@fails-components/webtransport 0.0.1-rc.0 → 0.0.1-rc.1

package/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/{cipher_extra → fipsmodule/cipher}/e_aesccm.c

@@ -1,446 +1,435 @@
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2008 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ==================================================================== */
-
-#include <openssl/aead.h>
-
-#include <assert.h>
-
-#include <openssl/cipher.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-
-#include "../fipsmodule/cipher/internal.h"
-
-
-struct ccm128_context {
-  block128_f block;
-  ctr128_f ctr;
-  unsigned M, L;
-};
-
-struct ccm128_state {
-  union {
-    uint64_t u[2];
-    uint8_t c[16];
-  } nonce, cmac;
-};
-
-static int CRYPTO_ccm128_init(struct ccm128_context *ctx, const AES_KEY *key,
-                              block128_f block, ctr128_f ctr, unsigned M,
-                              unsigned L) {
-  if (M < 4 || M > 16 || (M & 1) != 0 || L < 2 || L > 8) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  ctx->block = block;
-  ctx->ctr = ctr;
-  ctx->M = M;
-  ctx->L = L;
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static size_t CRYPTO_ccm128_max_input(const struct ccm128_context *ctx) {
-  return ctx->L >= sizeof(size_t) ? (size_t)-1
-                                  : (((size_t)1) << (ctx->L * 8)) - 1;
-}
-
-static int ccm128_init_state(const struct ccm128_context *ctx,
-                             struct ccm128_state *state, const AES_KEY *key,
-                             const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
-                             const uint8_t *aad, size_t aad_len,
-                             size_t plaintext_len) {
-  const block128_f block = ctx->block;
-  const unsigned M = ctx->M;
-  const unsigned L = ctx->L;
-
-  // |L| determines the expected |nonce_len| and the limit for |plaintext_len|.
-  if (plaintext_len > CRYPTO_ccm128_max_input(ctx) ||
-      nonce_len != 15 - L) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // Assemble the first block for computing the MAC.
-  OPENSSL_memset(state, 0, sizeof(*state));
-  state->nonce.c[0] = (uint8_t)((L - 1) | ((M - 2) / 2) << 3);
-  if (aad_len != 0) {
-    state->nonce.c[0] |= 0x40;  // Set AAD Flag
-  }
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(&state->nonce.c[1], nonce, nonce_len);
-  for (unsigned i = 0; i < L; i++) {
-    state->nonce.c[15 - i] = (uint8_t)(plaintext_len >> (8 * i));
-  }
-
-  (*block)(state->nonce.c, state->cmac.c, key);
-  size_t blocks = 1;
-
-  if (aad_len != 0) {
-    unsigned i;
-    // Cast to u64 to avoid the compiler complaining about invalid shifts.
-    uint64_t aad_len_u64 = aad_len;
-    if (aad_len_u64 < 0x10000 - 0x100) {
-      state->cmac.c[0] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 8);
-      state->cmac.c[1] ^= (uint8_t)aad_len_u64;
-      i = 2;
-    } else if (aad_len_u64 <= 0xffffffff) {
-      state->cmac.c[0] ^= 0xff;
-      state->cmac.c[1] ^= 0xfe;
-      state->cmac.c[2] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 24);
-      state->cmac.c[3] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 16);
-      state->cmac.c[4] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 8);
-      state->cmac.c[5] ^= (uint8_t)aad_len_u64;
-      i = 6;
-    } else {
-      state->cmac.c[0] ^= 0xff;
-      state->cmac.c[1] ^= 0xff;
-      state->cmac.c[2] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 56);
-      state->cmac.c[3] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 48);
-      state->cmac.c[4] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 40);
-      state->cmac.c[5] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 32);
-      state->cmac.c[6] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 24);
-      state->cmac.c[7] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 16);
-      state->cmac.c[8] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 8);
-      state->cmac.c[9] ^= (uint8_t)aad_len_u64;
-      i = 10;
-    }
-
-    do {
-      for (; i < 16 && aad_len != 0; i++) {
-        state->cmac.c[i] ^= *aad;
-        aad++;
-        aad_len--;
-      }
-      (*block)(state->cmac.c, state->cmac.c, key);
-      blocks++;
-      i = 0;
-    } while (aad_len != 0);
-  }
-
-  // Per RFC 3610, section 2.6, the total number of block cipher operations done
-  // must not exceed 2^61. There are two block cipher operations remaining per
-  // message block, plus one block at the end to encrypt the MAC.
-  size_t remaining_blocks = 2 * ((plaintext_len + 15) / 16) + 1;
-  if (plaintext_len + 15 < plaintext_len ||
-      remaining_blocks + blocks < blocks ||
-      (uint64_t) remaining_blocks + blocks > UINT64_C(1) << 61) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // Assemble the first block for encrypting and decrypting. The bottom |L|
-  // bytes are replaced with a counter and all bit the encoding of |L| is
-  // cleared in the first byte.
-  state->nonce.c[0] &= 7;
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int ccm128_encrypt(const struct ccm128_context *ctx,
-                          struct ccm128_state *state, const AES_KEY *key,
-                          uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
-  // The counter for encryption begins at one.
-  for (unsigned i = 0; i < ctx->L; i++) {
-    state->nonce.c[15 - i] = 0;
-  }
-  state->nonce.c[15] = 1;
-
-  uint8_t partial_buf[16];
-  unsigned num = 0;
-  if (ctx->ctr != NULL) {
-    CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len, key, state->nonce.c, partial_buf,
-                                &num, ctx->ctr);
-  } else {
-    CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, key, state->nonce.c, partial_buf, &num,
-                          ctx->block);
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int ccm128_compute_mac(const struct ccm128_context *ctx,
-                              struct ccm128_state *state, const AES_KEY *key,
-                              uint8_t *out_tag, size_t tag_len,
-                              const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
-  block128_f block = ctx->block;
-  if (tag_len != ctx->M) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // Incorporate |in| into the MAC.
-  union {
-    uint64_t u[2];
-    uint8_t c[16];
-  } tmp;
-  while (len >= 16) {
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(tmp.c, in, 16);
-    state->cmac.u[0] ^= tmp.u[0];
-    state->cmac.u[1] ^= tmp.u[1];
-    (*block)(state->cmac.c, state->cmac.c, key);
-    in += 16;
-    len -= 16;
-  }
-  if (len > 0) {
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
-      state->cmac.c[i] ^= in[i];
-    }
-    (*block)(state->cmac.c, state->cmac.c, key);
-  }
-
-  // Encrypt the MAC with counter zero.
-  for (unsigned i = 0; i < ctx->L; i++) {
-    state->nonce.c[15 - i] = 0;
-  }
-  (*block)(state->nonce.c, tmp.c, key);
-  state->cmac.u[0] ^= tmp.u[0];
-  state->cmac.u[1] ^= tmp.u[1];
-
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_tag, state->cmac.c, tag_len);
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(const struct ccm128_context *ctx,
-                                 const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t *out,
-                                 uint8_t *out_tag, size_t tag_len,
-                                 const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
-                                 const uint8_t *in, size_t len,
-                                 const uint8_t *aad, size_t aad_len) {
-  struct ccm128_state state;
-  return ccm128_init_state(ctx, &state, key, nonce, nonce_len, aad, aad_len,
-                           len) &&
-         ccm128_compute_mac(ctx, &state, key, out_tag, tag_len, in, len) &&
-         ccm128_encrypt(ctx, &state, key, out, in, len);
-}
-
-static int CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(const struct ccm128_context *ctx,
-                                 const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t *out,
-                                 uint8_t *out_tag, size_t tag_len,
-                                 const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
-                                 const uint8_t *in, size_t len,
-                                 const uint8_t *aad, size_t aad_len) {
-  struct ccm128_state state;
-  return ccm128_init_state(ctx, &state, key, nonce, nonce_len, aad, aad_len,
-                           len) &&
-         ccm128_encrypt(ctx, &state, key, out, in, len) &&
-         ccm128_compute_mac(ctx, &state, key, out_tag, tag_len, out, len);
-}
-
-#define EVP_AEAD_AES_CCM_MAX_TAG_LEN 16
-
-struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx {
-  union {
-    double align;
-    AES_KEY ks;
-  } ks;
-  struct ccm128_context ccm;
-};
-
-OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
-                          sizeof(struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx),
-                      "AEAD state is too small");
-#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
-OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
-                          alignof(struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx),
-                      "AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
-#endif
-
-static int aead_aes_ccm_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
-                             size_t key_len, size_t tag_len, unsigned M,
-                             unsigned L) {
-  assert(M == EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(ctx->aead));
-  assert(M == EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len(ctx->aead));
-  assert(15 - L == EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead));
-
-  if (key_len != EVP_AEAD_key_length(ctx->aead)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH);
-    return 0;  // EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this.
-  }
-
-  if (tag_len == EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) {
-    tag_len = M;
-  }
-
-  if (tag_len != M) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TAG_TOO_LARGE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx *ccm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
-
-  block128_f block;
-  ctr128_f ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&ccm_ctx->ks.ks, NULL, &block, key, key_len);
-  ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
-  if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&ccm_ctx->ccm, &ccm_ctx->ks.ks, block, ctr, M, L)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static void aead_aes_ccm_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {}
-
-static int aead_aes_ccm_seal_scatter(
-    const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag,
-    size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce,
-    size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in,
-    size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
-  const struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx *ccm_ctx =
-      (struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
-
-  if (in_len > CRYPTO_ccm128_max_input(&ccm_ctx->ccm)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (max_out_tag_len < ctx->tag_len) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(&ccm_ctx->ccm, &ccm_ctx->ks.ks, out, out_tag,
-                             ctx->tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len, ad,
-                             ad_len)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  *out_tag_len = ctx->tag_len;
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int aead_aes_ccm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
-                                    const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
-                                    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
-                                    const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
-                                    const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
-  const struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx *ccm_ctx =
-      (struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
-
-  if (in_len > CRYPTO_ccm128_max_input(&ccm_ctx->ccm)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (in_tag_len != ctx->tag_len) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  uint8_t tag[EVP_AEAD_AES_CCM_MAX_TAG_LEN];
-  assert(ctx->tag_len <= EVP_AEAD_AES_CCM_MAX_TAG_LEN);
-  if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(&ccm_ctx->ccm, &ccm_ctx->ks.ks, out, tag,
-                             ctx->tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len, ad,
-                             ad_len)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in_tag, ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int aead_aes_ccm_bluetooth_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
-                                       size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) {
-  return aead_aes_ccm_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, 4, 2);
-}
-
-static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth = {
-    16,  // key length (AES-128)
-    13,  // nonce length
-    4,   // overhead
-    4,   // max tag length
-    0,   // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
-
-    aead_aes_ccm_bluetooth_init,
-    NULL /* init_with_direction */,
-    aead_aes_ccm_cleanup,
-    NULL /* open */,
-    aead_aes_ccm_seal_scatter,
-    aead_aes_ccm_open_gather,
-    NULL /* get_iv */,
-    NULL /* tag_len */,
-};
-
-const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth(void) {
-  return &aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth;
-}
-
-static int aead_aes_ccm_bluetooth_8_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
-                                         size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) {
-  return aead_aes_ccm_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, 8, 2);
-}
-
-static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_8 = {
-    16,  // key length (AES-128)
-    13,  // nonce length
-    8,   // overhead
-    8,   // max tag length
-    0,   // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
-
-    aead_aes_ccm_bluetooth_8_init,
-    NULL /* init_with_direction */,
-    aead_aes_ccm_cleanup,
-    NULL /* open */,
-    aead_aes_ccm_seal_scatter,
-    aead_aes_ccm_open_gather,
-    NULL /* get_iv */,
-    NULL /* tag_len */,
-};
-
-const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_8(void) {
-  return &aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_8;
-}
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ==================================================================== */
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <openssl/cipher.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../service_indicator/internal.h"
+
+
+struct ccm128_context {
+  block128_f block;
+  ctr128_f ctr;
+  unsigned M, L;
+};
+
+struct ccm128_state {
+  union {
+    uint64_t u[2];
+    uint8_t c[16];
+  } nonce, cmac;
+};
+
+static int CRYPTO_ccm128_init(struct ccm128_context *ctx, const AES_KEY *key,
+                              block128_f block, ctr128_f ctr, unsigned M,
+                              unsigned L) {
+  if (M < 4 || M > 16 || (M & 1) != 0 || L < 2 || L > 8) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ctx->block = block;
+  ctx->ctr = ctr;
+  ctx->M = M;
+  ctx->L = L;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static size_t CRYPTO_ccm128_max_input(const struct ccm128_context *ctx) {
+  return ctx->L >= sizeof(size_t) ? (size_t)-1
+                                  : (((size_t)1) << (ctx->L * 8)) - 1;
+}
+
+static int ccm128_init_state(const struct ccm128_context *ctx,
+                             struct ccm128_state *state, const AES_KEY *key,
+                             const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+                             const uint8_t *aad, size_t aad_len,
+                             size_t plaintext_len) {
+  const block128_f block = ctx->block;
+  const unsigned M = ctx->M;
+  const unsigned L = ctx->L;
+
+  // |L| determines the expected |nonce_len| and the limit for |plaintext_len|.
+  if (plaintext_len > CRYPTO_ccm128_max_input(ctx) ||
+      nonce_len != 15 - L) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Assemble the first block for computing the MAC.
+  OPENSSL_memset(state, 0, sizeof(*state));
+  state->nonce.c[0] = (uint8_t)((L - 1) | ((M - 2) / 2) << 3);
+  if (aad_len != 0) {
+    state->nonce.c[0] |= 0x40;  // Set AAD Flag
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(&state->nonce.c[1], nonce, nonce_len);
+  for (unsigned i = 0; i < L; i++) {
+    state->nonce.c[15 - i] = (uint8_t)(plaintext_len >> (8 * i));
+  }
+
+  (*block)(state->nonce.c, state->cmac.c, key);
+  size_t blocks = 1;
+
+  if (aad_len != 0) {
+    unsigned i;
+    // Cast to u64 to avoid the compiler complaining about invalid shifts.
+    uint64_t aad_len_u64 = aad_len;
+    if (aad_len_u64 < 0x10000 - 0x100) {
+      state->cmac.c[0] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 8);
+      state->cmac.c[1] ^= (uint8_t)aad_len_u64;
+      i = 2;
+    } else if (aad_len_u64 <= 0xffffffff) {
+      state->cmac.c[0] ^= 0xff;
+      state->cmac.c[1] ^= 0xfe;
+      state->cmac.c[2] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 24);
+      state->cmac.c[3] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 16);
+      state->cmac.c[4] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 8);
+      state->cmac.c[5] ^= (uint8_t)aad_len_u64;
+      i = 6;
+    } else {
+      state->cmac.c[0] ^= 0xff;
+      state->cmac.c[1] ^= 0xff;
+      state->cmac.c[2] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 56);
+      state->cmac.c[3] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 48);
+      state->cmac.c[4] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 40);
+      state->cmac.c[5] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 32);
+      state->cmac.c[6] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 24);
+      state->cmac.c[7] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 16);
+      state->cmac.c[8] ^= (uint8_t)(aad_len_u64 >> 8);
+      state->cmac.c[9] ^= (uint8_t)aad_len_u64;
+      i = 10;
+    }
+
+    do {
+      for (; i < 16 && aad_len != 0; i++) {
+        state->cmac.c[i] ^= *aad;
+        aad++;
+        aad_len--;
+      }
+      (*block)(state->cmac.c, state->cmac.c, key);
+      blocks++;
+      i = 0;
+    } while (aad_len != 0);
+  }
+
+  // Per RFC 3610, section 2.6, the total number of block cipher operations done
+  // must not exceed 2^61. There are two block cipher operations remaining per
+  // message block, plus one block at the end to encrypt the MAC.
+  size_t remaining_blocks = 2 * ((plaintext_len + 15) / 16) + 1;
+  if (plaintext_len + 15 < plaintext_len ||
+      remaining_blocks + blocks < blocks ||
+      (uint64_t) remaining_blocks + blocks > UINT64_C(1) << 61) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Assemble the first block for encrypting and decrypting. The bottom |L|
+  // bytes are replaced with a counter and all bit the encoding of |L| is
+  // cleared in the first byte.
+  state->nonce.c[0] &= 7;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ccm128_encrypt(const struct ccm128_context *ctx,
+                          struct ccm128_state *state, const AES_KEY *key,
+                          uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
+  // The counter for encryption begins at one.
+  for (unsigned i = 0; i < ctx->L; i++) {
+    state->nonce.c[15 - i] = 0;
+  }
+  state->nonce.c[15] = 1;
+
+  uint8_t partial_buf[16];
+  unsigned num = 0;
+  if (ctx->ctr != NULL) {
+    CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len, key, state->nonce.c, partial_buf,
+                                &num, ctx->ctr);
+  } else {
+    CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, key, state->nonce.c, partial_buf, &num,
+                          ctx->block);
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ccm128_compute_mac(const struct ccm128_context *ctx,
+                              struct ccm128_state *state, const AES_KEY *key,
+                              uint8_t *out_tag, size_t tag_len,
+                              const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
+  block128_f block = ctx->block;
+  if (tag_len != ctx->M) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Incorporate |in| into the MAC.
+  union {
+    uint64_t u[2];
+    uint8_t c[16];
+  } tmp;
+  while (len >= 16) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(tmp.c, in, 16);
+    state->cmac.u[0] ^= tmp.u[0];
+    state->cmac.u[1] ^= tmp.u[1];
+    (*block)(state->cmac.c, state->cmac.c, key);
+    in += 16;
+    len -= 16;
+  }
+  if (len > 0) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+      state->cmac.c[i] ^= in[i];
+    }
+    (*block)(state->cmac.c, state->cmac.c, key);
+  }
+
+  // Encrypt the MAC with counter zero.
+  for (unsigned i = 0; i < ctx->L; i++) {
+    state->nonce.c[15 - i] = 0;
+  }
+  (*block)(state->nonce.c, tmp.c, key);
+  state->cmac.u[0] ^= tmp.u[0];
+  state->cmac.u[1] ^= tmp.u[1];
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_tag, state->cmac.c, tag_len);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(const struct ccm128_context *ctx,
+                                 const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t *out,
+                                 uint8_t *out_tag, size_t tag_len,
+                                 const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+                                 const uint8_t *in, size_t len,
+                                 const uint8_t *aad, size_t aad_len) {
+  struct ccm128_state state;
+  return ccm128_init_state(ctx, &state, key, nonce, nonce_len, aad, aad_len,
+                           len) &&
+         ccm128_compute_mac(ctx, &state, key, out_tag, tag_len, in, len) &&
+         ccm128_encrypt(ctx, &state, key, out, in, len);
+}
+
+static int CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(const struct ccm128_context *ctx,
+                                 const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t *out,
+                                 uint8_t *out_tag, size_t tag_len,
+                                 const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+                                 const uint8_t *in, size_t len,
+                                 const uint8_t *aad, size_t aad_len) {
+  struct ccm128_state state;
+  return ccm128_init_state(ctx, &state, key, nonce, nonce_len, aad, aad_len,
+                           len) &&
+         ccm128_encrypt(ctx, &state, key, out, in, len) &&
+         ccm128_compute_mac(ctx, &state, key, out_tag, tag_len, out, len);
+}
+
+#define EVP_AEAD_AES_CCM_MAX_TAG_LEN 16
+
+struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx {
+  union {
+    double align;
+    AES_KEY ks;
+  } ks;
+  struct ccm128_context ccm;
+};
+
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
+                          sizeof(struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state is too small");
+#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
+                          alignof(struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
+#endif
+
+static int aead_aes_ccm_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+                             size_t key_len, size_t tag_len, unsigned M,
+                             unsigned L) {
+  assert(M == EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(ctx->aead));
+  assert(M == EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len(ctx->aead));
+  assert(15 - L == EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead));
+
+  if (key_len != EVP_AEAD_key_length(ctx->aead)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH);
+    return 0;  // EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this.
+  }
+
+  if (tag_len == EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) {
+    tag_len = M;
+  }
+
+  if (tag_len != M) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TAG_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx *ccm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+
+  block128_f block;
+  ctr128_f ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&ccm_ctx->ks.ks, NULL, &block, key, key_len);
+  ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
+  if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&ccm_ctx->ccm, &ccm_ctx->ks.ks, block, ctr, M, L)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static void aead_aes_ccm_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {}
+
+static int aead_aes_ccm_seal_scatter(
+    const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag,
+    size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce,
+    size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in,
+    size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  const struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx *ccm_ctx =
+      (struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+
+  if (in_len > CRYPTO_ccm128_max_input(&ccm_ctx->ccm)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (max_out_tag_len < ctx->tag_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(&ccm_ctx->ccm, &ccm_ctx->ks.ks, out, out_tag,
+                             ctx->tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len, ad,
+                             ad_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  *out_tag_len = ctx->tag_len;
+  AEAD_CCM_verify_service_indicator(ctx);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_ccm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+                                    const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+                                    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                                    const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
+                                    const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  const struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx *ccm_ctx =
+      (struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+
+  if (in_len > CRYPTO_ccm128_max_input(&ccm_ctx->ccm)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in_tag_len != ctx->tag_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t tag[EVP_AEAD_AES_CCM_MAX_TAG_LEN];
+  assert(ctx->tag_len <= EVP_AEAD_AES_CCM_MAX_TAG_LEN);
+  if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(&ccm_ctx->ccm, &ccm_ctx->ks.ks, out, tag,
+                             ctx->tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len, ad,
+                             ad_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in_tag, ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  AEAD_CCM_verify_service_indicator(ctx);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_ccm_bluetooth_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+                                       size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) {
+  return aead_aes_ccm_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, 4, 2);
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
+
+  out->key_len = 16;
+  out->nonce_len = 13;
+  out->overhead = 4;
+  out->max_tag_len = 4;
+
+  out->init = aead_aes_ccm_bluetooth_init;
+  out->cleanup = aead_aes_ccm_cleanup;
+  out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_ccm_seal_scatter;
+  out->open_gather = aead_aes_ccm_open_gather;
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_ccm_bluetooth_8_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+                                         size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) {
+  return aead_aes_ccm_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, 8, 2);
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_8) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
+
+  out->key_len = 16;
+  out->nonce_len = 13;
+  out->overhead = 8;
+  out->max_tag_len = 8;
+
+  out->init = aead_aes_ccm_bluetooth_8_init;
+  out->cleanup = aead_aes_ccm_cleanup;
+  out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_ccm_seal_scatter;
+  out->open_gather = aead_aes_ccm_open_gather;
+}