@cosmicdrift/kumiko-framework 0.386.0 → 0.388.0

package/dist/pipeline/member-read-only-transaction.js

@@ -63,9 +63,7 @@ export async function runInMemberReadOnlyTransaction(ctx, tx, fn) {
             });
         }
         // Savepoint even on the pool path: Postgres rejects a READ WRITE reset (SQLSTATE 25001) inside a subtransaction.
-        return await transaction(pool, (outer) => 
-        // @cast-boundary driver begin() handle — structurally a DbTx, same shape runInSavepoint's caller relies on
-        runInDiscardedReadOnlySavepoint(outer, timeoutMs, true, fn));
+        return await transaction(pool, (outer) => runInDiscardedReadOnlySavepoint(outer, timeoutMs, true, fn));
     }
     catch (e) {
         if (e instanceof AccessDeniedError)

package/dist/pipeline/msp-rebuild.js

@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ async function replayMultiStreamProjectionIntoShadow(mspName, deps) {
         durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
         // countColumnDrift is single-table (public.<t> vs kumiko_rebuild.<t>) and
         // not wired into the multi-stream rebuild path — MSPs don't run the
-        // implicit-projection ghost-row guard either. #916 scope is single-table.
+        // implicit-projection ghost-row guard either. The scope is single-table.
         columnDriftCount: 0,
     };
     if (deps.meter) {

package/dist/pipeline/notify-scope.js

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import { assertNotificationVariables } from "../engine/template-variables.js";
 import { AccessDeniedError, FrameworkReasons } from "../errors/index.js";
+import { parseJsonOrThrow } from "../utils/safe-json.js";
 function isTenantBroadcast(to) {
     return typeof to === "object" && to !== null && !Array.isArray(to) && "tenant" in to;
 }
@@ -12,6 +13,16 @@ export function assertNotifyTargetsOwnTenant(options, tenantId) {
         });
     }
 }
+// Temporal values, functions and class instances in `data` are not structured-cloneable; the
+// job pipeline serializes them to JSON on enqueue anyway, so the JSON form is the faithful snapshot.
+function snapshotNotifyOptions(options) {
+    try {
+        return structuredClone(options);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return parseJsonOrThrow(JSON.stringify(options), "notify options snapshot");
+    }
+}
 // Without `immediate`, a notify inside a write transaction waits for the commit so a
 // rolled-back write leaves no notification behind.
 export function createDeferringNotify(deps) {
@@ -24,7 +35,7 @@ export function createDeferringNotify(deps) {
         if (options.immediate === true)
             return notifyNow(notificationType, options);
         // The hook runs after the handler returned; a caller reusing `data` meanwhile must not change what is sent.
-        const optionsAtCallTime = structuredClone(options);
+        const optionsAtCallTime = snapshotNotifyOptions(options);
         scheduleAfterCommit(async () => {
             await notifyAfterCommit(notificationType, optionsAtCallTime);
         });

package/dist/pipeline/pre-handler-gates.js

@@ -2,16 +2,17 @@ import { hasAccess } from "../engine/access.js";
 import { tenantOverrideDenied } from "../engine/cross-tenant.js";
 import { checkWriteFieldRoles } from "../engine/field-access.js";
 import { runValidation } from "../engine/validation.js";
-import { AccessDeniedError, FrameworkReasons, isKumikoError, ValidationError, validationErrorFromZod, writeFailure, } from "../errors/index.js";
+import { AccessDeniedError, FrameworkReasons, InternalError, isKumikoError, ValidationError, validationErrorFromZod, writeFailure, } from "../errors/index.js";
 import { checkFeatureEnabled, enforcePayloadRateLimits, enforceRateLimit, } from "./dispatch-shared.js";
 import { handlerAccessError } from "./handler-access-error.js";
 async function rejectDisabledFeature(ctx, type, user) {
     const disabledErr = await checkFeatureEnabled(ctx, type, user.tenantId);
     return disabledErr ? writeFailure(disabledErr) : undefined;
 }
-async function rejectRateLimited(ctx, handler, type, user) {
+async function rejectRateLimited(ctx, handler, type, user, resolveCostOverride) {
     try {
-        await enforceRateLimit(ctx, handler.rateLimit, type, user, ctx.registry.isHandlerSystemScoped(type));
+        const costOverride = resolveCostOverride?.();
+        await enforceRateLimit(ctx, handler.rateLimit, type, user, ctx.registry.isHandlerSystemScoped(type), costOverride);
     }
     catch (e) {
         if (isKumikoError(e))
@@ -20,6 +21,14 @@ async function rejectRateLimited(ctx, handler, type, user) {
     }
     return undefined;
 }
+function normalizeRateLimitCost(handlerName, cost) {
+    if (!Number.isFinite(cost)) {
+        throw new InternalError({
+            message: `Handler "${handlerName}" rateLimitCost returned ${cost}; expected a finite number.`,
+        });
+    }
+    return Math.max(1, Math.ceil(cost));
+}
 async function rejectPayloadRateLimited(ctx, handler, type, user, payload) {
     try {
         await enforcePayloadRateLimits(ctx, handler.additionalRateLimits, type, user, payload);
@@ -70,7 +79,7 @@ async function rejectBeforeParse(ctx, handler, type, user, mode) {
     const disabled = await rejectDisabledFeature(ctx, type, user);
     if (disabled)
         return disabled;
-    if (mode === "charge") {
+    if (mode === "charge" && !handler.rateLimitCost) {
         const rateLimited = await rejectRateLimited(ctx, handler, type, user);
         if (rateLimited)
             return rateLimited;
@@ -85,6 +94,13 @@ async function rejectAfterParse(ctx, handler, type, user, payload, mode) {
     const overrideDenied = tenantOverrideDenied(user, payload);
     if (overrideDenied)
         return writeFailure(overrideDenied);
+    if (mode === "charge" && handler.rateLimitCost) {
+        // Cost comes from the validated payload, so this bucket is billed after the parse instead of before it.
+        const { rateLimitCost } = handler;
+        const rateLimited = await rejectRateLimited(ctx, handler, type, user, () => normalizeRateLimitCost(type, rateLimitCost(payload)));
+        if (rateLimited)
+            return rateLimited;
+    }
     if (mode === "charge") {
         const rateLimited = await rejectPayloadRateLimited(ctx, handler, type, user, payload);
         if (rateLimited)

package/dist/pipeline/pre-transaction-reservations.d.ts

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ type ReservationConfirm = ReservationHandle["confirmInTransaction"];
 export type ConsumedReservation = {
     readonly confirmInTransaction: ReservationConfirm | undefined;
     readonly prepared: unknown;
+    readonly parsedPayload: unknown;
 };
 export declare function hasPreTransactionPhase(handler: WriteHandlerDef): boolean;
 export declare function runAsCommand<T>(reserved: {

package/dist/pipeline/pre-transaction-reservations.js

@@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ export async function reserveBeforeTransaction(ctx, commands, user, inheritedOri
                 return { isSuccess: false, error: gates.error, failedIndex: index };
             }
             const origin = effectiveWriteOrigin(rootWriteOrigin(ctx.registry, command.type, user), inheritedOrigin);
-            const handlerContext = await buildHandlerContext(ctx, command.type, user, origin);
             const event = { type: command.type, payload: gates.payload, user };
             let confirmInTransaction;
             if (handler.reserveBeforeTransaction) {
+                const handlerContext = await buildHandlerContext(ctx, command.type, user, origin);
                 const handle = toReservationHandle(await handler.reserveBeforeTransaction(event, denyTransactionBoundSurfaces(handlerContext)));
                 if (handle)
                     releases.push(handle.release);
@@ -73,7 +73,9 @@ export async function reserveBeforeTransaction(ctx, commands, user, inheritedOri
             }
             let prepared;
             if (handler.beforeTransaction) {
-                const phaseContext = await buildHandlerContext(ctx, command.type, user, origin, undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined, true);
+                const phaseContext = await buildHandlerContext(ctx, command.type, user, origin, {
+                    readOnlyForTenant: true,
+                });
                 const phase = await handler.beforeTransaction(event, applyBeforeTransactionReadOnly(phaseContext));
                 if (!phase.isSuccess) {
                     await releaseAll(ctx, releases);
@@ -83,7 +85,11 @@ export async function reserveBeforeTransaction(ctx, commands, user, inheritedOri
                     releases.push(phase.release);
                 prepared = phase.data;
             }
-            reservedCommands.set(index, { confirmInTransaction, prepared });
+            reservedCommands.set(index, {
+                confirmInTransaction,
+                prepared,
+                parsedPayload: gates.payload,
+            });
         }
         catch (error) {
             await releaseAll(ctx, releases);

package/dist/pipeline/projection-rebuild.js

@@ -1,12 +1,15 @@
 import { countSubscribedEvents, finalizeProjectionRebuild, markProjectionRebuildFailed, markProjectionRebuilding, selectEventsForProjectionRebuildBatch, } from "../db/queries/projection-rebuild.js";
 import { assertLiveColumnsMatchMeta, assertLiveTableHasNoRowLevelSecurity, assertNoBlindIndexLoss, assertNoUnreachableLiveRows, buildShadowTable, countColumnDrift, ensureRebuildSchema, fenceLiveTable, rebuildMetaOrThrow, swapShadowIntoLive, } from "../db/queries/shadow-swap.js";
-import { coerceRow, extractTableInfo, runInSavepoint, selectMany } from "../db/query.js";
+import { coerceRow, runInSavepoint, selectMany } from "../db/query.js";
 import { withoutStatementTimeout } from "../db/statement-timeout.js";
+import { extractTableInfo } from "../db/table-info.js";
 import { withExecutorManagedWrites } from "../db/tenant-db.js";
 import { eventsTable, getEventsHighWaterMark, upcastStoredEvent, } from "../event-store/index.js";
 import { createRebuildDeadLetterTable, recordRebuildDeadLetters, } from "../event-store/rebuild-dead-letter.js";
+import { createFallbackLogger } from "../logging/utils.js";
 import { emitProjectionRebuild } from "../observability/standard-metrics.js";
 import { projectionStateTable } from "./projection-state.js";
+const log = createFallbackLogger("kumiko:projection-rebuild");
 // Events replayed per catch-up batch. Each batch is a fresh READ COMMITTED
 // SELECT, so a batch shorter than this means the currently-committed tail is
 // drained.
@@ -32,7 +35,7 @@ function rowToStoredEvent(row) {
         createdBy: row.createdBy,
     };
 }
-// Ops-facing log line for countColumnDrift's result. No-op when clean. #916.
+// Ops-facing log line for countColumnDrift's result. No-op when clean.
 function warnOnColumnDrift(projectionName, tableName, drift) {
     // skip: no drift found — nothing to warn about
     if (drift.rowCount === 0)
@@ -41,7 +44,7 @@ function warnOnColumnDrift(projectionName, tableName, drift) {
     const countLabel = sampledIds.size < drift.rowCount
         ? `${drift.rowCount} (sample truncated)`
         : String(drift.rowCount);
-    console.warn(`projection-rebuild "${projectionName}": ${countLabel} live row(s) in "${tableName}" have ` +
+    log.warn(`projection "${projectionName}": ${countLabel} live row(s) in "${tableName}" have ` +
         `column values that differ from the freshly-replayed shadow (sample: ${drift.sample.join(", ")}). ` +
         "Not blocking — replay wins on swap. Likely cause: a legacy direct-write predating the row's " +
         "event history (#494), or a sensitive custom field pending #972. Investigate if unexpected.");
@@ -71,7 +74,7 @@ async function replayProjectionIntoShadow(projectionName, deps) {
     let lastProcessedEventId = 0n;
     const skipApplyErrors = deps.errorPolicy?.skipApplyErrors === true;
     // Quarantined events, collected in memory and written once after the
-    // replay settles — the #443 full-re-replay path would otherwise duplicate
+    // replay settles — the full-re-replay path would otherwise duplicate
     // the dead-letter rows.
     let skipped = [];
     // One chronological batch of events after lastProcessedEventId, applied into
@@ -145,7 +148,7 @@ async function replayProjectionIntoShadow(projectionName, deps) {
                 // Fence the live table, then drain the final delta. Once ACCESS
                 // EXCLUSIVE is held no concurrent apply can commit a new event, so this
                 // loop terminates and the shadow ends up reflecting every committed
-                // event — closing Phase 1's write-loss window for single-pod rebuilds.
+                // event — closing the write-loss window for single-pod rebuilds.
                 await fenceLiveTable(tx, meta.tableName, fenceLockTimeoutMs);
                 while ((await drainBatch(tx)) === REBUILD_BATCH_SIZE) {
                     // keep draining full batches; a short batch ends the loop
@@ -153,7 +156,7 @@ async function replayProjectionIntoShadow(projectionName, deps) {
                 // Fenced → the subscribed-event set is final (every live apply blocks
                 // on the live-table lock). If fewer events were applied than exist, a
                 // lower-id event committed late during the unlocked phase and the
-                // id-cursor leapt past it (#443). Rebuild the shadow from scratch and
+                // id-cursor leapt past it. Rebuild the shadow from scratch and
                 // replay the whole log under the fence: a fresh shadow means no
                 // double-apply (the rejected "re-drain into a populated shadow" hazard),
                 // and the full-replay cost is paid only on this rare detected path.
@@ -184,12 +187,12 @@ async function replayProjectionIntoShadow(projectionName, deps) {
             }
             // Guard the swap: abort if the process has no blind-index key configured
             // but the live table already has populated bidx columns — the rebuild
-            // would otherwise silently null them out (fw#3091). Applies to every
+            // would otherwise silently null them out. Applies to every
             // projection, not just implicit ones: the shadow always gets a fresh
             // computeBlindIndexValues() pass regardless of projection kind.
             await assertNoBlindIndexLoss(tx, meta.tableName, meta, projectionName);
             // Guard the swap: abort if the live table holds a row no event can
-            // reconstruct (#498 ghost — direct-inserted without a .created event),
+            // reconstruct (ghost — direct-inserted without a .created event),
             // which the swap would silently drop. Implicit projections only.
             if (projection.isImplicit === true) {
                 await assertNoUnreachableLiveRows(tx, projectionName, meta.tableName, sourcesList, projection.extraSourceRowIds);
@@ -249,11 +252,10 @@ export async function getProjectionState(db, projectionName) {
 // The registry is the source-of-truth for which projections exist; the
 // state table holds per-projection rebuild info and may be sparse.
 //
-// Implicit-Projections (auto-registered pro r.entity, eine pro entity)
-// werden default ausgefiltert — sie sind als rebuild-Ziele weiter mit
-// `<feature>:projection:<entity>-entity` adressierbar, aber in `kumiko
-// project list` würden sie das Bild dominieren ohne Mehrwert. Mit
-// `{ includeImplicit: true }` opt-in einschalten.
+// Implicit projections (auto-registered by r.entity, one per entity) are filtered
+// out by default. They stay addressable as rebuild targets via
+// `<feature>:projection:<entity>-entity`, but would dominate `kumiko project list`
+// without adding information. Opt in with `{ includeImplicit: true }`.
 export async function listProjectionsWithState(db, registry, options = {}) {
     const projections = registry.getAllProjections();
     const stateRows = await selectMany(db, projectionStateTable);

package/dist/pipeline/system-hooks.js

@@ -4,25 +4,26 @@ import { collectSearchableSubjectFields, configuredPiiSubjectKms, decryptPiiFiel
 import { createTenantDb, entityTableFromRegistry, rehydrateCompoundTypes } from "../db/index.js";
 import { tenantChannel } from "../engine/constants.js";
 import { InternalError } from "../errors/index.js";
+import { createFallbackLogger } from "../logging/utils.js";
+const log = createFallbackLogger("kumiko:search");
 // --- Search Index Consumer (async, via event-dispatcher) ---
 //
-// Search-Indexierung läuft seit D.4 als async EventConsumer über den event-
-// dispatcher, nicht mehr als synchroner postSave/postDelete-hook. Das
-// spiegelt Marten's ISubscription-Pattern: ein einziger async Pfad für alle
-// non-inline side-effects.
+// Search indexing runs as an async EventConsumer through the event dispatcher,
+// rather than as a synchronous postSave/postDelete hook. This mirrors Marten's
+// ISubscription pattern: one async path for all non-inline side effects.
 //
 // Event → Search-Op Mapping:
 //
 //   <entity>.created     → index(tenantId, doc)   // state = event.payload
 //   <entity>.updated     → index(tenantId, doc)   // state = { ...previous, ...changes }
 //   <entity>.restored    → index(tenantId, doc)   // state = event.payload.previous
-//   <entity>.deleted     → remove(tenantId, type, id)
-//   <entity>.forgotten   → remove(tenantId, type, id)
-//   <entity>.<named>     → index or remove, state read from the live
-//                          projection row (#2765) — a named domain event
-//                          carries only a payload slice, not the full
-//                          entity, so there's no fixed shape to reconstruct
-//                          state from the way created/updated/restored do.
+//   <entity>.deleted      → remove(tenantId, type, id)
+//   <entity>.forgotten    → remove(tenantId, type, id)
+//   <entity>.<named>      → index or remove, state read from the live
+//                          projection row — a named domain event carries
+//                          only a payload slice, not the full entity, so
+//                          there's no fixed shape to reconstruct state from
+//                          as there is for created/updated/restored.
 //                          Only queried when the entity declares searchable
 //                          fields/extensions; no row (hard/soft-deleted) →
 //                          remove, same as the deleted branch.
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ import { InternalError } from "../errors/index.js";
 // batchHandler collapses a turn's events to one search-op per
 // (tenantId, entityType, entityId) and issues one indexBatch/removeBatch
 // call per tenant instead of one round-trip per event; handler stays the
-// per-event fallback the dispatcher falls back to when a batch throws.
+// per-event fallback the dispatcher uses when a batch throws.
 export const SEARCH_CONSUMER_NAME = "system:consumer:search";
 // An executor update with includeDeleted leaves the row deleted; indexing it would make it findable again.
 function isUpdateOfSoftDeletedRow(event, verb) {
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ async function resolveSearchOperation(event, ctx, registry) {
         state = reconstructStateForSearch(event.payload, verb);
     }
     else {
-        // #2765 — named domain event: no fixed payload shape to reconstruct
+        // Named domain event: no fixed payload shape to reconstruct
         // state from. Only worth a projection read when the entity actually
         // declared searchable fields/extensions — same check
         // buildSearchDocument makes below, done here first so a non-
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ async function resolveSearchOperation(event, ctx, registry) {
             (registry.getSearchableFields(entityName).length > 0 ||
                 registry.getSearchPayloadExtensions(entityName).length > 0);
         // skip: entity declares no searchable fields/extensions — nothing to
-        // index, stays a no-op with no extra query, same as before #2765.
+        // index, stays a no-op with no extra query, same as before.
         if (!entity || !isSearchable)
             return undefined;
         const row = await readProjectionRowForSearch(ctx, registry, entityName, entity, tenantId, event.aggregateId);
@@ -183,7 +184,7 @@ export function createSearchEventConsumer(searchAdapter, registry) {
         },
     };
 }
-// #2765 — reads the live projection row for a named domain event, tenant-
+// Reads the live projection row for a named domain event, tenant-
 // scoped through createTenantDb the same way MultiStreamProjection appliers
 // scope their apply()-writes (see api/server.ts), on the table the registry
 // actually booted (entityTableFromRegistry) rather than one freshly derived
@@ -217,7 +218,7 @@ async function readProjectionRowForSearch(ctx, registry, entityName, entity, ten
     }
     return state;
 }
-// #1610 — subject-annotated searchable fields are ciphertext in the event
+// Subject-annotated searchable fields are ciphertext in the event
 // payload; decrypt into the derived index only. No KMS → omit ciphertext
 // values rather than indexing blobs.
 export async function decryptSearchableSubjectFields(entityName, state, registry) {
@@ -242,8 +243,8 @@ export async function decryptSearchableSubjectFields(entityName, state, registry
         });
     }
     catch (err) {
-        console.warn(`[kumiko:search] decryptSearchableSubjectFields failed for "${entityName}" — ` +
-            `dropping ciphertext fields for this document instead of wedging the consumer.`, err);
+        log.warn(`decryptSearchableSubjectFields failed for "${entityName}" — ` +
+            `dropping ciphertext fields for this document instead of wedging the consumer.`, { err });
         const out = { ...state };
         for (const name of fields) {
             if (isPiiCiphertext(out[name]))
@@ -295,7 +296,7 @@ function warnOncePerKeyCollision(registry, entityName, key, isBaseField) {
         return;
     warned.add(dedupKey);
     const collidesWith = isBaseField ? `base field "${key}"` : `earlier contributor key "${key}"`;
-    console.warn(`[kumiko:search] searchPayloadExtension on "${entityName}" tried to overwrite ` +
+    log.warn(`searchPayloadExtension on "${entityName}" tried to overwrite ` +
         `${collidesWith} — keeping the first value. Rename the contributor key.`);
 }
 // Build a SearchDocument from raw field-state. Parallel to the old
@@ -307,10 +308,9 @@ export async function buildSearchDocument(entityName, entityId, state, registry)
         return null;
     const searchableFields = registry.getSearchableFields(entityName);
     const extensions = registry.getSearchPayloadExtensions(entityName);
-    // Skip-Guard: kein indexable payload UND keine Extensions → kein doc.
-    // Extensions können auch ohne searchable-Stammfields den index befüllen
-    // (z.B. customFields-only-indexierung), daher muss die check beide
-    // berücksichtigen.
+    // Skip guard: no indexable payload and no extensions means there is no doc.
+    // Extensions can populate the index without searchable base fields
+    // (for example, customFields-only indexing), so both must be checked.
     if (searchableFields.length === 0 && extensions.length === 0)
         return null;
     const embeddedFields = new Set();
@@ -348,15 +348,15 @@ export async function buildSearchDocument(entityName, entityId, state, registry)
             fields[f] = state[f];
         }
     }
-    // F3 — Search-Payload-Extensions: contributors merge flat fields into the
+    // Search-Payload-Extensions: contributors merge flat fields into the
     // search-doc (customFields-bundle / tags / computed-counts / etc.).
     // Sequential await — extensions are expected sync or sub-millisecond async;
     // sequential keeps the path simple and deterministic.
     //
     // Precedence is base-fields-win: a contributor key that collides with a
-    // searchable Stammfield is dropped (not silently merged over the real value)
-    // and warned. A jsonb custom-field that happens to share a Stammfield name
-    // must not shadow the indexed Stammfield.
+    // searchable base field is dropped (not silently merged over the real value)
+    // and warned. A jsonb custom-field that happens to share a base field name
+    // must not shadow the indexed base field.
     const baseFieldKeys = new Set(Object.keys(fields));
     for (const contribute of extensions) {
         const contributed = await contribute({ entityName, entityId, state });
@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ export const SSE_BROADCAST_CONSUMER_NAME = "system:consumer:sse-broadcast";
 export function createSseBroadcastEventConsumer(sseBroker) {
     return {
         name: SSE_BROADCAST_CONSUMER_NAME,
-        // Shared delivery: one cursor reads every event exactly once (fw#2625).
+        // Shared delivery: one cursor reads every event exactly once.
         // Fanout to every process's own SSE clients happens below, through
         // sseBroker.pushToChannel — a Redis-backed broker (the default once
         // REDIS_URL is set) republishes across replicas, so every pod's
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ export function createSseBroadcastEventConsumer(sseBroker) {
 // r.multiStreamProjection's ctx.unsafeAppendEvent, or a raw
 // event-store-executor write (e.g. `files`' fileRef.created) — never
 // reached it, so a job could never trigger on an r.defineEvent-registered
-// event (kumiko-framework#1505).
+// event.
 //
 // This consumer closes that gap the same way search/SSE do: read every
 // committed event off the shared cursor and re-check job triggers. It is
@@ -467,10 +467,9 @@ export function createJobTriggerEventConsumer(jobRunner, registry) {
 }
 // --- Access-Invalidation Consumer (async, via event-dispatcher) ---
 //
-// #1524 (Design), #1558 (channel + stream subscribe), #1559 (session-revoke
-// emits an event). This consumer is the last leg: it watches for the two
-// event types that can make an already-issued JWT stale mid-stream and
-// pushes an invalidation through sseBroker.publishAccessInvalidation, which
+// This consumer is the last leg: it watches for the two event types that
+// can make an already-issued JWT stale mid-stream and pushes an invalidation
+// through sseBroker.publishAccessInvalidation, which
 // dispatch-stream.ts's subscribeAccessInvalidation listener turns into an
 // AccessDeniedError thrown into the open stream.
 //
@@ -499,21 +498,20 @@ export function createJobTriggerEventConsumer(jobRunner, registry) {
 //     payload.previous, the full pre-write entity snapshot written by
 //     createEventStoreExecutor. tenantMembershipEntity declares no
 //     encrypted/PII fields, so previous.userId is plaintext — no KMS
-//     decrypt step (see kumiko-framework#1560 PR discussion; the issue's
-//     original handoff assumed encryption that doesn't apply here).
+//     decrypt step; the original handoff assumed encryption that doesn't
+//     apply here.
 //
 // Over-invalidation (e.g. tenant-membership.updated fired by something
 // other than a role change) is fail-safe: the stream closes, the client
-// reconnects and re-authorizes. No opt-out/allowlist — #1524 chose
-// global-by-default specifically so this can't be silently disabled per
-// handler.
+// reconnects and re-authorizes. No opt-out/allowlist — global-by-default
+// specifically so this can't be silently disabled per handler.
 //
 // Scope note: entityEventName also emits "tenant-membership.forgotten" (DSGVO
 // erasure) and ".restored" — .restored re-grants access so ignoring it is
 // correct, .forgotten is not currently produced by any user-data-rights
 // pipeline for memberships but would be revocation-relevant if it ever is.
-// Out of #1560's stated scope (session-revoke + role/membership change),
-// tracked rather than handled speculatively here.
+// Out of the stated scope (session-revoke + role/membership change), tracked
+// rather than handled speculatively here.
 export const ACCESS_INVALIDATION_CONSUMER_NAME = "system:consumer:access-invalidation";
 const SESSION_REVOKED_EVENT_TYPE = "sessions:event:session-revoked";
 const PAT_REVOKED_EVENT_TYPE = "personal-access-tokens:event:pat-revoked";
@@ -557,7 +555,7 @@ function readPatRevokedScope(payload) {
 export function createAccessInvalidationEventConsumer(sseBroker) {
     return {
         name: ACCESS_INVALIDATION_CONSUMER_NAME,
-        // Shared delivery, same reasoning as SSE broadcast (fw#2625): one
+        // Shared delivery, same reasoning as SSE broadcast: one
         // cursor reads every event once and calls sseBroker.publishAccessInvalidation
         // below, which a Redis-backed broker republishes to every replica's
         // subscribeAccessInvalidation listeners — no per-instance cursor needed

package/dist/pipeline/system-identity-switch.js

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { escapeHatchFor } from "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-types/handlers";
-import { withSystemDbUnsafeRawGrant, withUnsafeRawGrant, } from "../db/tenant-db.js";
+import { withSystemDbUnsafeRawGrant, withUnsafeRawGrant } from "../db/tenant-db.js";
 import { SYSTEM_ROLE, SYSTEM_USER_ID } from "../engine/system-user.js";
 import { AccessDeniedError, FrameworkReasons, InternalError } from "../errors/index.js";
 export function isSystemIdentity(user) {
@@ -235,12 +235,10 @@ export function withHookEscapeHatchGrant(context, callerLabel, escapeHatch) {
         }),
         ...gatedMemberReaderField(callerLabel, identityHatch, ctxQueryAsMember),
         ...gatedProjectionReaderField(callerLabel, identityHatch, ctxQueryProjection),
-        // @cast-boundary engine-bridge — withUnsafeRawGrant passes non-TenantDb values (e.g. a guard Proxy) through unchanged.
         ...(ctxDb && { db: withUnsafeRawGrant(ctxDb, rawHatch) }),
         ...(ctxDbOutsideTransaction && {
             dbOutsideTransaction: withUnsafeRawGrant(ctxDbOutsideTransaction, rawHatch),
         }),
-        // @cast-boundary engine-bridge — withSystemDbUnsafeRawGrant passes non-UncheckedSystemDb values through unchanged.
         ...(ctxSystemDb && {
             systemDb: withSystemDbUnsafeRawGrant(ctxSystemDb, rawHatch, callerLabel),
         }),

package/dist/pipeline/tenant-timezone-cache.js

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 // Per-dispatcher in-process cache for the resolved tenant:config:timezone
-// value (fw#2462). dispatch-shared.ts's buildHandlerContext resolves that
+// value. dispatch-shared.ts's buildHandlerContext resolves that
 // key on every dispatch to build ctx.tz — without a cache that's a config
 // SELECT (sometimes two, cascade + fallback) per request, often inside an
 // open write transaction. A tenant-keyed TTL cache removes the steady-state

package/dist/random/generate.d.ts

@@ -1,56 +1,56 @@
 export type AdjNounNameOptions = {
-    /** Trennzeichen zwischen adj/noun (und ggf. suffix). Default "-". */
+    /** Separator between adj/noun (and, if applicable, suffix). Default "-". */
     readonly separator?: string;
-    /** Wenn gesetzt, wird ein random-suffix der Länge .length angehängt
-     *  (no-confusable-Alphabet). Empfohlen 3 Zeichen = 32^3 = 32.768
-     *  zusätzliche Combinations pro Wortpaar. */
+    /** If set, appends a random suffix of length .length
+     *  (no-confusable alphabet). 3 characters are recommended = 32^3 = 32,768
+     *  additional combinations per word pair. */
     readonly suffix?: {
         readonly length: number;
     };
     /** Custom Adjective-Liste — default ADJECTIVES (191 generic). */
     readonly adjectives?: readonly string[];
-    /** Custom Noun-Liste — default NOUNS (173 generic). Apps die Domain-
-     *  spezifische Slugs wollen (z.B. webhook-feature mit eigenen
-     *  -receiver/-listener-Substantiven) reichen ihre eigene Liste. */
+    /** Custom noun list — default NOUNS (173 generic). Apps that want
+     *  domain-specific slugs (e.g. webhook features with their own
+     *  -receiver/-listener nouns) provide their own list. */
     readonly nouns?: readonly string[];
 };
-/** Sync Generator: produziert "happy-cloud" oder "happy-cloud-k8x"
- *  (mit suffix). Kein Conflict-Check — Caller verantwortlich für
- *  Uniqueness, oder generateUniqueName() für die async Variante. */
+/** Sync generator: produces "happy-cloud" or "happy-cloud-k8x"
+ *  (with suffix). No conflict check — the caller is responsible for
+ *  uniqueness, or can use generateUniqueName() for the async variant. */
 export declare function generateAdjNounName(options?: AdjNounNameOptions): string;
-/** Random-String aus dem no-confusable-Alphabet. Für Suffix-bei-Kollision
- *  oder als standalone short-IDs (z.B. Webhook-Verifizierungs-Codes
- *  zum Vorlesen am Telefon). length ≥ 1. */
+/** Random string from the no-confusable alphabet. For suffixes after
+ *  collisions or as standalone short IDs (e.g. webhook verification codes
+ *  to be read aloud over the phone). length ≥ 1. */
 export declare function generateNoConfusableId(length: number): string;
 export type GenerateUniqueNameOptions = {
-    /** Caller-Predicate. Returns true wenn der Name noch nicht vergeben
-     *  ist (typisch: DB-Query "select where slug=$1" → row count === 0). */
+    /** Caller predicate. Returns true if the name is not yet assigned
+     *  (typically: DB query "select where slug=$1" → row count === 0). */
     readonly isAvailable: (name: string) => Promise<boolean>;
-    /** Max Versuche OHNE Suffix bevor wir auf suffix-mode wechseln.
-     *  Default 3. Bei 33.043 Default-Combos und ~150 existierenden
-     *  Tenants liegt p(Kollision) < 1% — 3 Versuche reichen weit. */
+    /** Maximum attempts WITHOUT a suffix before switching to suffix mode.
+     *  Default 3. With 33,043 default combinations and ~150 existing
+     *  tenants, p(collision) < 1% — 3 attempts are more than sufficient. */
     readonly maxCleanAttempts?: number;
-    /** Suffix-Länge bei Kollision-Mode. Default 3 (= 32.768 Combinations
-     *  pro Wortpaar). */
+    /** Suffix length in collision mode. Default 3 (= 32,768 combinations
+     *  per word pair). */
     readonly suffixLength?: number;
-    /** Hard-Cap an Total-Versuchen bevor wir aufgeben. Default 20.
-     *  Praktisch nie erreicht — wenn doch, ist die Wortliste leer oder
-     *  isAvailable() returnt durchgängig false (DB-Bug). */
+    /** Hard cap on total attempts before giving up. Default 20.
+     *  Rarely reached in practice — if it is, the word list may be empty or
+     *  isAvailable() may return false consistently (DB bug). */
     readonly maxTotalAttempts?: number;
     readonly separator?: string;
     readonly adjectives?: readonly string[];
     readonly nouns?: readonly string[];
 };
-/** Generiert einen unique Adj-Noun-Slug indem es bis zu maxCleanAttempts
- *  saubere Wortpaare versucht, danach mit random Suffix bis maxTotal-
- *  Attempts. Wirft wenn auch das nicht hilft (= caller hat ein Bug
- *  mit isAvailable, oder die Wortliste ist defekt).
+/** Generates a unique Adj-Noun slug by trying up to maxCleanAttempts
+ *  clean word pairs, then using a random suffix up to maxTotal-
+ *  Attempts. Throws if that also fails (= the caller has a bug
+ *  in isAvailable, or the word list is defective).
  *
- *  Beispiel:
+ *  Example:
  *    const slug = await generateUniqueName({
  *      isAvailable: async (s) =>
  *        !(await db.select().from(tenants).where(eq(tenants.tenantKey, s)).then(r => r.length > 0)),
  *    });
- *    // → "happy-cloud" oder "happy-cloud-k8x" bei Kollision
+ *    // → "happy-cloud" or "happy-cloud-k8x" on collision
  */
 export declare function generateUniqueName(options: GenerateUniqueNameOptions): Promise<string>;