@cosmicdrift/kumiko-framework 0.328.0 → 0.328.1

package/src/api/auth-routes.ts

@@ -1,1590 +0,0 @@
-import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
-import type { Context } from "hono";
-import { Hono } from "hono";
-import { deleteCookie, setCookie } from "hono/cookie";
-import type { ContentfulStatusCode } from "hono/utils/http-status";
-import type Redis from "ioredis";
-import * as z from "zod";
-import { buildSessionRoles } from "../engine/membership-roles";
-import { createAnonymousUser, createSystemUser } from "../engine/system-user";
-import {
-  type ActiveMembershipRejection,
-  type ActiveMembershipResult,
-  type SessionUser,
-  SYSTEM_TENANT_ID,
-  type TenantId,
-} from "../engine/types";
-import { NotFoundError, toKumikoError, toWriteErrorInfo } from "../errors";
-import type { Dispatcher } from "../pipeline/dispatcher";
-import { assertUnreachable } from "../utils";
-import { parseRoles } from "../utils/serialization";
-import { Routes } from "./api-constants";
-import {
-  AUTH_COOKIE_NAME,
-  type AuthSessionChecker,
-  type AuthSessionStatus,
-  CSRF_COOKIE_NAME,
-  getUser,
-  type TokenVerifier,
-} from "./auth-middleware";
-import {
-  type ClientIpResolver,
-  clientIpSourceFromHonoContext,
-  createClientIpResolver,
-} from "./client-ip";
-import type { JwtHelper } from "./jwt";
-import type { PostAuthLandingArgs, PostAuthLandingResolver } from "./post-auth-landing";
-import { resolvePostAuthLandingPath } from "./post-auth-landing";
-import { generateToken } from "./tokens";
-
-// Resolves the Secure cookie flag. Locked off in dev/test so Playwright
-// against http://localhost:… can actually receive the cookie. Production
-// flips it on — browsers drop Secure cookies on http, so a misconfigured
-// prod deploy would silently break login rather than fail loud.
-function cookieSecure(): boolean {
-  return process.env["NODE_ENV"] === "production";
-}
-
-// Double-entry cookie write used at login and switch-tenant. kumiko_auth is
-// the HttpOnly carrier of the JWT; kumiko_csrf is the JS-readable token the
-// web client echoes in X-CSRF-Token on every state-changing request. Both
-// cookies share lifetime and SameSite so a stale auth-cookie can't outlive
-// its csrf partner (or vice versa) and leave the client in a half-logged-in
-// state that would trip the csrf-middleware on every retry.
-function setAuthCookies(
-  c: Context,
-  opts: {
-    token: string;
-    csrfToken: string;
-    sameSite: "lax" | "strict";
-    domain?: string | undefined;
-    // Cookie lifetime must track the JWT's exp claim — both are issued
-    // together, both reference the same session. Callers pass jwt.ttlSeconds
-    // so the two never drift apart.
-    ttlSeconds: number;
-  },
-): void {
-  const sameSite = opts.sameSite === "strict" ? "Strict" : "Lax";
-  const common = {
-    secure: cookieSecure(),
-    sameSite,
-    path: "/",
-    maxAge: opts.ttlSeconds,
-    ...(opts.domain !== undefined && { domain: opts.domain }),
-  } as const;
-
-  // Bei gesetzter Domain zuerst die host-only-Variante invalidieren (analog
-  // clearAuthCookies): sonst koexistiert nach einem Deploy mit neuem
-  // cookieDomain das alte host-only-Cookie mit dem neuen Domain-Cookie
-  // (RFC 6265: name+domain ist distinct) und der Server bindet
-  // umgebungsabhängig potenziell ans veraltete host-only-Token.
-  if (opts.domain !== undefined) {
-    deleteCookie(c, AUTH_COOKIE_NAME, { path: "/" });
-    deleteCookie(c, CSRF_COOKIE_NAME, { path: "/" });
-  }
-
-  setCookie(c, AUTH_COOKIE_NAME, opts.token, { ...common, httpOnly: true });
-  // Intentionally NOT HttpOnly — the web client has to read this from
-  // document.cookie to include it in the X-CSRF-Token request header.
-  setCookie(c, CSRF_COOKIE_NAME, opts.csrfToken, { ...common, httpOnly: false });
-}
-
-function clearAuthCookies(c: Context, domain?: string): void {
-  // Beide Varianten löschen: mit Domain (aktuelle Cookies) UND host-only
-  // (Bestand aus der Zeit vor cookieDomain) — sonst bleibt nach einem
-  // Deploy mit neu gesetztem cookieDomain der alte Cookie liegen und der
-  // Logout wirkt nur scheinbar.
-  deleteCookie(c, AUTH_COOKIE_NAME, { path: "/" });
-  deleteCookie(c, CSRF_COOKIE_NAME, { path: "/" });
-  if (domain !== undefined) {
-    deleteCookie(c, AUTH_COOKIE_NAME, { path: "/", domain });
-    deleteCookie(c, CSRF_COOKIE_NAME, { path: "/", domain });
-  }
-}
-
-// Body schema for POST /auth/login. Enforced BEFORE rate-limit so that a
-// malformed body (`email: 42`, missing password, …) returns 400 instead of
-// crashing on `.toLowerCase()` and leaking a 500 that never increments the
-// login counter — previous wiring let attackers spam the endpoint without
-// tripping the bucket.
-const LoginBody = z.object({
-  email: z.string().min(1),
-  password: z.string(),
-});
-
-// Body schema for POST /auth/mfa/verify. challengeToken is opaque to the
-// framework — it's minted and verified entirely by the mfaVerifyHandler
-// (auth-mfa owns the token format, TOTP/recovery-code check, and the
-// brute-force cap). code covers both 6-digit TOTP and XXXX-XXXX recovery
-// codes (9 chars incl. the dash).
-const MfaVerifyBody = z.object({
-  challengeToken: z.string().min(1),
-  code: z.string().min(6).max(9),
-});
-
-// Body schema for POST /auth/mfa/preauth-enable-start. preauthSetupToken is
-// opaque to the framework — minted by login.write.ts's mfaStatusChecker
-// (auth-mfa) when enforcement policy blocks an unenrolled user, verified
-// entirely by the mfaPreauthEnableStartHandler. accountLabel is
-// client-supplied (the email the user just typed at login) for the
-// otpauth:// URI, mirroring auth-mfa's own enable-start.write.ts.
-const MfaPreauthEnableStartBody = z.object({
-  preauthSetupToken: z.string().min(1),
-  accountLabel: z.string().min(1).max(200),
-});
-
-// Body schema for POST /auth/mfa/preauth-confirm. setupToken is opaque to
-// the framework — minted by the mfaPreauthEnableStartHandler, verified
-// entirely by the mfaPreauthConfirmHandler. code is TOTP-only (no recovery
-// codes at enrollment time), mirroring auth-mfa's own enable-confirm.write.ts.
-const MfaPreauthConfirmBody = z.object({
-  setupToken: z.string().min(1),
-  code: z.string().length(6),
-});
-
-const ResetPasswordBody = z.object({
-  token: z.string().min(1),
-  newPassword: z.string().min(8).max(200),
-});
-
-const VerifyEmailBody = z.object({
-  token: z.string().min(1),
-});
-
-const SignupConfirmBody = z.object({
-  token: z.string().min(1),
-  password: z.string().min(8).max(200),
-});
-
-// Cross-device try-first handover (kumiko-framework#3035 follow-up,
-// offlot-app#454): an optional tenant-handover grant the signup-request
-// route forwards to the handler for server-side verification and binding —
-// the grant itself never appears anywhere else (URL, mail, log, response).
-const SignupRequestBody = z.object({
-  email: z.email(),
-  handover: z
-    .object({
-      entityType: z.string().min(1).max(200),
-      token: z.string().min(1).max(4096),
-    })
-    .optional(),
-});
-
-const InviteAcceptBody = z.object({
-  token: z.string().min(1),
-});
-
-const InviteAcceptWithLoginBody = z.object({
-  token: z.string().min(1),
-  email: z.string().email(),
-  password: z.string().min(8).max(200),
-});
-
-const InviteSignupCompleteBody = z.object({
-  token: z.string().min(1),
-  password: z.string().min(8).max(200),
-});
-
-const InviteInfoBody = z.object({
-  token: z.string().min(1),
-});
-
-// Shape guard for "handler not registered" — the only legitimate reason to
-// fall back to a single-tenant reply on /auth/tenants or /auth/switch-tenant.
-// Every other error (DB down, revoker throws, access denied, …) has to
-// propagate — otherwise we'd silently paper over outages.
-function isUnknownHandlerError(e: unknown): boolean {
-  if (!(e instanceof NotFoundError)) return false;
-  // @cast-boundary error-details — KumikoError.details shape is per-error
-  const details = e.details as { entity?: string } | undefined;
-  return details?.entity === "handler";
-}
-
-function switchTenantRejectionResponse(c: Context, reason: ActiveMembershipRejection): Response {
-  switch (reason) {
-    case "not_a_member":
-      return c.json({ error: "not_a_member" }, 403);
-    case "principal_blocked":
-      return c.json({ error: "principal_blocked" }, 403);
-    case "tenant_teardown":
-      return c.json({ error: "tenant_unavailable" }, 410);
-    default:
-      return assertUnreachable(reason, "ActiveMembershipRejection");
-  }
-}
-
-type MembershipRow = {
-  userId: string;
-  tenantId: TenantId;
-  roles: string[];
-  /** Display-Name des Tenants — liefert die membershipQuery seit dem
-   *  tenant-switcher-Fix mit; optional für ältere App-eigene Queries. */
-  tenantName?: string;
-  tenantKey?: string;
-};
-
-// Pluggable rate-limiter for POST /auth/login. Returning `false` blocks the
-// request with 429 before the login handler runs — use this to slow down
-// brute-force attempts. The framework ships a default in-memory impl; apps
-// can swap it for a Redis-backed one for multi-node deployments.
-export type LoginRateLimiter = {
-  check(key: string): Promise<boolean>;
-  // Called on successful login so a legitimate user's counter gets reset.
-  reset(key: string): Promise<void>;
-};
-
-// Per-session metadata forwarded to the sessionCreator. Captured at login
-// time so the sessions feature can store IP/UA alongside each record for
-// session-list UIs ("your devices") and security-audit flows.
-export type SessionMetadata = {
-  readonly ip: string;
-  readonly userAgent: string;
-};
-
-// Invoked on a successful login (and on switch-tenant) so an app can persist
-// a session record and return its ID. The returned string is embedded in the
-// JWT's `jti` claim and echoed back as `SessionUser.sid` on every request.
-// When the callback is not wired, JWTs are stateless — they remain valid
-// until expiration, with no server-side revocation. The framework stays
-// agnostic about WHERE sessions live (DB, Redis, memory); that's the
-// sessions feature's job.
-export type SessionCreator = (user: SessionUser, meta: SessionMetadata) => Promise<string>;
-
-// Invoked on logout and on switch-tenant. No-op if the app hasn't wired a
-// sessionCreator; in that case the framework never populates a `sid` and
-// there's nothing to revoke.
-export type SessionRevoker = (sid: string) => Promise<void>;
-
-// Mass-revoke every live session for a user. Used by password-change and
-// "sign out everywhere" (sessions feature) and by auth-foundation's
-// SessionStore extension point — canonical home so both can re-export
-// the same type instead of restating it.
-export type SessionMassRevoker = (userId: string) => Promise<number>;
-
-// Status reported by the session-store to the auth-middleware. The concrete
-// type lives on auth-middleware to keep the tight coupling visible there;
-// auth-routes just re-uses the alias for the AuthRoutesConfig surface.
-// "live" → let the request through; anything else → 401 with the status as
-// the response reason, so logs/metrics can distinguish "revoked" from
-// "expired" from "someone forged a sid that never existed".
-export type SessionChecker = AuthSessionChecker;
-export type { AuthSessionStatus };
-
-export type AuthRoutesConfig = {
-  membershipQuery: string; // qualified query handler name, e.g. config.membershipQuery
-  // Optional: qualified query handler that returns the user-row inkl.
-  // globaler Rollen (`roles` als JSON-encoded string[]). Wenn gesetzt,
-  // ruft switch-tenant diese Query und mergt die globalen Rollen mit den
-  // tenant-membership-Rollen — so überlebt SystemAdmin (oder ähnliche
-  // tenant-unabhängige Rollen) den Tenant-Switch. Erwartete Shape:
-  // `{id, roles?: string|null}`. Default nicht gesetzt = kein merge
-  // (backwards-compat für Apps ohne globale Rollen).
-  userQuery?: string;
-  // Optional: qualified write handler for login. When set, POST /auth/login
-  // dispatches to this handler with a guest identity and issues a JWT on
-  // success. Handler must return { kind: "auth-session", session: SessionUser }.
-  loginHandler?: string;
-  // Maps feature-specific login error codes to HTTP status codes. Unknown
-  // errors default to 400. Keeps the framework unaware of concrete auth codes.
-  loginErrorStatusMap?: Readonly<Record<string, number>>;
-  // Rate-limit for POST /auth/login. Defaults to in-memory 10/5min per
-  // (ip + email) bucket. Pass `null` to disable (tests, trusted networks).
-  loginRateLimit?: LoginRateLimiter | null;
-  // Optional: qualified write handler completing a two-step (password +
-  // TOTP/recovery-code) login. When set, POST /auth/mfa/verify dispatches
-  // { challengeToken, code } to this handler with a guest identity. On
-  // success the handler must return { kind: "mfa-verify-success", session:
-  // SessionUser } and the route mints a JWT exactly like /auth/login.
-  // Everything MFA-specific (challenge-token format, TOTP/recovery check,
-  // the per-account brute-force cap) is owned by the handler — the
-  // framework stays as agnostic about it as it is about password hashing.
-  mfaVerifyHandler?: string;
-  // Maps mfaVerifyHandler error codes to HTTP status codes, same pattern as
-  // loginErrorStatusMap. Unknown errors default to the error's own httpStatus.
-  mfaVerifyErrorStatusMap?: Readonly<Record<string, number>>;
-  // Rate-limit for POST /auth/mfa/verify, keyed by client IP. Defaults to
-  // in-memory 10/5min. Pass `null` to disable. This is DELIBERATELY separate
-  // from loginRateLimit: unlike /auth/login (a dispatcher write-handler
-  // route that could inherit a handler-level rateLimit), this is a
-  // framework route with no handler.rateLimit to fall back on — and it's
-  // also separate from any per-account brute-force cap the mfaVerifyHandler
-  // enforces itself (see its own doc comment) — IP-scoped abuse protection
-  // and per-account guessing protection are different threats, neither
-  // substitutes for the other.
-  mfaVerifyRateLimit?: LoginRateLimiter | null;
-  // Optional: qualified write handler generating a TOTP secret + QR for a
-  // user blocked at login by MFA enforcement but not yet enrolled (see
-  // mfaStatusChecker's setupRequired branch, auth-mfa). When set, POST
-  // /auth/mfa/preauth-enable-start dispatches { preauthSetupToken,
-  // accountLabel } to this handler with a guest identity — no session is
-  // minted, the response is just { setupToken, otpauthUri, recoveryCodes }
-  // (same shape as auth-mfa's own enable-start.write.ts).
-  mfaPreauthEnableStartHandler?: string;
-  // Maps mfaPreauthEnableStartHandler error codes to HTTP status codes,
-  // same pattern as mfaVerifyErrorStatusMap.
-  mfaPreauthEnableStartErrorStatusMap?: Readonly<Record<string, number>>;
-  // Rate-limit for POST /auth/mfa/preauth-enable-start, keyed by client IP.
-  // Defaults to in-memory 10/5min. Pass `null` to disable. This route does
-  // NOT inherit the generic L2 authEndpointRateLimit on /api/auth/* by
-  // default (that's opt-in per-app via runProdApp's rateLimit.auth), and a
-  // preauthSetupToken is valid for the full setup-token TTL and not
-  // single-use until preauth-confirm burns it — an unrate-limited replay
-  // means every hit re-derives a fresh TOTP secret + 8 argon2id recovery-
-  // code hashes (recovery-codes.ts, Promise.all), a memory-hard CPU
-  // amplifier reachable from a single stolen/leaked token.
-  mfaPreauthEnableStartRateLimit?: LoginRateLimiter | null;
-  // Optional: qualified write handler completing the enrollment started by
-  // mfaPreauthEnableStartHandler — takes the secret-carrying setupToken
-  // from that step plus a TOTP code. When set, POST /auth/mfa/preauth-
-  // confirm dispatches { setupToken, code } to this handler with a guest
-  // identity. On success the handler must return { kind: "mfa-preauth-
-  // confirm-success", session: SessionUser } and the route mints a JWT
-  // exactly like /auth/mfa/verify — this call both finishes enrollment AND
-  // completes the login that was blocked by mfa-setup-required. Unlike
-  // mfaPreauthEnableStartHandler, THIS is the per-account TOTP-guessing
-  // surface the enable-start doc comment refers to — the handler owns its
-  // own brute-force cap (mirroring mfaVerifyHandler's), and this route adds
-  // its own IP-scoped rate limiter for the same reason mfaVerifyRateLimit
-  // exists separately from loginRateLimit.
-  mfaPreauthConfirmHandler?: string;
-  // Maps mfaPreauthConfirmHandler error codes to HTTP status codes, same
-  // pattern as mfaVerifyErrorStatusMap.
-  mfaPreauthConfirmErrorStatusMap?: Readonly<Record<string, number>>;
-  // Rate-limit for POST /auth/mfa/preauth-confirm, keyed by client IP. Same
-  // reasoning as mfaVerifyRateLimit — defaults to in-memory 10/5min, pass
-  // `null` to disable.
-  mfaPreauthConfirmRateLimit?: LoginRateLimiter | null;
-  // Session-lifecycle callbacks. When both are wired the JWT carries a `jti`
-  // (sid) and the server can revoke individual sessions (logout, compromise,
-  // password-change). When unwired the framework issues plain stateless JWTs.
-  // Mirrors the loginRateLimit pattern: feature-owned storage, framework-
-  // owned routing.
-  sessionCreator?: SessionCreator;
-  sessionRevoker?: SessionRevoker;
-  // Consulted by the auth-middleware on every authenticated request when the
-  // incoming JWT carries a `jti`. Paired with sessionCreator: create a sid
-  // at login, check it here on every request. Leaving this empty disables
-  // the revocation path — old JWTs stay valid until they expire naturally.
-  sessionChecker?: SessionChecker;
-  // Resolves bearer tokens (any registered auth-foundation `tokenVerifier`
-  // provider — PAT today, future JWT-provider), consulted BEFORE jwt.verify.
-  // Wired by run-prod-app/run-dev-app when at least one provider feature is
-  // mounted; unwired = no non-JWT bearer auth.
-  tokenVerifier?: TokenVerifier;
-  // Per-token request-rate limiter for PAT-authenticated requests, keyed by
-  // the token id (SessionUser.pat.tokenId). Cookie/JWT requests are unaffected.
-  // Reuses the LoginRateLimiter shape (a generic keyed check/reset limiter).
-  // Wired by run-prod-app when the PAT feature is mounted; unwired = no PAT
-  // rate limiting.
-  patRateLimiter?: LoginRateLimiter;
-  // Tenant-lifecycle 410 gate — wired by tenant-lifecycle / run-prod-app.
-  resolveTenantLifecycleStatus?: import("./auth-middleware").TenantLifecycleStatusResolver;
-  // Password-reset flow. When wired, POST /auth/request-password-reset and
-  // POST /auth/reset-password are mounted as public routes. The framework
-  // dispatches to the feature-level handlers (authoring QNs typically come
-  // from `AuthHandlers.requestPasswordReset` / `.resetPassword`) and
-  // invokes sendResetEmail with the freshly-signed token when a user was
-  // actually found. Silent-success: every response to request-reset is
-  // { isSuccess: true } regardless of whether the email existed.
-  passwordReset?: PasswordResetConfig;
-  // Email-verification flow. Symmetric to passwordReset.
-  emailVerification?: EmailVerificationConfig;
-  // Account-unlock flow (#1266). When wired, POST
-  // /auth/request-account-unlock + /auth/confirm-account-unlock are
-  // mounted as public routes. Confirm needs no extra body field
-  // (token-only, like email-verification) — the handler only clears the
-  // Redis lockout state, no entity write.
-  accountUnlock?: AccountUnlockConfig;
-  // Self-Signup (Magic-Link). Wenn wired, mountet POST
-  // /auth/signup-request + /auth/signup-confirm. Confirm returnt JWT-
-  // Cookie + Session-Body wie login.
-  signup?: SignupConfig;
-  // Tenant-Invite (Magic-Link). Mountet 3 accept-Routes für die 3
-  // Branches (logged-in / anon-existing-email / anon-new-email).
-  invite?: InviteConfig;
-  // SameSite flag for the HttpOnly auth cookie + JS-readable csrf cookie
-  // issued by /auth/login and /auth/switch-tenant.
-  //   "lax"    (default) — blocks cross-site POSTs entirely (which is what
-  //            CSRF relies on) while allowing top-level GET navigation
-  //            from external sites. Email deep-links (invite, magic-link,
-  //            notification click) keep working.
-  //   "strict" — blocks the cookie on ANY cross-site navigation including
-  //            top-level GETs. Strongest CSRF control but silently breaks
-  //            email deep-links — opt-in for banking / high-security apps
-  //            that don't ship deep-linkable emails.
-  // The framework always pairs the cookie with a Double-Submit CSRF token
-  // (see csrf-middleware), so "lax" is defense-in-depth, not defense-alone.
-  cookieSameSite?: "lax" | "strict";
-  // Domain attribute for both auth cookies. Unset (default) = host-only
-  // cookie, scoped to the exact host that served the response. Set it to
-  // the registrable parent domain (e.g. "example.eu") when login and app
-  // live on DIFFERENT subdomains (login on apex, app on admin.) — the
-  // browser then sends the session to every subdomain. Careful: that
-  // includes ALL subdomains (tenant pages, previews); widen the scope
-  // only when the cross-subdomain session is actually required — and pair
-  // it with `allowedOrigins` so the server-side Origin guard stays on (a
-  // wide cookie makes the JS-readable csrf cookie reachable from every
-  // subdomain, weakening the double-submit defence).
-  cookieDomain?: string;
-  // Origin-allowlist for the server-side CSRF-hardening guard (origin-
-  // middleware). When non-empty, every cookie-authenticated, state-changing
-  // /api request must carry an `Origin` header that exact-matches one of
-  // these entries (scheme+host+optional port, e.g. "https://example.eu", no
-  // trailing slash, no wildcards). Requests without an Origin fall back to
-  // Sec-Fetch-Site and then to the CSRF token — the guard is defense-in-
-  // depth, not a replacement.
-  //
-  // List ONLY the trusted entry hosts: the apex and the admin host. Do NOT
-  // list tenant/public subdomains — with a wide `cookieDomain` they share
-  // the session cookie, so an XSS there is exactly the threat this blocks.
-  // Empty/unset (default) disables the guard; required only when
-  // `cookieDomain` widens the cookie across subdomains.
-  allowedOrigins?: readonly string[];
-  // Explicit opt-out of the fail-closed Origin guard. When `cookieDomain` is
-  // set the framework REFUSES TO BOOT unless `allowedOrigins` is configured — a
-  // wide cookie without an Origin check is the unguarded-subdomain-XSS footgun.
-  // Set this true ONLY for a single-host deployment that shares no untrusted
-  // subdomains and genuinely needs the wide cookie anyway; you accept that any
-  // subdomain can then forge authenticated state-changing requests. Prefer
-  // setting `allowedOrigins`.
-  unsafeSkipOriginCheck?: boolean;
-  // Number of trusted reverse-proxy hops between the client and this
-  // process that APPEND (not overwrite) their peer address to
-  // `x-forwarded-for` (e.g. nginx `$proxy_add_x_forwarded_for`). Used to
-  // derive the client IP for every auth rate-limiter (login, mfa-verify,
-  // preauth-enable-start, preauth-confirm) and for requestMeta's session
-  // IP via the shared resolveClientIp (see client-ip.ts for the extraction
-  // algorithm). Deprecated in favor of the
-  // top-level `trustedProxyHops` on ServerOptions/RunProdAppOptions/
-  // RunDevAppOptions, which wins when both are set — kept as a fallback so
-  // existing consumers that only set this don't regress. Default 0 = trust
-  // no proxy header, only the socket address (or "unknown") counts. Set
-  // this to your real proxy hop count (1 for a single ingress/reverse-
-  // proxy, 2 for edge-LB + ingress, etc.) when deployed behind a proxy.
-  trustedProxyHops?: number;
-  // Server-computed post-auth redirect, consulted at login, mfa-verify,
-  // mfa-preauth-confirm, signup-confirm, and all three invite-accept branches.
-  // Result lands in the response as `landingPath`; an invalid path or a
-  // throwing resolver just omits the field (see post-auth-landing.ts).
-  postAuthLanding?: PostAuthLandingResolver;
-  // Shared resolver instance from buildServer — takes precedence over
-  // `trustedProxyHops` so the whole server shares exactly one resolver
-  // instance (and warn-once flag) instead of building a private one here.
-  // Only standalone callers of createAuthRoutes
-  // (no buildServer) should rely on `trustedProxyHops` instead.
-  resolver?: ClientIpResolver;
-};
-
-export type PasswordResetConfig = {
-  // Qualified name of the request handler (the one that emits either
-  // { kind: "reset-requested", ... } or { kind: "no-op" }). The handler
-  // builds the magic-link and sends the mail via delivery (ctx.notify) — the
-  // route only dispatches and returns the silent-success envelope.
-  requestHandler: string;
-  // Qualified name of the confirm handler (token + newPassword → set).
-  confirmHandler: string;
-};
-
-export type EmailVerificationConfig = {
-  requestHandler: string;
-  confirmHandler: string;
-};
-
-export type AccountUnlockConfig = {
-  requestHandler: string;
-  // Token-only body (mirrors EmailVerificationConfig) — no entity write, so
-  // there's no newPassword-equivalent field.
-  confirmHandler: string;
-};
-
-// Tenant-Invite Magic-Link. Drei Accept-Branches für klare Separation:
-//   - acceptHandler: logged-in User akzeptiert via JWT (Branch 1)
-//   - acceptWithLoginHandler: anon User mit existing email (Branch 2)
-//   - signupCompleteHandler: anon User mit neuer email (Branch 3)
-// Branch 2+3 minten JWT analog signup-confirm.
-export type InviteConfig = {
-  // Qualified handler names. invite-create dispatches the invite mail itself
-  // via delivery (ctx.notify); the route layer only wires the accept branches.
-  readonly acceptHandler: string;
-  readonly acceptWithLoginHandler: string;
-  readonly signupCompleteHandler: string;
-  // Optional: qualified query handler name for the anonymous invite-info
-  // lookup (email + hasAccount for a pending invite, token not consumed).
-  // When unset, POST /auth/invite-info is not mounted.
-  readonly infoHandler?: string;
-};
-
-// Magic-Link Self-Signup. Anders als reset/verify NICHT HMAC-signed —
-// der Token ist opaque random, Redis ist Source of Truth. The request
-// handler dispatches the activation mail via delivery (ctx.notify); the
-// route only forwards the dispatch. Confirm returnt
-// `{ kind: "auth-session", session, tenantKey }` analog zu loginHandler,
-// sodass die Route JWT minten + Cookies setzen kann (Auto-Login direkt
-// nach Activation, kein zweiter login-Roundtrip).
-export type SignupConfig = {
-  // Qualified name of the request handler (typisch
-  // AuthHandlers.signupRequest).
-  requestHandler: string;
-  // Qualified name of the confirm handler (typisch
-  // AuthHandlers.signupConfirm). Returnt SessionUser-Shape — die
-  // Route wickelt das wie einen erfolgreichen login.
-  confirmHandler: string;
-};
-
-// Second rate-limit axis for preauth-enable-start: unlike the IP, a
-// preauthSetupToken isn't freely choosable by the attacker (it's minted by
-// login.write.ts), so hashing it into a bucket key still caps the replay
-// even when the IP-based bucket is bypassed via header rotation.
-function preauthTokenKeyOf(token: string): string {
-  return `preauth-token:${createHash("sha256").update(token).digest("hex")}`;
-}
-
-// Extract `ip` and `user-agent` for the sessionCreator. Client-IP resolution
-// (trustedProxyHops-aware) is the shared resolveClientIp (see client-ip.ts)
-// — createAuthRoutes builds one resolver instance below and
-// closes over it here and in getClientIp.
-function requestMeta(c: Context, resolver: ClientIpResolver): SessionMetadata {
-  const ip = resolver.resolve(clientIpSourceFromHonoContext(c));
-  const userAgent = c.req.header("user-agent") ?? "unknown";
-  return { ip, userAgent };
-}
-
-// Default: in-memory fixed window. Fine for a single Node process; for
-// multi-process deployments, inject a Redis-backed LoginRateLimiter instead
-// so attempts can't be spread across replicas.
-//
-// Memory management: entries expire after `windowMs` but the map entries
-// themselves linger until something touches them. To stop the map from
-// growing unbounded (a single attacker can create entries with different
-// `ip|email` buckets at ~req rate), we opportunistically sweep expired
-// entries when the map crosses `sweepThreshold` keys and hard-cap total
-// entries at `maxEntries` — oldest ones get dropped first.
-export function createInMemoryLoginRateLimiter(
-  maxAttempts = 10,
-  windowMs = 5 * 60_000,
-  {
-    maxEntries = 10_000,
-    sweepThreshold = 1_000,
-  }: { maxEntries?: number; sweepThreshold?: number } = {},
-): LoginRateLimiter {
-  const hits = new Map<string, { count: number; resetAt: number }>();
-
-  function sweepExpired(now: number): void {
-    for (const [k, entry] of hits) {
-      if (entry.resetAt <= now) hits.delete(k);
-    }
-  }
-
-  function enforceCap(): void {
-    // Map iteration is insertion-order, so the oldest entries are first.
-    // Drop from the front until we're back under the cap.
-    // skip: under the cap, nothing to do
-    if (hits.size <= maxEntries) return;
-    const toDrop = hits.size - maxEntries;
-    let dropped = 0;
-    for (const k of hits.keys()) {
-      if (dropped >= toDrop) break;
-      hits.delete(k);
-      dropped++;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return {
-    async check(key) {
-      const now = Date.now();
-      if (hits.size >= sweepThreshold) sweepExpired(now);
-
-      const entry = hits.get(key);
-      if (!entry || entry.resetAt <= now) {
-        hits.set(key, { count: 1, resetAt: now + windowMs });
-        enforceCap();
-        return true;
-      }
-      if (entry.count >= maxAttempts) return false;
-      entry.count++;
-      return true;
-    },
-    async reset(key) {
-      hits.delete(key);
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-// Redis-backed sibling of createInMemoryLoginRateLimiter — same fixed-window
-// semantics (count <= maxAttempts allows, window anchored on first hit), but
-// shared across replicas via INCR/PEXPIRE instead of an in-process Map.
-// runProdApp defaults to this: an in-memory limiter only rate-limits within
-// a single instance, so a multi-replica prod deployment would silently give
-// each replica its own bucket. namespace separates the login-key keyspace
-// from the mfa-verify one (they share the same LoginRateLimiter shape but
-// key on different values).
-// Fail-closed on Redis outage, unlike the in-memory limiter (which never
-// throws): `check`/`reset` propagate any Redis error, so callers 500
-// instead of falling back to unlimited attempts. Deliberate — Redis is
-// already required infra for a multi-replica deployment, and for a
-// security-relevant limiter "briefly unavailable" should read as "briefly
-// down", not "briefly unlimited".
-export function createRedisLoginRateLimiter(
-  redis: Redis,
-  maxAttempts = 10,
-  windowMs = 5 * 60_000,
-  namespace = "login",
-): LoginRateLimiter {
-  const prefix = `kumiko:auth:ratelimit:${namespace}:`;
-
-  return {
-    async check(key) {
-      const redisKey = `${prefix}${key}`;
-      // INCR then PEXPIRE was two round-trips: a crash/network blip between
-      // them (only possible right after count===1, when the key is fresh)
-      // left the key permanently without a TTL — the window never resets,
-      // the counter only grows, and the bucket is locked out until an
-      // operator manually resets/deletes the key. One atomic eval closes
-      // the gap: the TTL is set in the same script invocation that creates
-      // the key, so no observer (including a crash) can see count===1
-      // without the expiry already applied. The `PTTL < 0` branch also
-      // heals keys that already exist without a TTL from before this fix
-      // shipped (PTTL returns -1 for "no expiry set, key exists") — without
-      // it, those pre-existing keys would grow forever with no way back to
-      // a normal window.
-      const count = (await redis.eval(
-        `local c = redis.call('INCR', KEYS[1])
-         if c == 1 or redis.call('PTTL', KEYS[1]) < 0 then redis.call('PEXPIRE', KEYS[1], ARGV[1]) end
-         return c`,
-        1,
-        redisKey,
-        windowMs,
-      )) as number;
-      return count <= maxAttempts;
-    },
-    async reset(key) {
-      await redis.del(`${prefix}${key}`);
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-export function createAuthRoutes(
-  dispatcher: Dispatcher,
-  jwt: JwtHelper,
-  config: AuthRoutesConfig,
-): Hono {
-  const api = new Hono();
-  // Default to "lax": CSRF control comes from the double-submit token, and
-  // "lax" keeps email deep-links (invite, magic-link, notification click)
-  // working. High-security apps can opt into "strict" — see AuthRoutesConfig.
-  const cookieSameSite = config.cookieSameSite ?? "lax";
-  const cookieDomain = config.cookieDomain;
-  // Single hop-count-aware IP getter for every rate-limit call site below —
-  // see AuthRoutesConfig.trustedProxyHops and client-ip.ts's resolveClientIp
-  // doc comment. createClientIpResolver fails loud on a non-finite/negative
-  // value rather than letting it silently collapse every request into the
-  // shared "unknown" bucket.
-  const clientIpResolver =
-    config.resolver ?? createClientIpResolver(config.trustedProxyHops ?? 0, "createAuthRoutes");
-  const getClientIp = (c: Context): string =>
-    clientIpResolver.resolve(clientIpSourceFromHonoContext(c));
-
-  // Shared tail of every route that ends a request logged-in: create the
-  // session record (if wired), sign the JWT, set the auth+csrf cookies. Was
-  // duplicated 5x (login/signup-confirm/invite-accept-with-login/invite-
-  // signup-complete/switch-tenant) — extracted so a 6th caller (mfa-verify)
-  // doesn't grow it to 6.
-  async function mintSessionAndRespond(c: Context, session: SessionUser): Promise<string> {
-    let sessionForJwt = session;
-    if (config.sessionCreator) {
-      const sid = await config.sessionCreator(session, requestMeta(c, clientIpResolver));
-      sessionForJwt = { ...session, sid };
-    }
-    const token = await jwt.sign(sessionForJwt);
-    const csrfToken = generateToken();
-    setAuthCookies(c, {
-      token,
-      csrfToken,
-      sameSite: cookieSameSite,
-      domain: cookieDomain,
-      ttlSeconds: jwt.ttlSeconds,
-    });
-    return token;
-  }
-
-  // Spreadable landingPath fragment for the 7 auth-response call sites below
-  // — absent (not `landingPath: undefined`) when unwired/invalid/throwing.
-  function landingPathFragment(args: PostAuthLandingArgs): { readonly landingPath?: string } {
-    const landingPath = resolvePostAuthLandingPath(config.postAuthLanding, args);
-    return landingPath === undefined ? {} : { landingPath };
-  }
-
-  // POST /auth/login — public endpoint (bypasses auth middleware via PUBLIC_API_PATHS).
-  // The configured login handler authenticates and returns a SessionUser;
-  // the route signs the JWT and hands it back to the client.
-  if (config.loginHandler) {
-    const loginQn = config.loginHandler;
-    const statusMap = config.loginErrorStatusMap ?? {};
-    // Default to in-memory limiter unless the caller opted out via null.
-    const rateLimiter =
-      config.loginRateLimit === null
-        ? null
-        : (config.loginRateLimit ?? createInMemoryLoginRateLimiter());
-
-    api.post(Routes.authLogin, async (c) => {
-      const raw = await c.req.json().catch(() => null);
-      const parsed = LoginBody.safeParse(raw);
-      if (!parsed.success) {
-        return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: "invalid_body" }, 400);
-      }
-      const body = parsed.data;
-
-      const clientIp = getClientIp(c);
-      const rateLimitKey = `${clientIp}|${body.email.toLowerCase()}`;
-
-      if (rateLimiter) {
-        // Bucket by both IP and email so a single guessed password can't
-        // block a real user from logging in, but also so one abuser can't
-        // just cycle emails.
-        const allowed = await rateLimiter.check(rateLimitKey);
-        if (!allowed) {
-          return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: "rate_limited" }, 429);
-        }
-      }
-
-      const result = await dispatcher.write(loginQn, body, createAnonymousUser(SYSTEM_TENANT_ID));
-
-      if (!result.isSuccess) {
-        // Feature-specific auth reason codes arrive via UnprocessableError.details.reason
-        // (e.g. "invalid_credentials", "user_locked"). Fall back to the KumikoError code
-        // so unmapped cases still get a sensible status.
-        // @cast-boundary error-details — KumikoError.details shape is per-error
-        const reason =
-          (result.error.details as { reason?: string } | undefined)?.reason ?? result.error.code;
-        // @cast-boundary engine-payload — statusMap value union narrows to the http-status union
-        const status = (statusMap[reason] ?? result.error.httpStatus) as 400 | 401 | 403 | 500;
-        return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: result.error }, status);
-      }
-
-      // @cast-boundary engine-payload — generic dispatcher.write result for
-      // login. Three possible shapes: a straight session, an MFA challenge
-      // when the loginHandler is wired with a second-factor gate, or a hard
-      // block when enforcement policy demands MFA but the user never
-      // enrolled (see auth-mfa's config.ts for why this has no in-band
-      // recovery yet).
-      const data = result.data as
-        | { kind: "auth-session"; session: SessionUser }
-        | { kind: "mfa-challenge"; challengeToken: string }
-        | { kind: "mfa-setup-required"; preauthSetupToken: string };
-
-      if (data.kind === "mfa-setup-required") {
-        // No session, no challenge — the client must show an
-        // enrollment-required message. No rate-limit reset (same reasoning
-        // as the mfa-challenge branch below).
-        return c.json({
-          isSuccess: true,
-          mfaSetupRequired: true,
-          preauthSetupToken: data.preauthSetupToken,
-        });
-      }
-
-      if (data.kind === "mfa-challenge") {
-        // No session minted yet — no cookies, no token. The client must
-        // complete /auth/mfa/verify with this token before it gets either.
-        // Rate-limit counter is NOT reset here: a "correct password, wrong/
-        // no TOTP yet" outcome hasn't proven the caller owns the account any
-        // more than a wrong password did.
-        return c.json({ isSuccess: true, mfaRequired: true, challengeToken: data.challengeToken });
-      }
-
-      // Session creation (optional) + JWT sign + cookies — see
-      // mintSessionAndRespond. Creating the session BEFORE signing the JWT
-      // is load-bearing: the sid must exist on the server before the token
-      // that references it can be handed out, otherwise a fast client could
-      // arrive at an auth-middleware check before the insert commits.
-      const token = await mintSessionAndRespond(c, data.session);
-      const landingPath = landingPathFragment({
-        flow: "login",
-        roles: data.session.roles,
-        tenantId: data.session.tenantId,
-      });
-
-      if (rateLimiter) {
-        await rateLimiter.reset(rateLimitKey);
-      }
-
-      return c.json({
-        isSuccess: true,
-        token,
-        user: { id: data.session.id, tenantId: data.session.tenantId, roles: data.session.roles },
-        ...landingPath,
-      });
-    });
-  }
-
-  // POST /auth/mfa/verify — completes a two-step login. Mirrors /auth/login
-  // structurally (public, anonymous identity dispatch, mintSessionAndRespond on
-  // success) but with its OWN rate limiter (mfaVerifyRateLimit) — this route
-  // never goes through a dispatcher write-handler's own rateLimit config,
-  // so without this it would have NO rate limiting at all. Per-account
-  // brute-force protection (capping wrong-code guesses against one
-  // still-valid challenge token) is a separate mechanism the handler itself
-  // owns — see AuthRoutesConfig.mfaVerifyHandler's doc comment.
-  if (config.mfaVerifyHandler) {
-    const mfaVerifyQn = config.mfaVerifyHandler;
-    const statusMap = config.mfaVerifyErrorStatusMap ?? {};
-    const rateLimiter =
-      config.mfaVerifyRateLimit === null
-        ? null
-        : (config.mfaVerifyRateLimit ?? createInMemoryLoginRateLimiter());
-
-    api.post(Routes.authMfaVerify, async (c) => {
-      const raw = await c.req.json().catch(() => null);
-      const parsed = MfaVerifyBody.safeParse(raw);
-      if (!parsed.success) {
-        return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: "invalid_body" }, 400);
-      }
-      const body = parsed.data;
-
-      const clientIp = getClientIp(c);
-
-      if (rateLimiter) {
-        const allowed = await rateLimiter.check(clientIp);
-        if (!allowed) {
-          return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: "rate_limited" }, 429);
-        }
-      }
-
-      const result = await dispatcher.write(
-        mfaVerifyQn,
-        body,
-        createAnonymousUser(SYSTEM_TENANT_ID),
-      );
-
-      if (!result.isSuccess) {
-        // @cast-boundary error-details — KumikoError.details shape is per-error
-        const reason =
-          (result.error.details as { reason?: string } | undefined)?.reason ?? result.error.code;
-        // @cast-boundary engine-payload — statusMap value union narrows to the http-status union
-        const status = (statusMap[reason] ?? result.error.httpStatus) as
-          | 400
-          | 401
-          | 403
-          | 422
-          | 429
-          | 500;
-        return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: result.error }, status);
-      }
-
-      // @cast-boundary engine-payload — generic dispatcher.write result for mfa-verify handler
-      const data = result.data as { kind: "mfa-verify-success"; session: SessionUser };
-
-      const token = await mintSessionAndRespond(c, data.session);
-      const landingPath = landingPathFragment({
-        flow: "login",
-        roles: data.session.roles,
-        tenantId: data.session.tenantId,
-      });
-
-      if (rateLimiter) {
-        await rateLimiter.reset(clientIp);
-      }
-
-      return c.json({
-        isSuccess: true,
-        token,
-        user: { id: data.session.id, tenantId: data.session.tenantId, roles: data.session.roles },
-        ...landingPath,
-      });
-    });
-  }
-
-  // POST /auth/mfa/preauth-enable-start — lets a user blocked at login by
-  // MFA enforcement (mfa-setup-required) generate a TOTP secret + QR
-  // without a session, using the preauthSetupToken login.write.ts issued.
-  // No JWT is minted here (unlike /auth/login and /auth/mfa/verify) — the
-  // handler's response carries a secret-bearing setupToken that a later
-  // pre-auth confirm step (the same shape auth-mfa's own enable-confirm
-  // consumes) verifies. Rate-limited like mfaVerifyRateLimit/
-  // mfaPreauthConfirmRateLimit — a preauthSetupToken is valid and
-  // not-single-use for its whole TTL, so without this cap a replay is a
-  // memory-hard CPU amplifier (see AuthRoutesConfig doc comment).
-  if (config.mfaPreauthEnableStartHandler) {
-    const mfaPreauthEnableStartQn = config.mfaPreauthEnableStartHandler;
-    const statusMap = config.mfaPreauthEnableStartErrorStatusMap ?? {};
-    const rateLimiter =
-      config.mfaPreauthEnableStartRateLimit === null
-        ? null
-        : (config.mfaPreauthEnableStartRateLimit ?? createInMemoryLoginRateLimiter());
-
-    api.post(Routes.authMfaPreauthEnableStart, async (c) => {
-      const raw = await c.req.json().catch(() => null);
-      const parsed = MfaPreauthEnableStartBody.safeParse(raw);
-      if (!parsed.success) {
-        return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: "invalid_body" }, 400);
-      }
-      const body = parsed.data;
-
-      const clientIp = getClientIp(c);
-
-      if (rateLimiter) {
-        const allowed = await rateLimiter.check(clientIp);
-        if (!allowed) {
-          return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: "rate_limited" }, 429);
-        }
-        // Second axis, independent of the IP-derived bucket above: the
-        // preauthSetupToken is minted by login.write.ts and not freely
-        // choosable, so this cap survives an attacker rotating
-        // x-forwarded-for to bypass the IP bucket (kumiko-framework#1522).
-        const tokenAllowed = await rateLimiter.check(preauthTokenKeyOf(body.preauthSetupToken));
-        if (!tokenAllowed) {
-          return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: "rate_limited" }, 429);
-        }
-      }
-
-      const result = await dispatcher.write(
-        mfaPreauthEnableStartQn,
-        body,
-        createAnonymousUser(SYSTEM_TENANT_ID),
-      );
-
-      if (!result.isSuccess) {
-        // @cast-boundary error-details — KumikoError.details shape is per-error
-        const reason =
-          (result.error.details as { reason?: string } | undefined)?.reason ?? result.error.code;
-        // @cast-boundary engine-payload — statusMap value union narrows to the http-status union
-        const status = (statusMap[reason] ?? result.error.httpStatus) as
-          | 400
-          | 401
-          | 403
-          | 422
-          | 429
-          | 500;
-        return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: result.error }, status);
-      }
-
-      // @cast-boundary engine-payload — generic dispatcher.write result for
-      // the preauth-enable-start handler
-      const data = result.data as {
-        setupToken: string;
-        otpauthUri: string;
-        recoveryCodes: readonly string[];
-      };
-
-      return c.json({ isSuccess: true, ...data });
-    });
-  }
-
-  // POST /auth/mfa/preauth-confirm — completes both the enrollment started
-  // by preauth-enable-start AND the login mfa-setup-required blocked.
-  // Mirrors /auth/mfa/verify structurally (public, anonymous identity dispatch,
-  // mintSessionAndRespond on success) with its OWN rate limiter
-  // (mfaPreauthConfirmRateLimit) — same reasoning as mfaVerifyRateLimit.
-  // Per-account brute-force protection (capping wrong-code guesses against
-  // one still-valid setupToken) is owned by the handler itself — see
-  // AuthRoutesConfig.mfaPreauthConfirmHandler's doc comment.
-  if (config.mfaPreauthConfirmHandler) {
-    const mfaPreauthConfirmQn = config.mfaPreauthConfirmHandler;
-    const statusMap = config.mfaPreauthConfirmErrorStatusMap ?? {};
-    const rateLimiter =
-      config.mfaPreauthConfirmRateLimit === null
-        ? null
-        : (config.mfaPreauthConfirmRateLimit ?? createInMemoryLoginRateLimiter());
-
-    api.post(Routes.authMfaPreauthConfirm, async (c) => {
-      const raw = await c.req.json().catch(() => null);
-      const parsed = MfaPreauthConfirmBody.safeParse(raw);
-      if (!parsed.success) {
-        return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: "invalid_body" }, 400);
-      }
-      const body = parsed.data;
-
-      const clientIp = getClientIp(c);
-
-      if (rateLimiter) {
-        const allowed = await rateLimiter.check(clientIp);
-        if (!allowed) {
-          return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: "rate_limited" }, 429);
-        }
-      }
-
-      const result = await dispatcher.write(
-        mfaPreauthConfirmQn,
-        body,
-        createAnonymousUser(SYSTEM_TENANT_ID),
-      );
-
-      if (!result.isSuccess) {
-        // @cast-boundary error-details — KumikoError.details shape is per-error
-        const reason =
-          (result.error.details as { reason?: string } | undefined)?.reason ?? result.error.code;
-        // @cast-boundary engine-payload — statusMap value union narrows to the http-status union
-        const status = (statusMap[reason] ?? result.error.httpStatus) as
-          | 400
-          | 401
-          | 403
-          | 422
-          | 429
-          | 500;
-        return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: result.error }, status);
-      }
-
-      // @cast-boundary engine-payload — generic dispatcher.write result for mfa-preauth-confirm handler
-      const data = result.data as { kind: "mfa-preauth-confirm-success"; session: SessionUser };
-
-      const token = await mintSessionAndRespond(c, data.session);
-      const landingPath = landingPathFragment({
-        flow: "login",
-        roles: data.session.roles,
-        tenantId: data.session.tenantId,
-      });
-
-      if (rateLimiter) {
-        await rateLimiter.reset(clientIp);
-      }
-
-      return c.json({
-        isSuccess: true,
-        token,
-        user: { id: data.session.id, tenantId: data.session.tenantId, roles: data.session.roles },
-        ...landingPath,
-      });
-    });
-  }
-
-  // POST /auth/request-password-reset + /auth/reset-password — public.
-  // Silent-success on request (no enumeration), typed failure on confirm.
-  // Rate-limit covered via config.rateLimit.auth (Sprint G.5 L2, /auth/*).
-  if (config.passwordReset) {
-    const pr = config.passwordReset;
-    registerTokenRequestRoute({
-      api,
-      dispatcher,
-      path: Routes.authRequestPasswordReset,
-      requestHandler: pr.requestHandler,
-    });
-    registerTokenConfirmRoute({
-      api,
-      dispatcher,
-      path: Routes.authResetPassword,
-      confirmHandler: pr.confirmHandler,
-      schema: ResetPasswordBody,
-    });
-  }
-
-  // Email-verification mirrors password-reset.
-  if (config.emailVerification) {
-    const ev = config.emailVerification;
-    registerTokenRequestRoute({
-      api,
-      dispatcher,
-      path: Routes.authRequestEmailVerification,
-      requestHandler: ev.requestHandler,
-    });
-    registerTokenConfirmRoute({
-      api,
-      dispatcher,
-      path: Routes.authVerifyEmail,
-      confirmHandler: ev.confirmHandler,
-      schema: VerifyEmailBody,
-    });
-  }
-
-  // Account-unlock mirrors email-verification (token-only confirm body) —
-  // clears the Redis lockout state instead of an entity field, see
-  // confirm-account-unlock.write.ts.
-  if (config.accountUnlock) {
-    const au = config.accountUnlock;
-    registerTokenRequestRoute({
-      api,
-      dispatcher,
-      path: Routes.authRequestAccountUnlock,
-      requestHandler: au.requestHandler,
-    });
-    registerTokenConfirmRoute({
-      api,
-      dispatcher,
-      path: Routes.authConfirmAccountUnlock,
-      confirmHandler: au.confirmHandler,
-      schema: VerifyEmailBody,
-    });
-  }
-
-  // Self-Signup (Magic-Link). Request mountet wie reset/verify den
-  // silent-success-Pfad mit Token-Mail. Confirm ist anders: returnt
-  // SessionUser → die Route mintet JWT + setzt Cookies (Auto-Login
-  // direkt nach Activation, kein zweiter Login-Roundtrip nötig).
-  if (config.signup) {
-    const sg = config.signup;
-    registerTokenRequestRoute({
-      api,
-      dispatcher,
-      path: Routes.authSignupRequest,
-      requestHandler: sg.requestHandler,
-      schema: SignupRequestBody,
-    });
-
-    api.post(Routes.authSignupConfirm, async (c) => {
-      const raw = await c.req.json().catch(() => null);
-      const parsed = SignupConfirmBody.safeParse(raw);
-      if (!parsed.success) {
-        return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: "invalid_body" }, 400);
-      }
-
-      const result = await dispatcher.write(
-        sg.confirmHandler,
-        parsed.data,
-        createAnonymousUser(SYSTEM_TENANT_ID),
-      );
-
-      if (!result.isSuccess) {
-        // 422 für invalid_signup_token (handler-level UnprocessableError).
-        // @cast-boundary engine-payload — KumikoError.httpStatus narrows to the http-status union
-        const status = result.error.httpStatus as 400 | 401 | 403 | 422 | 500;
-        return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: result.error }, status);
-      }
-
-      // @cast-boundary engine-payload — generic dispatcher.write result for signup-confirm
-      const data = result.data as {
-        kind: "auth-session";
-        session: SessionUser;
-        tenantKey: string;
-        handover?: { entityType: string; id: string };
-      };
-
-      // Session creation + JWT sign + cookies — see mintSessionAndRespond.
-      const token = await mintSessionAndRespond(c, data.session);
-      const landingPath = landingPathFragment({
-        flow: "signup",
-        roles: data.session.roles,
-        tenantId: data.session.tenantId,
-        tenantKey: data.tenantKey,
-        ...(data.handover !== undefined && { handover: data.handover }),
-      });
-
-      return c.json({
-        isSuccess: true,
-        token,
-        user: {
-          id: data.session.id,
-          tenantId: data.session.tenantId,
-          roles: data.session.roles,
-        },
-        // tenantKey für Post-Signup-Redirect zu /<tenantKey>/.
-        // Anders als der login-response der nur `tenants[]` braucht
-        // (User wählt im Switcher), kennt der signup nur EINE
-        // membership — die Frontend-UI nimmt das direkt als Redirect-
-        // Target.
-        tenantKey: data.tenantKey,
-        // Cross-device try-first handover (kumiko-framework#3035 follow-up):
-        // present only when signup-confirm actually claimed a bound grant —
-        // absent, not null, so a client that doesn't know the field sees
-        // nothing unusual.
-        ...(data.handover !== undefined && { handover: data.handover }),
-        ...landingPath,
-      });
-    });
-  }
-
-  // Tenant-Invite Magic-Link. 3 separate Routes für 3 Accept-Branches:
-  if (config.invite) {
-    const inv = config.invite;
-
-    // Branch 1: logged-in User klickt Invite-Link → Membership-Add im
-    // invited Tenant (NICHT Tenant-Switch — User bleibt in seiner
-    // aktuellen Session, kann später via Tenant-Switcher wechseln).
-    // Requires JWT (siehe PUBLIC_API_PATHS — invite-accept ist NICHT
-    // public, im Gegensatz zu acceptWithLogin/signupComplete).
-    api.post(Routes.authInviteAccept, async (c) => {
-      const user = getUser(c);
-      const raw = await c.req.json().catch(() => null);
-      const parsed = InviteAcceptBody.safeParse(raw);
-      if (!parsed.success) {
-        return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: "invalid_body" }, 400);
-      }
-      const result = await dispatcher.write(inv.acceptHandler, parsed.data, user);
-      if (!result.isSuccess) {
-        // @cast-boundary engine-payload — KumikoError.httpStatus
-        const status = result.error.httpStatus as 400 | 401 | 403 | 422 | 500;
-        return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: result.error }, status);
-      }
-      // @cast-boundary engine-payload — generic dispatcher.write result
-      const data = result.data as {
-        kind: "invite-accepted";
-        tenantId: TenantId;
-        role: string;
-        alreadyMember: boolean;
-      };
-      const landingPath = landingPathFragment({
-        flow: "invite",
-        roles: [data.role],
-        tenantId: data.tenantId,
-      });
-      return c.json({
-        isSuccess: true,
-        tenantId: data.tenantId,
-        role: data.role,
-        alreadyMember: data.alreadyMember,
-        ...landingPath,
-      });
-    });
-
-    // Branch 2: anon User mit existing email — Login + Accept in einem
-    // Roundtrip. JWT-mint analog signup-confirm.
-    api.post(Routes.authInviteAcceptWithLogin, async (c) => {
-      const raw = await c.req.json().catch(() => null);
-      const parsed = InviteAcceptWithLoginBody.safeParse(raw);
-      if (!parsed.success) {
-        return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: "invalid_body" }, 400);
-      }
-      const result = await dispatcher.write(
-        inv.acceptWithLoginHandler,
-        parsed.data,
-        createAnonymousUser(SYSTEM_TENANT_ID),
-      );
-      if (!result.isSuccess) {
-        const status = result.error.httpStatus as 400 | 401 | 403 | 422 | 500; // @cast-boundary engine-payload
-        return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: result.error }, status);
-      }
-      // @cast-boundary engine-payload — same three-shape union as /auth/login
-      // (see gateEnforceMfa): a straight session, an MFA challenge, or a
-      // hard mfa-setup-required block. Only the auth-session branch also
-      // carries tenantId/role (invite-specific).
-      const data = result.data as
-        | { kind: "auth-session"; session: SessionUser; tenantId: TenantId; role: string }
-        | { kind: "mfa-challenge"; challengeToken: string }
-        | { kind: "mfa-setup-required"; preauthSetupToken: string };
-
-      if (data.kind === "mfa-setup-required") {
-        return c.json({
-          isSuccess: true,
-          mfaSetupRequired: true,
-          preauthSetupToken: data.preauthSetupToken,
-        });
-      }
-
-      if (data.kind === "mfa-challenge") {
-        return c.json({ isSuccess: true, mfaRequired: true, challengeToken: data.challengeToken });
-      }
-
-      const token = await mintSessionAndRespond(c, data.session);
-      const landingPath = landingPathFragment({
-        flow: "invite",
-        roles: data.session.roles,
-        tenantId: data.tenantId,
-      });
-      return c.json({
-        isSuccess: true,
-        token,
-        user: {
-          id: data.session.id,
-          tenantId: data.session.tenantId,
-          roles: data.session.roles,
-        },
-        tenantId: data.tenantId,
-        role: data.role,
-        ...landingPath,
-      });
-    });
-
-    // Branch 3: anon User mit neuer email — User+Membership entstehen,
-    // KEIN neuer Tenant. JWT-mint.
-    api.post(Routes.authInviteSignupComplete, async (c) => {
-      const raw = await c.req.json().catch(() => null);
-      const parsed = InviteSignupCompleteBody.safeParse(raw);
-      if (!parsed.success) {
-        return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: "invalid_body" }, 400);
-      }
-      const result = await dispatcher.write(
-        inv.signupCompleteHandler,
-        parsed.data,
-        createAnonymousUser(SYSTEM_TENANT_ID),
-      );
-      if (!result.isSuccess) {
-        const status = result.error.httpStatus as 400 | 401 | 403 | 422 | 500; // @cast-boundary engine-payload
-        return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: result.error }, status);
-      }
-      const data = result.data as {
-        kind: "auth-session";
-        session: SessionUser;
-        tenantId: TenantId;
-        role: string;
-      }; // @cast-boundary engine-payload
-      const token = await mintSessionAndRespond(c, data.session);
-      const landingPath = landingPathFragment({
-        flow: "invite",
-        roles: data.session.roles,
-        tenantId: data.tenantId,
-      });
-      return c.json({
-        isSuccess: true,
-        token,
-        user: {
-          id: data.session.id,
-          tenantId: data.session.tenantId,
-          roles: data.session.roles,
-        },
-        tenantId: data.tenantId,
-        role: data.role,
-        ...landingPath,
-      });
-    });
-
-    // Anonymous, read-only invite lookup for the acceptance page: pre-fill
-    // the invited email and pick Branch 2 (existing account) vs Branch 3
-    // (new account) before the user submits. Token is never consumed here.
-    if (inv.infoHandler) {
-      const infoHandler = inv.infoHandler;
-      api.post(Routes.authInviteInfo, async (c) => {
-        const raw = await c.req.json().catch(() => null);
-        const parsed = InviteInfoBody.safeParse(raw);
-        if (!parsed.success) {
-          return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: "invalid_body" }, 400);
-        }
-        try {
-          // @cast-boundary engine-payload — generic dispatcher.query result
-          const data = (await dispatcher.query(
-            infoHandler,
-            parsed.data,
-            createAnonymousUser(SYSTEM_TENANT_ID),
-          )) as { email: string; hasAccount: boolean };
-          return c.json({ isSuccess: true, ...data });
-        } catch (e) {
-          const err = toKumikoError(e);
-          // Same body shape as the write routes' `{ isSuccess: false, error:
-          // result.error }` (WriteErrorInfo) — this is a query, not a write,
-          // so there's no WriteResult to read `.error` off; toWriteErrorInfo
-          // builds the equivalent shape directly from the caught error.
-          return c.json(
-            { isSuccess: false, error: toWriteErrorInfo(err) },
-            err.httpStatus as ContentfulStatusCode, // @cast-boundary engine-payload
-          );
-        }
-      });
-    }
-  }
-
-  // POST /auth/logout — revokes the current session. Requires a valid JWT so
-  // the middleware has already populated `user.sid` from the `jti` claim. If
-  // the app hasn't wired a sessionRevoker, logout is effectively a no-op on
-  // the server — the client can just drop the token.
-  api.post(Routes.authLogout, async (c) => {
-    const user = getUser(c);
-    if (config.sessionRevoker && user.sid) {
-      await config.sessionRevoker(user.sid);
-    }
-    // Clear cookies on the cookie-transport path. Idempotent — clearing a
-    // missing cookie is a no-op, so bearer-only clients aren't affected.
-    clearAuthCookies(c, cookieDomain);
-    return c.json({ isSuccess: true });
-  });
-
-  // GET /auth/tenants — list tenants the current user belongs to
-  api.get(Routes.authTenants, async (c) => {
-    const user = getUser(c);
-
-    try {
-      // System-scoped: membershipQuery is access-locked to system-role.
-      // @cast-boundary engine-payload — generic dispatcher.query result
-      const memberships = (await dispatcher.query(
-        config.membershipQuery,
-        { userId: user.id },
-        createSystemUser(user.tenantId),
-      )) as MembershipRow[];
-
-      return c.json({
-        tenants: memberships.map((m) => ({
-          tenantId: m.tenantId,
-          roles: m.roles,
-          ...(m.tenantName !== undefined && { name: m.tenantName }),
-          ...(m.tenantKey !== undefined && { key: m.tenantKey }),
-        })),
-        activeTenantId: user.tenantId,
-      });
-    } catch (e) {
-      // Only legitimate fallback: the app hasn't wired membershipQuery at
-      // all. A DB fault or a permission failure has to bubble up so ops
-      // sees it — collapsing them into "just your current tenant" hides
-      // outages behind a UI that looks fine.
-      if (!isUnknownHandlerError(e)) throw e;
-      return c.json({
-        tenants: [{ tenantId: user.tenantId, roles: [...user.roles] }],
-        activeTenantId: user.tenantId,
-      });
-    }
-  });
-
-  // POST /auth/switch-tenant — switch to a different tenant
-  api.post(Routes.authSwitchTenant, async (c) => {
-    const user = getUser(c);
-    const body = await c.req.json<{ tenantId: TenantId }>();
-    const targetTenantId = body.tenantId;
-
-    if (targetTenantId === user.tenantId) {
-      return c.json({ error: "already_in_tenant" }, 400);
-    }
-
-    // Membership + principal-blocked + tenant-teardown in one building
-    // block — trusted server code asking on the user's behalf, same trust boundary as before.
-    let activeMembership: ActiveMembershipResult;
-    try {
-      activeMembership = await dispatcher.resolveActiveMembership(user.id, targetTenantId);
-    } catch (e) {
-      // No membershipQuery wired → switching tenants is just not offered in
-      // this deployment. Any other error propagates so a broken query handler
-      // surfaces as a real 5xx instead of a misleading 400.
-      if (!isUnknownHandlerError(e)) throw e;
-      return c.json({ error: "tenant_switch_not_available" }, 400);
-    }
-
-    if (activeMembership.kind === "rejected") {
-      return switchTenantRejectionResponse(c, activeMembership.reason);
-    }
-    const membership = activeMembership.membership;
-
-    // Globale Rollen aus user-feature lesen wenn userQuery wired —
-    // tenant-unabhängige Rollen (SystemAdmin etc.) überleben so den
-    // tenant-switch. `parseRoles` liegt utils-side, hier inline-deserialize
-    // damit das Framework keine bundled-features-Imports kriegt.
-    let globalRoles: readonly string[] = [];
-    if (config.userQuery) {
-      try {
-        // @cast-boundary engine-payload — dispatcher.query returnt unknown,
-        // userQuery liefert per AuthUserRow-Contract eine row mit roles-spalte.
-        const userRow = (await dispatcher.query(
-          config.userQuery,
-          { id: user.id },
-          createSystemUser(user.tenantId),
-        )) as { roles?: unknown } | null;
-        // roles is jsonb string[] (multiSelect); parseRoles also accepts legacy
-        // JSON-encoded text from pre-0.217.0 rows.
-        globalRoles = parseRoles(userRow?.roles ?? null);
-      } catch (e) {
-        // Non-fatal: globale Rollen kann nicht aufgelöst werden → switch
-        // läuft weiter mit nur tenant-rollen. Server-error mit nur dem
-        // Cause ohne Stack hochwerfen wäre für die UX schlimmer als ein
-        // Tenant-Switch ohne SystemAdmin (User merkt's und meldet's). Log
-        // it via the dispatcher so Ops sieht's.
-        if (!isUnknownHandlerError(e)) throw e;
-      }
-    }
-
-    // Issue new JWT with the target tenant and its roles. Claims MUST be
-    // recomputed for the new tenant — stale claims from the previous
-    // tenant would leak identity facts across tenancies (e.g. teamId from
-    // tenant A accidentally surviving into tenant B's session). The
-    // resolver runs each feature's r.authClaims() hook under the new
-    // TenantDb scope.
-    // buildSessionRoles calls stripForbiddenMembershipRoles internally and
-    // strips reserved roles from the membership side only — globalRoles
-    // (where SystemAdmin legitimately lives) is never filtered. Backstop for a
-    // membership role that a projection rebuild resurrected past command-time
-    // validation (see engine/membership-roles).
-    const mergedRoles = buildSessionRoles(globalRoles, membership.roles);
-    const targetSession: SessionUser = {
-      id: user.id,
-      tenantId: targetTenantId,
-      roles: mergedRoles,
-      // Tenant-independent prefs must survive the switch (fw#2343).
-      ...(user.timezone ? { timezone: user.timezone } : {}),
-      ...(user.locale ? { locale: user.locale } : {}),
-    };
-    const claims = await dispatcher.resolveAuthClaims(targetSession);
-    const sessionForJwt: SessionUser =
-      Object.keys(claims).length > 0 ? { ...targetSession, claims } : targetSession;
-
-    // Session rotation: revoke old sid BEFORE creating the new one so a
-    // creator failure leaves the user logged-out cleanly rather than with
-    // two live sessions. Client must log in again on creator-throw. A
-    // revoker/creator that actually throws (Redis down, DB deadlock) surfaces
-    // as a 5xx — swallowing it into tenant_switch_not_available was hiding
-    // real outages.
-    if (config.sessionRevoker && user.sid) {
-      await config.sessionRevoker(user.sid);
-    }
-    // Session creation + JWT sign + cookies — see mintSessionAndRespond. A
-    // fresh csrfToken is minted (inside the helper) so a compromised csrf-
-    // value can't cross a tenant boundary.
-    const newToken = await mintSessionAndRespond(c, sessionForJwt);
-
-    return c.json({ token: newToken, tenantId: targetTenantId, roles: mergedRoles });
-  });
-
-  return api;
-}
-
-// --- shared route builders for token flows ---------------------------------
-// Password-reset, email-verification and signup share the exact same request
-// HTTP-shape: parse body → dispatch the request handler → always-200 (no
-// enumeration). The handler mints the token AND dispatches the magic-link mail
-// via delivery (ctx.notify); the route never sees the token. confirm-route
-// validates the token + does the state change → typed failure or 200. Keeping
-// the silent-success invariant in one place means changing how the framework
-// handles "invalid_body" on a public token endpoint is one edit, not three.
-
-function registerTokenRequestRoute(opts: {
-  api: Hono;
-  dispatcher: Dispatcher;
-  path: string;
-  requestHandler: string;
-  // reset/verify/unlock keep the plain RequestTokenBody; signup passes its
-  // own schema (adds an optional `handover`, see SignupRequestBody above)
-  // so the extra field reaches the handler instead of being parsed away.
-  schema?: typeof RequestTokenBody | typeof SignupRequestBody;
-}): void {
-  const body = opts.schema ?? RequestTokenBody;
-  opts.api.post(opts.path, async (c) => {
-    const raw = await c.req.json().catch(() => null);
-    const parsed = body.safeParse(raw);
-    // Malformed body → silent success. A probing client mustn't learn
-    // anything from the shape of their input.
-    if (!parsed.success) return c.json({ isSuccess: true });
-
-    // The handler dispatches the magic-link mail via delivery before returning.
-    // Handler-level failures (misconfiguration, e.g. no RateLimitResolver) stay
-    // out of the response so it is uniform for unknown vs. known emails, but
-    // they are logged — otherwise the mail silently never goes out. No email in
-    // the log line (PII).
-    const result = await opts.dispatcher.write(
-      opts.requestHandler,
-      parsed.data,
-      createAnonymousUser(SYSTEM_TENANT_ID),
-    );
-    if (!result.isSuccess) {
-      console.error(
-        `[kumiko] token request handler "${opts.requestHandler}" failed: ${result.error.code}`,
-      );
-    }
-
-    return c.json({ isSuccess: true });
-  });
-}
-
-function registerTokenConfirmRoute(opts: {
-  api: Hono;
-  dispatcher: Dispatcher;
-  path: string;
-  confirmHandler: string;
-  // Endpoint-specific body shape (reset has `newPassword`, verify doesn't).
-  schema: typeof ResetPasswordBody | typeof VerifyEmailBody;
-}): void {
-  opts.api.post(opts.path, async (c) => {
-    const raw = await c.req.json().catch(() => null);
-    const parsed = opts.schema.safeParse(raw);
-    if (!parsed.success) {
-      return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: "invalid_body" }, 400);
-    }
-    const result = await opts.dispatcher.write(
-      opts.confirmHandler,
-      parsed.data,
-      createAnonymousUser(SYSTEM_TENANT_ID),
-    );
-    if (!result.isSuccess) {
-      const status = result.error.httpStatus as 400 | 401 | 403 | 422 | 500; // @cast-boundary engine-payload
-      return c.json({ isSuccess: false, error: result.error }, status);
-    }
-    return c.json({ isSuccess: true });
-  });
-}
-
-// Shared request-body shape for request-password-reset + request-email-
-// verification. Extracted so the two flows stay in sync when the schema
-// gains optional fields (locale, deviceId, …).
-const RequestTokenBody = z.object({
-  email: z.email(),
-});