@fails-components/webtransport 0.0.1 → 0.0.2

package/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/trust_token/trust_token_test.cc

@@ -54,6 +54,73 @@ TEST(TrustTokenTest, KeyGenExp1) {
       TRUST_TOKEN_MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE, 0x0001));
   ASSERT_EQ(292u, priv_key_len);
   ASSERT_EQ(301u, pub_key_len);
+
+  const uint8_t kKeygenSecret[] = "SEED";
+  ASSERT_TRUE(TRUST_TOKEN_derive_key_from_secret(
+      TRUST_TOKEN_experiment_v1(), priv_key, &priv_key_len,
+      TRUST_TOKEN_MAX_PRIVATE_KEY_SIZE, pub_key, &pub_key_len,
+      TRUST_TOKEN_MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE, 0x0001, kKeygenSecret,
+      sizeof(kKeygenSecret) - 1));
+
+  const uint8_t kExpectedPriv[] = {
+      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x98, 0xaa, 0x32, 0xfc, 0x5f, 0x83, 0x35, 0xea,
+      0x57, 0x4f, 0x9e, 0x61, 0x48, 0x6e, 0x89, 0x9d, 0x3d, 0xaa, 0x38, 0x5d,
+      0xd0, 0x06, 0x96, 0x62, 0xe8, 0x0b, 0xd6, 0x5f, 0x12, 0xa4, 0xcc, 0xa9,
+      0xb5, 0x20, 0x1b, 0x13, 0x8c, 0x1c, 0xaf, 0x36, 0x1b, 0xab, 0x0c, 0xc6,
+      0xac, 0x38, 0xae, 0x96, 0x3d, 0x14, 0x9d, 0xb8, 0x8d, 0xf4, 0x7f, 0xe2,
+      0x7d, 0xeb, 0x17, 0xc2, 0xbc, 0x63, 0x42, 0x93, 0x94, 0xe4, 0x97, 0xbf,
+      0x97, 0xea, 0x02, 0x40, 0xac, 0xb6, 0xa5, 0x03, 0x4c, 0x6b, 0x4c, 0xb8,
+      0x8c, 0xf4, 0x66, 0x1b, 0x4e, 0x02, 0x45, 0xf9, 0xcd, 0xb6, 0x0f, 0x59,
+      0x09, 0x21, 0x03, 0x7e, 0x92, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x40, 0x83, 0x50, 0xe3, 0xdc,
+      0x9e, 0x6f, 0x65, 0xc5, 0xbd, 0x2c, 0x7d, 0xab, 0x74, 0x49, 0xc8, 0xa2,
+      0x3c, 0xab, 0xcb, 0x4d, 0x63, 0x73, 0x81, 0x2b, 0xb2, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x8f,
+      0x00, 0xb8, 0xd8, 0xb4, 0x5d, 0xc4, 0x3f, 0x3d, 0xa8, 0x4f, 0x4c, 0x72,
+      0x0e, 0x20, 0x17, 0x4b, 0xac, 0x14, 0x8f, 0xb2, 0xa5, 0x20, 0x41, 0x2b,
+      0xf7, 0x62, 0x25, 0x6a, 0xd6, 0x41, 0x26, 0x62, 0x10, 0xc1, 0xbc, 0x42,
+      0xac, 0x54, 0x1b, 0x75, 0x05, 0xd6, 0x53, 0xb1, 0x7b, 0x84, 0x6a, 0x7b,
+      0x5b, 0x2a, 0x34, 0x6e, 0x43, 0x4b, 0x43, 0xcc, 0x6c, 0xdb, 0x1d, 0x02,
+      0x34, 0x7f, 0xd1, 0xe8, 0xfd, 0x42, 0x2c, 0xd9, 0x14, 0xdb, 0xd6, 0xf4,
+      0xad, 0xb5, 0xe4, 0xac, 0xdd, 0x7e, 0xb5, 0x4c, 0x3f, 0x59, 0x24, 0xfa,
+      0x04, 0xd9, 0xb6, 0xd2, 0xb7, 0x7d, 0xf1, 0xfa, 0x13, 0xc0, 0x4d, 0xd5,
+      0xca, 0x3a, 0x4e, 0xa8, 0xdd, 0xa9, 0xfc, 0xcb, 0x06, 0xb2, 0xde, 0x4b,
+      0x2a, 0x86, 0xbb, 0x0d, 0x41, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xfb, 0x49, 0xc8, 0xdf, 0x9a,
+      0x48, 0xe5, 0x68, 0x8a, 0xfc, 0x86, 0x9c, 0x79, 0x5a, 0x79, 0xc1, 0x09,
+      0x33, 0x53, 0xdc, 0x3d, 0xe9, 0x93, 0x7c, 0x5b, 0x72, 0xf7, 0xa0, 0x8a,
+      0x1f, 0x07, 0x6c, 0x38, 0x3c, 0x99, 0x0b, 0xe4, 0x4e, 0xa4, 0xbd, 0x41,
+      0x1f, 0x83, 0xa6, 0xd3
+  };
+  ASSERT_EQ(Bytes(kExpectedPriv, sizeof(kExpectedPriv)),
+            Bytes(priv_key, priv_key_len));
+
+  const uint8_t kExpectedPub[] = {
+      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x61, 0x04, 0x5e, 0x06, 0x6b, 0x7b, 0xfd,
+      0x54, 0x01, 0xe0, 0xd2, 0xb5, 0x12, 0xce, 0x48, 0x16, 0x66, 0xb2, 0xdf,
+      0xfd, 0xa8, 0x38, 0x7c, 0x1f, 0x45, 0x1a, 0xb8, 0x21, 0x52, 0x17, 0x25,
+      0xbb, 0x0b, 0x00, 0xd4, 0xa1, 0xbc, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x08, 0x36, 0x98, 0xb2,
+      0x17, 0xd3, 0xb5, 0xad, 0xb6, 0x4e, 0x03, 0x5f, 0xd3, 0x66, 0x2c, 0x58,
+      0x1c, 0xcc, 0xc6, 0x23, 0xa4, 0xf9, 0xa2, 0x7e, 0xb0, 0xe4, 0xd3, 0x95,
+      0x41, 0x6f, 0xba, 0x23, 0x4a, 0x82, 0x93, 0x29, 0x73, 0x75, 0x38, 0x85,
+      0x64, 0x9c, 0xaa, 0x12, 0x6d, 0x7d, 0xcd, 0x52, 0x02, 0x91, 0x9f, 0xa9,
+      0xee, 0x4b, 0xfd, 0x68, 0x97, 0x40, 0xdc, 0x00, 0x61, 0x04, 0x14, 0x16,
+      0x39, 0xf9, 0x63, 0x66, 0x94, 0x03, 0xfa, 0x0b, 0xbf, 0xca, 0x5a, 0x39,
+      0x9f, 0x27, 0x5b, 0x3f, 0x69, 0x7a, 0xc9, 0xf7, 0x25, 0x7c, 0x84, 0x9e,
+      0x1d, 0x61, 0x5a, 0x24, 0x53, 0xf2, 0x4a, 0x9d, 0xe9, 0x05, 0x53, 0xfd,
+      0x12, 0x01, 0x2d, 0x9a, 0x69, 0x50, 0x74, 0x82, 0xa3, 0x45, 0x73, 0xdc,
+      0x34, 0x36, 0x31, 0x44, 0x07, 0x0c, 0xda, 0x13, 0xbe, 0x94, 0x37, 0x65,
+      0xa0, 0xab, 0x16, 0x52, 0x90, 0xe5, 0x8a, 0x03, 0xe5, 0x98, 0x79, 0x14,
+      0x79, 0xd5, 0x17, 0xee, 0xd4, 0xb8, 0xda, 0x77, 0x76, 0x03, 0x20, 0x2a,
+      0x7e, 0x3b, 0x76, 0x0b, 0x23, 0xb7, 0x72, 0x77, 0xb2, 0xeb, 0x00, 0x61,
+      0x04, 0x68, 0x18, 0x4d, 0x23, 0x23, 0xf4, 0x45, 0xb8, 0x81, 0x0d, 0xa4,
+      0x5d, 0x0b, 0x9e, 0x08, 0xfb, 0x45, 0xfb, 0x96, 0x29, 0x43, 0x2f, 0xab,
+      0x93, 0x04, 0x4c, 0x04, 0xb6, 0x5e, 0x27, 0xf5, 0x39, 0x66, 0x94, 0x15,
+      0x1d, 0xb1, 0x1c, 0x7c, 0x27, 0x6f, 0xa5, 0x19, 0x0c, 0x30, 0x12, 0xcc,
+      0x77, 0x7f, 0x10, 0xa9, 0x7c, 0xe4, 0x08, 0x77, 0x3c, 0xd3, 0x6f, 0xa4,
+      0xf4, 0xaf, 0xf1, 0x9d, 0x14, 0x1d, 0xd0, 0x02, 0x33, 0x50, 0x55, 0x00,
+      0x6a, 0x47, 0x96, 0xe1, 0x8b, 0x4e, 0x44, 0x41, 0xad, 0xb3, 0xea, 0x0d,
+      0x0d, 0xd5, 0x73, 0x8e, 0x62, 0x67, 0x8a, 0xb4, 0xe7, 0x5d, 0x17, 0xa9,
+      0x24};
+  ASSERT_EQ(Bytes(kExpectedPub, sizeof(kExpectedPub)),
+            Bytes(pub_key, pub_key_len));
 }
 
 TEST(TrustTokenTest, KeyGenExp2VOPRF) {
@@ -66,6 +133,37 @@ TEST(TrustTokenTest, KeyGenExp2VOPRF) {
       TRUST_TOKEN_MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE, 0x0001));
   ASSERT_EQ(52u, priv_key_len);
   ASSERT_EQ(101u, pub_key_len);
+
+  const uint8_t kKeygenSecret[] = "SEED";
+  ASSERT_TRUE(TRUST_TOKEN_derive_key_from_secret(
+      TRUST_TOKEN_experiment_v2_voprf(), priv_key, &priv_key_len,
+      TRUST_TOKEN_MAX_PRIVATE_KEY_SIZE, pub_key, &pub_key_len,
+      TRUST_TOKEN_MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE, 0x0001, kKeygenSecret,
+      sizeof(kKeygenSecret) - 1));
+
+  const uint8_t kExpectedPriv[] = {
+      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x0b, 0xe2, 0xc4, 0x73, 0x92, 0xe7, 0xf8,
+      0x3e, 0xba, 0xab, 0x85, 0xa7, 0x77, 0xd7, 0x0a, 0x02, 0xc5, 0x36,
+      0xfe, 0x62, 0xa3, 0xca, 0x01, 0x75, 0xc7, 0x62, 0x19, 0xc7, 0xf0,
+      0x30, 0xc5, 0x14, 0x60, 0x13, 0x97, 0x4f, 0x63, 0x05, 0x37, 0x92,
+      0x7b, 0x76, 0x8e, 0x9f, 0xd0, 0x1a, 0x74, 0x44
+  };
+  ASSERT_EQ(Bytes(kExpectedPriv, sizeof(kExpectedPriv)),
+            Bytes(priv_key, priv_key_len));
+
+  const uint8_t kExpectedPub[] = {
+      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x04, 0x2c, 0x9c, 0x11, 0xc1, 0xe5, 0x52, 0x59,
+      0x0b, 0x6d, 0x88, 0x8b, 0x6e, 0x28, 0xe8, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xbe, 0x48, 0x18,
+      0xf7, 0x1d, 0x31, 0xcf, 0xa2, 0x6e, 0x2a, 0xd6, 0xcb, 0x83, 0x26, 0x04,
+      0xbd, 0x93, 0x67, 0xe4, 0x53, 0xf6, 0x11, 0x7d, 0x45, 0xe9, 0xfe, 0x27,
+      0x33, 0x90, 0xdb, 0x1b, 0xfc, 0x9b, 0x31, 0x4d, 0x39, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x8c,
+      0x43, 0x06, 0x70, 0x2c, 0x84, 0xdc, 0x23, 0x18, 0xc7, 0x6a, 0x58, 0xcf,
+      0x9e, 0xc1, 0xfa, 0xf2, 0x30, 0xdd, 0xad, 0x62, 0x24, 0xde, 0x11, 0xc1,
+      0xba, 0x8d, 0xc3, 0x4f, 0xfb, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0xd4, 0x37, 0xba, 0x3b, 0x70,
+      0xc0, 0xc3, 0xef, 0x20, 0x43
+  };
+  ASSERT_EQ(Bytes(kExpectedPub, sizeof(kExpectedPub)),
+            Bytes(pub_key, pub_key_len));
 }
 
 TEST(TrustTokenTest, KeyGenExp2PMB) {
@@ -78,6 +176,73 @@ TEST(TrustTokenTest, KeyGenExp2PMB) {
       TRUST_TOKEN_MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE, 0x0001));
   ASSERT_EQ(292u, priv_key_len);
   ASSERT_EQ(295u, pub_key_len);
+
+  const uint8_t kKeygenSecret[] = "SEED";
+  ASSERT_TRUE(TRUST_TOKEN_derive_key_from_secret(
+      TRUST_TOKEN_experiment_v2_pmb(), priv_key, &priv_key_len,
+      TRUST_TOKEN_MAX_PRIVATE_KEY_SIZE, pub_key, &pub_key_len,
+      TRUST_TOKEN_MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE, 0x0001, kKeygenSecret,
+      sizeof(kKeygenSecret) - 1));
+
+  const uint8_t kExpectedPriv[] = {
+      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x1b, 0x74, 0xdc, 0xf0, 0xa9, 0xa7, 0x6c, 0xfb,
+      0x41, 0xef, 0xfa, 0x65, 0x52, 0xc9, 0x86, 0x4e, 0xfb, 0x16, 0x9d, 0xea,
+      0x62, 0x3f, 0x47, 0xab, 0x1f, 0x1b, 0x05, 0xf2, 0x4f, 0x05, 0xfe, 0x64,
+      0xb7, 0xe8, 0xcd, 0x2a, 0x10, 0xfa, 0xa2, 0x48, 0x3f, 0x0e, 0x8b, 0x94,
+      0x39, 0xf1, 0xe7, 0x53, 0xe9, 0x50, 0x29, 0xe2, 0xb7, 0x0e, 0xc0, 0x94,
+      0xa9, 0xd3, 0xef, 0x64, 0x10, 0x1d, 0x08, 0xd0, 0x60, 0xcb, 0x6d, 0x97,
+      0x68, 0xc7, 0x04, 0x92, 0x07, 0xb2, 0x22, 0x83, 0xf7, 0xd9, 0x9b, 0x2c,
+      0xf2, 0x52, 0x34, 0x0c, 0x42, 0x31, 0x47, 0x41, 0x19, 0xb9, 0xee, 0xfc,
+      0x46, 0xbd, 0x14, 0xce, 0x42, 0xd7, 0x43, 0xc8, 0x32, 0x3b, 0x24, 0xed,
+      0xdc, 0x69, 0xa3, 0x8e, 0x29, 0x01, 0xbe, 0xae, 0x24, 0x39, 0x14, 0xa7,
+      0x52, 0xe5, 0xd5, 0xff, 0x9a, 0xc4, 0x15, 0x79, 0x29, 0x4c, 0x9b, 0x4e,
+      0xfc, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x12, 0x6f, 0x4f, 0xd3, 0x96, 0x28, 0xb0, 0x79, 0xf0,
+      0x4e, 0x6e, 0x7d, 0x56, 0x19, 0x1b, 0xc2, 0xd7, 0xf9, 0x3a, 0x58, 0x06,
+      0xe5, 0xec, 0xa4, 0x33, 0x14, 0x1c, 0x78, 0x0c, 0x83, 0x94, 0x34, 0x22,
+      0x5a, 0x8e, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x72, 0x4a, 0x03, 0x35, 0xfe, 0x46, 0x92, 0x41,
+      0x6b, 0xe6, 0x4b, 0x3f, 0xf0, 0xe7, 0x0b, 0xb5, 0xf3, 0x66, 0x6c, 0xc6,
+      0x14, 0xcf, 0xce, 0x32, 0x0a, 0x2c, 0x28, 0xba, 0x4e, 0xb9, 0x75, 0x4a,
+      0xa9, 0x2d, 0xb0, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x62, 0x52, 0x29, 0x1f, 0x12, 0xfd, 0xfb,
+      0xd3, 0x2a, 0x36, 0x0f, 0x89, 0x32, 0x86, 0x25, 0x56, 0xb9, 0xe7, 0x3c,
+      0xeb, 0xb4, 0x84, 0x41, 0x2b, 0xa8, 0xf3, 0xa5, 0x3d, 0xfe, 0x56, 0x94,
+      0x5b, 0x74, 0xb3, 0x5b, 0x27, 0x3f, 0xe7, 0xcf, 0xe4, 0xf8, 0x15, 0x95,
+      0x2a, 0xd2, 0x5f, 0x92, 0xb4, 0x6a, 0x89, 0xa5, 0x54, 0xbd, 0x27, 0x5e,
+      0xeb, 0x43, 0x07, 0x9b, 0x2b, 0x8b, 0x22, 0x59, 0x13, 0x4b, 0x9c, 0x56,
+      0xd8, 0x63, 0xd9, 0xe6, 0x85, 0x15, 0x2c, 0x82, 0x52, 0x40, 0x8f, 0xb1,
+      0xe7, 0x56, 0x07, 0x98
+  };
+  ASSERT_EQ(Bytes(kExpectedPriv, sizeof(kExpectedPriv)),
+            Bytes(priv_key, priv_key_len));
+
+  const uint8_t kExpectedPub[] = {
+      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x04, 0x48, 0xb1, 0x2d, 0xdd, 0x03, 0x32, 0xeb,
+      0x93, 0x31, 0x3d, 0x59, 0x74, 0xf0, 0xcf, 0xaa, 0xa5, 0x39, 0x5f, 0x53,
+      0xc4, 0x94, 0x98, 0xbe, 0x8f, 0x22, 0xd7, 0x30, 0xde, 0x1e, 0xb4, 0xf3,
+      0x32, 0x23, 0x90, 0x0b, 0xa6, 0x37, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x44, 0xb3, 0x26, 0x52,
+      0x93, 0x7b, 0x4b, 0xa4, 0x79, 0xe8, 0x77, 0x6a, 0x19, 0x81, 0x2a, 0xdd,
+      0x91, 0xfb, 0x90, 0x8b, 0x24, 0xb5, 0xbe, 0x20, 0x2e, 0xe8, 0xbc, 0xd3,
+      0x83, 0x6c, 0xa8, 0xc5, 0xa1, 0x9a, 0x5b, 0x5e, 0x60, 0xda, 0x45, 0x2e,
+      0x31, 0x7f, 0x54, 0x0e, 0x14, 0x40, 0xd2, 0x4d, 0x40, 0x2e, 0x21, 0x79,
+      0xfc, 0x77, 0xdd, 0xc7, 0x2d, 0x04, 0xfe, 0xc6, 0xe3, 0xcf, 0x99, 0xef,
+      0x88, 0xab, 0x76, 0x86, 0x16, 0x14, 0xed, 0x72, 0x35, 0xa7, 0x05, 0x13,
+      0x9f, 0x2c, 0x53, 0xd5, 0xdf, 0x66, 0x75, 0x2e, 0x68, 0xdc, 0xd4, 0xc4,
+      0x00, 0x36, 0x08, 0x6d, 0xb7, 0x15, 0xf7, 0xe5, 0x32, 0x59, 0x81, 0x16,
+      0x57, 0xaa, 0x72, 0x06, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd1, 0x85, 0xa0, 0x04, 0xd4, 0x11,
+      0x95, 0x1d, 0xac, 0x0b, 0x25, 0xbe, 0x59, 0xa2, 0xb3, 0x30, 0xee, 0x97,
+      0x07, 0x2a, 0x51, 0x15, 0xc1, 0x8d, 0xa8, 0xa6, 0x57, 0x9a, 0x4e, 0xbf,
+      0xd7, 0x2d, 0x35, 0x07, 0x6b, 0xd6, 0xc9, 0x3c, 0xe4, 0xcf, 0x0b, 0x14,
+      0x3e, 0x10, 0x51, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x84, 0x04, 0xbe, 0xd1, 0xd5, 0xa8, 0xf3,
+      0x9d, 0x1d, 0x4f, 0xc1, 0xc9, 0xf1, 0x0c, 0x6d, 0xb6, 0xcb, 0xe2, 0x05,
+      0x0b, 0x9c, 0x7a, 0x3a, 0x9a, 0x99, 0xe9, 0xa1, 0x93, 0xdc, 0x72, 0x2e,
+      0xef, 0xf3, 0x8d, 0xb9, 0x7b, 0xb0, 0x19, 0x24, 0x95, 0x0d, 0x68, 0xa7,
+      0xe0, 0xaa, 0x0b, 0xb1, 0xd1, 0xcc, 0x52, 0x14, 0xf9, 0x6c, 0x91, 0x59,
+      0xe4, 0xe1, 0x9b, 0xf9, 0x12, 0x39, 0xb1, 0x79, 0xbb, 0x21, 0x92, 0x00,
+      0xa4, 0x89, 0xf5, 0xbd, 0xd7, 0x89, 0x27, 0x40, 0xdc, 0xb1, 0x09, 0x38,
+      0x63, 0x91, 0x8c, 0xa5, 0x27, 0x27, 0x97, 0x39, 0x35, 0xfa, 0x1a, 0x8a,
+      0xa7, 0xe5, 0xc4, 0xd8, 0xbf, 0xe7, 0xbe
+  };
+  ASSERT_EQ(Bytes(kExpectedPub, sizeof(kExpectedPub)),
+            Bytes(pub_key, pub_key_len));
 }
 
 // Test that H in |TRUST_TOKEN_experiment_v1| was computed correctly.

package/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/trust_token/voprf.c

@@ -110,20 +110,18 @@ static int scalar_from_cbs(CBS *cbs, const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out) {
   return 1;
 }
 
-static int voprf_generate_key(const VOPRF_METHOD *method, CBB *out_private,
-                              CBB *out_public) {
+static int voprf_calculate_key(const VOPRF_METHOD *method, CBB *out_private,
+                               CBB *out_public, const EC_SCALAR *priv) {
   const EC_GROUP *group = method->group;
   EC_RAW_POINT pub;
-  EC_SCALAR priv;
   EC_AFFINE pub_affine;
-  if (!ec_random_nonzero_scalar(group, &priv, kDefaultAdditionalData) ||
-      !ec_point_mul_scalar_base(group, &pub, &priv) ||
+  if (!ec_point_mul_scalar_base(group, &pub, priv) ||
       !ec_jacobian_to_affine(group, &pub_affine, &pub)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE);
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (!scalar_to_cbb(out_private, group, &priv) ||
+  if (!scalar_to_cbb(out_private, group, priv) ||
       !cbb_add_point(out_public, group, &pub_affine)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
     return 0;
@@ -132,6 +130,46 @@ static int voprf_generate_key(const VOPRF_METHOD *method, CBB *out_private,
   return 1;
 }
 
+
+static int voprf_generate_key(const VOPRF_METHOD *method, CBB *out_private,
+                              CBB *out_public) {
+  EC_SCALAR priv;
+  if (!ec_random_nonzero_scalar(method->group, &priv, kDefaultAdditionalData)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return voprf_calculate_key(method, out_private, out_public, &priv);
+}
+
+static int voprf_derive_key_from_secret(const VOPRF_METHOD *method,
+                                        CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public,
+                                        const uint8_t *secret,
+                                        size_t secret_len) {
+  static const uint8_t kKeygenLabel[] = "TrustTokenVOPRFKeyGen";
+
+  EC_SCALAR priv;
+  int ok = 0;
+  CBB cbb;
+  CBB_zero(&cbb);
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  size_t len;
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, kKeygenLabel, sizeof(kKeygenLabel)) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, secret, secret_len) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&cbb, &buf, &len) ||
+      !method->hash_to_scalar(method->group, &priv, buf, len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(TRUST_TOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ok = voprf_calculate_key(method, out_private, out_public, &priv);
+
+err:
+  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+  OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  return ok;
+}
+
 static int voprf_client_key_from_bytes(const VOPRF_METHOD *method,
                                        TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
                                        const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
@@ -711,6 +749,17 @@ int voprf_exp2_generate_key(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public) {
   return voprf_generate_key(&voprf_exp2_method, out_private, out_public);
 }
 
+int voprf_exp2_derive_key_from_secret(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public,
+                                      const uint8_t *secret,
+                                      size_t secret_len) {
+  if (!voprf_exp2_init_method()) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return voprf_derive_key_from_secret(&voprf_exp2_method, out_private,
+                                      out_public, secret, secret_len);
+}
+
 int voprf_exp2_client_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
                                      const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
   if (!voprf_exp2_init_method()) {

package/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/x509/a_digest.c

@@ -62,35 +62,34 @@
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
 
 int ASN1_digest(i2d_of_void *i2d, const EVP_MD *type, char *data,
-                unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
-{
-    int i, ret;
-    unsigned char *str, *p;
+                unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len) {
+  int i, ret;
+  unsigned char *str, *p;
 
-    i = i2d(data, NULL);
-    if ((str = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(i)) == NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return (0);
-    }
-    p = str;
-    i2d(data, &p);
+  i = i2d(data, NULL);
+  if ((str = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(i)) == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  p = str;
+  i2d(data, &p);
 
-    ret = EVP_Digest(str, i, md, len, type, NULL);
-    OPENSSL_free(str);
-    return ret;
+  ret = EVP_Digest(str, i, md, len, type, NULL);
+  OPENSSL_free(str);
+  return ret;
 }
 
 int ASN1_item_digest(const ASN1_ITEM *it, const EVP_MD *type, void *asn,
-                     unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
-{
-    int i, ret;
-    unsigned char *str = NULL;
+                     unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len) {
+  int i, ret;
+  unsigned char *str = NULL;
 
-    i = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &str, it);
-    if (!str)
-        return (0);
+  i = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &str, it);
+  if (!str) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    ret = EVP_Digest(str, i, md, len, type, NULL);
-    OPENSSL_free(str);
-    return ret;
+  ret = EVP_Digest(str, i, md, len, type, NULL);
+  OPENSSL_free(str);
+  return ret;
 }

package/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/x509/a_sign.c

@@ -64,65 +64,62 @@
 
 #include "internal.h"
 
-int ASN1_item_sign(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *algor1,
-                   X509_ALGOR *algor2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn,
-                   EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *type)
-{
-    EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-    if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, type, NULL, pkey)) {
-        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(it, algor1, algor2, signature, asn, &ctx);
+int ASN1_item_sign(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *algor1, X509_ALGOR *algor2,
+                   ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                   const EVP_MD *type) {
+  EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+  if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, type, NULL, pkey)) {
+    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(it, algor1, algor2, signature, asn, &ctx);
 }
 
-int ASN1_item_sign_ctx(const ASN1_ITEM *it,
-                       X509_ALGOR *algor1, X509_ALGOR *algor2,
-                       ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-    unsigned char *buf_in = NULL, *buf_out = NULL;
-    size_t inl = 0, outl = 0;
+int ASN1_item_sign_ctx(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *algor1,
+                       X509_ALGOR *algor2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
+                       void *asn, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+  unsigned char *buf_in = NULL, *buf_out = NULL;
+  size_t inl = 0, outl = 0;
 
-    pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx->pctx);
+  pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx->pctx);
 
-    /* Write out the requested copies of the AlgorithmIdentifier. */
-    if (algor1 && !x509_digest_sign_algorithm(ctx, algor1)) {
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if (algor2 && !x509_digest_sign_algorithm(ctx, algor2)) {
-        goto err;
-    }
+  // Write out the requested copies of the AlgorithmIdentifier.
+  if (algor1 && !x509_digest_sign_algorithm(ctx, algor1)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (algor2 && !x509_digest_sign_algorithm(ctx, algor2)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
 
-    inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
-    outl = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-    buf_out = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)outl);
-    if ((buf_in == NULL) || (buf_out == NULL)) {
-        outl = 0;
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-    }
+  inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
+  outl = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+  buf_out = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)outl);
+  if ((buf_in == NULL) || (buf_out == NULL)) {
+    outl = 0;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
 
-    if (!EVP_DigestSign(ctx, buf_out, &outl, buf_in, inl)) {
-        outl = 0;
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if (signature->data != NULL)
-        OPENSSL_free(signature->data);
-    signature->data = buf_out;
-    buf_out = NULL;
-    signature->length = outl;
-    /*
-     * In the interests of compatibility, I'll make sure that the bit string
-     * has a 'not-used bits' value of 0
-     */
-    signature->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
-    signature->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
- err:
-    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
-    OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
-    OPENSSL_free(buf_out);
-    return (outl);
+  if (!EVP_DigestSign(ctx, buf_out, &outl, buf_in, inl)) {
+    outl = 0;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (signature->data != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_free(signature->data);
+  }
+  signature->data = buf_out;
+  buf_out = NULL;
+  signature->length = outl;
+  // In the interests of compatibility, I'll make sure that the bit string
+  // has a 'not-used bits' value of 0
+  signature->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
+  signature->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+err:
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+  OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
+  OPENSSL_free(buf_out);
+  return outl;
 }

package/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/x509/a_verify.c

@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 
 #include <stdio.h>
-#include <time.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -72,47 +71,47 @@
 int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, const X509_ALGOR *a,
                      const ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn,
                      EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
-    if (!pkey) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-        return 0;
-    }
+  if (!pkey) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-    size_t sig_len;
-    if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING) {
-        if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_bytes(signature, &sig_len)) {
-            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
-            return 0;
-        }
-    } else {
-        sig_len = (size_t)ASN1_STRING_length(signature);
+  size_t sig_len;
+  if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING) {
+    if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_bytes(signature, &sig_len)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
+      return 0;
     }
+  } else {
+    sig_len = (size_t)ASN1_STRING_length(signature);
+  }
 
-    EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-    uint8_t *buf_in = NULL;
-    int ret = 0, inl = 0;
-    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+  EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+  uint8_t *buf_in = NULL;
+  int ret = 0, inl = 0;
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 
-    if (!x509_digest_verify_init(&ctx, a, pkey)) {
-        goto err;
-    }
+  if (!x509_digest_verify_init(&ctx, a, pkey)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
 
-    inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
+  inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
 
-    if (buf_in == NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-    }
+  if (buf_in == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
 
-    if (!EVP_DigestVerify(&ctx, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(signature), sig_len,
-                          buf_in, inl)) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-        goto err;
-    }
+  if (!EVP_DigestVerify(&ctx, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(signature), sig_len, buf_in,
+                        inl)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
 
-    ret = 1;
+  ret = 1;
 
 err:
-    OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-    return ret;
+  OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+  return ret;
 }

package/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/x509/algorithm.c

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
 
 #include "internal.h"
 
-/* Restrict the digests that are allowed in X509 certificates */
+// Restrict the digests that are allowed in X509 certificates
 static int x509_digest_nid_ok(const int digest_nid) {
   switch (digest_nid) {
     case NID_md4:
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ int x509_digest_sign_algorithm(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, X509_ALGOR *algor) {
     if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(ctx->pctx, &pad_mode)) {
       return 0;
     }
-    /* RSA-PSS has special signature algorithm logic. */
+    // RSA-PSS has special signature algorithm logic.
     if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
       return x509_rsa_ctx_to_pss(ctx, algor);
     }
@@ -96,8 +96,8 @@ int x509_digest_sign_algorithm(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, X509_ALGOR *algor) {
     return X509_ALGOR_set0(algor, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_ED25519), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL);
   }
 
-  /* Default behavior: look up the OID for the algorithm/hash pair and encode
-   * that. */
+  // Default behavior: look up the OID for the algorithm/hash pair and encode
+  // that.
   const EVP_MD *digest = EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx);
   if (digest == NULL) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_CONTEXT_NOT_INITIALISED);
@@ -107,14 +107,13 @@ int x509_digest_sign_algorithm(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, X509_ALGOR *algor) {
   const int digest_nid = EVP_MD_type(digest);
   int sign_nid;
   if (!x509_digest_nid_ok(digest_nid) ||
-      !OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&sign_nid, digest_nid,
-                              EVP_PKEY_id(pkey))) {
+      !OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&sign_nid, digest_nid, EVP_PKEY_id(pkey))) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
     return 0;
   }
 
-  /* RSA signature algorithms include an explicit NULL parameter. Others omit
-   * it. */
+  // RSA signature algorithms include an explicit NULL parameter. Others omit
+  // it.
   int paramtype =
       (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) ? V_ASN1_NULL : V_ASN1_UNDEF;
   X509_ALGOR_set0(algor, OBJ_nid2obj(sign_nid), paramtype, NULL);
@@ -123,7 +122,7 @@ int x509_digest_sign_algorithm(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, X509_ALGOR *algor) {
 
 int x509_digest_verify_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
                             EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
-  /* Convert the signature OID into digest and public key OIDs. */
+  // Convert the signature OID into digest and public key OIDs.
   int sigalg_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm);
   int digest_nid, pkey_nid;
   if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sigalg_nid, &digest_nid, &pkey_nid)) {
@@ -131,19 +130,19 @@ int x509_digest_verify_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  /* Check the public key OID matches the public key type. */
+  // Check the public key OID matches the public key type.
   if (pkey_nid != EVP_PKEY_id(pkey)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
     return 0;
   }
 
-  /* Check for permitted digest algorithms */
+  // Check for permitted digest algorithms
   if (!x509_digest_nid_ok(digest_nid)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
     return 0;
   }
 
-  /* NID_undef signals that there are custom parameters to set. */
+  // NID_undef signals that there are custom parameters to set.
   if (digest_nid == NID_undef) {
     if (sigalg_nid == NID_rsassaPss) {
       return x509_rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, sigalg, pkey);
@@ -159,17 +158,17 @@ int x509_digest_verify_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  /* The parameter should be an explicit NULL for RSA and omitted for ECDSA. For
-   * compatibility, we allow either for both algorithms. See b/167375496.
-   *
-   * TODO(davidben): Chromium's verifier allows both forms for RSA, but enforces
-   * ECDSA more strictly. Align with Chromium and add a flag for b/167375496. */
+  // The parameter should be an explicit NULL for RSA and omitted for ECDSA. For
+  // compatibility, we allow either for both algorithms. See b/167375496.
+  //
+  // TODO(davidben): Chromium's verifier allows both forms for RSA, but enforces
+  // ECDSA more strictly. Align with Chromium and add a flag for b/167375496.
   if (sigalg->parameter != NULL && sigalg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_NULL) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_PARAMETER);
     return 0;
   }
 
-  /* Otherwise, initialize with the digest from the OID. */
+  // Otherwise, initialize with the digest from the OID.
   const EVP_MD *digest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest_nid);
   if (digest == NULL) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);