@devlab.group/agent-commerce 1.5.0 → 1.6.1

package/dist/authorization-BpbWGGrf.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+import { f as AuthorizationMethodName, A as AdapterDescriptor, m as PaymentRequirement, c as AdapterHealth } from './runtime-CiYbgGpi.js';
+
+/**
+ * Canonical authorization model. FROZEN CONTRACT.
+ *
+ * Payment proves that funds moved; authorization proves that the human behind
+ * the agent approved this exact purchase. A valid authorization gates
+ * settlement but never unlocks a paid resource on its own and never moves
+ * money, so a resource that requires one still needs a payment proof.
+ *
+ * Core decides that a resource requires authorization and when the pipeline
+ * checks it. Authorization providers decide how a submission is parsed,
+ * verified and bound to the purchase. No AP2, SD-JWT or JWT type may appear in
+ * this file.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Opaque authorization proof supplied by the buyer's client. Over HTTP it
+ * arrives as base64url JSON in the `Agent-Authorization` header; over MCP and
+ * A2A it is the same `{ method, payload }` object in the reserved
+ * `_authorization` input field.
+ *
+ * `payload` is kept byte for byte from the wire. It may hold signed or
+ * encoding-sensitive provider data, so transport adapters must not normalize
+ * it.
+ */
+interface AuthorizationSubmission {
+    readonly method: AuthorizationMethodName;
+    readonly payload: string;
+}
+/**
+ * What a buyer must present, advertised with the payment challenge so a client
+ * learns before it pays that a payment proof alone will not do. The gateway
+ * never issues the authorization; it names the method, the spec version it
+ * verifies against and the payload profile it expects.
+ */
+interface AuthorizationRequirement {
+    readonly method: AuthorizationMethodName;
+    readonly version: string;
+    readonly profile?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Safe audit identity of an authorization, fit for a receipt. `reference` is a
+ * digest, because a receipt outlives its request and a stored proof would be a
+ * spendable secret at rest.
+ */
+interface AuthorizationRecord {
+    readonly method: AuthorizationMethodName;
+    readonly reference: string;
+    /** Safe audit summary only. Never the proof, its disclosures, or PII */
+    readonly metadata?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;
+}
+/**
+ * A verified, reserved authorization. `reservationId` is the handle the
+ * pipeline consumes, releases or marks uncertain once the payment resolves. It
+ * stays out of `AuthorizationRecord` because a handle is not an audit fact.
+ */
+interface AuthorizationVerification extends AuthorizationRecord {
+    readonly status: 'verified';
+    readonly reservationId: string;
+}
+/** Input to {@link AuthorizationProvider.verifyAndReserve} */
+interface AuthorizationVerificationContext {
+    readonly requestId: string;
+    readonly resourceId: string;
+    /**
+     * The validated resource input with reserved fields stripped: the same value
+     * the merchant backend is called with. A provider that binds a proof to the
+     * request hashes it, so it excludes `_payment`, `_authorization`, the request
+     * id and transport metadata.
+     */
+    readonly input: unknown;
+    readonly submission: AuthorizationSubmission;
+    /** The resolved price and destination the proof must match */
+    readonly requirement: PaymentRequirement;
+}
+/** Input to {@link AuthorizationProvider.consume}, `release` and `markUncertain` */
+interface AuthorizationFinalizeContext {
+    readonly requestId: string;
+    readonly resourceId: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Contract every authorization method implements.
+ *
+ * The lifecycle straddles settlement: a proof is reserved before funds move, so
+ * a replay cannot race it, and its fate is known only afterwards. A reservation
+ * is released only after a failure that provably moved no money. Anything
+ * ambiguous is marked uncertain, because a proof handed back after a settlement
+ * that may have landed can be spent twice.
+ */
+interface AuthorizationProvider {
+    readonly name: AuthorizationMethodName;
+    readonly descriptor: AdapterDescriptor;
+    /** What a buyer must present, advertised with the payment challenge */
+    readonly requirement: AuthorizationRequirement;
+    /**
+     * Verify a submission against the resolved purchase and atomically reserve it
+     * against reuse. Throws a `CommerceError` with an `AUTHORIZATION_*` code,
+     * never a payment code; a verifier or store outage is
+     * `AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE`, not the buyer's fault.
+     */
+    verifyAndReserve(context: AuthorizationVerificationContext): Promise<AuthorizationVerification>;
+    /** Mark a reservation permanently spent. Called after settlement succeeds */
+    consume(reservationId: string, context: AuthorizationFinalizeContext): Promise<void>;
+    /** Return a reservation to unused. Only for failures that moved no funds */
+    release(reservationId: string, context: AuthorizationFinalizeContext): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Settlement threw, so whether funds moved is unknown: neither spend the
+     * reservation nor hand it back, and flag it for an operator
+     */
+    markUncertain(reservationId: string, context: AuthorizationFinalizeContext): Promise<void>;
+    health(): Promise<AdapterHealth>;
+}
+
+export type { AuthorizationProvider as A, AuthorizationRequirement as a, AuthorizationSubmission as b, AuthorizationFinalizeContext as c, AuthorizationRecord as d, AuthorizationVerification as e, AuthorizationVerificationContext as f };

package/dist/chunk-AFI2CEZS.js

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+// src/protocols/mcp/constants.ts
+var MCP_TOOL_NAME_CHARS = "A-Za-z0-9._-";
+var MCP_TOOL_NAME_MAX_LENGTH = 128;
+var MCP_TOOL_NAME_PATTERN = new RegExp(
+  `^[${MCP_TOOL_NAME_CHARS}]{1,${MCP_TOOL_NAME_MAX_LENGTH}}$`
+);
+
+export { MCP_TOOL_NAME_PATTERN };
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-AFI2CEZS.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-AFI2CEZS.js.map

package/dist/chunk-AFI2CEZS.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/protocols/mcp/constants.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";AAUO,IAAM,mBAAA,GAAsB,cAAA;AAG5B,IAAM,wBAAA,GAA2B,GAAA;AAQjC,IAAM,wBAAwB,IAAI,MAAA;AAAA,EACvC,CAAA,EAAA,EAAK,mBAAmB,CAAA,IAAA,EAAO,wBAAwB,CAAA,EAAA;AACzD","file":"chunk-AFI2CEZS.js","sourcesContent":["/**\n * MCP protocol constants shared by the config layer, the adapter and the\n * OpenAPI importer.\n *\n * Kept dependency-free: `src/config` validates tool names at load time, so\n * anything imported here would become a config-load dependency too, and the\n * MCP SDK is an optional peer the main entry and CLI must never load.\n */\n\n/** Characters SEP-986 allows in an MCP tool name, as a regex character class body */\nexport const MCP_TOOL_NAME_CHARS = 'A-Za-z0-9._-';\n\n/** Longest MCP tool name SEP-986 allows */\nexport const MCP_TOOL_NAME_MAX_LENGTH = 128;\n\n/**\n * MCP tool names per SEP-986: 1-128 chars of [A-Za-z0-9._-], the SDK's own\n * `TOOL_NAME_REGEX`, which it does not export. Config refuses an mcp-exposed\n * resource whose id fails it; the low-level `Server` checks no names, so the\n * adapter also skips such an id with a warning.\n */\nexport const MCP_TOOL_NAME_PATTERN = new RegExp(\n  `^[${MCP_TOOL_NAME_CHARS}]{1,${MCP_TOOL_NAME_MAX_LENGTH}}$`,\n);\n"]}

package/dist/{chunk-PBYN7EK2.js → chunk-CBJIT7QP.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
-import { CommerceError } from './chunk-5GEWKNIH.js';
+import { CommerceError } from './chunk-N5KRK7YA.js';
 
 // src/payments/x402/networks.ts
+var LOCAL_CHAIN_ID = 84532;
 var PROFILES = [
   {
     id: "eip155:84532",
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ function resolveDeploymentMode(profile, facilitatorMode) {
   if (facilitatorMode === "local") return "local";
   return profile.kind;
 }
-var LIVE_MAINNET_BANNER = "LIVE MAINNET MODE \u2014 REAL FUNDS";
+var LIVE_MAINNET_BANNER = "LIVE MAINNET MODE - REAL FUNDS";
 function describeDeploymentMode(mode) {
   return mode === "mainnet" ? LIVE_MAINNET_BANNER : mode.toUpperCase();
 }
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ function isWellKnownDevAddress(address) {
 }
 function isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname) {
   const h = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "");
-  if (h === "localhost" || h === "127.0.0.1" || h === "::1") return true;
+  if (h === "localhost" || h === "::1") return true;
   if (/^127\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;
   if (/^10\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;
   if (/^192\.168\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;
@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ function assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly(rpcUrl, signerPrivateKey) {
   if (!isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname)) {
     throw new CommerceError(
       "CONFIG_INVALID",
-      `x402 provider: facilitator.signerPrivateKey is a well-known Anvil development key, but rpcUrl ${describeRpc(rpcUrl)} does not look like a local/private chain. A public dev key must never sign against a public network \u2014 it is instantly drainable and can grief real settlements via nonce exhaustion. Use a real facilitator key for any non-local RPC, or point rpcUrl at your local/dev chain.`
+      `x402 provider: facilitator.signerPrivateKey is a well-known Anvil development key, but rpcUrl ${describeRpc(rpcUrl)} does not look like a local/private chain. A public dev key must never sign against a public network: it is instantly drainable and can grief real settlements via nonce exhaustion. Use a real facilitator key for any non-local RPC, or point rpcUrl at your local/dev chain.`
     );
   }
 }
@@ -157,7 +158,7 @@ function resolveX402Deployment(input) {
     assertFacilitatorUrlIsSafe(input.facilitator.url, mode, at);
     if (mode === "mainnet" && input.facilitator.auth.type === "none" && input.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator !== true) {
       throw invalid(
-        `${at}: facilitator ${describeOrigin(input.facilitator.url)} takes no credential, and this is a mainnet deployment. It will see every payment authorisation you handle, with no account, terms or support behind it. Set ${at}.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator: true to accept that, or configure facilitator.auth.`,
+        `${at}: no credential is configured for facilitator ${describeOrigin(input.facilitator.url)} on mainnet. Set ${at}.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator: true to accept anonymous access and the facilitator's limits, or configure facilitator.auth.`,
         `${at}.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator`
       );
     }
@@ -224,7 +225,7 @@ function assertFacilitatorUrlIsSafe(url, mode, at) {
   }
   if (mode !== "mainnet" && isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(parsed.hostname)) return;
   throw invalid(
-    `${at}: facilitator ${describeOrigin(url)} is reached over plain HTTP. Payment authorisations and settlement results would travel unencrypted. Use https, or point at a local/private host on a non-mainnet deployment.`,
+    `${at}: facilitator ${describeOrigin(url)} is reached over plain HTTP. Payment authorizations and settlement results would travel unencrypted. Use https, or point at a local/private host on a non-mainnet deployment.`,
     `${at}.facilitator.url`
   );
 }
@@ -252,6 +253,6 @@ function sameAddress(a, b) {
   return a.toLowerCase() === b.toLowerCase();
 }
 
-export { SUPPORTED_NETWORK_IDS, assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly, assertPayToIsNotDevAddress, describeDeploymentMode, describeRpc, requireNetworkProfile, resolveDeploymentMode, resolveX402Deployment };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-PBYN7EK2.js.map
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-PBYN7EK2.js.map
+export { LOCAL_CHAIN_ID, SUPPORTED_NETWORK_IDS, assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly, assertPayToIsNotDevAddress, describeDeploymentMode, describeRpc, requireNetworkProfile, resolveDeploymentMode, resolveX402Deployment };
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-CBJIT7QP.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-CBJIT7QP.js.map

package/dist/chunk-CBJIT7QP.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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* The networks this gateway settles on, as data: the chain id to sign against,\n * a display name, and whether real money is involved.\n *\n * A registry rather than \"parse any `eip155:*`\": the chain id parses from any\n * such string, but whether it is a mainnet does not, and the guardrails key off\n * that. An unknown id is refused at startup instead of passing as a testnet.\n *\n * The local dev chain runs under Base Sepolia's `eip155:84532`, so nothing may\n * infer \"public network\" from the id alone. `resolveDeploymentMode` derives\n * the mode from the facilitator too, and the provider's health check confirms\n * that a local facilitator's node is Anvil.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core';\n\n/** Chain id of the local dev chain, which Base Sepolia uses too */\nexport const LOCAL_CHAIN_ID = 84532;\n\nexport interface NetworkProfile {\n  /** CAIP-2 identifier, e.g. `eip155:84532` */\n  readonly id: string;\n  /** Signed into the buyer's EIP-712 domain */\n  readonly chainId: number;\n  readonly displayName: string;\n  readonly kind: 'testnet' | 'mainnet';\n  /**\n   * The USDC deployment this network settles in, with the EIP-712 domain the\n   * token reports. Enforced on mainnet only, since a testnet may use a mock\n   * token.\n   *\n   * `name` is the signed EIP-712 domain name, not the symbol, and the two\n   * deployments differ: `\"USDC\"` on Base Sepolia, `\"USD Coin\"` on Base. The\n   * values were read back from the contracts.\n   */\n  readonly canonicalAsset?: {\n    readonly symbol: string;\n    readonly address: string;\n    readonly name: string;\n    readonly version: string;\n  };\n}\n\nconst PROFILES: readonly NetworkProfile[] = [\n  {\n    id: 'eip155:84532',\n    chainId: 84532,\n    displayName: 'Base Sepolia',\n    kind: 'testnet',\n    canonicalAsset: {\n      symbol: 'USDC',\n      address: '0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e',\n      name: 'USDC',\n      version: '2',\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    id: 'eip155:8453',\n    chainId: 8453,\n    displayName: 'Base',\n    kind: 'mainnet',\n    canonicalAsset: {\n      symbol: 'USDC',\n      address: '0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913',\n      name: 'USD Coin',\n      version: '2',\n    },\n  },\n];\n\nconst BY_ID = new Map(PROFILES.map((profile) => [profile.id, profile]));\n\nexport const SUPPORTED_NETWORK_IDS: readonly string[] = PROFILES.map((p) => p.id);\n\nexport function findNetworkProfile(id: string): NetworkProfile | undefined {\n  return BY_ID.get(id);\n}\n\nexport function requireNetworkProfile(id: string, path: string): NetworkProfile {\n  const profile = BY_ID.get(id);\n  if (!profile) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      `${path}: \"${id}\" is not a supported network. Supported CAIP-2 identifiers: ${SUPPORTED_NETWORK_IDS.join(', ')}`,\n      { details: { path, network: id } },\n    );\n  }\n  return profile;\n}\n\n/**\n * What a deployment is, as opposed to the network it names. `local` comes from\n * the facilitator: the in-process facilitator makes a deployment local whatever\n * CAIP-2 id it is configured with, which lets diagnostics show `eip155:84532`\n * without claiming public Base Sepolia.\n */\nexport type DeploymentMode = 'local' | 'testnet' | 'mainnet';\n\nexport function resolveDeploymentMode(\n  profile: NetworkProfile,\n  facilitatorMode: 'local' | 'remote',\n): DeploymentMode {\n  if (facilitatorMode === 'local') return 'local';\n  return profile.kind;\n}\n\n// The banner an operator must not miss. Printed for mainnet only\nconst LIVE_MAINNET_BANNER = 'LIVE MAINNET MODE - REAL FUNDS';\n\nexport function describeDeploymentMode(mode: DeploymentMode): string {\n  return mode === 'mainnet' ? LIVE_MAINNET_BANNER : mode.toUpperCase();\n}\n","/**\n * Anvil's well-known development accounts.\n *\n * LOCAL DEVELOPMENT ONLY - DO NOT FUND. The keys come from Foundry's public\n * default mnemonic (\"test test ... junk\"), so value sent to these addresses on\n * a real network can be taken by anyone.\n *\n * Index layout on the local demo chain:\n * 0 - deployer and local facilitator signer (pays gas, broadcasts settlement)\n * 1 - merchant settlement destination (`payTo`)\n * 2 - buyer (signs EIP-3009 authorizations; never held by the gateway)\n */\nexport interface AnvilWellKnownAccount {\n  readonly address: `0x${string}`;\n  readonly privateKey: `0x${string}`;\n}\n\n/** A fixed-length tuple, so indexing by the layout above is typed */\nexport const ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS: readonly [\n  AnvilWellKnownAccount,\n  AnvilWellKnownAccount,\n  AnvilWellKnownAccount,\n] = [\n  {\n    address: '0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266',\n    privateKey: '0xac0974bec39a17e36ba4a6b4d238ff944bacb478cbed5efcae784d7bf4f2ff80',\n  },\n  {\n    address: '0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8',\n    privateKey: '0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d',\n  },\n  {\n    address: '0x3C44CdDdB6a900fa2b585dd299e03d12FA4293BC',\n    privateKey: '0x5de4111afa1a4b94908f83103eb1f1706367c2e68ca870fc3fb9a804cdab365a',\n  },\n];\n\nexport const LOCAL_FACILITATOR_ACCOUNT = ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS[0];\nexport const LOCAL_MERCHANT_ACCOUNT = ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS[1];\nexport const LOCAL_BUYER_ACCOUNT = ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS[2];\n\n/** Label printed wherever a dev key appears in output, logs or manifests */\nexport const DEV_KEY_LABEL = 'LOCAL DEVELOPMENT ONLY - DO NOT FUND';\n","/**\n * Rejects well-known Anvil keys and payment destinations when the RPC host\n * does not look local or private. Their private keys are published, so anyone\n * can spend what such an address receives on a public chain.\n *\n * The check uses the RPC hostname because the local chain shares Base\n * Sepolia's chain id. Both guards run at provider construction.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core';\nimport { ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS } from './local-chain/accounts';\n\nconst WELL_KNOWN_DEV_KEYS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(\n  ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS.map((a) => a.privateKey.toLowerCase()),\n);\n\nconst WELL_KNOWN_DEV_ADDRESSES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(\n  ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS.map((a) => a.address.toLowerCase()),\n);\n\n// `0x` plus 64 hex characters, the only shape `privateKeyToAccount` accepts\nconst PRIVATE_KEY_SHAPE = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/;\n\nexport function isWellKnownDevKey(privateKey: string): boolean {\n  return WELL_KNOWN_DEV_KEYS.has(privateKey.toLowerCase());\n}\n\nexport function isWellKnownDevAddress(address: string): boolean {\n  return WELL_KNOWN_DEV_ADDRESSES.has(address.toLowerCase());\n}\n\n/**\n * True for loopback addresses, RFC 1918 private ranges, and bare (dot-free)\n * hostnames, such as the compose service name \"anvil\".\n *\n * Bare hostnames are treated as local without resolving them. Operators must\n * point them at a private chain.\n */\nexport function isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname: string): boolean {\n  const h = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/^\\[|\\]$/g, '');\n  if (h === 'localhost' || h === '::1') return true;\n  if (/^127\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (/^10\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (/^192\\.168\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (/^172\\.(1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (!h.includes('.') && !h.includes(':')) return true; // bare hostname\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction parseHostnameOrThrow(rpcUrl: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(rpcUrl).hostname;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    // Never the URL itself: RPC providers commonly put an API key in the path,\n    // and this message reaches startup output and CI logs\n    throw new CommerceError('CONFIG_INVALID', 'x402 provider: rpcUrl is not a valid URL', {\n      cause,\n    });\n  }\n}\n\n/** Origin only, for diagnostics: RPC URLs often carry an API key in the path or query */\nexport function describeRpc(rpcUrl: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(rpcUrl).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return '[unparseable rpcUrl]';\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws CONFIG_INVALID if `signerPrivateKey` is not shaped like a private key,\n * or if it is a well-known dev key and the RPC is not local.\n *\n * The shape check runs first, so a truncated key is reported as malformed\n * instead of passing as \"not a dev key\".\n */\nexport function assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly(rpcUrl: string, signerPrivateKey: string): void {\n  if (!PRIVATE_KEY_SHAPE.test(signerPrivateKey)) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      'x402 provider: facilitator.signerPrivateKey is not a well-formed private key ' +\n        '(expected \"0x\" followed by exactly 64 hex characters).',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (!isWellKnownDevKey(signerPrivateKey)) return; // the operator's own key\n\n  const hostname = parseHostnameOrThrow(rpcUrl);\n\n  if (!isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname)) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      'x402 provider: facilitator.signerPrivateKey is a well-known Anvil development key, but rpcUrl ' +\n        `${describeRpc(rpcUrl)} does not look like a local/private chain. A public dev key must never sign against ` +\n        'a public network: it is instantly drainable and can grief real settlements via nonce exhaustion. ' +\n        'Use a real facilitator key for any non-local RPC, or point rpcUrl at your local/dev chain.',\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws CONFIG_INVALID if `payTo` is a well-known Anvil address and `rpcUrl`\n * does not look local or private.\n *\n * Guards the receiving side, in every facilitator mode. `agent-commerce init`\n * defaults `payTo` to a well-known address for the local demo, and on a real\n * network that default sends every payment where anyone can sweep it.\n */\nexport function assertPayToIsNotDevAddress(rpcUrl: string, payTo: string): void {\n  if (!isWellKnownDevAddress(payTo)) return;\n\n  const hostname = parseHostnameOrThrow(rpcUrl);\n\n  if (!isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname)) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      `x402 provider: \"payTo\" (${payTo}) is a well-known Anvil development address, but rpcUrl ` +\n        `${describeRpc(rpcUrl)} does not look like a local/private chain. The private key behind that address ` +\n        'is public knowledge, so any revenue settled to it is immediately spendable by anyone. Set ' +\n        '\"payTo\" to your own merchant wallet for any non-local RPC, or point rpcUrl at your ' +\n        'local/dev chain.',\n    );\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * What must hold before this gateway may settle a payment on the configured\n * network. Two callers share these checks: the provider runs them at\n * construction, so a library consumer who skips our config loader still gets\n * them, and the config loader runs them, so `validate` and `doctor` report\n * them too.\n *\n * Both run before any request, because a failure found in `settle()` would\n * come after the pipeline reserved the buyer's replay key.\n *\n * Imports no peer (no viem, no `@x402/*`), so the CLI can load it.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core';\nimport { isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost, isWellKnownDevAddress } from './dev-key-guard';\nimport {\n  type DeploymentMode,\n  type NetworkProfile,\n  requireNetworkProfile,\n  resolveDeploymentMode,\n} from './networks';\n\n/**\n * How the gateway authenticates to a remote facilitator.\n *\n * - `none`: send no credential; use it when the facilitator accepts\n *   anonymous requests.\n * - `bearer`: send a static token; no extra peer package is needed.\n * - `cdp`: Coinbase Developer Platform. The optional peer `@coinbase/x402`,\n *   imported only for this type, signs a fresh JWT per request.\n *\n * Any other auth type is refused at config load.\n */\nexport type FacilitatorAuth =\n  | { readonly type: 'none' }\n  | { readonly type: 'bearer'; readonly token: string }\n  | { readonly type: 'cdp'; readonly apiKeyId: string; readonly apiKeySecret: string };\n\nexport type X402FacilitatorConfig =\n  | { readonly mode: 'local'; readonly signerPrivateKey: string }\n  | { readonly mode: 'remote'; readonly url: string; readonly auth: FacilitatorAuth };\n\nexport interface X402DeploymentInput {\n  readonly network: string;\n  readonly payTo: string;\n  readonly asset: string;\n  /** EIP-712 domain of the asset, as the token itself reports it */\n  readonly assetName?: string;\n  readonly assetVersion?: string;\n  readonly facilitator: X402FacilitatorConfig;\n  /** Must be `true` before anything settles on a mainnet */\n  readonly allowMainnet?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Must be `true` on mainnet when facilitator auth is `none`. A separate\n   * decision from `allowMainnet`: it accepts settling without an account at\n   * the facilitator, under its anonymous-access limits.\n   */\n  readonly allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator?: boolean;\n  /** Error-path prefix, `payments.x402` by default */\n  readonly configPath?: string;\n  /** Settlement-recipient field named in errors, `payTo` by default */\n  readonly payToField?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface X402Deployment {\n  readonly profile: NetworkProfile;\n  readonly mode: DeploymentMode;\n}\n\nfunction invalid(message: string, path: string): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError('CONFIG_INVALID', message, { details: { path } });\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolves the deployment and refuses the combinations that could move real\n * money by accident. The network must resolve first; the other checks are\n * independent.\n */\nexport function resolveX402Deployment(input: X402DeploymentInput): X402Deployment {\n  const at = input.configPath ?? 'payments.x402';\n  const payTo = input.payToField ?? 'payTo';\n  const profile = requireNetworkProfile(input.network, `${at}.network`);\n  const mode = resolveDeploymentMode(profile, input.facilitator.mode);\n\n  // Local mode keeps a gas-paying key in the gateway process. A compromise\n  // could expose that key, so mainnet requires a remote facilitator.\n  if (profile.kind === 'mainnet' && input.facilitator.mode === 'local') {\n    throw invalid(\n      `${at}: network \"${profile.id}\" (${profile.displayName}) is a mainnet and cannot be served by facilitator.mode \"local\". A mainnet deployment must settle through a remote facilitator.`,\n      `${at}.facilitator.mode`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (mode === 'mainnet' && input.allowMainnet !== true) {\n    throw invalid(\n      `${at}: network \"${profile.id}\" (${profile.displayName}) settles real funds. Set ${at}.allowMainnet: true to acknowledge this explicitly - it is never the default.`,\n      `${at}.allowMainnet`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (input.facilitator.mode === 'remote') {\n    assertFacilitatorUrlIsSafe(input.facilitator.url, mode, at);\n    // The authorization fixes recipient, amount and chain, so a facilitator\n    // cannot redirect funds. A credential adds an account: rate limits, terms\n    // and support. On mainnet, going without one is an explicit choice.\n    if (\n      mode === 'mainnet' &&\n      input.facilitator.auth.type === 'none' &&\n      input.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator !== true\n    ) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `${at}: no credential is configured for facilitator ${describeOrigin(input.facilitator.url)} on mainnet. Set ${at}.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator: true to accept anonymous access and the facilitator's limits, or configure facilitator.auth.`,\n        `${at}.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator`,\n      );\n    }\n    // A blank credential reaches the facilitator as \"unauthenticated\" and fails\n    // every payment after the buyer signed. `${VAR:- }` resolving to whitespace\n    // is the usual cause.\n    for (const [field, value] of credentialFields(input.facilitator.auth)) {\n      if (value.trim() === '') {\n        throw invalid(\n          `${at}: facilitator.auth.type is \"${input.facilitator.auth.type}\" but ${field} is empty. An empty credential is refused rather than sent.`,\n          `${at}.facilitator.auth.${field}`,\n        );\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // The config loader's address check refuses this too; repeated here for a\n  // library consumer who calls `createX402PaymentProvider` without it\n  if (/^0x0{40}$/i.test(input.payTo)) {\n    throw invalid(\n      `${at}: \"${payTo}\" is the zero address. Every payment settled there is destroyed.`,\n      `${at}.${payTo}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Anyone can spend from a well-known Anvil address. `dev-key-guard` refuses\n  // one behind a public RPC; this refuses one on any non-local deployment,\n  // whose RPC host says nothing about where a remote facilitator settles.\n  if (mode !== 'local' && isWellKnownDevAddress(input.payTo)) {\n    throw invalid(\n      `${at}: \"${payTo}\" (${input.payTo}) is a well-known Anvil development address and this is a ${mode} deployment. Anyone can spend what settles there. Set ${payTo} to your own merchant wallet.`,\n      `${at}.${payTo}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Mainnet only: a testnet is where pointing at a mock token is normal\n  const canonical = profile.canonicalAsset;\n  if (mode === 'mainnet' && canonical) {\n    if (!sameAddress(input.asset, canonical.address)) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `${at}: asset ${input.asset} is not ${canonical.symbol} on ${profile.displayName} (expected ${canonical.address}). Settling a mainnet payment in an unintended token is refused.`,\n        `${at}.asset`,\n      );\n    }\n    // The buyer signs the EIP-712 domain and the scheme checks it. A wrong one\n    // refuses every payment with `invalid_exact_evm_token_name_mismatch` after\n    // the buyer signed, so it is caught here, before the gateway starts.\n    if (input.assetName !== undefined && input.assetName !== canonical.name) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `${at}: assetName \"${input.assetName}\" is not the EIP-712 domain name ${canonical.symbol} reports on ${profile.displayName} (expected \"${canonical.name}\"). Every payment would be refused after the buyer signed.`,\n        `${at}.assetName`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (input.assetVersion !== undefined && input.assetVersion !== canonical.version) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `${at}: assetVersion \"${input.assetVersion}\" is not the EIP-712 domain version ${canonical.symbol} reports on ${profile.displayName} (expected \"${canonical.version}\").`,\n        `${at}.assetVersion`,\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  return { profile, mode };\n}\n\n/**\n * A facilitator sees every payment authorization this gateway handles. Plain\n * HTTP puts those on the wire in the clear and lets anyone in the path rewrite\n * a settlement result, so it is allowed only to a local or private host, and\n * never on a mainnet.\n */\nfunction assertFacilitatorUrlIsSafe(url: string, mode: DeploymentMode, at: string): void {\n  let parsed: URL;\n  try {\n    parsed = new URL(url);\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw new CommerceError('CONFIG_INVALID', `${at}: facilitator.url is not a valid URL`, {\n      cause,\n      details: { path: `${at}.facilitator.url` },\n    });\n  }\n\n  if (parsed.protocol === 'https:') return;\n  if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:') {\n    throw invalid(\n      `${at}: facilitator ${describeOrigin(url)} must be reached over https (or http on a local/private host); got \"${parsed.protocol}//\"`,\n      `${at}.facilitator.url`,\n    );\n  }\n  if (mode !== 'mainnet' && isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(parsed.hostname)) return;\n\n  // The origin, never the whole URL: the path can carry a tenant or an API\n  // key, and this message reaches `validate`, `doctor`, startup output and CI logs\n  throw invalid(\n    `${at}: facilitator ${describeOrigin(url)} is reached over plain HTTP. Payment authorizations and settlement results would travel unencrypted. Use https, or point at a local/private host on a non-mainnet deployment.`,\n    `${at}.facilitator.url`,\n  );\n}\n\n// Origin only: a facilitator URL can carry a tenant path or an API key\nfunction describeOrigin(url: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(url).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return '[unparseable facilitator.url]';\n  }\n}\n\n// The secret-bearing fields of an auth block, for emptiness checks only. Never logged\nfunction credentialFields(auth: FacilitatorAuth): readonly (readonly [string, string])[] {\n  switch (auth.type) {\n    case 'bearer':\n      return [['token', auth.token]];\n    case 'cdp':\n      return [\n        ['apiKeyId', auth.apiKeyId],\n        ['apiKeySecret', auth.apiKeySecret],\n      ];\n    default:\n      return [];\n  }\n}\n\nfunction sameAddress(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  return a.toLowerCase() === b.toLowerCase();\n}\n"]}

package/dist/{chunk-NKNXVDHN.js → chunk-JKEKKXRJ.js}

@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
-import { assertPayToIsNotDevAddress, resolveX402Deployment, assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly, describeRpc, describeDeploymentMode } from './chunk-PBYN7EK2.js';
-import { CommerceError, systemClock, NOOP_LOGGER, PACKAGE_VERSION } from './chunk-5GEWKNIH.js';
-import { encodeAbiParameters, keccak256, isAddress, getAddress, createWalletClient, http, publicActions, createPublicClient, HttpRequestError, TimeoutError, WaitForTransactionReceiptTimeoutError, ContractFunctionRevertedError, ContractFunctionExecutionError } from 'viem';
+import { assertPayToIsNotDevAddress, resolveX402Deployment, assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly, describeRpc, LOCAL_CHAIN_ID, describeDeploymentMode } from './chunk-CBJIT7QP.js';
+import { CommerceError, systemClock, NOOP_LOGGER, PACKAGE_VERSION, redactedErrorText } from './chunk-N5KRK7YA.js';
+import { encodeAbiParameters, keccak256, isAddress, getAddress, formatUnits, createWalletClient, http, publicActions, createPublicClient, HttpRequestError, TimeoutError, WaitForTransactionReceiptTimeoutError, BaseError, ContractFunctionRevertedError } from 'viem';
 import { privateKeyToAccount } from 'viem/accounts';
 import { x402Facilitator } from '@x402/core/facilitator';
 import { HTTPFacilitatorClient } from '@x402/core/http';
+import { VerifyError } from '@x402/core/types';
 import { isEIP3009Payload, toFacilitatorEvmSigner } from '@x402/evm';
 import { registerExactEvmScheme } from '@x402/evm/exact/facilitator';
 import { PaymentPayloadV2Schema } from '@x402/core/schemas';
@@ -35,19 +36,6 @@ function parseCanonicalAmount(amount, decimals) {
   const combined = `${integerPart}${paddedFraction}`;
   return BigInt(combined);
 }
-function formatCanonicalAmount(baseUnits, decimals) {
-  if (!Number.isInteger(decimals) || decimals < 0) {
-    throw new CommerceError("INTERNAL_ERROR", `Invalid asset decimals: ${decimals}`);
-  }
-  const negative = baseUnits < 0n;
-  const abs = negative ? -baseUnits : baseUnits;
-  const digits = abs.toString().padStart(decimals + 1, "0");
-  const integerPart = digits.slice(0, digits.length - decimals) || "0";
-  const fractionPart = digits.slice(digits.length - decimals).replace(/0+$/, "");
-  const sign = negative ? "-" : "";
-  return fractionPart.length > 0 ? `${sign}${integerPart}.${fractionPart}` : `${sign}${integerPart}`;
-}
-var LOCAL_CHAIN_ID = 84532;
 function chainIdFromCaip2(network) {
   const match = /^eip155:(\d+)$/.exec(network);
   if (!match?.[1]) return void 0;
@@ -114,9 +102,6 @@ function createLocalFacilitatorBinding(client, network, isTransportError) {
         settle: (payload, requirements) => facilitator.settle(payload, requirements),
         transportFailed: failed
       };
-    },
-    async supported() {
-      return build().facilitator.getSupported().kinds;
     }
   };
 }
@@ -144,6 +129,16 @@ function cdpAuthHeaders(apiKeyId, apiKeySecret) {
     return await create();
   };
 }
+function verdictFromVerifyError(err) {
+  if (err instanceof VerifyError && err.statusCode === 400 && typeof err.invalidReason === "string") {
+    return {
+      isValid: false,
+      invalidReason: err.invalidReason,
+      ...err.payer !== void 0 ? { payer: err.payer } : {}
+    };
+  }
+  throw err;
+}
 function createRemoteFacilitatorBinding(options) {
   const auth = options.auth;
   let createAuthHeaders;
@@ -157,7 +152,7 @@ function createRemoteFacilitatorBinding(options) {
   }
   const client = new HTTPFacilitatorClient({
     url: options.url,
-    timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs ?? SETTLEMENT_CONFIRMATION_TIMEOUT_MS,
+    timeoutMs: SETTLEMENT_CONFIRMATION_TIMEOUT_MS,
     ...createAuthHeaders ? { createAuthHeaders } : {}
   });
   return {
@@ -174,7 +169,7 @@ function createRemoteFacilitatorBinding(options) {
         }
       };
       return {
-        verify: (payload, requirements) => watch(() => client.verify(payload, requirements)),
+        verify: (payload, requirements) => watch(() => client.verify(payload, requirements).catch(verdictFromVerifyError)),
         settle: (payload, requirements) => watch(() => client.settle(payload, requirements)),
         transportFailed: () => failed
       };
@@ -217,7 +212,7 @@ var SETTLEMENT_PENDING_REASON = "settlement_pending";
 var TRANSACTION_FAILED_REASON = "invalid_exact_evm_transaction_failed";
 var MAX_REASON_LENGTH = 64;
 var REASON_SHAPE = /^[a-z0-9_.-]+$/i;
-function sanitiseReason(reason, fallback) {
+function sanitizeReason(reason, fallback) {
   if (reason === void 0) return fallback;
   const trimmed = reason.trim();
   if (trimmed.length === 0 || trimmed.length > MAX_REASON_LENGTH) return fallback;
@@ -269,7 +264,7 @@ function createX402PaymentProvider(options) {
     } catch (cause) {
       throw new CommerceError(
         "CONFIG_INVALID",
-        "x402 provider: could not construct a local facilitator signer from facilitator.signerPrivateKey \u2014 it must be a valid 32-byte hex private key",
+        "x402 provider: could not construct a local facilitator signer from facilitator.signerPrivateKey. It must be a valid 32-byte hex private key.",
         { cause }
       );
     }
@@ -303,7 +298,7 @@ function createX402PaymentProvider(options) {
       `mode=${mode}`
     ],
     status: "stable",
-    unsupported: ["svm", "permit2", "upto scheme"]
+    unsupported: ["svm", "permit2", "upto scheme", "deferred scheme"]
   };
   async function createRequirement(context) {
     const amount = parseCanonicalAmount(context.amount, options.assetDecimals).toString();
@@ -314,15 +309,10 @@ function createX402PaymentProvider(options) {
       amount,
       payTo: options.payTo,
       maxTimeoutSeconds,
-      // `name`/`version` are what let a buyer and the facilitator build the
-      // same EIP-712 domain without an on-chain `version()` call, so
-      // verification stays deterministic against a token that has none.
-      //
-      // `assetTransferMethod` is stated rather than left to default: x402 v2's
-      // `exact`/EVM scheme also has a Permit2 path, and a client that picked it
-      // would produce a payload this provider cannot settle. Declaring the one
-      // supported method turns that into a client-side non-choice instead of a
-      // server-side rejection.
+      // `name`/`version` let the buyer and the facilitator build the same
+      // EIP-712 domain without calling `version()` on the token.
+      // `assetTransferMethod` names the one method this provider settles, so a
+      // conforming client never picks the `exact` scheme's Permit2 path.
       extra: {
         name: options.assetName,
         version: options.assetVersion,
@@ -418,17 +408,14 @@ function createX402PaymentProvider(options) {
     try {
       sdkResult = await scope.verify(payload, requirements);
     } catch (err) {
-      if (isProviderUnavailableError(err) || scope.transportFailed()) {
-        throw new CommerceError(
-          "PAYMENT_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE",
-          `x402 provider: ${binding.kind} facilitator unreachable during verify()`,
-          {
-            cause: err
-          }
-        );
+      if (!isProviderUnavailableError(err) && !scope.transportFailed()) {
+        logger.warn({ err: redactedErrorText(err) }, "x402 verify(): unexpected SDK error");
       }
-      logger.warn({ err: describeError(err) }, "x402 verify(): unexpected SDK error");
-      return rejected("unexpected_verify_error");
+      throw new CommerceError(
+        "PAYMENT_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE",
+        `x402 provider: ${binding.kind} facilitator returned no verdict during verify()`,
+        { cause: err }
+      );
     }
     if (!sdkResult.isValid) {
       if (scope.transportFailed()) {
@@ -449,14 +436,10 @@ function createX402PaymentProvider(options) {
           "x402 verify(): facilitator rejection reason"
         );
       }
-      return rejected(sanitiseReason(sdkResult.invalidReason, "invalid_payment"));
-    }
-    const payloadChainId = chainIdFromCaip2(payload.accepted.network);
-    if (payloadChainId === void 0) {
-      return rejected("wrong_network");
+      return rejected(sanitizeReason(sdkResult.invalidReason, "invalid_payment"));
     }
     const replayKey = computeReplayKey({
-      chainId: payloadChainId,
+      chainId: profile.chainId,
       asset: getAddress(requirements.asset),
       from: getAddress(authorization.from),
       nonce: authorization.nonce
@@ -466,7 +449,7 @@ function createX402PaymentProvider(options) {
       provider: "x402",
       payer: getAddress(authorization.from),
       payee: getAddress(authorization.to),
-      amount: formatCanonicalAmount(authorizedValue, options.assetDecimals),
+      amount: formatUnits(authorizedValue, options.assetDecimals),
       currency: requirement.currency,
       network: payload.accepted.network,
       asset: getAddress(requirements.asset),
@@ -519,7 +502,7 @@ function createX402PaymentProvider(options) {
       }
       if (!isOnChainRevertError(err)) {
         logger.warn(
-          { err: describeError(err) },
+          { err: redactedErrorText(err) },
           "x402 settle(): settlement failed with an unclassified error; outcome unknown"
         );
         throw new CommerceError(
@@ -529,7 +512,7 @@ function createX402PaymentProvider(options) {
         );
       }
       logger.warn(
-        { err: describeError(err), rejectionReason: "transaction_reverted" },
+        { err: redactedErrorText(err), rejectionReason: "transaction_reverted" },
         "x402 settle(): settlement transaction reverted on chain"
       );
       return rejectedSettlement("transaction_reverted");
@@ -561,7 +544,7 @@ function createX402PaymentProvider(options) {
         );
       }
       return {
-        ...rejectedSettlement(sanitiseReason(sdkResult.errorReason, "settlement_failed")),
+        ...rejectedSettlement(sanitizeReason(sdkResult.errorReason, "settlement_failed")),
         network: sdkResult.network,
         ...sdkResult.payer !== void 0 ? { payer: sdkResult.payer } : {}
       };
@@ -617,7 +600,7 @@ function createX402PaymentProvider(options) {
         }
         return {
           status: "pass",
-          detail: `${describeDeploymentMode(mode)} \u2014 RPC ${rpcOrigin} reachable, chain id ${profile.chainId} (${profile.displayName}), asset ${options.asset} has code, facilitator ${binding.describe} supports exact/${options.network}`,
+          detail: `${describeDeploymentMode(mode)}: RPC ${rpcOrigin} reachable, chain id ${profile.chainId} (${profile.displayName}), asset ${options.asset} has code, facilitator ${binding.describe} supports exact/${options.network}`,
           checkedAt,
           durationMs: clock.monotonicMs() - startedAt
         };
@@ -626,21 +609,21 @@ function createX402PaymentProvider(options) {
       if (!isAnvil) {
         return {
           status: "fail",
-          detail: `RPC at ${rpcOrigin} reports chain id ${profile.chainId} but does not answer "anvil_nodeInfo" \u2014 it does not look like a local Anvil dev node. Refusing to treat it as safe for a local-facilitator dev key.`,
+          detail: `RPC at ${rpcOrigin} reports chain id ${profile.chainId} but does not answer "anvil_nodeInfo", so it does not look like a local Anvil dev node. Refusing to treat it as safe for a local-facilitator dev key.`,
           checkedAt,
           durationMs: clock.monotonicMs() - startedAt
         };
       }
       return {
         status: "pass",
-        detail: `${describeDeploymentMode(mode)} \u2014 RPC ${rpcOrigin} reachable, chain id ${profile.chainId}, asset ${options.asset} has code, confirmed Anvil dev node`,
+        detail: `${describeDeploymentMode(mode)}: RPC ${rpcOrigin} reachable, chain id ${profile.chainId}, asset ${options.asset} has code, confirmed Anvil dev node`,
         checkedAt,
         durationMs: clock.monotonicMs() - startedAt
       };
     } catch (err) {
       return {
         status: "fail",
-        detail: `x402 health check failed: ${describeError(err)}`,
+        detail: `x402 health check failed: ${redactedErrorText(err)}`,
         checkedAt,
         durationMs: clock.monotonicMs() - startedAt
       };
@@ -673,19 +656,15 @@ function createX402PaymentProvider(options) {
   };
 }
 function isOnChainRevertError(err) {
-  return err instanceof ContractFunctionRevertedError || err instanceof ContractFunctionExecutionError;
+  return err instanceof BaseError && err.walk((e) => e instanceof ContractFunctionRevertedError) !== null;
 }
 function isProviderUnavailableError(err) {
   if (err instanceof HttpRequestError || err instanceof TimeoutError || err instanceof WaitForTransactionReceiptTimeoutError) {
     return true;
   }
-  const message = describeError(err).toLowerCase();
+  const message = redactedErrorText(err).toLowerCase();
   return message.includes("econnrefused") || message.includes("fetch failed") || message.includes("enotfound") || message.includes("etimedout") || message.includes("timed out") || message.includes("network error");
 }
-function describeError(err) {
-  const text = err instanceof Error ? `${err.name}: ${err.message}` : String(err);
-  return text.replace(/\bhttps?:\/\/[^\s"'<>]+/gi, (url) => describeRpc(url));
-}
 async function probeIsAnvilNode(client) {
   const request = client.request;
   try {
@@ -696,6 +675,6 @@ async function probeIsAnvilNode(client) {
   }
 }
 
-export { chainIdFromCaip2, computeReplayKey, createX402PaymentProvider, parseCanonicalAmount };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NKNXVDHN.js.map
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NKNXVDHN.js.map
+export { DEFAULT_IDS, chainIdFromCaip2, computeReplayKey, createX402PaymentProvider, parseCanonicalAmount };
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-JKEKKXRJ.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-JKEKKXRJ.js.map