@consiliency/agent-board-schema 1.64.0 → 1.74.0

package/tests/agent_board_sidserver_authority.test.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+create extension if not exists pgtap with schema extensions;
+set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
+begin;
+grant usage on schema extensions to service_role;
+select plan(12);
+create temp table _sidserver_authority(root_id uuid, board_id uuid, absent_board_id uuid, suffix text);
+create temp table _sidserver_children(label text primary key, agent_id uuid);
+do $$
+declare r uuid := gen_random_uuid(); b uuid := gen_random_uuid(); other_b uuid := gen_random_uuid(); a uuid;
+begin
+  a := public.ensure_github_user('sidserver-authority-'||r, 'sidserver-authority-'||r||'@example.test', 'sidserver-authority-'||r, 'SIDSERVER parent');
+  insert into agent_board.agents(id,agent_type,handle,display_name,status,auth_user_id)
+    values(r,'agent','sidserver-authority-'||r,'SIDSERVER parent','active',a);
+  insert into agent_board.session_identities(agent_id,root_agent_id,depth,current_risky_digest,approved_risky_digest)
+    values(r,r,0,repeat('a',64),repeat('a',64));
+  insert into agent_board.boards(id,slug,name,created_by_agent_id)
+    values(b,'sidserver-authority-'||b,'SIDSERVER room',r), (other_b,'sidserver-authority-'||other_b,'SIDSERVER absent room',r);
+  insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id,agent_id,role,membership_state) values(b,r,'member','joined');
+  insert into _sidserver_authority values(r,b,other_b,substr(r::text,1,8));
+end;
+$$;
+grant select on _sidserver_authority, _sidserver_children to service_role;
+grant insert on _sidserver_children to service_role;
+create function pg_temp.sidserver_child(p_label text,p_scopes jsonb,p_role text default null,p_absent boolean default false)
+returns void language plpgsql as $$
+declare r uuid; b uuid; s text; rooms jsonb := '[]';
+begin
+  select root_id,case when p_absent then absent_board_id else board_id end,suffix into r,b,s from _sidserver_authority;
+  if p_role is not null then rooms := jsonb_build_array(jsonb_build_object('board_id',b,'role',p_role)); end if;
+  insert into _sidserver_children select p_label,m.child_agent_id
+    from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(r,'sidserver-'||p_label||'-'||s,p_scopes,public.test_pubkey(s||p_label),interval '1 hour',false,
+      'codex','sidserver-'||p_label,null,rooms,jsonb_build_object('resolution','resolved','risky_digest',repeat('a',64),'recorded','{}'::jsonb),null) m;
+end;
+$$;
+grant execute on function pg_temp.sidserver_child(text,jsonb,text,boolean) to service_role;
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role','service_role',true);
+set local role service_role;
+select lives_ok($q$select agent_board.upsert_delegation_policy((select root_id from _sidserver_authority),'root_minted','["read"]',200,interval '1 hour',true)$q$,
+  'SIDSERVER-authority-policy-control: actual parent scope policy is configured');
+select lives_ok($q$select pg_temp.sidserver_child('allowed','["read"]','observer')$q$,
+  'SIDSERVER-authority-room-control: a narrower explicit room enters the real mint');
+reset role;
+select is((select bm.role from agent_board.board_memberships bm join _sidserver_children c on c.agent_id=bm.agent_id where c.label='allowed'), 'observer',
+  'SIDSERVER-ID-01/explicit-policy: the only requested room retains its narrower role');
+set local role service_role;
+select lives_ok($q$select pg_temp.sidserver_child('empty','["read"]')$q$,
+  'SIDSERVER-authority-empty-control: empty explicit rooms enter the real mint');
+reset role;
+select is((select count(*) from agent_board.board_memberships bm join _sidserver_children c on c.agent_id=bm.agent_id where c.label='empty'),0::bigint,
+  'SIDSERVER-ID-01/no-room-fallback: empty policy creates no parent membership copy');
+set local role service_role;
+select throws_ok($q$select pg_temp.sidserver_child('wider-role','["read"]','admin')$q$,'42501','room_authority_exceeded',
+  'SIDSERVER-ID-01/parent-authority-role: a child cannot outrank its parent');
+select throws_ok($q$select pg_temp.sidserver_child('absent-room','["read"]','observer',true)$q$,'42501','room_authority_exceeded',
+  'SIDSERVER-ID-01/parent-authority-room: a child cannot acquire a room its parent lacks');
+select throws_ok($q$select pg_temp.sidserver_child('wider-scope','["read","write"]')$q$,'42501',
+  'scope_exceeded: requested scopes are not a subset of the root allowed_scopes',
+  'SIDSERVER-ID-01/parent-scopes: a child cannot widen parent scopes');
+select lives_ok($q$select pg_temp.sidserver_child('after-refusal','["read"]','observer')$q$,
+  'SIDSERVER-authority-after-refusal-control: refusal does not stop an otherwise valid child');
+reset role;
+select is((select count(*) from _sidserver_children where label in ('wider-role','absent-room','wider-scope')),0::bigint,
+  'SIDSERVER-authority-refusal-state: rejected mints create no child');
+select is((select g.granted_scopes from agent_board.delegation_grants g join _sidserver_children c on c.agent_id=g.child_agent_id where c.label='allowed'),'["read"]'::jsonb,
+  'SIDSERVER-authority-granted-scope-control: allowed grant retains exact read scope');
+select is((select count(*) from agent_board.board_memberships bm join _sidserver_children c on c.agent_id=bm.agent_id where bm.board_id=(select absent_board_id from _sidserver_authority)),0::bigint,
+  'SIDSERVER-authority-absent-room-state: no child membership escapes the parent room set');
+select finish();
+rollback;

package/tests/agent_board_sidserver_catalog.test.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+-- Literal SQL call closure is the catalog model; dynamic callees are outside it.
+create extension if not exists pgtap with schema extensions;
+set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
+begin;
+select plan(6);
+
+create temp view _sidserver_direct as
+select p.oid, 'alias' kind from pg_proc p where p.pronamespace = 'agent_board'::regnamespace
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid, true) ~ agent_board_test.stmt_re(
+    'insert into|update|delete from|merge into|truncate|truncate table', 'session_id_aliases', agent_board_test.bare_ok(p.oid))
+union all
+select p.oid, 'issuer' kind from pg_proc p where p.pronamespace = 'agent_board'::regnamespace
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid, true) ~ agent_board_test.stmt_re('insert into|merge into', 'nonfleet_sessions', agent_board_test.bare_ok(p.oid))
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid, true) like '%fleet_agent_session%';
+create temp view _sidserver_class as
+select distinct p.oid, d.kind
+from pg_proc p join agent_board_test.fn_call_closure() c on c.root_oid = p.oid
+join _sidserver_direct d on d.oid = c.reached_oid;
+
+select ok(exists(select 1 from _sidserver_class where kind = 'alias')
+  and exists(select 1 from _sidserver_class where kind = 'issuer'),
+  'SIDSERVER-CATALOG-01: discovered alias writers and session credential issuers are nonempty');
+select is((select coalesce(string_agg(oid::regprocedure::text, ', ' order by oid::regprocedure::text), '')
+  from _sidserver_class where has_function_privilege('public', oid, 'EXECUTE')
+    or has_function_privilege('anon', oid, 'EXECUTE')), '',
+  'SIDSERVER-CATALOG-02: every discovered issuer or alias writer/caller closes PUBLIC and anon');
+select is((select coalesce(string_agg(oid::regprocedure::text, ', ' order by oid::regprocedure::text), '')
+  from _sidserver_class where kind = 'issuer' and has_function_privilege('authenticated', oid, 'EXECUTE')), '',
+  'SIDSERVER-CATALOG-03: session credential issuers and callers are not authenticated RPCs');
+-- Human readmission is positively required to reach owner authorization, rather than exempted.
+select is((select coalesce(string_agg(s.oid::regprocedure::text, ', ' order by s.oid::regprocedure::text), '')
+  from _sidserver_class s where s.kind = 'alias' and has_function_privilege('authenticated', s.oid, 'EXECUTE')
+    and not exists(select 1 from agent_board_test.fn_call_closure() c
+      where c.root_oid = s.oid and c.reached_oid = 'agent_board._session_identity_owner(uuid)'::regprocedure)), '',
+  'SIDSERVER-CATALOG-04: each authenticated alias writer positively reaches verified human ownership');
+select is((select coalesce(string_agg(s.oid::regprocedure::text, ', ' order by s.oid::regprocedure::text), '')
+  from _sidserver_class s where s.kind = 'alias'
+    and not exists(select 1 from agent_board_test.fn_call_closure() c
+      where c.root_oid = s.oid and c.reached_oid = 'agent_board._session_identity_ancestor_ceiling(uuid)'::regprocedure)), '',
+  'SIDSERVER-CATALOG-05: every alias writer/caller reaches the stored-lineage gate');
+select is((select coalesce(string_agg(oid::regprocedure::text, ', ' order by oid::regprocedure::text), '')
+  from _sidserver_direct where kind = 'issuer' and has_function_privilege('service_role', oid, 'EXECUTE')
+    and (pg_get_function_result(oid) not like '%identity_lease_epoch%'
+      or pg_get_function_result(oid) not like '%holder_secret%')), '',
+  'SIDSERVER-CATALOG-06: service session issuers expose the lease and holder result contract');
+select finish();
+rollback;

package/tests/agent_board_signed_write_gateway.test.sql

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ declare
   v_agent uuid := gen_random_uuid();
   v_recipient uuid := gen_random_uuid();
   v_thread uuid := gen_random_uuid();
+  v_board_thread uuid := gen_random_uuid();
   v_task uuid := gen_random_uuid();
   v_board uuid := gen_random_uuid();
   v_key uuid;
@@ -32,7 +33,8 @@ begin
     (v_recipient, 'agent', 'signgateway-recipient', 'SIGNGATEWAY Recipient');
 
   insert into agent_board.threads(id, created_by_agent_id, subject)
-  values (v_thread, v_agent, 'SIGNGATEWAY thread');
+  values (v_thread, v_agent, 'SIGNGATEWAY thread'),
+         (v_board_thread, v_agent, 'SIGNGATEWAY empty board thread');
 
   insert into agent_board.tasks(id, thread_id, created_by_agent_id, title)
   values (v_task, v_thread, v_agent, 'SIGNGATEWAY task');
@@ -124,7 +126,7 @@ begin
     into v_board_post
     from agent_board.signed_post_board_message(
       jsonb_build_object(
-        'p_thread_id', v_thread,
+        'p_thread_id', v_board_thread,
         'p_author_agent_id', v_agent,
         'p_board_id', v_board,
         'p_subject', 'Signed board',

package/tests/agent_board_task_thread_lock_order.test.sql

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 -- WHY A CLASS AND NOT TWO FUNCTION CHECKS. The #281 triage said reordering
 -- append_task_event alone "removes all 40 rows -- no other explicit lock on either
 -- relation participates". That was true of EXPLICIT locks and false of the fix:
--- `_upsert_delivery_recipient` takes no explicit lock at all (KEY SHARE on tasks through
+-- the old `_upsert_delivery_recipient` took no explicit lock (KEY SHARE on tasks through
 -- delivery_recipients_source_task_id_fkey, then an UPDATE on threads), and moving
 -- append_task_event to threads-first promoted it into the cycle set -- 186 -> 150 with four
 -- rows still on the pair. A hand-written list of "the functions that matter" produced
@@ -15,12 +15,9 @@
 -- run here as a closure claim), so a NEW function that takes tasks before threads fails and
 -- NAMES ITSELF.
 --
--- TIES ARE RENDERED, NOT ROUNDED. Six of these functions take both relations in ONE
--- statement (`create_task`, `acquire_claim`, `add_artifact`, `delegate_task`,
--- `raise_conflict`, `raise_escalation` -- an insert whose FKs reach both parents). FKL-9's
--- two-branch `case` maps a tie to its else-branch, which would report those six as
--- "threads-first" -- a claim the derivation does not support. They are rendered as
--- `same statement` here, so the assertion says only what it knows.
+-- TIES ARE RENDERED, NOT ROUNDED. The derivation distinguishes one-statement FK
+-- acquisitions from distinct statements. #667 adds conditional thread locks to the
+-- writers, and the rows below describe the resulting catalog paths.
 --
 -- WHAT IS ASSERTED, AND WHAT IS NOT.
 --   * TT-1/TT-2 are the ORDER. They do not claim, and this file does not claim, that a
@@ -40,7 +37,7 @@ set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
 
 begin;
 
-select plan(13);
+select plan(20);
 
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 -- The derivation, materialized once. Same shape as agent_board_fk_lock_edges.test.sql:
@@ -84,23 +81,29 @@ select is(
     -- with it. The public append_task_event still appears below, reaching the same two
     -- acquisitions `via callee` -- so this row is a NEW member, not a relocated one.
     '_append_task_event: threads(key share) then tasks(update)',
+    '_deliver_board_message: threads(update) then tasks(key share)',
+    '_insert_thread_message: threads(update) then tasks(key share)',
     '_upsert_delivery_recipient: threads(update) then tasks(key share)',
-    'acquire_claim: same statement: threads(key share) + tasks(update)',
-    'add_artifact: same statement: threads(key share) + tasks(update)',
+    -- #667: acquire_claim and add_artifact now lock unstamped anchor threads.
+    'acquire_claim: threads(no key update) then tasks(update)',
+    'add_artifact: threads(no key update) then tasks(update)',
     'append_task_event: threads(key share) then tasks(update)',
-    'create_task: same statement: threads(key share) + tasks(key share)',
-    'create_tasking_delivery: same statement: threads(update) + tasks(key share)',
-    'delegate_task: same statement: threads(key share) + tasks(update)',
+    -- #667: create_task, its tasking and delegation callers take the thread first.
+    'create_task: threads(no key update) then tasks(key share)',
+    'create_tasking_delivery: threads(update) then tasks(key share)',
+    'delegate_task: threads(no key update) then tasks(update)',
     'post_board_message: threads(update) then tasks(key share)',
     'post_message: threads(update) then tasks(key share)',
-    'raise_conflict: same statement: threads(key share) + tasks(update)',
-    'raise_escalation: same statement: threads(key share) + tasks(update)',
+    -- #667: both conflict and escalation lock their actual thread before task events.
+    'raise_conflict: threads(no key update) then tasks(update)',
+    'raise_escalation: threads(no key update) then tasks(update)',
     'resolve_conflict: threads(key share) then tasks(update)',
     'resolve_escalation: threads(key share) then tasks(update)',
     'send_direct_message: threads(update) then tasks(key share)',
     'send_multicast_message: threads(update) then tasks(key share)',
     'signed_append_task_event: threads(key share) then tasks(update)',
-    'signed_create_tasking_delivery: same statement: threads(update) + tasks(key share)',
+    -- #667: the signed tasking wrapper inherits its early association boundary.
+    'signed_create_tasking_delivery: threads(update) then tasks(key share)',
     'signed_post_board_message: threads(update) then tasks(key share)',
     'signed_send_direct_message: threads(update) then tasks(key share)',
     'signed_send_multicast_message: threads(update) then tasks(key share)'
@@ -116,8 +119,8 @@ select is(
   (select count(*)::text || ' functions acquire both; '
           || count(*) filter (where tasks_first)::text || ' take tasks before threads'
      from _tt_ord),
-  '21 functions acquire both; 0 take tasks before threads',
-  'TT-2: 21 functions acquire both relations and NONE takes tasks before threads');
+  '23 functions acquire both; 0 take tasks before threads',
+  'TT-2: 23 functions acquire both relations and NONE takes tasks before threads');
 
 -- ===========================================================================
 -- TT-3: append_task_event's acquisitions on the two relations, in path order, with mode
@@ -190,17 +193,16 @@ select is(
   'TT-6: _append_task_event still takes an EXPLICIT FOR UPDATE on tasks -- the sequence guard is intact');
 
 -- ===========================================================================
--- TT-7: the second half of the fix, on its own. `_upsert_delivery_recipient` has no
--- explicit lock at all, so it is invisible to every textual lock-order guard in this repo;
--- its order is entirely a statement order. The OBSGATE (#78) threads stamp must precede the
--- delivery_recipients insert whose FK reaches tasks.
+-- TT-7: the sink reaches the association helper before the delivery INSERT. The
+-- helper locks and stamps the thread before the task FK acquisition.
 -- ===========================================================================
 select is(
   (select string_agg(e.rel_name || ' ' || e.lock_mode || ' via ' || e.via, ' -> ' order by e.path)
      from _tt_le e
     where e.fn_name = '_upsert_delivery_recipient'
       and e.rel_name in ('agent_board.tasks', 'agent_board.threads')),
-  'agent_board.threads update via write-update'
+  'agent_board.threads no key update via callee:_associate_empty_thread'
+  || ' -> agent_board.threads update via callee:_associate_empty_thread'
   || ' -> agent_board.tasks key share via fk-insert:delivery_recipients_source_task_id_fkey',
   'TT-7: _upsert_delivery_recipient stamps threads BEFORE the insert that FK-locks tasks');
 
@@ -214,12 +216,13 @@ select is(
 -- simply stops, and a summary-line reader calls that a pass (#113).
 --
 -- The fixture is: a board with a member and an observer; a board-linked thread carrying one
--- task; and a SECOND board plus a board-LESS thread carrying its own task, which TT-12/13
--- need in order to observe a stamp actually being written rather than a no-op.
+-- task; a SECOND board; a boardless thread holding a private task; and a separate
+-- empty thread. TT-12/13 distinguish legitimate first association of the empty
+-- thread from private-history promotion and a conflicting second-board stamp.
 -- ===========================================================================
 create temp table _tt_fixture (
   board uuid, board2 uuid, actor uuid, observer uuid,
-  thread uuid, task uuid, free_thread uuid, free_task uuid,
+  thread uuid, task uuid, free_thread uuid, free_task uuid, empty_thread uuid,
   actor_user uuid, observer_user uuid, membership uuid, membership2 uuid
 ) on commit drop;
 
@@ -233,6 +236,7 @@ declare
   v_board uuid; v_board2 uuid; v_membership uuid; v_membership2 uuid;
   v_thread uuid := gen_random_uuid(); v_task uuid;
   v_free_thread uuid := gen_random_uuid(); v_free_task uuid;
+  v_empty_thread uuid := gen_random_uuid();
 begin
   v_actor_user := public.ensure_github_user('tt-actor-' || v_suffix, 'tt-actor-' || v_suffix || '@example.test', 'tt-actor-' || v_suffix, 'TT Actor');
   v_observer_user := public.ensure_github_user('tt-obs-' || v_suffix, 'tt-obs-' || v_suffix || '@example.test', 'tt-obs-' || v_suffix, 'TT Observer');
@@ -262,7 +266,8 @@ begin
 
   insert into agent_board.threads(id, thread_type, created_by_agent_id, subject)
   values (v_thread, 'coordination', v_actor, 'TT board thread'),
-         (v_free_thread, 'coordination', v_actor, 'TT board-less thread');
+         (v_free_thread, 'coordination', v_actor, 'TT board-less thread'),
+         (v_empty_thread, 'coordination', v_actor, 'TT empty thread');
 
   perform set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', 'authenticated', true);
   perform set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', v_actor_user::text, true);
@@ -273,7 +278,7 @@ begin
   select task_id into v_free_task from agent_board.create_task(v_free_thread, v_actor, 'tt free task', 'd');
 
   insert into _tt_fixture values (v_board, v_board2, v_actor, v_observer, v_thread, v_task,
-                                  v_free_thread, v_free_task, v_actor_user, v_observer_user,
+                                  v_free_thread, v_free_task, v_empty_thread, v_actor_user, v_observer_user,
                                   v_membership, v_membership2);
 end
 $$;
@@ -317,24 +322,44 @@ select throws_ok(
   'task mutation requires a non-observer board role, or task assignment/creation',
   'TT-11: a board observer that is not a party to the task is still denied');
 
--- TT-12: the hoisted OBSGATE (#78) stamp still runs. service_role -- the helper is
--- service_role-only by grant. Two calls: one that must STAMP (board-less thread), one that
--- must NOT overwrite (same thread, different board).
+-- First association belongs to the operation creating its own task, before the
+-- task FK or event exists. The pre-existing private task remains a sink refusal.
 select lives_ok(
+  $$ select * from agent_board.create_tasking_delivery(
+       (select empty_thread from _tt_fixture), (select actor from _tt_fixture),
+       'first board task', p_board_id => (select board from _tt_fixture)) $$,
+  'TT-12: an empty thread accepts its own first board task');
+select is(
+  (select board_id from agent_board.threads where id=(select empty_thread from _tt_fixture)),
+  (select board from _tt_fixture), 'TT-12 state: first board is stamped');
+select throws_ok(
+  $$ select * from agent_board.create_tasking_delivery(
+       (select empty_thread from _tt_fixture), (select actor from _tt_fixture),
+       'second board task', p_board_id => (select board2 from _tt_fixture)) $$,
+  '42501', 'thread belongs to a different board',
+  'TT-13: a second board is refused at the association boundary');
+select is(
+  (select count(*) from agent_board.tasks where thread_id=(select empty_thread from _tt_fixture)),
+  1::bigint, 'TT-13 state: mismatch creates no second task');
+select is(
+  (select board_id from agent_board.threads where id=(select empty_thread from _tt_fixture)),
+  (select board from _tt_fixture), 'TT-13 state: mismatch preserves first board');
+select is(
+  (select count(*) from agent_board.delivery_recipients d join agent_board.tasks t on t.id=d.source_task_id
+    where t.thread_id=(select empty_thread from _tt_fixture) and d.board_id=(select board2 from _tt_fixture)),
+  0::bigint, 'TT-13 state: mismatch creates no second-board delivery');
+select throws_ok(
   $$ select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', 'service_role', true);
      select agent_board._upsert_delivery_recipient('tasking', f.actor, 'task', null,
-              f.free_task, null, f.board, f.membership) from _tt_fixture f;
-     select agent_board._upsert_delivery_recipient('tasking', f.actor, 'task', null,
-              f.free_task, null, f.board2, f.membership2) from _tt_fixture f $$,
-  'TT-12: the hoisted stamp runs for both a first and a second board delivery');
-
--- TT-13: the state TT-12 wrote -- first-board-wins survived the hoist. `false` on the
--- second element would mean the reorder turned the stamp into an overwrite.
+              f.free_task, null, f.board, f.membership) from _tt_fixture f $$,
+  '42501', 'thread has private history',
+  'TT-14: direct sink cannot promote a pre-existing private task');
+select is(
+  (select board_id from agent_board.threads where id=(select free_thread from _tt_fixture)),
+  null::uuid, 'TT-14 state: private thread remains unstamped');
 select is(
-  (select (t.board_id = f.board)::text || '/' || (t.board_id = f.board2)::text
-     from agent_board.threads t, _tt_fixture f where t.id = f.free_thread),
-  'true/false',
-  'TT-13: the board-less thread was stamped with the FIRST board and not overwritten by the second');
+  (select count(*) from agent_board.tasks where id=(select free_task from _tt_fixture)),
+  1::bigint, 'TT-14 state: private task remains intact');
 
 select * from finish();
 

package/tests/agent_board_v2_invariants.test.sql

@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ values (
   'coordination',
   '20000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000101',
   'V2 invariant thread'
+), (
+  '20000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000202', 'coordination',
+  '20000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000101', 'V2 empty board thread'
 );
 
 create temporary table v2_board on commit drop as
@@ -310,7 +313,7 @@ select is(
 create temporary table v2_board_delivery on commit drop as
 select *
   from agent_board.post_board_message(
-    '20000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000201',
+    '20000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000202',
     '20000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000101',
     (select board_id from v2_board),
     'Board subject',
@@ -355,7 +358,7 @@ select is(
 create temporary table v2_tasking_delivery on commit drop as
 select *
   from agent_board.create_tasking_delivery(
-    '20000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000201',
+    '20000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000202',
     '20000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000101',
     'Tasking invariant title',
     'Tasking invariant details',

package/tests/agent_board_write_enforcement_class.test.sql

@@ -579,12 +579,12 @@ select is( -- pgtap-allow-raise-checked
 select is(
   (select (select count(*) from _wec_closure cl join pg_proc rp on rp.oid = cl.root_oid
             where rp.pronamespace = 'agent_board'::regnamespace
-              and rp.proname = 'send_direct_message' and cl.reached_name = 'post_message')::text
+              and rp.proname = 'send_direct_message' and cl.reached_name = '_insert_thread_message')::text
           || '/' ||
           (select count(*) from _wec_direct d join pg_proc p on p.oid = d.fn_oid
-            where p.proname = 'post_message' and d.relname = 'messages')::text),
+            where p.proname = '_insert_thread_message' and d.relname = 'messages')::text),
   '2/1',
-  '#325 instrument liveness: BOTH send_direct_message overloads reach post_message, and post_message writes messages — the delegation chain is real, so a closure that stopped resolving edges reds HERE instead of silently emptying the class');
+  '#325 instrument liveness: BOTH send_direct_message overloads reach _insert_thread_message, and _insert_thread_message writes messages — the delegation chain is real, so a closure that stopped resolving edges reds HERE instead of silently emptying the class');
 
 -- ===========================================================================================
 -- HALF A — every writer derives its actor FROM THE SESSION.

package/tests/catalog/function_execute_privileges.json

@@ -100,6 +100,15 @@
         "authenticated": false
       }
     },
+    {
+      "name": "_associate_empty_thread",
+      "signature": "_associate_empty_thread(p_thread_id uuid, p_board_id uuid)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": false,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
     {
       "name": "_board_membership_events_provenance_guard",
       "signature": "_board_membership_events_provenance_guard()",
@@ -295,7 +304,7 @@
       "executable_by": {
         "anon": false,
         "service_role": true,
-        "authenticated": false
+        "authenticated": true
       }
     },
     {
@@ -331,7 +340,7 @@
       "executable_by": {
         "anon": false,
         "service_role": true,
-        "authenticated": false
+        "authenticated": true
       }
     },
     {
@@ -388,6 +397,15 @@
         "authenticated": false
       }
     },
+    {
+      "name": "_deliver_board_message",
+      "signature": "_deliver_board_message(p_message_id uuid, p_subject text, p_body text, p_priority text)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": false,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
     {
       "name": "_emit_membership_event",
       "signature": "_emit_membership_event(p_board_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_membership_state text, p_event_kind text)",
@@ -496,6 +514,15 @@
         "authenticated": true
       }
     },
+    {
+      "name": "_insert_thread_message",
+      "signature": "_insert_thread_message(p_thread_id uuid, p_author_agent_id uuid, p_body text, p_message_type text, p_task_id uuid, p_metadata jsonb)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": false,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
     {
       "name": "_invite_permitted",
       "signature": "_invite_permitted(p_board_id uuid, p_target_agent_id uuid, p_inviter_agent_id uuid)",
@@ -600,7 +627,7 @@
       "signature": "_next_thread_message_sequence(p_thread_id uuid)",
       "executable_by": {
         "anon": false,
-        "service_role": true,
+        "service_role": false,
         "authenticated": false
       }
     },
@@ -645,7 +672,7 @@
       "signature": "_queue_board_post_callbacks(p_board_id uuid, p_message_id uuid, p_subject text, p_preview text, p_priority text, p_fetch_descriptor jsonb)",
       "executable_by": {
         "anon": false,
-        "service_role": true,
+        "service_role": false,
         "authenticated": false
       }
     },
@@ -654,7 +681,7 @@
       "signature": "_queue_inbox_callbacks(p_inbox_item_id uuid, p_event_category text)",
       "executable_by": {
         "anon": false,
-        "service_role": true,
+        "service_role": false,
         "authenticated": false
       }
     },
@@ -951,7 +978,7 @@
       "signature": "_upsert_delivery_recipient(p_delivery_mode text, p_recipient_agent_id uuid, p_source_kind text, p_source_message_id uuid, p_source_task_id uuid, p_source_delegation_id uuid, p_board_id uuid, p_board_membership_id uuid, p_metadata jsonb)",
       "executable_by": {
         "anon": false,
-        "service_role": true,
+        "service_role": false,
         "authenticated": false
       }
     },
@@ -960,7 +987,7 @@
       "signature": "_upsert_inbox_item(p_delivery_recipient_id uuid, p_recipient_agent_id uuid, p_board_id uuid, p_delivery_mode text, p_source_kind text, p_source_message_id uuid, p_source_task_id uuid, p_source_delegation_id uuid, p_subject text, p_preview text, p_priority text, p_visible_in_inbox boolean, p_visible_in_board_feed boolean, p_fetch_descriptor jsonb, p_metadata jsonb)",
       "executable_by": {
         "anon": false,
-        "service_role": true,
+        "service_role": false,
         "authenticated": false
       }
     },
@@ -1405,6 +1432,15 @@
         "authenticated": false
       }
     },
+    {
+      "name": "mint_fleet_agent_session_measured",
+      "signature": "mint_fleet_agent_session_measured(p_challenge_id uuid, p_nonce text, p_signing_key_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_max_ttl_seconds integer, p_holder_secret text, p_session_id text, p_fingerprint jsonb, p_continuity text, p_predecessor_agent_id uuid)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": true,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
     {
       "name": "onboard_federated_fleet_agent",
       "signature": "onboard_federated_fleet_agent(p_issuer text, p_audience text, p_subject text, p_human_identity_claim jsonb, p_slug text, p_agent_public_key text, p_agent_public_key_format text, p_agent_public_key_fingerprint text, p_pop_verified boolean, p_token_sha256 text, p_token_expires_at timestamp with time zone, p_actor_sub text, p_agent_kind text, p_requested_scopes text[], p_requested_board_scopes text[], p_invite_code text, p_board_id uuid, p_machine_id uuid, p_harness_kind text, p_harness_label text, p_repo_slug text, p_repo_fingerprint text, p_repo_scope_role text, p_agent_role text, p_expected_agent_handle text)",

package/tests/catalog/p_metadata_parameters.json

@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@
       "signature": "_assert_signed_authority_signer_live(p_actor_agent_id uuid, p_gateway_decision jsonb)",
       "declares_p_metadata": false
     },
+    {
+      "signature": "_associate_empty_thread(p_thread_id uuid, p_board_id uuid)",
+      "declares_p_metadata": false
+    },
     {
       "signature": "_board_membership_events_provenance_guard()",
       "declares_p_metadata": false
@@ -173,6 +177,10 @@
       "signature": "_delegate_visible_board_ids()",
       "declares_p_metadata": false
     },
+    {
+      "signature": "_deliver_board_message(p_message_id uuid, p_subject text, p_body text, p_priority text)",
+      "declares_p_metadata": false
+    },
     {
       "signature": "_emit_membership_event(p_board_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_membership_state text, p_event_kind text)",
       "declares_p_metadata": false
@@ -221,6 +229,10 @@
       "signature": "_grant_within_ceiling(p_grantor_agent_id uuid, p_board_id uuid, p_grantee_role text)",
       "declares_p_metadata": false
     },
+    {
+      "signature": "_insert_thread_message(p_thread_id uuid, p_author_agent_id uuid, p_body text, p_message_type text, p_task_id uuid, p_metadata jsonb)",
+      "declares_p_metadata": true
+    },
     {
       "signature": "_invite_permitted(p_board_id uuid, p_target_agent_id uuid, p_inviter_agent_id uuid)",
       "declares_p_metadata": false
@@ -625,6 +637,10 @@
       "signature": "mint_fleet_agent_session(p_challenge_id uuid, p_nonce text, p_signing_key_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_max_ttl_seconds integer, p_holder_secret text, p_session_id text)",
       "declares_p_metadata": false
     },
+    {
+      "signature": "mint_fleet_agent_session_measured(p_challenge_id uuid, p_nonce text, p_signing_key_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_max_ttl_seconds integer, p_holder_secret text, p_session_id text, p_fingerprint jsonb, p_continuity text, p_predecessor_agent_id uuid)",
+      "declares_p_metadata": false
+    },
     {
       "signature": "onboard_federated_fleet_agent(p_issuer text, p_audience text, p_subject text, p_human_identity_claim jsonb, p_slug text, p_agent_public_key text, p_agent_public_key_format text, p_agent_public_key_fingerprint text, p_pop_verified boolean, p_token_sha256 text, p_token_expires_at timestamp with time zone, p_actor_sub text, p_agent_kind text, p_requested_scopes text[], p_requested_board_scopes text[], p_invite_code text, p_board_id uuid, p_machine_id uuid, p_harness_kind text, p_harness_label text, p_repo_slug text, p_repo_fingerprint text, p_repo_scope_role text, p_agent_role text, p_expected_agent_handle text)",
       "declares_p_metadata": false