@event4u/agent-config 9.8.0 → 9.10.0

package/docs/decisions/ADR-066-skill-body-prerendering.md

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
----
-adr: 066
-status: accepted
-date: 2026-06-08
-decision: skill-body-prerendering
-supersedes: —
-superseded_by: —
-phase: employee-product Phase 8 (road-to-employee-product-and-external-proof)
-type: structural
----
-
-# ADR-066 — Skill-body pre-rendering for host hand-off (v0)
-
-## Status
-
-**Accepted** · 2026-06-08. Design converged via AI-council (claude-sonnet-4-5 +
-gpt-4o, design mode, 2026-06-08). Resolves the skill-body pre-rendering ADR-065
-(and ADR-024) deferred.
-
-## Context
-
-A role prompt carries one `skill_hint` (e.g. `doc-coauthoring`). Hosts without
-skill resolution — Codex / Gemini (Tier-1, no skill surface per ADR-024) and
-every Tier-3 host — cannot follow that reference, so the workspace must
-**pre-render the skill body** into the hand-off prompt. Skills live at
-`<skills-root>/<id>/SKILL.md` (YAML frontmatter + body); roots are
-`.agent-src.uncondensed/skills/` then `dist/agent-src/skills/` (only the latter
-exists in a consumer checkout). `skill_hint` is **package-controlled** (it comes
-from a shipped role prompt, not user input).
-
-## Decision
-
-### K1 — include the body **+ a one-line header** (option c)
-
-`workspace_skills.resolve_section(skill_hint)` returns a
-`## Skill context: <name>` section: the skill `name`, its one-line
-`description` (both from frontmatter), then the procedure **body** (frontmatter
-stripped). Body-only loses the skill's identity; the whole SKILL.md leaks
-metadata noise into the host prompt.
-
-### K2 — a dedicated resolver module
-
-`workspace_skills.py` owns skill → prompt-section rendering; the inbox store
-imports it and appends the section when `--skill-hint` is passed. The skill
-domain owns its own rendering syntax. *(Debt: the section markup lives in the
-skill module rather than a pure-data resolver + caller-side formatter. Accepted
-for v0; revisit if a second consumer needs a different format.)*
-
-### K3 — trust + bounds
-
-`skill_hint` is package-controlled but hardened anyway: charset-validate
-`^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$` (rejects path traversal), resolve **strictly under** a
-skills root (a `relative_to` guard backs the charset check), and the
-**existence-under-root** check is the de-facto allowlist (only real skill dirs
-resolve). A missing / invalid / unreadable skill **degrades to a one-line inline
-note** ("skill `<id>` not found — proceed without it"), never a crash. The body
-is **size-capped** at 64 KB (≫ the 912-line max). **No transitive resolution** —
-a skill body is included verbatim, it never pulls other skills → no cycles.
-*(Debt: a generated skill-id manifest allowlist is deferred to v1; the
-existence check covers v0.)*
-
-### K4 — scope
-
-v0 wires pre-rendering into the **Tier-3 inbox hand-off only** (the surface
-shipped in ADR-065): `workspace_inbox.py write --skill-hint <id>` +
-`POST /api/v1/workspace/inbox {skill_hint}`. Codex/Gemini Tier-1 pre-rendering
-rides the host-agent launch loop, which is unbuilt → out of scope. Ships dark
-behind the existing `AGENT_CONFIG_TIER3_INBOX` flag (no new flag).
-
-## Consequences
-
-- A Tier-3 hand-off now carries the skill context inline; a host with no skill
-  resolution can act on it.
-- Plaintext (the inbox is plaintext per ADR-065); no cryptography dependency.
-- Deferred to v1 (recorded debt): manifest-based skill-id allowlist, a
-  `--dry-run` resolve mode, and success / kill-switch metrics
-  (e.g. missing-skill rate). The feature ships dark, so these are not v0
-  blockers.
-
-## Alternatives
-
-- **Body-only / whole-SKILL.md** (K1 a/b) — rejected: identity loss vs metadata
-  noise.
-- **Resolver returns pure data, Node formats** (K2) — cleaner layering, deferred
-  as over-scoped for a single v0 consumer.
-- **Manifest allowlist in v0** (K3) — deferred; existence-under-root suffices
-  for package-controlled ids.
-
-## References
-
-- ADR-065 — Tier-3 inbox (the hand-off surface this renders into).
-- ADR-024 — notes Codex/Gemini lack skill resolution.
-- `src/cli/python/workspace_skills.py`, `workspace_inbox.py`, `src/server/routes/workspace.ts`.

package/docs/decisions/ADR-067-glama-registry-listing.md

@@ -1,259 +0,0 @@
----
-adr: 067
-status: proposed
-date: 2026-06-08
-decision: glama-registry-listing
-supersedes: —
-superseded_by: —
-phase: road-to-glama-registry-listing (Phases 1–3)
-type: lightweight
----
-
-# ADR-067 — Glama MCP registry listing
-
-## Status
-
-**Proposed** · 2026-06-08. Implements
-[`road-to-glama-registry-listing.md`](../../agents/roadmaps/archive/road-to-glama-registry-listing.md).
-Council convergence: claude-sonnet-4-5 + gpt-4o, design mode, 2 rounds +
-peer-review, 2026-06-08 — one of four candidate Glama moves survives the
-"no-bullshit" bar (registry listing only; Gateway, Inspector in CI, and Worker
-listing all dropped with reasons in the roadmap).
-
-## Context
-
-[Glama](https://glama.ai) indexes ~32k open-source MCP servers, provides a free
-registry listing, and surfaces them in tool-level search across Claude Code,
-Cursor, VS Code, and similar clients. The `agent-config` local stdio MCP server
-(`scripts/mcp_server/`, Python, `mcp_scope: full`) is not currently listed
-anywhere outside the package README. The listing is a one-way-door free
-experiment: costs nothing, creates no technical lock-in, and the only ongoing
-maintenance surface is a removable README badge.
-
-The listing targets **agent developers and contributors**, not end-users
-configuring pre-built agents. The stdio server requires a local checkout; there
-is no turnkey `npx`/`pip` install path (that is a separate roadmap:
-`road-to-mcp-stdio-end-user-packaging.md`, held at `status: draft` until a real
-demand signal fires). Listing the server for end-users without packaging would
-create friction and false support expectations — the audience scope below must be
-reflected verbatim in the Glama listing description.
-
-The experimental Cloudflare Worker (`internal/workers/mcp/`, `mcp_scope: lite`,
-not README-linked) is **never listed** here or anywhere else until it exits
-`experimental`. Listing it would create an incoherent support promise.
-
-## Decision
-
-List the local stdio MCP server in the Glama registry. Developer-first scope.
-This ADR documents the exact submission content, discovery channels, kill-switch
-criteria, and review trigger so the whole process is reproducible and auditable
-without re-litigating the council decision.
-
----
-
-## Submission — exact steps (manual, one-time)
-
-1. Open: <https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/new> (or the "Add server" button on
-   <https://glama.ai/mcp/servers>).
-2. **Repository URL:** `https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config`
-3. Paste the **listing description** from `## Listing description` below.
-4. **Tags / categories:** `governance`, `agent-tools`, `rules`, `skills`,
-   `prompts`, `resources`, `claude-code`, `cursor`, `windsurf`
-5. Submit.
-6. Record the resulting listing URL in this ADR (`## Listing URL` section below)
-   and add the README badge per `## README badge` below.
-
----
-
-## Listing description
-
-> **agent-config — MCP governance server for AI coding agents**
->
-> Exposes the package's read-only governance surface (skills, commands, rules,
-> guidelines) as MCP `prompts` and `resources`. Intended for **agent developers
-> and contributors** who want to load the governance content into Claude Code,
-> Cursor, Zed, or Continue without manual copy-paste.
->
-> **Not a turnkey package** — requires a local checkout (`git clone` +
-> `task mcp:setup`). End-user turnkey packaging is a separate, future roadmap.
->
-> **What it serves:** `prompts/list` + `prompts/get` (every skill, command, rule,
-> guideline as a named prompt) and `resources/list` + `resources/read` (same
-> content as addressable resources). Read-only; never executes code, never writes
-> files, never spawns shells.
->
-> **Quick start (developers):**
-> ```bash
-> git clone https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config
-> cd agent-config
-> task mcp:setup   # creates .venv-mcp/, installs MCP SDK
-> task mcp:run     # starts the server on stdio
-> ```
->
-> Source: `src/scripts/mcp_server/` · Contract:
-> `docs/contracts/mcp-phase-1-scope.md` · Experimental hosted Worker (separate,
-> opt-in): `docs/setup/mcp-cloud-setup.md`
-
----
-
-## Listing URL
-
-Live — Glama **auto-indexed** the GitHub repo (no manual form submission was
-needed):
-
-```
-https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/event4u-app/agent-config
-```
-
-Listing state as of 2026-06-08: License **MIT (permissive)**, Quality **not
-tested**, Maintenance **C-grade**, and a **"This server cannot be installed"**
-notice. The "cannot be installed" flag is expected and consistent with the
-developer-first scope — the stdio server is not a turnkey `npx`/`pip` package;
-it requires a local checkout + `task mcp:setup`. Resolving that flag is the job
-of the follow-up roadmap (`road-to-mcp-stdio-end-user-packaging.md`), not this
-one.
-
----
-
-## README badge
-
-Glama does **not** expose an embeddable badge snippet for this listing, so a
-plain link is used instead of a badge image (avoids a broken-image surface). One
-discreet line was added to `README.md` in the MCP section (after the Worker
-"Scope — Lite, not Full" note):
-
-```markdown
-> The built-in **local stdio** server is listed for discovery in the
-> [Glama MCP Registry](https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/event4u-app/agent-config)
-> (agent developers / contributors; requires a local checkout, not a turnkey
-> install — see [ADR-067](docs/decisions/ADR-067-glama-registry-listing.md)).
-```
-
-This link is the **sole reputational signal** from the listing and is removable
-in a single commit. Removing it is the Phase-3 kill-switch for spam-farm
-scenarios; see `## Kill-switches` below.
-
----
-
-## Discovery channels (cross-listing)
-
-The listing must not depend on Glama alone (network-effect lock-in risk per
-council). Two channels are active as of 2026-06-08:
-
-| Channel | State | How |
-|---|---|---|
-| Glama MCP Registry | **pending** (manual form) | This ADR |
-| GitHub topics | **active** | `model-context-protocol` added via `gh api` (see below) |
-| Awesome MCP list (`punkpeye/awesome-mcp-servers`) | **optional next step** | Open a PR; content below |
-
-### GitHub topics (done)
-
-`model-context-protocol` added to `event4u-app/agent-config` topics, alongside
-the existing `mcp` topic. Both surface the repo in
-`github.com/topics/model-context-protocol` and `github.com/topics/mcp` searches.
-
-Command run:
-```bash
-gh api -X PUT /repos/event4u-app/agent-config/topics \
-  --field 'names[]=claude-code' \
-  --field 'names[]=ai-agent' \
-  --field 'names[]=mcp' \
-  --field 'names[]=model-context-protocol' \
-  --field 'names[]=mcp-server' \
-  --field 'names[]=agent-governance' \
-  --field 'names[]=ai-video' \
-  --field 'names[]=cursor' \
-  --field 'names[]=llm' \
-  --field 'names[]=prompt-engineering' \
-  --field 'names[]=skills' \
-  --field 'names[]=windsurf'
-```
-
-### Awesome MCP list (optional future step)
-
-If Glama alone proves insufficient or to reach the GitHub-native audience, open
-a PR against `punkpeye/awesome-mcp-servers`:
-
-```bash
-gh repo fork punkpeye/awesome-mcp-servers --clone
-# Add to the appropriate section:
-# - [agent-config](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config) —
-#   MCP governance server for AI coding agents (skills, rules, commands,
-#   guidelines as prompts/resources). Developer-first; requires local checkout.
-gh pr create --repo punkpeye/awesome-mcp-servers \
-  --title "Add agent-config MCP governance server" \
-  --body "..."
-```
-
-**Kill-switch:** if Glama listing alone drives sufficient discovery (≥1 inbound
-issue referencing it within 12 months), skip this PR — it adds maintenance
-surface without additive benefit.
-
----
-
-## Kill-switches
-
-Conditions under which to **remove the README badge** (the listing itself can
-harmlessly stay up — removing the badge severs the only active reputational
-signal):
-
-| Trigger | Action |
-|---|---|
-| (a) Glama makes listing **conditional on using their Gateway hosting** | Remove badge immediately; delist if possible. Rationale: migration to Glama hosting breaks the A0-cloud contract (version-pinned URLs, prebaked skillSetSignature, bearer-token control). Non-negotiable. |
-| (b) Registry degrades into a spam farm (>50 % low-quality entries dominate MCP search results) | Remove the badge; let the listing rot harmlessly (no maintenance cost). |
-| (c) Per-release listing maintenance exceeds ~5 min/release | Investigate whether Glama auto-syncs from GitHub releases (preferred); if not, evaluate removing the listing. |
-
-A listing **fee** is **not** an automatic remove trigger — evaluate the amount.
-A $5–10/month fee buys real distribution; an unreasonable fee does not.
-
----
-
-## Review trigger (trigger-based, never calendar-based)
-
-**Do not set a 60/90-day calendar review.** This is OSS infrastructure, not a
-SaaS product; 60-day windows measure random noise.
-
-**Trigger:** the first GitHub issue, PR, or star note that references Glama.
-On that signal, assess:
-1. Did the user have a good experience? Could they actually run the server?
-2. If friction: fix docs or sharpen "developers only" in the listing description.
-3. If confusion about end-user use: link to the end-user packaging roadmap
-   (`road-to-mcp-stdio-end-user-packaging.md`) from the listing.
-
-**Timeout kill-switch:** if no inbound reference to Glama appears within
-12 months of the listing going live, treat the listing as low-signal. The
-badge removal cost is one commit.
-
----
-
-## Consequences
-
-**Positive:**
-- Zero-cost discovery channel for agent developers. The Glama inspector also
-  lets potential users explore tools without cloning.
-- GitHub `model-context-protocol` + `mcp-server` topics reach the GitHub-native
-  audience independently of Glama.
-
-**Negative / risks:**
-- Listing implies a degree of support. Mitigated by the honest "developers only /
-  not a turnkey package" scope label in the description.
-- Network-effect lock-in if Glama becomes the de facto standard and adds
-  badge-gating for Gateway users. Kill-switch (a) handles this.
-- Registry could attract wrong-audience users (expecting `npx` one-liner).
-  Mitigated by explicit description language + link to future packaging roadmap
-  once it ships.
-
-**Not changed:**
-- No CI dependency added.
-- No hosting changed.
-- The Cloudflare Worker is not listed.
-- The `mcp_scope: full` contract is unchanged.
-- All three dropped options (Inspector in CI, Gateway hosting migration, manual
-  Inspector smoke) remain dropped.
-
-## See also
-
-- [`road-to-glama-registry-listing.md`](../../agents/roadmaps/archive/road-to-glama-registry-listing.md)
-- [`road-to-mcp-stdio-end-user-packaging.md`](../../agents/roadmaps/archive/road-to-mcp-stdio-end-user-packaging.md) — follow-up (completed + archived)
-- [`docs/contracts/mcp-phase-1-scope.md`](../contracts/mcp-phase-1-scope.md) — stdio kernel contract
-- [`docs/contracts/mcp-cloud-scope.md`](../contracts/mcp-cloud-scope.md) — Worker A0-cloud contract

package/docs/decisions/ADR-068-host-tier-detection.md

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
----
-adr: 068
-status: accepted
-date: 2026-06-08
-decision: host-tier-detection
-supersedes: —
-superseded_by: —
-phase: employee-product Phase 8 (road-to-employee-product-and-external-proof)
-type: structural
----
-
-# ADR-068 — Host-agent tier detection (v0)
-
-## Status
-
-**Accepted** · 2026-06-08. Design converged via AI-council (claude-sonnet-4-5 +
-gpt-4o, design mode, 2026-06-08), with one verdict reversed on review (see H3).
-
-## Context
-
-The workspace shells out to a host agent per ADR-023; `host-agent-protocol.md`
-is the source-of-truth inventory + tier matrix (Tier 1 = CLI-drivable: Claude
-Code / Codex / Gemini; Tier 3 = observe-only → inbox hand-off: Augment / Cursor
-/ Cline / Windsurf). Nothing detected a host's tier — `launch` took a free-text
-`host` string and recorded a session blindly. The **Tier-1 drive loop**
-(`claude -p …` turn loop) is unbuilt and stays so.
-
-## Decision
-
-### H1 — code map mirroring the contract + consistency test
-`workspace_hosts.py HOST_INVENTORY = {id: {tier, cli}}` mirrors the contract's
-inventory table. `tests/test_workspace_hosts.py::test_inventory_matches_contract_tiers`
-parses the contract table and asserts every tier agrees — so the human-readable
-contract stays canonical without fragile **runtime** markdown parsing (the
-parsing lives in the test, not the hot path).
-
-### H2 — effective tier = inventory tier capped by CLI presence
-`effective_tier = 1 iff (inventory_tier == 1 and shutil.which(cli)) else 3`.
-A Tier-1 host whose CLI is missing demotes to Tier 3 (the contract's fail-closed
-rule). Detection is **deterministic and side-effect-free** — PATH probe only, it
-**never spawns** a host CLI (a test asserts no `subprocess.run`/`Popen`). A
-`--version` probe (vs PATH-only) is v1 debt.
-
-### H3 — launch reports the tier; it does NOT drive (council verdict reversed)
-The design first proposed a Tier-1 `{tier:1, mode:'session-recorded'}` branch.
-**Rejected on review** as a phantom state — recording a Tier-1 "launch" that
-cannot execute is dead telemetry with no rollback. Instead `launch` resolves the
-effective tier and **reports** it (`effective_tier`, `cli_present`, `known`,
-`mode`) alongside the recorded session; `mode` is honest —
-`tier1-drive-pending` (drivable, drive unbuilt) or `handoff` (use the inbox).
-
-**Scope honesty:** the council assumed `launch` could auto-route Tier-3 to the
-inbox. It cannot in v0 — `launch` has only `role`+`task`, not a *rendered*
-prompt, and the prompt renderer is unbuilt. So `launch` **reports** the tier;
-the actual hand-off stays the explicit `POST /api/v1/workspace/inbox` (which
-takes a caller-rendered prompt + skill pre-render, ADR-065/066). Auto-routing
-`launch → inbox` is deferred to when the prompt renderer lands.
-
-### Unknown host — fail-soft in-process, fail-loud at the CLI
-`detect(host_id)` returns `known: false, effective_tier: 3` for an unregistered
-id (so `launch` never 500s on a host string), while the `detect` **CLI exits
-non-zero** on an unknown id (so tooling / tests catch typos). `local` (the
-legacy `launch` default) is unregistered → Tier-3 hand-off, `known: false`.
-
-### H4 — single PR
-Detector + `launch` tier-reporting + the contract-consistency test + cross-
-runtime tests, one PR. No dead code (a detector with no caller has no
-integration proof).
-
-## Consequences
-
-- `launch` now tells the caller whether a host is CLI-drivable or needs the
-  hand-off — the seam the UI/caller uses to pick the path.
-- No phantom Tier-1 sessions; no fabricated drive.
-- Plaintext, no cryptography dependency; detection is always-on (harmless —
-  read-only PATH probe).
-
-### Deferred (v1 debt)
-- `--version` probe instead of PATH-only presence.
-- A generated inventory manifest (vs the hand-maintained map + consistency test).
-- Detection circuit-breaker / error-rate metrics.
-- `launch → inbox` auto-routing (awaits the prompt renderer).
-- The Tier-1 drive loop itself (ADR-023 Tier-1 conversation surface).
-
-## References
-
-- ADR-023 — host-agent protocol (tier definitions).
-- ADR-065/066 — the Tier-3 inbox hand-off + skill pre-render this reports toward.
-- Contract: [`docs/contracts/host-agent-protocol.md`](../contracts/host-agent-protocol.md).
-- `src/cli/python/workspace_hosts.py`, `src/server/routes/workspace.ts`.

package/docs/decisions/ADR-069-prompt-renderer.md

@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
----
-adr: 069
-status: accepted
-date: 2026-06-08
-decision: prompt-renderer
-supersedes: —
-superseded_by: —
-phase: employee-product Phase 8 (road-to-employee-product-and-external-proof)
-type: structural
----
-
-# ADR-069 — Role-prompt placeholder renderer (v0)
-
-## Status
-
-**Accepted** · 2026-06-08. Design converged via AI-council (claude-sonnet-4-5 +
-gpt-4o, design mode, 2026-06-08): both members agreed on decisions 1–4; on
-decision 5 (CLI surface) claude-sonnet-4-5's minimal-surface argument prevailed
-over gpt-4o's "keep `--input k=v`" — see the verdict table below.
-
-## Context
-
-Role prompts live at `agents/roles/<role>/prompts/<name>.md` with YAML
-frontmatter declaring `inputs` (name / required / shape) and a `skill_hint`,
-plus a body with `{{name}}` placeholders. Nothing filled those placeholders:
-the launch endpoint stored a session header but never produced a usable prompt.
-
-The hand-off surfaces both need a *filled* prompt:
-
-- **Tier-3 inbox** (ADR-065) writes a rendered prompt for copy-paste, and
-  pre-renders a `skill_hint` body (ADR-066).
-- **Tier-1 hosts without a skill surface** (Codex / Gemini, per ADR-068 /
-  host-agent-protocol) need the prompt pre-rendered with skill context inlined.
-
-`workspace_render.py` is the missing pure function: prompt + `name → value`
-map → rendered prompt string. It mirrors the existing `workspace_*.py`
-Python-authoritative CLI shape.
-
-## Decision
-
-| # | Question | Verdict | Rationale |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| 1 | Missing **optional** input | **(a)** substitute empty string, leave the heading | Markdown-structure stripping ("this heading belongs to that placeholder") is fragile template-validation masquerading as runtime logic. An empty section is template-author feedback, not a renderer bug. |
-| 2 | Unknown `{{placeholder}}` (no declared input) | **Hard error** (CLI exit 1) | A broken template contract. Leaving the literal wastes host tokens — the agent tries to interpret template syntax as content. |
-| 3 | Value contains `{{...}}` | **Single-pass literal** substitution | Recursive expansion is a code-injection vector; one pass over the original body means an injected token is never re-expanded. |
-| 4 | `skill_hint` coupling | **Stay pure** — return the hint, never append the body | The inbox already owns skill pre-rendering (ADR-066). Appending here would double-append when the inbox calls the renderer. Tier-1 and inbox have different attach policies. |
-| 5 | CLI surface | **Minimal** — `render --role --prompt [--inputs-json <f\|->] [--root]` + `inspect` | `--input k=v` is a shell-escaping trap for multi-line paragraph inputs; `--json`-on-render duplicates `inspect`. Smallest surface that works; add flags when pain emerges. |
-
-The `shape` frontmatter field is **advisory documentation only** — the renderer
-does not enforce it (decision deferred to v1).
-
-### Node wiring
-
-`POST /api/v1/workspace/render` → `{role, prompt, inputs}` → `{rendered,
-skill_hint}`. Inputs flow to the CLI via a temp JSON file (mirrors the inbox
-`--body-file` path — values can be large / multi-line). A missing-required or
-undeclared-placeholder error surfaces as HTTP 400. Role prompts are read from
-the read-only `<packageRoot>/agents/roles` tree, never the write root.
-
-## Consequences
-
-- The renderer is a pure, side-effect-free function — trivially testable, no
-  store / crypto / network coupling.
-- The `skill_hint`-pure boundary means the inbox auto-routing flow is:
-  `render(role, prompt, inputs) → {rendered, skill_hint}` then
-  `inbox.write(rendered, skill_hint=skill_hint)` — the skill body is appended
-  exactly **once**, by the inbox. No double-append.
-- Tier-1 pre-rendering (Codex / Gemini) consumes the same `{rendered,
-  skill_hint}` and inlines the skill itself when the drive loop lands.
-
-## Alternatives considered
-
-- **Heading-aware empty-section stripping (decision 1b)** — rejected as
-  fragile Markdown-structure inference with no robust signal for "which heading
-  introduces which placeholder".
-- **Forgiving unknown placeholders (leave literal)** — rejected: silent
-  token-wasting bug; a template typo should fail loud.
-- **Renderer appends the skill body** — rejected: couples three concerns and
-  double-appends on the inbox path.
-- **`--input k=v` repeatable flag** — rejected for v0: multi-line paragraph
-  inputs make shell escaping unusable; `--inputs-json` (file / stdin) is the
-  one clean mechanism.
-
-## Deferred to v1 (debt)
-
-- Per-prompt **kill-switch** (disable a template by name without redeploying) —
-  belongs at the launch / inbox layer, not in this pure function.
-- **Shape validation** against declared `shape` hints.
-- Render success / failure **metrics**.
-
-## References
-
-- [`ADR-065`](ADR-065-tier3-inbox-handoff-v0.md) — Tier-3 inbox (first consumer).
-- [`ADR-066`](ADR-066-skill-body-prerendering.md) — skill pre-rendering (owns the append).
-- [`ADR-068`](ADR-068-host-tier-detection.md) — host-tier detection (drives whether to pre-render for Tier-1 or hand off to Tier-3).
-- [`host-agent-protocol`](../contracts/host-agent-protocol.md) — Tier-1 hosts without a skill surface.
-- [`daily-workspace`](../contracts/daily-workspace.md) — workspace surface contract (lists the `/render` endpoint).

package/docs/decisions/ADR-070-tier1-drive-loop.md

@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
----
-adr: 070
-status: accepted
-date: 2026-06-08
-decision: tier1-drive-loop
-supersedes: —
-superseded_by: —
-phase: employee-product Phase 8 (road-to-employee-product-and-external-proof)
-type: structural
----
-
-# ADR-070 — Tier-1 host drive loop (v0)
-
-## Status
-
-**Accepted** · 2026-06-08. Design converged via AI-council (claude-sonnet-4-5 +
-gpt-4o, design mode, 2026-06-08): both members agreed on decisions 1, 2, 4, 5,
-6; on decision 3 (adapter shape) both sided with the **unified** adapter over
-three copy-paste functions. This ADR covers the **first PR** — the Python
-executor + tests, no HTTP endpoint (that is PR 2).
-
-## Context
-
-ADR-023 locks a CLI shell-out protocol with three tiers. Tier-1 hosts
-(Claude Code / Codex / Gemini) expose `launch` (`claude -p "<prompt>"
---output-format json`) and a JSON envelope per turn. `detectHostTier`
-(ADR-068) already classifies a host as Tier 1, but reports
-`mode = tier1-drive-pending` — there was no executor. The rendered prompt now
-exists (`workspace_render.py`, ADR-069). The missing piece is the **drive
-loop**: spawn the host CLI, parse the envelope, record the turn.
-
-## Decision
-
-| # | Question | Verdict | Rationale |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| 1 | Turn model | **Single-turn.** Tool calls **recorded opaquely, never executed.** | Smallest useful cut. Agentic multi-turn (feed results back) + tool execution are v1 — recording tool-call JSON now keeps the session log complete without an executor. |
-| 2 | Envelope validation | **Explicit required/optional keys per host; fail closed.** Missing `result` or `is_error: true` → error turn, not a fabricated one. | "Named keys only" is too vague; an unrecognised envelope must degrade to the inbox, never invent a turn. |
-| 3 | Adapter shape | **Unified `drive(host, prompt, …)`** + per-host config (`build_args` + `normalise`). | The `ai-council` skill already drives all three hosts through one path; three copy-paste functions discard a proven abstraction. Variance is CLI flags, not control flow. |
-| 4 | Loop vs launch | **Sync drive inside `POST /launch`** when tier 1 (PR 2); no separate `/drive` endpoint. | A two-call split (header then drive) risks orphaned sessions with no rollback / dedup / lock. Sync-in-launch (202 on timeout) is sounder for v0. |
-| 5 | Timeout / failure | **90 s** default, configurable. CLI-missing / non-zero-exit / timeout / bad-envelope → `host.error` record + degrade to Tier-3 inbox. | 30 s is too short for LLM+tool turns; the user is never stuck because every failure path has an inbox fallback. |
-| 6 | First PR | `workspace_drive.py` (claude-code adapter) + stubbed-runner tests + a real-CLI **contract test** (skipped when `claude` absent). **No HTTP endpoint.** | The contract test catches Anthropic-side envelope drift (e.g. `result` renamed) the moment it runs where `claude` is present. The endpoint is PR 2. |
-
-### Uniform turn record
-
-`drive()` returns, on success:
-
-```json
-{"ok": true, "host": "claude-code", "text": "...", "model": null,
- "usage": {"input_tokens": 12, "output_tokens": 34}, "session_id": "...",
- "cost_usd": 0.01, "num_turns": 1, "tool_calls": []}
-```
-
-On any operational failure it returns `{"ok": false, "host", "error",
-"error_kind"}` (`error_kind` ∈ `unsupported-host` / `empty-prompt` / `timeout`
-/ `cli-missing` / `spawn-failed` / `nonzero-exit` / `bad-envelope`). It never
-raises for an operational failure — the caller records `host.error` via
-`workspace_sessions.py` and degrades to the Tier-3 inbox.
-
-## Consequences
-
-- The drive loop is the executor behind `tier1-drive-pending`; PR 2 wires it
-  into `POST /launch` so a Tier-1 launch actually drives a turn.
-- The session log stays the source of truth: every drive (success or error) is
-  one append, through the encrypted store (ADR-064) — `workspace_drive.py`
-  never writes JSONL itself.
-- `runner` injection keeps the test suite hermetic; the opt-in contract test is
-  the only path that touches a real host CLI.
-
-## Alternatives considered
-
-- **Multi-turn agentic loop in v0** — rejected: large surface, tool-execution
-  trust questions; single-turn is useful and shippable now.
-- **Three per-host functions** — rejected: discards the proven `ai-council`
-  unified adapter; the variance is purely CLI flags.
-- **Separate `POST /launch/:id/drive` endpoint** — rejected: orphaned-session
-  risk with no rollback / dedup / lock in v0.
-- **Hard-error on bad envelope** — rejected: leaves the user stuck; fail-closed
-  to the inbox is the protocol's stated posture (host-agent-protocol).
-
-## Deferred to v1 (debt)
-
-- Multi-turn agentic loops + **tool-call execution**.
-- `codex` / `gemini` host configs (the unified `drive()` is ready for them).
-- Drive **metrics** (success / timeout rate) + a kill-switch that flips Tier-1
-  to inbox-only when the failure rate crosses a threshold.
-- Error-taxonomy refinement (structured error codes).
-
-## References
-
-- [`ADR-023`](ADR-023-host-agent-protocol.md) — the three-tier CLI protocol.
-- [`ADR-068`](ADR-068-host-tier-detection.md) — detection (`tier1-drive-pending` is what this resolves).
-- [`ADR-069`](ADR-069-prompt-renderer.md) — produces the rendered prompt the drive loop consumes.
-- [`ADR-064`](ADR-064-append-jsonl-per-record-encryption.md) — the encrypted session store turns are appended to.
-- [`host-agent-protocol`](../contracts/host-agent-protocol.md) — fail-closed posture + envelope-as-contract.