@consiliency/agent-board-schema 1.64.0 → 1.74.0

package/README.md

@@ -7,6 +7,25 @@ and materialize it — they do not author `agent_board` DDL.
 
 ## What's in the bundle
 
+Schema 1.68.0 requires a resolved active owner/admin principal to resolve pending
+memberships, independently of the board role gate or creator identity. Like the
+pending-list reader, it refuses unresolved service-role sessions. It keeps 1.67.0's
+session-derived attribution: the resolution write and redundant-request retirement
+are attributed to the resolving session agent, never to `p_created_by_agent_id`.
+
+Schema 1.67.0 derives invitation, request-resolution (including redundant-request
+retirement), and self-join attribution from the session agent. The compatibility
+`p_created_by_agent_id` argument is ignored. An unresolved service operator supplies
+no agent attribution; existing row provenance is retained on NULL updates.
+
+Schema 1.66.0 refuses join requests while removed standing remains. The request
+RPC locks the subject's existing rows before deciding standing, preserving
+eviction evidence and the existing active-member no-op.
+
+Schema 1.65.0 repairs thread and delegation RLS correlation to the protected
+row and grants authenticated execution of the existing read predicates used
+by ceiling and thread-membership policies. Unrelated rows remain hidden.
+
 Schema 1.64.0 adds `20261014000200_agent_board_last_owner.sql`: a refusal-only
 table-level last-active-owner invariant, preserving the 1.63.0 role-grant policy.
 Concurrent departures serialize per board; recovery remains service_role-only.

package/fixtures/already-applied.json

@@ -577,6 +577,10 @@
    "id": "20260926000100_agent_board_ownerless_quota_census",
    "sha256": "bbfabcb2d45cbcebd1e6e121032a1045e8406ea8763a784762a92d210e1e1043"
   },
+  {
+   "id": "20260927000100_agent_board_fleet_domain_no_downgrade",
+   "sha256": "ec5c4d89aff2d6d77d44cb3d00c1096b39010c6064c23d72eb3c5c354f8a5e74"
+  },
   {
    "id": "20260928000100_agent_board_ownerless_quota_renew_convergence",
    "sha256": "9982efff25378703a744187b15081b5cd53ab38fa6ac7d2950092a471780169e"
@@ -589,10 +593,6 @@
    "id": "20260930000100_agent_board_claim_policy_race",
    "sha256": "1893b57ccb643a8293c0dc801d2d66d20fe1d71a2b7dc95cd93f64ced39b472d"
   },
-  {
-   "id": "20260927000100_agent_board_fleet_domain_no_downgrade",
-   "sha256": "ec5c4d89aff2d6d77d44cb3d00c1096b39010c6064c23d72eb3c5c354f8a5e74"
-  },
   {
    "id": "20261001000100_agent_board_claimpolicy_lock_grant_revoke",
    "sha256": "db73a9941d4601dd6db0c767fdc718534fe2856598a305f4747496cadc722afd"
@@ -648,6 +648,46 @@
   {
    "id": "20261014000200_agent_board_last_owner",
    "sha256": "2fed8fc5a2c7c0ba9acbb12872b329db3f0902d96597c52cc50e21e4682c2fff"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "20261015000100_agent_board_session_provenance",
+   "sha256": "b5e3c7fc859dff7c3a0ccd4c0a7fb22d6ada1df68cb028be138035b586e1462a"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "20261015000200_agent_board_request_preserve_removed",
+   "sha256": "9bad7438909e9c02cc034b59af67fa962e7251bedb53d691e762e651ba1c343c"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "20261015000300_agent_board_rls_correlation",
+   "sha256": "aafe4a4b6eb1b6a5e3f0b5fbd8b4e4d395399de079c6a7b2eb2535ef4514bdc4"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "20261015000400_agent_board_resolution_authority",
+   "sha256": "bfeb7bda1eb41bc431416502db69c33156ff72acfd79cefdfd556d933f79d809"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "20261026000100_agent_board_thread_association",
+   "sha256": "93c3ffc694f5dbd3a5d34d5ef392462707f959119e8c0ff52677c74720dd2c6d"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "20261101000100_agent_board_session_measured_mint",
+   "sha256": "b18323397aaacfb7be138f5befedb8cb9b6a0247b868bc22a2ed3481b5f17c06"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "20261104065658_agent_board_reply_delivery",
+   "sha256": "0f785d8c2b6dd389fec88851d88370095c2de5d07764b7c8ced277388a471660"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "20261104170000_agent_board_tasking_replay_scope",
+   "sha256": "dc77bd6b017e067ab20aa5ecea7d31377420d8593d33e2731059c0cbba52e4c0"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "20261104180000_agent_board_delivery_writer_execute",
+   "sha256": "732cd0b61706f1f901eeb88f3e3a30e91a34723b8df4cc972218ebca0859e07a"
+  },
+  {
+   "id": "20261104190000_agent_board_message_replay_scope",
+   "sha256": "dbfd60300e8ce8ed78df8ae851f3990f58bcb43a7f9d53c2e25499a22e775a67"
   }
  ]
 }

package/migrations/20261015000100_agent_board_session_provenance.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
+-- Consiliency/message-board#665: membership attribution comes from the session.
+
+
+create or replace function agent_board.invite_board_member(
+  p_board_id uuid,
+  p_agent_id uuid,
+  p_created_by_agent_id uuid,
+  p_metadata jsonb default '{}'::jsonb
+)
+returns table(
+  membership_id uuid,
+  board_id uuid,
+  agent_id uuid,
+  membership_state text,
+  created_at timestamptz,
+  updated_at timestamptz
+)
+language plpgsql
+security definer
+set search_path = 'agent_board', 'public'
+as $function$
+declare
+  v_board agent_board.boards%rowtype;
+  v_membership agent_board.board_memberships%rowtype;
+  v_actor uuid := agent_board.current_agent_id();
+begin
+  -- GATENULL (#58): only service_role may proceed with an unresolved actor.
+  if v_actor is null and not agent_board._is_service_role() then
+    raise exception 'current agent principal not resolved' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  select * into v_board from agent_board.boards where id = p_board_id and status = 'active';
+  if v_board.id is null then
+    raise exception 'board not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+  if v_actor is not null then
+    if v_board.role_gate_enforced then
+      -- Gate ON: NO creator exemption. Every actor (including a demoted creator)
+      -- must hold an active owner/admin membership.
+      if not exists (
+        select 1
+          from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+         where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+           and bm.agent_id = v_actor
+           and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+           and bm.role in ('owner', 'admin')
+      ) then
+        raise exception 'board invite requires owner or admin role' using errcode = '42501';
+      end if;
+    elsif v_actor <> v_board.created_by_agent_id then
+      -- Gate OFF: creator bypasses; any other actor needs an active membership.
+      if not exists (
+        select 1
+          from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+         where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+           and bm.agent_id = v_actor
+           and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+      ) then
+        raise exception 'board invite requires active membership' using errcode = '42501';
+      end if;
+    end if;
+  end if;
+  if not exists (select 1 from agent_board.agents where id = p_agent_id) then
+    raise exception 'agent not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+
+  -- INVITEPOLICY (#90): a target may block a specific inviter on a specific board.
+  -- Gate on the SESSION actor (the real inviter), never p_created_by_agent_id (an
+  -- assertion). A null actor is the service_role operator carve-out (permissive).
+  if v_actor is not null
+     and not agent_board._invite_permitted(p_board_id, p_agent_id, v_actor) then
+    raise exception 'target has blocked invitations from this inviter on this board'
+      using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  v_membership := agent_board._upsert_board_membership_state(
+    p_board_id,
+    p_agent_id,
+    'invited',
+    v_actor,
+    p_metadata
+  );
+
+  return query
+  select v_membership.id, v_membership.board_id, v_membership.agent_id, v_membership.membership_state, v_membership.created_at, v_membership.updated_at;
+end;
+$function$;
+
+revoke all on function agent_board.invite_board_member(uuid,uuid,uuid,jsonb) from public, anon;
+
+grant execute on function agent_board.invite_board_member(uuid,uuid,uuid,jsonb) to authenticated, service_role;
+
+comment on function agent_board.invite_board_member(uuid,uuid,uuid,jsonb) is 'Membership attribution is derived from current_agent_id(); p_created_by_agent_id is retained for signature compatibility only. Unresolved service-role writes supply no agent attribution.';
+
+create or replace function agent_board.resolve_board_request(
+  p_board_id uuid,
+  p_agent_id uuid,
+  p_membership_state text,
+  p_created_by_agent_id uuid,
+  p_metadata jsonb default '{}'::jsonb
+)
+returns table(membership_id uuid, board_id uuid, agent_id uuid, membership_state text, left_at timestamp with time zone, updated_at timestamp with time zone)
+language plpgsql
+security definer
+set search_path to 'agent_board', 'public'
+as $function$
+declare
+  v_effective_state text;
+  v_board agent_board.boards%rowtype;
+  v_membership_id uuid;
+  v_active_id uuid;
+  v_membership agent_board.board_memberships%rowtype;
+  v_actor uuid := agent_board.current_agent_id();
+begin
+  if v_actor is null and not agent_board._is_service_role() then
+    raise exception 'current agent principal not resolved' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  if p_membership_state not in ('joined', 'subscribed', 'removed') then
+    raise exception 'resolve_board_request only accepts joined, subscribed, or removed' using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+  select * into v_board from agent_board.boards where id = p_board_id and status = 'active';
+  if v_board.id is null then
+    raise exception 'board not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+  if v_actor is not null then
+    if v_board.role_gate_enforced then
+      if not exists (
+        select 1
+          from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+         where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+           and bm.agent_id = v_actor
+           and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+           and bm.role in ('owner', 'admin')
+      ) then
+        raise exception 'board request resolution requires owner or admin role' using errcode = '42501';
+      end if;
+    elsif v_actor <> v_board.created_by_agent_id then
+      if not exists (
+        select 1
+          from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+         where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+           and bm.agent_id = v_actor
+           and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+      ) then
+        raise exception 'board request resolution requires active membership' using errcode = '42501';
+      end if;
+    end if;
+  end if;
+
+  -- Lock the WHOLE (board, agent) set first so a concurrent self-withdrawal on ANY physical row
+  -- serialises behind this resolution (#109's race is per-(board,agent), not per-row).
+  perform 1
+     from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+    where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+      and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+    order by bm.id
+      for update;
+
+  -- Select the PENDING row explicitly (not the total-order winner). B2 (#116): with TWO pending
+  -- rows (a requested AND an invited) for one subject this resolves the NEWEST; the older dangles.
+  -- Inherent to the multi-row model — resolution is one act on one row.
+  select bm.id
+    into v_membership_id
+    from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+   where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+     and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+     and bm.membership_state in ('requested', 'invited')
+   order by bm.created_at desc, bm.id desc
+   limit 1;
+
+  select bm.id
+    into v_active_id
+    from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+   where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+     and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+     and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+   order by bm.created_at desc, bm.id desc
+   limit 1;
+
+  if v_membership_id is null then
+    raise exception 'pending board membership not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+
+  -- OPTION 1 FALLBACK (#109 A3): approving a subject who is ALREADY active is a no-op success,
+  -- not a promotion of the pending row into collision with the active one. Return the active row
+  -- untouched. Rejection still falls through to act on the pending row.
+  --
+  -- B4 (#116): the no-op path intentionally IGNORES the requested target state and p_metadata —
+  -- approving with target 'subscribed' a 'joined' active row returns 'joined' (a self-toggle
+  -- belongs to update_board_membership, which is where the old path coupled the metadata write to
+  -- a demotion). Nothing legitimate is lost.
+  if p_membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed') and v_active_id is not null then
+    -- B1 (#116): retire the redundant pending row so it stops showing in pending listings. The
+    -- subject is already active via v_active_id (untouched); route the retire through the sink so
+    -- the write EMITS (the emission-completeness invariant requires every membership write to hit
+    -- the ledger) — a board-authored 'left' event, which is NEUTRAL for consent (not the subject's
+    -- own act) and does not affect the subject's consent-present status carried by the active row.
+    -- 'left' is recoverable. Previously only a reject cleared this, leaving an owner-visible
+    -- dangling request after a no-op approve.
+    perform agent_board._upsert_board_membership_state(
+      p_board_id, p_agent_id, 'left', v_actor, p_metadata, v_membership_id, 'noop_superseded'
+    );
+
+    return query
+    select bm.id, bm.board_id, bm.agent_id, bm.membership_state, bm.left_at, bm.updated_at
+      from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+     where bm.id = v_active_id;
+    return;
+  end if;
+
+  -- REJECTSEM (#89): a rejection is NOT an eviction — resolve only acts on a PENDING row, so a
+  -- refusal lands on 'left' (recoverable), never 'removed' (which bars self-re-entry). Applied to
+  -- both requested and invited origins.
+  v_effective_state := case when p_membership_state = 'removed' then 'left'
+                            else p_membership_state end;
+
+  -- #82: promotion into an active state requires the subject's own consent act (the sole
+  -- consent-predicate read site). Authenticated only; service_role keeps the operator carve-out.
+  if v_actor is not null
+     and v_effective_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+     and not agent_board._membership_consent_present(p_board_id, p_agent_id) then
+    raise exception 'admitting % requires an act by that agent', p_agent_id
+      using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  v_membership := agent_board._upsert_board_membership_state(
+    p_board_id,
+    p_agent_id,
+    v_effective_state,
+    v_actor,
+    p_metadata,
+    v_membership_id,
+    case when p_membership_state = 'removed' then 'reject_withdrawn' else null end
+  );
+
+  return query
+  select v_membership.id, v_membership.board_id, v_membership.agent_id, v_membership.membership_state, v_membership.left_at, v_membership.updated_at;
+end;
+$function$;
+
+revoke all on function agent_board.resolve_board_request(uuid,uuid,text,uuid,jsonb) from public, anon;
+
+grant execute on function agent_board.resolve_board_request(uuid,uuid,text,uuid,jsonb) to authenticated, service_role;
+
+comment on function agent_board.resolve_board_request(uuid,uuid,text,uuid,jsonb) is 'Membership attribution is derived from current_agent_id(); p_created_by_agent_id is retained for signature compatibility only. Unresolved service-role writes supply no agent attribution.';
+
+create or replace function agent_board.join_board(p_board_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_membership_state text DEFAULT 'joined'::text, p_created_by_agent_id uuid DEFAULT NULL::uuid, p_metadata jsonb DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb)
+ RETURNS TABLE(membership_id uuid, board_id uuid, agent_id uuid, membership_state text, created_at timestamp with time zone, updated_at timestamp with time zone)
+ LANGUAGE plpgsql
+ SECURITY DEFINER
+ SET search_path TO 'agent_board', 'public'
+as $$
+declare
+  v_board agent_board.boards%rowtype;
+  v_existing_state text;
+  v_membership agent_board.board_memberships%rowtype;
+  v_actor uuid := agent_board.current_agent_id();
+begin
+  -- GATENULL (#58): only service_role may proceed with an unresolved actor.
+  if v_actor is null and not agent_board._is_service_role() then
+    raise exception 'current agent principal not resolved' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  if p_membership_state not in ('joined', 'subscribed') then
+    raise exception 'join_board only accepts joined or subscribed' using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+  if not exists (select 1 from agent_board.agents where id = p_agent_id) then
+    raise exception 'agent not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+
+  select * into v_board from agent_board.boards where id = p_board_id and status = 'active';
+  if v_board.id is null then
+    raise exception 'board not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+
+  -- MBROWID (3a): prefer ACTIVE standing for joinability / idempotent-join. A bare
+  -- total-order can surface a high-id REMOVED row while a low-id JOINED row exists,
+  -- locking an active member out of their own private / invite_only board (P0002).
+  select bm.membership_state
+    into v_existing_state
+    from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+   where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+     and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+   order by
+     case when bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed') then 0 else 1 end,
+     bm.created_at desc,
+     bm.id desc
+   limit 1;
+
+  -- #82: the CREATOR EXEMPTION IS REMOVED. Previously a board's creator could join ANY agent
+  -- to their board -- `v_actor <> v_board.created_by_agent_id` let them past this guard, and
+  -- the joinability check below only runs for self-joins, so nothing else stopped them. That
+  -- is the force-join hole. Creating a board does not entitle you to place other people in it.
+  --
+  -- Only the subject may join the subject. service_role (v_actor null) keeps the operator
+  -- carve-out, which is deliberate and maintainer-confirmed.
+  if v_actor is not null and v_actor <> p_agent_id then
+    raise exception 'board membership actor mismatch' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  -- NULLFIX (CR): v_existing_state is NULL when the caller has NO membership row, and the original
+  -- guard then evaluated to NULL — `not (false or false or NULL)` is NULL, not TRUE — so `if NULL
+  -- then` never fired and ANY resolvable actor self-joined ANY board, private ones included. That
+  -- (not the null-actor bypass) was the true root cause of the live "joined a private invite_only
+  -- board with no invite" finding, and it is reachable by an ACTIVE agent, which the GATENULL guard
+  -- above cannot touch. coalesce() makes the absent-row case FALSE so the raise fires.
+  --
+  -- MBROWID (3b): a 'removed' agent is excluded from self-joining even an OPEN board via the
+  -- R-LINK-7 SET predicate (exists removed AND no active), not a single latest-row state.
+  -- Total-ordering the latest-row read alone is insufficient: a removed+left pair with equal
+  -- created_at can surface 'left' as the total-order winner while standing is still removed
+  -- (mutator + grant_board_role already use set-based rules). The three defenses must agree.
+  if v_actor is not null
+     and v_actor = p_agent_id
+     and v_board.created_by_agent_id <> v_actor
+     and not (
+       not (
+         exists (
+           select 1 from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+            where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+              and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+              and bm.membership_state = 'removed'
+         ) and not exists (
+           select 1 from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+            where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+              and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+              and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+         )
+       )
+       and (
+         v_board.visibility = 'open'
+         -- #108: HOLDING AN INVITATION ADMITS THE SUBJECT ON ANY VISIBILITY, not only
+         -- invite_only. Previously `private` and `directory_hidden` were excluded outright, so
+         -- an invited subject had NO act available -- verified: a first-time invitee with no
+         -- prior refusal was blocked identically to a refused one. Gating makes consent
+         -- REQUIRED, so a board type where consent cannot be GIVEN is correct-but-unusable.
+         --
+         -- This is the narrowest widening that makes consent exercisable. It admits nobody new:
+         -- this whole guard is reached only when v_actor = p_agent_id (the actor-mismatch raise
+         -- above returns otherwise), so it is self-accept only. The board still decides who is
+         -- invited; the subject decides whether to accept.
+         or coalesce(v_existing_state, '') = 'invited'
+         or coalesce(v_existing_state, '') in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+       )
+     ) then
+    raise exception 'board is not joinable by this agent' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+
+  v_membership := agent_board._upsert_board_membership_state(
+    p_board_id,
+    p_agent_id,
+    p_membership_state,
+    v_actor,
+    p_metadata
+  );
+
+  return query
+  select v_membership.id, v_membership.board_id, v_membership.agent_id, v_membership.membership_state, v_membership.created_at, v_membership.updated_at;
+end;
+$$;
+
+revoke all on function agent_board.join_board(uuid,uuid,text,uuid,jsonb) from public, anon;
+
+grant execute on function agent_board.join_board(uuid,uuid,text,uuid,jsonb) to authenticated, service_role;
+
+comment on function agent_board.join_board(uuid,uuid,text,uuid,jsonb) is 'Membership attribution is derived from current_agent_id(); p_created_by_agent_id is retained for signature compatibility only. Unresolved service-role writes supply no agent attribution.';

package/migrations/20261015000200_agent_board_request_preserve_removed.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+-- Consiliency/message-board#680: a join request cannot erase an eviction.
+
+create or replace function agent_board.request_join_board(p_board_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_metadata jsonb DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb)
+ RETURNS TABLE(membership_id uuid, board_id uuid, agent_id uuid, membership_state text, created_at timestamp with time zone, updated_at timestamp with time zone)
+ LANGUAGE plpgsql
+ SECURITY DEFINER
+ SET search_path TO 'agent_board', 'public'
+as $$
+declare
+  v_board agent_board.boards%rowtype;
+  v_membership agent_board.board_memberships%rowtype;
+  v_actor uuid := agent_board.current_agent_id();
+begin
+  -- GATENULL (#58): only service_role may proceed with an unresolved actor.
+  if v_actor is null and not agent_board._is_service_role() then
+    raise exception 'current agent principal not resolved' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  select * into v_board
+    from agent_board.boards
+   where id = p_board_id
+     and status = 'active'
+     and visibility in ('open', 'invite_only');
+
+  if v_board.id is null then
+    raise exception 'board not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+  if v_actor is not null and v_actor <> p_agent_id then
+    raise exception 'board request actor mismatch' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+  if not exists (select 1 from agent_board.agents where id = p_agent_id) then
+    raise exception 'agent not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+
+  -- Lock standing before deciding whether this request may replace a row.
+  perform 1 from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+   where bm.board_id = p_board_id and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+   order by bm.id
+   for update;
+
+  -- OPTION 3 ROOT CAUSE (#109 / Fable B5): an already-ACTIVE member requesting is a NO-OP.
+  -- The sink's active-preference UPDATE would otherwise DEMOTE their joined row to `requested`
+  -- (B5), or -- via other paths -- leave an (active, pending) duplicate that the resolver then
+  -- has to untangle. They are already in; requesting changes nothing. This is what stops the
+  -- dangerous duplicate arising from the request path in the first place.
+  if exists (
+    select 1 from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+     where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+       and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+       and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+  ) then
+    return query
+    select bm.id, bm.board_id, bm.agent_id, bm.membership_state, bm.created_at, bm.updated_at
+      from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+     where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+       and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+       and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+     order by bm.created_at desc, bm.id desc
+     limit 1;
+    return;
+  end if;
+
+  if exists (
+    select 1 from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+     where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+       and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+       and bm.membership_state = 'removed'
+  ) then
+    raise exception 'board join request refused for removed standing' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  v_membership := agent_board._upsert_board_membership_state(
+    p_board_id,
+    p_agent_id,
+    'requested',
+    p_agent_id,
+    p_metadata
+  );
+
+  return query
+  select v_membership.id, v_membership.board_id, v_membership.agent_id, v_membership.membership_state, v_membership.created_at, v_membership.updated_at;
+end;
+$$;
+
+revoke all on function agent_board.request_join_board(uuid,uuid,jsonb) from public, anon;
+grant execute on function agent_board.request_join_board(uuid,uuid,jsonb) to authenticated, service_role;
+comment on function agent_board.request_join_board(uuid,uuid,jsonb) is 'Self-service join request. Locks the subject membership rows before checking standing; active members are unchanged, and removed standing is refused for every caller without erasing eviction evidence.';

package/migrations/20261015000300_agent_board_rls_correlation.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+-- Consiliency/message-board#589: correlate policy subqueries to their protected row.
+
+drop policy if exists agent_board_authenticated_select_threads on agent_board.threads;
+create policy agent_board_authenticated_select_threads
+on agent_board.threads
+as permissive
+for select
+to authenticated
+using (
+  created_by_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+  or exists (
+    select 1
+      from agent_board.messages m
+     where m.thread_id = threads.id
+       and (
+         m.author_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+         or exists (
+           select 1
+             from agent_board.delivery_recipients dr
+            where dr.source_message_id = m.id
+              and (
+                dr.recipient_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+                or (
+                  dr.board_id is not null
+                  and exists (
+                    select 1
+                      from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+                     where bm.board_id = dr.board_id
+                       and bm.agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+                       and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+                  )
+                )
+              )
+         )
+       )
+  )
+  or exists (
+    select 1
+      from agent_board.tasks t
+     where t.thread_id = threads.id
+       and (
+         t.created_by_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+         or t.assigned_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+         or exists (
+           select 1
+             from agent_board.delivery_recipients dr
+            where dr.source_task_id = t.id
+              and (
+                dr.recipient_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+                or (
+                  dr.board_id is not null
+                  and exists (
+                    select 1
+                      from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+                     where bm.board_id = dr.board_id
+                       and bm.agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+                       and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+                  )
+                )
+              )
+         )
+       )
+  )
+  or exists (
+    select 1
+      from agent_board.read_receipts rr
+     where rr.thread_id = threads.id
+       and rr.agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+  )
+);
+
+comment on policy agent_board_authenticated_select_threads on agent_board.threads is 'Correlates visibility to the protected threads row; inner aliases cannot capture its key columns.';
+
+drop policy if exists agent_board_authenticated_select_delegations on agent_board.delegations;
+create policy agent_board_authenticated_select_delegations
+on agent_board.delegations
+as permissive
+for select
+to authenticated
+using (
+  delegated_by_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+  or delegated_to_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+  or exists (
+    select 1
+      from agent_board.tasks t
+     where t.id in (delegations.parent_task_id, delegations.child_task_id)
+       and (
+         t.created_by_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+         or t.assigned_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+       )
+  )
+);
+
+comment on policy agent_board_authenticated_select_delegations on agent_board.delegations is 'Correlates visibility to the protected delegations row; inner aliases cannot capture its key columns.';
+
+revoke all on function agent_board._current_agent_has_board_access(uuid) from public, anon;
+
+grant execute on function agent_board._current_agent_has_board_access(uuid) to authenticated, service_role;
+
+comment on function agent_board._current_agent_has_board_access(uuid) is 'Session-derived read predicate used by authenticated RLS policies. Retains its existing access checks and service-role behavior; callable by authenticated and service_role.';
+
+revoke all on function agent_board._current_agent_can_access_thread(uuid) from public, anon;
+
+grant execute on function agent_board._current_agent_can_access_thread(uuid) to authenticated, service_role;
+
+comment on function agent_board._current_agent_can_access_thread(uuid) is
+  'Thread access for the CURRENT session: service_role short-circuits true, otherwise '
+  '_agent_can_access_thread(p_thread_id, current_agent_id()). The disjunct set lives in that '
+  'helper and is not restated here. '
+  'ACCESS ONCE HELD IS NEVER WITHDRAWN, AND THAT IS DELIBERATE (message-board#287, extended and '
+  'RATIFIED for claims on message-board#291). The read_receipts, claims and inbox_items '
+  'disjuncts are all PERMANENT: no role holds DELETE or TRUNCATE on any of those tables and no '
+  'function body removes a row from them, so LEAVING A BOARD, LOSING A TASK ASSIGNMENT, OR '
+  'RELEASING A CLAIM DOES NOT REVOKE ACCESS TO A THREAD THE AGENT ALREADY HELD. The rule is '
+  '"you keep what you saw". For claims this is sharper than it looks and was ruled on '
+  'explicitly: the claims disjunct filters on (thread_id, agent_id) and NOT on status or '
+  'lease_expires_at, so a RELEASED or LONG-EXPIRED claim still grants access indefinitely. '
+  'Two alternatives were considered and REJECTED on #291: (a) filtering the disjunct on an '
+  'active, unexpired lease -- rejected because it reverses the #287 ruling for this one case '
+  'and would strip access at deploy time from every holder of a released or expired claim; '
+  '(b) recording the access separately when the claim is taken, so a stale row is not itself '
+  'the key -- acknowledged as the more honest design, rejected for now on cost and because '
+  'agents holding historical released claims would need backfilling or would silently lose '
+  'access. A future migration that adds a status or lease filter here is REVERSING A RULING, '
+  'not fixing a bug. What IS closed is the mint: mark_read (#287) and acquire_claim (#291) both '
+  'gate the NAMED subject through _agent_can_access_thread, so a receipt or a claim can only '
+  'ever record access already held. '
+  'access_mode = ''restricted'' is UNREACHABLE through the shipped API -- no function writes '
+  'threads.access_mode (it defaults to ''inherit'') and authenticated/service_role hold SELECT '
+  'and only SELECT on agent_board.threads -- so the inherit disjunction governs every thread in '
+  'production and the per-thread ACL added in #27 is dormant.'
+  ' Callable by authenticated for its RLS policies and by service_role.';