@conarium-ai/core 0.2.36 → 0.2.37

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Files changed (39) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +41 -0
  2. package/LIMITATIONS.md +32 -3
  3. package/LIMITATIONS.tr.md +67 -2
  4. package/README.md +5 -2
  5. package/bin/conarium-reconcile.mjs +297 -13
  6. package/bin/conarium-stamp.mjs +2 -2
  7. package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-clocks-declared.json +16 -0
  8. package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-clocks-undeclared-profile.json +16 -0
  9. package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-excluded.json +16 -0
  10. package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-indeterminate.json +14 -0
  11. package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-matched.json +16 -0
  12. package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-neg-unattributed.json +15 -0
  13. package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-neg-undeclared-exclusion.json +16 -0
  14. package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-neg-undeclared-multiplicity.json +16 -0
  15. package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-neg-undeclared-skew.json +15 -0
  16. package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-observed-without-receipt.json +14 -0
  17. package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-receipted-without-observation.json +14 -0
  18. package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/after-customers-1.json +1 -0
  19. package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/after-customers-15.json +1 -0
  20. package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/after-empty.json +1 -0
  21. package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/after-set.json +1 -0
  22. package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/after-unattributed.json +1 -0
  23. package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/before-customers-10.json +1 -0
  24. package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/before-empty.json +1 -0
  25. package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/profile-clocks.json +9 -0
  26. package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/profile-exclusion.json +7 -0
  27. package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/profile-multiplicity.json +9 -0
  28. package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/profile-no-clocks.json +4 -0
  29. package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/receipts-customers-early.jsonl +1 -0
  30. package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/receipts-customers.jsonl +1 -0
  31. package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/receipts-empty.jsonl +0 -0
  32. package/conformance/run.mjs +59 -0
  33. package/docs/API-STABILITY.md +1 -1
  34. package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md +2 -2
  35. package/docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md +92 -15
  36. package/docs/claims/retracted-phrasings.json +7 -0
  37. package/docs/claims/reviews/0.2.37.md +180 -0
  38. package/docs/claims/surfaces.json +115 -0
  39. package/package.json +1 -1
package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,46 @@
1
1
  # Changelog
2
2
 
3
+ ## 0.2.37 — 2026-08-20 — a claim with no call site, and the bound that decided anyway
4
+
5
+ `docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md` said "Receipts are anchored automatically." Nothing in
6
+ `src/` or `bin/` called the anchor scheduler: `Audit.writeReceipt` emits
7
+ `anchor: null`, and `createAnchorSinkFromEnv`, `maybeAnchor` and
8
+ `appendAnchorSidecar` had no production caller outside their own definitions.
9
+ Anchoring is a manual step — `conarium-stamp` for a document,
10
+ `conarium-anchor-service` for a chain head — and the sentence now says so, in
11
+ `README.md`, `LIMITATIONS.md`, `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` and the stamp tool's own
12
+ header, which repeated it. The scheduler was not wired: adding an outbound hop to
13
+ the receipt path is a product decision, not a way to make a sentence true.
14
+ `test/anchor_wiring.mjs` refuses an automatic-anchoring claim on a claim surface
15
+ unless a write call exists in `src/` or `bin/`.
16
+
17
+ `conarium-reconcile` now emits `coverage-reconciliation/2` as a separate object
18
+ (`--json-v2`, `--result-v2 <path>`), alongside the `/1` body and the exit codes,
19
+ which are unchanged. The `/2` object carries `profile`, `bounds`, `outcome`,
20
+ `items` and `counts` as the published draft defines them, and it stops treating
21
+ undeclared bounds as decisions: with no Mapping Profile, a multiplicity-dependent
22
+ item is `indeterminate` rather than `matched`, an unattributed pattern is
23
+ `indeterminate` rather than `observed-without-receipt`, an infrastructure pattern
24
+ is `indeterminate` rather than `excluded`, and a `receipted-without-observation`
25
+ item makes the outcome `exceptions`. A `/1` result is not a `/2` result and the
26
+ two cannot share a body; asking for both at once is an error.
27
+
28
+ A Mapping Profile (`conarium-mapping-profile/0.1`, `--profile`) declares the
29
+ multiplicity bound, the exclusion rules, and the two clocks: which clock stamps
30
+ the observation window, which stamps receipts, and how far they may differ.
31
+ `clocks.skew` uses the same duration grammar as `--skew` — there is not a second
32
+ one — and if both are present and disagree the run fails rather than picking one,
33
+ because which bound won would be invisible on the result. The field list and its
34
+ encoding are written out in `docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md` so another specification can
35
+ adopt the shape instead of inventing a second.
36
+
37
+ The claim-surface list lived in two hand-maintained copies, which is the shape
38
+ that produced most of 0.2.36. It is one file now, `docs/claims/surfaces.json`,
39
+ read by both the review gate and the retracted-phrasing scan, with a stated
40
+ reason per entry and no silent exemptions. `LIMITATIONS.tr.md` was three sections
41
+ short of `LIMITATIONS.md`; the sections were written and a check now compares the
42
+ two by section key, so a limitation cannot reach one language and not the other.
43
+
3
44
  ## 0.2.36 — 2026-08-20 — the lock that could be taken twice
4
45
 
5
46
  The receipt sink had no lock of its own. `Audit` took one on the audit sink at
package/LIMITATIONS.md CHANGED
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
3
3
  What Conarium has not done. Measured. No dates.
4
4
 
5
5
  ## No certification
6
+ <!-- s: no-certification -->
6
7
 
7
8
  No SOC 2. No ISO/IEC 27001. Neither is planned: at this stage the priority is
8
9
  independent penetration testing and implementation-level assurance rather than
@@ -10,10 +11,12 @@ organisational certification. No independent penetration test yet — that one i
10
11
  on the roadmap.
11
12
 
12
13
  ## Not 1.0
14
+ <!-- s: not-1.0 -->
13
15
 
14
16
  Version is 0.2.x. The API can break.
15
17
 
16
18
  ## Node 20 is the floor, and Node 20 is past end-of-life
19
+ <!-- s: node-20-floor -->
17
20
 
18
21
  `engines` requires Node >=20 and CI runs the full suite on 20, 22 and 24. It said
19
22
  >=18 until 2026-08-17, and that was wrong rather than merely unverified: the MCP
@@ -29,6 +32,7 @@ ask for. Node 22 or later is the version to run; if you are on 20, that choice i
29
32
  yours to make with this stated rather than hidden.
30
33
 
31
34
  ## SQL is Postgres, Microsoft SQL Server, and Oracle
35
+ <!-- s: sql-dialects -->
32
36
 
33
37
  MySQL is not implemented.
34
38
  A dialect is listed here only when the shared SQL-gate vector set is green against that dialect, unparseable input is denied, and a live engine run applied the row cap.
@@ -38,32 +42,40 @@ There is no MSSQL or Oracle connector. An operator can attach their own executor
38
42
  Parsers: Postgres `pgsql-ast-parser` · MSSQL `node-sql-parser` (transactsql) · Oracle `@guanmingchiu/sqlparser-ts`.
39
43
 
40
44
  ## Bare 9-digit US SSN is not a content detector
45
+ <!-- s: bare-ssn -->
41
46
 
42
47
  `XXX-XX-XXXX` (hyphenated) is masked. A bare 9-digit run is not: it
43
48
  collides with order IDs and other identifiers. This is a measured
44
49
  limitation, not an oversight.
45
50
 
46
51
  ## Names in free text are not guaranteed
52
+ <!-- s: names-free-text -->
47
53
 
48
54
  Structured columns: deterministic (`maskColumns`).
49
55
  Free text: best effort (carry-over of values this policy already masks; labelled names).
50
56
  A bare name in running prose is not detected.
51
57
 
52
58
  ## One production install
59
+ <!-- s: one-prod-install -->
53
60
 
54
61
  The only production deployment is the author's own company.
55
62
  There is no external reference customer.
56
63
  The figure 121,366 identities masked comes from that company's ERP. It cannot be verified from outside.
57
64
 
58
65
  ## One-person team
66
+ <!-- s: one-person-team -->
59
67
 
60
68
  Bus factor 1.
61
69
 
62
70
  ## Anchors may stay pending
71
+ <!-- s: anchors-pending -->
63
72
 
64
- An OpenTimestamps stamp can take hours to confirm on Bitcoin. Receipts already show `pending`.
73
+ An OpenTimestamps stamp can take hours to confirm on Bitcoin. A receipt is
74
+ born with `anchor: null`. `pending` appears only after an operator has
75
+ submitted a stamp (`conarium-stamp` or `conarium-anchor-service`).
65
76
 
66
77
  ## Masking hides values; it does not make them unlearnable
78
+ <!-- s: masking-unlearnable -->
67
79
 
68
80
  Masking is applied to result rows. A query's WHERE clause is checked for table
69
81
  permission, not rewritten: `WHERE email LIKE 'a%'` on an allowed table reaches
@@ -81,6 +93,7 @@ before it reaches the database. Columns that are not on that list are unchanged
81
93
  masked values in general have become unlearnable.
82
94
 
83
95
  ## The row cap is per query, not per session
96
+ <!-- s: row-cap-per-query -->
84
97
 
85
98
  `maxRows` caps a single query. `OFFSET` is preserved, so an allowed, unmasked
86
99
  table can be read in full, cap-sized pages at a time. That is what allowing a
@@ -88,6 +101,7 @@ table means; the cap exists to stop single-query bulk exfiltration and to keep
88
101
  result sets small, not to ration total access.
89
102
 
90
103
  ## A countersignature is not a statement about the data
104
+ <!-- s: countersign-not-data -->
91
105
 
92
106
  The countersigning service says that a signer other than you saw this chain head
93
107
  at this time and put it at this position in a log that is appended to, never
@@ -97,6 +111,7 @@ cannot be quietly rearranged afterwards. If the signing key leaks, every
97
111
  signature it ever made is worth what the key is worth: nothing.
98
112
 
99
113
  ## The countersigning service is one key on one server
114
+ <!-- s: countersign-one-key -->
100
115
 
101
116
  Since 2026-08-15 a Conarium-operated endpoint exists (`demo.conarium.dev/anchor`,
102
117
  keyId `verax-cs-20260815`). The signing key lives on one server, on disk, with
@@ -108,6 +123,7 @@ a countersigner you operate proves ordering to you, not to a third party who
108
123
  does not trust you.
109
124
 
110
125
  ## The operator is inside the boundary
126
+ <!-- s: operator-inside -->
111
127
 
112
128
  The product defends the assistant-to-gateway path. Code that imports the
113
129
  library can skip the gate the same way it can open the database with the
@@ -115,6 +131,7 @@ operator's credential. The operator's own process is not an audit subject
115
131
  of this gateway.
116
132
 
117
133
  ## Two processes, one audit file
134
+ <!-- s: two-processes -->
118
135
 
119
136
  `Audit.log()` is synchronous. One process can write many concurrent queries
120
137
  without breaking `prevHash`. A second OS process that opens the same sink
@@ -122,12 +139,14 @@ is rejected (`<sink>.lock`, advisory `wx`). The lock does not stop a writer
122
139
  outside Conarium that ignores the lock file.
123
140
 
124
141
  ## Strict signature mode is opt-in
142
+ <!-- s: strict-sig-opt-in -->
125
143
 
126
144
  `CONARIUM_AUDIT_REQUIRE_SIG=1` refuses boot if a signing key is set and
127
145
  any audit line is unsigned. The default still accepts a fully unsigned
128
146
  legacy chain when an HMAC key is later added (08-05 compatibility).
129
147
 
130
148
  ## Audit sink hash is not JCS
149
+ <!-- s: audit-hash-not-jcs -->
131
150
 
132
151
  Receipts hash with RFC 8785 JCS (`canonicalize`). The audit JSONL hasher
133
152
  (`src/audit-hash.ts`) uses `JSON.stringify` of insertion order. The two
@@ -136,10 +155,12 @@ Switching the sink to JCS would invalidate every existing audit file.
136
155
  Independent re-hash of an old sink must use `JSON.stringify`, not JCS.
137
156
 
138
157
  ## Cryptography is not independently audited
158
+ <!-- s: crypto-unaudited -->
139
159
 
140
160
  The Ed25519 implementation has not had a formal audit.
141
161
 
142
162
  ## Masking cost grows with distinct masked values
163
+ <!-- s: masking-cost -->
143
164
 
144
165
  Carry-over builds one matcher per unique value this policy already
145
166
  masked. `maxRows` bounds that set. When the policy leaves it unset the code falls
@@ -159,6 +180,7 @@ Raising the cap is allowed. The doctor and boot log warn above 500.
159
180
  The query is not rejected.
160
181
 
161
182
  ## A disclosure hash is a verification oracle on low-entropy payloads
183
+ <!-- s: disclosure-oracle -->
162
184
 
163
185
  `disclosure.hash` is SHA-256 of the exact bytes that left the gateway after
164
186
  masking and the row cap. Anyone who holds the receipt can try a guess
@@ -168,6 +190,7 @@ would be written on the same receipt. High-entropy results are not
168
190
  practically guessable this way. A one-row yes/no result is.
169
191
 
170
192
  ## Destination is a declaration, not a verification
193
+ <!-- s: destination-declaration -->
171
194
 
172
195
  `destination` is what the operator wrote in config. Conarium does not
173
196
  check that the result went there. MCP does not carry model identity, so
@@ -175,6 +198,7 @@ the field cannot be measured. Policy does not read it. A receipt that
175
198
  says `openai/gpt-x` is not proof that OpenAI saw the bytes.
176
199
 
177
200
  ## Reconciliation establishes object attribution, not per-statement coverage
201
+ <!-- s: reconcile-object-attribution -->
178
202
 
179
203
  `conarium-reconcile` exits 0 when every query pattern the database counted
180
204
  names a table for which a receipt exists in the same window. One receipt
@@ -186,9 +210,13 @@ client request can produce several source statements (PostgREST, a connection
186
210
  pooler, an ORM), and a 1:1 rule would report false uncovered activity on any
187
211
  such deployment. The consequence is that a clean run establishes pattern and
188
212
  object overlap within the window. It does not establish that each recorded
189
- statement was itself receipted.
213
+ statement was itself receipted. `--json-v2` prints a separate
214
+ `coverage-reconciliation/2` object; a consumer MUST NOT read the `/1` result
215
+ as `/2`. Without a Mapping Profile the `/2` object leaves multiplicity-bound
216
+ items `indeterminate` rather than treating one receipt as a bound of one.
190
217
 
191
218
  ## Reconciliation cannot tell a trailing clock from a late receipt
219
+ <!-- s: reconcile-trailing-clock -->
192
220
 
193
221
  The window comes from the database's snapshot timestamps and a receipt's
194
222
  timestamp comes from the gateway, so the boundary is decided by two clocks.
@@ -214,8 +242,9 @@ not change the exit code. `unassigned` is a different gap (the receipt
214
242
  named no object at all).
215
243
 
216
244
  ## OpenTimestamps client
245
+ <!-- s: ots-client -->
217
246
 
218
247
  Stamping uses a built-in calendar client (Node `crypto` + HTTPS to the public calendars).
219
248
  `javascript-opentimestamps` is not a dependency. The `web3` / `elliptic` / `crypto-js` / `request` / `lodash` tree is not installed.
220
- Bitcoin confirmation still takes hours; receipts still show `pending` until upgrade.
249
+ Bitcoin confirmation still takes hours; a submitted stamp stays `pending` until upgrade.
221
250
  Bitcoin-block verification talks to `blockstream.info`. If that host is unreachable the verifier reports "could not check", not "valid".
package/LIMITATIONS.tr.md CHANGED
@@ -3,16 +3,34 @@
3
3
  Conarium'un yapmadıkları. Ölçülmüş. Tarih yok.
4
4
 
5
5
  ## Sertifikasyon yok
6
+ <!-- s: no-certification -->
6
7
 
7
8
  SOC 2 yok. ISO/IEC 27001 yok. İkisi de planlanmıyor: bu aşamada öncelik,
8
9
  kurumsal sertifikasyon değil, bağımsız sızma testi ve uygulama düzeyinde
9
10
  güvence. Bağımsız sızma testi de henüz yok — o yol haritasında.
10
11
 
11
12
  ## 1.0 değil
13
+ <!-- s: not-1.0 -->
12
14
 
13
15
  Sürüm 0.2.x. API kırılabilir.
14
16
 
17
+ ## Taban Node 20, ve Node 20 artık yama almıyor
18
+ <!-- s: node-20-floor -->
19
+
20
+ `engines` Node >=20 ister. CI tam paketi 20, 22 ve 24'te koşar. 2026-08-17'ye
21
+ kadar taban >=18 yazıyordu; bu doğrulanmamış değil, yanlıştı. MCP SDK'nın HTTP
22
+ taşıması global `crypto`'yu kullanır ve bayraksız hali Node 19'dan itibaren
23
+ var. Node 18'de kapı `initialize`'da `ReferenceError: crypto is not defined`
24
+ ile düşer.
25
+
26
+ nodejs/Release takviminde Node 18 (2025-04-30) ve Node 20 (2026-04-30)
27
+ destek dışı. Node 20 kuran, güvenlik yaması gelmeyen bir çalışma zamanı
28
+ çalıştırıyor. Taban yine 20: o sürümde paket yeşil, kaldırmak ise
29
+ operatörün seçmediği bir sebeple kurulumları kırardı. Çalıştırılacak olan
30
+ Node 22 veya üstü. Hâlâ 20'daysan bu cümle duruyor diye duruyor; gizlenmiyor.
31
+
15
32
  ## SQL: Postgres, Microsoft SQL Server ve Oracle
33
+ <!-- s: sql-dialects -->
16
34
 
17
35
  MySQL yok.
18
36
  Bir lehçe ancak paylaşılan SQL-kapısı vektör seti o lehçede yeşilse, ayrıştırılamayan girdi reddediliyorsa ve canlı motorda satır tavanı uygulanıyorsa burada yazılır.
@@ -22,31 +40,39 @@ MSSQL veya Oracle konnektörü yok. Operatör kendi çalıştırıcısını taka
22
40
  Ayrıştırıcılar: Postgres `pgsql-ast-parser` · MSSQL `node-sql-parser` (transactsql) · Oracle `@guanmingchiu/sqlparser-ts`.
23
41
 
24
42
  ## Çıplak 9 haneli ABD SSN içerik dedektörü değil
43
+ <!-- s: bare-ssn -->
25
44
 
26
45
  `XXX-XX-XXXX` (tireli) maskelenir. Çıplak 9 haneli koşu maskelenmez:
27
46
  sipariş numarası ve benzeri kimliklerle çakışır. Ölçülmüş sınır, unutkanlık değil.
28
47
 
29
48
  ## Serbest metinde isim garantisi yok
49
+ <!-- s: names-free-text -->
30
50
 
31
51
  Yapılandırılmış kolonlar: deterministik (`maskColumns`).
32
52
  Serbest metin: en iyi çaba (bu politikanın zaten maskelediği değerlerin taşınması; etiketli isimler).
33
53
  Düz cümledeki çıplak isim yakalanmaz.
34
54
 
35
55
  ## Tek üretim kurulumu
56
+ <!-- s: one-prod-install -->
36
57
 
37
58
  Tek üretim kurulumu yazarın kendi şirketi.
38
59
  Dış referans müşteri yok.
39
60
  121.366 kimlik maskelendi rakamı o şirketin ERP'sinden gelir. Dışarıdan doğrulanamaz.
40
61
 
41
62
  ## Tek kişilik ekip
63
+ <!-- s: one-person-team -->
42
64
 
43
65
  Bus factor 1.
44
66
 
45
67
  ## Çıpa beklemede kalabilir
68
+ <!-- s: anchors-pending -->
46
69
 
47
- OpenTimestamps damgasının Bitcoin'de onaylanması saatler sürebilir. Makbuzda `pending` zaten görünür.
70
+ OpenTimestamps damgasının Bitcoin'de onaylanması saatler sürebilir. Makbuz
71
+ `anchor: null` ile doğar. `pending` ancak operatör damgayı gönderdikten sonra
72
+ görünür (`conarium-stamp` veya `conarium-anchor-service`).
48
73
 
49
74
  ## Maskeleme değeri gizler; öğrenilemez kılmaz
75
+ <!-- s: masking-unlearnable -->
50
76
 
51
77
  Maskeleme sonuç satırlarına uygulanır. Sorgunun WHERE koşulu tablo izni için
52
78
  denetlenir, yeniden yazılmaz: izinli bir tabloda `WHERE email LIKE 'a%'`
@@ -63,6 +89,7 @@ Listede olmayan sütunlar için yukarıdaki paragraf aynen geçerlidir. Bu,
63
89
  maskelenen değerlerin genel olarak öğrenilemez olduğu iddiası değildir.
64
90
 
65
91
  ## Satır tavanı sorgu başınadır, oturum başına değil
92
+ <!-- s: row-cap-per-query -->
66
93
 
67
94
  `maxRows` tek sorguyu sınırlar. `OFFSET` korunur; izinli ve maskesiz bir tablo
68
95
  tavan boyunda sayfalarla baştan sona okunabilir. Tabloya izin vermek budur;
@@ -70,6 +97,7 @@ tavan tek sorguluk toplu sızdırmayı durdurmak ve sonuç kümesini küçük tu
70
97
  için vardır, toplam erişimi karneye bağlamak için değil.
71
98
 
72
99
  ## Karşı-imza, verinin doğruluğu hakkında bir beyan değildir
100
+ <!-- s: countersign-not-data -->
73
101
 
74
102
  Karşı-imza servisi şunu söyler: senden başka bir imzalayan bu zincir başını şu
75
103
  anda gördü ve üzerine eklenen, yeniden yazılmayan bir kütükte şu sıraya koydu.
@@ -79,6 +107,7 @@ dizilemeyeceğini söyler. İmza anahtarı sızarsa, o anahtarın attığı büt
79
107
  imzalar anahtar kadar değerlidir: hiç.
80
108
 
81
109
  ## Karşı-imza servisi tek sunucuda tek anahtardır
110
+ <!-- s: countersign-one-key -->
82
111
 
83
112
  2026-08-15'ten beri Conarium'un işlettiği bir uç nokta var
84
113
  (`demo.conarium.dev/anchor`, keyId `verax-cs-20260815`). İmza anahtarı tek
@@ -90,28 +119,43 @@ tam olarak bunu söylüyor. Uç nokta yine bu pakette geliyor ve kendin
90
119
  güvenmeyen üçüncü tarafa değil.
91
120
 
92
121
  ## Operatör sınırın içindedir
122
+ <!-- s: operator-inside -->
93
123
 
94
124
  Ürün asistan ↔ kapı yolunu korur. Kütüphaneyi import eden kod kapıyı,
95
125
  operatörün kimlik bilgisiyle veritabanına bağlanmakla aynı yetkiyle
96
126
  atlayabilir. Operatörün kendi süreci bu kapının denetim konusu değildir.
97
127
 
98
128
  ## İki süreç, tek denetim dosyası
129
+ <!-- s: two-processes -->
99
130
 
100
131
  `Audit.log()` senkrondur. Tek süreçte eşzamanlı sorgular `prevHash` kırmadan
101
132
  yazar. Aynı sink’i açan ikinci OS süreci reddedilir (`<sink>.lock`,
102
133
  advisory `wx`). Kilit, Conarium dışından dosyaya yazan süreci durdurmaz.
103
134
 
104
135
  ## Sıkı imza kipi opt-in
136
+ <!-- s: strict-sig-opt-in -->
105
137
 
106
138
  `CONARIUM_AUDIT_REQUIRE_SIG=1` imza anahtarı varken imzasız tek satırda
107
139
  boot'u reddeder. Varsayılan, HMAC sonradan eklenince tamamen imzasız
108
140
  eski zinciri hâlâ açar (08-05 uyumu).
109
141
 
142
+ ## Denetim sink'inin hash'i JCS değil
143
+ <!-- s: audit-hash-not-jcs -->
144
+
145
+ Makbuz RFC 8785 JCS ile hash'lenir (`canonicalize`). Denetim JSONL hasher'ı
146
+ (`src/audit-hash.ts`) ekleme sırasındaki `JSON.stringify`'ı kullanır.
147
+ Anahtarlar sıralı değilse iki hesap ayrışır: `{"b":1,"a":2}` ile
148
+ `{"a":2,"b":1}` aynı nesne değildir. Sink'i JCS'e çevirmek eldeki her
149
+ denetim dosyasını geçersiz kılar. Eski bir sink'i başkasının yeniden
150
+ hash'lemesi gerekiyorsa kullanacağı şey JCS değil, `JSON.stringify`'dır.
151
+
110
152
  ## Denetlenmemiş kriptografi
153
+ <!-- s: crypto-unaudited -->
111
154
 
112
155
  Ed25519 uygulaması resmî denetimden geçmedi.
113
156
 
114
157
  ## Maskeleme maliyeti satırla değil, benzersiz değerle büyür
158
+ <!-- s: masking-cost -->
115
159
 
116
160
  Taşıma eşleştiricisi, politikanın maskelediği her benzersiz değer için
117
161
  bir tarama kurar. `maxRows` o kümeyi sınırlar. Politika boş bırakırsa kod 100'e
@@ -131,6 +175,7 @@ Tavanı yükseltmek serbest. 500'ün üstünde doctor ve boot uyarır.
131
175
  Sorgu reddedilmez.
132
176
 
133
177
  ## Düşük entropili yükte disclosure hash'i doğrulama kehanetidir
178
+ <!-- s: disclosure-oracle -->
134
179
 
135
180
  `disclosure.hash`, maskeleme ve satır tavanından sonra sınırdan çıkan
136
181
  baytların SHA-256'sıdır. Makbuzu elinde tutan biri "cevap `evet` miydi?"
@@ -140,20 +185,40 @@ Yüksek entropili sonuç pratikte bu yolla tahmin edilmez. Tek satırlık
140
185
  evet/hayır sonucu edilir.
141
186
 
142
187
  ## Hedef beyandır, doğrulanmaz
188
+ <!-- s: destination-declaration -->
143
189
 
144
190
  `destination` operatörün config'e yazdığıdır. Conarium sonucun oraya
145
191
  gittiğini kontrol etmez. MCP model kimliği taşımaz, yani alan ölçülemez.
146
192
  Politika onu okumaz. Makbuzda `openai/gpt-x` yazması, baytları OpenAI'ın
147
193
  gördüğü anlamına gelmez.
148
194
 
195
+ ## Mutabakat nesneyi bağlar, her ifadeyi değil
196
+ <!-- s: reconcile-object-attribution -->
197
+
198
+ `conarium-reconcile` çıkış 0'ı şuna verir: veritabanının saydığı her sorgu
199
+ deseni, aynı pencerede bir makbuzun adlandırdığı bir tabloya bağlanır. Bir
200
+ tabloyu adlandıran tek makbuz, o pencerede o tabloya giden başka kaç ifade
201
+ olursa olsun hepsini temizler. `test/reconcile_cli.test.mjs` bunu bilerek
202
+ pozitif örnek tutar — sayaç farkı aynı desende beş çağrı, bir makbuz tabloyu
203
+ adlandırır, koşu 0 döner. Sayılar kasıtlı olarak 1:1 karşılaştırılmaz: bir
204
+ istemci isteği birden fazla kaynak ifadesi üretebilir (PostgREST, bağlantı
205
+ havuzu, ORM). 1:1 kuralı böyle her kurulumda sahte "kapsanmamış etkinlik"
206
+ üretir. Temiz koşunun kurduğu şey pencere içinde desen ve nesne
207
+ örtüşmesidir. Kayda geçmiş her ifadenin ayrıca makbuzlandığını kurmaz.
208
+ `--json-v2` ayrı bir `coverage-reconciliation/2` nesnesi basar; `/1` sonucu
209
+ `/2` diye okunmaz. Mapping Profile yoksa `/2` çokluğa bağlı kalemleri
210
+ `matched` saymaz, `indeterminate` bırakır.
211
+
149
212
  ## OpenTimestamps istemcisi
213
+ <!-- s: ots-client -->
150
214
 
151
215
  Damgalama yerleşik takvim istemcisiyle yapılır (Node `crypto` + herkese açık takvimlere HTTPS).
152
216
  `javascript-opentimestamps` bağımlılık değil. `web3` / `elliptic` / `crypto-js` / `request` / `lodash` ağacı kurulmaz.
153
- Bitcoin onayı yine saatler sürebilir; makbuz `pending` gösterir.
217
+ Bitcoin onayı yine saatler sürebilir; `pending` yalnız damga gönderildikten sonra görünür.
154
218
  Bitcoin blok doğrulaması `blockstream.info`'ya sorar. O host yoksa doğrulayıcı "kontrol edemedim" der, "geçerli" demez.
155
219
 
156
220
  ## Mutabakat, kayan saatle geç yazılmış makbuzu ayıramaz
221
+ <!-- s: reconcile-trailing-clock -->
157
222
 
158
223
  Pencerenin iki ucu veritabanının snapshot damgalarından, makbuzun damgası ise
159
224
  gateway'den geliyor. Yani sınıra iki ayrı saat karar veriyor. Bir deseni
package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -131,8 +131,11 @@ npx conarium-verify chain.jsonl --pubkey key.pem --anchor-check
131
131
 
132
132
  A second verifier, Go and the standard library only, is in [`verifiers/go`](verifiers/go). `go build -o conarium-verify .` then the same arguments as `conarium-verify`; `test-vectors/` is the contract.
133
133
 
134
- Opt-in anchoring: `CONARIUM_ANCHOR_SINK=opentimestamps`. Upgrade pending proofs later with
135
- `npx conarium-anchor-upgrade ./audit.jsonl.anchors.jsonl`.
134
+ Anchoring is a separate step. Stamp a document with `npx conarium-stamp <file>`,
135
+ or submit a chain-head hash with `npx conarium-anchor-service`.
136
+ `CONARIUM_ANCHOR_SINK=opentimestamps` selects the in-tree calendar client those
137
+ tools use; it does not stamp receipts as they are written. Upgrade pending
138
+ proofs later with `npx conarium-anchor-upgrade ./audit.jsonl.anchors.jsonl`.
136
139
  The client is in-tree (Node `crypto` + calendar HTTPS). It does not install
137
140
  `javascript-opentimestamps`. See [LIMITATIONS.md](LIMITATIONS.md).
138
141