@fails-components/webtransport 0.0.1 → 0.0.2

package/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/x509/x_x509.c

@@ -74,100 +74,96 @@
 static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
 
 ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CINF, enc, 0) = {
-        ASN1_EXP_OPT(X509_CINF, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, signature, X509_ALGOR),
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, issuer, X509_NAME),
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, validity, X509_VAL),
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, subject, X509_NAME),
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, key, X509_PUBKEY),
-        ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, issuerUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1),
-        ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, subjectUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 2),
-        ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CINF, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 3),
+    ASN1_EXP_OPT(X509_CINF, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
+    ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
+    ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, signature, X509_ALGOR),
+    ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, issuer, X509_NAME),
+    ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, validity, X509_VAL),
+    ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, subject, X509_NAME),
+    ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, key, X509_PUBKEY),
+    ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, issuerUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1),
+    ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, subjectUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 2),
+    ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CINF, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 3),
 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CINF, X509_CINF)
 
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CINF)
-/* X509 top level structure needs a bit of customisation */
+// X509 top level structure needs a bit of customisation
 
 extern void policy_cache_free(X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache);
 
 static int x509_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
-                   void *exarg)
-{
-    X509 *ret = (X509 *)*pval;
-
-    switch (operation) {
+                   void *exarg) {
+  X509 *ret = (X509 *)*pval;
 
+  switch (operation) {
     case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
-        ret->ex_flags = 0;
-        ret->ex_pathlen = -1;
-        ret->skid = NULL;
-        ret->akid = NULL;
-        ret->aux = NULL;
-        ret->crldp = NULL;
-        ret->buf = NULL;
-        CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ret->ex_data);
-        CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&ret->lock);
-        break;
+      ret->ex_flags = 0;
+      ret->ex_pathlen = -1;
+      ret->skid = NULL;
+      ret->akid = NULL;
+      ret->aux = NULL;
+      ret->crldp = NULL;
+      ret->buf = NULL;
+      CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ret->ex_data);
+      CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&ret->lock);
+      break;
 
     case ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE:
-        CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(ret->buf);
-        ret->buf = NULL;
-        break;
+      CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(ret->buf);
+      ret->buf = NULL;
+      break;
 
     case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST: {
-        /* The version must be one of v1(0), v2(1), or v3(2). */
-        long version = X509_VERSION_1;
-        if (ret->cert_info->version != NULL) {
-            version = ASN1_INTEGER_get(ret->cert_info->version);
-            /* TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/364): |X509_VERSION_1| should
-             * also be rejected here. This means an explicitly-encoded X.509v1
-             * version. v1 is DEFAULT, so DER requires it be omitted. */
-            if (version < X509_VERSION_1 || version > X509_VERSION_3) {
-                OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_VERSION);
-                return 0;
-            }
+      // The version must be one of v1(0), v2(1), or v3(2).
+      long version = X509_VERSION_1;
+      if (ret->cert_info->version != NULL) {
+        version = ASN1_INTEGER_get(ret->cert_info->version);
+        // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/364): |X509_VERSION_1| should
+        // also be rejected here. This means an explicitly-encoded X.509v1
+        // version. v1 is DEFAULT, so DER requires it be omitted.
+        if (version < X509_VERSION_1 || version > X509_VERSION_3) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_VERSION);
+          return 0;
         }
+      }
 
-        /* Per RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.8, these fields require v2 or v3. */
-        if (version == X509_VERSION_1 && (ret->cert_info->issuerUID != NULL ||
-                                          ret->cert_info->subjectUID != NULL)) {
-            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_FOR_VERSION);
-            return 0;
-        }
+      // Per RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.8, these fields require v2 or v3.
+      if (version == X509_VERSION_1 && (ret->cert_info->issuerUID != NULL ||
+                                        ret->cert_info->subjectUID != NULL)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_FOR_VERSION);
+        return 0;
+      }
 
-        /* Per RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9, extensions require v3. */
-        if (version != X509_VERSION_3 && ret->cert_info->extensions != NULL) {
-            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_FOR_VERSION);
-            return 0;
-        }
+      // Per RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9, extensions require v3.
+      if (version != X509_VERSION_3 && ret->cert_info->extensions != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_FOR_VERSION);
+        return 0;
+      }
 
-        break;
+      break;
     }
 
     case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST:
-        CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&ret->lock);
-        CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ret, &ret->ex_data);
-        X509_CERT_AUX_free(ret->aux);
-        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->skid);
-        AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(ret->akid);
-        CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(ret->crldp);
-        policy_cache_free(ret->policy_cache);
-        GENERAL_NAMES_free(ret->altname);
-        NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ret->nc);
-        CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(ret->buf);
-        break;
-
-    }
-
-    return 1;
+      CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&ret->lock);
+      CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ret, &ret->ex_data);
+      X509_CERT_AUX_free(ret->aux);
+      ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->skid);
+      AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(ret->akid);
+      CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(ret->crldp);
+      policy_cache_free(ret->policy_cache);
+      GENERAL_NAMES_free(ret->altname);
+      NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ret->nc);
+      CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(ret->buf);
+      break;
+  }
 
+  return 1;
 }
 
 ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509, x509_cb) = {
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509, cert_info, X509_CINF),
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(X509, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING),
+    ASN1_SIMPLE(X509, cert_info, X509_CINF),
+    ASN1_SIMPLE(X509, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
+    ASN1_SIMPLE(X509, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING),
 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509, X509)
 
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509)
@@ -204,191 +200,181 @@ X509 *X509_parse_from_buffer(CRYPTO_BUFFER *buf) {
   return ret;
 }
 
-int X509_up_ref(X509 *x)
-{
-    CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&x->references);
-    return 1;
+int X509_up_ref(X509 *x) {
+  CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&x->references);
+  return 1;
 }
 
-int X509_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused,
-                          CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
-{
-    int index;
-    if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
-                                 free_func)) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-    return index;
+int X509_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
+                          CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
+                          CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+  int index;
+  if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
+                               free_func)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return index;
 }
 
-int X509_set_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx, void *arg)
-{
-    return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg));
+int X509_set_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx, void *arg) {
+  return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg));
 }
 
-void *X509_get_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx)
-{
-    return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx));
+void *X509_get_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx) {
+  return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx));
 }
 
-/*
- * X509_AUX ASN1 routines. X509_AUX is the name given to a certificate with
- * extra info tagged on the end. Since these functions set how a certificate
- * is trusted they should only be used when the certificate comes from a
- * reliable source such as local storage.
- */
-
-X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
-{
-    const unsigned char *q = *pp;
-    X509 *ret;
-    int freeret = 0;
-
-    if (!a || *a == NULL)
-        freeret = 1;
-    ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length);
-    /* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
-    if (!ret)
-        return NULL;
-    /* update length */
-    length -= q - *pp;
-    /* Parse auxiliary information if there is any. */
-    if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length))
-        goto err;
-    *pp = q;
-    return ret;
- err:
-    if (freeret) {
-        X509_free(ret);
-        if (a)
-            *a = NULL;
-    }
+// X509_AUX ASN1 routines. X509_AUX is the name given to a certificate with
+// extra info tagged on the end. Since these functions set how a certificate
+// is trusted they should only be used when the certificate comes from a
+// reliable source such as local storage.
+
+X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) {
+  const unsigned char *q = *pp;
+  X509 *ret;
+  int freeret = 0;
+
+  if (!a || *a == NULL) {
+    freeret = 1;
+  }
+  ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length);
+  // If certificate unreadable then forget it
+  if (!ret) {
     return NULL;
+  }
+  // update length
+  length -= q - *pp;
+  // Parse auxiliary information if there is any.
+  if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  *pp = q;
+  return ret;
+err:
+  if (freeret) {
+    X509_free(ret);
+    if (a) {
+      *a = NULL;
+    }
+  }
+  return NULL;
 }
 
-/*
- * Serialize trusted certificate to *pp or just return the required buffer
- * length if pp == NULL.  We ultimately want to avoid modifying *pp in the
- * error path, but that depends on similar hygiene in lower-level functions.
- * Here we avoid compounding the problem.
- */
-static int i2d_x509_aux_internal(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
-{
-    int length, tmplen;
-    unsigned char *start = pp != NULL ? *pp : NULL;
-
-    assert(pp == NULL || *pp != NULL);
-
-    /*
-     * This might perturb *pp on error, but fixing that belongs in i2d_X509()
-     * not here.  It should be that if a == NULL length is zero, but we check
-     * both just in case.
-     */
-    length = i2d_X509(a, pp);
-    if (length <= 0 || a == NULL) {
-        return length;
-    }
+// Serialize trusted certificate to *pp or just return the required buffer
+// length if pp == NULL.  We ultimately want to avoid modifying *pp in the
+// error path, but that depends on similar hygiene in lower-level functions.
+// Here we avoid compounding the problem.
+static int i2d_x509_aux_internal(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp) {
+  int length, tmplen;
+  unsigned char *start = pp != NULL ? *pp : NULL;
+
+  assert(pp == NULL || *pp != NULL);
+
+  // This might perturb *pp on error, but fixing that belongs in i2d_X509()
+  // not here.  It should be that if a == NULL length is zero, but we check
+  // both just in case.
+  length = i2d_X509(a, pp);
+  if (length <= 0 || a == NULL) {
+    return length;
+  }
 
-    if (a->aux != NULL) {
-        tmplen = i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp);
-        if (tmplen < 0) {
-            if (start != NULL)
-                *pp = start;
-            return tmplen;
-        }
-        length += tmplen;
+  if (a->aux != NULL) {
+    tmplen = i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp);
+    if (tmplen < 0) {
+      if (start != NULL) {
+        *pp = start;
+      }
+      return tmplen;
     }
+    length += tmplen;
+  }
 
-    return length;
+  return length;
 }
 
-/*
- * Serialize trusted certificate to *pp, or just return the required buffer
- * length if pp == NULL.
- *
- * When pp is not NULL, but *pp == NULL, we allocate the buffer, but since
- * we're writing two ASN.1 objects back to back, we can't have i2d_X509() do
- * the allocation, nor can we allow i2d_X509_CERT_AUX() to increment the
- * allocated buffer.
- */
-int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
-{
-    int length;
-    unsigned char *tmp;
-
-    /* Buffer provided by caller */
-    if (pp == NULL || *pp != NULL)
-        return i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, pp);
-
-    /* Obtain the combined length */
-    if ((length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, NULL)) <= 0)
-        return length;
-
-    /* Allocate requisite combined storage */
-    *pp = tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
-    if (tmp == NULL)
-        return -1; /* Push error onto error stack? */
-
-    /* Encode, but keep *pp at the originally malloced pointer */
-    length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, &tmp);
-    if (length <= 0) {
-        OPENSSL_free(*pp);
-        *pp = NULL;
-    }
+// Serialize trusted certificate to *pp, or just return the required buffer
+// length if pp == NULL.
+//
+// When pp is not NULL, but *pp == NULL, we allocate the buffer, but since
+// we're writing two ASN.1 objects back to back, we can't have i2d_X509() do
+// the allocation, nor can we allow i2d_X509_CERT_AUX() to increment the
+// allocated buffer.
+int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp) {
+  int length;
+  unsigned char *tmp;
+
+  // Buffer provided by caller
+  if (pp == NULL || *pp != NULL) {
+    return i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, pp);
+  }
+
+  // Obtain the combined length
+  if ((length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, NULL)) <= 0) {
     return length;
+  }
+
+  // Allocate requisite combined storage
+  *pp = tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+  if (tmp == NULL) {
+    return -1;  // Push error onto error stack?
+  }
+
+  // Encode, but keep *pp at the originally malloced pointer
+  length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, &tmp);
+  if (length <= 0) {
+    OPENSSL_free(*pp);
+    *pp = NULL;
+  }
+  return length;
 }
 
-int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x509, unsigned char **outp)
-{
-    x509->cert_info->enc.modified = 1;
-    return i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, outp);
+int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x509, unsigned char **outp) {
+  x509->cert_info->enc.modified = 1;
+  return i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, outp);
 }
 
-int i2d_X509_tbs(X509 *x509, unsigned char **outp)
-{
-    return i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, outp);
+int i2d_X509_tbs(X509 *x509, unsigned char **outp) {
+  return i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, outp);
 }
 
-int X509_set1_signature_algo(X509 *x509, const X509_ALGOR *algo)
-{
-    /* TODO(davidben): Const-correct generated ASN.1 dup functions.
-     * Alternatively, when the types are hidden and we can embed required fields
-     * directly in structs, import |X509_ALGOR_copy| from upstream. */
-    X509_ALGOR *copy1 = X509_ALGOR_dup((X509_ALGOR *)algo);
-    X509_ALGOR *copy2 = X509_ALGOR_dup((X509_ALGOR *)algo);
-    if (copy1 == NULL || copy2 == NULL) {
-        X509_ALGOR_free(copy1);
-        X509_ALGOR_free(copy2);
-        return 0;
-    }
+int X509_set1_signature_algo(X509 *x509, const X509_ALGOR *algo) {
+  // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/407): Generated ASN.1 dup functions
+  // should be const. Alternatively, when we can embed required fields
+  // directly in structs, import |X509_ALGOR_copy| from upstream.
+  X509_ALGOR *copy1 = X509_ALGOR_dup((X509_ALGOR *)algo);
+  X509_ALGOR *copy2 = X509_ALGOR_dup((X509_ALGOR *)algo);
+  if (copy1 == NULL || copy2 == NULL) {
+    X509_ALGOR_free(copy1);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(copy2);
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    X509_ALGOR_free(x509->sig_alg);
-    x509->sig_alg = copy1;
-    X509_ALGOR_free(x509->cert_info->signature);
-    x509->cert_info->signature = copy2;
-    return 1;
+  X509_ALGOR_free(x509->sig_alg);
+  x509->sig_alg = copy1;
+  X509_ALGOR_free(x509->cert_info->signature);
+  x509->cert_info->signature = copy2;
+  return 1;
 }
 
-int X509_set1_signature_value(X509 *x509, const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len)
-{
-    if (!ASN1_STRING_set(x509->signature, sig, sig_len)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    x509->signature->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
-    x509->signature->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
-    return 1;
+int X509_set1_signature_value(X509 *x509, const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len) {
+  if (!ASN1_STRING_set(x509->signature, sig, sig_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  x509->signature->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
+  x509->signature->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+  return 1;
 }
 
 void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig, const X509_ALGOR **palg,
-                         const X509 *x)
-{
-    if (psig)
-        *psig = x->signature;
-    if (palg)
-        *palg = x->sig_alg;
+                         const X509 *x) {
+  if (psig) {
+    *psig = x->signature;
+  }
+  if (palg) {
+    *palg = x->sig_alg;
+  }
 }
 
-int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x)
-{
-    return OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x) {
+  return OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
 }