@devlab.group/agent-commerce 1.5.0 → 1.6.1

package/dist/ap2.js

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
-import { AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM, AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM, AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE, AP2_SPEC_VERSION, AP2_KEY_TYPE, AP2_JWK_CURVE, openSqliteDatabase } from './chunk-US622BKF.js';
-export { AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT, AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE, AP2_DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, AP2_MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM, AP2_SPEC_VERSION } from './chunk-US622BKF.js';
-import { systemClock, NOOP_LOGGER, CommerceError, PACKAGE_VERSION } from './chunk-5GEWKNIH.js';
-import { SignJWT, importPKCS8, importJWK, jwtVerify } from 'jose';
+import { AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM, AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM, AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE, AP2_SPEC_VERSION, AP2_KEY_TYPE, AP2_JWK_CURVE, openSqliteDatabase } from './chunk-VKDXMXHL.js';
+export { AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT, AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE, AP2_DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, AP2_MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM, AP2_SPEC_VERSION } from './chunk-VKDXMXHL.js';
+import { systemClock, NOOP_LOGGER, CommerceError, isRecord, PACKAGE_VERSION } from './chunk-N5KRK7YA.js';
+import { SignJWT, importPKCS8, importJWK, jwtVerify, decodeProtectedHeader, decodeJwt } from 'jose';
 import canonicalize from 'canonicalize';
+import { createHash } from 'crypto';
 import { decodeSdJwt, splitSdJwt, getClaims } from '@sd-jwt/core';
 
 // src/authorization/ap2/errors.ts
@@ -11,7 +12,6 @@ var AP2_REJECTION_REASONS = [
   "untrusted_issuer",
   "unknown_key",
   "invalid_signature",
-  "unsupported_algorithm",
   "invalid_claims",
   "expired",
   "wrong_audience",
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ var MESSAGES = {
   untrusted_issuer: "The mandate was issued by a party this merchant does not trust.",
   unknown_key: "The mandate names a signing key this merchant does not trust.",
   invalid_signature: "The mandate signature did not verify.",
-  unsupported_algorithm: "The mandate uses a signature or digest algorithm that is not accepted.",
   invalid_claims: "The mandate is missing required claims or they are malformed.",
   expired: "The mandate is expired or not yet valid.",
   wrong_audience: "The mandate is addressed to a different audience.",
@@ -63,6 +62,9 @@ function ap2Unavailable(detail, context = {}) {
     }
   );
 }
+function sha256(data) {
+  return createHash("sha256").update(data).digest();
+}
 
 // src/authorization/ap2/profile.ts
 var REQUIRED_PROFILE_CLAIMS = [
@@ -73,13 +75,12 @@ var REQUIRED_PROFILE_CLAIMS = [
   "currency",
   "payment_method"
 ];
-async function computeInputHash(input) {
+function computeInputHash(input) {
   const canonical = canonicalize(input ?? {});
   if (canonical === void 0) {
-    throw new TypeError("resource input is not canonicalizable JSON");
+    throw new CommerceError("INTERNAL_ERROR", "resource input is not canonicalizable JSON");
   }
-  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", new TextEncoder().encode(canonical));
-  return Buffer.from(digest).toString("base64url");
+  return sha256(canonical).toString("base64url");
 }
 var EVM_ADDRESS = /^0x[0-9a-f]{40}$/i;
 function sameCoordinate(declared, expected) {
@@ -90,12 +91,9 @@ function sameCoordinate(declared, expected) {
   }
   return declared === expected;
 }
-function asRecord(value) {
-  return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value) ? value : void 0;
-}
 async function bindMandateToPurchase(mandate, context, errorContext) {
-  const profile = asRecord(mandate.checkoutClaims["agent_commerce"]);
-  if (profile === void 0) throw ap2Rejected("purchase_mismatch", errorContext);
+  const profile = mandate.checkoutClaims["agent_commerce"];
+  if (!isRecord(profile)) throw ap2Rejected("purchase_mismatch", errorContext);
   for (const claim of REQUIRED_PROFILE_CLAIMS) {
     const value = profile[claim];
     if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0) {
@@ -103,7 +101,7 @@ async function bindMandateToPurchase(mandate, context, errorContext) {
     }
   }
   const requirement = context.requirement;
-  const expectedInputHash = await computeInputHash(context.input);
+  const expectedInputHash = computeInputHash(context.input);
   const mustMatch = [
     ["profile", AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE],
     ["resource_id", context.resourceId],
@@ -126,12 +124,6 @@ async function bindMandateToPurchase(mandate, context, errorContext) {
     if (declared === void 0 && expected === void 0) continue;
     if (!sameCoordinate(declared, expected)) throw ap2Rejected("purchase_mismatch", errorContext);
   }
-  return {
-    resourceId: profile["resource_id"],
-    amount: profile["amount"],
-    currency: profile["currency"],
-    paymentMethod: profile["payment_method"]
-  };
 }
 
 // src/authorization/ap2/checkout-signer.ts
@@ -193,7 +185,7 @@ async function createCheckoutJwt(options) {
   const agentCommerce = {
     profile: AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,
     resource_id: resourceId,
-    input_hash: await computeInputHash(options.input),
+    input_hash: computeInputHash(options.input),
     amount,
     currency,
     payment_method: paymentMethod,
@@ -218,8 +210,7 @@ var AP2_CAPABILITIES = [
   "replay-defence"
 ];
 var AP2_UNSUPPORTED = [
-  // Mandate kinds. Open mandates carry spending constraints nothing here
-  // evaluates, so accepting one would tell a buyer their limits were checked.
+  // Mandate kinds. Open mandates are refused: see AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT
   "autonomous mode",
   "open checkout mandates (mandate.checkout.open.1)",
   "intent mandates",
@@ -358,16 +349,6 @@ function migrate(db) {
   });
   apply();
 }
-function decodeSegment(jwt, index) {
-  const segment = jwt.split(".")[index];
-  if (segment === void 0) return void 0;
-  try {
-    const parsed = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(segment, "base64url").toString("utf8"));
-    return typeof parsed === "object" && parsed !== null && !Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : void 0;
-  } catch {
-    return void 0;
-  }
-}
 async function verifyCheckoutJwt(mandateClaims, deps, context) {
   const compact = mandateClaims["checkout_jwt"];
   const expectedHash = mandateClaims["checkout_hash"];
@@ -377,17 +358,16 @@ async function verifyCheckoutJwt(mandateClaims, deps, context) {
   if (typeof expectedHash !== "string" || expectedHash.length === 0) {
     throw ap2Rejected("invalid_claims", context);
   }
-  await requireMatchingHash(compact, expectedHash, context);
-  const header = decodeSegment(compact, 0);
-  const unverifiedPayload = decodeSegment(compact, 1);
-  if (header === void 0 || unverifiedPayload === void 0) {
-    throw ap2Rejected("checkout_binding_failed", context);
+  requireMatchingHash(compact, expectedHash, context);
+  let header;
+  let unverifiedPayload;
+  try {
+    header = decodeProtectedHeader(compact);
+    unverifiedPayload = decodeJwt(compact);
+  } catch (cause) {
+    throw ap2Rejected("checkout_binding_failed", { ...context, cause });
   }
-  const { issuer, key } = await deps.trust.resolve(
-    unverifiedPayload["iss"],
-    header["kid"],
-    context
-  );
+  const { issuer, key } = await deps.trust.resolve(unverifiedPayload.iss, header.kid, context);
   const options = {
     algorithms: [AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM],
     issuer: issuer.issuer,
@@ -415,20 +395,15 @@ async function verifyCheckoutJwt(mandateClaims, deps, context) {
   if (iat > nowSeconds + deps.clockSkewSeconds) throw ap2Rejected("expired", context);
   return { issuer: issuer.issuer, jwtId: jti, claims };
 }
-async function requireMatchingHash(compact, expected, context) {
-  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", new TextEncoder().encode(compact));
-  const actual = Buffer.from(digest).toString("base64url");
+function requireMatchingHash(compact, expected, context) {
+  const actual = sha256(compact).toString("base64url");
   if (actual !== expected) throw ap2Rejected("checkout_binding_failed", context);
 }
-async function hasher(data, algorithm) {
+function hasher(data, algorithm) {
   if (algorithm.toLowerCase() !== AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM) {
-    throw new Error(`unsupported digest algorithm ${algorithm}`);
+    throw ap2Rejected("malformed_presentation");
   }
-  const bytes = typeof data === "string" ? new TextEncoder().encode(data) : new Uint8Array(data);
-  return new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", bytes));
-}
-function asRecord2(value) {
-  return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value) ? value : void 0;
+  return sha256(typeof data === "string" ? data : new Uint8Array(data));
 }
 async function verifyMandate(presentation, deps, context) {
   let decoded;
@@ -442,26 +417,25 @@ async function verifyMandate(presentation, deps, context) {
   if (decoded.kbJwt !== void 0) {
     throw ap2Rejected("unsupported_mandate_type", context);
   }
-  const rawPayload = asRecord2(decoded.jwt.payload);
-  const header = asRecord2(decoded.jwt.header);
-  if (rawPayload === void 0 || header === void 0) {
+  const rawPayload = decoded.jwt.payload;
+  const header = decoded.jwt.header;
+  if (!isRecord(rawPayload) || !isRecord(header)) {
     throw ap2Rejected("malformed_presentation", context);
   }
   const { issuer, key } = await deps.trust.resolve(rawPayload["iss"], header["kid"], context);
   const options = {
-    // Redundant today (the key is EC, so jose already refuses `alg: none` and
-    // a forged HMAC) and kept for the day this resolves a key set instead of
-    // one key, where the header would get to pick
+    // Redundant with one resolved EC key, which already refuses `alg: none` and
+    // a forged HMAC. It stops the header picking the algorithm if a key set is
+    // ever resolved instead.
     algorithms: [AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM],
-    // Also redundant, and for the same reason: the key was resolved *from*
-    // `iss` against the configured allowlist, so nothing reaching here can
-    // carry a different one. It backstops a future resolver that matches on
-    // something else. `audience` below is not redundant - `aud` is the
-    // presenter's claim, checked against what the operator configured.
+    // Also redundant, since the key was resolved *from* `iss`, and kept as a
+    // backstop for a resolver that matches on something else. `audience` is
+    // not redundant: `aud` is the presenter's claim, checked against the
+    // configured value.
     issuer: issuer.issuer,
     audience: issuer.audience,
     clockTolerance: deps.clockSkewSeconds,
-    // Injected clock, not jose's `Date.now()`, so expiry tests are tests
+    // Injected clock, not jose's `Date.now()`, so expiry is testable
     currentDate: deps.clock.now()
   };
   let verifiedPayload;
@@ -544,9 +518,8 @@ function createTrustStore(issuers) {
 }
 
 // src/authorization/ap2/verifier.ts
-async function mandateReference(signedToken) {
-  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", new TextEncoder().encode(signedToken));
-  return `sha256:${Buffer.from(digest).toString("base64url")}`;
+function mandateReference(signedToken) {
+  return `sha256:${sha256(signedToken).toString("base64url")}`;
 }
 function createAp2MandateVerifier(options) {
   const mandateTrust = createTrustStore(options.config.trust.mandateIssuers);
@@ -564,12 +537,11 @@ function createAp2MandateVerifier(options) {
         context
       );
       return {
-        reference: await mandateReference(mandate.signedToken),
+        reference: mandateReference(mandate.signedToken),
         mandateIssuer: mandate.issuer,
         checkoutIssuer: checkout.issuer,
         checkoutJwtId: checkout.jwtId,
-        checkoutClaims: checkout.claims,
-        mandateClaims: mandate.claims
+        checkoutClaims: checkout.claims
       };
     },
     trustedIssuers() {
@@ -616,6 +588,8 @@ function createAp2AuthorizationProvider(options) {
       status: "verified",
       method: "ap2",
       reference: mandate.reference,
+      // The reservation handle is the reference itself, so the two can never
+      // name different mandates
       reservationId: mandate.reference,
       // Opaque identifiers an operator can reconcile with. Never a claim from
       // the mandate: those carry the buyer's purchase and their personal data.
@@ -651,14 +625,18 @@ function createAp2AuthorizationProvider(options) {
     },
     async health() {
       const startedAt = clock.monotonicMs();
-      const trusted = verifier.trustedIssuers();
       const checkedAt = clock.nowIso();
-      const durationMs = Math.round(clock.monotonicMs() - startedAt);
+      let available = true;
       try {
         replay.stateOf("health-probe");
       } catch {
+        available = false;
+      }
+      const durationMs = Math.round(clock.monotonicMs() - startedAt);
+      if (!available) {
         return { status: "fail", checkedAt, durationMs, detail: "replay-store-unavailable" };
       }
+      const trusted = verifier.trustedIssuers();
       return {
         status: "pass",
         checkedAt,

package/dist/ap2.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* Every failure the AP2 verifier can report.\n *\n * `CommerceError.message` reaches the client, and a mandate carries the\n * buyer's purchase and often personal data, so messages are fixed phrases from\n * the list below. The machine-readable code goes in `details.reason` and the\n * original exception on `cause`, which is never serialised.\n *\n * Three codes: AUTHORIZATION_INVALID when the buyer's mandate is bad,\n * AUTHORIZATION_REPLAYED when it is good but spent, and\n * AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE when our verifier never reached a\n * verdict. Blaming the buyer for our outage refuses a good mandate.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core/index.js';\n\n/**\n * Coarse on purpose: a client learns roughly where its mandate was refused,\n * not which check failed. Finer detail is an oracle for probing trust policy.\n */\nexport const AP2_REJECTION_REASONS = [\n  'malformed_presentation',\n  'untrusted_issuer',\n  'unknown_key',\n  'invalid_signature',\n  'unsupported_algorithm',\n  'invalid_claims',\n  'expired',\n  'wrong_audience',\n  'unsupported_mandate_type',\n  'checkout_binding_failed',\n  'purchase_mismatch',\n] as const;\n\nexport type Ap2RejectionReason = (typeof AP2_REJECTION_REASONS)[number];\n\nconst MESSAGES: Readonly<Record<Ap2RejectionReason, string>> = {\n  malformed_presentation: 'The authorization is not a well-formed SD-JWT presentation.',\n  untrusted_issuer: 'The mandate was issued by a party this merchant does not trust.',\n  unknown_key: 'The mandate names a signing key this merchant does not trust.',\n  invalid_signature: 'The mandate signature did not verify.',\n  unsupported_algorithm: 'The mandate uses a signature or digest algorithm that is not accepted.',\n  invalid_claims: 'The mandate is missing required claims or they are malformed.',\n  expired: 'The mandate is expired or not yet valid.',\n  wrong_audience: 'The mandate is addressed to a different audience.',\n  unsupported_mandate_type: 'The mandate is not a closed Direct Checkout Mandate.',\n  checkout_binding_failed: 'The merchant checkout document bound to the mandate did not verify.',\n  purchase_mismatch: 'The mandate does not authorize this purchase.',\n};\n\nexport interface Ap2ErrorContext {\n  readonly requestId?: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n  readonly cause?: unknown;\n}\n\n/** The buyer's mandate is bad. Fail closed */\nexport function ap2Rejected(\n  reason: Ap2RejectionReason,\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext = {},\n): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError('AUTHORIZATION_INVALID', MESSAGES[reason], {\n    details: { method: 'ap2', reason },\n    ...(context.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: context.requestId } : {}),\n    ...(context.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: context.resourceId } : {}),\n    ...(context.cause !== undefined ? { cause: context.cause } : {}),\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * The mandate verified but has already been presented. A separate code from\n * a bad mandate: nothing is wrong with this proof except that it is spent\n */\nexport function ap2Replayed(state: string, context: Ap2ErrorContext = {}): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError(\n    'AUTHORIZATION_REPLAYED',\n    'This mandate has already been presented and cannot authorize another purchase.',\n    {\n      details: { method: 'ap2', reason: 'replayed', state },\n      ...(context.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: context.requestId } : {}),\n      ...(context.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: context.resourceId } : {}),\n    },\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * The check never ran (a configured key that will not import, say). Retryable,\n * and never recorded against the payer: the mandate may be perfectly good.\n */\nexport function ap2Unavailable(detail: string, context: Ap2ErrorContext = {}): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError(\n    'AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n    'Authorization could not be verified right now. This is a merchant-side fault, not a problem with the presented mandate.',\n    {\n      details: { method: 'ap2', reason: 'verifier_unavailable', detail },\n      ...(context.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: context.requestId } : {}),\n      ...(context.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: context.resourceId } : {}),\n      ...(context.cause !== undefined ? { cause: context.cause } : {}),\n    },\n  );\n}\n","/**\n * Binds a verified mandate to the purchase in front of us.\n *\n * A perfect mandate authorises exactly one purchase; without this comparison a\n * mandate approved for a $0.01 report would settle a $500 one.\n *\n * Everything is compared against the ALREADY RESOLVED request. Nothing is\n * taken from the mandate and used to shape the purchase, which would invert\n * the control.\n */\nimport canonicalize from 'canonicalize';\nimport type { AuthorizationVerificationContext } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE } from './constants.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors.js';\nimport type { VerifiedCheckoutMandate } from './types.js';\n\n/**\n * All required. Absent is a mismatch, never a skipped check: a mandate that\n * will not say which resource or how much authorises nothing in particular.\n */\nconst REQUIRED_PROFILE_CLAIMS = [\n  'profile',\n  'resource_id',\n  'input_hash',\n  'amount',\n  'currency',\n  'payment_method',\n] as const;\n\n/**\n * RFC 8785 (JCS) digest of the validated resource input.\n *\n * Binds a mandate to the exact request, not just to a resource and a price:\n * without it, one mandate for `translate` would authorise any translation.\n *\n * `canonicalize` rather than a sorted-key `JSON.stringify`, which differs\n * exactly where it matters. The merchant's signer computes this same digest,\n * probably in another language, and the two agree only if both follow RFC\n * 8785's number formatting and UTF-16 key ordering.\n *\n * The caller passes what the backend will receive: validated, reserved fields\n * stripped, no request id or transport metadata (the buyer could not have\n * known those when they approved).\n */\nexport async function computeInputHash(input: unknown): Promise<string> {\n  const canonical = canonicalize(input ?? {});\n  // undefined means JSON cannot represent it. Input has already passed schema\n  // validation, so this is something exotic getting past it, not a buyer error.\n  if (canonical === undefined) {\n    throw new TypeError('resource input is not canonicalizable JSON');\n  }\n  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(canonical));\n  return Buffer.from(digest).toString('base64url');\n}\n\n/** What the mandate turned out to authorise, once it matched */\nexport interface BoundPurchase {\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  readonly amount: string;\n  readonly currency: string;\n  readonly paymentMethod: string;\n}\n\nconst EVM_ADDRESS = /^0x[0-9a-f]{40}$/i;\n\n// EIP-55 encodes an address checksum through letter casing, so lowercase and\n// checksummed forms identify the same account. Other values compare exactly.\nfunction sameCoordinate(declared: unknown, expected: string | undefined): boolean {\n  if (typeof declared === 'string' && expected !== undefined) {\n    if (EVM_ADDRESS.test(declared) && EVM_ADDRESS.test(expected)) {\n      return declared.toLowerCase() === expected.toLowerCase();\n    }\n  }\n  return declared === expected;\n}\n\nfunction asRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {\n  return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value)\n    ? (value as Record<string, unknown>)\n    : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws on the first mismatch with one coarse reason. Which field disagreed\n * is not reported: a caller able to ask about one field at a time can read a\n * mandate's contents out of the gateway by elimination.\n */\nexport async function bindMandateToPurchase(\n  mandate: VerifiedCheckoutMandate,\n  context: AuthorizationVerificationContext,\n  errorContext: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<BoundPurchase> {\n  const profile = asRecord(mandate.checkoutClaims['agent_commerce']);\n  if (profile === undefined) throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n\n  for (const claim of REQUIRED_PROFILE_CLAIMS) {\n    const value = profile[claim];\n    if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) {\n      throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n    }\n  }\n\n  const requirement = context.requirement;\n  const expectedInputHash = await computeInputHash(context.input);\n\n  const mustMatch: readonly (readonly [string, unknown])[] = [\n    ['profile', AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE],\n    ['resource_id', context.resourceId],\n    ['input_hash', expectedInputHash],\n    // Decimal strings on both sides. Comparing numerically would make \"0.10\"\n    // and \"0.1\" equal, and a mandate says what it says.\n    ['amount', requirement.amount],\n    ['currency', requirement.currency],\n    ['payment_method', requirement.provider],\n  ];\n\n  for (const [claim, expected] of mustMatch) {\n    if (profile[claim] !== expected) throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n  }\n\n  // Checked whenever EITHER side names one, which is the fail-closed reading.\n  // A mandate silent about the chain must not unlock a mainnet settlement, and\n  // one naming a chain the requirement lacks was approved for another rail.\n  for (const [claim, expected] of [\n    ['destination', requirement.destination],\n    ['network', requirement.network],\n    ['asset', requirement.asset],\n  ] as const) {\n    const declared = profile[claim];\n    if (declared === undefined && expected === undefined) continue;\n    if (!sameCoordinate(declared, expected)) throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n  }\n\n  return {\n    resourceId: profile['resource_id'] as string,\n    amount: profile['amount'] as string,\n    currency: profile['currency'] as string,\n    paymentMethod: profile['payment_method'] as string,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Merchant-side helper: mint the checkout JWT a Checkout Mandate binds.\n *\n * The gateway only verifies. This is what a merchant runs in their own\n * process, with their own key, to produce the document the buyer approves. It\n * never calls the gateway and the gateway never calls it - the mirror of\n * `createPaymentProof`, which a buyer runs to produce a payment proof.\n *\n * It exists for `input_hash`, an RFC 8785 digest. A signer reaching for a\n * sorted-key `JSON.stringify` agrees on most inputs and disagrees on floats\n * and non-ASCII keys, and the mandate is then refused with a reason that does\n * not say which field disagreed.\n */\nimport { importPKCS8, type JWK, SignJWT } from 'jose';\nimport {\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  AP2_JWK_CURVE,\n  AP2_KEY_TYPE,\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n} from './constants.js';\nimport { computeInputHash } from './profile.js';\n\n/**\n * A private ES256 key: either a private JWK (the pair of the public one in the\n * gateway's `checkoutIssuers`) or a PKCS#8 PEM, as `openssl` emits it.\n */\nexport type Ap2SigningKey = Readonly<Record<string, unknown>> | string;\n\nexport interface CreateCheckoutJwtOptions {\n  readonly privateKey: Ap2SigningKey;\n  /** Must match a `kid` configured under the gateway's `checkoutIssuers` */\n  readonly kid: string;\n  /** Must match that issuer's configured `issuer` */\n  readonly issuer: string;\n  /** Must match that issuer's configured `audience` */\n  readonly audience: string;\n\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  /**\n   * The resource input this purchase is for, exactly as the buyer will send\n   * it: no reserved fields, no request id, no transport metadata.\n   */\n  readonly input: unknown;\n\n  /**\n   * Decimal string, never a number, and compared as a string: `0.10` and `0.1`\n   * are different mandates. Take it from your own catalogue rather than from\n   * whatever the agent asked for.\n   */\n  readonly amount: string;\n  readonly currency: string;\n  /** The rail that will settle, e.g. `x402` */\n  readonly paymentMethod: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Settlement coordinates. Required whenever the gateway's requirement names\n   * them, which under x402 is always. A mandate silent about the chain will\n   * not unlock a settlement on one.\n   */\n  readonly destination?: string;\n  readonly network?: string;\n  readonly asset?: string;\n\n  /** Defaults to a random UUID. Recorded on the receipt and used for replay defence */\n  readonly jwtId?: string;\n  /** Defaults to 900: a human approval sits inside this window */\n  readonly expiresInSeconds?: number;\n  /** Injectable so a test need not move the wall clock */\n  readonly now?: Date;\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN_SECONDS = 900;\n\nfunction requireText(value: unknown, field: string): string {\n  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      `createCheckoutJwt: ${field} must be a non-empty string, received ${describe(value)}`,\n    );\n  }\n  return value;\n}\n\nfunction describe(value: unknown): string {\n  return value === null ? 'null' : typeof value;\n}\n\n/**\n * Every rejection here is a mistake that would otherwise surface as an opaque\n * verification failure much later: the public half of the pair, the wrong key\n * type, or a PEM that is not PKCS#8.\n */\nasync function resolveKey(\n  key: Ap2SigningKey,\n): Promise<JWK | Awaited<ReturnType<typeof importPKCS8>>> {\n  if (typeof key === 'string') {\n    if (!key.includes('BEGIN PRIVATE KEY')) {\n      throw new TypeError(\n        'createCheckoutJwt: a string privateKey must be a PKCS#8 PEM beginning \"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\"',\n      );\n    }\n    return importPKCS8(key, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM);\n  }\n  if (typeof key !== 'object' || key === null) {\n    throw new TypeError('createCheckoutJwt: privateKey must be a private JWK or a PKCS#8 PEM');\n  }\n  if (key['d'] === undefined) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      'createCheckoutJwt: privateKey is a public JWK (no \"d\"). Use the private half of the pair whose public key is configured under checkoutIssuers',\n    );\n  }\n  if (key['kty'] !== AP2_KEY_TYPE || key['crv'] !== AP2_JWK_CURVE) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      `createCheckoutJwt: privateKey must be ${AP2_KEY_TYPE}/${AP2_JWK_CURVE}, the pair ${AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM} implies`,\n    );\n  }\n  return key as JWK;\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns the compact JWT to hand to the agent, which wraps it in the Checkout\n * Mandate the buyer signs.\n */\nexport async function createCheckoutJwt(options: CreateCheckoutJwtOptions): Promise<string> {\n  const kid = requireText(options.kid, 'kid');\n  const issuer = requireText(options.issuer, 'issuer');\n  const audience = requireText(options.audience, 'audience');\n  const resourceId = requireText(options.resourceId, 'resourceId');\n  const currency = requireText(options.currency, 'currency');\n  const paymentMethod = requireText(options.paymentMethod, 'paymentMethod');\n\n  if (typeof options.amount === 'number') {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      'createCheckoutJwt: amount must be a decimal string, not a number. It is compared as a string, so 0.1 and \"0.10\" are different mandates',\n    );\n  }\n  const amount = requireText(options.amount, 'amount');\n\n  const key = await resolveKey(options.privateKey);\n  const issuedAt = Math.floor((options.now ?? new Date()).getTime() / 1000);\n  const expiresIn = options.expiresInSeconds ?? DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN_SECONDS;\n  if (!Number.isInteger(expiresIn) || expiresIn <= 0) {\n    throw new TypeError('createCheckoutJwt: expiresInSeconds must be a positive whole number');\n  }\n\n  const agentCommerce: Record<string, string> = {\n    profile: AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n    resource_id: resourceId,\n    input_hash: await computeInputHash(options.input),\n    amount,\n    currency,\n    payment_method: paymentMethod,\n    ...(options.destination !== undefined ? { destination: options.destination } : {}),\n    ...(options.network !== undefined ? { network: options.network } : {}),\n    ...(options.asset !== undefined ? { asset: options.asset } : {}),\n  };\n\n  return new SignJWT({ agent_commerce: agentCommerce })\n    .setProtectedHeader({ alg: AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM, kid, typ: 'JWT' })\n    .setIssuer(issuer)\n    .setAudience(audience)\n    .setIssuedAt(issuedAt)\n    .setExpirationTime(issuedAt + expiresIn)\n    .setJti(options.jwtId ?? crypto.randomUUID())\n    .sign(key);\n}\n","/**\n * Adapter self-description.\n *\n * Imports nothing but core types and the pins, so `doctor` can report AP2\n * without pulling `jose` or `@sd-jwt/core` into the CLI bundle.\n */\nimport type { AdapterDescriptor } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport {\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT,\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_SPEC_VERSION,\n} from './constants.js';\n\n/** What this provider actually verifies */\nexport const AP2_CAPABILITIES: readonly string[] = [\n  'direct-mode',\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT,\n  'sd-jwt-presentation',\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,\n  'static-inline-trust',\n  'merchant-checkout-jwt-binding',\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  'purchase-binding',\n  'replay-defence',\n];\n\n/**\n * Everything an AP2 client may reasonably expect and will not get here.\n * Complete on purpose: a short list reads as \"mostly compatible\", which is the\n * blanket claim alpha honesty forbids.\n */\nexport const AP2_UNSUPPORTED: readonly string[] = [\n  // Mandate kinds. Open mandates carry spending constraints nothing here\n  // evaluates, so accepting one would tell a buyer their limits were checked.\n  'autonomous mode',\n  'open checkout mandates (mandate.checkout.open.1)',\n  'intent mandates',\n  'cart mandates',\n  'spending constraint evaluation',\n  'cnf-bound agent keys',\n  // Key handling. Every key is written into config by an operator\n  'JWKS and any key discovery by URL (jku, x5u)',\n  'issuer metadata fetching',\n  'key rotation without a config change',\n  // Algorithms\n  'signature algorithms other than ES256',\n  'digest algorithms other than sha-256',\n  // Roles this gateway does not play\n  'mandate issuance',\n  'AP2 over the ACP checkout adapter',\n];\n\nexport function buildAp2Descriptor(implementationVersion: string): AdapterDescriptor {\n  return {\n    name: 'ap2',\n    kind: 'authorization',\n    implementationVersion,\n    supportedSpec: `ap2/v${AP2_SPEC_VERSION} mode=direct`,\n    capabilities: AP2_CAPABILITIES,\n    status: 'experimental',\n    unsupported: AP2_UNSUPPORTED,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Durable record of which mandates have been spent.\n *\n * Its own table in its own file: an x402 payment replay key expires with its\n * on-chain authorisation, while a consumed mandate must stay consumed for as\n * long as the merchant can be asked what they delivered. Hence no retention\n * sweep here, unlike the ACP idempotency store next door - deleting a\n * `consumed` row makes that mandate spendable again. If the table ever needs\n * bounding, archive `released` rows and leave the rest.\n *\n * Settlement and a local commit are not one transaction. If the process dies\n * between them the row stays `reserved` and that mandate is refused from then\n * on: a refused retry costs a round trip, the other direction costs a second\n * payment.\n */\nimport type { Database } from 'better-sqlite3';\nimport { type Logger, NOOP_LOGGER } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { openSqliteDatabase } from '../../storage/sqlite.js';\n\n/**\n * `released` is \"nothing happened\" and the only state a mandate can be\n * presented from again. `uncertain` is a settlement whose outcome we never\n * learned: not reusable, but findable by an operator reconciling by hand.\n */\nexport type Ap2AuthorizationState = 'reserved' | 'consumed' | 'released' | 'uncertain';\n\n/**\n * A digest and a few identifiers: everything replay defence needs, and nothing\n * a leaked database would hand an attacker\n */\nexport interface Ap2ReservationRequest {\n  /**\n   * Digest of the ISSUER-SIGNED TOKEN, not of the presentation. Selective\n   * disclosure gives one mandate many presentation strings, so keying on the\n   * presentation would let it be spent once per disclosed subset.\n   */\n  readonly reference: string;\n  /** `jti` of the merchant checkout JWT the mandate binds */\n  readonly checkoutJti: string;\n  readonly mandateIssuer: string;\n  readonly checkoutIssuer: string;\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  readonly requestId: string;\n}\n\nexport type Ap2ReservationResult =\n  | { readonly kind: 'reserved' }\n  /** Already reserved, consumed, or of uncertain outcome. Never re-spendable */\n  | { readonly kind: 'replayed'; readonly state: Ap2AuthorizationState };\n\nexport interface Ap2ReplayStore {\n  /** Atomically claim a mandate, or report that something already holds it */\n  reserve(request: Ap2ReservationRequest): Ap2ReservationResult;\n  /** Settlement succeeded: spend it permanently */\n  consume(reference: string): void;\n  /** Nothing happened: hand it back so a corrected retry can use it */\n  release(reference: string): void;\n  /** Settlement outcome unknown. Not reusable, and flagged for a human */\n  markUncertain(reference: string): void;\n  /** Current state, for tests and diagnostics */\n  stateOf(reference: string): Ap2AuthorizationState | undefined;\n  close(): void;\n}\n\nexport interface Ap2ReplayStoreOptions {\n  /** File path, or ':memory:' for tests */\n  readonly path: string;\n  readonly logger?: Logger;\n  /** Injectable so tests need not move the wall clock */\n  readonly now?: () => number;\n}\n\ninterface StateRow {\n  state: string;\n}\n\nexport function createAp2ReplayStore(options: Ap2ReplayStoreOptions): Ap2ReplayStore {\n  const logger = options.logger ?? NOOP_LOGGER;\n  const now = options.now ?? (() => Date.now());\n\n  const db: Database = openSqliteDatabase({\n    path: options.path,\n    label: 'AP2 authorization database',\n    logger,\n  });\n  migrate(db);\n\n  const selectByReference = db.prepare<[string], StateRow>(\n    'SELECT state FROM ap2_authorizations WHERE reference = ?',\n  );\n  // Two mandates can bind one checkout document, giving two references, so\n  // the reference alone would not catch the second one\n  const selectLiveByJti = db.prepare<[string, string], StateRow>(\n    `SELECT state FROM ap2_authorizations\n      WHERE checkout_jti = ? AND reference != ? AND state != 'released'`,\n  );\n  const insert = db.prepare(\n    `INSERT INTO ap2_authorizations\n       (reference, checkout_jti, mandate_issuer, checkout_issuer, resource_id, request_id,\n        state, created_at, updated_at)\n     VALUES (@reference, @checkout_jti, @mandate_issuer, @checkout_issuer, @resource_id,\n             @request_id, 'reserved', @at, @at)`,\n  );\n  const reReserve = db.prepare(\n    `UPDATE ap2_authorizations\n        SET state = 'reserved', request_id = @request_id, updated_at = @at\n      WHERE reference = @reference AND state = 'released'`,\n  );\n  // Guarded on `reserved`: releasing a `consumed` row would hand back a\n  // mandate whose money has already moved\n  const transition = db.prepare(\n    `UPDATE ap2_authorizations SET state = @state, updated_at = @at\n      WHERE reference = @reference AND state = 'reserved'`,\n  );\n\n  const reserveTx = db.transaction((request: Ap2ReservationRequest): Ap2ReservationResult => {\n    const at = new Date(now()).toISOString();\n\n    const existing = selectByReference.get(request.reference);\n    if (existing !== undefined && existing.state !== 'released') {\n      return { kind: 'replayed', state: existing.state as Ap2AuthorizationState };\n    }\n\n    // Checked for a released reference too: another mandate may have reserved\n    // or spent the same checkout while this one was released\n    const sameCheckout = selectLiveByJti.get(request.checkoutJti, request.reference);\n    if (sameCheckout !== undefined) {\n      return { kind: 'replayed', state: sameCheckout.state as Ap2AuthorizationState };\n    }\n\n    if (existing !== undefined) {\n      reReserve.run({ reference: request.reference, request_id: request.requestId, at });\n      return { kind: 'reserved' };\n    }\n\n    insert.run({\n      reference: request.reference,\n      checkout_jti: request.checkoutJti,\n      mandate_issuer: request.mandateIssuer,\n      checkout_issuer: request.checkoutIssuer,\n      resource_id: request.resourceId,\n      request_id: request.requestId,\n      at,\n    });\n    return { kind: 'reserved' };\n  });\n\n  const move = (reference: string, state: Ap2AuthorizationState): void => {\n    transition.run({ reference, state, at: new Date(now()).toISOString() });\n  };\n\n  let closed = false;\n  return {\n    reserve(request) {\n      return reserveTx(request);\n    },\n    consume(reference) {\n      move(reference, 'consumed');\n    },\n    release(reference) {\n      move(reference, 'released');\n    },\n    markUncertain(reference) {\n      move(reference, 'uncertain');\n    },\n    stateOf(reference) {\n      return selectByReference.get(reference)?.state as Ap2AuthorizationState | undefined;\n    },\n    close() {\n      if (closed) return;\n      closed = true;\n      db.close();\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n// `PRAGMA user_version`, so reopening an existing file is a no-op check\nfunction migrate(db: Database): void {\n  const current = db.pragma('user_version', { simple: true }) as number;\n  if (current >= 1) return;\n  const apply = db.transaction(() => {\n    db.exec(`\n      CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ap2_authorizations (\n        reference        TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n        checkout_jti     TEXT NOT NULL,\n        mandate_issuer   TEXT NOT NULL,\n        checkout_issuer  TEXT NOT NULL,\n        resource_id      TEXT NOT NULL,\n        request_id       TEXT NOT NULL,\n        state            TEXT NOT NULL\n                         CHECK (state IN ('reserved', 'consumed', 'released', 'uncertain')),\n        created_at       TEXT NOT NULL,\n        updated_at       TEXT NOT NULL\n      );\n      CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ap2_authorizations_checkout_jti\n        ON ap2_authorizations(checkout_jti);\n    `);\n    db.pragma('user_version = 1');\n  });\n  apply();\n}\n","/**\n * Stage two: the merchant checkout JWT the mandate binds.\n *\n * Two things have to hold. The hash proves the buyer approved *this* document;\n * the signature proves the merchant issued it. Hash alone accepts a document\n * the buyer wrote themselves; signature alone accepts a genuine merchant\n * document this mandate never covered.\n */\nimport { type JWTVerifyOptions, jwtVerify } from 'jose';\nimport type { Clock } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM } from './constants.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors.js';\nimport type { TrustStore } from './trust.js';\n\nexport interface VerifiedCheckoutJwt {\n  readonly issuer: string;\n  readonly jwtId: string;\n  readonly claims: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n}\n\nfunction decodeSegment(jwt: string, index: 0 | 1): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {\n  const segment = jwt.split('.')[index];\n  if (segment === undefined) return undefined;\n  try {\n    const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(segment, 'base64url').toString('utf8'));\n    return typeof parsed === 'object' && parsed !== null && !Array.isArray(parsed)\n      ? (parsed as Record<string, unknown>)\n      : undefined;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * `mandateClaims` must come from an already-verified mandate: `checkout_hash`\n * is worth nothing unless the issuer signed it\n */\nexport async function verifyCheckoutJwt(\n  mandateClaims: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>,\n  deps: { readonly trust: TrustStore; readonly clock: Clock; readonly clockSkewSeconds: number },\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<VerifiedCheckoutJwt> {\n  const compact = mandateClaims['checkout_jwt'];\n  const expectedHash = mandateClaims['checkout_hash'];\n  if (typeof compact !== 'string' || compact.length === 0) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  if (typeof expectedHash !== 'string' || expectedHash.length === 0) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n\n  await requireMatchingHash(compact, expectedHash, context);\n\n  const header = decodeSegment(compact, 0);\n  const unverifiedPayload = decodeSegment(compact, 1);\n  if (header === undefined || unverifiedPayload === undefined) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('checkout_binding_failed', context);\n  }\n\n  const { issuer, key } = await deps.trust.resolve(\n    unverifiedPayload['iss'],\n    header['kid'],\n    context,\n  );\n\n  const options: JWTVerifyOptions = {\n    algorithms: [AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM],\n    issuer: issuer.issuer,\n    audience: issuer.audience,\n    clockTolerance: deps.clockSkewSeconds,\n    currentDate: deps.clock.now(),\n  };\n\n  let claims: Record<string, unknown>;\n  try {\n    const result = await jwtVerify(compact, key, options);\n    claims = result.payload as Record<string, unknown>;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('checkout_binding_failed', { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  const exp = claims['exp'];\n  const iat = claims['iat'];\n  const jti = claims['jti'];\n  // jose validates a time claim only when present, so requiring them is ours\n  if (typeof exp !== 'number' || typeof iat !== 'number') {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  // `jti` is what replay defence and the receipt record, so it is required\n  if (typeof jti !== 'string' || jti.length === 0) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  const nowSeconds = Math.floor(deps.clock.now().getTime() / 1000);\n  if (iat > nowSeconds + deps.clockSkewSeconds) throw ap2Rejected('expired', context);\n\n  return { issuer: issuer.issuer, jwtId: jti, claims };\n}\n\n/**\n * Hashed as the bytes that arrived, never re-encoded from parsed claims: a\n * re-serialised payload has a different digest, and normalising first would\n * hash a document other than the one being verified\n */\nasync function requireMatchingHash(\n  compact: string,\n  expected: string,\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<void> {\n  // sha-256 only: `_sd_alg` was already pinned to it upstream\n  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(compact));\n  const actual = Buffer.from(digest).toString('base64url');\n  // Plain comparison: both sides are public to anyone holding the\n  // presentation, so there is no secret for timing to leak\n  if (actual !== expected) throw ap2Rejected('checkout_binding_failed', context);\n}\n","/**\n * Stage one: parse the presentation, verify the issuer's signature, resolve\n * the disclosures.\n *\n * Disclosure mechanics come from `@sd-jwt/core`, which refuses the three\n * attacks that live in that algorithm: an appended disclosure nothing\n * references, the same disclosure twice, and one that will not decode.\n * Cryptography is `jose`'s. This file supplies the policy: which key, which\n * algorithm, which audience, what counts as fresh.\n */\nimport { decodeSdJwt, getClaims, splitSdJwt } from '@sd-jwt/core';\nimport { type JWTVerifyOptions, jwtVerify } from 'jose';\nimport type { Clock } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport {\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT,\n  AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n} from './constants.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors.js';\nimport type { TrustStore } from './trust.js';\n\nexport interface VerifiedMandate {\n  readonly issuer: string;\n  /** Every claim, with the presented disclosures resolved into place */\n  readonly claims: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n  /**\n   * The issuer-signed token on its own, without the disclosures.\n   *\n   * This, not the presentation string, is the stable identity of a mandate:\n   * disclosing or withholding an optional claim rewrites the presentation and\n   * leaves the signed token untouched. Replay defence keys on a digest of it.\n   */\n  readonly signedToken: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * `@sd-jwt/core` passes the algorithm it read from `_sd_alg`, so this is also\n * where a presentation declaring anything but sha-256 is refused\n */\nasync function hasher(data: string | ArrayBuffer, algorithm: string): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  if (algorithm.toLowerCase() !== AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM) {\n    throw new Error(`unsupported digest algorithm ${algorithm}`);\n  }\n  const bytes = typeof data === 'string' ? new TextEncoder().encode(data) : new Uint8Array(data);\n  return new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', bytes));\n}\n\nfunction asRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {\n  return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value)\n    ? (value as Record<string, unknown>)\n    : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Order is the security boundary here: nothing is trusted until `jwtVerify`\n * returns. `kid` and `iss` are read before that only to pick which configured\n * key to try, and picking wrong just makes the signature fail.\n */\nexport async function verifyMandate(\n  presentation: string,\n  deps: { readonly trust: TrustStore; readonly clock: Clock; readonly clockSkewSeconds: number },\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<VerifiedMandate> {\n  let decoded: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof decodeSdJwt>>;\n  let encodedJws: string;\n  try {\n    // Covers a malformed base JWT, a disclosure that will not decode, a\n    // duplicate digest, and an `_sd_alg` this release does not implement\n    decoded = await decodeSdJwt(presentation, hasher);\n    encodedJws = splitSdJwt(presentation).jwt;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  // Direct mode issues no key-bound mandates, so one arriving here belongs to\n  // a flow we do not verify. Ignoring it would mean silently not checking a\n  // proof that was sent.\n  if (decoded.kbJwt !== undefined) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('unsupported_mandate_type', context);\n  }\n\n  const rawPayload = asRecord(decoded.jwt.payload);\n  const header = asRecord(decoded.jwt.header);\n  if (rawPayload === undefined || header === undefined) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', context);\n  }\n\n  const { issuer, key } = await deps.trust.resolve(rawPayload['iss'], header['kid'], context);\n\n  const options: JWTVerifyOptions = {\n    // Redundant today (the key is EC, so jose already refuses `alg: none` and\n    // a forged HMAC) and kept for the day this resolves a key set instead of\n    // one key, where the header would get to pick\n    algorithms: [AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM],\n    // Also redundant, and for the same reason: the key was resolved *from*\n    // `iss` against the configured allowlist, so nothing reaching here can\n    // carry a different one. It backstops a future resolver that matches on\n    // something else. `audience` below is not redundant - `aud` is the\n    // presenter's claim, checked against what the operator configured.\n    issuer: issuer.issuer,\n    audience: issuer.audience,\n    clockTolerance: deps.clockSkewSeconds,\n    // Injected clock, not jose's `Date.now()`, so expiry tests are tests\n    currentDate: deps.clock.now(),\n  };\n\n  let verifiedPayload: Record<string, unknown>;\n  try {\n    const result = await jwtVerify(encodedJws, key, options);\n    verifiedPayload = result.payload as Record<string, unknown>;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw ap2Rejected(classifyJoseFailure(cause), { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  requireFreshness(verifiedPayload, deps, context);\n\n  let claims: Record<string, unknown>;\n  try {\n    // Against the VERIFIED payload: the decoded one would match disclosures\n    // against digests nobody signed\n    claims = (await getClaims(verifiedPayload, decoded.disclosures, hasher)) as Record<\n      string,\n      unknown\n    >;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    // Where an appended disclosure that no digest references is refused\n    throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  requireClosedCheckoutMandate(claims, context);\n\n  return { issuer: issuer.issuer, claims, signedToken: encodedJws };\n}\n\n/**\n * Matched on jose's stable error `code`, not its message. A client is owed\n * \"expired\" versus \"did not verify\"; anything finer describes our checks back\n * to whoever is probing them.\n */\nfunction classifyJoseFailure(cause: unknown): 'expired' | 'wrong_audience' | 'invalid_signature' {\n  const code = (cause as { code?: unknown })?.code;\n  if (code === 'ERR_JWT_EXPIRED') return 'expired';\n  if (code === 'ERR_JWT_CLAIM_VALIDATION_FAILED') {\n    const claim = (cause as { claim?: unknown }).claim;\n    if (claim === 'aud') return 'wrong_audience';\n    if (claim === 'nbf' || claim === 'exp') return 'expired';\n  }\n  return 'invalid_signature';\n}\n\n/**\n * Required, not merely checked when present: jose validates a time claim only\n * if it is there, so a mandate omitting `exp` would verify and never expire\n */\nfunction requireFreshness(\n  payload: Record<string, unknown>,\n  deps: { readonly clock: Clock; readonly clockSkewSeconds: number },\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): void {\n  const exp = payload['exp'];\n  const iat = payload['iat'];\n  if (typeof exp !== 'number' || typeof iat !== 'number') {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  const nowSeconds = Math.floor(deps.clock.now().getTime() / 1000);\n  // A future `iat` is a broken signer, or a mandate minted to outlive its own\n  // expiry window\n  if (iat > nowSeconds + deps.clockSkewSeconds) throw ap2Rejected('expired', context);\n}\n\n// Exactly `mandate.checkout.1`; see AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT for why\nfunction requireClosedCheckoutMandate(\n  claims: Record<string, unknown>,\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): void {\n  if (claims['vct'] !== AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('unsupported_mandate_type', context);\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Static key resolution.\n *\n * Every key was written into `config.yaml` by an operator. No JWKS fetch, no\n * `jku`, no `x5u`. A mandate's `iss` and `kid` only choose *which* trusted key\n * verifies it; an unrecognised pair is refused, so a mandate can never\n * nominate its own signer.\n *\n * Not a \"try every key\" loop: that would make `kid` advisory and accept a\n * mandate that named a key it was not signed with.\n */\nimport { importJWK, type JWK } from 'jose';\nimport { AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM } from './constants.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected, ap2Unavailable } from './errors.js';\nimport type { Ap2TrustedIssuer } from './types.js';\n\n/** Named off `importJWK` because `CryptoKey` is a DOM type we do not load */\nexport type VerificationKey = Awaited<ReturnType<typeof importJWK>>;\n\nexport interface ResolvedKey {\n  readonly issuer: Ap2TrustedIssuer;\n  readonly key: VerificationKey;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolves `(iss, kid)` against one configured issuer list. Caches the import\n * promise, not the key, so concurrent requests for a cold key share one import.\n */\nexport function createTrustStore(issuers: readonly Ap2TrustedIssuer[]) {\n  const byIssuer = new Map(issuers.map((entry) => [entry.issuer, entry]));\n  const imported = new Map<string, Promise<VerificationKey>>();\n\n  return {\n    /** Every trusted issuer id, for diagnostics. Never the keys themselves */\n    issuerIds(): readonly string[] {\n      return [...byIssuer.keys()];\n    },\n\n    async resolve(iss: unknown, kid: unknown, context: Ap2ErrorContext): Promise<ResolvedKey> {\n      if (typeof iss !== 'string' || iss.length === 0) {\n        throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n      }\n      const issuer = byIssuer.get(iss);\n      if (issuer === undefined) throw ap2Rejected('untrusted_issuer', context);\n\n      // Not defaulted to the issuer's only key: mid-rotation there are two,\n      // and the gateway should not guess which one signed this\n      if (typeof kid !== 'string' || kid.length === 0) {\n        throw ap2Rejected('unknown_key', context);\n      }\n      const trusted = issuer.keys.find((candidate) => candidate.kid === kid);\n      if (trusted === undefined) throw ap2Rejected('unknown_key', context);\n\n      // JSON, not a joined string: both halves are operator-chosen and could\n      // contain whatever separator we picked\n      const cacheKey = JSON.stringify([iss, kid]);\n      let pending = imported.get(cacheKey);\n      if (pending === undefined) {\n        pending = importJWK(trusted.jwk as JWK, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM);\n        imported.set(cacheKey, pending);\n      }\n\n      try {\n        return { issuer, key: await pending };\n      } catch (cause) {\n        // Config already checked this JWK member by member, so reaching here\n        // means our config is broken, not the mandate. Drop the cached\n        // rejection so a fixed config is not still failing against it.\n        imported.delete(cacheKey);\n        throw ap2Unavailable('configured verification key could not be imported', {\n          ...context,\n          cause,\n        });\n      }\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nexport type TrustStore = ReturnType<typeof createTrustStore>;\n","/**\n * The Direct Checkout Mandate verifier: mandate signature first, then the\n * merchant checkout JWT it binds. Either stage failing is a refusal.\n *\n * What this proves is narrow. A trusted issuer signed this mandate, it has not\n * expired, it is addressed to us, and it binds a checkout document the\n * merchant signed. It does NOT prove the mandate authorises the purchase in\n * front of us: that is profile.ts, and a caller treating this as permission to\n * settle has skipped it.\n */\nimport type { Clock } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { verifyCheckoutJwt } from './checkout-jwt.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors.js';\nimport { verifyMandate } from './sd-jwt.js';\nimport { createTrustStore } from './trust.js';\nimport type { EnabledAp2Config, VerifiedCheckoutMandate } from './types.js';\n\nexport interface Ap2VerifierOptions {\n  readonly config: EnabledAp2Config;\n  readonly clock: Clock;\n}\n\nexport interface Ap2MandateVerifier {\n  verify(presentation: string, context?: Ap2ErrorContext): Promise<VerifiedCheckoutMandate>;\n  /** Trusted issuer ids, for `doctor`. Counts and names only, never keys */\n  trustedIssuers(): { readonly mandate: readonly string[]; readonly checkout: readonly string[] };\n}\n\n/**\n * Algorithm-prefixed so a future digest change is visible in stored references\n * rather than silently producing unequal values for one mandate\n */\nasync function mandateReference(signedToken: string): Promise<string> {\n  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(signedToken));\n  return `sha256:${Buffer.from(digest).toString('base64url')}`;\n}\n\nexport function createAp2MandateVerifier(options: Ap2VerifierOptions): Ap2MandateVerifier {\n  // Two stores, not one list: signing the merchant's checkout documents must\n  // not confer the power to issue mandates\n  const mandateTrust = createTrustStore(options.config.trust.mandateIssuers);\n  const checkoutTrust = createTrustStore(options.config.trust.checkoutIssuers);\n  const deps = { clock: options.clock, clockSkewSeconds: options.config.clockSkewSeconds };\n\n  return {\n    async verify(\n      presentation: string,\n      context: Ap2ErrorContext = {},\n    ): Promise<VerifiedCheckoutMandate> {\n      if (typeof presentation !== 'string' || presentation.length === 0) {\n        throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', context);\n      }\n\n      const mandate = await verifyMandate(presentation, { ...deps, trust: mandateTrust }, context);\n      const checkout = await verifyCheckoutJwt(\n        mandate.claims,\n        { ...deps, trust: checkoutTrust },\n        context,\n      );\n\n      return {\n        reference: await mandateReference(mandate.signedToken),\n        mandateIssuer: mandate.issuer,\n        checkoutIssuer: checkout.issuer,\n        checkoutJwtId: checkout.jwtId,\n        checkoutClaims: checkout.claims,\n        mandateClaims: mandate.claims,\n      };\n    },\n\n    trustedIssuers() {\n      return { mandate: mandateTrust.issuerIds(), checkout: checkoutTrust.issuerIds() };\n    },\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * The AP2 authorization provider: the seam between core's generic contract and\n * the mandate machinery.\n *\n * The provider owns its replay store. The caller that creates the provider must\n * call `close()`; `createGateway` does not close authorization providers.\n */\nimport type {\n  AdapterHealth,\n  AuthorizationFinalizeContext,\n  AuthorizationProvider,\n  AuthorizationRequirement,\n  AuthorizationVerification,\n  AuthorizationVerificationContext,\n  Clock,\n  Logger,\n} from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { NOOP_LOGGER, systemClock } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { PACKAGE_VERSION } from '../../version.js';\nimport { AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE, AP2_SPEC_VERSION } from './constants.js';\nimport { buildAp2Descriptor } from './descriptor.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Replayed, ap2Unavailable } from './errors.js';\nimport { bindMandateToPurchase } from './profile.js';\nimport { type Ap2ReplayStore, createAp2ReplayStore } from './replay-store.js';\nimport type { EnabledAp2Config } from './types.js';\nimport { createAp2MandateVerifier } from './verifier.js';\n\nexport interface Ap2AuthorizationProviderOptions {\n  readonly config: EnabledAp2Config;\n  readonly clock?: Clock;\n  readonly logger?: Logger;\n  /** Injectable so tests need not touch the filesystem */\n  readonly replayStore?: Ap2ReplayStore;\n}\n\nexport interface Ap2AuthorizationProvider extends AuthorizationProvider {\n  /** Closes the replay store */\n  close(): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * A reservation is keyed by the mandate reference, so the handle and the\n * receipt's identity are the same digest. Kept as one name rather than two\n * fields that must never disagree.\n */\nexport function createAp2AuthorizationProvider(\n  options: Ap2AuthorizationProviderOptions,\n): Ap2AuthorizationProvider {\n  const clock = options.clock ?? systemClock;\n  const logger = options.logger ?? NOOP_LOGGER;\n\n  const verifier = createAp2MandateVerifier({ config: options.config, clock });\n  const replay =\n    options.replayStore ?? createAp2ReplayStore({ path: options.config.replay.path, logger });\n\n  const requirement: AuthorizationRequirement = {\n    method: 'ap2',\n    version: AP2_SPEC_VERSION,\n    profile: AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  };\n\n  async function verifyAndReserve(\n    context: AuthorizationVerificationContext,\n  ): Promise<AuthorizationVerification> {\n    const errorContext: Ap2ErrorContext = {\n      requestId: context.requestId,\n      resourceId: context.resourceId,\n    };\n\n    const mandate = await verifier.verify(context.submission.payload, errorContext);\n    // Before reserving, not after: a mandate that does not authorize this\n    // purchase must stay spendable on the purchase it does authorize\n    await bindMandateToPurchase(mandate, context, errorContext);\n\n    let reservation: ReturnType<Ap2ReplayStore['reserve']>;\n    try {\n      reservation = replay.reserve({\n        reference: mandate.reference,\n        checkoutJti: mandate.checkoutJwtId,\n        mandateIssuer: mandate.mandateIssuer,\n        checkoutIssuer: mandate.checkoutIssuer,\n        resourceId: context.resourceId,\n        requestId: context.requestId,\n      });\n    } catch (cause) {\n      throw ap2Unavailable('replay store could not be written', { ...errorContext, cause });\n    }\n\n    if (reservation.kind === 'replayed') {\n      throw ap2Replayed(reservation.state, errorContext);\n    }\n\n    return {\n      status: 'verified',\n      method: 'ap2',\n      reference: mandate.reference,\n      reservationId: mandate.reference,\n      // Opaque identifiers an operator can reconcile with. Never a claim from\n      // the mandate: those carry the buyer's purchase and their personal data.\n      // `checkoutId`, not `checkoutJwtId` - the receipt store redacts any key\n      // that reads as secret-shaped, and \"jwt\" is on that list.\n      metadata: {\n        mandateIssuer: mandate.mandateIssuer,\n        checkoutIssuer: mandate.checkoutIssuer,\n        checkoutId: mandate.checkoutJwtId,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  const finalize = (\n    action: 'consume' | 'release' | 'markUncertain',\n    reservationId: string,\n    context: AuthorizationFinalizeContext,\n  ): void => {\n    try {\n      replay[action](reservationId);\n    } catch (cause) {\n      throw ap2Unavailable(`replay store could not record ${action}`, { ...context, cause });\n    }\n  };\n\n  return {\n    name: 'ap2',\n    descriptor: buildAp2Descriptor(PACKAGE_VERSION),\n    requirement,\n    verifyAndReserve,\n\n    async consume(reservationId, context) {\n      finalize('consume', reservationId, context);\n    },\n    async release(reservationId, context) {\n      finalize('release', reservationId, context);\n    },\n    async markUncertain(reservationId, context) {\n      finalize('markUncertain', reservationId, context);\n    },\n\n    async health(): Promise<AdapterHealth> {\n      const startedAt = clock.monotonicMs();\n      const trusted = verifier.trustedIssuers();\n      const checkedAt = clock.nowIso();\n      const durationMs = Math.round(clock.monotonicMs() - startedAt);\n      try {\n        // A read against the real table, so a database that opened but cannot\n        // be queried is caught here rather than on the first purchase\n        replay.stateOf('health-probe');\n      } catch {\n        // A fixed token, never a sentence built from the caught error\n        return { status: 'fail', checkedAt, durationMs, detail: 'replay-store-unavailable' };\n      }\n      return {\n        status: 'pass',\n        checkedAt,\n        durationMs,\n        detail: `mandate-issuers=${trusted.mandate.length} checkout-issuers=${trusted.checkout.length}`,\n      };\n    },\n\n    close() {\n      replay.close();\n    },\n  };\n}\n"]}
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* Every failure the AP2 verifier can report.\n *\n * `CommerceError.message` reaches the client, and a mandate carries the\n * buyer's purchase and often personal data, so messages are fixed phrases from\n * the list below. The machine-readable code goes in `details.reason` and the\n * original exception on `cause`, which is never serialized.\n *\n * Three codes: AUTHORIZATION_INVALID when the buyer's mandate is bad,\n * AUTHORIZATION_REPLAYED when it is good but spent, and\n * AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE when our verifier never reached a\n * verdict. Blaming the buyer for our outage refuses a good mandate.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core';\n\n/**\n * Coarse on purpose: a client learns roughly where its mandate was refused,\n * not which check failed. Finer detail is an oracle for probing trust policy,\n * so a mandate signed with a disallowed algorithm reports `invalid_signature`\n * and one declaring a digest other than sha-256 `malformed_presentation`.\n */\nexport const AP2_REJECTION_REASONS = [\n  'malformed_presentation',\n  'untrusted_issuer',\n  'unknown_key',\n  'invalid_signature',\n  'invalid_claims',\n  'expired',\n  'wrong_audience',\n  'unsupported_mandate_type',\n  'checkout_binding_failed',\n  'purchase_mismatch',\n] as const;\n\nexport type Ap2RejectionReason = (typeof AP2_REJECTION_REASONS)[number];\n\nconst MESSAGES: Readonly<Record<Ap2RejectionReason, string>> = {\n  malformed_presentation: 'The authorization is not a well-formed SD-JWT presentation.',\n  untrusted_issuer: 'The mandate was issued by a party this merchant does not trust.',\n  unknown_key: 'The mandate names a signing key this merchant does not trust.',\n  invalid_signature: 'The mandate signature did not verify.',\n  invalid_claims: 'The mandate is missing required claims or they are malformed.',\n  expired: 'The mandate is expired or not yet valid.',\n  wrong_audience: 'The mandate is addressed to a different audience.',\n  unsupported_mandate_type: 'The mandate is not a closed Direct Checkout Mandate.',\n  checkout_binding_failed: 'The merchant checkout document bound to the mandate did not verify.',\n  purchase_mismatch: 'The mandate does not authorize this purchase.',\n};\n\nexport interface Ap2ErrorContext {\n  readonly requestId?: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n  readonly cause?: unknown;\n}\n\n/** The buyer's mandate is bad. Fail closed */\nexport function ap2Rejected(\n  reason: Ap2RejectionReason,\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext = {},\n): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError('AUTHORIZATION_INVALID', MESSAGES[reason], {\n    details: { method: 'ap2', reason },\n    ...(context.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: context.requestId } : {}),\n    ...(context.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: context.resourceId } : {}),\n    ...(context.cause !== undefined ? { cause: context.cause } : {}),\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * The mandate verified but has already been presented. A separate code from\n * a bad mandate: nothing is wrong with this mandate except that it is spent.\n */\nexport function ap2Replayed(state: string, context: Ap2ErrorContext = {}): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError(\n    'AUTHORIZATION_REPLAYED',\n    'This mandate has already been presented and cannot authorize another purchase.',\n    {\n      details: { method: 'ap2', reason: 'replayed', state },\n      ...(context.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: context.requestId } : {}),\n      ...(context.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: context.resourceId } : {}),\n    },\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * The check never ran (a configured key that will not import, say). Retryable,\n * and never recorded against the payer: the mandate may be perfectly good.\n */\nexport function ap2Unavailable(detail: string, context: Ap2ErrorContext = {}): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError(\n    'AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n    'Authorization could not be verified right now. This is a merchant-side fault, not a problem with the presented mandate.',\n    {\n      details: { method: 'ap2', reason: 'verifier_unavailable', detail },\n      ...(context.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: context.requestId } : {}),\n      ...(context.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: context.resourceId } : {}),\n      ...(context.cause !== undefined ? { cause: context.cause } : {}),\n    },\n  );\n}\n","import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';\n\n/** SHA-256, the only digest AP2 verification and signing use. A string is hashed as UTF-8 */\nexport function sha256(data: string | Uint8Array): Buffer {\n  return createHash('sha256').update(data).digest();\n}\n","/**\n * Binds a verified mandate to the purchase in front of us. Without this\n * comparison a mandate approved for a $0.01 report would settle a $500 one.\n *\n * Everything is compared against the ALREADY RESOLVED request. Nothing is\n * taken from the mandate to shape the purchase, which would invert the\n * control.\n */\nimport canonicalize from 'canonicalize';\nimport { type AuthorizationVerificationContext, CommerceError } from '../../core';\nimport { isRecord } from '../../core/is-record';\nimport { AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE } from './constants';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors';\nimport { sha256 } from './sha256';\nimport type { VerifiedCheckoutMandate } from './types';\n\n/**\n * All required. Absent is a mismatch, never a skipped check: a mandate that\n * will not say which resource or how much authorizes nothing in particular.\n */\nconst REQUIRED_PROFILE_CLAIMS = [\n  'profile',\n  'resource_id',\n  'input_hash',\n  'amount',\n  'currency',\n  'payment_method',\n] as const;\n\n/**\n * RFC 8785 (JCS) digest of the validated resource input.\n *\n * Binds a mandate to the exact request, not just to a resource and a price:\n * without it, one mandate for `translate` would authorize any translation.\n *\n * The merchant's signer, possibly in another language, agrees with this digest\n * only if it follows RFC 8785's number formatting and UTF-16 key ordering too;\n * sorting keys is not enough.\n *\n * The caller passes what the backend will receive: validated, reserved fields\n * stripped, no request id or transport metadata (the buyer could not have\n * known those when they approved).\n */\nexport function computeInputHash(input: unknown): string {\n  const canonical = canonicalize(input ?? {});\n  // undefined means JSON cannot represent the value (a function, say). On the\n  // gateway path the input already passed schema validation, so this is not a\n  // buyer error.\n  if (canonical === undefined) {\n    throw new CommerceError('INTERNAL_ERROR', 'resource input is not canonicalizable JSON');\n  }\n  return sha256(canonical).toString('base64url');\n}\n\nconst EVM_ADDRESS = /^0x[0-9a-f]{40}$/i;\n\n// EIP-55 encodes an address checksum through letter casing, so lowercase and\n// checksummed forms identify the same account. Other values compare exactly.\nfunction sameCoordinate(declared: unknown, expected: string | undefined): boolean {\n  if (typeof declared === 'string' && expected !== undefined) {\n    if (EVM_ADDRESS.test(declared) && EVM_ADDRESS.test(expected)) {\n      return declared.toLowerCase() === expected.toLowerCase();\n    }\n  }\n  return declared === expected;\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws on the first mismatch with one coarse reason. Which field disagreed\n * is not reported: a caller able to ask about one field at a time can read a\n * mandate's contents out of the gateway by elimination.\n */\nexport async function bindMandateToPurchase(\n  mandate: VerifiedCheckoutMandate,\n  context: AuthorizationVerificationContext,\n  errorContext: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const profile = mandate.checkoutClaims['agent_commerce'];\n  if (!isRecord(profile)) throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n\n  for (const claim of REQUIRED_PROFILE_CLAIMS) {\n    const value = profile[claim];\n    if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) {\n      throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n    }\n  }\n\n  const requirement = context.requirement;\n  const expectedInputHash = computeInputHash(context.input);\n\n  const mustMatch: readonly (readonly [string, unknown])[] = [\n    ['profile', AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE],\n    ['resource_id', context.resourceId],\n    ['input_hash', expectedInputHash],\n    // Decimal strings on both sides. Comparing numerically would make \"0.10\"\n    // and \"0.1\" equal, and a mandate says what it says.\n    ['amount', requirement.amount],\n    ['currency', requirement.currency],\n    ['payment_method', requirement.provider],\n  ];\n\n  for (const [claim, expected] of mustMatch) {\n    if (profile[claim] !== expected) throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n  }\n\n  // Checked whenever EITHER side names one, which is the fail-closed reading.\n  // A mandate silent about the chain must not unlock a mainnet settlement, and\n  // one naming a chain the requirement lacks was approved for another rail.\n  for (const [claim, expected] of [\n    ['destination', requirement.destination],\n    ['network', requirement.network],\n    ['asset', requirement.asset],\n  ] as const) {\n    const declared = profile[claim];\n    if (declared === undefined && expected === undefined) continue;\n    if (!sameCoordinate(declared, expected)) throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Merchant-side helper: mints the checkout JWT a Checkout Mandate binds.\n *\n * A merchant runs it in their own process, with their own key, to produce the\n * document the buyer approves; the gateway never calls it. It mirrors\n * `createPaymentProof`, which a buyer runs to produce a payment proof.\n *\n * It exists mainly for `input_hash`, an RFC 8785 digest. A serializer that\n * only sorts keys, as many non-JavaScript JSON libraries do, can disagree with\n * it on floats and non-ASCII keys, and the mandate is then refused with a\n * reason that does not name the field.\n */\nimport { importPKCS8, type JWK, SignJWT } from 'jose';\nimport {\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  AP2_JWK_CURVE,\n  AP2_KEY_TYPE,\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n} from './constants';\nimport { computeInputHash } from './profile';\n\n/**\n * A private ES256 key: either a private JWK (the pair of the public one in the\n * gateway's `checkoutIssuers`) or a PKCS#8 PEM, as `openssl` emits it\n */\nexport type Ap2SigningKey = Readonly<Record<string, unknown>> | string;\n\nexport interface CreateCheckoutJwtOptions {\n  readonly privateKey: Ap2SigningKey;\n  /** Must match a `kid` configured under the gateway's `checkoutIssuers` */\n  readonly kid: string;\n  /** Must match that issuer's configured `issuer` */\n  readonly issuer: string;\n  /** Must match that issuer's configured `audience` */\n  readonly audience: string;\n\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  /**\n   * The resource input this purchase is for, exactly as the buyer will send\n   * it: no reserved fields, no request id, no transport metadata\n   */\n  readonly input: unknown;\n\n  /**\n   * Decimal string, never a number, and compared as a string: `0.10` and `0.1`\n   * are different mandates. Take it from your own catalog rather than from\n   * whatever the agent asked for.\n   */\n  readonly amount: string;\n  readonly currency: string;\n  /** The rail that will settle, e.g. `x402` */\n  readonly paymentMethod: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Settlement coordinates. Required whenever the gateway's requirement names\n   * them, which under x402 is always. A mandate silent about the chain will\n   * not unlock a settlement on one.\n   */\n  readonly destination?: string;\n  readonly network?: string;\n  readonly asset?: string;\n\n  /** Defaults to a random UUID. Recorded on the receipt and used for replay defense */\n  readonly jwtId?: string;\n  /** Defaults to 900: a human approval sits inside this window */\n  readonly expiresInSeconds?: number;\n  /** Injectable so a test need not move the wall clock */\n  readonly now?: Date;\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN_SECONDS = 900;\n\nfunction requireText(value: unknown, field: string): string {\n  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      `createCheckoutJwt: ${field} must be a non-empty string, received ${describe(value)}`,\n    );\n  }\n  return value;\n}\n\nfunction describe(value: unknown): string {\n  return value === null ? 'null' : typeof value;\n}\n\n/**\n * Every rejection here is a mistake that would otherwise surface as an opaque\n * verification failure much later: the public half of the pair, the wrong key\n * type, or a PEM that is not PKCS#8\n */\nasync function resolveKey(\n  key: Ap2SigningKey,\n): Promise<JWK | Awaited<ReturnType<typeof importPKCS8>>> {\n  if (typeof key === 'string') {\n    if (!key.includes('BEGIN PRIVATE KEY')) {\n      throw new TypeError(\n        'createCheckoutJwt: a string privateKey must be a PKCS#8 PEM beginning \"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\"',\n      );\n    }\n    return importPKCS8(key, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM);\n  }\n  if (typeof key !== 'object' || key === null) {\n    throw new TypeError('createCheckoutJwt: privateKey must be a private JWK or a PKCS#8 PEM');\n  }\n  if (key['d'] === undefined) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      'createCheckoutJwt: privateKey is a public JWK (no \"d\"). Use the private half of the pair whose public key is configured under checkoutIssuers',\n    );\n  }\n  if (key['kty'] !== AP2_KEY_TYPE || key['crv'] !== AP2_JWK_CURVE) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      `createCheckoutJwt: privateKey must be ${AP2_KEY_TYPE}/${AP2_JWK_CURVE}, the pair ${AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM} implies`,\n    );\n  }\n  return key as JWK;\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns the compact JWT to hand to the agent, which wraps it in the Checkout\n * Mandate the buyer signs\n */\nexport async function createCheckoutJwt(options: CreateCheckoutJwtOptions): Promise<string> {\n  const kid = requireText(options.kid, 'kid');\n  const issuer = requireText(options.issuer, 'issuer');\n  const audience = requireText(options.audience, 'audience');\n  const resourceId = requireText(options.resourceId, 'resourceId');\n  const currency = requireText(options.currency, 'currency');\n  const paymentMethod = requireText(options.paymentMethod, 'paymentMethod');\n\n  if (typeof options.amount === 'number') {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      'createCheckoutJwt: amount must be a decimal string, not a number. It is compared as a string, so 0.1 and \"0.10\" are different mandates',\n    );\n  }\n  const amount = requireText(options.amount, 'amount');\n\n  const key = await resolveKey(options.privateKey);\n  const issuedAt = Math.floor((options.now ?? new Date()).getTime() / 1000);\n  const expiresIn = options.expiresInSeconds ?? DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN_SECONDS;\n  if (!Number.isInteger(expiresIn) || expiresIn <= 0) {\n    throw new TypeError('createCheckoutJwt: expiresInSeconds must be a positive whole number');\n  }\n\n  const agentCommerce: Record<string, string> = {\n    profile: AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n    resource_id: resourceId,\n    input_hash: computeInputHash(options.input),\n    amount,\n    currency,\n    payment_method: paymentMethod,\n    ...(options.destination !== undefined ? { destination: options.destination } : {}),\n    ...(options.network !== undefined ? { network: options.network } : {}),\n    ...(options.asset !== undefined ? { asset: options.asset } : {}),\n  };\n\n  return new SignJWT({ agent_commerce: agentCommerce })\n    .setProtectedHeader({ alg: AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM, kid, typ: 'JWT' })\n    .setIssuer(issuer)\n    .setAudience(audience)\n    .setIssuedAt(issuedAt)\n    .setExpirationTime(issuedAt + expiresIn)\n    .setJti(options.jwtId ?? crypto.randomUUID())\n    .sign(key);\n}\n","/**\n * Adapter self-description.\n *\n * Imports nothing but core types and the pins, so `doctor` can report AP2\n * without pulling `jose` or `@sd-jwt/core` into the CLI bundle.\n */\nimport type { AdapterDescriptor } from '../../core';\nimport {\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT,\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_SPEC_VERSION,\n} from './constants';\n\n/** What this provider actually verifies */\nexport const AP2_CAPABILITIES: readonly string[] = [\n  'direct-mode',\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT,\n  'sd-jwt-presentation',\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,\n  'static-inline-trust',\n  'merchant-checkout-jwt-binding',\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  'purchase-binding',\n  'replay-defence',\n];\n\n/**\n * Major AP2 features this provider does not support, published in its\n * descriptor and printed by `doctor`, so no client assumes full protocol\n * support\n */\nexport const AP2_UNSUPPORTED: readonly string[] = [\n  // Mandate kinds. Open mandates are refused: see AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT\n  'autonomous mode',\n  'open checkout mandates (mandate.checkout.open.1)',\n  'intent mandates',\n  'cart mandates',\n  'spending constraint evaluation',\n  'cnf-bound agent keys',\n  // Key handling. Every key is written into config by an operator\n  'JWKS and any key discovery by URL (jku, x5u)',\n  'issuer metadata fetching',\n  'key rotation without a config change',\n  // Algorithms\n  'signature algorithms other than ES256',\n  'digest algorithms other than sha-256',\n  // Roles this gateway does not play\n  'mandate issuance',\n  'AP2 over the ACP checkout adapter',\n];\n\nexport function buildAp2Descriptor(implementationVersion: string): AdapterDescriptor {\n  return {\n    name: 'ap2',\n    kind: 'authorization',\n    implementationVersion,\n    supportedSpec: `ap2/v${AP2_SPEC_VERSION} mode=direct`,\n    capabilities: AP2_CAPABILITIES,\n    status: 'experimental',\n    unsupported: AP2_UNSUPPORTED,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Durable record of which mandates have been spent.\n *\n * Its own table in its own file: a payment replay key is needed only until its\n * authorization's `validBefore`, after which it cannot settle, while a consumed\n * mandate must stay consumed for as long as the merchant can be asked what they\n * delivered. Hence no retention sweep, unlike the ACP idempotency store:\n * deleting a `consumed` row makes that mandate spendable again. If the table\n * ever needs bounding, archive `released` rows and leave the rest.\n *\n * Settlement and a local commit are not one transaction. If the process dies\n * between them the row stays `reserved` and that mandate is refused from then\n * on: a refused retry costs a round trip, the other direction costs a second\n * payment.\n */\nimport type { Database } from 'better-sqlite3';\nimport { type Logger, NOOP_LOGGER } from '../../core';\nimport { openSqliteDatabase } from '../../storage/sqlite';\n\n/**\n * `released` is \"nothing happened\" and the only state a mandate can be\n * presented from again. `uncertain` is a settlement whose outcome we never\n * learned: not reusable, but findable by an operator reconciling by hand.\n */\nexport type Ap2AuthorizationState = 'reserved' | 'consumed' | 'released' | 'uncertain';\n\n/**\n * A digest and a few identifiers: everything replay defense needs, and nothing\n * a leaked database would hand an attacker\n */\nexport interface Ap2ReservationRequest {\n  /**\n   * Digest of the ISSUER-SIGNED TOKEN, not of the presentation. Selective\n   * disclosure gives one mandate many presentation strings, so keying on the\n   * presentation would let it be spent once per disclosed subset.\n   */\n  readonly reference: string;\n  /** `jti` of the merchant checkout JWT the mandate binds */\n  readonly checkoutJti: string;\n  readonly mandateIssuer: string;\n  readonly checkoutIssuer: string;\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  readonly requestId: string;\n}\n\nexport type Ap2ReservationResult =\n  | { readonly kind: 'reserved' }\n  /** Already reserved, consumed, or of uncertain outcome. Never re-spendable */\n  | { readonly kind: 'replayed'; readonly state: Ap2AuthorizationState };\n\nexport interface Ap2ReplayStore {\n  /** Atomically claim a mandate, or report that something already holds it */\n  reserve(request: Ap2ReservationRequest): Ap2ReservationResult;\n  /** Settlement succeeded: spend it permanently */\n  consume(reference: string): void;\n  /** Nothing happened: hand it back so a corrected retry can use it */\n  release(reference: string): void;\n  /** Settlement outcome unknown. Not reusable, and flagged for a human */\n  markUncertain(reference: string): void;\n  /** Current state, for tests and diagnostics */\n  stateOf(reference: string): Ap2AuthorizationState | undefined;\n  close(): void;\n}\n\nexport interface Ap2ReplayStoreOptions {\n  /** File path, or ':memory:' for tests */\n  readonly path: string;\n  readonly logger?: Logger;\n  /** Injectable so tests need not move the wall clock */\n  readonly now?: () => number;\n}\n\ninterface StateRow {\n  state: string;\n}\n\nexport function createAp2ReplayStore(options: Ap2ReplayStoreOptions): Ap2ReplayStore {\n  const logger = options.logger ?? NOOP_LOGGER;\n  const now = options.now ?? (() => Date.now());\n\n  const db: Database = openSqliteDatabase({\n    path: options.path,\n    label: 'AP2 authorization database',\n    logger,\n  });\n  migrate(db);\n\n  const selectByReference = db.prepare<[string], StateRow>(\n    'SELECT state FROM ap2_authorizations WHERE reference = ?',\n  );\n  // Two mandates can bind one checkout document, giving two references, so\n  // the reference alone would not catch the second one\n  const selectLiveByJti = db.prepare<[string, string], StateRow>(\n    `SELECT state FROM ap2_authorizations\n      WHERE checkout_jti = ? AND reference != ? AND state != 'released'`,\n  );\n  const insert = db.prepare(\n    `INSERT INTO ap2_authorizations\n       (reference, checkout_jti, mandate_issuer, checkout_issuer, resource_id, request_id,\n        state, created_at, updated_at)\n     VALUES (@reference, @checkout_jti, @mandate_issuer, @checkout_issuer, @resource_id,\n             @request_id, 'reserved', @at, @at)`,\n  );\n  const reReserve = db.prepare(\n    `UPDATE ap2_authorizations\n        SET state = 'reserved', request_id = @request_id, updated_at = @at\n      WHERE reference = @reference AND state = 'released'`,\n  );\n  // Guarded on `reserved`: releasing a `consumed` row would hand back a\n  // mandate whose money has already moved\n  const transition = db.prepare(\n    `UPDATE ap2_authorizations SET state = @state, updated_at = @at\n      WHERE reference = @reference AND state = 'reserved'`,\n  );\n\n  const reserveTx = db.transaction((request: Ap2ReservationRequest): Ap2ReservationResult => {\n    const at = new Date(now()).toISOString();\n\n    const existing = selectByReference.get(request.reference);\n    if (existing !== undefined && existing.state !== 'released') {\n      return { kind: 'replayed', state: existing.state as Ap2AuthorizationState };\n    }\n\n    // Checked for a released reference too: another mandate may have reserved\n    // or spent the same checkout while this one was released\n    const sameCheckout = selectLiveByJti.get(request.checkoutJti, request.reference);\n    if (sameCheckout !== undefined) {\n      return { kind: 'replayed', state: sameCheckout.state as Ap2AuthorizationState };\n    }\n\n    if (existing !== undefined) {\n      reReserve.run({ reference: request.reference, request_id: request.requestId, at });\n      return { kind: 'reserved' };\n    }\n\n    insert.run({\n      reference: request.reference,\n      checkout_jti: request.checkoutJti,\n      mandate_issuer: request.mandateIssuer,\n      checkout_issuer: request.checkoutIssuer,\n      resource_id: request.resourceId,\n      request_id: request.requestId,\n      at,\n    });\n    return { kind: 'reserved' };\n  });\n\n  const move = (reference: string, state: Ap2AuthorizationState): void => {\n    transition.run({ reference, state, at: new Date(now()).toISOString() });\n  };\n\n  let closed = false;\n  return {\n    reserve(request) {\n      return reserveTx(request);\n    },\n    consume(reference) {\n      move(reference, 'consumed');\n    },\n    release(reference) {\n      move(reference, 'released');\n    },\n    markUncertain(reference) {\n      move(reference, 'uncertain');\n    },\n    stateOf(reference) {\n      return selectByReference.get(reference)?.state as Ap2AuthorizationState | undefined;\n    },\n    close() {\n      if (closed) return;\n      closed = true;\n      db.close();\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n// `PRAGMA user_version`, so reopening an existing file is a no-op check\nfunction migrate(db: Database): void {\n  const current = db.pragma('user_version', { simple: true }) as number;\n  if (current >= 1) return;\n  const apply = db.transaction(() => {\n    db.exec(`\n      CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ap2_authorizations (\n        reference        TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n        checkout_jti     TEXT NOT NULL,\n        mandate_issuer   TEXT NOT NULL,\n        checkout_issuer  TEXT NOT NULL,\n        resource_id      TEXT NOT NULL,\n        request_id       TEXT NOT NULL,\n        state            TEXT NOT NULL\n                         CHECK (state IN ('reserved', 'consumed', 'released', 'uncertain')),\n        created_at       TEXT NOT NULL,\n        updated_at       TEXT NOT NULL\n      );\n      CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ap2_authorizations_checkout_jti\n        ON ap2_authorizations(checkout_jti);\n    `);\n    db.pragma('user_version = 1');\n  });\n  apply();\n}\n","/**\n * Stage two: the merchant checkout JWT the mandate binds.\n *\n * Two things have to hold. The hash proves the buyer approved *this* document;\n * the signature proves the merchant issued it. Hash alone accepts a document\n * the buyer wrote themselves; signature alone accepts a genuine merchant\n * document this mandate never covered.\n */\nimport { decodeJwt, decodeProtectedHeader, type JWTVerifyOptions, jwtVerify } from 'jose';\nimport type { Clock } from '../../core';\nimport { AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM } from './constants';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors';\nimport { sha256 } from './sha256';\nimport type { TrustStore } from './trust';\n\nexport interface VerifiedCheckoutJwt {\n  readonly issuer: string;\n  readonly jwtId: string;\n  readonly claims: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n}\n\n/**\n * `mandateClaims` must come from an already-verified mandate: `checkout_hash`\n * is worth nothing unless the issuer signed it\n */\nexport async function verifyCheckoutJwt(\n  mandateClaims: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>,\n  deps: { readonly trust: TrustStore; readonly clock: Clock; readonly clockSkewSeconds: number },\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<VerifiedCheckoutJwt> {\n  const compact = mandateClaims['checkout_jwt'];\n  const expectedHash = mandateClaims['checkout_hash'];\n  if (typeof compact !== 'string' || compact.length === 0) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  if (typeof expectedHash !== 'string' || expectedHash.length === 0) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n\n  requireMatchingHash(compact, expectedHash, context);\n\n  // Unverified, and read only to pick which configured key to try\n  let header: ReturnType<typeof decodeProtectedHeader>;\n  let unverifiedPayload: ReturnType<typeof decodeJwt>;\n  try {\n    header = decodeProtectedHeader(compact);\n    unverifiedPayload = decodeJwt(compact);\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('checkout_binding_failed', { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  const { issuer, key } = await deps.trust.resolve(unverifiedPayload.iss, header.kid, context);\n\n  const options: JWTVerifyOptions = {\n    algorithms: [AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM],\n    issuer: issuer.issuer,\n    audience: issuer.audience,\n    clockTolerance: deps.clockSkewSeconds,\n    currentDate: deps.clock.now(),\n  };\n\n  let claims: Record<string, unknown>;\n  try {\n    const result = await jwtVerify(compact, key, options);\n    claims = result.payload as Record<string, unknown>;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('checkout_binding_failed', { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  const exp = claims['exp'];\n  const iat = claims['iat'];\n  const jti = claims['jti'];\n  // jose validates a time claim only when present, so requiring them is ours\n  if (typeof exp !== 'number' || typeof iat !== 'number') {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  // `jti` is what replay defense and the receipt record, so it is required\n  if (typeof jti !== 'string' || jti.length === 0) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  const nowSeconds = Math.floor(deps.clock.now().getTime() / 1000);\n  if (iat > nowSeconds + deps.clockSkewSeconds) throw ap2Rejected('expired', context);\n\n  return { issuer: issuer.issuer, jwtId: jti, claims };\n}\n\n/**\n * Hashes the compact JWT as it arrived. Re-encoding the parsed claims would\n * hash a different document from the one being verified.\n */\nfunction requireMatchingHash(compact: string, expected: string, context: Ap2ErrorContext): void {\n  // sha-256 only: `_sd_alg` was already pinned to it upstream\n  const actual = sha256(compact).toString('base64url');\n  // Plain comparison: both sides are public to anyone holding the\n  // presentation, so there is no secret for timing to leak\n  if (actual !== expected) throw ap2Rejected('checkout_binding_failed', context);\n}\n","/**\n * Stage one: parse the presentation, verify the issuer's signature, resolve\n * the disclosures.\n *\n * Disclosure mechanics come from `@sd-jwt/core`, which refuses the three\n * attacks that live in that algorithm: an appended disclosure nothing\n * references, the same disclosure twice, and one that will not decode.\n * Cryptography is `jose`'s. This file supplies the policy: which key, which\n * algorithm, which audience, what counts as fresh.\n */\nimport { decodeSdJwt, getClaims, splitSdJwt } from '@sd-jwt/core';\nimport { type JWTVerifyOptions, jwtVerify } from 'jose';\nimport type { Clock } from '../../core';\nimport { isRecord } from '../../core/is-record';\nimport { AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT, AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM } from './constants';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors';\nimport { sha256 } from './sha256';\nimport type { TrustStore } from './trust';\n\nexport interface VerifiedMandate {\n  readonly issuer: string;\n  /** Every claim, with the presented disclosures resolved into place */\n  readonly claims: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n  /**\n   * The issuer-signed token on its own, without the disclosures.\n   *\n   * This, not the presentation string, is the stable identity of a mandate:\n   * disclosing or withholding an optional claim rewrites the presentation and\n   * leaves the signed token untouched. Replay defense keys on a digest of it.\n   */\n  readonly signedToken: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * `@sd-jwt/core` passes the algorithm it read from `_sd_alg`, so this is also\n * where a presentation declaring anything but sha-256 is refused\n */\nfunction hasher(data: string | ArrayBuffer, algorithm: string): Uint8Array {\n  if (algorithm.toLowerCase() !== AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation');\n  }\n  return sha256(typeof data === 'string' ? data : new Uint8Array(data));\n}\n\n/**\n * Order is the security boundary here: nothing is trusted until `jwtVerify`\n * returns. `kid` and `iss` are read before that only to pick which configured\n * key to try, and picking wrong just makes the signature fail.\n */\nexport async function verifyMandate(\n  presentation: string,\n  deps: { readonly trust: TrustStore; readonly clock: Clock; readonly clockSkewSeconds: number },\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<VerifiedMandate> {\n  let decoded: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof decodeSdJwt>>;\n  let encodedJws: string;\n  try {\n    // Covers a malformed base JWT, a disclosure that will not decode, a\n    // duplicate digest, and an `_sd_alg` other than sha-256\n    decoded = await decodeSdJwt(presentation, hasher);\n    encodedJws = splitSdJwt(presentation).jwt;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  // Direct mode issues no key-bound mandates, so one arriving here belongs to\n  // a flow we do not verify. Ignoring it would mean silently not checking a\n  // proof that was sent.\n  if (decoded.kbJwt !== undefined) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('unsupported_mandate_type', context);\n  }\n\n  const rawPayload = decoded.jwt.payload;\n  const header = decoded.jwt.header;\n  if (!isRecord(rawPayload) || !isRecord(header)) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', context);\n  }\n\n  const { issuer, key } = await deps.trust.resolve(rawPayload['iss'], header['kid'], context);\n\n  const options: JWTVerifyOptions = {\n    // Redundant with one resolved EC key, which already refuses `alg: none` and\n    // a forged HMAC. It stops the header picking the algorithm if a key set is\n    // ever resolved instead.\n    algorithms: [AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM],\n    // Also redundant, since the key was resolved *from* `iss`, and kept as a\n    // backstop for a resolver that matches on something else. `audience` is\n    // not redundant: `aud` is the presenter's claim, checked against the\n    // configured value.\n    issuer: issuer.issuer,\n    audience: issuer.audience,\n    clockTolerance: deps.clockSkewSeconds,\n    // Injected clock, not jose's `Date.now()`, so expiry is testable\n    currentDate: deps.clock.now(),\n  };\n\n  let verifiedPayload: Record<string, unknown>;\n  try {\n    const result = await jwtVerify(encodedJws, key, options);\n    verifiedPayload = result.payload as Record<string, unknown>;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw ap2Rejected(classifyJoseFailure(cause), { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  requireFreshness(verifiedPayload, deps, context);\n\n  let claims: Record<string, unknown>;\n  try {\n    // Against the VERIFIED payload: the decoded one would match disclosures\n    // against digests nobody signed\n    claims = (await getClaims(verifiedPayload, decoded.disclosures, hasher)) as Record<\n      string,\n      unknown\n    >;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    // Where an appended disclosure that no digest references is refused\n    throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  requireClosedCheckoutMandate(claims, context);\n\n  return { issuer: issuer.issuer, claims, signedToken: encodedJws };\n}\n\n/**\n * Matched on jose's stable error `code`, not its message. A client is owed\n * \"expired\" versus \"did not verify\"; anything finer describes our checks back\n * to whoever is probing them.\n */\nfunction classifyJoseFailure(cause: unknown): 'expired' | 'wrong_audience' | 'invalid_signature' {\n  const code = (cause as { code?: unknown })?.code;\n  if (code === 'ERR_JWT_EXPIRED') return 'expired';\n  if (code === 'ERR_JWT_CLAIM_VALIDATION_FAILED') {\n    const claim = (cause as { claim?: unknown }).claim;\n    if (claim === 'aud') return 'wrong_audience';\n    if (claim === 'nbf' || claim === 'exp') return 'expired';\n  }\n  return 'invalid_signature';\n}\n\n/**\n * Required, not merely checked when present: jose validates a time claim only\n * if it is there, so a mandate omitting `exp` would verify and never expire\n */\nfunction requireFreshness(\n  payload: Record<string, unknown>,\n  deps: { readonly clock: Clock; readonly clockSkewSeconds: number },\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): void {\n  const exp = payload['exp'];\n  const iat = payload['iat'];\n  if (typeof exp !== 'number' || typeof iat !== 'number') {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  const nowSeconds = Math.floor(deps.clock.now().getTime() / 1000);\n  // A future `iat` is a broken signer, or a mandate minted to outlive its own\n  // expiry window\n  if (iat > nowSeconds + deps.clockSkewSeconds) throw ap2Rejected('expired', context);\n}\n\n// Exactly `mandate.checkout.1`; see AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT for why\nfunction requireClosedCheckoutMandate(\n  claims: Record<string, unknown>,\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): void {\n  if (claims['vct'] !== AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('unsupported_mandate_type', context);\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Static key resolution.\n *\n * Every key was written into `config.yaml` by an operator. No JWKS fetch, no\n * `jku`, no `x5u`. A mandate's `iss` and `kid` only choose *which* trusted key\n * verifies it; an unrecognized pair is refused, so a mandate can never\n * nominate its own signer.\n *\n * Not a \"try every key\" loop: that would make `kid` advisory and accept a\n * mandate that named a key it was not signed with.\n */\nimport { importJWK, type JWK } from 'jose';\nimport { AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM } from './constants';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected, ap2Unavailable } from './errors';\nimport type { Ap2TrustedIssuer } from './types';\n\n/** Named off `importJWK` because `CryptoKey` is a DOM type we do not load */\nexport type VerificationKey = Awaited<ReturnType<typeof importJWK>>;\n\nexport interface ResolvedKey {\n  readonly issuer: Ap2TrustedIssuer;\n  readonly key: VerificationKey;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolves `(iss, kid)` against one configured issuer list. Caches the import\n * promise, not the key, so concurrent requests for a cold key share one import.\n */\nexport function createTrustStore(issuers: readonly Ap2TrustedIssuer[]) {\n  const byIssuer = new Map(issuers.map((entry) => [entry.issuer, entry]));\n  const imported = new Map<string, Promise<VerificationKey>>();\n\n  return {\n    /** Every trusted issuer id, for diagnostics. Never the keys themselves */\n    issuerIds(): readonly string[] {\n      return [...byIssuer.keys()];\n    },\n\n    async resolve(iss: unknown, kid: unknown, context: Ap2ErrorContext): Promise<ResolvedKey> {\n      if (typeof iss !== 'string' || iss.length === 0) {\n        throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n      }\n      const issuer = byIssuer.get(iss);\n      if (issuer === undefined) throw ap2Rejected('untrusted_issuer', context);\n\n      // Not defaulted to the issuer's only key: mid-rotation there are two,\n      // and the gateway should not guess which one signed this\n      if (typeof kid !== 'string' || kid.length === 0) {\n        throw ap2Rejected('unknown_key', context);\n      }\n      const trusted = issuer.keys.find((candidate) => candidate.kid === kid);\n      if (trusted === undefined) throw ap2Rejected('unknown_key', context);\n\n      // JSON, not a joined string: both halves are operator-chosen and could\n      // contain whatever separator we picked\n      const cacheKey = JSON.stringify([iss, kid]);\n      let pending = imported.get(cacheKey);\n      if (pending === undefined) {\n        pending = importJWK(trusted.jwk as JWK, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM);\n        imported.set(cacheKey, pending);\n      }\n\n      try {\n        return { issuer, key: await pending };\n      } catch (cause) {\n        // Config already checked this JWK member by member, so reaching here\n        // means our config is broken, not the mandate. Drop the cached\n        // rejection so the next request retries the import.\n        imported.delete(cacheKey);\n        throw ap2Unavailable('configured verification key could not be imported', {\n          ...context,\n          cause,\n        });\n      }\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nexport type TrustStore = ReturnType<typeof createTrustStore>;\n","/**\n * The Direct Checkout Mandate verifier: mandate signature first, then the\n * merchant checkout JWT it binds. Either stage failing is a refusal.\n *\n * What this proves is narrow. A trusted issuer signed this mandate, it has not\n * expired, it is addressed to us, and it binds a checkout document the\n * merchant signed. It does NOT prove the mandate authorizes the purchase in\n * front of us: that is `bindMandateToPurchase`, and a caller treating this as\n * permission to settle has skipped it.\n */\nimport type { Clock } from '../../core';\nimport { verifyCheckoutJwt } from './checkout-jwt';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors';\nimport { verifyMandate } from './sd-jwt';\nimport { sha256 } from './sha256';\nimport { createTrustStore } from './trust';\nimport type { EnabledAp2Config, VerifiedCheckoutMandate } from './types';\n\nexport interface Ap2VerifierOptions {\n  readonly config: EnabledAp2Config;\n  readonly clock: Clock;\n}\n\nexport interface Ap2MandateVerifier {\n  verify(presentation: string, context?: Ap2ErrorContext): Promise<VerifiedCheckoutMandate>;\n  /** Trusted issuer ids, for the provider's health detail. Never keys */\n  trustedIssuers(): { readonly mandate: readonly string[]; readonly checkout: readonly string[] };\n}\n\n/**\n * Algorithm-prefixed so a future digest change is visible in stored references\n * rather than silently producing unequal values for one mandate\n */\nfunction mandateReference(signedToken: string): string {\n  return `sha256:${sha256(signedToken).toString('base64url')}`;\n}\n\nexport function createAp2MandateVerifier(options: Ap2VerifierOptions): Ap2MandateVerifier {\n  // Two stores, not one list: signing the merchant's checkout documents must\n  // not confer the power to issue mandates\n  const mandateTrust = createTrustStore(options.config.trust.mandateIssuers);\n  const checkoutTrust = createTrustStore(options.config.trust.checkoutIssuers);\n  const deps = { clock: options.clock, clockSkewSeconds: options.config.clockSkewSeconds };\n\n  return {\n    async verify(\n      presentation: string,\n      context: Ap2ErrorContext = {},\n    ): Promise<VerifiedCheckoutMandate> {\n      if (typeof presentation !== 'string' || presentation.length === 0) {\n        throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', context);\n      }\n\n      const mandate = await verifyMandate(presentation, { ...deps, trust: mandateTrust }, context);\n      const checkout = await verifyCheckoutJwt(\n        mandate.claims,\n        { ...deps, trust: checkoutTrust },\n        context,\n      );\n\n      return {\n        reference: mandateReference(mandate.signedToken),\n        mandateIssuer: mandate.issuer,\n        checkoutIssuer: checkout.issuer,\n        checkoutJwtId: checkout.jwtId,\n        checkoutClaims: checkout.claims,\n      };\n    },\n\n    trustedIssuers() {\n      return { mandate: mandateTrust.issuerIds(), checkout: checkoutTrust.issuerIds() };\n    },\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * The AP2 authorization provider: the seam between core's generic contract and\n * the mandate machinery.\n *\n * It owns its replay store, so whoever creates it must call `close()`:\n * `createGateway` does not close authorization providers.\n */\nimport type {\n  AdapterHealth,\n  AuthorizationFinalizeContext,\n  AuthorizationProvider,\n  AuthorizationRequirement,\n  AuthorizationVerification,\n  AuthorizationVerificationContext,\n  Clock,\n  Logger,\n} from '../../core';\nimport { NOOP_LOGGER, systemClock } from '../../core';\nimport { PACKAGE_VERSION } from '../../version';\nimport { AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE, AP2_SPEC_VERSION } from './constants';\nimport { buildAp2Descriptor } from './descriptor';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Replayed, ap2Unavailable } from './errors';\nimport { bindMandateToPurchase } from './profile';\nimport { type Ap2ReplayStore, createAp2ReplayStore } from './replay-store';\nimport type { EnabledAp2Config } from './types';\nimport { createAp2MandateVerifier } from './verifier';\n\nexport interface Ap2AuthorizationProviderOptions {\n  readonly config: EnabledAp2Config;\n  readonly clock?: Clock;\n  readonly logger?: Logger;\n  /** Injectable so tests need not touch the filesystem */\n  readonly replayStore?: Ap2ReplayStore;\n}\n\nexport interface Ap2AuthorizationProvider extends AuthorizationProvider {\n  /** Closes the replay store */\n  close(): void;\n}\n\nexport function createAp2AuthorizationProvider(\n  options: Ap2AuthorizationProviderOptions,\n): Ap2AuthorizationProvider {\n  const clock = options.clock ?? systemClock;\n  const logger = options.logger ?? NOOP_LOGGER;\n\n  const verifier = createAp2MandateVerifier({ config: options.config, clock });\n  const replay =\n    options.replayStore ?? createAp2ReplayStore({ path: options.config.replay.path, logger });\n\n  const requirement: AuthorizationRequirement = {\n    method: 'ap2',\n    version: AP2_SPEC_VERSION,\n    profile: AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  };\n\n  async function verifyAndReserve(\n    context: AuthorizationVerificationContext,\n  ): Promise<AuthorizationVerification> {\n    const errorContext: Ap2ErrorContext = {\n      requestId: context.requestId,\n      resourceId: context.resourceId,\n    };\n\n    const mandate = await verifier.verify(context.submission.payload, errorContext);\n    // Before reserving, not after: a mandate that does not authorize this\n    // purchase must stay spendable on the purchase it does authorize\n    await bindMandateToPurchase(mandate, context, errorContext);\n\n    let reservation: ReturnType<Ap2ReplayStore['reserve']>;\n    try {\n      reservation = replay.reserve({\n        reference: mandate.reference,\n        checkoutJti: mandate.checkoutJwtId,\n        mandateIssuer: mandate.mandateIssuer,\n        checkoutIssuer: mandate.checkoutIssuer,\n        resourceId: context.resourceId,\n        requestId: context.requestId,\n      });\n    } catch (cause) {\n      throw ap2Unavailable('replay store could not be written', { ...errorContext, cause });\n    }\n\n    if (reservation.kind === 'replayed') {\n      throw ap2Replayed(reservation.state, errorContext);\n    }\n\n    return {\n      status: 'verified',\n      method: 'ap2',\n      reference: mandate.reference,\n      // The reservation handle is the reference itself, so the two can never\n      // name different mandates\n      reservationId: mandate.reference,\n      // Opaque identifiers an operator can reconcile with. Never a claim from\n      // the mandate: those carry the buyer's purchase and their personal data.\n      // `checkoutId`, not `checkoutJwtId` - the receipt store redacts any key\n      // that reads as secret-shaped, and \"jwt\" is on that list.\n      metadata: {\n        mandateIssuer: mandate.mandateIssuer,\n        checkoutIssuer: mandate.checkoutIssuer,\n        checkoutId: mandate.checkoutJwtId,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  const finalize = (\n    action: 'consume' | 'release' | 'markUncertain',\n    reservationId: string,\n    context: AuthorizationFinalizeContext,\n  ): void => {\n    try {\n      replay[action](reservationId);\n    } catch (cause) {\n      throw ap2Unavailable(`replay store could not record ${action}`, { ...context, cause });\n    }\n  };\n\n  return {\n    name: 'ap2',\n    descriptor: buildAp2Descriptor(PACKAGE_VERSION),\n    requirement,\n    verifyAndReserve,\n\n    async consume(reservationId, context) {\n      finalize('consume', reservationId, context);\n    },\n    async release(reservationId, context) {\n      finalize('release', reservationId, context);\n    },\n    async markUncertain(reservationId, context) {\n      finalize('markUncertain', reservationId, context);\n    },\n\n    async health(): Promise<AdapterHealth> {\n      const startedAt = clock.monotonicMs();\n      const checkedAt = clock.nowIso();\n      let available = true;\n      try {\n        // A read against the real table, so a database that opened but cannot\n        // be queried is caught here rather than on the first purchase\n        replay.stateOf('health-probe');\n      } catch {\n        available = false;\n      }\n      const durationMs = Math.round(clock.monotonicMs() - startedAt);\n      if (!available) {\n        // A fixed token, never a sentence built from the caught error\n        return { status: 'fail', checkedAt, durationMs, detail: 'replay-store-unavailable' };\n      }\n      const trusted = verifier.trustedIssuers();\n      return {\n        status: 'pass',\n        checkedAt,\n        durationMs,\n        detail: `mandate-issuers=${trusted.mandate.length} checkout-issuers=${trusted.checkout.length}`,\n      };\n    },\n\n    close() {\n      replay.close();\n    },\n  };\n}\n"]}