@cosmicdrift/kumiko-framework 0.328.0 → 0.328.1

package/src/api/server.ts

@@ -1,1550 +0,0 @@
-import { Hono, type MiddlewareHandler } from "hono";
-import { ROLES } from "../auth/roles";
-import type { DbConnection, PgClient } from "../db/connection";
-import { createDerivativesContext } from "../derivatives/derivatives-context";
-import { buildAppSchema } from "../engine/build-app-schema";
-import { EXT_FILE_PROVIDER, EXT_PRINCIPAL_STATUS } from "../engine/extension-names";
-import { projectAppSchemaForRoles } from "../engine/project-app-schema-for-roles";
-import { runsInLane } from "../engine/run-in";
-import { ANONYMOUS_ROLE, createAnonymousUser, createSystemUser } from "../engine/system-user";
-import {
-  type AppContext,
-  type HttpRouteMethod,
-  isFileField,
-  type Registry,
-  type RunIn,
-  type SessionUser,
-  type TenantId,
-  type WebSocketRouteDefinition,
-  type WriteResult,
-} from "../engine/types";
-import { createFileContext } from "../files/file-handle";
-import type { FileRoutesOptions } from "../files/file-routes";
-import { createFileRoutes, readFilesRouteOptions } from "../files/file-routes";
-import { makeFileProviderResolver } from "../files/provider-resolver";
-import type { Lifecycle } from "../lifecycle";
-import { createFallbackLogger } from "../logging";
-import {
-  createNoopProvider,
-  DEFAULT_SENSITIVE_CONFIG,
-  mergeSensitiveConfig,
-  type ObservabilityOptions,
-  type ObservabilityProvider,
-  registerStandardMetrics,
-  wrapRedisClient,
-} from "../observability";
-import { resolveTenantLifecyclePlugin } from "../pipeline/active-membership";
-import type { DispatcherOptions } from "../pipeline/dispatcher";
-import { createDispatcher, type Dispatcher } from "../pipeline/dispatcher";
-import { SHARED_INSTANCE_SENTINEL } from "../pipeline/event-consumer-state";
-import type { EventDedup } from "../pipeline/event-dedup";
-import type { EventConsumer, EventDispatcher } from "../pipeline/event-dispatcher";
-import { createEventDispatcher } from "../pipeline/event-dispatcher";
-import { createLifecycleHooks, type SystemHooks } from "../pipeline/lifecycle-pipeline";
-import { createMultiStreamApplyContext } from "../pipeline/multi-stream-apply-context";
-import {
-  createAccessInvalidationEventConsumer,
-  createJobTriggerEventConsumer,
-  createSearchEventConsumer,
-  createSseBroadcastEventConsumer,
-} from "../pipeline/system-hooks";
-import {
-  type AuthEndpointRateLimitOptions,
-  authEndpointRateLimit,
-  createRateLimitResolver,
-  type GlobalIpRateLimitOptions,
-  globalIpRateLimit,
-} from "../rate-limit";
-import { deriveSearchAdapterConfig } from "../search/derive-search-adapter-config";
-import type { SearchAdapter } from "../search/types";
-import type { AppSchema } from "../ui-types/app-schema";
-import { assertUnreachable, generateId } from "../utils";
-import { NO_ROUTE_MATCH_HEADER_NAME, PUBLIC_API_PATHS, Routes } from "./api-constants";
-import {
-  type AnonymousAccessResolved,
-  type AuthSessionChecker,
-  authMiddleware,
-  getAuthTokenExpiry,
-  getUser,
-  type TenantLifecycleStatusResolver,
-} from "./auth-middleware";
-import { type AuthRoutesConfig, createAuthRoutes, type LoginRateLimiter } from "./auth-routes";
-import {
-  assertValidTrustedProxyHops,
-  type ClientIpResolver,
-  clientIpSourceFromHonoContext,
-  createClientIpResolver,
-} from "./client-ip";
-import { csrfMiddleware } from "./csrf-middleware";
-import {
-  type ExtraRouteDefinition,
-  ExtraRouteEntries,
-  type ExtraRouteEntry,
-  ExtraRouteRejection,
-  type SystemDispatchArgs,
-} from "./extra-route";
-import { computeStrongEtag, etagMatches } from "./http-cache";
-import { createJwtHelper, type JwtHelper, type JwtKeyring } from "./jwt";
-import { observabilityMiddleware } from "./observability-middleware";
-import {
-  assertOriginGuardConfig,
-  isWebSocketOriginAllowed,
-  normalizeOrigin,
-  originMiddleware,
-  rejectOrigin,
-} from "./origin-middleware";
-import { patRouteGuard } from "./pat-route-guard";
-import { piiCiphertextResponseGuard } from "./pii-leak-guard";
-import { createDefaultSseBroker, type RedisSseBroker } from "./redis-sse-broker";
-import { type RequestContextData, requestContext } from "./request-context";
-import { buildRequestContextData, requestIdMiddleware } from "./request-id-middleware";
-import {
-  DEFAULT_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES,
-  registerBodyLimit,
-  registerHealthRoutes,
-  registerMetricsRoute,
-  registerVersionRoute,
-} from "./route-registrars";
-import { createApiRoutes } from "./routes";
-import type { SseBroker } from "./sse-broker";
-import { createSseRoute } from "./sse-route";
-import {
-  buildWebSocketSessionRevalidator,
-  createWebSocketConnectionLimiter,
-  hasWebSocketUpgradeServer,
-  isWebSocketUpgradeRequest,
-  WEBSOCKET_DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS_PER_USER,
-  WEBSOCKET_DEFAULT_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES,
-  type WebSocketConnectionLimiter,
-} from "./websocket-route";
-
-export type ServerOptions = {
-  registry: Registry;
-  context: AppContext;
-  jwtSecret: string | JwtKeyring;
-  jwtIssuer?: string;
-  // JWT lifetime in seconds. Explicit always wins. When omitted, the default
-  // depends on `auth.sessionChecker`: wired (revocation possible) keeps the
-  // long-lived 24h default; unwired (stateless JWTs, no revocation) drops to
-  // 1h so a leaked stateless token has a much smaller exposure window.
-  jwtTtl?: number;
-  dispatcherOptions?: Omit<DispatcherOptions, "lifecycle">;
-  systemHooks?: SystemHooks;
-  eventDedup?: EventDedup;
-  sseBroker?: SseBroker;
-  auth?: AuthRoutesConfig;
-  // Number of trusted reverse-proxy hops for client-IP resolution — feeds
-  // requestIdMiddleware's `ip`, the L1/L2
-  // rate-limit middleware below, and createAuthRoutes. Wins over the
-  // deprecated `auth.trustedProxyHops`. Default 0 = trust no proxy header,
-  // only the socket address (or "unknown") counts — see client-ip.ts.
-  trustedProxyHops?: number;
-  // No `files` option: file-storage is wired by mounting `file-foundation` +
-  // a `file-provider-*` feature. Upload routes, ctx.files and the GDPR jobs
-  // resolve the provider per-tenant through that single source (issue #608).
-  // Upload-route policy (accessGuard/privilegedRoles/maxUploadSize) lives on
-  // `createFilesFeature(opts?)`.
-  // Async event-dispatcher config. The dispatcher is created automatically
-  // when (a) context.db is a DbConnection AND (b) at least one consumer is
-  // wired — SSE (iff sseBroker), Search (iff context.searchAdapter), or
-  // feature-level r.multiStreamProjection consumers.
-  //
-  // Mirrors the old outboxPoller contract: `KumikoServer.eventDispatcher` is
-  // created but NOT auto-started. Production boot must call `.start()`;
-  // shutdown must call `.stop()`. Tests prefer `.runOnce()` for determinism
-  // and skip `.start()` entirely.
-  eventDispatcher?: {
-    pollIntervalMs?: number;
-    batchSize?: number;
-    maxAttempts?: number;
-    rearmCooldownMs?: number;
-    maxRearmCount?: number;
-    // Opt out of building the dispatcher even if consumers exist — e.g. ops
-    // runs a dedicated dispatcher process, or a test needs to control the
-    // consumer lifecycle manually.
-    disabled?: boolean;
-    // Opt out of the auto-built system consumers (SSE, Search, Job-Trigger)
-    // while still running feature r.multiStreamProjection consumers. Useful
-    // for tests that assert only on subscriber behaviour, or for a
-    // deployment that routes SSE via a different transport. Default: sse/
-    // search enabled when the respective dependency (sseBroker /
-    // context.searchAdapter) is available; jobTrigger enabled when a
-    // jobRunner is wired via dispatcherOptions.
-    systemConsumers?: {
-      sse?: boolean;
-      search?: boolean;
-      jobTrigger?: boolean;
-      accessInvalidation?: boolean;
-    };
-    // Raw postgres.js client for LISTEN/NOTIFY wake-up (Sprint E.4). When
-    // present, `.start()` subscribes to EVENTS_PUBSUB_CHANNEL — delivery
-    // latency drops from pollIntervalMs to TCP-round-trip. The poll timer
-    // stays on as a safety net. Typically wired from
-    // `createDbConnection(url).client` so both Drizzle-queries and the
-    // dispatcher share the same underlying postgres.js pool.
-    pgClient?: PgClient;
-  };
-  // Observability: tracer + meter used for auto-instrumentation across
-  // HTTP, dispatcher, pipeline, DB. Omitted => NoopProvider (zero overhead,
-  // no spans or metrics emitted). Typically set to a ConsoleProvider in dev,
-  // OTLPProvider in prod.
-  observability?: ObservabilityProvider;
-  observabilityOptions?: ObservabilityOptions;
-  // L1/L2 rate-limit middleware. Both layers share the auto-wired
-  // resolver (or `context.rateLimit` if you provided one). Layers are
-  // independent — wire only what you need:
-  //   - `global`: gates every /api/* request by client IP. Use behind
-  //     Cloudflare-less deployments to absorb naive floods at the edge
-  //     of the app process.
-  //   - `auth`: gates a single path-pattern (default `/api/auth/*`)
-  //     with tighter limits. Typically `limit: 5, windowSeconds: 60`
-  //     to slow brute-force without breaking real users. GET /api/auth/tenants
-  //     (session read, called on every page load) is always exempt — see
-  //     AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_ROUTES in api-constants.ts.
-  // Both omitted → no L1/L2 wired and no resolver auto-built unless an
-  // L3 handler declared `rateLimit:`. This keeps zero-cost when unused.
-  rateLimit?: {
-    readonly global?: Omit<GlobalIpRateLimitOptions, "resolver">;
-    readonly auth?: Omit<AuthEndpointRateLimitOptions, "resolver"> & {
-      // Path-pattern the L2 middleware applies to. Default `/api/auth/*`.
-      // Override for apps with a different auth route layout. The
-      // GET /api/auth/tenants exemption above applies regardless of `path`.
-      readonly path?: string;
-    };
-  };
-  // Hard cap on JSON request bodies in bytes. Applied to /api/write,
-  // /api/batch, /api/query, /api/command and /api/auth/*. File uploads
-  // (/api/files) are excluded — those have their own per-field maxSize.
-  // `undefined` → 1 MB default. `0` disables the limit entirely (tests
-  // or bespoke deployments with a reverse-proxy that caps upstream).
-  maxRequestBytes?: number;
-  // SSE heartbeat interval for POST /api/stream (ms). Omit → framework default.
-  // Tune down behind proxies with aggressive idle timeouts.
-  sseHeartbeatMs?: number;
-  // Process lifecycle. When present:
-  //   - GET /health/ready reflects lifecycle.state() (200 ready / 503 else)
-  //   - eventDispatcher.stop() is auto-registered as a shutdown hook, so
-  //     lifecycle.drain() tears the poller down without the caller wiring it
-  // Production main.ts passes `createLifecycle()`; tests that don't care
-  // about drain() orchestration omit this and /health/ready stays absent.
-  lifecycle?: Lifecycle;
-  // Prometheus-scrape endpoint. When set, `/metrics` returns the current
-  // accumulated metric state in OpenMetrics text format. Requires the
-  // configured `observability` to use a PrometheusMeter (duck-typed via
-  // the `snapshot` method) — otherwise the route returns 503 with a
-  // note about misconfiguration. The optional `token` enforces
-  // `Authorization: Bearer <token>`; without a token set the endpoint
-  // is open (fine inside a private cluster, dangerous on the public
-  // internet). Omit this option entirely to skip the route.
-  metrics?: {
-    readonly token?: string;
-    readonly path?: string; // default "/metrics"
-  };
-  // /health/ready depth. When lifecycle is wired, the readiness handler
-  // ALSO runs dependency checks before returning 200:
-  //   - DB ping (auto-wired when context.db is a DbConnection)
-  //   - Redis PING (auto-wired when context.redis is set)
-  //   - Dispatcher consumer-lag (opt-in via maxDispatcherLag — off by default
-  //     because a default threshold would false-503 small deployments that
-  //     legitimately lag during bursts)
-  // Checks run in parallel with a per-check timeout; any failed check drops
-  // the probe to 503 with a JSON body listing which check failed.
-  readiness?: {
-    readonly timeoutMs?: number;
-    readonly maxDispatcherLag?: bigint;
-  };
-  // Which deploy-lane this process runs — drives MSP-consumer filtering.
-  //   "api":    picks up MSPs with runIn in {api, both}.
-  //   "worker": picks up MSPs with runIn in {worker, both, undefined (default)}.
-  //   "both":   all-in-one, no filtering — every MSP runs here.
-  // When omitted, defaults to "worker" — preserves pre-Welle-2.6 behaviour
-  // (every MSP runs on the single dispatcher, wherever it lives).
-  processLane?: RunIn;
-  // Stable identifier for THIS process in the event-consumer state table.
-  // Used as the `instance_id` on every per-instance consumer's cursor row
-  // (Welle 2.7). Shared consumers ignore this and always write the reserved
-  // sentinel. Default: `process.env.KUMIKO_INSTANCE_ID ?? generateId()`
-  // — a fresh UUID at boot is fine for single-process deploys, but
-  // multi-instance deploys SHOULD set KUMIKO_INSTANCE_ID to a stable
-  // identifier (pod name, hostname) so ops can correlate lag metrics to
-  // specific instances and can DELETE stale rows on scale-down. Must never
-  // equal the sentinel; validator fails boot if it does.
-  instanceId?: string;
-  // Opt-in: serve unauthenticated requests on handlers that allow
-  // roles=["anonymous"]. When omitted, every /api/* request still requires
-  // a valid JWT (status quo). App-facing config is AnonymousAccessConfig
-  // (defaultTenantId only); run{Prod,Dev}App merge auth-foundation tenant
-  // providers into AnonymousAccessResolved before calling buildServer.
-  anonymousAccess?: AnonymousAccessResolved;
-  // Declarative HTTP routes outside the /api/write|query|batch pipeline that
-  // still need the framework's dispatcher (webhooks, OAuth callbacks, admin
-  // escape-hatches). Each entry declares its access tier (`entry`) up
-  // front — buildServer wires the matching guard + deps, no handler gets a
-  // raw db/redis. Mounted right after the r.httpRoute loop, before
-  // registerVersionRoute (kumiko-framework#3050).
-  extraRoutes?: readonly ExtraRouteDefinition[];
-};
-
-export type KumikoServer = {
-  app: Hono;
-  jwt: JwtHelper;
-  sseBroker: SseBroker;
-  observability: ObservabilityProvider;
-  // The command-dispatcher behind /api/* — same idempotency/jobRunner/
-  // lifecycle wiring as HTTP-dispatched writes. For dispatching outside
-  // the HTTP pipeline, e.g. provider-webhook routes that authenticate
-  // via signature instead of JWT (subscription-stripe et al.).
-  dispatcher: Dispatcher;
-  // Present when at least one consumer is wired and context.db is a
-  // DbConnection. Caller owns the lifecycle: `.start()` in boot, `.stop()`
-  // in shutdown. Tests drain via `.runOnce()` instead.
-  eventDispatcher?: EventDispatcher;
-  // Echoed back so the caller has a single handle for both the app and the
-  // lifecycle. Only set when the caller passed one in.
-  lifecycle?: Lifecycle;
-  // The AppContext every handler on this server sees — options.context plus
-  // what buildServer wires onto it (_fileProviderResolver, rateLimit, the
-  // observability tracer/meter). Callers that build a second consumer of the
-  // same registry outside this server (a dev-server's job-runners) must pass
-  // THIS, not their own pre-buildServer literal, or that consumer reaches for
-  // fields only the request path has (#1232).
-  context: AppContext;
-};
-
-// The per-tenant file-provider resolver, built once for a registry+context so
-// a job-runner and the server it runs beside share one instance (and one
-// per-tenant provider cache). Mirrors buildServer's own resolution exactly —
-// including NOT inventing a resolver when no `file-provider-*` plugin is
-// mounted, which is what keeps buildServer's boot-guard below able to fire.
-export function withFileProviderResolver(registry: Registry, context: AppContext): AppContext {
-  if (context._fileProviderResolver !== undefined) return context;
-  if (registry.getExtensionUsages(EXT_FILE_PROVIDER).length === 0) return context;
-  return {
-    ...context,
-    _fileProviderResolver: makeFileProviderResolver({
-      registry,
-      _configAccessorFactory: context._configAccessorFactory,
-      secrets: context.secrets,
-      db: context.db,
-    }),
-  };
-}
-
-export function buildServer(options: ServerOptions): KumikoServer {
-  // Single effective hop-count for every IP-derived rate-limit + requestMeta
-  // below — the top-level option wins over the deprecated
-  // `auth.trustedProxyHops` fallback.
-  const trustedProxyHops = options.trustedProxyHops ?? options.auth?.trustedProxyHops ?? 0;
-  assertValidTrustedProxyHops(trustedProxyHops, "buildServer");
-  // Exactly ONE resolver for the whole server — the warn-once flag must fire
-  // once per boot, not once per consumer (requestIdMiddleware, L1, L2,
-  // auth-routes each sharing this same instance rather than building a
-  // private one).
-  const clientIpResolver = createClientIpResolver(trustedProxyHops, "buildServer");
-
-  // File-storage is resolved per-tenant through file-foundation: a mounted
-  // `file-provider-*` plugin (inmemory/s3/s3-env) is the single source for
-  // uploads, ctx.files and the GDPR jobs.
-  const hasFileProvider = options.registry.getExtensionUsages(EXT_FILE_PROVIDER).length > 0;
-  // A test/advanced caller may inject the resolver directly on the context
-  // (e.g. a static in-memory provider) instead of mounting a provider plugin.
-  const hasInjectedResolver = options.context._fileProviderResolver !== undefined;
-  // Hard-fail when the registry declares file/image fields but no provider
-  // plugin is mounted — uploads would otherwise fail at the first request
-  // instead of at boot. Proves a plugin is mounted, not that each tenant
-  // selected one; per-tenant misconfig surfaces via createFileProviderForTenant.
-  if (registryDeclaresFileFields(options.registry) && !hasFileProvider && !hasInjectedResolver) {
-    throw new Error(
-      "Features declare file/image fields but no file-storage provider is mounted — " +
-        "mount `file-foundation` + a `file-provider-*` feature (inmemory/s3/s3-env) and " +
-        "select one per tenant via the 'file-foundation:config:provider' config-key.",
-    );
-  }
-
-  // #2051 — a screen whose search box renders (kumiko-screen.tsx gates it on
-  // `screen.searchable ?? entity-has-searchable-field`, the same condition
-  // used below) sends `payload.search` on every query. Without a
-  // context.searchAdapter that throws UnprocessableError at request time
-  // (#2032) — surface the misconfig at boot instead of on the first search.
-  // Warn, not throw: unlike missing file-storage (uploads always fail),
-  // list screens still work without search: only the search box is broken.
-  // Several deployed apps (offlot-app, publicstatus, kumiko-studio,
-  // kumiko-enterprise) currently run in exactly this state.
-  if (!options.context.searchAdapter) {
-    const unwiredEntities = entitiesWithSearchableScreen(options.registry);
-    if (unwiredEntities.length > 0) {
-      console.warn(
-        `[kumiko:boot] ${unwiredEntities.length} entit${unwiredEntities.length === 1 ? "y" : "ies"} ` +
-          `have a searchable list screen but no SearchAdapter is wired on context.searchAdapter: ` +
-          `${unwiredEntities.join(", ")}. Search requests against ${unwiredEntities.length === 1 ? "it" : "them"} will fail with a 422 (search_adapter_not_wired) at runtime. ` +
-          "Wire a SearchAdapter (e.g. createMeilisearchAdapter) on context.searchAdapter, or remove `searchable: true` from the affected fields.",
-      );
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Stateless JWTs (no sessionChecker → no revocation) default to a shorter
-  // TTL than session-backed ones, since a leaked stateless token can't be
-  // revoked and stays valid until it expires. Explicit jwtTtl always wins.
-  const defaultJwtTtl = options.auth?.sessionChecker ? 8 * 60 * 60 : 60 * 60;
-  const jwt = createJwtHelper(
-    options.jwtSecret,
-    options.jwtIssuer,
-    options.jwtTtl ?? defaultJwtTtl,
-  );
-  // An explicit ServerOptions.sseBroker always wins (caller owns its
-  // lifecycle) — createDefaultSseBroker is the single decision point every
-  // other caller must funnel through instead of picking a broker on its
-  // own, so the REDIS_URL-gated cross-replica default (fw#2625) can't be
-  // silently bypassed the way runProdApp bypassed it before this existed.
-  let sseBroker: SseBroker;
-  let ownedRedisSseBroker: RedisSseBroker | undefined;
-  if (options.sseBroker) {
-    sseBroker = options.sseBroker;
-  } else {
-    const defaults = createDefaultSseBroker();
-    sseBroker = defaults.sseBroker;
-    ownedRedisSseBroker = defaults.ownedRedisSseBroker;
-  }
-
-  // Resolve the per-process instance identifier. Prefer explicit
-  // ServerOptions.instanceId (tests, deliberate wiring), fall back to the
-  // deploy-env variable, finally a boot-time UUID. Validator rejects the
-  // sentinel — a deliberate collision attempt would silently merge this
-  // instance's per-instance cursors with the shared-row cursors and
-  // deliver events twice to one shard while starving the other.
-  const resolvedInstanceId =
-    options.instanceId ?? process.env["KUMIKO_INSTANCE_ID"] ?? generateId();
-  if (resolvedInstanceId === SHARED_INSTANCE_SENTINEL) {
-    throw new Error(
-      `ServerOptions.instanceId / KUMIKO_INSTANCE_ID cannot equal the reserved sentinel "${SHARED_INSTANCE_SENTINEL}" — ` +
-        `pick any other stable string.`,
-    );
-  }
-  // Warn when we fell back to a random UUID: the default SSE system-consumer
-  // is delivery="per-instance", so every boot gets a fresh cursor-row in
-  // kumiko_event_consumers. The previous boot's row stays behind on its last
-  // cursor and pins pruneEvents (retention-guard uses MIN(lastProcessedEventId)
-  // across all shards). Without a stable KUMIKO_INSTANCE_ID this accumulates
-  // on every restart, not just scale-down. Silent when options.instanceId or
-  // KUMIKO_INSTANCE_ID is explicit — those are deliberate choices (the test
-  // suite sets KUMIKO_INSTANCE_ID="test-instance" in vitest config).
-  const instanceIdWasRandom =
-    options.instanceId === undefined && !process.env["KUMIKO_INSTANCE_ID"];
-  if (instanceIdWasRandom) {
-    console.warn(
-      `[kumiko:boot] No ServerOptions.instanceId / KUMIKO_INSTANCE_ID set — generated a random UUID (${resolvedInstanceId}). ` +
-        `Per-instance consumers (SSE by default) write one cursor-row per instance; without a stable id, each restart leaves an orphaned row behind and pins events-retention on its last cursor. ` +
-        `Set KUMIKO_INSTANCE_ID to a stable value (e.g. hostname, pod name) in production.`,
-    );
-  }
-
-  // Observability — Noop by default so no call-site needs to null-check.
-  // Every handler/middleware that reaches for ctx.tracer / ctx.metrics gets
-  // a working, zero-cost fallback when no provider is configured.
-  const observability = options.observability ?? createNoopProvider();
-
-  // Register framework + feature metrics once on this meter. Standard
-  // metrics (HTTP, dispatcher, DB) are used by Auto-Instrumentation; feature
-  // metrics come from r.metric(...) declarations collected in the registry.
-  registerStandardMetrics(observability.meter);
-  for (const [name, def] of options.registry.getAllMetrics()) {
-    if (observability.meter.definitions().has(name)) continue;
-    observability.meter.registerMetric({
-      name,
-      type: def.type,
-      description: def.description,
-      labels: def.labels,
-      buckets: def.buckets,
-      unit: def.unit,
-      tenantLabel: def.tenantLabel,
-    });
-  }
-
-  // When a non-default provider is configured, wrap the injected Redis clients
-  // so `redis.cmd` spans attach to every command. For the default NoopProvider
-  // we skip the proxy to keep zero runtime overhead when observability is off.
-  const shouldWrapRedis = options.observability !== undefined;
-  const redisCtx = options.context.redis;
-  const wrappedRedis =
-    shouldWrapRedis && redisCtx ? wrapRedisClient(redisCtx, observability.tracer) : redisCtx;
-
-  // Inject tracer + meter into the AppContext so the dispatcher can propagate
-  // them into every HandlerContext it builds. Build the per-tenant file-provider
-  // resolver once (when a provider plugin is mounted) — the dispatcher uses it
-  // to materialise `ctx.files`, the upload routes + MSP-applies share it. The
-  // resolver reads config + the s3.secretAccessKey secret under SYSTEM identity.
-  const contextWithFiles = withFileProviderResolver(options.registry, options.context);
-  const fileProviderResolver = contextWithFiles._fileProviderResolver;
-  // Auto-wire the rate-limit resolver, but ONLY when at least one
-  // handler actually declared a rateLimit option. Apps that don't use
-  // L3 pay zero cost: no resolver instance, no Lua-script registration
-  // on Redis, no AppContext field. Apps that wire L1/L2 middleware can
-  // pass `context.rateLimit` explicitly — that takes precedence over
-  // the auto-wire (e.g. middleware-only setup without any L3 handler).
-  // Auto-build the resolver when L3 handlers declared rateLimit OR when
-  // the caller asked for L1/L2 middleware. Either path needs a resolver;
-  // both share the same instance to avoid duplicate Lua-script registration.
-  const wantsL3 = options.registry.hasRateLimitedHandler();
-  const wantsL1L2 =
-    options.rateLimit?.global !== undefined || options.rateLimit?.auth !== undefined;
-  const wantsResolver = wantsL3 || wantsL1L2;
-  const rateLimitResolver =
-    options.context.rateLimit ??
-    (wrappedRedis && wantsResolver ? createRateLimitResolver({ redis: wrappedRedis }) : undefined);
-  const contextWithObservability: AppContext = {
-    ...contextWithFiles,
-    ...(wrappedRedis ? { redis: wrappedRedis } : {}),
-    ...(rateLimitResolver ? { rateLimit: rateLimitResolver } : {}),
-    // Propagate the feature-toggle resolver to the context so the event-
-    // dispatcher (and any future context-reading consumer) sees the same
-    // source as the command dispatcher's handler-gate. Options take
-    // precedence over whatever was already on context — the
-    // dispatcher-options arg is the authoritative wire-up point.
-    ...(options.dispatcherOptions?.effectiveFeatures
-      ? { effectiveFeatures: options.dispatcherOptions.effectiveFeatures }
-      : {}),
-    tracer: observability.tracer,
-    meter: observability.meter,
-  };
-
-  const lifecycle = createLifecycleHooks(
-    options.registry,
-    options.systemHooks,
-    options.eventDedup ? { eventDedup: options.eventDedup } : undefined,
-  );
-
-  const dispatcher = createDispatcher(options.registry, contextWithObservability, {
-    ...options.dispatcherOptions,
-    lifecycle,
-    sseBroker,
-    ...(options.auth ? { membershipQuery: options.auth.membershipQuery } : {}),
-  });
-
-  // Async event-dispatcher — the replacement for the old transactional
-  // outbox. Consumer sources:
-  //   1. System: SSE broadcast (iff sseBroker), Search index (iff
-  //      context.searchAdapter).
-  //   2. Features: every r.multiStreamProjection registered in the registry
-  //      becomes its own consumer row with an independent cursor. The MSP
-  //      apply map is routed by event.type; apply receives the raw DbRunner
-  //      of a TX-scoped, tenant-bound DB handle so per-tenant writes stay
-  //      isolated.
-  //
-  // The dispatcher is built but NOT started here. Production boot code
-  // must call `.start()`; test code typically calls `.runOnce()`.
-  // @cast-boundary engine-bridge — context.db union narrows to DbConnection here
-  const baseDb = contextWithObservability.db as DbConnection | undefined;
-  // @cast-boundary engine-bridge — searchAdapter is an optional context-extension
-  const searchAdapter = (contextWithObservability as { searchAdapter?: SearchAdapter })
-    .searchAdapter;
-  // Adapter is built before the registry exists (app boot order) — hand it
-  // the registry-derived default config here so it can lazily configure
-  // each tenant index on first access instead of requiring per-tenant app
-  // wiring.
-  const derivedSearchConfig = searchAdapter
-    ? deriveSearchAdapterConfig(options.registry)
-    : undefined;
-  if (searchAdapter && derivedSearchConfig) {
-    searchAdapter.setDefaultConfig?.(derivedSearchConfig);
-  }
-
-  const sseConsumerEnabled = options.eventDispatcher?.systemConsumers?.sse ?? true;
-  const searchConsumerEnabled = options.eventDispatcher?.systemConsumers?.search ?? true;
-  const jobTriggerConsumerEnabled = options.eventDispatcher?.systemConsumers?.jobTrigger ?? true;
-  const jobRunnerForTriggers = options.dispatcherOptions?.jobRunner;
-
-  const systemConsumers: EventConsumer[] = [];
-  if (sseConsumerEnabled) {
-    systemConsumers.push(createSseBroadcastEventConsumer(sseBroker));
-  }
-  if (searchConsumerEnabled && searchAdapter) {
-    systemConsumers.push(createSearchEventConsumer(searchAdapter, options.registry));
-  }
-  if (jobTriggerConsumerEnabled && jobRunnerForTriggers) {
-    systemConsumers.push(createJobTriggerEventConsumer(jobRunnerForTriggers, options.registry));
-  }
-  // Default ON (#1524 global-by-default). Tests that opt out of SSE via
-  // systemConsumers.accessInvalidation=false (test-stack mirrors sse off)
-  // skip the row so retention prune suites are not blocked by a lagging
-  // cursor=0 consumer they never drain.
-  const accessInvalidationEnabled =
-    options.eventDispatcher?.systemConsumers?.accessInvalidation ?? true;
-  if (accessInvalidationEnabled) {
-    systemConsumers.push(createAccessInvalidationEventConsumer(sseBroker));
-  }
-
-  // MultiStreamProjections: one EventConsumer per MSP. Handler routes by
-  // event.type into the MSP's apply map. MSPs aggregate cross-aggregate but
-  // still within one tenant by default — the applier receives the plain
-  // baseDb DbRunner; tenant consistency comes from the triggering event's
-  // own tenantId, not a per-event TenantDb scope.
-  //
-  // Lane-filter (Welle 2.6.b): MSPs declare `runIn` to pin them to a
-  // deploy-lane. An MSP with `runIn: "api"` won't be wired into the
-  // worker-process dispatcher (and vice versa). `runIn: "both"` (or the
-  // legacy undefined default of "worker") runs wherever a dispatcher is
-  // started — SKIP LOCKED on the consumer-cursor handles the race between
-  // processes that both want the same event.
-  const processLane: RunIn = options.processLane ?? "worker";
-  const mspDefs = [...options.registry.getAllMultiStreamProjections().values()].filter((msp) =>
-    runsInLane(msp.runIn, processLane),
-  );
-  const mspConsumers: EventConsumer[] = mspDefs.map((msp) => ({
-    name: msp.name,
-    // Feature-toggle gating: carry the owning feature so the event-dispatcher
-    // can pause this consumer when the feature is globally disabled. Events
-    // queue up in the store and replay cleanly from the same cursor on resume.
-    ...(options.registry.getMultiStreamProjectionFeature(msp.name) && {
-      featureName: options.registry.getMultiStreamProjectionFeature(msp.name) as string, // @cast-boundary engine-bridge
-    }),
-    // Copy the continuous-lifecycle error policy straight onto the consumer.
-    // Rebuild uses its own policy (rebuildProjection reads msp.errorMode.rebuild
-    // directly); steady-state delivery runs through this consumer.
-    ...(msp.errorMode?.continuous && { errorPolicy: msp.errorMode.continuous }),
-    // Carry the MSP's declared delivery semantic through to the consumer.
-    // Default (shared) is applied inside event-dispatcher, so omitting when
-    // the MSP didn't declare one keeps the existing behaviour.
-    ...(msp.delivery && { delivery: msp.delivery }),
-    // Carry the MSP's declared cursor-seed through to the consumer. Default
-    // (beginning) is applied inside insertConsumerIfAbsent.
-    ...(msp.startFrom && { startFrom: msp.startFrom }),
-    handler: async (event, ctx) => {
-      const applyFn = msp.apply[event.type];
-      // skip: this MSP doesn't care about this event type — fast path,
-      // every event type passes through every MSP consumer exactly once.
-      if (!applyFn) return;
-      if (!baseDb) {
-        // skip: no baseDb wired — allConsumers.length > 0 + baseDb check
-        // above gates dispatcher creation, so we won't reach here in
-        // production. Defensive return for the type-narrowing path.
-        return;
-      }
-      // Saga/process-manager ctx: apply can call ctx.appendEvent to cascade
-      // a follow-up event onto another aggregate. Uses the triggering event's
-      // tenantId + userId so the causal chain stays tenant-consistent.
-      // MSP qualified names are "<feature>:projection:<short>" — the
-      // prefix before the first ":" owns the MSP. Used to reject
-      // cross-feature ctx.appendEvent calls at emit-site.
-      const mspOwner = msp.name.split(":")[0];
-      const mspFiles = fileProviderResolver
-        ? createFileContext(() => fileProviderResolver(event.tenantId))
-        : undefined;
-      const applyCtx = createMultiStreamApplyContext({
-        registry: options.registry,
-        db: baseDb,
-        tenantId: event.tenantId,
-        userId: event.metadata.userId,
-        ...(mspOwner && { callerFeature: mspOwner }),
-        ...(mspFiles && { files: mspFiles }),
-        ...(contextWithObservability.secrets && { secrets: contextWithObservability.secrets }),
-        ...(mspFiles && {
-          derivatives: createDerivativesContext({
-            files: mspFiles,
-            registry: options.registry,
-            db: baseDb,
-            tenantId: event.tenantId,
-          }),
-        }),
-      });
-      await applyFn(event, baseDb, applyCtx);
-      // Keep ctx reachable to satisfy the EventConsumerHandler signature.
-      void ctx;
-    },
-  }));
-
-  const allConsumers = [...systemConsumers, ...mspConsumers];
-  const {
-    disabled: dispatcherDisabled,
-    systemConsumers: _systemConsumersOpt,
-    ...dispatcherTunables
-  } = options.eventDispatcher ?? {};
-  let eventDispatcher: EventDispatcher | undefined;
-  if (allConsumers.length > 0 && baseDb && !dispatcherDisabled) {
-    eventDispatcher = createEventDispatcher({
-      db: baseDb,
-      consumers: allConsumers,
-      context: contextWithObservability,
-      tracer: observability.tracer,
-      meter: observability.meter,
-      instanceId: resolvedInstanceId,
-      ...dispatcherTunables,
-    });
-  }
-
-  // Wire the event-dispatcher shutdown into the lifecycle so the caller
-  // doesn't have to know the dispatcher exists. Hooks drain LIFO, so this
-  // runs before anything registered later by the caller (e.g. DB pool close).
-  if (options.lifecycle && eventDispatcher) {
-    const dispatcher = eventDispatcher;
-    options.lifecycle.registerShutdownHook("eventDispatcher", async () => {
-      await dispatcher.stop();
-    });
-  }
-
-  // Same reasoning, scoped to the broker this function created itself — an
-  // app-injected sseBroker (options.sseBroker) owns its own teardown.
-  if (options.lifecycle && ownedRedisSseBroker) {
-    const broker = ownedRedisSseBroker;
-    options.lifecycle.registerShutdownHook("redisSseBroker", async () => {
-      await broker.close();
-    });
-  }
-
-  const app = new Hono();
-
-  // Only entry:"signature" bypasses jwtGuard (verify() authenticates
-  // itself); entry:"anonymous" still needs the anonymousAccess fallthrough
-  // (tenant-by-host), entry:"user" needs c.get("user") populated.
-  const extraRoutePublicMatchers = compileExtraRoutePublicMatchers(options.extraRoutes);
-  const isExtraRoutePublicPath = (c: import("hono").Context): boolean =>
-    extraRoutePublicMatchers.some((m) => m.method === c.req.method && m.pattern.test(c.req.path));
-
-  const sensitiveConfig = mergeSensitiveConfig(
-    options.observabilityOptions?.sensitiveFilter ?? DEFAULT_SENSITIVE_CONFIG,
-  );
-
-  registerHealthRoutes(app, {
-    lifecycle: options.lifecycle,
-    readiness: {
-      db: baseDb,
-      redis: options.context.redis,
-      consumers: allConsumers,
-      ...(options.readiness ?? {}),
-    },
-  });
-
-  if (options.metrics) {
-    registerMetricsRoute(app, observability.meter, options.metrics);
-  }
-
-  app.use("/api/*", requestIdMiddleware({ resolver: clientIpResolver }));
-
-  // Cap JSON bodies before rate-limit/auth/observability even run. Header-
-  // check is O(1); oversized requests never allocate memory for a full body
-  // parse. Upload route keeps its own per-field maxSize.
-  registerBodyLimit(app, options.maxRequestBytes ?? DEFAULT_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES);
-
-  // L1/L2 rate-limit middleware run BEFORE auth so an unauthenticated
-  // flood can't even reach the JWT-verify code path. Wired only when
-  // the caller passed `rateLimit.global` or `rateLimit.auth`. The
-  // resolver is the auto-wired one (or `context.rateLimit` if set);
-  // boot-fails loudly when the caller asked for middleware without a
-  // working Redis to back it.
-  if (wantsL1L2) {
-    if (!rateLimitResolver) {
-      throw new Error(
-        "rateLimit middleware requested but no resolver available — pass `context.redis` " +
-          "or `context.rateLimit` so the resolver can be built.",
-      );
-    }
-    if (options.rateLimit?.global) {
-      app.use(
-        "/api/*",
-        globalIpRateLimit({
-          ...options.rateLimit.global,
-          resolver: rateLimitResolver,
-          clientIpResolver,
-        }),
-      );
-    }
-    if (options.rateLimit?.auth) {
-      const { path: l2Path = "/api/auth/*", ...l2Opts } = options.rateLimit.auth;
-      app.use(
-        l2Path,
-        authEndpointRateLimit({ ...l2Opts, resolver: rateLimitResolver, clientIpResolver }),
-      );
-    }
-  }
-  // Observability span wraps everything that follows (auth, routes).
-  // Must come AFTER request-id (so span can carry the id) and BEFORE auth
-  // (so auth-verify can be a child span once we instrument it in v2).
-  app.use(
-    "/api/*",
-    observabilityMiddleware({
-      tracer: observability.tracer,
-      meter: observability.meter,
-      sensitiveConfig,
-    }),
-  );
-
-  // Tripwire: a kumiko-pii: ciphertext in a JSON response is always a bug
-  // (raw read leaked past a decrypt) — dev fails loud, prod redacts (#820).
-  app.use("/api/*", piiCiphertextResponseGuard());
-
-  // Auth middleware skips public paths (login, health) — those routes need
-  // to be callable without a valid JWT. Every other /api/* request requires
-  // a token (or, when anonymousAccess is wired, falls through as anonymous).
-  // A session-checker is forwarded when the auth-config wires one, so the
-  // middleware can reject revoked sids on every request.
-  // Mounting a tenantLifecycleStatus provider is what turns the 410 on, so no
-  // entrypoint can forget the wiring; `??` short-circuits, so an explicit
-  // auth.resolveTenantLifecycleStatus remains the override.
-  const tenantLifecycleResolver =
-    options.auth?.resolveTenantLifecycleStatus ??
-    deriveTenantLifecycleResolver(options.registry, baseDb);
-  // sessionOnlyGuard deliberately does NOT get this — its callers have no
-  // anonymousAccess fallback, so a foreign-origin cookie there must keep
-  // failing through the sibling originMiddleware 403.
-  const normalizedForeignCookieOrigins = options.auth?.allowedOrigins?.length
-    ? new Set(options.auth.allowedOrigins.map(normalizeOrigin))
-    : undefined;
-  const jwtGuard = authMiddleware(jwt, {
-    ...(options.auth?.sessionChecker ? { sessionChecker: options.auth.sessionChecker } : {}),
-    ...(options.auth?.tokenVerifier ? { tokenVerifier: options.auth.tokenVerifier } : {}),
-    ...(tenantLifecycleResolver ? { resolveTenantLifecycleStatus: tenantLifecycleResolver } : {}),
-    ...(options.anonymousAccess ? { anonymousAccess: options.anonymousAccess } : {}),
-    ...(normalizedForeignCookieOrigins
-      ? { foreignCookieOrigins: normalizedForeignCookieOrigins }
-      : {}),
-  });
-  app.use("/api/*", async (c, next) => {
-    if (PUBLIC_API_PATHS.has(c.req.path) || isExtraRoutePublicPath(c)) return next();
-    return jwtGuard(c, next);
-  });
-
-  // Fail-closed PAT scoping: a PAT-authenticated caller (user.pat set by
-  // jwtGuard's tokenVerifier above) may only reach the dispatcher routes —
-  // everywhere else on /api/* is off-limits regardless of granted scopes.
-  const patRouteGuardMiddleware = patRouteGuard();
-  app.use("/api/*", async (c, next) => {
-    if (PUBLIC_API_PATHS.has(c.req.path) || isExtraRoutePublicPath(c)) return next();
-    return patRouteGuardMiddleware(c, next);
-  });
-
-  // Without anonymousAccess a missing token 401s instead of falling through as anonymous.
-  const sessionOnlyGuard = authMiddleware(jwt, {
-    ...(options.auth?.sessionChecker ? { sessionChecker: options.auth.sessionChecker } : {}),
-    ...(options.auth?.tokenVerifier ? { tokenVerifier: options.auth.tokenVerifier } : {}),
-    ...(tenantLifecycleResolver ? { resolveTenantLifecycleStatus: tenantLifecycleResolver } : {}),
-  });
-
-  // PAT rate limiting — runs AFTER the auth guard so the resolved principal is
-  // available. Only PAT-authenticated requests are counted (keyed by token id);
-  // cookie/JWT users pass through untouched. In-memory limiter is per-instance
-  // (see run-prod-app) — a multi-node deployment wanting a shared counter swaps
-  // in a Redis-backed LoginRateLimiter.
-  const patRateLimiter = options.auth?.patRateLimiter;
-  const patRateLimitGuard = patRateLimiter ? buildPatRateLimitGuard(patRateLimiter) : undefined;
-  if (patRateLimitGuard) {
-    app.use("/api/*", async (c, next) => {
-      if (PUBLIC_API_PATHS.has(c.req.path) || isExtraRoutePublicPath(c)) return next();
-      return patRateLimitGuard(c, next);
-    });
-  }
-
-  // Origin-allowlist guard — additional CSRF-hardening for deployments that
-  // widen the auth cookie across subdomains (auth.cookieDomain). Registered
-  // only when allowedOrigins is non-empty, with the same /api/* + public-skip
-  // scope as the CSRF guard and BEFORE it, so a disallowed cross-site POST
-  // surfaces as `origin_not_allowed` rather than `csrf_token_mismatch`. Fails
-  // closed (assertOriginGuardConfig throws) when a wide cookieDomain is set
-  // without an allowlist and without an explicit opt-out — that config is the
-  // unguarded-subdomain-XSS footgun, not a warn-and-continue case.
-  assertOriginGuardConfig(options.auth);
-  const allowedOrigins = options.auth?.allowedOrigins;
-  const originGuard =
-    allowedOrigins && allowedOrigins.length > 0 ? originMiddleware(allowedOrigins) : undefined;
-  if (originGuard) {
-    app.use("/api/*", async (c, next) => {
-      if (PUBLIC_API_PATHS.has(c.req.path) || isExtraRoutePublicPath(c)) return next();
-      return originGuard(c, next);
-    });
-  }
-
-  // Double-submit CSRF guard — runs only on cookie-authenticated,
-  // state-changing requests (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE). The guard reads the
-  // authTransport flag set by authMiddleware, so public paths (no auth)
-  // and bearer-authenticated paths (no cookie vector) fall straight
-  // through. Must be registered AFTER the auth middleware above so the
-  // flag is populated; registered for the same scope so /api/* routes
-  // are covered uniformly.
-  const csrfGuard = csrfMiddleware();
-  app.use("/api/*", async (c, next) => {
-    if (PUBLIC_API_PATHS.has(c.req.path) || isExtraRoutePublicPath(c)) return next();
-    return csrfGuard(c, next);
-  });
-
-  // Same order as /api/* above: auth → PAT route scope → PAT rate-limit → origin → CSRF.
-  const sessionOnlyHttpRouteGuards: readonly MiddlewareHandler[] = [
-    sessionOnlyGuard,
-    patRouteGuardMiddleware,
-    ...(patRateLimitGuard ? [patRateLimitGuard] : []),
-    ...(originGuard ? [originGuard] : []),
-    csrfGuard,
-  ];
-
-  // Public auth routes (login) need to be registered BEFORE the generic
-  // api routes so Hono matches them first.
-  if (options.auth) {
-    // A membershipQuery handler is registered but nothing fulfils
-    // principalStatus — surface that misconfig at boot instead of an InternalError on first login/switch-tenant.
-    if (
-      options.registry.getQueryHandler(options.auth.membershipQuery) &&
-      options.registry.getExtensionUsages(EXT_PRINCIPAL_STATUS).length === 0
-    ) {
-      throw new Error(
-        `[kumiko] auth membershipQuery "${options.auth.membershipQuery}" is registered but no feature ` +
-          'provides the "principalStatus" contract — mount the user feature (tenant switch and sign-in ' +
-          "need it to reject blocked principals).",
-      );
-    }
-    app.route(
-      "/api",
-      createAuthRoutes(dispatcher, jwt, { ...options.auth, resolver: clientIpResolver }),
-    );
-  }
-  app.route(
-    "/api",
-    createApiRoutes(dispatcher, {
-      ...(options.sseHeartbeatMs !== undefined ? { sseHeartbeatMs: options.sseHeartbeatMs } : {}),
-    }),
-  );
-  app.route("/api", createSseRoute(sseBroker));
-
-  // GET /api/schema — the only way a client obtains the AppSchema. Behind
-  // jwtGuard (NON_PUBLIC_API_PATHS), so anonymousAccess's synthesised user
-  // also gets rejected below — the schema never reaches an unauthenticated
-  // caller. The FULL schema is built lazily once — the registry is
-  // immutable for this server's lifetime, so it's the same on every
-  // request — then projected per caller-role-set (fw#3314: a role only
-  // sees the screens/navs/workspaces/content-collections it may reach,
-  // not the whole app's schema) and cached per role key. Tenant is
-  // deliberately NOT part of the key: the projection depends only on
-  // roles, and per-tenant caching would grow unboundedly across tenants
-  // that share the same role set.
-  let fullSchema: AppSchema | undefined;
-  const projectedSchemaCache = new Map<string, { readonly json: string; readonly etag: string }>();
-  app.get(`/api${Routes.schema}`, (c) => {
-    const user = getUser(c);
-    if (isMissingOrAnonymousUser(user)) {
-      return unauthenticatedResponse(c);
-    }
-    const roleKey = JSON.stringify([...new Set(user?.roles ?? [])].sort());
-    let cached = projectedSchemaCache.get(roleKey);
-    if (cached === undefined) {
-      if (fullSchema === undefined) {
-        fullSchema = buildAppSchema(options.registry, {
-          searchAdapterMissing: !options.context.searchAdapter,
-        });
-      }
-      const projected = projectAppSchemaForRoles(fullSchema, user?.roles ?? []);
-      const json = JSON.stringify(projected);
-      cached = { json, etag: computeStrongEtag(json) };
-      projectedSchemaCache.set(roleKey, cached);
-    }
-    const cacheHeaders = { "Cache-Control": "private, no-cache", ETag: cached.etag };
-    if (etagMatches(c.req.header("If-None-Match") ?? null, cached.etag)) {
-      return c.body(null, 304, cacheHeaders);
-    }
-    return c.body(cached.json, 200, {
-      "Content-Type": "application/json; charset=utf-8",
-      ...cacheHeaders,
-    });
-  });
-
-  // Mount upload/download routes whenever a file provider is resolvable (a
-  // file-provider plugin is mounted, or a resolver was injected). They resolve
-  // the provider per-tenant through file-foundation — no `files` option; route
-  // policy comes from createFilesFeature(opts?). Gating on the resolver (not on
-  // declared file fields) keeps unattached uploads working and matches the old
-  // "files option present → routes" behavior.
-  if (fileProviderResolver) {
-    const fileDb = options.context.db as FileRoutesOptions["db"]; // @cast-boundary engine-bridge
-    if (!fileDb) throw new Error("file routes require db in context");
-    const routeOptions = readFilesRouteOptions(options.registry);
-    app.route(
-      "/api",
-      createFileRoutes({
-        db: fileDb,
-        registry: options.registry,
-        resolveProvider: fileProviderResolver,
-        ...(routeOptions.accessGuard ? { accessGuard: routeOptions.accessGuard } : {}),
-        ...(routeOptions.privilegedRoles ? { privilegedRoles: routeOptions.privilegedRoles } : {}),
-        ...(routeOptions.maxUploadSize ? { maxUploadSize: routeOptions.maxUploadSize } : {}),
-      }),
-    );
-  }
-
-  // Feature-deklarierte HTTP-Routes (r.httpRoute). Mount nach /api/* damit
-  // /api/* immer Vorrang hat — feature-Routes liegen ohnehin außerhalb
-  // (Boot-Validator blockt /api-Prefix). deps.app ist die Outer-App, sodass
-  // der Handler /api/query intern via app.fetch(...) nutzen kann (gleicher
-  // Auth-Pfad wie ein echter HTTP-Call). deps.systemQuery umgeht diesen
-  // Pfad bewusst — für Routes die einen FESTEN Tenant erzwingen müssen
-  // (z.B. legal-pages → immer SYSTEM_TENANT_ID), statt ihn per X-Tenant-
-  // Header vorzutäuschen (das sieht für die anonymousAccess-Auflösung
-  // wie ein normaler Client-Header aus und wird von resolverTrust:
-  // "authoritative"-Configs zurecht als Tenant-Override abgelehnt).
-  for (const feature of options.registry.features.values()) {
-    for (const route of Object.values(feature.httpRoutes)) {
-      // @wrapper-known semantic-alias
-      const honoHandler = async (c: import("hono").Context): Promise<Response> =>
-        route.handler(c, {
-          app,
-          // createAnonymousUser, NOT createSystemUser: systemQuery's
-          // synthesized user must clear the SAME access gate a real
-          // anonymous visitor would, no more — regardless of the route's
-          // own `anonymous` mode. The system role would ALSO satisfy that
-          // gate here, but it can read fields gated to "system" that
-          // "anonymous" can't (filterReadFields is a plain role-in-map
-          // check) — a systemQuery caller reading a system-gated field
-          // would leak it into the response. The forced tenant already
-          // comes from bypassing the HTTP layer entirely; no elevated
-          // role is needed or wanted on top of that.
-          systemQuery: makeSystemQuery(c, dispatcher, clientIpResolver),
-          clientIp: clientIpResolver.resolve(clientIpSourceFromHonoContext(c)),
-        });
-      mountHonoRoute(
-        app,
-        route.method,
-        route.path,
-        honoHandler,
-        route.anonymous ? [] : sessionOnlyHttpRouteGuards,
-      );
-    }
-  }
-
-  // r.webSocketRoute — GET routes under /api/ws/*, so the jwt/pat/rate-limit
-  // chain above already ran. Origin/CSRF guards skip GETs, hence the own check.
-  const webSocketOriginAllowlist = allowedOrigins?.length
-    ? new Set(allowedOrigins.map(normalizeOrigin))
-    : undefined;
-  const webSocketRoutePaths = new Map<string, string>();
-  const webSocketConnectionLimiter = createWebSocketConnectionLimiter();
-  for (const feature of options.registry.features.values()) {
-    for (const route of Object.values(feature.webSocketRoutes)) {
-      const owner = webSocketRoutePaths.get(route.path);
-      if (owner !== undefined) {
-        throw new Error(
-          `[kumiko] WebSocket route "${route.path}" is declared by both feature "${owner}" and ` +
-            `"${feature.name}" — paths must be unique across features.`,
-        );
-      }
-      webSocketRoutePaths.set(route.path, feature.name);
-      app.get(
-        route.path,
-        buildWebSocketRouteHandler(route, {
-          dispatcher,
-          clientIpResolver,
-          originAllowlist: webSocketOriginAllowlist,
-          ...(options.auth?.sessionChecker ? { sessionChecker: options.auth.sessionChecker } : {}),
-          ...(tenantLifecycleResolver
-            ? { resolveTenantLifecycleStatus: tenantLifecycleResolver }
-            : {}),
-          connectionLimiter: webSocketConnectionLimiter,
-        }),
-      );
-    }
-  }
-
-  // extraRoutes (kumiko-framework#3050) — declarative HTTP-routes with a
-  // Pflicht `entry` tier. Mounted after r.httpRoute for the same reason: an
-  // extraRoute dispatching through `dispatcher` builds Hono's matcher, so
-  // this must run before any seed that also dispatches (runProdApp/
-  // createKumikoServer call buildServer before seeding).
-  if (options.extraRoutes) {
-    // Boot-time validation for the whole list BEFORE mounting anything —
-    // an app with one bad route should fail loud at boot, not mount N-1
-    // routes and then throw on route N.
-    for (const route of options.extraRoutes) {
-      if (!isKnownExtraRouteEntry(route.entry)) {
-        throw new Error(
-          `[kumiko] extraRoutes: unknown entry "${String(route.entry)}" on ` +
-            `"${route.method} ${route.path}" — expected "anonymous" | "user" | "signature". ` +
-            "A JS caller without the ExtraRouteDefinition type can hit this at boot.",
-        );
-      }
-      if (route.entry === ExtraRouteEntries.user && !route.path.startsWith("/api/")) {
-        throw new Error(
-          `[kumiko] extraRoutes: entry:"user" route "${route.method} ${route.path}" must be ` +
-            "mounted under \"/api/\" — that's the only path prefix that rides the framework's " +
-            "jwtGuard chain, which is what populates deps.user.",
-        );
-      }
-      // A signature route under /api/ skips jwtGuard/origin/csrf for every
-      // path its pattern matches — a wildcard would switch off auth for
-      // unrelated /api/* handlers (e.g. "/api/*" swallows /api/write).
-      if (
-        route.entry === ExtraRouteEntries.signature &&
-        route.path.startsWith("/api/") &&
-        route.path.includes("*")
-      ) {
-        throw new Error(
-          `[kumiko] extraRoutes: entry:"signature" route "${route.method} ${route.path}" must not ` +
-            'use a wildcard under "/api/" — it would bypass the auth chain for every matching path.',
-        );
-      }
-    }
-    const dispatchSystemWrite = makeDispatchSystemWrite(dispatcher);
-    const dispatchSystemQuery = makeDispatchSystemQuery(dispatcher);
-    for (const route of options.extraRoutes) {
-      const honoHandler = buildExtraRouteHonoHandler(route, {
-        app,
-        dispatcher,
-        registry: options.registry,
-        secrets: contextWithObservability.secrets,
-        dispatchSystemWrite,
-        dispatchSystemQuery,
-        clientIpResolver,
-      });
-      mountHonoRoute(app, route.method, route.path, honoHandler);
-    }
-  }
-
-  // /version-Default registriert NACH feature-routes — Hono "first match
-  // wins", also gewinnt feature-deklariertes /version (z.B. App-spezifisches
-  // version-format mit Tenant-Stats) wenn vorhanden, sonst greift der
-  // Default-Handler aus BUILD_VERSION/BUILD_TIME-env-vars.
-  registerVersionRoute(app);
-
-  // Marks "no route matched this path" so tryHonoFirst (server-runtime)
-  // can tell it apart from a matched route's OWN deliberate 404 (e.g.
-  // default-deny reads like file-derivatives' public-variant route) —
-  // without this, tryHonoFirst's only signal was the status code, and a
-  // matched route answering 404 got silently rewritten to the SPA shell
-  // with status 200 (kumiko-framework#2435). Must be the LAST thing wired
-  // on `app`: this only fires when the router found no handler at all, so
-  // a route's own `c.text(..., 404)` never passes through here. A handler
-  // that calls `c.notFound()` instead of building its own Response DOES
-  // route through this same handler and stays indistinguishable from a
-  // routing miss — pre-existing Hono semantics, not something this fix
-  // changes; deliberate 404s must build their own Response.
-  // The header is an internal signal only — tryHonoFirst and every direct
-  // app.fetch() passthrough strip it before a response reaches a client.
-  app.notFound((c) => c.text("Not Found", 404, { [NO_ROUTE_MATCH_HEADER_NAME]: "1" }));
-
-  return {
-    app,
-    jwt,
-    sseBroker,
-    observability,
-    dispatcher,
-    context: contextWithObservability,
-    ...(eventDispatcher ? { eventDispatcher } : {}),
-    ...(options.lifecycle ? { lifecycle: options.lifecycle } : {}),
-  };
-}
-
-// Method-switch shared by r.httpRoute and extraRoutes — one place to keep
-// the two mounting paths from drifting on which Hono methods get a
-// convenience-call vs. app.on().
-function mountHonoRoute(
-  app: Hono,
-  method: HttpRouteMethod,
-  path: string,
-  // biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noExplicitAny: Hono context generics are invisible at the framework boundary
-  handler: (c: import("hono").Context<any, any>) => Response | Promise<Response>,
-  middlewares: readonly MiddlewareHandler[] = [],
-): void {
-  // Guards go into the route's own handler chain, never a method-gated
-  // app.use: Hono serves HEAD through the GET route with c.req.method still
-  // "HEAD", so a `method === c.req.method` gate would skip them for HEAD.
-  if (middlewares.length > 0) {
-    // [path]: only Hono's array-path overload accepts a variable-length handler spread.
-    app.on(method, [path], ...middlewares, handler);
-    // skip: guarded route already mounted with its guard chain
-    return;
-  }
-  switch (method) {
-    case "GET":
-      app.get(path, handler);
-      break;
-    case "POST":
-      app.post(path, handler);
-      break;
-    case "PUT":
-      app.put(path, handler);
-      break;
-    case "PATCH":
-      app.patch(path, handler);
-      break;
-    case "DELETE":
-      app.delete(path, handler);
-      break;
-    case "OPTIONS":
-    case "HEAD":
-      // Hono's on() for the methods without a convenience method.
-      app.on(method, path, handler);
-      break;
-    default:
-      assertUnreachable(method, "http method");
-  }
-}
-
-// Must run after the auth guard so getUser(c) carries the PAT.
-function buildPatRateLimitGuard(patRateLimiter: LoginRateLimiter): MiddlewareHandler {
-  return async (c, next) => {
-    const pat = getUser(c)?.pat;
-    if (pat && !(await patRateLimiter.check(pat.tokenId))) {
-      return c.json(
-        {
-          error: {
-            code: "pat_rate_limited",
-            httpStatus: 429,
-            message: "personal access token rate limit exceeded",
-            i18nKey: "auth.errors.patRateLimited",
-          },
-        },
-        429,
-      );
-    }
-    return next();
-  };
-}
-
-// Shared systemQuery builder for r.httpRoute and extraRoutes (anonymous +
-// signature entries). requestContext.run must wrap the dispatcher call —
-// both route kinds run outside the requestIdMiddleware chain that normally
-// populates it, and `rateLimit: {per: "ip", ...}` on a handler invoked
-// through systemQuery is otherwise silent dead-code (enforceRateLimit reads
-// requestContext.get()?.ip, undefined without this wrap).
-function makeSystemQuery(
-  // biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noExplicitAny: Hono context generics are invisible at the framework boundary
-  c: import("hono").Context<any, any>,
-  dispatcher: Dispatcher,
-  clientIpResolver?: ClientIpResolver,
-): (type: string, payload: unknown, tenantId: TenantId) => Promise<unknown> {
-  return (type, payload, tenantId) =>
-    requestContext.run(requestContext.get() ?? buildRequestContextData(c, clientIpResolver), () =>
-      dispatcher.query(type, payload, createAnonymousUser(tenantId)),
-    );
-}
-
-// SystemAdmin write/query builders shared by buildServer's `extraRoutes`
-// mount and server-runtime's `wire` hook (runProdApp/createKumikoServer,
-// after buildServer). Privilege-scope: SystemAdmin is the highest
-// non-tenant-scoped role — reaches ANY SystemAdmin-gated handler on ANY
-// tenant. Only safe for callers that already proved their own authenticity
-// (signature verify(), HMAC state, ...), never exposed to a raw request.
-export function makeDispatchSystemWrite(
-  dispatcher: Dispatcher,
-): (args: SystemDispatchArgs) => Promise<WriteResult> {
-  return ({ handlerQn, payload, tenantId }) =>
-    dispatcher.write(handlerQn, payload, createSystemUser(tenantId, [ROLES.SystemAdmin]));
-}
-
-export function makeDispatchSystemQuery(
-  dispatcher: Dispatcher,
-): (args: SystemDispatchArgs) => Promise<unknown> {
-  return ({ handlerQn, payload, tenantId }) =>
-    dispatcher.query(handlerQn, payload, createSystemUser(tenantId, [ROLES.SystemAdmin]));
-}
-
-// Same dispatcher.write(...) as entry:"user", but the user is getUser(c) —
-// see AnonymousExtraRouteDeps.write for the privilege/tenant contract.
-function makeAnonymousWrite(
-  // biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noExplicitAny: Hono context generics are invisible at the framework boundary
-  c: import("hono").Context<any, any>,
-  dispatcher: Dispatcher,
-): (type: string, payload: unknown) => Promise<WriteResult> {
-  return (type, payload) => {
-    const user = getUser(c);
-    if (!user) {
-      throw new Error(
-        '[kumiko] extraRoutes: entry:"anonymous" deps.write requires this route to be mounted ' +
-          'under "/api/" with anonymousAccess wired — no request-resolved session user was found.',
-      );
-    }
-    return dispatcher.write(type, payload, user);
-  };
-}
-
-// Shared by entry:"user" extra routes and GET /api/schema — both require a
-// real, signed-in principal and reject the synthesised anonymousAccess user
-// (SessionUser.roles includes ANONYMOUS_ROLE) the same way.
-function isMissingOrAnonymousUser(user: SessionUser | undefined): boolean {
-  return !user || user.roles.includes(ANONYMOUS_ROLE);
-}
-
-function unauthenticatedResponse(c: import("hono").Context): Response {
-  return c.json(
-    {
-      error: {
-        code: "unauthenticated",
-        httpStatus: 401,
-        message: "this route requires a signed-in user",
-        i18nKey: "auth.errors.missingToken",
-      },
-    },
-    401,
-  );
-}
-
-type WebSocketRouteHandlerDeps = {
-  readonly dispatcher: Dispatcher;
-  readonly clientIpResolver: ClientIpResolver;
-  readonly originAllowlist: ReadonlySet<string> | undefined;
-  readonly sessionChecker?: AuthSessionChecker;
-  readonly resolveTenantLifecycleStatus?: TenantLifecycleStatusResolver;
-  readonly connectionLimiter: WebSocketConnectionLimiter;
-};
-
-const webSocketLog = createFallbackLogger("websocket");
-
-function webSocketErrorResponse(
-  c: import("hono").Context,
-  status: 400 | 426 | 429 | 501,
-  code: string,
-  message: string,
-): Response {
-  return c.json({ error: { code, httpStatus: status, message } }, status);
-}
-
-function buildWebSocketRouteHandler(
-  route: WebSocketRouteDefinition,
-  shared: WebSocketRouteHandlerDeps,
-  // biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noExplicitAny: Hono context generics are invisible at the framework boundary
-): (c: import("hono").Context<any, any>) => Promise<Response> {
-  return async (c) => {
-    if (!isWebSocketOriginAllowed(c, shared.originAllowlist)) return rejectOrigin(c);
-    const user = getUser(c);
-    if (isMissingOrAnonymousUser(user)) return unauthenticatedResponse(c);
-    if (!isWebSocketUpgradeRequest(c.req.raw)) {
-      return webSocketErrorResponse(
-        c,
-        426,
-        "websocket_upgrade_required",
-        "this route only accepts WebSocket upgrade requests",
-      );
-    }
-    const honoEnv: unknown = c.env;
-    if (!hasWebSocketUpgradeServer(honoEnv)) {
-      const message = "webSocketUpgradeFetch not wired: pass it to buildBunServeOptions";
-      webSocketLog.error(message, { path: route.path });
-      return webSocketErrorResponse(c, 501, "websocket_upgrade_not_wired", message);
-    }
-    // The slot is taken before connect (a refused attempt must not run it) and stays synchronous with
-    // the check, so concurrent upgrades can't overshoot the cap. Every path without a live socket frees it.
-    const releaseConnectionSlot = shared.connectionLimiter.tryAcquire(
-      `${route.path}\n${user.tenantId}\n${user.id}`,
-      route.maxConnectionsPerUser ?? WEBSOCKET_DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS_PER_USER,
-    );
-    if (!releaseConnectionSlot) {
-      return webSocketErrorResponse(
-        c,
-        429,
-        "websocket_connection_limit",
-        "too many open WebSocket connections for this user",
-      );
-    }
-    let upgraded = false;
-    try {
-      const handlers = await route.connect(c, {
-        user,
-        query: (type, payload) => shared.dispatcher.query(type, payload, user),
-        write: (type, payload) => shared.dispatcher.write(type, payload, user),
-        clientIp: shared.clientIpResolver.resolve(clientIpSourceFromHonoContext(c)),
-      });
-      if (handlers instanceof Response) return handlers;
-
-      const captured = requestContext.get();
-      const requestContextData = captured ? withoutAbortSignal(captured) : undefined;
-      const revalidateSession = buildWebSocketSessionRevalidator({
-        user,
-        sessionChecker: shared.sessionChecker,
-        resolveTenantLifecycleStatus: shared.resolveTenantLifecycleStatus,
-        tokenExpiresAtSec: getAuthTokenExpiry(c),
-      });
-      upgraded = honoEnv.server.upgrade(c.req.raw, {
-        data: {
-          handlers,
-          maxMessageBytes: route.maxMessageBytes ?? WEBSOCKET_DEFAULT_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES,
-          requestContextData,
-          revalidateSession,
-          releaseConnectionSlot,
-        },
-      });
-      if (!upgraded) {
-        return webSocketErrorResponse(
-          c,
-          400,
-          "websocket_upgrade_failed",
-          "the WebSocket upgrade was rejected",
-        );
-      }
-      // Bun ignores the returned Response after a successful upgrade.
-      return new Response(null);
-    } finally {
-      if (!upgraded) releaseConnectionSlot();
-    }
-  };
-}
-
-// The request's AbortSignal fires when the upgrade request ends, which would
-// abort every later handler running under the captured context.
-function withoutAbortSignal(data: RequestContextData): RequestContextData {
-  const { signal: _signal, ...rest } = data;
-  return rest;
-}
-
-function isKnownExtraRouteEntry(entry: unknown): entry is ExtraRouteEntry {
-  return (
-    entry === ExtraRouteEntries.anonymous ||
-    entry === ExtraRouteEntries.user ||
-    entry === ExtraRouteEntries.signature
-  );
-}
-
-// Hono path pattern ("/api/foo/:bar", "/api/foo/*") → RegExp. Only the
-// subset extraRoutes actually uses (static segments, `:param`, trailing
-// `*`) — no inline `:param{regex}` constraints, no optional `:param?`.
-function honoPathToRegex(path: string): RegExp {
-  const segments = path
-    .split("/")
-    .map((segment) => {
-      if (segment.startsWith(":")) return "[^/]+";
-      if (segment === "*") return ".*";
-      return segment.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&");
-    })
-    .join("/");
-  return new RegExp(`^${segments}$`);
-}
-
-type ExtraRoutePublicMatcher = { readonly method: string; readonly pattern: RegExp };
-
-// See the bypass comment at the jwtGuard mount above — only signature
-// routes are public here.
-function compileExtraRoutePublicMatchers(
-  extraRoutes: readonly ExtraRouteDefinition[] | undefined,
-): readonly ExtraRoutePublicMatcher[] {
-  if (!extraRoutes) return [];
-  return extraRoutes
-    .filter((route) => route.entry === ExtraRouteEntries.signature)
-    .map((route) => ({ method: route.method, pattern: honoPathToRegex(route.path) }));
-}
-
-type ExtraRouteHonoHandlerDeps = {
-  readonly app: Hono;
-  readonly dispatcher: Dispatcher;
-  readonly registry: Registry;
-  readonly secrets: import("../secrets").SecretsContext | undefined;
-  readonly dispatchSystemWrite: (args: SystemDispatchArgs) => Promise<WriteResult>;
-  readonly dispatchSystemQuery: (args: SystemDispatchArgs) => Promise<unknown>;
-  readonly clientIpResolver: ClientIpResolver;
-};
-
-function buildExtraRouteHonoHandler(
-  route: ExtraRouteDefinition,
-  shared: ExtraRouteHonoHandlerDeps,
-  // biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noExplicitAny: Hono context generics are invisible at the framework boundary
-): (c: import("hono").Context<any, any>) => Promise<Response> {
-  switch (route.entry) {
-    case ExtraRouteEntries.anonymous:
-      return async (c) =>
-        route.handler(c, {
-          app: shared.app,
-          registry: shared.registry,
-          systemQuery: makeSystemQuery(c, shared.dispatcher, shared.clientIpResolver),
-          write: makeAnonymousWrite(c, shared.dispatcher),
-          clientIp: shared.clientIpResolver.resolve(clientIpSourceFromHonoContext(c)),
-        });
-    case ExtraRouteEntries.user:
-      return async (c) => {
-        const user = getUser(c);
-        if (isMissingOrAnonymousUser(user)) {
-          return unauthenticatedResponse(c);
-        }
-        return route.handler(c, {
-          app: shared.app,
-          registry: shared.registry,
-          user,
-          query: (type, payload) => shared.dispatcher.query(type, payload, user),
-          write: (type, payload) => shared.dispatcher.write(type, payload, user),
-        });
-      };
-    case ExtraRouteEntries.signature:
-      return async (c) => {
-        const rawBody = await c.req.text();
-        const headers: Record<string, string> = {};
-        c.req.raw.headers.forEach((value, key) => {
-          headers[key.toLowerCase()] = value;
-        });
-        let verified: unknown;
-        try {
-          verified = await route.verify(
-            { rawBody, headers, params: c.req.param(), query: c.req.query() },
-            { registry: shared.registry, secrets: shared.secrets },
-          );
-        } catch (e) {
-          if (e instanceof ExtraRouteRejection) {
-            if (e.retryAfterSeconds !== undefined) {
-              return c.json(e.body, e.status, { "Retry-After": String(e.retryAfterSeconds) });
-            }
-            return c.json(e.body, e.status);
-          }
-          return c.json(
-            {
-              error: {
-                code: "extra_route_signature_invalid",
-                message: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e),
-              },
-            },
-            401,
-          );
-        }
-        return route.handler(c, verified, {
-          app: shared.app,
-          registry: shared.registry,
-          secrets: shared.secrets,
-          systemQuery: makeSystemQuery(c, shared.dispatcher, shared.clientIpResolver),
-          dispatchSystemWrite: shared.dispatchSystemWrite,
-          dispatchSystemQuery: shared.dispatchSystemQuery,
-        });
-      };
-    default:
-      return assertUnreachable(route, "extra route entry");
-  }
-}
-
-function deriveTenantLifecycleResolver(
-  registry: Registry,
-  db: DbConnection | undefined,
-): TenantLifecycleStatusResolver | undefined {
-  const plugin = resolveTenantLifecyclePlugin(registry, "buildServer");
-  if (!plugin) return undefined;
-  if (!db) {
-    throw new Error(
-      "[kumiko] a tenantLifecycleStatus provider is mounted (tenant-lifecycle) but context.db is " +
-        "missing — the request-level teardown gate needs a DbConnection. Pass context.db, or wire " +
-        "auth.resolveTenantLifecycleStatus explicitly.",
-    );
-  }
-  return (tenantId) => plugin.resolveStatus(tenantId, { db });
-}
-
-// Scans every feature's entities for a file/image/files/images field. Short-
-// circuits on the first hit — no need to build a full inventory, we only want
-// the yes/no answer for the boot check.
-function registryDeclaresFileFields(registry: Registry): boolean {
-  for (const feature of registry.features.values()) {
-    for (const entity of Object.values(feature.entities ?? {})) {
-      for (const field of Object.values(entity.fields)) {
-        if (isFileField(field)) return true;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return false;
-}
-
-// Entities whose entityList screen WOULD render a search box based on
-// screen/field config alone: `screen.searchable` wins when set, otherwise
-// the box shows iff the entity has ≥1 searchable field. `screen.searchable
-// === false` is excluded — the boot-validator (entity-list-screens.ts) only
-// allows that on the whitelisted download-attempt-list-style screens, which
-// never render the box. This is the config-only half of the rule; the
-// client additionally gates on FeatureSchema.searchAdapterMissing (#2062,
-// set from the same `!options.context.searchAdapter` check below) so the
-// box is actually suppressed once this function finds a hit.
-function entitiesWithSearchableScreen(registry: Registry): readonly string[] {
-  const entities = new Set<string>();
-  for (const feature of registry.features.values()) {
-    for (const screen of Object.values(feature.screens)) {
-      if (screen.type !== "entityList") continue;
-      const isSearchable =
-        screen.searchable === true ||
-        (screen.searchable === undefined && registry.getSearchableFields(screen.entity).length > 0);
-      if (isSearchable) entities.add(screen.entity);
-    }
-  }
-  return [...entities];
-}