@gajae-code/coding-agent 0.13.2 → 0.14.0

package/dist/types/sdk/elevation/grant-ledger.d.ts

@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
-import { SDK_STATE_VERSION } from "../broker/state-version";
-import { type ElevationOperation } from "./digest";
-import { type ElevationAnswerAuthority, type ElevationClaimIdentity, type ElevationDispatchOutcome, type ElevationDispatchReceipt } from "./dispatch-receipt";
-import { type BrokerOwnerPrincipal, classifyProcessIncarnationLiveness } from "./owner";
-/**
- * Broker-owned elevation grant ledger.
- *
- * Durable state machine (per elevation request):
- * `requested -> granted -> claimed -> dispatched(outcome)`; terminal
- * `denied`/`expired`/`misused`/`target_unavailable`; crash truth
- * `consumed` (claimed but outcome unknown). Grants are single-use: the claim
- * CAS consumes the grant before dispatch, and a crash between consume and
- * dispatch is replayed truthfully as `consumed` with outcome `unknown`
- * (retry requires a new grant — fail closed).
- *
- * All mutations and reads serialize on one elevation-local
- * `withFileLock` transaction covering grants (`grants.jsonl`), dispatch
- * receipts (`receipts.jsonl`), the issue index (`index.json`), and the
- * audit trail (`audit.jsonl`), so a claim, its receipt, and the issue
- * sequence commit together.
- *
- * The answer boundary is internal operator-only: there is no public
- * `elevation.answer` operation; answers are admitted only from the internal
- * operator attestation, so requester self-approval is impossible by
- * construction.
- */
-export type ElevationGrantState = "requested" | "granted" | "claimed" | "dispatched" | "consumed" | "denied" | "expired" | "misused" | "target_unavailable";
-export interface ElevationSessionIdentity {
-    sessionId: string;
-    /** Exact endpoint state root bound at issue time; never the repo root. */
-    endpointStateRoot: string;
-    endpointGeneration: number;
-    endpointIncarnation: string;
-}
-/** Audit-only requester binding; never an identity claim. */
-export interface ElevationRequester {
-    source: "broker_connection";
-    connectionId: string;
-}
-export interface ElevationGrantRecord {
-    version: typeof SDK_STATE_VERSION;
-    /** Durable correlation ID; UUID, path-safe. */
-    elevationRequestId: string;
-    /** Monotonic path-safe issue sequence, allocated under the ledger lock. */
-    issueIndex: number;
-    state: ElevationGrantState;
-    operation: ElevationOperation;
-    requestDigest: string;
-    sessionIdentity: ElevationSessionIdentity;
-    principal: BrokerOwnerPrincipal;
-    requester: ElevationRequester;
-    requestedAt: number;
-    expiresAt: number;
-    outcome?: ElevationDispatchOutcome;
-    ts: number;
-}
-export type ElevationErrorCode = "not_found" | "invalid_input" | "idempotency_conflict" | "grant_spent" | "elevation_claim_in_progress" | "elevation_required" | "elevation_unavailable" | "elevation_not_required" | "endpoint_stale" | "target_unavailable" | "expired" | "misused" | "duplicate_answer" | "terminal_uncertain" | (string & {});
-export type ElevationResult<T> = {
-    ok: true;
-    value: T;
-} | {
-    ok: false;
-    error: {
-        code: ElevationErrorCode;
-        message: string;
-    };
-};
-export interface ElevationIssueParams {
-    /** Optional caller-supplied correlation ID for idempotent retry; the broker generates a UUID otherwise. */
-    elevationRequestId?: string;
-    operation: ElevationOperation;
-    input: Record<string, unknown>;
-    sessionIdentity: ElevationSessionIdentity;
-    principal: BrokerOwnerPrincipal;
-    requester: ElevationRequester;
-    expiresInMs?: number;
-}
-export interface ElevationIssueValue {
-    replay: boolean;
-    elevationRequestId: string;
-    issueIndex: number;
-    requestDigest: string;
-    state: ElevationGrantState;
-    requestedAt: number;
-    expiresAt: number;
-    grant: ElevationGrantRecord;
-}
-export interface ElevationAnswerParams {
-    elevationRequestId: string;
-    answer: "approve" | "deny";
-    /** Digest the answering surface presented from the gate payload. */
-    presentedDigest: string;
-    /** Broker-owner principal attesting the answer authority. */
-    principal: BrokerOwnerPrincipal;
-    answerer: ElevationAnswerAuthority;
-    /** Current broker-resolved target identity; undefined means the session is unreachable. */
-    currentSessionIdentity?: ElevationSessionIdentity;
-}
-export type ElevationAnswerOutcome = "granted" | "denied" | "expired" | "misused" | "target_unavailable" | "duplicate_answer";
-export interface ElevationAnswerValue {
-    outcome: ElevationAnswerOutcome;
-    grant: ElevationGrantRecord;
-}
-export interface ElevationClaimParams {
-    elevationRequestId: string;
-    claimIdentity: ElevationClaimIdentity;
-    /** Current broker-resolved target identity; undefined means the session is unreachable. */
-    currentSessionIdentity?: ElevationSessionIdentity;
-}
-export interface ElevationClaimValue {
-    grant: ElevationGrantRecord;
-    receipt: ElevationDispatchReceipt;
-}
-export interface ElevationDispatchParams {
-    elevationRequestId: string;
-    dispatchIdentity: ElevationClaimIdentity;
-    outcome: ElevationDispatchOutcome;
-}
-export interface ElevationDispatchValue {
-    grant: ElevationGrantRecord;
-    receipt: ElevationDispatchReceipt;
-}
-export interface ElevationReadValue {
-    grant: ElevationGrantRecord;
-    receipt?: ElevationDispatchReceipt;
-}
-export interface ElevationListValue {
-    grants: ElevationReadValue[];
-}
-export interface ElevationLedgerOptions {
-    /** Defaults to the GJC_SDK_ELEVATION_ENABLED environment flag. */
-    enabled?: boolean;
-    /** Request lifetime before the grant expires. */
-    ttlMs?: number;
-    /** Injectable clock. */
-    now?: () => number;
-    /**
-     * Injectable tri-state process-incarnation liveness classifier (defaults to
-     * `classifyProcessIncarnationLiveness`). Test seam for crash-state replay:
-     * "unknown" must always fail closed as `elevation_claim_in_progress`.
-     */
-    classifyLiveness?: typeof classifyProcessIncarnationLiveness;
-}
-declare function isElevationOperation(value: unknown): value is ElevationOperation;
-declare function isElevationGrantRecord(value: unknown): value is ElevationGrantRecord;
-export declare class ElevationLedger {
-    #private;
-    constructor(agentDir: string, options?: ElevationLedgerOptions);
-    get warnings(): readonly string[];
-    open(): Promise<this>;
-    assertSupportedStateVersions(): Promise<void>;
-    issue(params: ElevationIssueParams): Promise<ElevationResult<ElevationIssueValue>>;
-    answer(params: ElevationAnswerParams): Promise<ElevationResult<ElevationAnswerValue>>;
-    claim(params: ElevationClaimParams): Promise<ElevationResult<ElevationClaimValue>>;
-    dispatch(params: ElevationDispatchParams): Promise<ElevationResult<ElevationDispatchValue>>;
-    /** Pure read without reconciliation writes; used before actions. */
-    get(elevationRequestId: string): Promise<ElevationResult<ElevationReadValue>>;
-    /** Truthful read: reconciles expiry and crash-state claims before returning. */
-    resolve(elevationRequestId: string, claimIdentity: ElevationClaimIdentity): Promise<ElevationResult<ElevationReadValue>>;
-    /** Truthful listing: reconciles every grant before returning. */
-    list(claimIdentity: ElevationClaimIdentity): Promise<ElevationResult<ElevationListValue>>;
-}
-export { isElevationGrantRecord, isElevationOperation };

package/dist/types/sdk/elevation/owner.d.ts

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Broker-owner principal.
- *
- * The elevation authority is the broker itself under the existing loopback
- * trust model: one local OS-user/broker authority derived entirely from
- * broker-owned state, never from caller input. `agentDirUid` is the uid that
- * owns the agent directory, `brokerPid`/`brokerIncarnation` identify the
- * broker process tenure so a restarted broker cannot attest the same
- * authority.
- */
-export interface BrokerOwnerPrincipal {
-    kind: "broker_owner";
-    owner: {
-        agentDirUid: number;
-        brokerPid: number;
-        brokerIncarnation: string;
-    };
-}
-export declare function isBrokerOwnerPrincipal(value: unknown): value is BrokerOwnerPrincipal;
-export declare function sameBrokerOwnerPrincipal(left: BrokerOwnerPrincipal, right: BrokerOwnerPrincipal): boolean;
-/**
- * Reads the broker-owner principal from broker-owned state. Throws when the
- * broker cannot attest a canonical process incarnation (the broker refuses to
- * start in that case anyway), so callers treat a throw as "authority
- * unavailable".
- */
-export declare function readBrokerOwnerPrincipal(agentDir: string, brokerPid: number, brokerIncarnation: string): Promise<BrokerOwnerPrincipal>;
-export type ProcessIncarnationLiveness = "alive" | "dead" | "unknown";
-/**
- * Tri-state liveness of a process incarnation.
- *
- * - `alive`: the pid is running and its current incarnation matches the
- *   stored one, so the original process tenure is still live.
- * - `dead`: ESRCH (the pid is provably gone — independent of any persisted
- *   incarnation text), or the pid is running under a *different* canonical
- *   incarnation (PID reuse), which provably means the original process
- *   ended.
- * - `unknown`: the pid is malformed, the persisted or observed incarnation
- *   is malformed/undefined, or the current incarnation cannot be read.
- *   Unknown never implies death: elevation claims must fail closed with
- *   `elevation_claim_in_progress` instead of terminalizing state on
- *   unprovable liveness.
- *
- * ESRCH is independent positive death proof: a pid that provably does not
- * exist is dead regardless of the persisted incarnation text, so a corrupt
- * persisted incarnation can never stall recovery forever.
- */
-export declare function classifyProcessIncarnationLiveness(pid: unknown, incarnation: unknown): ProcessIncarnationLiveness;

package/dist/types/sdk/host/import-graph.test.d.ts

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export {};

package/dist/types/sdk/host/sdk-surface-parity.test.d.ts

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export {};

package/dist/types/sdk/host/session-runtime.test.d.ts

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export {};

package/dist/types/sdk/host/websocket-transport.lifecycle.test.d.ts

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export {};

package/dist/types/session/auth-broker-config.d.ts

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-export interface AuthBrokerClientConfig {
-    url: string;
-    token: string;
-}
-/** Path to the local bearer token file. Created on the broker host by `gjc auth-broker token`. */
-export declare function getAuthBrokerTokenFilePath(): string;
-/**
- * Read broker configuration. Returns null when the URL is missing
- * (broker disabled — local store is used). Throws when URL is set but no
- * token is available — the caller cannot fall back silently because the
- * user explicitly asked to use the broker.
- */
-export declare function resolveAuthBrokerConfig(): Promise<AuthBrokerClientConfig | null>;

package/dist/types/session/heap-eviction-artifacts.test.d.ts

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export {};

package/dist/types/skills/skills.test.d.ts

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export {};

package/dist/types/slash-commands/notify-command.test.d.ts

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export {};

package/dist/types/task/token-log.test.d.ts

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export {};

package/dist/types/tools/computer.enforcement.test.d.ts

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export {};

package/dist/types/tools/descriptors.test.d.ts

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export {};

package/scripts/g005-daemon-smoke.ts

@@ -1,180 +0,0 @@
-// G005 real end-to-end daemon-orchestration smoke.
-//
-// Drives the lifecycle orchestrator's create -> close path with REAL effects:
-// a real fsynced file-backed idempotency ledger, a real audit JSONL, and a real
-// tmux session spawned/closed via the actual tmux helpers. Proves the daemon
-// orchestration turns a `session_create` frame into a genuinely-spawned,
-// GJC-tagged tmux session and a `session_close` frame into a real hard-close,
-// with idempotent re-ack. Not part of the unit suite.
-import assert from "node:assert";
-import * as fs from "node:fs";
-import * as os from "node:os";
-import * as path from "node:path";
-
-import {
-	buildGjcTmuxExactOptionTarget,
-	buildGjcTmuxProfileCommands,
-	resolveGjcTmuxCommand,
-} from "../src/gjc-runtime/tmux-common";
-import { forceCloseGjcTmuxSession, statusGjcTmuxSession } from "../src/gjc-runtime/tmux-sessions";
-import type { SessionCloseFrame, SessionCreateFrame } from "../src/sdk/bus/index";
-import {
-	type AuditEvent,
-	handleLifecycleRequest,
-	type LedgerDoc,
-	type LedgerStore,
-	type OrchestratorDeps,
-} from "../src/sdk/bus/lifecycle-orchestrator";
-
-const tmux = resolveGjcTmuxCommand(process.env);
-const tmpRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "gjc-g005-"));
-const ledgerPath = path.join(tmpRoot, "idempotency.json");
-const auditPath = path.join(tmpRoot, "audit.jsonl");
-const created: string[] = [];
-
-function sh(args: string[]): number {
-	return Bun.spawnSync([tmux, ...args], { stdout: "pipe", stderr: "pipe" }).exitCode;
-}
-function exists(name: string): boolean {
-	return sh(["has-session", "-t", `=${name}`]) === 0;
-}
-
-// Real fsynced + atomic file ledger store.
-const store: LedgerStore = {
-	async read(): Promise<LedgerDoc> {
-		try {
-			return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(ledgerPath, "utf8")) as LedgerDoc;
-		} catch {
-			return { version: 1, entries: {} };
-		}
-	},
-	async write(doc: LedgerDoc): Promise<void> {
-		const tmp = `${ledgerPath}.${process.pid}.tmp`;
-		const fd = fs.openSync(tmp, "w", 0o600);
-		fs.writeSync(fd, JSON.stringify(doc));
-		fs.fsyncSync(fd);
-		fs.closeSync(fd);
-		fs.renameSync(tmp, ledgerPath);
-	},
-};
-
-const auditLines: AuditEvent[] = [];
-const deps: OrchestratorDeps = {
-	pairedChatId: "42",
-	auditRedactionKey: new Uint8Array(32).fill(5),
-	isPsmuxProvider: () => false,
-	now: () => Date.now(),
-	store,
-	audit: e => {
-		auditLines.push(e);
-		fs.appendFileSync(auditPath, `${JSON.stringify(e)}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
-	},
-	allowCreate: () => true,
-	writeStartupPrompt: async (requestId, prompt) => {
-		if (prompt === undefined) return undefined;
-		const ref = path.join(tmpRoot, `prompt-${requestId}`);
-		const fd = fs.openSync(ref, "w", 0o600);
-		fs.writeSync(fd, prompt);
-		fs.fsyncSync(fd);
-		fs.closeSync(fd);
-		return ref;
-	},
-	// REAL spawn: create a GJC-tagged tmux session carrying the authoritative id.
-	spawnCreate: async (_frame, ids) => {
-		const name = `gjc_g005_${ids.intendedSessionId}`;
-		created.push(name);
-		if (sh(["new-session", "-d", "-s", name, "sleep 600"]) !== 0) {
-			throw new Error(`tmux spawn failed for ${name}`);
-		}
-		const target = buildGjcTmuxExactOptionTarget(name);
-		for (const cmd of buildGjcTmuxProfileCommands(target, process.env, {
-			sessionId: ids.intendedSessionId,
-		})) {
-			if (sh(cmd.args) !== 0) throw new Error(`tag failed for ${name}`);
-		}
-		return {
-			sessionId: ids.intendedSessionId,
-			tmuxSession: name,
-			endpointUrl: "ws://127.0.0.1:0",
-			topicThreadId: "1",
-		};
-	},
-	// REAL close: hard-close the GJC-managed tmux session, id-matched.
-	closeSession: async target => {
-		forceCloseGjcTmuxSession(target.tmuxSession ?? "", process.env, target.sessionId);
-		return { processGone: !exists(target.tmuxSession ?? "") };
-	},
-	resumeSession: async () => ({ ambiguous: [] }),
-};
-
-const createFrame: SessionCreateFrame = {
-	type: "session_create",
-	requestId: "lc_g005",
-	lifecycleRequestId: "lc_g005",
-	intendedSessionId: `g005${Date.now().toString(36)}`,
-	updateId: 100,
-	chatId: "42",
-	token: "control-token",
-	target: { kind: "existing_path", path: tmpRoot },
-};
-
-async function main(): Promise<void> {
-	// 1. CREATE -> real tmux session spawned + GJC-tagged with the authoritative id.
-	const createOut = await handleLifecycleRequest(createFrame, deps);
-	assert.equal(createOut.status, "ok", "create must succeed");
-	const session = createOut.status === "ok" ? createOut.entry.tmuxSession! : "";
-	assert.ok(exists(session), "real tmux session must exist after create");
-	const status = statusGjcTmuxSession(session);
-	assert.equal(status.profile, "1", "spawned session must be GJC-managed");
-	assert.equal(status.sessionId, createFrame.intendedSessionId, "authoritative session id propagated to tmux tag");
-	console.log(`[g005] CREATE -> live tmux session ${session} (id=${status.sessionId})`);
-
-	// 2. Idempotent re-ack: same updateId+body must NOT spawn a second session.
-	const before = created.length;
-	const dupOut = await handleLifecycleRequest(createFrame, deps);
-	assert.equal(dupOut.status, "ok", "duplicate create re-acks ok");
-	assert.equal(created.length, before, "duplicate create must NOT spawn a second session");
-	console.log("[g005] DUPLICATE create re-acked, no second spawn (idempotent)");
-
-	// 3. CLOSE -> real hard-close of the GJC-managed session, id-matched.
-	const closeFrame: SessionCloseFrame = {
-		type: "session_close",
-		requestId: "lc_g005_close",
-		updateId: 101,
-		chatId: "42",
-		token: "control-token",
-		target: { sessionId: createFrame.intendedSessionId, tmuxSession: session },
-		force: true,
-	};
-	const closeOut = await handleLifecycleRequest(closeFrame, deps);
-	assert.equal(closeOut.status, "ok", "close must succeed");
-	assert.ok(!exists(session), "real tmux session must be gone after close");
-	console.log(`[g005] CLOSE -> hard-closed ${session} (id-matched)`);
-
-	// 4. Durable ledger + audit redaction.
-	const doc = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(ledgerPath, "utf8")) as LedgerDoc;
-	assert.equal(doc.entries["42:100"]?.state, "success");
-	assert.equal(doc.entries["42:101"]?.state, "success");
-	const auditBlob = fs.readFileSync(auditPath, "utf8");
-	assert.ok(!auditBlob.includes("control-token"), "audit must never contain the control token");
-	assert.ok(
-		auditLines.some(a => a.event === "spawn_started"),
-		"audit records spawn_started",
-	);
-	console.log("[g005] durable fsynced ledger + token-redacted audit verified");
-
-	console.log("[g005] PASS: real create->close daemon orchestration over live tmux");
-}
-
-main()
-	.then(() => {
-		for (const n of created) sh(["kill-session", "-t", `=${n}`]);
-		fs.rmSync(tmpRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
-		process.exit(0);
-	})
-	.catch(err => {
-		for (const n of created) sh(["kill-session", "-t", `=${n}`]);
-		fs.rmSync(tmpRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
-		console.error("[g005] FAIL", err);
-		process.exit(1);
-	});

package/scripts/g011-daemon-path-smoke.ts

@@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
-// G011 real daemon-path smoke.
-//
-// Drives a PARSED /session_* command through the LIVE native
-// NotificationControlServer + a real loopback WebSocket client (NO injected/fake
-// seams), wired to the real orchestrator (with stubbed spawn/close effects so the
-// focus is the authenticated wire path, not tmux). Asserts:
-//  - a wrong-token handshake is rejected (control token gates the endpoint);
-//  - a valid frame is forwarded with the control token STRIPPED from payloadJson;
-//  - the host response is routed back to the client by requestId;
-//  - control discovery exists while running and is removed after stop.
-import assert from "node:assert";
-import * as crypto from "node:crypto";
-import * as fs from "node:fs";
-import * as os from "node:os";
-import * as path from "node:path";
-import WebSocket from "ws";
-
-// Import the WORKTREE native build directly (not @gajae-code/natives, which can
-// resolve to a different checkout in this dev environment).
-import { NotificationControlServer } from "../../natives/native/index.js";
-import { parseLifecycleCommand } from "../src/sdk/bus/lifecycle-commands";
-import { attachLifecycleControl, fileAudit, fileLedgerStore } from "../src/sdk/bus/lifecycle-control-runtime";
-import type { OrchestratorDeps } from "../src/sdk/bus/lifecycle-orchestrator";
-
-const tmp = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "gjc-g011-"));
-const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
-const ownerId = "daemon-g011";
-const closed: string[] = [];
-
-function deps(): OrchestratorDeps {
-	return {
-		pairedChatId: "42",
-		auditRedactionKey: new Uint8Array(32).fill(11),
-		isPsmuxProvider: () => false,
-		now: () => Date.now(),
-		store: fileLedgerStore(path.join(tmp, "idempotency.json")),
-		audit: fileAudit(path.join(tmp, "audit.jsonl")),
-		allowCreate: () => true,
-		writeStartupPrompt: async () => undefined,
-		// Stubbed effects: this smoke proves the WIRE path, not tmux (covered by g005).
-		spawnCreate: async (_f, ids) => ({
-			sessionId: ids.intendedSessionId,
-			tmuxSession: `gjc-${ids.intendedSessionId}`,
-			endpointUrl: "ws://127.0.0.1:0",
-			topicThreadId: "1",
-		}),
-		closeSession: async t => {
-			closed.push(t.sessionId);
-			return { processGone: true };
-		},
-		resumeSession: async () => ({ ambiguous: [] }),
-	};
-}
-
-function send(ws: WebSocket, frame: unknown): void {
-	ws.send(JSON.stringify(frame));
-}
-
-async function main(): Promise<void> {
-	const server = new NotificationControlServer(token, ownerId, tmp);
-
-	// Wire the real orchestrator to the real native control server.
-	const d = deps();
-	attachLifecycleControl(server as never, d);
-
-	const ep = (await server.start()) as { url: string };
-	assert.ok(ep.url.startsWith("ws://127.0.0.1:"), `loopback url, got ${ep.url}`);
-	const controlJson = path.join(tmp, "notifications", "control.json");
-	assert.ok(fs.existsSync(controlJson), "control discovery must exist while running");
-	// The control discovery file MUST NOT persist the privileged control token:
-	// the daemon holds it in memory and is the only client.
-	const controlRaw = fs.readFileSync(controlJson, "utf8");
-	assert.ok(!controlRaw.includes(token), "control token MUST NOT be persisted in control.json");
-	assert.ok(
-		!("token" in (JSON.parse(controlRaw) as Record<string, unknown>)),
-		"control.json must omit any token field",
-	);
-	console.log(`[g011] live control endpoint ${ep.url}; discovery present, no persisted token`);
-
-	// 1. Wrong-token handshake must be rejected.
-	await new Promise<void>(resolve => {
-		const bad = new WebSocket(`${ep.url}/?token=wrong`);
-		bad.on("open", () => {
-			throw new Error("wrong-token handshake must NOT open");
-		});
-		bad.on("error", () => {
-			console.log("[g011] wrong-token handshake rejected (expected)");
-			resolve();
-		});
-	});
-
-	// 2. Valid client: send a PARSED /session_close command through the real wire.
-	const parsed = parseLifecycleCommand("/session_close sess-g011");
-	assert.equal(parsed.kind, "close", "parser must yield a close command");
-	const requestId = "lc-g011-1";
-	const frame = {
-		type: "session_close",
-		requestId,
-		updateId: 1,
-		chatId: "42",
-		token,
-		target: parsed.kind === "close" ? parsed.target : { sessionId: "sess-g011" },
-		force: true,
-	};
-
-	const response = await new Promise<Record<string, unknown>>((resolve, reject) => {
-		const ws = new WebSocket(`${ep.url}/?token=${token}`);
-		const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error("timed out")), 5000);
-		ws.on("open", () => send(ws, frame));
-		ws.on("message", data => {
-			clearTimeout(timer);
-			ws.close();
-			resolve(JSON.parse(String(data)) as Record<string, unknown>);
-		});
-		ws.on("error", reject);
-	});
-
-	assert.equal(response.type, "session_close_response", "response routed back to client");
-	assert.equal(response.requestId, requestId, "response correlated by requestId");
-	assert.equal(response.sessionId, "sess-g011");
-	assert.deepEqual(closed, ["sess-g011"], "orchestrator close effect ran exactly once");
-	console.log("[g011] parsed command -> real wire -> orchestrator -> routed response OK");
-
-	// 3. The real orchestrator path must NOT leak the control token into its
-	// durable audit log or idempotency ledger (g002 separately proves the native
-	// payloadJson boundary is token-stripped).
-	for (const f of ["audit.jsonl", "idempotency.json"]) {
-		const p = path.join(tmp, f);
-		if (fs.existsSync(p)) {
-			assert.ok(!fs.readFileSync(p, "utf8").includes(token), `control token leaked into ${f}`);
-		}
-	}
-	console.log("[g011] no control-token leak in audit/ledger on the real path");
-
-	// 4. Stop removes control discovery.
-	server.stop();
-	await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 50));
-	assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(controlJson), "control discovery removed after stop");
-	console.log("[g011] control discovery removed after stop");
-
-	console.log("[g011] PASS: real daemon-path (parse -> native control endpoint -> orchestrator -> reply)");
-}
-
-main()
-	.then(() => {
-		fs.rmSync(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true });
-		process.exit(0);
-	})
-	.catch(err => {
-		fs.rmSync(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true });
-		console.error("[g011] FAIL", err);
-		process.exit(1);
-	});