@gajae-code/coding-agent 0.13.2 → 0.14.0

package/dist/types/sdk/bus/lifecycle-control-runtime.d.ts

@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-import { type OwnerIsolationProbe } from "../../gjc-runtime/tmux-owner-isolation";
-import { type GjcTmuxSessionStatus } from "../../gjc-runtime/tmux-sessions";
-import type { ResumeCandidate, SessionCreateFrame, SessionLifecycleRequest, SessionLifecycleResponse } from "./index";
-import { type AuditEvent, type CreateEffectResult, type LedgerStore, type LifecycleOutcome, type OrchestratorDeps, type ResumeEffectResult } from "./lifecycle-orchestrator";
-/** Minimal view of the native control server this runtime depends on. */
-export interface ControlServerLike {
-    onLifecycleRequest(cb: (err: Error | null, req: {
-        kind: string;
-        requestId: string;
-        payloadJson: string;
-    }) => void): void;
-    respond(responseJson: string): void;
-}
-/**
- * A startable control server (the native NotificationControlServer, or a fake in
- * tests). Extends {@link ControlServerLike} with the start/stop lifecycle the
- * daemon owns.
- */
-export interface LifecycleControlServer extends ControlServerLike {
-    start(): Promise<unknown>;
-    stop(): void;
-}
-/** Factory the daemon uses to construct a control server bound to its ownership. */
-export type LifecycleControlServerFactory = (input: {
-    token: string;
-    ownerId: string;
-    agentDir: string;
-}) => LifecycleControlServer;
-export declare function fileLedgerStore(idempotencyFile: string): LedgerStore;
-/** Append-only JSONL audit sink (0600). Never receives tokens or raw prompts. */
-export declare function fileAudit(auditPath: string): (e: AuditEvent) => void;
-/** Simple per-chat sliding-window create rate limiter. */
-export declare function createRateLimiter(maxPerWindow: number, windowMs: number): (chatId: string, nowMs: number) => boolean;
-/** Build the `gjc` argv for a create target (existing path / worktree / dir).
- *
- *  The launched session id is carried via `GJC_SESSION_ID` in the child env (see
- *  {@link daemonSpawnCreate}); the root `gjc` launcher has no `--session-id`
- *  flag, so it must never appear in argv. Only flags the launch parser actually
- *  supports are emitted (`--worktree <branch>` for worktree targets,
- *  `--mpreset <profile>` for model presets). */
-export declare function buildCreateArgv(frame: SessionCreateFrame, _ids: {
-    intendedSessionId: string;
-    startupPromptRef?: string;
-}): {
-    cwd: string;
-    args: string[];
-};
-/** Real daemon-safe tmux launcher: canonical owner-isolation plan + GJC tags. */
-export declare function daemonSpawnCreate(env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, opts?: {
-    ownerIsolationProbe?: OwnerIsolationProbe;
-    platform?: NodeJS.Platform;
-    processIncarnation?: (pid: number) => string | undefined;
-}): (frame: SessionCreateFrame, ids: {
-    lifecycleRequestId: string;
-    intendedSessionId: string;
-    startupPromptRef?: string;
-}) => Promise<CreateEffectResult>;
-/** Real force-close effect (GJC-managed only, id-matched). */
-export declare function daemonCloseSession(env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, deps?: {
-    forceClose?: (name: string, env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, expectedSessionId?: string, sessionStateFile?: string) => Promise<void>;
-    findSession?: (name: string, env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) => GjcTmuxSessionStatus | undefined;
-}): (target: {
-    sessionId: string;
-    tmuxSession?: string;
-    sessionStateFile?: string;
-}) => Promise<{
-    processGone: boolean;
-}>;
-/** Real resume effect: reattach if a live GJC session matches; else resolve the
- *  prefix against saved history and fail closed (`ambiguous`/`notFound`) before
- *  cold-restarting exactly one resolved session via the daemon-safe launcher. */
-export declare function daemonResumeSession(env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, opts?: {
-    agentDir?: string;
-    /** Explicit managed root for isolated tests. */
-    sessionsRoot?: string;
-    listSessions?: (env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) => GjcTmuxSessionStatus[];
-    ownerIsolationProbe?: OwnerIsolationProbe;
-    platform?: NodeJS.Platform;
-    processIncarnation?: (pid: number) => string | undefined;
-}): (target: {
-    sessionIdOrPrefix: string;
-    path?: string;
-}) => Promise<ResumeEffectResult | {
-    ambiguous: ResumeCandidate[];
-} | {
-    notFound: true;
-}>;
-/** Translate an orchestrator outcome into a wire response frame. */
-export declare function outcomeToResponse(frame: SessionLifecycleRequest, outcome: LifecycleOutcome): SessionLifecycleResponse;
-/**
- * Wire a control server's lifecycle requests through the orchestrator.
- *
- * Handlers run on a single serial queue (a promise chain): the daemon owns the
- * one control endpoint, so serializing here makes each request's ledger
- * read -> classify -> write atomic with respect to every other request. Two
- * identical updates that arrive nearly simultaneously can no longer both
- * classify as `new` and both spawn — the second sees the first's persisted
- * `in_progress`/`success` entry and re-acks instead.
- */
-export declare function attachLifecycleControl(server: ControlServerLike, deps: OrchestratorDeps): void;
-/** Assemble real orchestrator deps for the daemon (ledger/audit under agentDir). */
-export declare function buildOrchestratorDeps(input: {
-    pairedChatId: string;
-    agentNotificationsDir: string;
-    /** Required in-memory, 32-byte audit-v2 redaction key. */
-    auditRedactionKey: Uint8Array;
-    /** Root of saved session histories (`<agentDir>/sessions`), for resume resolution. */
-    sessionsRoot?: string;
-    /** Agent directory used for readonly managed-session resume resolution. */
-    agentDir?: string;
-    env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
-}): OrchestratorDeps;
-/**
- * Default production factory: a real native NotificationControlServer bound to
- * the daemon's control token, owner id, and agent dir.
- */
-export declare const createNativeControlServer: LifecycleControlServerFactory;

package/dist/types/sdk/bus/lifecycle-orchestrator.d.ts

@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
-import type { LifecycleErrorReason, ResumeCandidate, SessionCreateFrame, SessionLifecycleRequest } from "./index";
-/** Durable idempotency state for a single lifecycle request. */
-export type LedgerState = "in_progress" | "success" | "failure" | "terminal_uncertain";
-/** One persisted idempotency entry, keyed by `chatId:updateId`. */
-export interface LedgerEntry {
-    requestHash: string;
-    state: LedgerState;
-    requestId: string;
-    verb: SessionLifecycleRequest["type"];
-    intendedSessionId?: string;
-    startupPromptRef?: string;
-    createdAt: number;
-    updatedAt: number;
-    targetSummary: Record<string, unknown>;
-    sessionId?: string;
-    tmuxSession?: string;
-    sessionStateFile?: string;
-    endpointUrl?: string;
-    /** Close effect outcome: whether the tmux process is confirmed gone. */
-    processGone?: boolean;
-    reason?: LifecycleErrorReason;
-    resumeMode?: ResumeEffectResult["mode"];
-}
-/** The full on-disk ledger document. */
-export interface LedgerDoc {
-    version: 1;
-    entries: Record<string, LedgerEntry>;
-}
-/** Persistence boundary: atomic + fsynced read/write of the ledger document. */
-export interface LedgerStore {
-    read(): Promise<LedgerDoc>;
-    /** Write atomically (temp + fsync + rename) under a per-ledger lock. */
-    write(doc: LedgerDoc): Promise<void>;
-}
-/** Redacted audit-v2 event. */
-export interface AuditEvent {
-    schemaVersion: 2;
-    ts: string;
-    event: "accepted" | "rejected" | "duplicate_reack" | "rate_limited" | "spawn_started" | "recovered_in_progress" | "success" | "failure" | "terminal_uncertain";
-    chatRef: string;
-    updateId: number;
-    requestRef: string;
-    verb: SessionLifecycleRequest["type"];
-    targetKind: CanonicalTargetKind;
-    targetRef: string;
-    reason?: LifecycleErrorReason;
-}
-export interface CreateEffectResult {
-    sessionId: string;
-    tmuxSession: string;
-    sessionStateFile?: string;
-    endpointUrl: string;
-    topicThreadId: string;
-}
-export interface ResumeEffectResult extends CreateEffectResult {
-    mode: "reattached" | "cold_restarted";
-}
-/** Injected effects + policy. Pure orchestration calls into these. */
-export interface OrchestratorDeps {
-    /** The single paired chat id. Anything else is rejected before parsing. */
-    pairedChatId: string;
-    /** In-memory, derived 32-byte audit-v2 HMAC key. */
-    auditRedactionKey: Uint8Array;
-    now: () => number;
-    store: LedgerStore;
-    audit: (event: AuditEvent) => Promise<void> | void;
-    /** Resolves the returned tmux provider once per request for psmux preflight. */
-    isPsmuxProvider: () => boolean;
-    /** Per-chat create rate limiter: returns true when allowed. */
-    allowCreate: (chatId: string, nowMs: number) => boolean;
-    /** Persist the once-consumed 0600 startup-prompt file after durably recording its ref. */
-    writeStartupPrompt: (requestId: string, prompt: string | undefined, persistRef: (ref: string) => Promise<void>) => Promise<string | undefined>;
-    /** Spawn a session for a create/cold-restart. */
-    spawnCreate: (frame: SessionCreateFrame, ids: {
-        lifecycleRequestId: string;
-        intendedSessionId: string;
-        startupPromptRef?: string;
-    }) => Promise<CreateEffectResult>;
-    closeSession: (target: {
-        sessionId: string;
-        tmuxSession?: string;
-        sessionStateFile?: string;
-    }) => Promise<{
-        processGone: boolean;
-    }>;
-    resumeSession: (target: {
-        sessionIdOrPrefix: string;
-        path?: string;
-    }) => Promise<ResumeEffectResult | {
-        ambiguous: ResumeCandidate[];
-    } | {
-        notFound: true;
-    }>;
-}
-export type CanonicalTargetKind = "existing_path" | "worktree" | "plain_dir" | "session_close" | "session_resume";
-export declare function canonicalTarget(frame: SessionLifecycleRequest): string;
-export declare function canonicalRequest(frame: SessionLifecycleRequest): string;
-export declare function requestHash(frame: SessionLifecycleRequest): string;
-export declare function auditRedactionRef(key: Uint8Array, domain: string, value: string): string;
-export declare function summarizeTarget(frame: SessionLifecycleRequest): Record<string, unknown>;
-export declare function ledgerKey(chatId: string, updateId: number): string;
-/** How a freshly-arrived request relates to the durable ledger. */
-export type DuplicateClass = {
-    kind: "new";
-} | {
-    kind: "reack_success";
-    entry: LedgerEntry;
-} | {
-    kind: "reack_failure";
-    entry: LedgerEntry;
-} | {
-    kind: "in_progress";
-    entry: LedgerEntry;
-} | {
-    kind: "terminal_uncertain";
-    entry: LedgerEntry;
-} | {
-    kind: "conflict";
-    entry: LedgerEntry;
-};
-/** Classify a request against an existing ledger entry (pure). */
-export declare function classifyDuplicate(existing: LedgerEntry | undefined, hash: string): DuplicateClass;
-/** The structured outcome the daemon translates into a wire response frame. */
-export type LifecycleOutcome = {
-    status: "ok";
-    entry: LedgerEntry;
-    mode?: "reattached" | "cold_restarted";
-} | {
-    status: "error";
-    reason: LifecycleErrorReason;
-    message: string;
-    candidates?: ResumeCandidate[];
-} | {
-    status: "pending";
-    entry: LedgerEntry;
-};
-/**
- * Handle one authenticated lifecycle request. Enforces paired-chat gating,
- * idempotency, and rate limiting BEFORE any side effect, then dispatches.
- */
-export declare function handleLifecycleRequest(frame: SessionLifecycleRequest, deps: OrchestratorDeps): Promise<LifecycleOutcome>;

package/dist/types/sdk/bus/telegram-cli.d.ts

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bun
-/**
- * Reference CLI for the Gajae-Code SDK Telegram client.
- *
- * Bridges a running GJC session's notification endpoint to a Telegram bot so you
- * can answer asks / see idle pings from your phone — no RPC mode required. This
- * is an EXAMPLE/template (the SDK contract is in `docs/sdk.md`);
- * Discord/Slack clients are written the same way.
- *
- * Usage:
- *   bun run packages/coding-agent/src/sdk/bus/telegram-cli.ts \
- *     --bot-token <token> [--chat-id <id>] [--endpoint-file <path> | --session-id <id>] [--repo <dir>]
- *
- * Env fallbacks: GJC_TG_BOT_TOKEN, GJC_TG_CHAT_ID.
- * If --chat-id is omitted it is auto-resolved from getUpdates (message the bot once).
- * If neither --endpoint-file nor --session-id is given, the newest endpoint file
- * under <repo>/.gjc/state/sdk/ is used.
- */
-import { type TelegramNotificationSound } from "./telegram-reference";
-interface CliArgs {
-    botToken?: string;
-    chatId?: string;
-    endpointFile?: string;
-    sessionId?: string;
-    repo: string;
-    apiBase?: string;
-    sound: TelegramNotificationSound;
-    force: boolean;
-}
-export declare function parseArgs(argv: string[]): CliArgs;
-export {};

package/dist/types/sdk/elevation/allowlist.d.ts

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Exact elevation-gated allowlist, fully qualified and enumerative.
- *
- * The elevation allowlist is the exact set of registry operations below (the
- * raw destructive lifecycle and workflow-approval operations). It is declared
- * ONCE here as a `Set<string>` of `"kind:sdkId"` keys and mechanically pinned
- * against `operation-registry.ts` by the allowlist unit test: every key must
- * resolve via `findOperation(kind, sdkId)` and no elevatable operation may be
- * silently missing. Any operation NOT in this set is rejected at issue with
- * `elevation_not_allowlisted` before any ledger reservation. There is no
- * generalized policy engine: this is the deterministic predicate.
- */
-export declare const ELEVATION_ALLOWLIST_KEYS: readonly ["global:session.close", "global:session.delete", "control:session.delete", "control:session.close", "control:context.clear", "control:session.cwd.move", "control:compaction.run", "control:bash.execute", "control:bash.background", "control:queue.message.remove", "control:queue.message.update", "control:retry.abort", "control:retry.now", "control:bash.abort", "control:retry.auto.set", "control:compaction.auto.set", "control:extension.set_enabled", "control:queue.interrupt_mode.set", "control:queue.follow_up_mode.set", "control:queue.steering_mode.set", "control:tools.active.set", "control:permission_mode.set", "control:service_tier.set", "control:workflow.gate_answer", "control:workflow.plan_approve"];
-/**
- * Whether `(kind, sdkId)` is the fully qualified identity of an allowlisted
- * elevation-gated operation. The pair is validated against the operation
- * registry before any elevation is admitted, so a key can never name an
- * operation that does not exist.
- */
-export declare function isElevationAllowlisted(kind: unknown, sdkId: unknown): boolean;

package/dist/types/sdk/elevation/audit.d.ts

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-import { SDK_STATE_VERSION } from "../broker/state-version";
-import { classifyProcessIncarnationLiveness } from "./owner";
-/**
- * Durable elevation audit trail.
- *
- * Append-only JSONL under the same elevation-local lock as the grant ledger,
- * mode 0600. Every state transition of a grant — issue, operator answer,
- * expiry, misuse, duplicate answer, claim, and dispatch outcome — is
- * recorded with the exact identity evidence the transition consumed, so an
- * auditor can reproduce why a grant reached its terminal state without
- * trusting in-memory state.
- *
- * The audit stream is an evidence trail, never an authority: audit rows are
- * append-only, are never re-read to drive decisions, and a corrupted row is
- * quarantined (like ledger rows) instead of failing the ledger.
- */
-export type ElevationAuditEvent = {
-    kind: "issued";
-} | {
-    kind: "answered";
-    outcome: "granted" | "denied" | "expired" | "misused" | "target_unavailable" | "duplicate_answer";
-} | {
-    kind: "expired";
-} | {
-    kind: "misused";
-} | {
-    kind: "duplicate_answer";
-} | {
-    kind: "claimed";
-    claim: {
-        ownerId: string;
-        epoch: number;
-        pid: number;
-        incarnation: string;
-    };
-} | {
-    kind: "dispatched";
-    dispatch: {
-        ownerId: string;
-        epoch: number;
-        dispatchedAt: number;
-    };
-    outcome: {
-        status: "ok" | "failed";
-        code?: string;
-        message?: string;
-        dispatchedAt: number;
-    };
-} | {
-    kind: "consumed";
-    message: string;
-} | {
-    kind: "unavailable";
-    reason: string;
-};
-export interface ElevationAuditEntry {
-    version: typeof SDK_STATE_VERSION;
-    ts: number;
-    elevationRequestId: string;
-    issueIndex: number;
-    event: ElevationAuditEvent;
-}
-export type ElevationAuditEventName = ElevationAuditEvent["kind"];
-export declare function isElevationAuditEntry(value: unknown): value is ElevationAuditEntry;
-export interface ElevationAuditOptions {
-    /** Injectable clock. */
-    now?: () => number;
-    /**
-     * Injectable tri-state process-incarnation liveness classifier, defaulting
-     * to `classifyProcessIncarnationLiveness`. The audit trail records the
-     * liveness verdict behind `consumed`/`unavailable` settlements so the
-     * crash-truth settlement is reproducible; the verdict never drives the
-     * settlement itself (that lives in the ledger).
-     */
-    classifyLiveness?: typeof classifyProcessIncarnationLiveness;
-}
-export declare class ElevationAudit {
-    #private;
-    constructor(agentDir: string, options?: ElevationAuditOptions);
-    get warnings(): readonly string[];
-    /**
-     * Appends one audit row for an elevation grant transition. Callers MUST
-     * hold the same elevation-local lock that guards the grant ledger; the
-     * audit row and the grant row therefore commit together.
-     */
-    append(entry: Omit<ElevationAuditEntry, "version">): Promise<void>;
-    /**
-     * Opens the audit stream: creates the 0600 directory/file if absent and
-     * quarantines any corrupt tail so subsequent appends are always readable.
-     * Called under the same lock as `ElevationLedger.open()`.
-     */
-    open(): Promise<this>;
-}

package/dist/types/sdk/elevation/capability.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-export declare function signElevationCapability(authorityToken: string, requestId: string, sdkId: string, input: Record<string, unknown>): string;
-export declare function verifyElevationCapability(authorityToken: string, capability: string, sdkId: string, input: Record<string, unknown>): boolean;
-export declare function elevationAuthorityPath(stateRoot: string, sessionId: string): string;

package/dist/types/sdk/elevation/digest.d.ts

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Fully qualified elevation request digest.
- *
- * An elevation grant binds the exact operation the operator approved. The
- * digest covers the complete `{kind, sdkId, input}` triple so substituting a
- * different operation or different input bytes changes the digest and the
- * gate presentation fails closed (`misused`). The top-level
- * `elevationRequestId` correlation field is deliberately excluded: it is the
- * durable correlation ID assigned to a request, not part of the approved
- * content, and the same content re-issued under a new ID must produce the
- * same digest.
- *
- * Only allowlisted operations can be elevated; anything else is refused so a
- * caller cannot mint a grant for an operation outside the elevation policy.
- */
-export declare const ELEVATION_OPERATION_KINDS: readonly ["control", "query", "global"];
-export type ElevationOperationKind = (typeof ELEVATION_OPERATION_KINDS)[number];
-export interface ElevationOperation {
-    kind: ElevationOperationKind;
-    sdkId: string;
-}
-/**
- * Operations that require an elevation grant. Default SDK scope
- * (list/query/send/tail) stays grant-free; destructive lifecycle operations
- * and workflow approval operations are elevatable and therefore gated.
- */
-export declare const ELEVATION_ALLOWLIST: readonly {
-    kind: ElevationOperationKind;
-    sdkId: string;
-}[];
-export declare function isElevatableOperation(kind: unknown, sdkId: unknown): boolean;
-/**
- * Whether the `(kind, sdkId)` pair names a registry operation that the
- * elevation allowlist recognizes. Used by the ledger row validator so a
- * persisted row can never bind an operation outside the allowlist.
- */
-export declare function isKnownElevationOperation(kind: unknown, sdkId: unknown): boolean;
-/**
- * Canonical JSON encoding for elevation digest leaves.
- *
- * Intentionally byte-compatible with the broker's identity canonicalization
- * (`canonicalJson` in `sdk/broker/broker.ts`): object keys sorted, compact
- * separators, `undefined` fields preserved verbatim, arrays joined without
- * separators. The broker computes the request digest at issue time and the
- * ledger recomputes/compares the same encoding, so digest verification is
- * stable across issue, gate presentation, and answer.
- */
-export declare function canonicalElevationJson(value: unknown): string;
-export type ElevationDigestResult = {
-    ok: true;
-    digest: string;
-} | {
-    ok: false;
-    error: {
-        code: string;
-        message: string;
-    };
-};
-/**
- * Computes the fully qualified digest for an elevation request.
- *
- * `input` is digested exactly as supplied except that a top-level
- * `elevationRequestId` field is removed first (it is the correlation ID, not
- * approved content). Operations outside `ELEVATION_ALLOWLIST` are refused
- * with `elevation_not_required` so the broker never mints a grant for an
- * operation that does not need one.
- */
-export declare function elevationRequestDigest(request: {
-    kind: unknown;
-    sdkId: unknown;
-    input: unknown;
-}): ElevationDigestResult;

package/dist/types/sdk/elevation/dispatch-receipt.d.ts

@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-export declare const ELEVATION_RECEIPT_VERSION = 1;
-/**
- * Identity of the broker tenure that claims a grant and dispatches it.
- *
- * `ownerId` is the broker instance owner id and `epoch` increments per broker
- * start, so a restart (even of the same object) yields a new tenure. `pid` and
- * `incarnation` are retained for truthful tri-state liveness replay.
- */
-export interface ElevationClaimIdentity {
-    ownerId: string;
-    epoch: number;
-    pid: number;
-    incarnation: string;
-}
-export type ElevationReceiptState = "claimed" | "dispatched" | "uncertain";
-/**
- * Durable dispatch outcome. `unknown` is the crash truth: the grant was
- * consumed by a claim but the dispatch outcome is not knowable, so retry
- * requires a new grant.
- */
-export type ElevationDispatchOutcome = {
-    status: "ok";
-    dispatchedAt: number;
-} | {
-    status: "failed";
-    code: string;
-    message: string;
-    dispatchedAt: number;
-} | {
-    status: "unknown";
-    message: string;
-    dispatchedAt: number;
-};
-/**
- * Owner/epoch-bound dispatch receipt.
- *
- * State machine: `claimed` (grant spent, dispatch in flight, bound to the
- * claiming broker tenure) -> `dispatched` (terminal, outcome recorded) or
- * `uncertain` (terminal truth: the claim's outcome is unknowable after its
- * broker tenure died). Replay never fabricates an outcome: a receipt left in
- * `claimed` by a dead tenure is truthfully terminalized to `uncertain`.
- */
-export interface ElevationDispatchReceipt {
-    version: typeof ELEVATION_RECEIPT_VERSION;
-    elevationRequestId: string;
-    issueIndex: number;
-    state: ElevationReceiptState;
-    claim: ElevationClaimIdentity & {
-        claimedAt: number;
-    };
-    dispatch?: {
-        ownerId: string;
-        epoch: number;
-        dispatchedAt: number;
-    };
-    outcome?: ElevationDispatchOutcome;
-    ts: number;
-}
-export declare function isElevationRequestId(value: unknown): value is string;
-export declare function isElevationClaimIdentity(value: unknown): value is ElevationClaimIdentity;
-export declare function isElevationDispatchOutcome(value: unknown): value is ElevationDispatchOutcome;
-export declare function isElevationDispatchReceipt(value: unknown): value is ElevationDispatchReceipt;
-export declare function claimReceipt(requestId: string, issueIndex: number, claim: ElevationClaimIdentity, claimedAt: number): ElevationDispatchReceipt;
-export declare function dispatchReceipt(receipt: ElevationDispatchReceipt, dispatch: {
-    ownerId: string;
-    epoch: number;
-    dispatchedAt: number;
-}, outcome: ElevationDispatchOutcome): ElevationDispatchReceipt;
-export declare function uncertainReceipt(receipt: ElevationDispatchReceipt, at: number): ElevationDispatchReceipt;
-export declare function receiptClaimMatches(receipt: ElevationDispatchReceipt, identity: ElevationClaimIdentity): boolean;
-/**
- * Who may answer an elevation gate.
- *
- * Internal operator-only: the answer boundary is the broker's internal
- * operator attestation (`local_operator`), reached only through broker-owned
- * surfaces. There is no public `elevation.answer` operation and no
- * requester-correlation check: the answerer is structurally an operator
- * attestation, so requester self-approval is impossible by construction.
- */
-export type ElevationAnswerAuthority = {
-    source: "local_operator";
-    attestedBy: string;
-};
-/** Structural guard for the internal operator attestation. */
-export declare function isElevationAnswerAuthority(value: unknown): value is ElevationAnswerAuthority;