@gotgenes/pi-permission-system 17.1.1 → 18.0.1

package/src/input-normalizer.ts

@@ -1,25 +1,60 @@
+import type { AccessIntent } from "./access-intent/access-intent";
 import { stripBashCommentLines } from "./bash-arity";
 import { createMcpPermissionTargets } from "./mcp-targets";
-import { getPathPolicyValues, PATH_BEARING_TOOLS } from "./path-utils";
+import type { PathNormalizer } from "./path-normalizer";
+import { PATH_SURFACES } from "./path-surfaces";
 import { getNonEmptyString, toRecord } from "./value-guards";
 
 /**
- * Construct a surface-appropriate input object from a raw value string.
+ * Build the {@link AccessIntent} an external policy query (the `Symbol.for()`
+ * service and the event-bus RPC) feeds to the resolver from a `(surface, value)`
+ * pair.
  *
- * This is the inverse of `normalizeInput()` — it builds the minimal input
- * object that `PermissionManager.checkPermission()` expects for a given
- * surface, from a single string value.
+ * For a path-shaped surface (`path`, `external_directory`, or a path-bearing
+ * tool) carrying a non-empty value, it builds an `AccessPath` and emits an
+ * `access-path` intent, so the resolver matches the lexical aliases ∪ canonical
+ * (symlink-resolved) set — at parity with the gates (#486, #502). Every other
+ * surface, and any value-less surface-level query, keeps the `tool` intent so
+ * the manager's `normalizeInput` `["*"]` fallback is preserved.
+ */
+export function buildAccessIntentForSurface(
+  surface: string,
+  value: string | undefined,
+  normalizer: PathNormalizer,
+  agentName: string | undefined,
+): AccessIntent {
+  const pathValue = getNonEmptyString(value);
+  if (pathValue !== null && PATH_SURFACES.has(surface)) {
+    return {
+      kind: "access-path",
+      surface,
+      path: normalizer.forPath(pathValue),
+      agentName,
+    };
+  }
+  return {
+    kind: "tool",
+    surface,
+    input: buildInputForSurface(surface, value),
+    agentName,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Construct a surface-appropriate input object from a raw value string for the
+ * `tool`-intent branch of {@link buildAccessIntentForSurface} (the non-path
+ * surfaces and value-less path queries).
  *
- * Used by the event-bus RPC handler and the `Symbol.for()` service accessor
- * so external callers can query policy with `(surface, value)` instead of
- * constructing a full tool-call input payload.
+ * This is the inverse of `normalizeInput()` — it builds the minimal input
+ * object that the manager expects for a given surface, from a single string
+ * value.
  *
  * Note: MCP inputs are complex (server name + tool name derivation). Callers
  * providing an MCP surface receive a best-effort policy evaluation using the
  * value as a pre-qualified target string. Pass the fully-qualified target
  * (e.g. "exa:search" or "exa") directly.
  */
-export function buildInputForSurface(
+function buildInputForSurface(
   surface: string,
   value: string | undefined,
 ): unknown {
@@ -51,12 +86,16 @@ export interface NormalizedInput {
   resultExtras: Record<string, unknown>;
 }
 
-const SPECIAL_PERMISSION_KEYS = new Set(["external_directory", "path"]);
-
 /**
  * Map a raw tool invocation to the surface/values/extras triple needed by
  * `checkPermission()`.
  *
+ * Handles bash, skill, mcp, and extension surfaces. Path-bearing tool surfaces
+ * (`path`, `external_directory`, `read`, `write`, `edit`, `grep`, `find`,
+ * `ls`) now route through the access-path gate (#502) and service/RPC builder
+ * (#503) before reaching the manager, so they never arrive here with a real
+ * path value — all fall through to the extension catch-all `["*"]`.
+ *
  * @param toolName - Normalized (trimmed) tool name from the tool-call event.
  * @param input    - Raw input payload from the tool-call event.
  * @param configuredMcpServerNames - Ordered list of MCP server names from the
@@ -66,18 +105,7 @@ export function normalizeInput(
   toolName: string,
   input: unknown,
   configuredMcpServerNames: readonly string[],
-  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
-  cwd?: string,
 ): NormalizedInput {
-  // --- Special surfaces (path, external_directory) ---
-  if (SPECIAL_PERMISSION_KEYS.has(toolName)) {
-    return {
-      surface: toolName,
-      values: normalizePathSurfaceValues(input, platform, cwd),
-      resultExtras: {},
-    };
-  }
-
   // --- Skill ---
   if (toolName === "skill") {
     const record = toRecord(input);
@@ -120,43 +148,13 @@ export function normalizeInput(
     };
   }
 
-  // --- Path-bearing tools (read, write, edit, grep, find, ls) ---
-  if (PATH_BEARING_TOOLS.has(toolName)) {
-    return {
-      surface: toolName,
-      values: normalizePathSurfaceValues(input, platform, cwd),
-      resultExtras: {},
-    };
-  }
-
-  // --- Extension tools (non-path-bearing) ---
+  // --- All other surfaces (path-bearing tools and extension tools) ---
+  // Path-bearing tools with a present path never reach here — the gate emits
+  // an access-path intent (#502). Missing-path and extension-tool cases both
+  // collapse to the surface catch-all.
   return {
     surface: toolName,
     values: ["*"],
     resultExtras: {},
   };
 }
-
-/**
- * Extract and normalize the path lookup values shared by every path surface
- * (`path`, `external_directory`, and the path-bearing tools).
- *
- * Missing, empty, or whitespace-only paths collapse to the surface catch-all
- * `"*"`. When CWD is known, a relative path also produces a normalized
- * absolute policy value and a project-relative alias while keeping its legacy
- * relative value, so values match home- and cwd-anchored patterns
- * symmetrically with how the patterns themselves are expanded (#350).
- *
- * Only `input.path` is read — policy values are never sourced from any other
- * (potentially attacker-controlled) field on the raw tool input.
- */
-function normalizePathSurfaceValues(
-  input: unknown,
-  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
-  cwd?: string,
-): string[] {
-  const path = getNonEmptyString(toRecord(input).path);
-  if (path === null) return ["*"];
-  const values = getPathPolicyValues(path, cwd ? { cwd } : {}, platform);
-  return values.length > 0 ? values : ["*"];
-}

package/src/path-containment.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+import { posix as posixPath, win32 as winPath } from "node:path";
+
+import { isSafeSystemPath } from "./safe-system-paths";
+
+/**
+ * Returns true when `pathValue` is `directory` itself or nested inside it.
+ *
+ * Containment is decided with Node's platform-native `path.relative` rather
+ * than a hand-rolled prefix check: on `win32` the comparison folds case (and
+ * tolerates either separator), matching the case-insensitive filesystem.
+ * `platform` is injected from the composition root so Windows behavior is
+ * testable on a POSIX CI.
+ */
+export function isPathWithinDirectory(
+  pathValue: string,
+  directory: string,
+  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
+): boolean {
+  if (!pathValue || !directory) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (pathValue === directory) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  const impl = platform === "win32" ? winPath : posixPath;
+  const rel = impl.relative(directory, pathValue);
+  return (
+    rel !== "" &&
+    rel !== ".." &&
+    !rel.startsWith(`..${impl.sep}`) &&
+    !impl.isAbsolute(rel)
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Pure geometry: is `canonicalPath` outside `canonicalCwd`?
+ *
+ * Both operands must already be canonical (symlink-resolved, win32-lowercased)
+ * — the caller prepares them (see {@link PathNormalizer.isOutsideWorkingDirectory}).
+ * This predicate touches no filesystem and does no derivation.
+ */
+export function isPathOutsideWorkingDirectory(
+  canonicalPath: string,
+  canonicalCwd: string,
+  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
+): boolean {
+  if (!canonicalCwd || !canonicalPath) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (isSafeSystemPath(canonicalPath)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return !isPathWithinDirectory(canonicalPath, canonicalCwd, platform);
+}

package/src/path-normalizer.ts

@@ -1,12 +1,15 @@
 import { posix as posixPath, win32 as winPath } from "node:path";
 
 import { AccessPath } from "./access-intent/access-path";
+import {
+  canonicalNormalizePathForComparison,
+  normalizePathForComparison,
+} from "./access-intent/path-normalization";
 import {
   isPathOutsideWorkingDirectory,
   isPathWithinDirectory,
-  isPiInfrastructureRead,
-  normalizePathForComparison,
-} from "./path-utils";
+} from "./path-containment";
+import { isPiInfrastructureRead } from "./pi-infrastructure-read";
 
 /**
  * Path-interpretation collaborator, constructed once at the session edge with
@@ -19,16 +22,19 @@ import {
  * prepared {@link AccessPath} values, instead of reading `process.platform`
  * ambiently or threading `cwd` through every call. Internally it selects the
  * `win32`/`posix` path flavor once and delegates to the platform-parameterized
- * `path-utils` / `AccessPath` primitives.
+ * `path-containment` / `path-normalization` / `AccessPath` primitives.
  */
 export class PathNormalizer {
   private readonly impl: typeof posixPath;
+  /** Canonical form of the baked cwd, resolved once (the symlink target is stable per session). */
+  private readonly canonicalCwd: string;
 
   constructor(
     private readonly platform: NodeJS.Platform,
     private readonly cwd: string,
   ) {
     this.impl = platform === "win32" ? winPath : posixPath;
+    this.canonicalCwd = canonicalNormalizePathForComparison(cwd, cwd, platform);
   }
 
   /** Build an AccessPath for a token, resolved against `resolveBase` (default cwd). */
@@ -67,7 +73,16 @@ export class PathNormalizer {
 
   /** Canonical (symlink-resolved) outside-cwd test against the baked cwd. */
   isOutsideWorkingDirectory(pathValue: string): boolean {
-    return isPathOutsideWorkingDirectory(pathValue, this.cwd, this.platform);
+    const canonicalPath = canonicalNormalizePathForComparison(
+      pathValue,
+      this.cwd,
+      this.platform,
+    );
+    return isPathOutsideWorkingDirectory(
+      canonicalPath,
+      this.canonicalCwd,
+      this.platform,
+    );
   }
 
   /**

package/src/path-surfaces.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/**
+ * File tools that only read — never write — the filesystem.
+ * Only these tools are eligible for the Pi infrastructure auto-allow.
+ */
+export const READ_ONLY_PATH_BEARING_TOOLS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
+  "read",
+  "find",
+  "grep",
+  "ls",
+]);
+
+export const PATH_BEARING_TOOLS = new Set([
+  "read",
+  "write",
+  "edit",
+  "find",
+  "grep",
+  "ls",
+]);
+
+/**
+ * Surfaces whose patterns are matched against filesystem paths and therefore
+ * fold case (and separators) on Windows: the path-bearing tools plus the
+ * cross-cutting `path` gate and the `external_directory` boundary gate.
+ */
+export const PATH_SURFACES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
+  ...PATH_BEARING_TOOLS,
+  "external_directory",
+  "path",
+]);

package/src/pattern-suggest.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { prefix, stripBashCommentLines } from "./bash-arity";
-import { PATH_BEARING_TOOLS } from "./path-utils";
+import { PATH_BEARING_TOOLS } from "./path-surfaces";
 import { deriveApprovalPattern } from "./session-rules";
 
 /** The suggestion returned for a "Yes, for this session" dialog option. */

package/src/permission-event-rpc.ts

@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
  * permission prompts without importing this package.
  */
 import type { ExtensionContext } from "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent";
-import { buildInputForSurface } from "./input-normalizer";
+import { buildAccessIntentForSurface } from "./input-normalizer";
+import type { PathNormalizer } from "./path-normalizer";
 import type {
   PermissionPromptDecision,
   RequestPermissionOptions,
@@ -26,22 +27,26 @@ import {
   PERMISSIONS_RPC_CHECK_CHANNEL,
   PERMISSIONS_RPC_PROMPT_CHANNEL,
 } from "./permission-events";
-import type { ScopedPermissionManager } from "./permission-manager";
+import type { ScopedPermissionResolver } from "./permission-resolver";
 import { buildRpcUiPrompt } from "./permission-ui-prompt";
 import type { ReviewLogger } from "./session-logger";
-import type { SessionRules } from "./session-rules";
 
 /** Dependencies injected into the RPC handler registry. */
 export interface PermissionRpcDeps {
-  /** The shared PermissionManager instance. */
-  permissionManager: Pick<ScopedPermissionManager, "check">;
-  /** The shared SessionRules instance. */
-  sessionRules: Pick<SessionRules, "getRuleset">;
   /**
-   * Narrow session view: provides runtime context.
-   * Used by the prompt handler to check hasUI and access the UI dialog.
+   * The shared resolver: answers an access intent, composing the session
+   * ruleset and unwrapping `access-path` → `path-values` internally so the
+   * RPC check matches the same lexical ∪ canonical set the gates do (#503).
    */
-  session: { getRuntimeContext(): ExtensionContext | null };
+  resolver: Pick<ScopedPermissionResolver, "resolve">;
+  /**
+   * Narrow session view: runtime context for the prompt handler (hasUI / UI
+   * dialog) and the cwd-bound path normalizer for path-surface check queries.
+   */
+  session: {
+    getRuntimeContext(): ExtensionContext | null;
+    getPathNormalizer(): PathNormalizer;
+  };
   /** Show the interactive permission dialog in the parent session UI. */
   requestPermissionDecisionFromUi(
     ui: ExtensionContext["ui"],
@@ -107,12 +112,13 @@ function handleCheckRpc(
       return;
     }
 
-    const input = buildInputForSurface(surface, value);
-    const sessionRules = deps.sessionRules.getRuleset();
-    const result = deps.permissionManager.check(
-      { kind: "tool", surface, input, agentName: agentName ?? undefined },
-      sessionRules,
+    const intent = buildAccessIntentForSurface(
+      surface,
+      value,
+      deps.session.getPathNormalizer(),
+      agentName ?? undefined,
     );
+    const result = deps.resolver.resolve(intent);
 
     const data: PermissionsCheckReplyData = {
       result: result.state,

package/src/permission-manager.ts

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import {
 } from "./config-paths";
 import { normalizeInput } from "./input-normalizer";
 import { normalizeFlatConfig } from "./normalize";
-import { PATH_SURFACES } from "./path-utils";
+import { PATH_SURFACES } from "./path-surfaces";
 import {
   FilePolicyLoader,
   type PolicyLoader,
@@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ export interface PermissionManagerOptions extends PolicyLoaderOptions {
 export class PermissionManager implements ScopedPermissionManager {
   private readonly agentDir: string | undefined;
   private readonly platform: NodeJS.Platform;
-  private currentCwd: string | undefined;
   private loader: PolicyLoader;
   private readonly resolvedPermissionsCache = new Map<
     string,
@@ -123,8 +122,6 @@ export class PermissionManager implements ScopedPermissionManager {
    * built with explicit paths), only the cache is cleared.
    */
   configureForCwd(cwd: string | undefined | null): void {
-    this.currentCwd =
-      typeof cwd === "string" && cwd.trim().length > 0 ? cwd : undefined;
     if (this.agentDir !== undefined) {
       this.loader = new FilePolicyLoader(
         derivePolicyLoaderOptions(this.agentDir, cwd),
@@ -248,8 +245,16 @@ export class PermissionManager implements ScopedPermissionManager {
   /**
    * Unified resolution entry point — dispatches on intent kind.
    *
-   * `"tool"` → normalizes raw input through `normalizeInput`.
+   * `"tool"` → normalizes raw input through `normalizeInput` (bash, skill, mcp,
+   * extension surfaces). Path-bearing surfaces arrive as `"path-values"` via
+   * the access-path gate (#502) or service/RPC builder (#503).
    * `"path-values"` → evaluates the precomputed values directly.
+   *
+   * The manager stays string-based by design: it consumes `ResolvedAccessIntent`
+   * (`tool | path-values`) and never imports `AccessPath`. This deliberate
+   * boundary is formalized in ADR-0002
+   * (`docs/decisions/0002-path-values-string-boundary.md`) and guarded by a
+   * `no-restricted-imports` lint rule on this file.
    */
   check(
     intent: ResolvedAccessIntent,
@@ -280,8 +285,6 @@ export class PermissionManager implements ScopedPermissionManager {
       toolName,
       intent.input,
       this.loader.getConfiguredMcpServerNames(),
-      this.platform,
-      this.currentCwd,
     );
     return buildCheckResult(
       surface,

package/src/permission-resolver.ts

@@ -26,6 +26,11 @@ export interface ScopedPermissionResolver {
  *
  * Tell-Don't-Ask: the resolver asks an `AccessPath` for its `matchValues()`,
  * so the low-level manager never imports the value object.
+ *
+ * This is the sole `matchValues()` unwrap site — the single place the lexical ∪
+ * canonical alias set (#418) is derived. Keeping it here (not in the manager)
+ * is the deliberate boundary formalized in ADR-0002
+ * (`docs/decisions/0002-path-values-string-boundary.md`).
  */
 function toResolvedIntent(intent: AccessIntent): ResolvedAccessIntent {
   if (intent.kind === "access-path") {

package/src/permission-session.ts

@@ -85,11 +85,6 @@ export class PermissionSession implements ToolCallGateInputs {
     return this.context;
   }
 
-  /** The host platform injected at the composition root. */
-  getPlatform(): NodeJS.Platform {
-    return this.platform;
-  }
-
   // ── UI notifications ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
   /** Surface a warning message to the user via the active UI context, if any. */

package/src/permissions-service.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-import { buildInputForSurface } from "./input-normalizer";
-import type { ScopedPermissionManager } from "./permission-manager";
+import type { AccessIntent } from "./access-intent/access-intent";
+import { buildAccessIntentForSurface } from "./input-normalizer";
+import type { PathNormalizer } from "./path-normalizer";
 import type { PermissionsService } from "./service";
-import type { SessionRules } from "./session-rules";
 import type {
   ToolAccessExtractor,
   ToolAccessExtractorRegistrar,
@@ -10,18 +10,37 @@ import type {
   ToolInputFormatter,
   ToolInputFormatterRegistrar,
 } from "./tool-input-formatter-registry";
+import type { PermissionCheckResult, PermissionState } from "./types";
+
+/**
+ * Resolution surface the service needs: answer a gate-style {@link AccessIntent}
+ * (composing the session ruleset internally) and report a tool-level state.
+ * `PermissionResolver` satisfies it.
+ */
+interface ResolverForService {
+  resolve(intent: AccessIntent): PermissionCheckResult;
+  getToolPermission(toolName: string, agentName?: string): PermissionState;
+}
+
+/** Narrow session view: hands out the cwd-bound path normalizer. */
+interface PathNormalizerProvider {
+  getPathNormalizer(): PathNormalizer;
+}
 
 /**
  * In-process implementation of the cross-extension {@link PermissionsService}.
  *
  * Constructed once in the composition root and backed by the single shared
- * `PermissionManager` and `SessionRules` instances that `PermissionSession`
- * also uses — so service queries and gate-path approvals see the same state.
+ * `PermissionResolver` and `PermissionSession` that the gates also use — so
+ * service queries and gate-path decisions see the same state. Path-shaped
+ * surface queries route through the resolver as an `access-path` intent, so
+ * they match the lexical aliases ∪ canonical (symlink-resolved) set the gates
+ * do (#503); non-path surfaces stay on the `tool` intent.
  */
 export class LocalPermissionsService implements PermissionsService {
   constructor(
-    private readonly permissionManager: ScopedPermissionManager,
-    private readonly sessionRules: Pick<SessionRules, "getRuleset">,
+    private readonly resolver: ResolverForService,
+    private readonly session: PathNormalizerProvider,
     private readonly formatterRegistry: ToolInputFormatterRegistrar,
     private readonly accessExtractorRegistry: ToolAccessExtractorRegistrar,
   ) {}
@@ -31,18 +50,20 @@ export class LocalPermissionsService implements PermissionsService {
     value?: string,
     agentName?: string,
   ): ReturnType<PermissionsService["checkPermission"]> {
-    const input = buildInputForSurface(surface, value);
-    return this.permissionManager.check(
-      { kind: "tool", surface, input, agentName },
-      this.sessionRules.getRuleset(),
+    const intent = buildAccessIntentForSurface(
+      surface,
+      value,
+      this.session.getPathNormalizer(),
+      agentName,
     );
+    return this.resolver.resolve(intent);
   }
 
   getToolPermission(
     toolName: string,
     agentName?: string,
   ): ReturnType<PermissionsService["getToolPermission"]> {
-    return this.permissionManager.getToolPermission(toolName, agentName);
+    return this.resolver.getToolPermission(toolName, agentName);
   }
 
   registerToolInputFormatter(

package/src/pi-infrastructure-read.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+import { join } from "node:path";
+
+import { expandHomePath } from "./expand-home";
+import { isPathWithinDirectory } from "./path-containment";
+import { READ_ONLY_PATH_BEARING_TOOLS } from "./path-surfaces";
+import { wildcardMatch } from "./wildcard-matcher";
+
+function containsGlobChars(value: string): boolean {
+  return value.includes("*") || value.includes("?");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if the given tool + normalized path combination qualifies for
+ * automatic allow as a Pi infrastructure read.
+ *
+ * A path qualifies when:
+ * 1. The tool is read-only (in READ_ONLY_PATH_BEARING_TOOLS).
+ * 2. The normalized path is within one of the provided `infrastructureDirs`
+ *    OR within the project-local Pi package directories
+ *    (`<cwd>/.pi/npm/` or `<cwd>/.pi/git/`).
+ *
+ * `infrastructureDirs` entries may be absolute paths or patterns containing
+ * `~`/`$HOME` (expanded at call time) or glob characters (`*`, `?`).
+ * Project-local paths are computed fresh from `cwd` on each call so they
+ * follow working-directory changes without a runtime rebuild.
+ */
+export function isPiInfrastructureRead(
+  toolName: string,
+  normalizedPath: string,
+  infrastructureDirs: readonly string[],
+  cwd: string,
+  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
+): boolean {
+  if (!READ_ONLY_PATH_BEARING_TOOLS.has(toolName)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // On Windows the path value is canonicalized + lowercased; fold case (and
+  // separators) so mixed-case infra dirs and glob patterns still match.
+  const matchOptions =
+    platform === "win32"
+      ? { caseInsensitive: true, windowsSeparators: true }
+      : undefined;
+
+  for (const dir of infrastructureDirs) {
+    if (containsGlobChars(dir)) {
+      if (wildcardMatch(dir, normalizedPath, matchOptions)) return true;
+    } else {
+      if (isPathWithinDirectory(normalizedPath, expandHomePath(dir), platform))
+        return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Project-local Pi packages — checked fresh every call so CWD changes work.
+  const projectNpmDir = join(cwd, ".pi", "npm");
+  const projectGitDir = join(cwd, ".pi", "git");
+  if (isPathWithinDirectory(normalizedPath, projectNpmDir, platform)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (isPathWithinDirectory(normalizedPath, projectGitDir, platform)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}

package/src/rule.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { PATH_SURFACES } from "./path-utils";
+import { PATH_SURFACES } from "./path-surfaces";
 import type { PermissionState } from "./types";
 import { wildcardMatch } from "./wildcard-matcher";
 

package/src/safe-system-paths.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/**
+ * Paths that are universally safe and should never trigger external-directory checks.
+ * These are OS device files: read returns EOF or process streams, write discards or goes to process streams.
+ */
+export const SAFE_SYSTEM_PATHS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
+  "/dev/null",
+  "/dev/stdin",
+  "/dev/stdout",
+  "/dev/stderr",
+]);
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if the given normalized path is a safe OS device file
+ * that should never trigger external-directory checks.
+ */
+export function isSafeSystemPath(normalizedPath: string): boolean {
+  return SAFE_SYSTEM_PATHS.has(normalizedPath);
+}