@fails-components/webtransport 0.0.1-rc.0 → 0.0.1-rc.1

package/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/ctrdrbg.c

@@ -1,202 +1,204 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2017, Google Inc.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
- * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
- * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
- * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
-
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-
-#include <openssl/type_check.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-
-#include "internal.h"
-#include "../cipher/internal.h"
-
-
-// Section references in this file refer to SP 800-90Ar1:
-// http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
-
-// See table 3.
-static const uint64_t kMaxReseedCount = UINT64_C(1) << 48;
-
-int CTR_DRBG_init(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg,
-                  const uint8_t entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
-                  const uint8_t *personalization, size_t personalization_len) {
-  // Section 10.2.1.3.1
-  if (personalization_len > CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  uint8_t seed_material[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(seed_material, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
-
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < personalization_len; i++) {
-    seed_material[i] ^= personalization[i];
-  }
-
-  // Section 10.2.1.2
-
-  // kInitMask is the result of encrypting blocks with big-endian value 1, 2
-  // and 3 with the all-zero AES-256 key.
-  static const uint8_t kInitMask[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN] = {
-      0x53, 0x0f, 0x8a, 0xfb, 0xc7, 0x45, 0x36, 0xb9, 0xa9, 0x63, 0xb4, 0xf1,
-      0xc4, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x8b, 0xce, 0xa7, 0x40, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0x60, 0x6b, 0x6e,
-      0x07, 0x4e, 0xc5, 0xd3, 0xba, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x18, 0x72, 0x60, 0x03, 0xca,
-      0x37, 0xa6, 0x2a, 0x74, 0xd1, 0xa2, 0xf5, 0x8e, 0x75, 0x06, 0x35, 0x8e,
-  };
-
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(kInitMask); i++) {
-    seed_material[i] ^= kInitMask[i];
-  }
-
-  drbg->ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&drbg->ks, NULL, &drbg->block, seed_material, 32);
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(drbg->counter.bytes, seed_material + 32, 16);
-  drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0,
-                      "not a multiple of AES block size");
-
-// ctr_inc adds |n| to the last four bytes of |drbg->counter|, treated as a
-// big-endian number.
-static void ctr32_add(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, uint32_t n) {
-  drbg->counter.words[3] =
-      CRYPTO_bswap4(CRYPTO_bswap4(drbg->counter.words[3]) + n);
-}
-
-static int ctr_drbg_update(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, const uint8_t *data,
-                           size_t data_len) {
-  // Per section 10.2.1.2, |data_len| must be |CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN|. Here, we
-  // allow shorter inputs and right-pad them with zeros. This is equivalent to
-  // the specified algorithm but saves a copy in |CTR_DRBG_generate|.
-  if (data_len > CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  uint8_t temp[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-    ctr32_add(drbg, 1);
-    drbg->block(drbg->counter.bytes, temp + i, &drbg->ks);
-  }
-
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
-    temp[i] ^= data[i];
-  }
-
-  drbg->ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&drbg->ks, NULL, &drbg->block, temp, 32);
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(drbg->counter.bytes, temp + 32, 16);
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-int CTR_DRBG_reseed(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg,
-                    const uint8_t entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
-                    const uint8_t *additional_data,
-                    size_t additional_data_len) {
-  // Section 10.2.1.4
-  uint8_t entropy_copy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
-
-  if (additional_data_len > 0) {
-    if (additional_data_len > CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(entropy_copy, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < additional_data_len; i++) {
-      entropy_copy[i] ^= additional_data[i];
-    }
-
-    entropy = entropy_copy;
-  }
-
-  if (!ctr_drbg_update(drbg, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-int CTR_DRBG_generate(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
-                      const uint8_t *additional_data,
-                      size_t additional_data_len) {
-  // See 9.3.1
-  if (out_len > CTR_DRBG_MAX_GENERATE_LENGTH) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // See 10.2.1.5.1
-  if (drbg->reseed_counter > kMaxReseedCount) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (additional_data_len != 0 &&
-      !ctr_drbg_update(drbg, additional_data, additional_data_len)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // kChunkSize is used to interact better with the cache. Since the AES-CTR
-  // code assumes that it's encrypting rather than just writing keystream, the
-  // buffer has to be zeroed first. Without chunking, large reads would zero
-  // the whole buffer, flushing the L1 cache, and then do another pass (missing
-  // the cache every time) to “encrypt” it. The code can avoid this by
-  // chunking.
-  static const size_t kChunkSize = 8 * 1024;
-
-  while (out_len >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-    size_t todo = kChunkSize;
-    if (todo > out_len) {
-      todo = out_len;
-    }
-
-    todo &= ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE-1);
-    const size_t num_blocks = todo / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-
-    if (drbg->ctr) {
-      OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, todo);
-      ctr32_add(drbg, 1);
-      drbg->ctr(out, out, num_blocks, &drbg->ks, drbg->counter.bytes);
-      ctr32_add(drbg, num_blocks - 1);
-    } else {
-      for (size_t i = 0; i < todo; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-        ctr32_add(drbg, 1);
-        drbg->block(drbg->counter.bytes, out + i, &drbg->ks);
-      }
-    }
-
-    out += todo;
-    out_len -= todo;
-  }
-
-  if (out_len > 0) {
-    uint8_t block[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-    ctr32_add(drbg, 1);
-    drbg->block(drbg->counter.bytes, block, &drbg->ks);
-
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(out, block, out_len);
-  }
-
-  // Right-padding |additional_data| in step 2.2 is handled implicitly by
-  // |ctr_drbg_update|, to save a copy.
-  if (!ctr_drbg_update(drbg, additional_data, additional_data_len)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  drbg->reseed_counter++;
-  return 1;
-}
-
-void CTR_DRBG_clear(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg) {
-  OPENSSL_cleanse(drbg, sizeof(CTR_DRBG_STATE));
-}
+/* Copyright (c) 2017, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include <openssl/type_check.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../cipher/internal.h"
+#include "../service_indicator/internal.h"
+
+
+// Section references in this file refer to SP 800-90Ar1:
+// http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
+
+// See table 3.
+static const uint64_t kMaxReseedCount = UINT64_C(1) << 48;
+
+int CTR_DRBG_init(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg,
+                  const uint8_t entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
+                  const uint8_t *personalization, size_t personalization_len) {
+  // Section 10.2.1.3.1
+  if (personalization_len > CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t seed_material[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(seed_material, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < personalization_len; i++) {
+    seed_material[i] ^= personalization[i];
+  }
+
+  // Section 10.2.1.2
+
+  // kInitMask is the result of encrypting blocks with big-endian value 1, 2
+  // and 3 with the all-zero AES-256 key.
+  static const uint8_t kInitMask[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN] = {
+      0x53, 0x0f, 0x8a, 0xfb, 0xc7, 0x45, 0x36, 0xb9, 0xa9, 0x63, 0xb4, 0xf1,
+      0xc4, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x8b, 0xce, 0xa7, 0x40, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0x60, 0x6b, 0x6e,
+      0x07, 0x4e, 0xc5, 0xd3, 0xba, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x18, 0x72, 0x60, 0x03, 0xca,
+      0x37, 0xa6, 0x2a, 0x74, 0xd1, 0xa2, 0xf5, 0x8e, 0x75, 0x06, 0x35, 0x8e,
+  };
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(kInitMask); i++) {
+    seed_material[i] ^= kInitMask[i];
+  }
+
+  drbg->ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&drbg->ks, NULL, &drbg->block, seed_material, 32);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(drbg->counter.bytes, seed_material + 32, 16);
+  drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0,
+                      "not a multiple of AES block size");
+
+// ctr_inc adds |n| to the last four bytes of |drbg->counter|, treated as a
+// big-endian number.
+static void ctr32_add(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, uint32_t n) {
+  drbg->counter.words[3] =
+      CRYPTO_bswap4(CRYPTO_bswap4(drbg->counter.words[3]) + n);
+}
+
+static int ctr_drbg_update(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, const uint8_t *data,
+                           size_t data_len) {
+  // Per section 10.2.1.2, |data_len| must be |CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN|. Here, we
+  // allow shorter inputs and right-pad them with zeros. This is equivalent to
+  // the specified algorithm but saves a copy in |CTR_DRBG_generate|.
+  if (data_len > CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t temp[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+    ctr32_add(drbg, 1);
+    drbg->block(drbg->counter.bytes, temp + i, &drbg->ks);
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
+    temp[i] ^= data[i];
+  }
+
+  drbg->ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&drbg->ks, NULL, &drbg->block, temp, 32);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(drbg->counter.bytes, temp + 32, 16);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int CTR_DRBG_reseed(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg,
+                    const uint8_t entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
+                    const uint8_t *additional_data,
+                    size_t additional_data_len) {
+  // Section 10.2.1.4
+  uint8_t entropy_copy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
+
+  if (additional_data_len > 0) {
+    if (additional_data_len > CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(entropy_copy, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < additional_data_len; i++) {
+      entropy_copy[i] ^= additional_data[i];
+    }
+
+    entropy = entropy_copy;
+  }
+
+  if (!ctr_drbg_update(drbg, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int CTR_DRBG_generate(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
+                      const uint8_t *additional_data,
+                      size_t additional_data_len) {
+  // See 9.3.1
+  if (out_len > CTR_DRBG_MAX_GENERATE_LENGTH) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // See 10.2.1.5.1
+  if (drbg->reseed_counter > kMaxReseedCount) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (additional_data_len != 0 &&
+      !ctr_drbg_update(drbg, additional_data, additional_data_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // kChunkSize is used to interact better with the cache. Since the AES-CTR
+  // code assumes that it's encrypting rather than just writing keystream, the
+  // buffer has to be zeroed first. Without chunking, large reads would zero
+  // the whole buffer, flushing the L1 cache, and then do another pass (missing
+  // the cache every time) to “encrypt” it. The code can avoid this by
+  // chunking.
+  static const size_t kChunkSize = 8 * 1024;
+
+  while (out_len >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+    size_t todo = kChunkSize;
+    if (todo > out_len) {
+      todo = out_len;
+    }
+
+    todo &= ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE-1);
+    const size_t num_blocks = todo / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+    if (drbg->ctr) {
+      OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, todo);
+      ctr32_add(drbg, 1);
+      drbg->ctr(out, out, num_blocks, &drbg->ks, drbg->counter.bytes);
+      ctr32_add(drbg, num_blocks - 1);
+    } else {
+      for (size_t i = 0; i < todo; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+        ctr32_add(drbg, 1);
+        drbg->block(drbg->counter.bytes, out + i, &drbg->ks);
+      }
+    }
+
+    out += todo;
+    out_len -= todo;
+  }
+
+  if (out_len > 0) {
+    uint8_t block[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    ctr32_add(drbg, 1);
+    drbg->block(drbg->counter.bytes, block, &drbg->ks);
+
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(out, block, out_len);
+  }
+
+  // Right-padding |additional_data| in step 2.2 is handled implicitly by
+  // |ctr_drbg_update|, to save a copy.
+  if (!ctr_drbg_update(drbg, additional_data, additional_data_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  drbg->reseed_counter++;
+  FIPS_service_indicator_update_state();
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void CTR_DRBG_clear(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg) {
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(drbg, sizeof(CTR_DRBG_STATE));
+}