.flags.includes('g') ? verbs.flags : `${verbs.flags}g`);
|
|
24
|
+
let wordStart = -1;
|
|
25
|
+
let wordEnd = -1;
|
|
26
|
+
let cluster = false;
|
|
27
|
+
let extension = false;
|
|
28
|
+
for (let m = re.exec(text); m !== null; m = re.exec(text)) {
|
|
29
|
+
if (m[0].length === 0) {
|
|
30
|
+
re.lastIndex++;
|
|
31
|
+
continue;
|
|
32
|
+
}
|
|
33
|
+
const at = m.index;
|
|
34
|
+
if (at < wordStart || at >= wordEnd) {
|
|
35
|
+
let s = at;
|
|
36
|
+
while (s > 0 && !isBreak(text.charCodeAt(s - 1)))
|
|
37
|
+
s--;
|
|
38
|
+
let e = at;
|
|
39
|
+
while (e < text.length && !isBreak(text.charCodeAt(e)))
|
|
40
|
+
e++;
|
|
41
|
+
wordStart = s;
|
|
42
|
+
wordEnd = e;
|
|
43
|
+
const raw = text.slice(s, e);
|
|
44
|
+
cluster = /^-[A-Za-z0-9]+$/.test(raw);
|
|
45
|
+
const ext = /\.([A-Za-z0-9]{1,8})$/.exec(raw.replace(/["'\\]/g, ''));
|
|
46
|
+
extension = ext !== null && ext[1].toLowerCase() !== 'exe';
|
|
47
|
+
}
|
|
48
|
+
if (cluster || extension)
|
|
49
|
+
continue;
|
|
50
|
+
if (text.charCodeAt(at + m[0].length) === 47)
|
|
51
|
+
continue; // the verb is a directory name inside a path
|
|
52
|
+
return true;
|
|
53
|
+
}
|
|
54
|
+
return false;
|
|
55
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ export interface HookInput {
|
|
|
93
93
|
malformed?: boolean;
|
|
94
94
|
/** @implements A-SPEC-163.2 — the payload carries a patch whose targets cannot be read one way; denied whichever tool sent it. */
|
|
95
95
|
patchUnreadable?: boolean;
|
|
96
|
+
/** @implements A-SPEC-163.7 — set only when the one cause is a marked shell command (A-SPEC-163.6 rule 3). */
|
|
97
|
+
patchUnreadableCause?: 'shell-marker';
|
|
96
98
|
}
|
|
97
99
|
/**
|
|
98
100
|
* @implements A-SPEC-753.2 — what a denial leaves in the provenance ledger: the reason up to the operator command.
|
|
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ exports.gateErrorDecision = gateErrorDecision;
|
|
|
48
48
|
exports.wiredSpecsDir = wiredSpecsDir;
|
|
49
49
|
exports.evaluateHook = evaluateHook;
|
|
50
50
|
exports.readSpecsSync = readSpecsSync;
|
|
51
|
-
// @implements A-SPEC-278, A-SPEC-733, A-SPEC-734, A-SPEC-747, A-SPEC-477.1, A-SPEC-753
|
|
51
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-134.2, A-SPEC-278, A-SPEC-733, A-SPEC-734, A-SPEC-747, A-SPEC-477.1, A-SPEC-753, A-SPEC-163.7
|
|
52
52
|
const shell_argument_roles_1 = require("../guardrail/shell-argument-roles");
|
|
53
53
|
// @implements A-SPEC-549.3 — the hook's deny reasons are English here; hooks-english.test.ts drives
|
|
54
54
|
// evaluateHook in this file to prove it.
|
|
@@ -952,6 +952,9 @@ const PATCH_STRINGS_MAX = 256;
|
|
|
952
952
|
/** A file an update hunk is applied to; a larger one is not judged by its result. */
|
|
953
953
|
const PATCH_UPDATE_BYTES_MAX = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
|
|
954
954
|
const PATCH_UNREADABLE_REASON = '[Holmes-Kit] cannot read the edit target path, so it cannot be judged (file_path missing or not a string)';
|
|
955
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-163.7 — the refusal of A-SPEC-163.6 rule 3 in its own words (each refusal names its channel, A-SPEC-737).
|
|
956
|
+
const SHELL_MARKED_REASON = '[Holmes-Kit] this shell command mentions the patch tool or a patch marker and is not one plain read, so it is not judged — '
|
|
957
|
+
+ 'search with the harness\'s own search tool, or run one plain grep, egrep, fgrep, rg, cat, head, tail, wc or ls with literal words (no pipe, redirect or substitution)';
|
|
955
958
|
/**
|
|
956
959
|
* @implements A-SPEC-753.2 — what a denial leaves in the provenance ledger: the reason up to the operator command.
|
|
957
960
|
* The installer refusal (A-SPEC-753.1) carries the raw command after ` Operator: ` for the operator to run; the ledger
|
|
@@ -1026,6 +1029,9 @@ function normalizeHookInput(raw) {
|
|
|
1026
1029
|
// A patch that cannot be read one way (no target, an empty path, too many, an indented header) is unreadable.
|
|
1027
1030
|
const toolName = (str(r.tool_name) ?? '').toLowerCase();
|
|
1028
1031
|
let patchUnreadable = false;
|
|
1032
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-163.7 — why: a shell command refused for a patch marker is told so (it has no file path to miss).
|
|
1033
|
+
let shellMarked = false;
|
|
1034
|
+
let otherUnreadable = false;
|
|
1029
1035
|
if (!write_target_1.READ_ONLY_TOOLS.includes(toolName)) {
|
|
1030
1036
|
const strings = [];
|
|
1031
1037
|
const collect = (v, depth) => {
|
|
@@ -1033,8 +1039,10 @@ function normalizeHookInput(raw) {
|
|
|
1033
1039
|
if (!v.includes('*** '))
|
|
1034
1040
|
return;
|
|
1035
1041
|
// @implements A-SPEC-163.3 (rule 6) — more than the gate reads is unreadable, never unread.
|
|
1036
|
-
if (strings.length >= PATCH_STRINGS_MAX)
|
|
1042
|
+
if (strings.length >= PATCH_STRINGS_MAX) {
|
|
1037
1043
|
patchUnreadable = true;
|
|
1044
|
+
otherUnreadable = true;
|
|
1045
|
+
}
|
|
1038
1046
|
else
|
|
1039
1047
|
strings.push(v);
|
|
1040
1048
|
return;
|
|
@@ -1055,21 +1063,25 @@ function normalizeHookInput(raw) {
|
|
|
1055
1063
|
const patches = strings.filter((text) => !(isShell && text === cmd) && (isPatchTool ? (0, write_target_1.hasPatchEnvelope)(text) : (0, write_target_1.isWholePatch)(text)));
|
|
1056
1064
|
if (isShell && cmd !== undefined) {
|
|
1057
1065
|
const shellPatch = shellPatchOf(cmd);
|
|
1058
|
-
if (shellPatch === 'unreadable')
|
|
1066
|
+
if (shellPatch === 'unreadable') {
|
|
1059
1067
|
patchUnreadable = true;
|
|
1068
|
+
shellMarked = true;
|
|
1069
|
+
}
|
|
1060
1070
|
else if (shellPatch !== null)
|
|
1061
1071
|
patches.push(shellPatch.text);
|
|
1062
1072
|
}
|
|
1063
1073
|
if (patches.length > 0) {
|
|
1064
1074
|
const targets = patches.flatMap((text) => (0, write_target_1.patchTargetsOf)(text));
|
|
1065
|
-
if (targets.length === 0 || targets.length > write_target_1.PATCH_TARGETS_MAX || patches.some((text) => !(0, write_target_1.canonicalPatch)(text)))
|
|
1075
|
+
if (targets.length === 0 || targets.length > write_target_1.PATCH_TARGETS_MAX || patches.some((text) => !(0, write_target_1.canonicalPatch)(text))) {
|
|
1066
1076
|
patchUnreadable = true;
|
|
1077
|
+
otherUnreadable = true;
|
|
1078
|
+
}
|
|
1067
1079
|
else
|
|
1068
1080
|
out.patch_targets = targets;
|
|
1069
1081
|
}
|
|
1070
1082
|
}
|
|
1071
1083
|
return { tool_name: str(r.tool_name) ?? '', tool_input: out, ...(cwd === undefined ? {} : { cwd }), ...(malformed ? { malformed: true } : {}),
|
|
1072
|
-
...(patchUnreadable ? { patchUnreadable: true } : {}) };
|
|
1084
|
+
...(patchUnreadable ? { patchUnreadable: true } : {}), ...(shellMarked && !otherUnreadable ? { patchUnreadableCause: 'shell-marker' } : {}) };
|
|
1073
1085
|
}
|
|
1074
1086
|
/**
|
|
1075
1087
|
* Which way to fail when the gate itself throws.
|
|
@@ -1220,8 +1232,10 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
1220
1232
|
// disk); a move's source is judged as a delete; a relative target is `<base>/<path>` as written, not folded first;
|
|
1221
1233
|
// a patch that cannot be read or applied is denied. When no target is denied, a payload with a path field or a
|
|
1222
1234
|
// shell command is then judged as before.
|
|
1223
|
-
if (input.patchUnreadable)
|
|
1224
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason:
|
|
1235
|
+
if (input.patchUnreadable) {
|
|
1236
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: input.patchUnreadableCause === 'shell-marker'
|
|
1237
|
+
? SHELL_MARKED_REASON : PATCH_UNREADABLE_REASON };
|
|
1238
|
+
}
|
|
1225
1239
|
const patchTargets = input.tool_input.patch_targets;
|
|
1226
1240
|
if (patchTargets !== undefined && !input.malformed) {
|
|
1227
1241
|
const isShell = (input.tool_name ?? '').toLowerCase() === 'bash';
|
|
@@ -2566,11 +2580,20 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2566
2580
|
if (debt && debt.length > 0 && !cureOnly
|
|
2567
2581
|
&& (0, approval_grants_1.resolveApproval)(projectRoot, weApproval, { kind: 'code-write', target: relPath }, nowTs) === undefined) {
|
|
2568
2582
|
const why = `code write under constitution debt (${debt.join(', ')})`;
|
|
2583
|
+
let hint = (0, approval_queue_1.queueHint)(projectRoot, { kind: 'code-write', target: relPath, why });
|
|
2584
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-134.2 — a decision-kind request that is already pending is not written again, so the
|
|
2585
|
+
// hint is empty for it. The refusal still names that request; "could not persist" is for a queue that
|
|
2586
|
+
// really could not be written.
|
|
2587
|
+
if (!hint) {
|
|
2588
|
+
const id = (0, approval_queue_1.approvalRequestId)('code-write', relPath);
|
|
2589
|
+
if ((0, approval_queue_1.readQueue)(projectRoot).pending.some((request) => request.id === id)) {
|
|
2590
|
+
hint = (0, approval_queue_1.pendingRequestLine)(id);
|
|
2591
|
+
}
|
|
2592
|
+
}
|
|
2569
2593
|
return {
|
|
2570
2594
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
2571
2595
|
permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] constitution-debt outstanding (${debt.join(', ')}) — resolve the constitution (a clean turn clears it) before writing new code, or supply a covering approval`
|
|
2572
|
-
+ (
|
|
2573
|
-
|| ' — could not persist the approval request; ask the operator to check the project approval queue storage'),
|
|
2596
|
+
+ (hint || ' — could not persist the approval request; ask the operator to check the project approval queue storage'),
|
|
2574
2597
|
};
|
|
2575
2598
|
}
|
|
2576
2599
|
}
|
|
@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@ export type ApprovalPolicyDecision = {
|
|
|
7
7
|
kind: 'hold';
|
|
8
8
|
reason: string;
|
|
9
9
|
};
|
|
10
|
-
/**
|
|
10
|
+
/**
|
|
11
|
+
* The sole response transition table; timeout is never a synonym for cancel or deny.
|
|
12
|
+
* A-SPEC-718.1: it is not a synonym for approve either — an unanswered prompt is held in every mode.
|
|
13
|
+
*/
|
|
11
14
|
export declare function resolveApprovalPresentation(result: ApprovalPresentationResult, options: {
|
|
12
15
|
autonomous: boolean;
|
|
13
16
|
harness: string;
|
|
@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
"use strict";
|
|
2
2
|
Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
|
|
3
3
|
exports.resolveApprovalPresentation = resolveApprovalPresentation;
|
|
4
|
-
/**
|
|
4
|
+
/**
|
|
5
|
+
* The sole response transition table; timeout is never a synonym for cancel or deny.
|
|
6
|
+
* A-SPEC-718.1: it is not a synonym for approve either — an unanswered prompt is held in every mode.
|
|
7
|
+
*/
|
|
5
8
|
function resolveApprovalPresentation(result, options) {
|
|
6
9
|
const harness = options.harness.trim() || 'unknown';
|
|
7
10
|
switch (result.kind) {
|
|
8
11
|
case 'approve': return { kind: 'approved', actor: `elicitation:${harness}`, ...(result.reason ? { reason: result.reason } : {}) };
|
|
9
|
-
case 'timeout': return
|
|
10
|
-
? { kind: 'approved', actor: `autonomous-timeout:${harness}`, reason: 'in-session approval timeout' }
|
|
11
|
-
: { kind: 'hold', reason: 'approval prompt timed out' };
|
|
12
|
+
case 'timeout': return { kind: 'hold', reason: 'approval prompt timed out' };
|
|
12
13
|
case 'deny': return { kind: 'hold', reason: result.reason ? `denied: ${result.reason}` : 'denied' };
|
|
13
14
|
case 'question': return { kind: 'hold', reason: `question: ${result.reason}` };
|
|
14
15
|
case 'cancel': return { kind: 'hold', reason: 'cancelled' };
|
|
@@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ export interface ElicitApprovalRequest {
|
|
|
34
34
|
target: string;
|
|
35
35
|
/** Human-facing one-liner: what is being approved (id, title, sealed-or-not). */
|
|
36
36
|
summary: string;
|
|
37
|
-
/** Server-derived outcome wording; only explicit autonomy may select automatic approval. */
|
|
38
|
-
timeoutBehavior?: 'queue' | 'autonomous-approve';
|
|
39
37
|
}
|
|
40
38
|
/** The human's decision. `null` from interpretElicitResult means "no answer in this shape". */
|
|
41
39
|
export interface ElicitDecision {
|
|
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ exports.buildDecisionForm = buildDecisionForm;
|
|
|
9
9
|
exports.buildReasonForm = buildReasonForm;
|
|
10
10
|
exports.runElicitFlow = runElicitFlow;
|
|
11
11
|
exports.interpretElicitResult = interpretElicitResult;
|
|
12
|
-
// @implements A-SPEC-718, A-SPEC-263.1, A-SPEC-732
|
|
12
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-718.2, A-SPEC-718, A-SPEC-263.1, A-SPEC-732
|
|
13
13
|
const npx_bin_1 = require("../project/npx-bin");
|
|
14
14
|
/**
|
|
15
15
|
* The decision comes INTO the session (REQ-263): an approval-shaped refusal (spec_approve without a
|
|
@@ -108,9 +108,8 @@ const flat = (s, max) => s.replace(/[\u0000-\u001f\u007f\u0085\u2028\u2029\u200b
|
|
|
108
108
|
*/
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function buildDecisionForm(req, attempt, timeoutMs) {
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const redisplay = attempt > 1 ? `⚠ 재표시 ${attempt}/${exports.MAX_PRESENTATIONS} — 이전 다이얼로그는 만료되어 무효입니다\n` : '';
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-
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-
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: `⏱ ${timeoutMs / 1000}초 내 미결정 시 승인 큐로 회송됩니다(운영자: ${(0, npx_bin_1.npxBin)()} holmes-kit approve).`;
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+
// @implements A-SPEC-718.2 — one outcome for silence, in every mode: the request returns to the queue.
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+
const timeoutNotice = `⏱ ${timeoutMs / 1000}초 내 미결정 시 승인 큐로 회송됩니다(운영자: ${(0, npx_bin_1.npxBin)()} holmes-kit approve).`;
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return {
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// @implements A-SPEC-497.1 — the forewarning is the LAST line and template-owned: it survives a
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// cap-filling summary (appended after the caps) and tells the human, before the clock runs out,
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@@ -11,9 +11,8 @@ export interface ReviewEvidenceContext {
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11
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projectRootOf(root: string): string;
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12
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basisFor(root: string | undefined, withDisk?: boolean): Basis;
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hasElicitor(): boolean;
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14
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-
tryElicit(kind: string, target: string, summary: string
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14
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+
tryElicit(kind: string, target: string, summary: string): Promise<ElicitOutcome>;
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15
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elicitApproval(reason?: string): Approval;
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16
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autonomousApproval(derivedFrom?: string[], source?: 'immediate' | 'timeout'): Approval;
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resolveHandlerApproval(root: string | undefined, approval: Approval | undefined, action: {
|
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kind: string;
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19
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target: string;
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@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {
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35
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Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
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36
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exports.summarizeReviewNeeded = summarizeReviewNeeded;
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exports.createReviewEvidenceHandlers = createReviewEvidenceHandlers;
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38
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-
// @implements A-SPEC-718, A-SPEC-746, A-SPEC-617, A-SPEC-100.2, A-SPEC-102.1, A-SPEC-133, A-SPEC-135, A-SPEC-141, A-SPEC-157, A-SPEC-160, A-SPEC-189, A-SPEC-191, A-SPEC-244, A-SPEC-245, A-SPEC-263.1, A-SPEC-497.1, A-SPEC-732
|
|
38
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-718.1, A-SPEC-718.2, A-SPEC-718, A-SPEC-746, A-SPEC-617, A-SPEC-100.2, A-SPEC-102.1, A-SPEC-133, A-SPEC-135, A-SPEC-141, A-SPEC-157, A-SPEC-160, A-SPEC-189, A-SPEC-191, A-SPEC-244, A-SPEC-245, A-SPEC-263.1, A-SPEC-497.1, A-SPEC-732
|
|
39
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const path = __importStar(require("node:path"));
|
|
40
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const findings_1 = require("../../review/findings");
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41
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const review_targets_1 = require("../../review/review-targets");
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@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ const ledger_store_1 = require("../../governance/ledger-store");
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45
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|
const ledger_lock_1 = require("../../governance/ledger-lock");
|
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46
46
|
const approval_grants_1 = require("../../governance/approval-grants");
|
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47
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|
const provenance_chain_1 = require("../../governance/provenance-chain");
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48
|
-
const autonomy_1 = require("../../governance/autonomy");
|
|
49
48
|
/**
|
|
50
49
|
* @implements A-SPEC-746 — the review-needed backlog as an agent reads it: one row per spec (signals
|
|
51
50
|
* merged, files unioned), newest first, without the from/to digests — 64-hex identifiers were most of
|
|
@@ -132,6 +131,7 @@ function createReviewEvidenceHandlers(context) {
|
|
|
132
131
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// not covered by env/grant, ask now and carry the grant into the lock as data. TOCTOU folds
|
|
133
132
|
// fail-closed — state moved so the lift is no longer needed → the grant is simply unused;
|
|
134
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|
// state moved so a lift IS needed that the snapshot missed → no grant → the standard refusal.
|
|
134
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-718.1 — only a person's answer is a grant here; this handler holds no autonomous channel.
|
|
135
135
|
const elicitGrants = new Map();
|
|
136
136
|
// A DENY at pre-scan is carried as data too (round-1): throwing here judged a stale snapshot —
|
|
137
137
|
// a finding concurrently resolved by someone else no longer needs a lift inside the lock, and
|
|
@@ -144,13 +144,6 @@ function createReviewEvidenceHandlers(context) {
|
|
|
144
144
|
const elicitExpiries = new Map();
|
|
145
145
|
if (context.hasElicitor()) {
|
|
146
146
|
try {
|
|
147
|
-
// @implements A-SPEC-732 (round 2) — autonomy is read at the project root, never a raw root.
|
|
148
|
-
const autonomyOn = (0, autonomy_1.autonomousApprovalEnabled)(process.env, (() => { try {
|
|
149
|
-
return context.projectRootOf(a.root);
|
|
150
|
-
}
|
|
151
|
-
catch {
|
|
152
|
-
return undefined;
|
|
153
|
-
} })(), new Date().toISOString());
|
|
154
147
|
const snapshot = new Map();
|
|
155
148
|
for (const f of new findings_1.FindingsLedger(findingsFile).list())
|
|
156
149
|
snapshot.set(f.id, f);
|
|
@@ -168,13 +161,12 @@ function createReviewEvidenceHandlers(context) {
|
|
|
168
161
|
}
|
|
169
162
|
if (context.resolveHandlerApproval(a.root, env0, { kind: 'review-resolve', target: f.id }, new Date().toISOString()) !== undefined)
|
|
170
163
|
continue; // an open door never summons a human
|
|
171
|
-
const out = await context.tryElicit('review-resolve', f.id, `열린 치명 발견 ${f.id} 의 해소
|
|
164
|
+
const out = await context.tryElicit('review-resolve', f.id, `열린 치명 발견 ${f.id} 의 해소 기록`);
|
|
172
165
|
if (out.kind === 'answered' && out.decision.granted)
|
|
173
166
|
elicitGrants.set(f.id, { approval: context.elicitApproval(out.decision.reason), source: 'elicitation' });
|
|
174
167
|
else if (out.kind === 'answered')
|
|
175
168
|
elicitDenials.set(f.id, out.decision.reason ?? '(사유 없음)');
|
|
176
|
-
|
|
177
|
-
elicitGrants.set(f.id, { approval: context.autonomousApproval(undefined, 'timeout'), source: 'autonomous' });
|
|
169
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-718.1 — an expired dialog grants nothing in any mode.
|
|
178
170
|
else if (out.kind === 'expired')
|
|
179
171
|
elicitExpiries.set(f.id, out.waitedMs);
|
|
180
172
|
}
|
|
@@ -10,9 +10,9 @@ export interface SpecApprovalContext {
|
|
|
10
10
|
resolver(specs: Spec[]): (id: string) => Spec | null;
|
|
11
11
|
projectRootOf(root: string): string;
|
|
12
12
|
cachedScan(root: string, repoRoot?: string): ScannedFile[];
|
|
13
|
-
tryElicit(kind: string, target: string, summary: string
|
|
13
|
+
tryElicit(kind: string, target: string, summary: string): Promise<ElicitOutcome>;
|
|
14
14
|
elicitApproval(reason?: string): Approval;
|
|
15
|
-
autonomousApproval(derivedFrom?: string[]
|
|
15
|
+
autonomousApproval(derivedFrom?: string[]): Approval;
|
|
16
16
|
approvalAdapter(): ApprovalAdapter;
|
|
17
17
|
approvalHarness(): string;
|
|
18
18
|
prepareHostApproval(input: {
|