@conarium-ai/core 0.2.36 → 0.2.37
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +41 -0
- package/LIMITATIONS.md +32 -3
- package/LIMITATIONS.tr.md +67 -2
- package/README.md +5 -2
- package/bin/conarium-reconcile.mjs +297 -13
- package/bin/conarium-stamp.mjs +2 -2
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-clocks-declared.json +16 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-clocks-undeclared-profile.json +16 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-excluded.json +16 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-indeterminate.json +14 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-matched.json +16 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-neg-unattributed.json +15 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-neg-undeclared-exclusion.json +16 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-neg-undeclared-multiplicity.json +16 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-neg-undeclared-skew.json +15 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-observed-without-receipt.json +14 -0
- package/conformance/cases/reconciliation/v2-receipted-without-observation.json +14 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/after-customers-1.json +1 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/after-customers-15.json +1 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/after-empty.json +1 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/after-set.json +1 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/after-unattributed.json +1 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/before-customers-10.json +1 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/before-empty.json +1 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/profile-clocks.json +9 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/profile-exclusion.json +7 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/profile-multiplicity.json +9 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/profile-no-clocks.json +4 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/receipts-customers-early.jsonl +1 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/receipts-customers.jsonl +1 -0
- package/conformance/fixtures/reconciliation/receipts-empty.jsonl +0 -0
- package/conformance/run.mjs +59 -0
- package/docs/API-STABILITY.md +1 -1
- package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md +2 -2
- package/docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md +92 -15
- package/docs/claims/retracted-phrasings.json +7 -0
- package/docs/claims/reviews/0.2.37.md +180 -0
- package/docs/claims/surfaces.json +115 -0
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/CHANGELOG.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,46 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
# Changelog
|
|
2
2
|
|
|
3
|
+
## 0.2.37 — 2026-08-20 — a claim with no call site, and the bound that decided anyway
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
`docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md` said "Receipts are anchored automatically." Nothing in
|
|
6
|
+
`src/` or `bin/` called the anchor scheduler: `Audit.writeReceipt` emits
|
|
7
|
+
`anchor: null`, and `createAnchorSinkFromEnv`, `maybeAnchor` and
|
|
8
|
+
`appendAnchorSidecar` had no production caller outside their own definitions.
|
|
9
|
+
Anchoring is a manual step — `conarium-stamp` for a document,
|
|
10
|
+
`conarium-anchor-service` for a chain head — and the sentence now says so, in
|
|
11
|
+
`README.md`, `LIMITATIONS.md`, `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` and the stamp tool's own
|
|
12
|
+
header, which repeated it. The scheduler was not wired: adding an outbound hop to
|
|
13
|
+
the receipt path is a product decision, not a way to make a sentence true.
|
|
14
|
+
`test/anchor_wiring.mjs` refuses an automatic-anchoring claim on a claim surface
|
|
15
|
+
unless a write call exists in `src/` or `bin/`.
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
17
|
+
`conarium-reconcile` now emits `coverage-reconciliation/2` as a separate object
|
|
18
|
+
(`--json-v2`, `--result-v2 <path>`), alongside the `/1` body and the exit codes,
|
|
19
|
+
which are unchanged. The `/2` object carries `profile`, `bounds`, `outcome`,
|
|
20
|
+
`items` and `counts` as the published draft defines them, and it stops treating
|
|
21
|
+
undeclared bounds as decisions: with no Mapping Profile, a multiplicity-dependent
|
|
22
|
+
item is `indeterminate` rather than `matched`, an unattributed pattern is
|
|
23
|
+
`indeterminate` rather than `observed-without-receipt`, an infrastructure pattern
|
|
24
|
+
is `indeterminate` rather than `excluded`, and a `receipted-without-observation`
|
|
25
|
+
item makes the outcome `exceptions`. A `/1` result is not a `/2` result and the
|
|
26
|
+
two cannot share a body; asking for both at once is an error.
|
|
27
|
+
|
|
28
|
+
A Mapping Profile (`conarium-mapping-profile/0.1`, `--profile`) declares the
|
|
29
|
+
multiplicity bound, the exclusion rules, and the two clocks: which clock stamps
|
|
30
|
+
the observation window, which stamps receipts, and how far they may differ.
|
|
31
|
+
`clocks.skew` uses the same duration grammar as `--skew` — there is not a second
|
|
32
|
+
one — and if both are present and disagree the run fails rather than picking one,
|
|
33
|
+
because which bound won would be invisible on the result. The field list and its
|
|
34
|
+
encoding are written out in `docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md` so another specification can
|
|
35
|
+
adopt the shape instead of inventing a second.
|
|
36
|
+
|
|
37
|
+
The claim-surface list lived in two hand-maintained copies, which is the shape
|
|
38
|
+
that produced most of 0.2.36. It is one file now, `docs/claims/surfaces.json`,
|
|
39
|
+
read by both the review gate and the retracted-phrasing scan, with a stated
|
|
40
|
+
reason per entry and no silent exemptions. `LIMITATIONS.tr.md` was three sections
|
|
41
|
+
short of `LIMITATIONS.md`; the sections were written and a check now compares the
|
|
42
|
+
two by section key, so a limitation cannot reach one language and not the other.
|
|
43
|
+
|
|
3
44
|
## 0.2.36 — 2026-08-20 — the lock that could be taken twice
|
|
4
45
|
|
|
5
46
|
The receipt sink had no lock of its own. `Audit` took one on the audit sink at
|
package/LIMITATIONS.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
|
|
|
3
3
|
What Conarium has not done. Measured. No dates.
|
|
4
4
|
|
|
5
5
|
## No certification
|
|
6
|
+
<!-- s: no-certification -->
|
|
6
7
|
|
|
7
8
|
No SOC 2. No ISO/IEC 27001. Neither is planned: at this stage the priority is
|
|
8
9
|
independent penetration testing and implementation-level assurance rather than
|
|
@@ -10,10 +11,12 @@ organisational certification. No independent penetration test yet — that one i
|
|
|
10
11
|
on the roadmap.
|
|
11
12
|
|
|
12
13
|
## Not 1.0
|
|
14
|
+
<!-- s: not-1.0 -->
|
|
13
15
|
|
|
14
16
|
Version is 0.2.x. The API can break.
|
|
15
17
|
|
|
16
18
|
## Node 20 is the floor, and Node 20 is past end-of-life
|
|
19
|
+
<!-- s: node-20-floor -->
|
|
17
20
|
|
|
18
21
|
`engines` requires Node >=20 and CI runs the full suite on 20, 22 and 24. It said
|
|
19
22
|
>=18 until 2026-08-17, and that was wrong rather than merely unverified: the MCP
|
|
@@ -29,6 +32,7 @@ ask for. Node 22 or later is the version to run; if you are on 20, that choice i
|
|
|
29
32
|
yours to make with this stated rather than hidden.
|
|
30
33
|
|
|
31
34
|
## SQL is Postgres, Microsoft SQL Server, and Oracle
|
|
35
|
+
<!-- s: sql-dialects -->
|
|
32
36
|
|
|
33
37
|
MySQL is not implemented.
|
|
34
38
|
A dialect is listed here only when the shared SQL-gate vector set is green against that dialect, unparseable input is denied, and a live engine run applied the row cap.
|
|
@@ -38,32 +42,40 @@ There is no MSSQL or Oracle connector. An operator can attach their own executor
|
|
|
38
42
|
Parsers: Postgres `pgsql-ast-parser` · MSSQL `node-sql-parser` (transactsql) · Oracle `@guanmingchiu/sqlparser-ts`.
|
|
39
43
|
|
|
40
44
|
## Bare 9-digit US SSN is not a content detector
|
|
45
|
+
<!-- s: bare-ssn -->
|
|
41
46
|
|
|
42
47
|
`XXX-XX-XXXX` (hyphenated) is masked. A bare 9-digit run is not: it
|
|
43
48
|
collides with order IDs and other identifiers. This is a measured
|
|
44
49
|
limitation, not an oversight.
|
|
45
50
|
|
|
46
51
|
## Names in free text are not guaranteed
|
|
52
|
+
<!-- s: names-free-text -->
|
|
47
53
|
|
|
48
54
|
Structured columns: deterministic (`maskColumns`).
|
|
49
55
|
Free text: best effort (carry-over of values this policy already masks; labelled names).
|
|
50
56
|
A bare name in running prose is not detected.
|
|
51
57
|
|
|
52
58
|
## One production install
|
|
59
|
+
<!-- s: one-prod-install -->
|
|
53
60
|
|
|
54
61
|
The only production deployment is the author's own company.
|
|
55
62
|
There is no external reference customer.
|
|
56
63
|
The figure 121,366 identities masked comes from that company's ERP. It cannot be verified from outside.
|
|
57
64
|
|
|
58
65
|
## One-person team
|
|
66
|
+
<!-- s: one-person-team -->
|
|
59
67
|
|
|
60
68
|
Bus factor 1.
|
|
61
69
|
|
|
62
70
|
## Anchors may stay pending
|
|
71
|
+
<!-- s: anchors-pending -->
|
|
63
72
|
|
|
64
|
-
An OpenTimestamps stamp can take hours to confirm on Bitcoin.
|
|
73
|
+
An OpenTimestamps stamp can take hours to confirm on Bitcoin. A receipt is
|
|
74
|
+
born with `anchor: null`. `pending` appears only after an operator has
|
|
75
|
+
submitted a stamp (`conarium-stamp` or `conarium-anchor-service`).
|
|
65
76
|
|
|
66
77
|
## Masking hides values; it does not make them unlearnable
|
|
78
|
+
<!-- s: masking-unlearnable -->
|
|
67
79
|
|
|
68
80
|
Masking is applied to result rows. A query's WHERE clause is checked for table
|
|
69
81
|
permission, not rewritten: `WHERE email LIKE 'a%'` on an allowed table reaches
|
|
@@ -81,6 +93,7 @@ before it reaches the database. Columns that are not on that list are unchanged
|
|
|
81
93
|
masked values in general have become unlearnable.
|
|
82
94
|
|
|
83
95
|
## The row cap is per query, not per session
|
|
96
|
+
<!-- s: row-cap-per-query -->
|
|
84
97
|
|
|
85
98
|
`maxRows` caps a single query. `OFFSET` is preserved, so an allowed, unmasked
|
|
86
99
|
table can be read in full, cap-sized pages at a time. That is what allowing a
|
|
@@ -88,6 +101,7 @@ table means; the cap exists to stop single-query bulk exfiltration and to keep
|
|
|
88
101
|
result sets small, not to ration total access.
|
|
89
102
|
|
|
90
103
|
## A countersignature is not a statement about the data
|
|
104
|
+
<!-- s: countersign-not-data -->
|
|
91
105
|
|
|
92
106
|
The countersigning service says that a signer other than you saw this chain head
|
|
93
107
|
at this time and put it at this position in a log that is appended to, never
|
|
@@ -97,6 +111,7 @@ cannot be quietly rearranged afterwards. If the signing key leaks, every
|
|
|
97
111
|
signature it ever made is worth what the key is worth: nothing.
|
|
98
112
|
|
|
99
113
|
## The countersigning service is one key on one server
|
|
114
|
+
<!-- s: countersign-one-key -->
|
|
100
115
|
|
|
101
116
|
Since 2026-08-15 a Conarium-operated endpoint exists (`demo.conarium.dev/anchor`,
|
|
102
117
|
keyId `verax-cs-20260815`). The signing key lives on one server, on disk, with
|
|
@@ -108,6 +123,7 @@ a countersigner you operate proves ordering to you, not to a third party who
|
|
|
108
123
|
does not trust you.
|
|
109
124
|
|
|
110
125
|
## The operator is inside the boundary
|
|
126
|
+
<!-- s: operator-inside -->
|
|
111
127
|
|
|
112
128
|
The product defends the assistant-to-gateway path. Code that imports the
|
|
113
129
|
library can skip the gate the same way it can open the database with the
|
|
@@ -115,6 +131,7 @@ operator's credential. The operator's own process is not an audit subject
|
|
|
115
131
|
of this gateway.
|
|
116
132
|
|
|
117
133
|
## Two processes, one audit file
|
|
134
|
+
<!-- s: two-processes -->
|
|
118
135
|
|
|
119
136
|
`Audit.log()` is synchronous. One process can write many concurrent queries
|
|
120
137
|
without breaking `prevHash`. A second OS process that opens the same sink
|
|
@@ -122,12 +139,14 @@ is rejected (`<sink>.lock`, advisory `wx`). The lock does not stop a writer
|
|
|
122
139
|
outside Conarium that ignores the lock file.
|
|
123
140
|
|
|
124
141
|
## Strict signature mode is opt-in
|
|
142
|
+
<!-- s: strict-sig-opt-in -->
|
|
125
143
|
|
|
126
144
|
`CONARIUM_AUDIT_REQUIRE_SIG=1` refuses boot if a signing key is set and
|
|
127
145
|
any audit line is unsigned. The default still accepts a fully unsigned
|
|
128
146
|
legacy chain when an HMAC key is later added (08-05 compatibility).
|
|
129
147
|
|
|
130
148
|
## Audit sink hash is not JCS
|
|
149
|
+
<!-- s: audit-hash-not-jcs -->
|
|
131
150
|
|
|
132
151
|
Receipts hash with RFC 8785 JCS (`canonicalize`). The audit JSONL hasher
|
|
133
152
|
(`src/audit-hash.ts`) uses `JSON.stringify` of insertion order. The two
|
|
@@ -136,10 +155,12 @@ Switching the sink to JCS would invalidate every existing audit file.
|
|
|
136
155
|
Independent re-hash of an old sink must use `JSON.stringify`, not JCS.
|
|
137
156
|
|
|
138
157
|
## Cryptography is not independently audited
|
|
158
|
+
<!-- s: crypto-unaudited -->
|
|
139
159
|
|
|
140
160
|
The Ed25519 implementation has not had a formal audit.
|
|
141
161
|
|
|
142
162
|
## Masking cost grows with distinct masked values
|
|
163
|
+
<!-- s: masking-cost -->
|
|
143
164
|
|
|
144
165
|
Carry-over builds one matcher per unique value this policy already
|
|
145
166
|
masked. `maxRows` bounds that set. When the policy leaves it unset the code falls
|
|
@@ -159,6 +180,7 @@ Raising the cap is allowed. The doctor and boot log warn above 500.
|
|
|
159
180
|
The query is not rejected.
|
|
160
181
|
|
|
161
182
|
## A disclosure hash is a verification oracle on low-entropy payloads
|
|
183
|
+
<!-- s: disclosure-oracle -->
|
|
162
184
|
|
|
163
185
|
`disclosure.hash` is SHA-256 of the exact bytes that left the gateway after
|
|
164
186
|
masking and the row cap. Anyone who holds the receipt can try a guess
|
|
@@ -168,6 +190,7 @@ would be written on the same receipt. High-entropy results are not
|
|
|
168
190
|
practically guessable this way. A one-row yes/no result is.
|
|
169
191
|
|
|
170
192
|
## Destination is a declaration, not a verification
|
|
193
|
+
<!-- s: destination-declaration -->
|
|
171
194
|
|
|
172
195
|
`destination` is what the operator wrote in config. Conarium does not
|
|
173
196
|
check that the result went there. MCP does not carry model identity, so
|
|
@@ -175,6 +198,7 @@ the field cannot be measured. Policy does not read it. A receipt that
|
|
|
175
198
|
says `openai/gpt-x` is not proof that OpenAI saw the bytes.
|
|
176
199
|
|
|
177
200
|
## Reconciliation establishes object attribution, not per-statement coverage
|
|
201
|
+
<!-- s: reconcile-object-attribution -->
|
|
178
202
|
|
|
179
203
|
`conarium-reconcile` exits 0 when every query pattern the database counted
|
|
180
204
|
names a table for which a receipt exists in the same window. One receipt
|
|
@@ -186,9 +210,13 @@ client request can produce several source statements (PostgREST, a connection
|
|
|
186
210
|
pooler, an ORM), and a 1:1 rule would report false uncovered activity on any
|
|
187
211
|
such deployment. The consequence is that a clean run establishes pattern and
|
|
188
212
|
object overlap within the window. It does not establish that each recorded
|
|
189
|
-
statement was itself receipted.
|
|
213
|
+
statement was itself receipted. `--json-v2` prints a separate
|
|
214
|
+
`coverage-reconciliation/2` object; a consumer MUST NOT read the `/1` result
|
|
215
|
+
as `/2`. Without a Mapping Profile the `/2` object leaves multiplicity-bound
|
|
216
|
+
items `indeterminate` rather than treating one receipt as a bound of one.
|
|
190
217
|
|
|
191
218
|
## Reconciliation cannot tell a trailing clock from a late receipt
|
|
219
|
+
<!-- s: reconcile-trailing-clock -->
|
|
192
220
|
|
|
193
221
|
The window comes from the database's snapshot timestamps and a receipt's
|
|
194
222
|
timestamp comes from the gateway, so the boundary is decided by two clocks.
|
|
@@ -214,8 +242,9 @@ not change the exit code. `unassigned` is a different gap (the receipt
|
|
|
214
242
|
named no object at all).
|
|
215
243
|
|
|
216
244
|
## OpenTimestamps client
|
|
245
|
+
<!-- s: ots-client -->
|
|
217
246
|
|
|
218
247
|
Stamping uses a built-in calendar client (Node `crypto` + HTTPS to the public calendars).
|
|
219
248
|
`javascript-opentimestamps` is not a dependency. The `web3` / `elliptic` / `crypto-js` / `request` / `lodash` tree is not installed.
|
|
220
|
-
Bitcoin confirmation still takes hours;
|
|
249
|
+
Bitcoin confirmation still takes hours; a submitted stamp stays `pending` until upgrade.
|
|
221
250
|
Bitcoin-block verification talks to `blockstream.info`. If that host is unreachable the verifier reports "could not check", not "valid".
|
package/LIMITATIONS.tr.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -3,16 +3,34 @@
|
|
|
3
3
|
Conarium'un yapmadıkları. Ölçülmüş. Tarih yok.
|
|
4
4
|
|
|
5
5
|
## Sertifikasyon yok
|
|
6
|
+
<!-- s: no-certification -->
|
|
6
7
|
|
|
7
8
|
SOC 2 yok. ISO/IEC 27001 yok. İkisi de planlanmıyor: bu aşamada öncelik,
|
|
8
9
|
kurumsal sertifikasyon değil, bağımsız sızma testi ve uygulama düzeyinde
|
|
9
10
|
güvence. Bağımsız sızma testi de henüz yok — o yol haritasında.
|
|
10
11
|
|
|
11
12
|
## 1.0 değil
|
|
13
|
+
<!-- s: not-1.0 -->
|
|
12
14
|
|
|
13
15
|
Sürüm 0.2.x. API kırılabilir.
|
|
14
16
|
|
|
17
|
+
## Taban Node 20, ve Node 20 artık yama almıyor
|
|
18
|
+
<!-- s: node-20-floor -->
|
|
19
|
+
|
|
20
|
+
`engines` Node >=20 ister. CI tam paketi 20, 22 ve 24'te koşar. 2026-08-17'ye
|
|
21
|
+
kadar taban >=18 yazıyordu; bu doğrulanmamış değil, yanlıştı. MCP SDK'nın HTTP
|
|
22
|
+
taşıması global `crypto`'yu kullanır ve bayraksız hali Node 19'dan itibaren
|
|
23
|
+
var. Node 18'de kapı `initialize`'da `ReferenceError: crypto is not defined`
|
|
24
|
+
ile düşer.
|
|
25
|
+
|
|
26
|
+
nodejs/Release takviminde Node 18 (2025-04-30) ve Node 20 (2026-04-30)
|
|
27
|
+
destek dışı. Node 20 kuran, güvenlik yaması gelmeyen bir çalışma zamanı
|
|
28
|
+
çalıştırıyor. Taban yine 20: o sürümde paket yeşil, kaldırmak ise
|
|
29
|
+
operatörün seçmediği bir sebeple kurulumları kırardı. Çalıştırılacak olan
|
|
30
|
+
Node 22 veya üstü. Hâlâ 20'daysan bu cümle duruyor diye duruyor; gizlenmiyor.
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
15
32
|
## SQL: Postgres, Microsoft SQL Server ve Oracle
|
|
33
|
+
<!-- s: sql-dialects -->
|
|
16
34
|
|
|
17
35
|
MySQL yok.
|
|
18
36
|
Bir lehçe ancak paylaşılan SQL-kapısı vektör seti o lehçede yeşilse, ayrıştırılamayan girdi reddediliyorsa ve canlı motorda satır tavanı uygulanıyorsa burada yazılır.
|
|
@@ -22,31 +40,39 @@ MSSQL veya Oracle konnektörü yok. Operatör kendi çalıştırıcısını taka
|
|
|
22
40
|
Ayrıştırıcılar: Postgres `pgsql-ast-parser` · MSSQL `node-sql-parser` (transactsql) · Oracle `@guanmingchiu/sqlparser-ts`.
|
|
23
41
|
|
|
24
42
|
## Çıplak 9 haneli ABD SSN içerik dedektörü değil
|
|
43
|
+
<!-- s: bare-ssn -->
|
|
25
44
|
|
|
26
45
|
`XXX-XX-XXXX` (tireli) maskelenir. Çıplak 9 haneli koşu maskelenmez:
|
|
27
46
|
sipariş numarası ve benzeri kimliklerle çakışır. Ölçülmüş sınır, unutkanlık değil.
|
|
28
47
|
|
|
29
48
|
## Serbest metinde isim garantisi yok
|
|
49
|
+
<!-- s: names-free-text -->
|
|
30
50
|
|
|
31
51
|
Yapılandırılmış kolonlar: deterministik (`maskColumns`).
|
|
32
52
|
Serbest metin: en iyi çaba (bu politikanın zaten maskelediği değerlerin taşınması; etiketli isimler).
|
|
33
53
|
Düz cümledeki çıplak isim yakalanmaz.
|
|
34
54
|
|
|
35
55
|
## Tek üretim kurulumu
|
|
56
|
+
<!-- s: one-prod-install -->
|
|
36
57
|
|
|
37
58
|
Tek üretim kurulumu yazarın kendi şirketi.
|
|
38
59
|
Dış referans müşteri yok.
|
|
39
60
|
121.366 kimlik maskelendi rakamı o şirketin ERP'sinden gelir. Dışarıdan doğrulanamaz.
|
|
40
61
|
|
|
41
62
|
## Tek kişilik ekip
|
|
63
|
+
<!-- s: one-person-team -->
|
|
42
64
|
|
|
43
65
|
Bus factor 1.
|
|
44
66
|
|
|
45
67
|
## Çıpa beklemede kalabilir
|
|
68
|
+
<!-- s: anchors-pending -->
|
|
46
69
|
|
|
47
|
-
OpenTimestamps damgasının Bitcoin'de onaylanması saatler sürebilir.
|
|
70
|
+
OpenTimestamps damgasının Bitcoin'de onaylanması saatler sürebilir. Makbuz
|
|
71
|
+
`anchor: null` ile doğar. `pending` ancak operatör damgayı gönderdikten sonra
|
|
72
|
+
görünür (`conarium-stamp` veya `conarium-anchor-service`).
|
|
48
73
|
|
|
49
74
|
## Maskeleme değeri gizler; öğrenilemez kılmaz
|
|
75
|
+
<!-- s: masking-unlearnable -->
|
|
50
76
|
|
|
51
77
|
Maskeleme sonuç satırlarına uygulanır. Sorgunun WHERE koşulu tablo izni için
|
|
52
78
|
denetlenir, yeniden yazılmaz: izinli bir tabloda `WHERE email LIKE 'a%'`
|
|
@@ -63,6 +89,7 @@ Listede olmayan sütunlar için yukarıdaki paragraf aynen geçerlidir. Bu,
|
|
|
63
89
|
maskelenen değerlerin genel olarak öğrenilemez olduğu iddiası değildir.
|
|
64
90
|
|
|
65
91
|
## Satır tavanı sorgu başınadır, oturum başına değil
|
|
92
|
+
<!-- s: row-cap-per-query -->
|
|
66
93
|
|
|
67
94
|
`maxRows` tek sorguyu sınırlar. `OFFSET` korunur; izinli ve maskesiz bir tablo
|
|
68
95
|
tavan boyunda sayfalarla baştan sona okunabilir. Tabloya izin vermek budur;
|
|
@@ -70,6 +97,7 @@ tavan tek sorguluk toplu sızdırmayı durdurmak ve sonuç kümesini küçük tu
|
|
|
70
97
|
için vardır, toplam erişimi karneye bağlamak için değil.
|
|
71
98
|
|
|
72
99
|
## Karşı-imza, verinin doğruluğu hakkında bir beyan değildir
|
|
100
|
+
<!-- s: countersign-not-data -->
|
|
73
101
|
|
|
74
102
|
Karşı-imza servisi şunu söyler: senden başka bir imzalayan bu zincir başını şu
|
|
75
103
|
anda gördü ve üzerine eklenen, yeniden yazılmayan bir kütükte şu sıraya koydu.
|
|
@@ -79,6 +107,7 @@ dizilemeyeceğini söyler. İmza anahtarı sızarsa, o anahtarın attığı büt
|
|
|
79
107
|
imzalar anahtar kadar değerlidir: hiç.
|
|
80
108
|
|
|
81
109
|
## Karşı-imza servisi tek sunucuda tek anahtardır
|
|
110
|
+
<!-- s: countersign-one-key -->
|
|
82
111
|
|
|
83
112
|
2026-08-15'ten beri Conarium'un işlettiği bir uç nokta var
|
|
84
113
|
(`demo.conarium.dev/anchor`, keyId `verax-cs-20260815`). İmza anahtarı tek
|
|
@@ -90,28 +119,43 @@ tam olarak bunu söylüyor. Uç nokta yine bu pakette geliyor ve kendin
|
|
|
90
119
|
güvenmeyen üçüncü tarafa değil.
|
|
91
120
|
|
|
92
121
|
## Operatör sınırın içindedir
|
|
122
|
+
<!-- s: operator-inside -->
|
|
93
123
|
|
|
94
124
|
Ürün asistan ↔ kapı yolunu korur. Kütüphaneyi import eden kod kapıyı,
|
|
95
125
|
operatörün kimlik bilgisiyle veritabanına bağlanmakla aynı yetkiyle
|
|
96
126
|
atlayabilir. Operatörün kendi süreci bu kapının denetim konusu değildir.
|
|
97
127
|
|
|
98
128
|
## İki süreç, tek denetim dosyası
|
|
129
|
+
<!-- s: two-processes -->
|
|
99
130
|
|
|
100
131
|
`Audit.log()` senkrondur. Tek süreçte eşzamanlı sorgular `prevHash` kırmadan
|
|
101
132
|
yazar. Aynı sink’i açan ikinci OS süreci reddedilir (`<sink>.lock`,
|
|
102
133
|
advisory `wx`). Kilit, Conarium dışından dosyaya yazan süreci durdurmaz.
|
|
103
134
|
|
|
104
135
|
## Sıkı imza kipi opt-in
|
|
136
|
+
<!-- s: strict-sig-opt-in -->
|
|
105
137
|
|
|
106
138
|
`CONARIUM_AUDIT_REQUIRE_SIG=1` imza anahtarı varken imzasız tek satırda
|
|
107
139
|
boot'u reddeder. Varsayılan, HMAC sonradan eklenince tamamen imzasız
|
|
108
140
|
eski zinciri hâlâ açar (08-05 uyumu).
|
|
109
141
|
|
|
142
|
+
## Denetim sink'inin hash'i JCS değil
|
|
143
|
+
<!-- s: audit-hash-not-jcs -->
|
|
144
|
+
|
|
145
|
+
Makbuz RFC 8785 JCS ile hash'lenir (`canonicalize`). Denetim JSONL hasher'ı
|
|
146
|
+
(`src/audit-hash.ts`) ekleme sırasındaki `JSON.stringify`'ı kullanır.
|
|
147
|
+
Anahtarlar sıralı değilse iki hesap ayrışır: `{"b":1,"a":2}` ile
|
|
148
|
+
`{"a":2,"b":1}` aynı nesne değildir. Sink'i JCS'e çevirmek eldeki her
|
|
149
|
+
denetim dosyasını geçersiz kılar. Eski bir sink'i başkasının yeniden
|
|
150
|
+
hash'lemesi gerekiyorsa kullanacağı şey JCS değil, `JSON.stringify`'dır.
|
|
151
|
+
|
|
110
152
|
## Denetlenmemiş kriptografi
|
|
153
|
+
<!-- s: crypto-unaudited -->
|
|
111
154
|
|
|
112
155
|
Ed25519 uygulaması resmî denetimden geçmedi.
|
|
113
156
|
|
|
114
157
|
## Maskeleme maliyeti satırla değil, benzersiz değerle büyür
|
|
158
|
+
<!-- s: masking-cost -->
|
|
115
159
|
|
|
116
160
|
Taşıma eşleştiricisi, politikanın maskelediği her benzersiz değer için
|
|
117
161
|
bir tarama kurar. `maxRows` o kümeyi sınırlar. Politika boş bırakırsa kod 100'e
|
|
@@ -131,6 +175,7 @@ Tavanı yükseltmek serbest. 500'ün üstünde doctor ve boot uyarır.
|
|
|
131
175
|
Sorgu reddedilmez.
|
|
132
176
|
|
|
133
177
|
## Düşük entropili yükte disclosure hash'i doğrulama kehanetidir
|
|
178
|
+
<!-- s: disclosure-oracle -->
|
|
134
179
|
|
|
135
180
|
`disclosure.hash`, maskeleme ve satır tavanından sonra sınırdan çıkan
|
|
136
181
|
baytların SHA-256'sıdır. Makbuzu elinde tutan biri "cevap `evet` miydi?"
|
|
@@ -140,20 +185,40 @@ Yüksek entropili sonuç pratikte bu yolla tahmin edilmez. Tek satırlık
|
|
|
140
185
|
evet/hayır sonucu edilir.
|
|
141
186
|
|
|
142
187
|
## Hedef beyandır, doğrulanmaz
|
|
188
|
+
<!-- s: destination-declaration -->
|
|
143
189
|
|
|
144
190
|
`destination` operatörün config'e yazdığıdır. Conarium sonucun oraya
|
|
145
191
|
gittiğini kontrol etmez. MCP model kimliği taşımaz, yani alan ölçülemez.
|
|
146
192
|
Politika onu okumaz. Makbuzda `openai/gpt-x` yazması, baytları OpenAI'ın
|
|
147
193
|
gördüğü anlamına gelmez.
|
|
148
194
|
|
|
195
|
+
## Mutabakat nesneyi bağlar, her ifadeyi değil
|
|
196
|
+
<!-- s: reconcile-object-attribution -->
|
|
197
|
+
|
|
198
|
+
`conarium-reconcile` çıkış 0'ı şuna verir: veritabanının saydığı her sorgu
|
|
199
|
+
deseni, aynı pencerede bir makbuzun adlandırdığı bir tabloya bağlanır. Bir
|
|
200
|
+
tabloyu adlandıran tek makbuz, o pencerede o tabloya giden başka kaç ifade
|
|
201
|
+
olursa olsun hepsini temizler. `test/reconcile_cli.test.mjs` bunu bilerek
|
|
202
|
+
pozitif örnek tutar — sayaç farkı aynı desende beş çağrı, bir makbuz tabloyu
|
|
203
|
+
adlandırır, koşu 0 döner. Sayılar kasıtlı olarak 1:1 karşılaştırılmaz: bir
|
|
204
|
+
istemci isteği birden fazla kaynak ifadesi üretebilir (PostgREST, bağlantı
|
|
205
|
+
havuzu, ORM). 1:1 kuralı böyle her kurulumda sahte "kapsanmamış etkinlik"
|
|
206
|
+
üretir. Temiz koşunun kurduğu şey pencere içinde desen ve nesne
|
|
207
|
+
örtüşmesidir. Kayda geçmiş her ifadenin ayrıca makbuzlandığını kurmaz.
|
|
208
|
+
`--json-v2` ayrı bir `coverage-reconciliation/2` nesnesi basar; `/1` sonucu
|
|
209
|
+
`/2` diye okunmaz. Mapping Profile yoksa `/2` çokluğa bağlı kalemleri
|
|
210
|
+
`matched` saymaz, `indeterminate` bırakır.
|
|
211
|
+
|
|
149
212
|
## OpenTimestamps istemcisi
|
|
213
|
+
<!-- s: ots-client -->
|
|
150
214
|
|
|
151
215
|
Damgalama yerleşik takvim istemcisiyle yapılır (Node `crypto` + herkese açık takvimlere HTTPS).
|
|
152
216
|
`javascript-opentimestamps` bağımlılık değil. `web3` / `elliptic` / `crypto-js` / `request` / `lodash` ağacı kurulmaz.
|
|
153
|
-
Bitcoin onayı yine saatler sürebilir;
|
|
217
|
+
Bitcoin onayı yine saatler sürebilir; `pending` yalnız damga gönderildikten sonra görünür.
|
|
154
218
|
Bitcoin blok doğrulaması `blockstream.info`'ya sorar. O host yoksa doğrulayıcı "kontrol edemedim" der, "geçerli" demez.
|
|
155
219
|
|
|
156
220
|
## Mutabakat, kayan saatle geç yazılmış makbuzu ayıramaz
|
|
221
|
+
<!-- s: reconcile-trailing-clock -->
|
|
157
222
|
|
|
158
223
|
Pencerenin iki ucu veritabanının snapshot damgalarından, makbuzun damgası ise
|
|
159
224
|
gateway'den geliyor. Yani sınıra iki ayrı saat karar veriyor. Bir deseni
|
package/README.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -131,8 +131,11 @@ npx conarium-verify chain.jsonl --pubkey key.pem --anchor-check
|
|
|
131
131
|
|
|
132
132
|
A second verifier, Go and the standard library only, is in [`verifiers/go`](verifiers/go). `go build -o conarium-verify .` then the same arguments as `conarium-verify`; `test-vectors/` is the contract.
|
|
133
133
|
|
|
134
|
-
|
|
135
|
-
`npx conarium-anchor-
|
|
134
|
+
Anchoring is a separate step. Stamp a document with `npx conarium-stamp <file>`,
|
|
135
|
+
or submit a chain-head hash with `npx conarium-anchor-service`.
|
|
136
|
+
`CONARIUM_ANCHOR_SINK=opentimestamps` selects the in-tree calendar client those
|
|
137
|
+
tools use; it does not stamp receipts as they are written. Upgrade pending
|
|
138
|
+
proofs later with `npx conarium-anchor-upgrade ./audit.jsonl.anchors.jsonl`.
|
|
136
139
|
The client is in-tree (Node `crypto` + calendar HTTPS). It does not install
|
|
137
140
|
`javascript-opentimestamps`. See [LIMITATIONS.md](LIMITATIONS.md).
|
|
138
141
|
|