@conarium-ai/core 0.2.36 → 0.2.37
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +41 -0
- package/LIMITATIONS.md +32 -3
- package/LIMITATIONS.tr.md +67 -2
- package/README.md +5 -2
- package/bin/conarium-reconcile.mjs +297 -13
- package/bin/conarium-stamp.mjs +2 -2
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-clocks-declared.json +16 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-clocks-undeclared-profile.json +16 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-excluded.json +16 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-indeterminate.json +14 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-matched.json +16 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-neg-unattributed.json +15 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-neg-undeclared-exclusion.json +16 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-neg-undeclared-multiplicity.json +16 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-neg-undeclared-skew.json +15 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-observed-without-receipt.json +14 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-receipted-without-observation.json +14 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/after-customers-1.json +1 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/after-customers-15.json +1 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/after-empty.json +1 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/after-set.json +1 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/after-unattributed.json +1 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/before-customers-10.json +1 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/before-empty.json +1 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/profile-clocks.json +9 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/profile-exclusion.json +7 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/profile-multiplicity.json +9 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/profile-no-clocks.json +4 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/receipts-customers-early.jsonl +1 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/receipts-customers.jsonl +1 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/receipts-empty.jsonl +0 -0
- package/conformance/run.mjs +59 -0
- package/docs/API-STABILITY.md +1 -1
- package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md +2 -2
- package/docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md +92 -15
- package/docs/claims/retracted-phrasings.json +7 -0
- package/docs/claims/reviews/0.2.37.md +180 -0
- package/docs/claims/surfaces.json +115 -0
- package/package.json +1 -1
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{"v":"conarium-receipt/0.3","ts":"2026-08-06T11:00:00.000Z","request":{"tool":"query","target":"zion-rest","argsHash":"sha256:00"},"dataRefs":[{"source":"zion-rest","object":"zion.customers","fieldsRequested":[]}],"policy":{"decision":"allow"},"chain":{"seq":1}}
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package/conformance/run.mjs
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@@ -97,6 +97,56 @@ function resistanceStatusFor(c, empirical, claimsFile) {
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return empirical.denied ? 'ENFORCED' : 'NOT_COVERED'
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}
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function runReconcileV2(c) {
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const bin = join(REPO, 'bin', 'conarium-reconcile.mjs')
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const args = [
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bin,
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'--before', resolve(REPO, c.before),
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'--after', resolve(REPO, c.after),
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'--receipts', resolve(REPO, c.receipts),
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'--json-v2',
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]
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if (c.mappingProfile) args.push('--profile', resolve(REPO, c.mappingProfile))
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const r = spawnSync(process.execPath, args, { encoding: 'utf8', cwd: REPO, windowsHide: true })
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let body
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try {
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body = JSON.parse((r.stdout || '').trim().split('\n').filter(Boolean).pop() || '')
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} catch {
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return { toolFailure: true, detail: `reconcile --json-v2 stdout was not JSON (exit ${r.status}): ${(r.stderr || r.stdout || '').trim()}` }
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}
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if (body.v !== 'coverage-reconciliation/2') {
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return { ok: false, outcome: body.v, detail: `expected v coverage-reconciliation/2, got ${body.v}` }
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}
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const reasons = []
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if (c.expectOutcome && body.outcome !== c.expectOutcome) {
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reasons.push(`outcome ${body.outcome} != ${c.expectOutcome}`)
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}
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if (c.expectCounts) {
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for (const [k, n] of Object.entries(c.expectCounts)) {
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if ((body.counts?.[k] ?? 0) !== n) reasons.push(`counts.${k} ${body.counts?.[k]} != ${n}`)
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}
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}
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if (c.expectBounds) {
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for (const [k, n] of Object.entries(c.expectBounds)) {
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if (body.bounds?.[k] !== n) reasons.push(`bounds.${k} ${body.bounds?.[k]} != ${n}`)
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}
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}
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const itemOutcomes = (body.items || []).map((i) => i.outcome)
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for (const want of c.expectItemOutcomes) {
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if (!itemOutcomes.includes(want)) reasons.push(`missing item outcome ${want}`)
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}
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}
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if (Array.isArray(c.forbidItemOutcomes)) {
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for (const bad of c.forbidItemOutcomes) {
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if (itemOutcomes.includes(bad) || (bad === 'matched' && (body.counts?.matched ?? 0) > 0)) {
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reasons.push(`forbidden outcome present: ${bad}`)
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}
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}
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}
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return { ok: reasons.length === 0, outcome: body.outcome, detail: reasons.join('; ') || null }
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}
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function evaluate(c, claimsFile, adapter) {
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const row = {
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id: c.id,
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expectedStatus: c.expectedStatus || null,
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}
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if ((c.harness || 'query') === 'reconcile-v2') {
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const v = runReconcileV2(c)
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if (v.toolFailure) return { ...row, status: 'TOOL_FAILURE', detail: v.detail, unexpected: true }
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const ok = v.ok
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const status = label('conformance', conformanceStatus({ ok }))
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const unexpected = status === 'FAIL' && claimed(claimsFile, c.claim)
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return { ...row, status, outcome: v.outcome, unexpected, detail: v.detail || null }
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}
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if ((c.harness || 'query') === 'verify') {
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const v = runVerify(claimsFile, c)
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if (v.toolFailure) return { ...row, status: 'TOOL_FAILURE', detail: v.detail, unexpected: true }
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package/docs/API-STABILITY.md
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@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ No dates. Shipping 1.0 is a decision, not a document.
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| `conarium-doctor` | `--config` `--no-net` `--help` | experimental |
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| `conarium-verify` | `--pubkey` (repeatable) `--anchor-check` `--require-head-anchor` `--anchors` `--expect-seq-from` `--expect-count` `--expect-last-hash` `--strict` `--json` `--help` | **candidate** (exit codes + flags in RECEIPT-SPEC) |
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| `conarium-coverage` | `--pubkey` `--receipts` `--expect-seq-from` `--allow-gaps` `--json` `--help` | experimental |
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| `conarium-reconcile` | `--before` `--after` `--receipts` `--skew` `--json` `--help` | experimental |
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| `conarium-reconcile` | `--before` `--after` `--receipts` `--skew` `--profile` `--json` `--json-v2` `--result-v2` `--help` | experimental |
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| `conarium-stamp` | `--sidecar` `--json` `--help` | experimental |
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| `conarium-anchor-upgrade` | `<anchors.jsonl>` | experimental |
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| `conarium-console` | `--config` `--port` `--host` `--install-shortcut` `--uninstall-shortcut` `--launch` `--help` | experimental |
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package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md
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@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ MCP made "connect an AI assistant to your data" a commodity. The durable value i
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1. **Ingestion** of messy internal sources (schemas today; docs, ADRs, APIs next).
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2. **Governance + audit** — what the AI may see, and a record of what it saw.
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3. **Self-hosting** — the gateway runs in the customer's network. Raw protected values stay there; the policy-approved disclosure is what reaches the customer's AI client, and `disclosure.hash` binds exactly which bytes those were. Protected values are not sent to us or to a vendor.
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3. **Self-hosting** — the gateway runs in the customer's network. Raw protected values stay there; the policy-approved disclosure is what reaches the customer's AI client, and `disclosure.hash` binds exactly which bytes those were. Protected values are not sent to us or to a vendor. Outbound connections are named so they can be checked, not because they carry those values:
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- **npm version check** — `src/update-check.ts` `announceUpdate()`, called at start from both entry points, `src/index.ts` (stdio) and `src/http.ts` (HTTP gateway). Asks the public registry for `@conarium-ai/core`'s latest version number. Sends no installation identity. Disable with `CONARIUM_NO_UPDATE_CHECK=1`.
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- **OpenTimestamps calendars** —
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- **OpenTimestamps calendars** — only when `conarium-stamp` or `conarium-anchor-service` runs. Those tools submit a digest, not row values, to the public calendars listed in `src/ots/calendar.ts`. The receipt write path does not. The production profile (`src/config.ts`) sets `CONARIUM_ANCHOR_SINK=opentimestamps` when the operator did not; that env selects the calendar client the tools use. Set `CONARIUM_ANCHOR_SINK=none` to keep the client off.
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4. **Freshness** — incremental re-index so context never goes stale.
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Conarium owns this layer and stays **tool-agnostic**: it speaks MCP, so it plugs into Cursor, Copilot, Claude Code, Windsurf, Continue.dev — whatever wins.
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package/docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md
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@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Version string: `conarium-receipt/0.4` (verifier also accepts `0.1`, `0.2`, and
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| `chain.seq` | coverage backbone | contiguous integer; required even before v0.2 coverage proofs |
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| `chain.prevHash` / `chain.hash` | integrity | JCS (RFC 8785 subset) → SHA-256 |
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| `sig` | Ed25519 over `chain.hash` | `{ alg, keyId, value }` |
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| `anchor` | transparency-log head |
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| `anchor` | transparency-log head | `null` when written; filled only after `conarium-stamp` or `conarium-anchor-service` |
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`hash = sha256(canonicalize(receipt \ {hash, sig, anchor}))` with `chain.hash`
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stripped before hashing. Prefix: `sha256:` + hex.
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## Reconciliation (two-sided, v0.1)
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```
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conarium-reconcile --before <snapshot.json> --after <snapshot.json> --receipts <receipts.jsonl> [--json]
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conarium-reconcile --before <snapshot.json> --after <snapshot.json> --receipts <receipts.jsonl> [--skew <duration>] [--profile <path>] [--json] [--json-v2] [--result-v2 <path>]
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```
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The coverage declaration is one-sided: it reports what the receipt chain says
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| 40 | Unreconciled DB activity — recorded by the database, not receipted |
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| 41 | Indeterminate — a pattern is uncovered only by the window boundary, and two clocks decide that boundary |
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`--json` is the `/1` body (`conarium-reconcile/0.1`) and the exit codes
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above are its contract. `--json-v2` prints a separate
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`coverage-reconciliation/2` object; `--result-v2 <path>` writes that object
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to a file. The two must not share a body: a consumer MUST NOT read a `/1`
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result as a `/2` result. `/2` does not change these exit codes. Signing and
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SCITT registration of the `/2` object are out of scope for this version.
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Without a Mapping Profile (`--profile`), `/2` sets `profile` to `null`.
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Every item whose outcome depends on a multiplicity bound is then
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`indeterminate`, an unattributed pattern is `indeterminate` rather than
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`observed-without-receipt`, an infrastructure pattern is `indeterminate`
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rather than `excluded` (`bounds.exclusion` is `undeclared` — an undeclared
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bound does not decide), and `receipted-without-observation` makes
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`outcome` `exceptions`. `bounds.exclusion` is `operator-declared` only
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when the profile lists at least one exclusion rule.
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### Mapping Profile (`conarium-mapping-profile/0.1`)
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A Mapping Profile is an operator declaration. It is versioned, serialized as
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JSON, and digested as raw file bytes (`sha256:` + hex). The result binds that
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digest. The profile is not a measurement: a declared bound is
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`operator-declared` on the result, never `measured`.
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```json
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{
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"v": "conarium-mapping-profile/0.1",
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"version": "1",
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"multiplicity": { "maxStatementsPerReceipt": 8 },
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"exclusions": [ { "id": "infra-query", "version": "1" } ],
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"clocks": {
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"observation": "pg_stat_statements",
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"receipt": "gateway",
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"skew": "5s"
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}
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}
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```
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`v` is the object type. `version` is the operator's identifier for this
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profile (a string). Every other member is optional. Omitted members are
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undeclared, not defaulted.
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| Field | Type | Encoding | What it declares |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| `multiplicity.maxStatementsPerReceipt` | integer ≥ 1 | JSON number | how many source statements one receipt may cover |
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| `exclusions[]` | array | `{ "id": string, "version": string }` | rules that remove items before comparison |
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| `clocks.observation` | string | clock identifier | the clock that stamps the observation window (the Data Source). This implementation writes it on `/1` as `clocks.window`. Typical value here: `pg_stat_statements`. |
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| `clocks.receipt` | string | clock identifier | the clock that stamps receipts (the Gateway). This implementation writes it on `/1` as `clocks.receipts`. Typical value here: `gateway`. |
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| `clocks.skew` | string | duration | how far those two clocks may differ |
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`clocks` accepts only those three keys. A declaration that both sides read
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one clock still writes both identifiers (they may be the same string) and
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still writes `skew` — including `0ms`. Zero is a declaration, not a default.
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**Duration encoding** (the same grammar as `--skew`; there is not a second
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one): a number, optional fraction, optional unit `ms` / `s` / `m` / `h`.
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The number is scaled by `ms` = 1, `s` = 1000, `m` = 60 000, `h` = 3 600 000,
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then rounded to an integer millisecond. A bare number is milliseconds.
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Examples: `500ms`, `5s`, `2m`, `1h`, `5000`. An unreadable duration is an
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error, not a default.
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`--skew` and `clocks.skew` are both operator declarations. If both are
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present and they do not parse to the same number of milliseconds, the run
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fails (exit 20). This tool will not pick one: which bound won would be
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invisible on the result. Equal values (`5s` and `5000`) are the same
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declaration. If either is present, `/2` reports `bounds.skew` as
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`operator-declared` and the comparison uses that bound. If neither is
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present, `bounds.skew` is `undeclared` and a pattern uncovered only by the
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window boundary stays `indeterminate`.
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### The window straddles two clocks
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The window is `[before.ts, after.ts]` and both timestamps come from the database.
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offset cannot support. 41 was never a silent pass, and is not one now; what
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changed is that the tool stops offering an excuse it cannot back.
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A declared `--skew`
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A declared skew bound (`--skew` or Mapping Profile `clocks.skew`) is the
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operator's own statement about their clocks and
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outranks the window rule. A window shorter than a clock correction is possible —
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a five-second window and a six-second step would read as beyond the boundary
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while being exactly the case the class exists for — and the operator is the one
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@@ -363,11 +433,12 @@ who knows whether that is their deployment. We have not measured how often it
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happens; the flag exists so the answer does not have to come from us:
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```
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INDETERMINATE: 1 pattern(s) are uncovered only by the window boundary — no
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INDETERMINATE: 1 pattern(s) are uncovered only by the window boundary — no skew bound was declared…
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~ (+5) table(s) [public.customers] have a receipt 3000ms outside the window: SELECT …
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```
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`--skew <duration>`
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`--skew <duration>` or Mapping Profile `clocks.skew` declares the bound
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(`500ms`, `5s`, `2m`, `1h`). A receipt
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further out than the bound is not skew, and its pattern goes back to unreconciled
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at 40 with the bypass sentence. An unreadable duration is an error, not a default:
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a tolerance nobody chose is the kind of number this tool exists to refuse.
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| 0 | Stamped; sidecar written (`pending` until upgraded) |
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Receipts are anchored
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Receipts are not anchored by the write path. An operator stamps a document
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with `conarium-stamp`, or submits a chain-head hash through
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`conarium-anchor-service`. A git commit date is **not evidence** —
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`git commit --date` accepts whatever you type. This stamps the
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SHA-256 of a file to the OpenTimestamps calendars and writes the same sidecar shape
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-
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those tools use, so `conarium-anchor-upgrade` upgrades it to a Bitcoin block
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height unchanged. Only the 32-byte digest leaves the machine.
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**What a stamp proves, exactly:** this file existed, byte for byte in this form, no
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2. **`dataRefs[].fieldsRequested` and `policy.rulesApplied` are emitted empty.** Until 0.2.29 the first was filled from the masked-field list and the second from the set of SQL functions the query touched — in both cases a field whose name described something other than its contents. A reader takes `fieldsRequested` for the columns a query asked for, and `rulesApplied` for policy rule identifiers; neither was true, and both were signed. They are now empty, because in a signed document a field filled with the wrong thing is worse than a field left empty: empty says *unknown*, wrongly-filled says *known* and misleads. The correct contents are recoverable — selected columns from the SQL AST, rule identifiers from a policy engine that emits them — and neither is implemented; when it is, these fields carry it. **The conformance vectors under `test-vectors/` show both fields populated. Those vectors are hand-written to exercise the format and are not produced by this implementation; a populated value is valid, and an empty one is what this version emits.** Losing per-field masking detail from `dataRefs` is a regression and is stated here rather than absorbed silently — `masking.byClass` still carries the per-class counts.
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3. **Bypass detection — addressed as of reconcile v0.1, with stated limits.** Disabling Conarium and reading the DB directly still produces no receipt — no gateway can prevent that from inside. What changed: absence is now *checkable from both sides*. One-sided: `conarium-coverage` emits a signed declaration (chain contiguity + which declared objects have recorded access). Two-sided: `conarium-reconcile` compares the database's own per-role query counters against the in-window receipts and reports any DB-recorded pattern no receipt covers (see §Reconciliation). Remaining limits, stated: reconciliation trusts the DB's own counters (an attacker who can falsify `pg_stat_statements` is out of scope), requires a dedicated DB role per gateway instance, and matches per pattern/table — never per call count. **The language rule stands: "access NOT RECORDED", never "no access occurred."**
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4. **Creation-time truth is not proven.** Without hardware attestation, an operator can still write false-but-well-formed receipts *before* anchoring.
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-
5. **In-file `sig` stripping + HMAC/`anchor` reduction.** Content `hash` is computed with `{hash, sig, anchor}` (and audit `signature`/`sig`) excluded, so an operator who controls the file can drop or thin those fields without invalidating the content hash itself. Contiguity and the trust store catch some boot-time cases, but full protection against in-file strip/reduce games is **not solvable in-file** (*in-file çözülemez*) — it needs an external transparency-log anchor and/or out-of-band key ceremony. **Opt-in strict boot (G3):** `CONARIUM_AUDIT_REQUIRE_SIG=1` rejects a chain with any unsigned line when a signing key is configured; the default stays the 08-05 compatibility open. **Mitigation available today, measured:** keep `CONARIUM_AUDIT_HMAC_KEY` enabled alongside Ed25519. HMAC is keyed, so an actor who strips `sig` and recomputes the unkeyed hashes still fails the HMAC check (`entry signature mismatch`). Verified by test: Ed25519 alone → strip-all passes the boot check; Ed25519 + HMAC → caught. `conarium-verify --pubkey` also catches it (exit 13, `missing sig`) because it is told to expect signatures. **Anchor is available** (`CONARIUM_ANCHOR_SINK=opentimestamps`)
|
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+
5. **In-file `sig` stripping + HMAC/`anchor` reduction.** Content `hash` is computed with `{hash, sig, anchor}` (and audit `signature`/`sig`) excluded, so an operator who controls the file can drop or thin those fields without invalidating the content hash itself. Contiguity and the trust store catch some boot-time cases, but full protection against in-file strip/reduce games is **not solvable in-file** (*in-file çözülemez*) — it needs an external transparency-log anchor and/or out-of-band key ceremony. **Opt-in strict boot (G3):** `CONARIUM_AUDIT_REQUIRE_SIG=1` rejects a chain with any unsigned line when a signing key is configured; the default stays the 08-05 compatibility open. **Mitigation available today, measured:** keep `CONARIUM_AUDIT_HMAC_KEY` enabled alongside Ed25519. HMAC is keyed, so an actor who strips `sig` and recomputes the unkeyed hashes still fails the HMAC check (`entry signature mismatch`). Verified by test: Ed25519 alone → strip-all passes the boot check; Ed25519 + HMAC → caught. `conarium-verify --pubkey` also catches it (exit 13, `missing sig`) because it is told to expect signatures. **Anchor client is available** (`conarium-stamp` / `conarium-anchor-service`; `CONARIUM_ANCHOR_SINK=opentimestamps` selects the calendars). Receipts start as `anchor: null`. After a stamp is submitted the sidecar is `pending` until Bitcoin finality (hours); see §Anchoring.
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6. **`argsHash` hurts debugging.** Support cases need the customer's own logs to correlate.
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7. **Tail truncation is invisible to `conarium-verify` unless pinned.** Deleting the last N receipts leaves a consistent leftover chain (exit 0). `--expect-count` / `--expect-last-hash` exist for operators who have an external length or last-hash; they are opt-in so a verifier that saw the same file yesterday still exits 0 today. Anchoring the head, or `conarium-reconcile` against the database's own counters, are the other pins.
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## Anchoring (OpenTimestamps)
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-
`
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-
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+
Receipts are not stamped by the write path. `Audit.writeReceipt` emits
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`anchor: null`. An operator stamps a file with `conarium-stamp`, or submits
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+
a chain-head hash through `conarium-anchor-service`. Those tools talk to the
|
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+
**OpenTimestamps** calendars. `CONARIUM_ANCHOR_SINK=opentimestamps` selects
|
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+
the in-tree calendar client they use; it does not stamp receipts as they
|
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+
are written. Only the raw 32-byte digest is sent (our `sha256:<hex>` prefix
|
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+
is stripped first). Proofs live in a sidecar `<sink>.anchors.jsonl`; after
|
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|
+
a stamp is submitted, the receipt’s `anchor` field is a hash-exterior
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|
reference: `{ "log": "opentimestamps", "ref": "sha256:…", "state": "pending"|"bitcoin" }`.
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| State | Meaning |
|
|
@@ -442,8 +519,8 @@ chain, not hash calendars.
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implementation; institutional buyers may prefer it, but it requires trusting a TSA.
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**Honest latency:** “not backdated” becomes Bitcoin-hard only after upgrade. Pending
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is disclosed — `conarium-verify --anchor-check` skips `anchor:null` (
|
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-
|
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+
is disclosed — `conarium-verify --anchor-check` skips `anchor:null` (nothing
|
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+
has been submitted yet), exits 0 with a stderr warning while pending, and exits 14 if a
|
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*claimed* anchor's proof is missing or does not match the hash. The run prints
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`N/M anchored, head anchored: yes/no`. `--require-head-anchor` exits 14 when
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the chain head is unanchored.
|
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@@ -89,6 +89,13 @@
|
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"why": "scanCharCap replaces a whole field with [MASKED_PII] even when it contains no identifier",
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"use": "a field longer than policy.scanCharCap is replaced whole with [MASKED_PII], even when it contains no identifier"
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},
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{
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"id": "anchored-automatically",
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"re": "anchored automatically",
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"flags": "i",
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"why": "Audit.writeReceipt emits anchor:null and does not call the scheduler; stamp and the anchor service are manual",
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"use": "receipts are not anchored by the write path; stamp a document or run conarium-anchor-service"
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+
},
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{
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"id": "node-18-floor",
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"re": "(?:with\\s+)?node\\s*\\(?\\s*(?:≥|>=)\\s*18\\s*\\)?|engines[^\\n]{0,40}>=\\s*18\\b",
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
|
|
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1
|
+
# Claims review — 0.2.37
|
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2
|
+
|
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3
|
+
- base: v0.2.36
|
|
4
|
+
- head: ef7b1dd
|
|
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+
- surface: sha256:ccfef14ad8a5dddddd579822a9513c16680ef757c4e3007ed55c6858936357ef
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- verdict: pass
|
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- reviewer: Claude (Opus 5)
|
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|
+
|
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+
Six surfaces changed. The release began as a claim with no call site and a
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|
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result object that decided on bounds nobody had declared; two of the five
|
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|
+
findings below were found while reviewing the fixes for the other three, which
|
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|
+
is the only reason they are in this record rather than in the next one. The
|
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+
shape that recurs: a sentence corrected once, in one of the places it was
|
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+
written.
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## Findings
|
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|
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|
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### 1. docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md — "Receipts are anchored automatically"
|
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|
+
|
|
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|
+
- Claim, as of 0.2.36: *"Receipts are anchored automatically. Documents are
|
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|
+
not…"* — unconditional, on a surface that ships in the tarball. The same claim
|
|
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|
+
was repeated in `README.md` (*"Opt-in anchoring: `CONARIUM_ANCHOR_SINK=…`"*,
|
|
23
|
+
which reads as: setting the variable stamps receipts), in `LIMITATIONS.md`
|
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24
|
+
(*"Receipts already show `pending`"*), in `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` (*"that path
|
|
25
|
+
submits a digest"*), and in the header of `bin/conarium-stamp.mjs`.
|
|
26
|
+
- Mechanism: `AnchorScheduler.maybeAnchor`, `createAnchorSinkFromEnv` and
|
|
27
|
+
`appendAnchorSidecar` in `src/anchor.ts`.
|
|
28
|
+
- Why it fell short: none of them has a caller. `src/audit.ts` contains no
|
|
29
|
+
occurrence of the string `anchor`; `src/receipt.ts:399` gives every receipt
|
|
30
|
+
`anchor: null`; the only production files importing `./anchor.js` are
|
|
31
|
+
`src/console.ts`, which classifies an anchor for display, and
|
|
32
|
+
`src/anchor-service.ts`, which is the hosted endpoint. Measured end to end
|
|
33
|
+
with `CONARIUM_ANCHOR_SINK=opentimestamps` and a receipt sink configured: the
|
|
34
|
+
receipt carried `anchor: null` and no `<sink>.anchors.jsonl` was written. The
|
|
35
|
+
variable selects a calendar client for the manual tools; it does not put the
|
|
36
|
+
write path in touch with a calendar.
|
|
37
|
+
- Disposition: the text is narrowed to the mechanism in all five places, and the
|
|
38
|
+
scheduler was deliberately **not** wired. Wiring it adds an outbound network
|
|
39
|
+
hop to the receipt path and changes the two-connection list in
|
|
40
|
+
`docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`; that is a product decision, and making a sentence true
|
|
41
|
+
by adding a network call to satisfy it is the wrong direction of fit.
|
|
42
|
+
- Guard: `test/anchor_wiring.mjs` — an automatic-anchoring claim on a claim
|
|
43
|
+
surface requires a write call in `src/` or `bin/`, excluding tests and
|
|
44
|
+
excluding the definitions themselves. Demonstrated in both directions rather
|
|
45
|
+
than one: with the claim restored and no call it exits 1 and prints the file
|
|
46
|
+
and line; with the claim present and a call added to `src/console.ts` it exits
|
|
47
|
+
0 and prints the call site. A guard that has only been shown to fail proves it
|
|
48
|
+
can fail.
|
|
49
|
+
- Residual, and it is the same residual the guard has by construction: the rules
|
|
50
|
+
are phrasings. Finding 3 is what that costs.
|
|
51
|
+
|
|
52
|
+
### 2. bin/conarium-reconcile.mjs — an undeclared exclusion decided the outcome
|
|
53
|
+
|
|
54
|
+
- Claim: the `/2` object implements `coverage-reconciliation/2` as
|
|
55
|
+
`draft-dogru-scitt-disclosure-evidence-04` defines it.
|
|
56
|
+
- Mechanism: `projectResultV2`, and §Exclusions of that draft: *"Exclusion rules
|
|
57
|
+
MUST be stated in the Mapping Profile and are therefore covered by its digest…
|
|
58
|
+
An implementation MUST NOT exclude items by a rule that is not in the
|
|
59
|
+
profile."*
|
|
60
|
+
- Why it fell short: with no profile, an infrastructure pattern was emitted as
|
|
61
|
+
`excluded` with `rule.version: "hardcoded"`, and the run reported
|
|
62
|
+
`outcome: no-exceptions` while `bounds.exclusion` said `undeclared` on the same
|
|
63
|
+
object. It named the bound as undeclared and then decided with it. The
|
|
64
|
+
inversion is what makes it a defect rather than a rough edge: measured on one
|
|
65
|
+
input, a profile that merely omitted the rule produced `indeterminate` and
|
|
66
|
+
`exceptions`, while **no profile at all** produced `excluded` and
|
|
67
|
+
`no-exceptions`. Strictly less declaration bought a strictly cleaner verdict,
|
|
68
|
+
which is Proposition 2b run backwards, on the outcome the draft calls the one
|
|
69
|
+
through which a reconciliation can be made to come out clean.
|
|
70
|
+
- Disposition: with no profile, an infrastructure pattern is `indeterminate`
|
|
71
|
+
(`reason: exclusion-undeclared`), and `bounds.exclusion` is
|
|
72
|
+
`operator-declared` only when the profile lists at least one exclusion rule —
|
|
73
|
+
a profile carrying no exclusions declares nothing about exclusion. Measured
|
|
74
|
+
after the fix on the same input: no profile → `indeterminate` / `exceptions`;
|
|
75
|
+
profile without the rule → `indeterminate` / `exceptions`; profile with the
|
|
76
|
+
rule → `excluded` / `no-exceptions`. Declaration and verdict now move in the
|
|
77
|
+
same direction.
|
|
78
|
+
- Second finding, inside the first: `conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-excluded.json`
|
|
79
|
+
had pinned the defect. Its `expectOutcome` was `no-exceptions` with
|
|
80
|
+
`expectCounts.excluded: 1`, and its own `rationale` field said *"Without a
|
|
81
|
+
Mapping Profile the exclusion bound is undeclared."* The fixture stated the
|
|
82
|
+
undeclared bound and asserted the decision taken with it. A green vector over
|
|
83
|
+
a defect is worse than no vector: it converts the defect into a contract. The
|
|
84
|
+
case now runs against a profile that declares the rule, and the profile-less
|
|
85
|
+
input is a negative case (`v2-neg-undeclared-exclusion`).
|
|
86
|
+
|
|
87
|
+
### 3. LIMITATIONS.md — the anchoring correction had a second copy
|
|
88
|
+
|
|
89
|
+
- Claim: *"Bitcoin confirmation still takes hours; receipts still show `pending`
|
|
90
|
+
until upgrade."* (`LIMITATIONS.md`, OpenTimestamps client section.)
|
|
91
|
+
- Mechanism: the same one as finding 1 — a receipt is born `anchor: null`.
|
|
92
|
+
- Why it fell short: the file contradicted itself. Its anchors section, rewritten
|
|
93
|
+
earlier in this same release, says `pending` appears only after an operator
|
|
94
|
+
submits a stamp; two hundred lines down the old sentence was still there, and
|
|
95
|
+
it is the more specific of the two, so a reader resolving the contradiction
|
|
96
|
+
would resolve it the wrong way. `LIMITATIONS.tr.md` had both places corrected,
|
|
97
|
+
so the two languages had also come apart — with the English, the surface that
|
|
98
|
+
ships to npm, holding the stale half.
|
|
99
|
+
- Why the guard did not catch it: the rule was `receipts already show
|
|
100
|
+
`pending``. The sentence says *still*. A rule pinned to one adverb guards one
|
|
101
|
+
sentence, not the claim the sentence makes.
|
|
102
|
+
- Disposition: sentence corrected to match the mechanism; the rule now matches
|
|
103
|
+
*already* / *still* / *are*, and was shown red against the live tree before the
|
|
104
|
+
sentence was touched — the check named `LIMITATIONS.md:249` and exited 1.
|
|
105
|
+
- Recorded because of when it was found: during the release review, not by the
|
|
106
|
+
guard written in the same release for exactly this claim. The guard is worth
|
|
107
|
+
keeping and its limit is worth stating rather than describing it as coverage.
|
|
108
|
+
|
|
109
|
+
### 4. Two hand-written copies of the claim-surface list
|
|
110
|
+
|
|
111
|
+
- Claim: the release gate reviews the documents that carry promises, and the
|
|
112
|
+
retracted-phrasing scan reads the same documents.
|
|
113
|
+
- Mechanism: `SURFACES` in `test/denetci.mjs` (22 entries) and `SURFACES` in
|
|
114
|
+
`test/claim_discipline.mjs` (12 entries).
|
|
115
|
+
- Why it fell short: the second was a silent subset of the first. Measured: a
|
|
116
|
+
strict subset, no entry in the second that was absent from the first, so ten
|
|
117
|
+
documents — including `standards/README.md` and
|
|
118
|
+
`docs/security/THREAT-MODEL.md`, the two that carried stale sentences into
|
|
119
|
+
0.2.35 — were exempt from the phrasing scan for no stated reason. 0.2.36's
|
|
120
|
+
record named this and deferred it to its own release; this is that release.
|
|
121
|
+
- Disposition: one file, `docs/claims/surfaces.json`, read by both. Every entry
|
|
122
|
+
carries the reason it is a surface, and the phrasing exemption is an explicit
|
|
123
|
+
per-entry field with a required justification — measured after the change: 22
|
|
124
|
+
entries, 22 reasons, zero exemptions. Widening the scan from 12 to 22 produced
|
|
125
|
+
one new red, `docs/PRIOR-ART.md` matching the Turkish-letter check on a
|
|
126
|
+
registry field name (*Yayın Numarası*); it was resolved by naming the example,
|
|
127
|
+
not by narrowing the list back.
|
|
128
|
+
|
|
129
|
+
### 5. LIMITATIONS.tr.md — three limitations reached one language and not the other
|
|
130
|
+
|
|
131
|
+
- Claim: the Turkish limitations file is the Turkish limitations file.
|
|
132
|
+
- Mechanism: nothing. Two files, written by hand, with no relation between them.
|
|
133
|
+
- Why it fell short: 24 sections against 21. Missing in Turkish: the Node 20
|
|
134
|
+
end-of-life floor, the audit sink hash not being JCS, and reconciliation
|
|
135
|
+
establishing object attribution rather than per-statement coverage. All three
|
|
136
|
+
are limits a reader is entitled to before choosing this package; a reader in
|
|
137
|
+
one language was told and a reader in the other was not. The same shape lost
|
|
138
|
+
the SOC 2 answer for a release in 0.2.26.
|
|
139
|
+
- Disposition: the three sections written, and `test/limitations_locale.mjs`
|
|
140
|
+
compares the two files by a section key carried in an HTML comment — not by
|
|
141
|
+
heading text, which is translated and cannot be the join. Shown red first: with
|
|
142
|
+
one key removed the check exits 1, names the missing key, and names the
|
|
143
|
+
orphaned heading beside it.
|
|
144
|
+
|
|
145
|
+
## What this release adds rather than corrects
|
|
146
|
+
|
|
147
|
+
`--profile` reads a Mapping Profile that declares the multiplicity bound, the
|
|
148
|
+
exclusion rules, and the two clocks. The clock fields are **declarations and
|
|
149
|
+
nothing more**: the tool does not verify that `clocks.observation` is the clock
|
|
150
|
+
that stamped the snapshots or that `clocks.receipt` is the one that stamped the
|
|
151
|
+
receipts, and `/2` therefore reports them at `operator-declared`, never
|
|
152
|
+
`measured`. What the declaration does change is the comparison — measured, not
|
|
153
|
+
asserted: against a receipt 3s outside the window, a declared bound of 5s leaves
|
|
154
|
+
the item `indeterminate` (a declaration does not invent a match) and a declared
|
|
155
|
+
bound of 1s moves it to `observed-without-receipt`. `--skew` and `clocks.skew`
|
|
156
|
+
are the same kind of statement, so disagreement between them fails the run rather
|
|
157
|
+
than resolving silently; `5s` and `5000` are the same declaration.
|
|
158
|
+
|
|
159
|
+
The field list and its duration grammar are written out in
|
|
160
|
+
`docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md` because another specification in the same working group
|
|
161
|
+
asked to adopt the shape rather than invent a second one. That is the reason the
|
|
162
|
+
encoding is stated to the millisecond and the reason `0ms` is documented as a
|
|
163
|
+
declaration rather than a default.
|
|
164
|
+
|
|
165
|
+
## What did not change
|
|
166
|
+
|
|
167
|
+
The policy gate, masking, the receipt format, `conarium-verify`, and the `/1`
|
|
168
|
+
reconciliation body and its exit codes. `/1` was re-measured on the same input
|
|
169
|
+
after each change and is byte-identical; `test/spec_exitcode_drift.mjs` reports
|
|
170
|
+
the same set. `standards/` is untouched — the published `-04` is immutable, and
|
|
171
|
+
the promises made to that list were kept in code and in `docs/`, not by editing
|
|
172
|
+
a posted draft. `-04`'s Implementation Status now understates this
|
|
173
|
+
implementation in four places; correcting it is `-05`'s work and is not done
|
|
174
|
+
here, because a draft describing an unpublished tree would be the same defect
|
|
175
|
+
pointed the other way.
|
|
176
|
+
|
|
177
|
+
Measured and not a finding, recorded so it is not re-raised: `package-lock.json`
|
|
178
|
+
carries `version: 0.2.24`. The published SBOM does not inherit it — `npm sbom
|
|
179
|
+
--package-lock-only` takes the root component from `package.json` and reports
|
|
180
|
+
`@conarium-ai/core@0.2.37`, 81 components, CycloneDX 1.5.
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{
|
|
2
|
+
"_comment": "Single source for the claim-surface list. test/denetci.mjs and test/claim_discipline.mjs both read this file. A second copy of the list is how a document became a promise that nobody was assigned to read. phrasing=false is an exemption from retracted-phrasing scan and requires phrasingWhy. phrasing=true is not a silent default — every entry states it.",
|
|
3
|
+
"surfaces": [
|
|
4
|
+
{
|
|
5
|
+
"path": "README.md",
|
|
6
|
+
"why": "Published front page. A reader takes the opening sentences as a promise about what the package does.",
|
|
7
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
8
|
+
},
|
|
9
|
+
{
|
|
10
|
+
"path": "README.tr.md",
|
|
11
|
+
"why": "Turkish front page. The same promise surface in the other language; it may be absent from a given tree.",
|
|
12
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
13
|
+
},
|
|
14
|
+
{
|
|
15
|
+
"path": "SECURITY.md",
|
|
16
|
+
"why": "Security promises: outbound calls, countersigning, what is and is not operated.",
|
|
17
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
18
|
+
},
|
|
19
|
+
{
|
|
20
|
+
"path": "LIMITATIONS.md",
|
|
21
|
+
"why": "The measured-limits surface. A missing limit is itself a claim: the English reader is told something the other language is not.",
|
|
22
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
23
|
+
},
|
|
24
|
+
{
|
|
25
|
+
"path": "LIMITATIONS.tr.md",
|
|
26
|
+
"why": "Turkish measured-limits surface. The SOC 2 answer failed to reach this file in 0.2.26 for exactly this reason.",
|
|
27
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
28
|
+
},
|
|
29
|
+
{
|
|
30
|
+
"path": "docs.html",
|
|
31
|
+
"why": "Website documentation page. Not in the tarball; a reader of conarium.dev still takes it as a promise.",
|
|
32
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
33
|
+
},
|
|
34
|
+
{
|
|
35
|
+
"path": "dpa.html",
|
|
36
|
+
"why": "Data-processing terms a reader can treat as a legal promise.",
|
|
37
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
38
|
+
},
|
|
39
|
+
{
|
|
40
|
+
"path": "terms.html",
|
|
41
|
+
"why": "Terms of use. A promise surface even though it is not in the npm tarball.",
|
|
42
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
43
|
+
},
|
|
44
|
+
{
|
|
45
|
+
"path": "privacy.html",
|
|
46
|
+
"why": "Privacy page. The 2026-08-17 overclaim ('never receive, see, or store your data') lived here.",
|
|
47
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
48
|
+
},
|
|
49
|
+
{
|
|
50
|
+
"path": "docs/ARCHITECTURE.md",
|
|
51
|
+
"why": "Names the outbound connections and the request path. A reader auditing traffic starts here.",
|
|
52
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
53
|
+
},
|
|
54
|
+
{
|
|
55
|
+
"path": "docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md",
|
|
56
|
+
"why": "The receipt-format contract. Exit codes, field meanings, and anchoring mood are taken as specification.",
|
|
57
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
58
|
+
},
|
|
59
|
+
{
|
|
60
|
+
"path": "docs/API-STABILITY.md",
|
|
61
|
+
"why": "States which flags and exit codes are candidate-stable. A reader pins a script to this page.",
|
|
62
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
63
|
+
},
|
|
64
|
+
{
|
|
65
|
+
"path": "docs/CONTRIBUTING.md",
|
|
66
|
+
"why": "Tells a contributor what the project claims to require. Not a product promise to a customer, but it is public and it is read.",
|
|
67
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
68
|
+
},
|
|
69
|
+
{
|
|
70
|
+
"path": "docs/COUNTERSIGN.md",
|
|
71
|
+
"why": "Documents the countersigning endpoint a reader is told to run. The missing bin-registration of conarium-anchor-service lived next to this page.",
|
|
72
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
73
|
+
},
|
|
74
|
+
{
|
|
75
|
+
"path": "docs/BENCHMARK.md",
|
|
76
|
+
"why": "Publishes numbers. A number without a method is a claim; a number with a method is still a claim about what was measured.",
|
|
77
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
78
|
+
},
|
|
79
|
+
{
|
|
80
|
+
"path": "docs/PRIOR-ART.md",
|
|
81
|
+
"why": "States what was searched and what was not. A reader treating this as legal advice would be wrong; a reader treating the search record as a search record must still get a current one.",
|
|
82
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
83
|
+
},
|
|
84
|
+
{
|
|
85
|
+
"path": "docs/CONSENT-BINDING-SPEC.md",
|
|
86
|
+
"why": "A specification page. Field names and binding rules are taken as the format.",
|
|
87
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
88
|
+
},
|
|
89
|
+
{
|
|
90
|
+
"path": "docs/security/THREAT-MODEL.md",
|
|
91
|
+
"why": "Two levels down, and for five days that was enough to hide it. The sentence 'two OS processes … have no file lock' stayed in the tree after the audit sink got a lock, because unlistedDocs only looked one level under docs/ and nothing ever asked why this file was absent from both lists.",
|
|
92
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
93
|
+
},
|
|
94
|
+
{
|
|
95
|
+
"path": "docs/security/PENTEST-SCOPE.md",
|
|
96
|
+
"why": "States that no independent pentest is on file. That is a claim with an expiry date attached to an event we intend to cause.",
|
|
97
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
98
|
+
},
|
|
99
|
+
{
|
|
100
|
+
"path": "standards/README.md",
|
|
101
|
+
"why": "Not in the tarball, public on GitHub, and the place a reader checks what we say our IETF standing is. It carried '-04 has not been submitted' for two days after -04 was posted.",
|
|
102
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
103
|
+
},
|
|
104
|
+
{
|
|
105
|
+
"path": "docs/PRICING.md",
|
|
106
|
+
"why": "Ships in the tarball and states a price, a refund window and what each tier delivers. It arrived in 0.2.31 unlisted, and the review that listed it found the Button column pointing at a checkout route that redirects to the waitlist form — a promise surface that no reader was assigned.",
|
|
107
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
108
|
+
},
|
|
109
|
+
{
|
|
110
|
+
"path": "docs/security/NPM-PROVENANCE.md",
|
|
111
|
+
"why": "Ships in the tarball and tells a reader how to check where the package came from. Unlisted until 0.2.33, by which point it had gone stale in the worst direction: it said 'this is not a published release' inside eight published releases, and pointed at a verification command that answers 404 for npm provenance. A page about how to distrust us is one a reader must be able to trust.",
|
|
112
|
+
"phrasing": true
|
|
113
|
+
}
|
|
114
|
+
]
|
|
115
|
+
}
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@conarium-ai/core",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "0.2.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.2.37",
|
|
4
4
|
"mcpName": "io.github.dogrucanemek-alt/conarium",
|
|
5
5
|
"//files-artefakt": "examples/ altindaki uretilmis dosyalar (ozel anahtar, makbuz/denetim JSONL) ELENIR. .gitignore npm'i baglamaz: izin listesinde 'examples' oldugu icin demoyu kosturmus bir makinede 'npm publish' _keys/audit-ed25519.pem'i (OZEL ANAHTAR) ve makbuzlari yayinliyordu. test/pack_artefakt.mjs bunu kilitler. Elemeler examples/ ile SINIRLI: test-vectors/ altindaki receipts.jsonl ve .pub.pem YAYINLANMAK ZORUNDA, yoksa ucuncu taraf konformans vektorlerini kosturamaz.",
|
|
6
6
|
"//files": "Pakete NE gireceginin izin listesi. Liste olmadan npm her seyi gonderiyordu: 296 dosya / 1.5 MB — CI workflowlari, gitleaks ayari, 137 KB pazarlama gorseli, sitenin api/chat.js dosyasi. Bir bankanin guvenlik ekibi tarball'i acip bunlari gorur. scripts/ BILEREK var: conarium-reconcile calisirken scripts/pg-snapshot.sql'e atif yapiyor, olmazsa kullanici destek maili yazar.",
|