@gotgenes/pi-permission-system 17.1.1 → 18.0.1

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,39 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## [18.0.1](https://github.com/gotgenes/pi-packages/compare/pi-permission-system-v18.0.0...pi-permission-system-v18.0.1) (2026-06-30)
+
+
+### Documentation
+
+* **pi-permission-system:** name the path-values boundary contract and guard it ([#506](https://github.com/gotgenes/pi-packages/issues/506)) ([a47648c](https://github.com/gotgenes/pi-packages/commit/a47648c1fcff3226b6ea3269392f9d8548654ee1))
+
+## [18.0.0](https://github.com/gotgenes/pi-packages/compare/pi-permission-system-v17.1.1...pi-permission-system-v18.0.0) (2026-06-29)
+
+
+### ⚠ BREAKING CHANGES
+
+* **pi-permission-system:** A permissions:rpc:check query for a `path` / `external_directory` / path-bearing surface now matches the canonical (symlink-resolved) alias, and a `path` / path-bearing query now evaluates the supplied path instead of collapsing to `*`.
+* **pi-permission-system:** A service (`getPermissionsService().checkPermission`) query for a `path` / `external_directory` / path-bearing surface now matches the canonical (symlink-resolved) alias, and a `path` / path-bearing query now evaluates the supplied path instead of collapsing to `*`. A symlinked path can now match a rule on its canonical target.
+* **pi-permission-system:** a per-tool path rule (e.g. `read: deny *.env`) now also fires when a symlink's resolved target matches the pattern, where previously only the lexically-referenced spelling matched. A symlink alias can no longer evade a per-tool deny/allow.
+
+### Features
+
+* **pi-permission-system:** match the canonical form on service path queries ([be4a3e7](https://github.com/gotgenes/pi-packages/commit/be4a3e7f48e700db4c667ce8176459a1e89820b4))
+* **pi-permission-system:** match the canonical form on the per-tool path gate ([ad36e78](https://github.com/gotgenes/pi-packages/commit/ad36e7860084be7692cb142f50c8818bd013ec38))
+* **pi-permission-system:** match the canonical form on the RPC check query ([bb04ca5](https://github.com/gotgenes/pi-packages/commit/bb04ca5d0bae265570144f7d76dee2bad9269f94))
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **pi-permission-system:** remove unused join import; annotate closed findings ([#504](https://github.com/gotgenes/pi-packages/issues/504)) ([eb7c7b2](https://github.com/gotgenes/pi-packages/commit/eb7c7b298e21358d831892545b5dd8d3e9fb340a))
+
+
+### Documentation
+
+* **pi-permission-system:** document canonical per-tool path matching ([bafa492](https://github.com/gotgenes/pi-packages/commit/bafa492cf8517902aea5a44d6ea59d4b33e7f754))
+* **pi-permission-system:** document canonical service/RPC path matching ([35c36fa](https://github.com/gotgenes/pi-packages/commit/35c36fa9f7954aa84eb468954660b5857e067be3))
+
 ## [17.1.1](https://github.com/gotgenes/pi-packages/compare/pi-permission-system-v17.1.0...pi-permission-system-v17.1.1) (2026-06-29)
 
 

package/README.md

@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ A `path` pattern matches both the path as the agent references it and its canoni
 
 For per-tool path patterns (`read`, `write`, `edit`, `find`, `grep`, `ls`), patterns are matched against the file path from `input.path`.
 This lets you express rules like "allow reads but deny `.env` files" at the individual tool level.
+Like the cross-cutting `path` surface, per-tool patterns match both the referenced path and its canonical (symlink-resolved) form, so a per-tool deny resists symlink-alias evasion.
 When Pi's current working directory is known, relative path inputs also match their cwd-normalized absolute form, so `src/App.jsx` can match both `src/*` and `/workspace/project/*`.
 
 The `external_directory` surface is the CWD-boundary gate: it decides whether reaching **outside** the working tree is allowed, and accepts a pattern map so you can allow specific outside-CWD directories without opening up all external access.

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@gotgenes/pi-permission-system",
-  "version": "17.1.1",
+  "version": "18.0.1",
   "description": "Permission enforcement extension for the Pi coding agent.",
   "type": "module",
   "exports": {

package/src/access-intent/access-intent.ts

@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ export interface ToolAccessIntent {
  * Not gate-emitted: the resolver produces it internally by unwrapping an
  * `access-path` intent via `matchValues()`, keeping the low-level manager
  * string-based (it never imports `AccessPath`). See {@link ResolvedAccessIntent}.
+ *
+ * This string seam is a deliberate, formalized boundary — not transitional
+ * scaffolding to collapse into the manager (ADR-0002,
+ * `docs/decisions/0002-path-values-string-boundary.md`).
  */
 export interface PathValuesAccessIntent {
   kind: "path-values";
@@ -32,9 +36,12 @@ export interface PathValuesAccessIntent {
 /**
  * An `AccessPath` value object for a path-shaped surface.
  *
- * Emitted by every path gate (the `path` and `external_directory` surfaces);
- * lets `AccessPath` flow into the resolver as a first-class variant so the
- * resolver — not the gate — asks it for `matchValues()` (Tell-Don't-Ask).
+ * Built for every path-shaped surface: the cross-cutting `path` and
+ * `external_directory` gates, the per-tool path-bearing surfaces
+ * (`read`/`write`/`edit`/`grep`/`find`/`ls`, #502), and the service/RPC policy
+ * queries for those surfaces (#503). Lets `AccessPath` flow into the resolver
+ * as a first-class variant so the resolver — not the producer — asks it for
+ * `matchValues()` (Tell-Don't-Ask).
  */
 export interface AccessPathAccessIntent {
   kind: "access-path";
@@ -50,6 +57,9 @@ export type AccessIntent = ToolAccessIntent | AccessPathAccessIntent;
  * What the manager consumes — the `access-path` variant has already been
  * unwrapped to `path-values` by the resolver via `path.matchValues()`.
  *
- * The manager stays string-based and never imports `AccessPath`.
+ * The manager stays string-based and never imports `AccessPath`: this is the
+ * deliberate boundary formalized in ADR-0002
+ * (`docs/decisions/0002-path-values-string-boundary.md`), guarded by a
+ * `no-restricted-imports` lint rule on `permission-manager.ts`.
  */
 export type ResolvedAccessIntent = ToolAccessIntent | PathValuesAccessIntent;

package/src/access-intent/access-path.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import {
   canonicalNormalizePathForComparison,
   getPathPolicyValues,
   normalizePathForComparison,
-} from "#src/path-utils";
+} from "./path-normalization";
 
 /**
  * A path's two representations held behind type-distinct accessors.

package/src/access-intent/bash/bash-path-resolver.ts

@@ -14,8 +14,9 @@ import {
   collectRedirectTokens,
   extractCommandName,
 } from "#src/access-intent/bash/token-collection";
+import { normalizePathPolicyLiteral } from "#src/access-intent/path-normalization";
 import type { PathNormalizer } from "#src/path-normalizer";
-import { isSafeSystemPath, normalizePathPolicyLiteral } from "#src/path-utils";
+import { isSafeSystemPath } from "#src/safe-system-paths";
 
 // ── Internal types ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 

package/src/access-intent/bash/program.ts

@@ -73,10 +73,6 @@ export class BashProgram {
    * back to the whole command so the surface is never evaluated weaker than
    * before.
    */
-  // Used by resolveBashCommandCheck (bash-command.ts) and tests. Fallow's
-  // syntactic analysis cannot resolve the static-factory return type (private
-  // ctor), so it reports a false positive here.
-  // fallow-ignore-next-line unused-class-member
   commands(): BashCommand[] {
     return [...this.commandUnits];
   }

package/src/access-intent/path-normalization.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+import { posix as posixPath, win32 as winPath } from "node:path";
+
+import { canonicalizePath } from "#src/canonicalize-path";
+import { expandHomePath } from "#src/expand-home";
+import { isPathWithinDirectory } from "#src/path-containment";
+
+/**
+ * Representation derivation backing {@link AccessPath}: turn an accessed path
+ * into the lexical / canonical / policy-value forms the resolver matches
+ * against rules. Pure (no filesystem access except `canonicalizePath`'s
+ * best-effort symlink resolution); the `platform` is injected, never read
+ * ambiently.
+ */
+export function normalizePathForComparison(
+  pathValue: string,
+  cwd: string,
+  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
+): string {
+  const trimmed = pathValue.trim().replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, "");
+  if (!trimmed) {
+    return "";
+  }
+
+  let normalizedPath = trimmed.startsWith("@") ? trimmed.slice(1) : trimmed;
+  normalizedPath = expandHomePath(normalizedPath);
+
+  const impl = platform === "win32" ? winPath : posixPath;
+  const absolutePath = impl.resolve(cwd, normalizedPath);
+  const normalizedAbsolutePath = impl.normalize(absolutePath);
+  return platform === "win32"
+    ? normalizedAbsolutePath.toLowerCase()
+    : normalizedAbsolutePath;
+}
+
+export interface PathPolicyValueOptions {
+  /**
+   * Current Pi working directory. When provided, returned values include a
+   * project-relative alias for paths that resolve inside this directory.
+   */
+  cwd?: string;
+  /**
+   * Directory used to resolve `pathValue` into an absolute policy value.
+   * Defaults to `cwd`. Bash uses this for tokens seen after a literal `cd`.
+   */
+  resolveBase?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Normalize a single path-like lookup value without resolving it against CWD.
+ *
+ * Preserves compatibility with existing relative path rules (`src/*`, `*.env`)
+ * while applying the same lexical cleanup as
+ * {@link normalizePathForComparison}: trim, strip simple wrapping quotes,
+ * strip the OpenCode-style leading `@`, and expand `~` / `$HOME`.
+ */
+export function normalizePathPolicyLiteral(pathValue: string): string {
+  const trimmed = pathValue.trim().replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, "");
+  if (!trimmed) return "";
+  const unprefixed = trimmed.startsWith("@") ? trimmed.slice(1) : trimmed;
+  return expandHomePath(unprefixed);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return equivalent lookup values for path-policy matching.
+ *
+ * The first value is the cwd/effective-base normalized absolute path when a
+ * base is available. The later values preserve project-relative and raw
+ * relative forms so existing rules like `src/*` and `*.env` continue to match.
+ */
+export function getPathPolicyValues(
+  pathValue: string,
+  options: PathPolicyValueOptions,
+  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
+): string[] {
+  const literal = normalizePathPolicyLiteral(pathValue);
+  if (!literal) return [];
+  if (literal === "*") return ["*"];
+
+  return [
+    ...new Set([
+      ...getAbsolutePathPolicyValues(pathValue, options, platform),
+      literal,
+    ]),
+  ];
+}
+
+function getAbsolutePathPolicyValues(
+  pathValue: string,
+  options: PathPolicyValueOptions,
+  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
+): string[] {
+  const resolveBase = options.resolveBase ?? options.cwd;
+  if (!resolveBase) return [];
+
+  const absolute = normalizePathForComparison(pathValue, resolveBase, platform);
+  if (!absolute) return [];
+
+  return [
+    absolute,
+    ...getCwdRelativePathPolicyValues(absolute, options.cwd, platform),
+  ];
+}
+
+function getCwdRelativePathPolicyValues(
+  absolute: string,
+  cwd: string | undefined,
+  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
+): string[] {
+  if (!cwd) return [];
+
+  const normalizedCwd = normalizePathForComparison(cwd, cwd, platform);
+  if (!normalizedCwd) return [];
+  if (
+    absolute !== normalizedCwd &&
+    !isPathWithinDirectory(absolute, normalizedCwd, platform)
+  ) {
+    return [];
+  }
+
+  const impl = platform === "win32" ? winPath : posixPath;
+  const relativeValue = impl.relative(normalizedCwd, absolute);
+  return relativeValue ? [relativeValue] : [];
+}
+
+/**
+ * Like {@link normalizePathForComparison} but also resolves symlinks via
+ * `realpathSync` (best-effort). Use this for containment decisions where the
+ * OS-followed path matters, not for pattern matching.
+ */
+export function canonicalNormalizePathForComparison(
+  pathValue: string,
+  cwd: string,
+  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
+): string {
+  const lexical = normalizePathForComparison(pathValue, cwd, platform);
+  if (!lexical) return "";
+  const canonical = canonicalizePath(lexical, platform);
+  return platform === "win32" ? canonical.toLowerCase() : canonical;
+}

package/src/handlers/gates/external-directory.ts

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 import type { PathNormalizer } from "#src/path-normalizer";
-import { getToolInputPath } from "#src/path-utils";
 import type { ScopedPermissionResolver } from "#src/permission-resolver";
 import { SessionApproval } from "#src/session-approval";
 import { deriveApprovalPattern } from "#src/session-rules";
 import type { ToolAccessExtractorLookup } from "#src/tool-access-extractor-registry";
+import { getToolInputPath } from "#src/tool-input-path";
 import type { GateResult } from "./descriptor";
 import { formatExternalDirectoryAskPrompt } from "./external-directory-messages";
 import { resolveExternalDirectoryPolicy } from "./external-directory-policy";

package/src/handlers/gates/path.ts

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 import type { PathNormalizer } from "#src/path-normalizer";
-import { getToolInputPath } from "#src/path-utils";
 import type { ScopedPermissionResolver } from "#src/permission-resolver";
 import { SessionApproval } from "#src/session-approval";
 import { deriveApprovalPattern } from "#src/session-rules";
 import type { ToolAccessExtractorLookup } from "#src/tool-access-extractor-registry";
+import { getToolInputPath } from "#src/tool-input-path";
 import type { GateDescriptor, GateResult } from "./descriptor";
 import type { ToolCallContext } from "./types";
 

package/src/handlers/gates/tool-call-gate-pipeline.ts

@@ -1,13 +1,16 @@
+import type { AccessPath } from "#src/access-intent/access-path";
 import { BashProgram } from "#src/access-intent/bash/program";
 import type { PathNormalizer } from "#src/path-normalizer";
 import type { ScopedPermissionResolver } from "#src/permission-resolver";
 import type { SkillPromptEntry } from "#src/skill-prompt-sanitizer";
 import type { ToolAccessExtractorLookup } from "#src/tool-access-extractor-registry";
 import type { ToolInputFormatterLookup } from "#src/tool-input-formatter-registry";
+import { getPathBearingToolPath } from "#src/tool-input-path";
 import {
   ToolPreviewFormatter,
   type ToolPreviewFormatterOptions,
 } from "#src/tool-preview-formatter";
+import type { PermissionCheckResult } from "#src/types";
 import { getNonEmptyString, toRecord } from "#src/value-guards";
 import { resolveBashCommandCheck } from "./bash-command";
 import { describeBashExternalDirectoryGate } from "./bash-external-directory";
@@ -39,8 +42,6 @@ export interface ToolCallGateInputs {
   getToolPreviewLimits(): ToolPreviewFormatterOptions;
   /** The session's path normalizer (platform + cwd baked in). */
   getPathNormalizer(): PathNormalizer;
-  /** The host platform injected at the composition root. */
-  getPlatform(): NodeJS.Platform;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -81,7 +82,6 @@ export class ToolCallGatePipeline {
     );
 
     const infraDirs = this.inputs.getInfrastructureReadDirs();
-    const platform = this.inputs.getPlatform();
 
     const gateProducers: Array<() => GateResult | Promise<GateResult>> = [
       () =>
@@ -101,29 +101,17 @@ export class ToolCallGatePipeline {
       () => describeBashExternalDirectoryGate(tcc, bashProgram, this.resolver),
       () => describeBashPathGate(tcc, bashProgram, this.resolver),
       () => {
-        // Bash commands may chain several sub-commands (`a && b`, `a | b`, …);
-        // evaluate each unit from the shared parse on the bash surface and
-        // select the most restrictive, rather than matching the whole program
-        // string (#301). Other tools evaluate their single input directly.
-        const toolCheck =
-          tcc.toolName === "bash" && bashProgram
-            ? resolveBashCommandCheck(
-                command ?? "",
-                bashProgram.commands(),
-                tcc.agentName ?? undefined,
-                this.resolver,
-              )
-            : this.resolver.resolve({
-                kind: "tool",
-                surface: tcc.toolName,
-                input: tcc.input,
-                agentName: tcc.agentName ?? undefined,
-              });
+        const { toolCheck, accessPath } = this.resolvePerToolCheck(
+          tcc,
+          bashProgram,
+          command,
+          normalizer,
+        );
         const toolDescriptor = describeToolGate(
           tcc,
           toolCheck,
           formatter,
-          platform,
+          accessPath,
         );
         toolDescriptor.preCheck = toolCheck;
         return toolDescriptor;
@@ -143,4 +131,55 @@ export class ToolCallGatePipeline {
 
     return { action: "allow" };
   }
+
+  /**
+   * Resolve the per-tool gate's check, choosing the intent by tool shape:
+   * bash chains its sub-commands; a path-bearing tool with a path emits an
+   * `access-path` intent (so the per-tool surface matches lexical ∪ canonical,
+   * #502); every other tool (and a path-bearing tool with no path) keeps the
+   * raw `tool` intent the manager normalizes.
+   *
+   * Returns the `AccessPath` alongside the check so `describeToolGate` derives
+   * the session-approval value from `accessPath.value()`.
+   */
+  private resolvePerToolCheck(
+    tcc: ToolCallContext,
+    bashProgram: BashProgram | null,
+    command: string | null,
+    normalizer: PathNormalizer,
+  ): { toolCheck: PermissionCheckResult; accessPath?: AccessPath } {
+    if (tcc.toolName === "bash" && bashProgram) {
+      return {
+        toolCheck: resolveBashCommandCheck(
+          command ?? "",
+          bashProgram.commands(),
+          tcc.agentName ?? undefined,
+          this.resolver,
+        ),
+      };
+    }
+
+    const filePath = getPathBearingToolPath(tcc.toolName, tcc.input);
+    if (filePath !== null) {
+      const accessPath = normalizer.forPath(filePath);
+      return {
+        accessPath,
+        toolCheck: this.resolver.resolve({
+          kind: "access-path",
+          surface: tcc.toolName,
+          path: accessPath,
+          agentName: tcc.agentName ?? undefined,
+        }),
+      };
+    }
+
+    return {
+      toolCheck: this.resolver.resolve({
+        kind: "tool",
+        surface: tcc.toolName,
+        input: tcc.input,
+        agentName: tcc.agentName ?? undefined,
+      }),
+    };
+  }
 }

package/src/handlers/gates/tool.ts

@@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
-import {
-  getPathBearingToolPath,
-  normalizePathForComparison,
-  PATH_BEARING_TOOLS,
-} from "#src/path-utils";
+import type { AccessPath } from "#src/access-intent/access-path";
+import { PATH_BEARING_TOOLS } from "#src/path-surfaces";
 import { suggestSessionPattern } from "#src/pattern-suggest";
 import { formatAskPrompt } from "#src/permission-prompts";
 import { SessionApproval } from "#src/session-approval";
+import { getPathBearingToolPath } from "#src/tool-input-path";
 import type { ToolPreviewFormatter } from "#src/tool-preview-formatter";
 import type { PermissionCheckResult } from "#src/types";
 import type { GateDescriptor } from "./descriptor";
@@ -16,20 +14,19 @@ import type { ToolCallContext } from "./types";
  * Derive the value used for session-approval pattern suggestions.
  *
  * Bash → command string; MCP → qualified target;
- * path-bearing tools → the file path resolved to its canonical (cwd-anchored,
- * absolute) form so the suggested pattern matches the policy values a later
- * call produces; others → catch-all wildcard.
+ * path-bearing tools → the `AccessPath`'s lexical absolute form (`value()`),
+ * so the suggested pattern matches the policy values a later call produces;
+ * others (or a path-bearing tool with no path) → catch-all wildcard.
  */
 function deriveSuggestionValue(
   tcc: ToolCallContext,
   check: PermissionCheckResult,
-  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
+  accessPath?: AccessPath,
 ): string {
   if (tcc.toolName === "bash") return check.command ?? "";
   if (tcc.toolName === "mcp") return check.target ?? "mcp";
-  const path = getPathBearingToolPath(tcc.toolName, tcc.input);
-  if (path === null) return "*";
-  return normalizePathForComparison(path, tcc.cwd, platform);
+  if (accessPath) return accessPath.value();
+  return "*";
 }
 
 /**
@@ -42,7 +39,7 @@ export function describeToolGate(
   tcc: ToolCallContext,
   check: PermissionCheckResult,
   formatter: ToolPreviewFormatter,
-  platform: NodeJS.Platform,
+  accessPath?: AccessPath,
 ): GateDescriptor {
   const permissionLogContext = formatter.getPermissionLogContext(
     check,
@@ -53,7 +50,7 @@ export function describeToolGate(
   // Compute session approval suggestion for the "for this session" option.
   const suggestion = suggestSessionPattern(
     tcc.toolName,
-    deriveSuggestionValue(tcc, check, platform),
+    deriveSuggestionValue(tcc, check, accessPath),
   );
 
   const askMessage = formatAskPrompt(

package/src/index.ts

@@ -134,17 +134,21 @@ export default function piPermissionSystemExtension(pi: ExtensionAPI): void {
       ),
   });
 
+  // Resolver composes the manager + session ruleset and owns the
+  // access-path → path-values unwrap; the RPC and service route their policy
+  // queries through it, so it is constructed before both.
+  const resolver = new PermissionResolver(permissionManager, sessionRules);
+
   const rpcHandles = registerPermissionRpcHandlers(pi.events, {
-    permissionManager,
-    sessionRules,
+    resolver,
     session,
     requestPermissionDecisionFromUi,
     logger,
   });
 
   const permissionsService = new LocalPermissionsService(
-    permissionManager,
-    sessionRules,
+    resolver,
+    session,
     formatterRegistry,
     accessExtractorRegistry,
   );
@@ -174,8 +178,6 @@ export default function piPermissionSystemExtension(pi: ExtensionAPI): void {
     setActive: (names: string[]) => pi.setActiveTools(names),
   };
 
-  const resolver = new PermissionResolver(permissionManager, sessionRules);
-
   const audit = new DecisionAudit();
   const lifecycle = new SessionLifecycleHandler(
     session,