@code-yeongyu/senpi 2026.8.24 → 2026.8.26

package/node_modules/@anthropic-ai/sdk/src/tools/agent-toolset/node.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,914 @@
+/**
+ * Node implementation of the `agent_toolset_20260401` tools — `bash`, `read`,
+ * `write`, `edit`, `glob`, `grep` — plus the workdir/skills
+ * {@link AgentToolContext}.
+ *
+ * This mirrors `@anthropic-ai/sdk/tools/memory/node`: it is the explicit,
+ * Node-only entry point for these implementations. Importing it pulls in
+ * `node:child_process`, `node:fs`, etc., so it is kept separate from the rest of
+ * the SDK — depending on it is an opt-in.
+ *
+ * **Node 22+ is required** for this module: the `glob` tool uses the native
+ * `fs.glob`, added in Node 22. The rest of the SDK still supports Node 18+; only
+ * the agent toolset has this requirement.
+ *
+ * The result of {@link betaAgentToolset20260401} is a plain `BetaRunnableTool[]`;
+ * hand it to any tool runner — `client.beta.messages.toolRunner({ …, tools })`
+ * for the Messages API, or `client.beta.sessions.events.toolRunner({ …, tools })`
+ * for a managed-agents session:
+ *
+ * ```ts
+ * import { betaAgentToolset20260401 } from '@anthropic-ai/sdk/tools/agent-toolset/node';
+ *
+ * const tools = betaAgentToolset20260401({ workdir: '/work' });
+ * const tools2 = betaAgentToolset20260401({ workdir: '/work' }).filter((t) => t.name !== 'bash');
+ * ```
+ *
+ * Trust model: the file tools confine to `workdir` plus any `allowedRoots`
+ * (symlink-aware) and are safe without a sandbox; `bash` is unrestricted and
+ * should run inside one. See {@link AgentToolContext}.
+ */
+
+import * as fs from 'node:fs/promises';
+import * as fssync from 'node:fs';
+import * as path from 'node:path';
+import * as cp from 'node:child_process';
+import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
+import * as readline from 'node:readline';
+import type { Anthropic } from '../../client';
+import type { BetaManagedAgentsSession } from '../../resources/beta/sessions/sessions';
+import { AnthropicError } from '../../core/error';
+import type { BetaRunnableTool } from '../../lib/tools/BetaRunnableTool';
+import { ToolError } from '../../lib/tools/ToolError';
+import { betaTool } from '../../helpers/beta/json-schema';
+import { promiseWithResolvers } from '../../internal/utils/promise';
+import {
+  atomicWriteFile,
+  canonicalize,
+  confineToRoot,
+  containingRoot,
+  DIR_CREATE_MODE,
+  fsErrorMessage,
+  isWithin,
+} from './fs-util';
+
+export { setupSkills, resolveSkillVersion, extractSkillArchive } from './skills';
+export {
+  SessionMemoryStores,
+  SessionMemoryError,
+  DEFAULT_MEMORY_SYNC_INTERVAL_MS,
+  MIN_MEMORY_SYNC_INTERVAL_MS,
+  MEMORY_FLUSH_TIMEOUT_MS,
+  MARKER_PATH,
+  type MemoryDeleteMode,
+  type SessionMemoryStoresOptions,
+} from './memories';
+
+const BASH_OUTPUT_LIMIT = 100 * 1024;
+const BASH_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000;
+// Default size cap for the read/edit tools (both load the whole file into
+// memory) when AgentToolContext.maxFileBytes is unset. The reject-vs-truncate
+// behaviour remains a separate question pending CMA validation.
+const DEFAULT_MAX_FILE_BYTES = 256 * 1024;
+const GREP_OUTPUT_LIMIT = 100 * 1024;
+const GREP_MAX_LINE_LENGTH = 2000;
+const GLOB_RESULT_LIMIT = 200;
+
+/**
+ * A bash command exceeded its `timeoutMs`. Carries the timeout so a caller can
+ * tell it apart from an abort without matching on the message text.
+ */
+export class BashTimeoutError extends AnthropicError {
+  readonly timeoutMs: number;
+
+  constructor(timeoutMs: number) {
+    super(`bash command timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`);
+    this.name = 'BashTimeoutError';
+    this.timeoutMs = timeoutMs;
+  }
+}
+
+const ANSI_RE = /\x1b\[[0-9;?]*[ -/]*[@-~]/g;
+
+// `fs.glob` is Node 22+. `@types/node` may still target an older line, so the
+// surface this module uses is typed locally rather than relying on the ambient
+// declaration. At runtime this module requires Node 22 (see the file header).
+type GlobFn = (
+  pattern: string,
+  options: {
+    cwd?: string;
+    withFileTypes?: boolean;
+    exclude?: (entry: fssync.Dirent) => boolean;
+  },
+) => AsyncIterable<fssync.Dirent>;
+const fsGlob = (fs as unknown as { glob: GlobFn }).glob;
+
+function resolveMaxBytes(configured: number | null | undefined): number | null {
+  return configured === undefined ? DEFAULT_MAX_FILE_BYTES : configured;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Throw when the deprecated {@link AgentToolContext.unrestrictedPaths} was
+ * passed at all. Nothing else reads that property.
+ */
+function rejectUnrestrictedPaths(value: boolean | undefined): void {
+  if (value === undefined) return;
+  throw new AnthropicError(
+    'The `unrestrictedPaths` option you passed to the agent toolset (AgentToolContext) is no longer ' +
+      "supported. The toolset's file tools (read, write, edit, glob, grep) are now always confined to " +
+      'the working directory plus the directories listed in `allowedRoots`. Remove `unrestrictedPaths` ' +
+      'from your context; to let the file tools reach any other directory, add it to `allowedRoots`.',
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Workdir + path-policy for the agent toolset.
+ *
+ * Trust model — two tiers:
+ *
+ * - The file tools ({@link betaReadTool}, {@link betaWriteTool},
+ *   {@link betaEditTool}, {@link betaGlobTool}, {@link betaGrepTool}) confine to
+ *   `workdir` plus any `allowedRoots`. {@link resolvePath} canonicalizes the
+ *   target (resolving every symlink, including the leaf) before the check
+ *   *and* returns that canonical path for the operation, so a symlink inside
+ *   the workdir that points outside it neither passes the check nor gets
+ *   followed afterwards — this is a real boundary, not a lexical hint (modulo
+ *   the residual TOCTOU noted on {@link resolvePath}).
+ * - {@link betaBashTool} runs an unrestricted `/bin/bash` and cannot be
+ *   confined. Run it — and, for defense in depth, the whole toolset — inside a
+ *   sandbox the host controls (e.g. a self-hosted environment runner).
+ */
+export interface AgentToolContext {
+  /** Base directory for resolving relative tool paths. */
+  workdir: string;
+  /**
+   * @deprecated No longer accepted: the file tools are always confined to
+   * `workdir` plus `allowedRoots`, which is neither behavior this flag used to
+   * select, so passing either value throws. Remove it; list extra directories
+   * in {@link AgentToolContext.allowedRoots}. The property is removed in a
+   * future release.
+   */
+  unrestrictedPaths?: boolean;
+  /**
+   * Absolute directories outside `workdir` the file tools may also reach,
+   * resolved at check time. The environment worker sets this to the session's
+   * memory-store folders. Does **not** constrain {@link betaBashTool}.
+   */
+  allowedRoots?: string[];
+  /**
+   * Anthropic client. Optional — the bare toolset needs no client; it is only
+   * used by `setupSkills`, which (together with {@link AgentToolContext.session},
+   * or the deprecated {@link AgentToolContext.sessionId}) downloads each of the
+   * session agent's skills into `{workdir}/skills/<name>/`.
+   */
+  client?: Anthropic;
+  /**
+   * The already-fetched session whose agent's skills `setupSkills` downloads.
+   * A session's resources cannot change while it runs, so the caller fetches it
+   * once and shares that snapshot with the memory-store download; the two can
+   * then never disagree about them.
+   */
+  session?: BetaManagedAgentsSession;
+  /**
+   * @deprecated `setupSkills` fetches the session itself when given only an id,
+   * one extra round trip per context. Prefer {@link AgentToolContext.session}.
+   * Kept for callers written before `session` existed; ignored when `session`
+   * is set.
+   */
+  sessionId?: string;
+  /**
+   * Directories the write and edit tools refuse to modify, resolved at check
+   * time exactly like `allowedRoots`. The worker sets this to the roots of
+   * read-only memory stores so the agent sees the error at write time instead
+   * of the change silently never syncing; the mechanism is generic to any
+   * directory.
+   */
+  readOnlyRoots?: string[];
+  /**
+   * Optional environment for the bash subprocess. When unset, the bash tool
+   * inherits the process environment with the runner's `ANTHROPIC_*`
+   * credentials scrubbed. When provided, it FULLY REPLACES that default
+   * environment — the mapping is used verbatim and is NOT merged with or added
+   * to the scrubbed process environment. To keep the defaults plus extra vars,
+   * build the combined mapping yourself before passing it.
+   */
+  env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
+  /**
+   * Size cap for the `read` and `edit` tools, which both load the whole file into
+   * memory. `undefined` (default) uses the built-in 256 KiB cap; a positive number
+   * sets a custom cap; `null` disables the cap entirely. Disabling it reintroduces
+   * the OOM risk on a model-controlled path, so pass `null` only when the sandbox
+   * can absorb arbitrarily large files. The non-regular-file (FIFO/device) guard
+   * always applies regardless of this value.
+   */
+  maxFileBytes?: number | null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns the `agent_toolset_20260401` implementations bound to `ctx`. The
+ * result is a plain array of `BetaRunnableTool`; filter or extend it before
+ * handing it to a tool runner:
+ *
+ * ```ts
+ * const tools = [...betaAgentToolset20260401(ctx), myCustomTool];
+ * const tools = betaAgentToolset20260401(ctx).filter((t) => t.name !== 'grep');
+ * ```
+ *
+ * Concurrency note: `client.beta.sessions.events.toolRunner` dispatches a
+ * session's tool calls serially (the sessions API delivers one `agent.tool_use`
+ * at a time). `client.beta.messages.toolRunner` runs a turn's `tool.run` calls
+ * via `Promise.all`. The toolset below is safe under either model —
+ * {@link betaBashTool} serializes its persistent shell internally and the FS
+ * tools are independent per call — but {@link betaEditTool}/{@link betaWriteTool}
+ * cannot synchronize concurrent writes to the *same* file across processes, so a
+ * multi-edit turn touching one path is still subject to inherent FS lost-update
+ * races. Custom tools that close over mutable state should do their own queueing.
+ */
+export function betaAgentToolset20260401(ctx: AgentToolContext): BetaRunnableTool[] {
+  return [
+    betaBashTool(ctx),
+    betaReadTool(ctx),
+    betaWriteTool(ctx),
+    betaEditTool(ctx),
+    betaGlobTool(ctx),
+    betaGrepTool(ctx),
+  ];
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve `p` against `ctx.workdir`; reject results outside `ctx.workdir` and
+ * `ctx.allowedRoots`. Absolute and relative inputs go through the same
+ * canonicalise-then-contain check — an absolute path that lands inside a
+ * permitted root is accepted, only paths that resolve *outside* all of them
+ * are rejected. Every symlink in `p` (including the leaf, even a dangling one)
+ * is resolved before the check, and the resolved path is what the tool then
+ * operates on, so a symlink inside the workdir that points outside it can
+ * neither pass the check nor be followed afterwards. See the trust model on
+ * {@link AgentToolContext}.
+ *
+ * Residual TOCTOU: a component could still be swapped for a symlink between this
+ * call and the eventual `fs` operation. Closing that fully needs per-component
+ * `O_NOFOLLOW`/`openat`, which Node does not expose ergonomically; the same
+ * residual exposure exists in `tools/memory/node` and is why a sandbox is still
+ * recommended for the toolset as a whole.
+ */
+export async function resolvePath(ctx: AgentToolContext, p: string): Promise<string> {
+  rejectUnrestrictedPaths(ctx.unrestrictedPaths);
+  return confineToRoot(ctx.workdir, p, { allowedRoots: ctx.allowedRoots ?? [] });
+}
+
+/**
+ * The read-only root `target` falls under, or `undefined`. `target` arrives
+ * fully canonicalized (from {@link resolvePath}), so each root is
+ * canonicalized too — a root recorded through a symlinked workdir must still
+ * match the resolved write target.
+ */
+function readOnlyRootFor(ctx: AgentToolContext, target: string): Promise<string | undefined> {
+  return containingRoot(ctx.readOnlyRoots ?? [], target);
+}
+
+// ---- bash ----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Build the environment for the spawned bash shell. The runner process holds
+ * Anthropic credentials in `ANTHROPIC_*` env vars — the API key, the auth token,
+ * and the per-work session token among them. `bash` runs an unrestricted shell,
+ * so any command the agent runs could read those straight out of `process.env`;
+ * strip the whole `ANTHROPIC_*` namespace from the child's environment.
+ * Everything else (PATH, HOME, locale, …) is passed through unchanged.
+ *
+ * Passing an explicit `env` to {@link AgentToolContext} does NOT add to this
+ * default — it FULLY REPLACES it. The provided mapping becomes the entire bash
+ * environment verbatim; nothing here is merged in, so callers who want the
+ * scrubbed process environment plus extras must build that mapping themselves.
+ */
+function scrubbedShellEnv(): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {
+  const env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = {};
+  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(process.env)) {
+    if (key.startsWith('ANTHROPIC_')) continue;
+    env[key] = value;
+  }
+  return env;
+}
+
+/**
+ * A persistent /bin/bash process. State (cwd, env, background jobs) survives
+ * across exec() calls. Uses pipes rather than a PTY so input is never echoed.
+ */
+export class BashSession {
+  #proc: cp.ChildProcessWithoutNullStreams;
+  #buf = '';
+  #truncated = false;
+  #closed = false;
+  // While a command is in flight, the resolver to fire once its sentinel lands
+  // in `#buf` (or once the shell dies). Event-driven: no polling loop.
+  #waiting: { sentinel: string; resolve: () => void } | null = null;
+
+  constructor(dir: string, env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = scrubbedShellEnv()) {
+    this.#proc = cp.spawn('/bin/bash', ['--noprofile', '--norc'], {
+      cwd: dir,
+      // `env` is the full base environment (the scrubbed process env by
+      // default, or the verbatim replacement from `AgentToolContext.env`).
+      // PS1/PS2/TERM are shell-control settings BashSession always applies so
+      // the pipe-based sentinel exec parsing works — not part of the
+      // user-facing environment.
+      env: { ...env, PS1: '', PS2: '', TERM: 'dumb' },
+      stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
+      detached: true,
+    });
+    this.#proc.stdout.setEncoding('utf8');
+    this.#proc.stderr.setEncoding('utf8');
+    this.#proc.stdout.on('data', (d: string) => this.#append(d));
+    this.#proc.stderr.on('data', (d: string) => this.#append(d));
+    this.#proc.once('close', () => {
+      this.#closed = true;
+      // Wake any in-flight exec so it fails fast instead of waiting for its deadline.
+      const w = this.#waiting;
+      this.#waiting = null;
+      w?.resolve();
+    });
+  }
+
+  /** Whether the underlying shell process has exited. */
+  get closed(): boolean {
+    return this.#closed;
+  }
+
+  // Cap the buffer during accumulation so a command that streams unboundedly
+  // can't OOM the runner. Keeps the tail so the sentinel stays detectable.
+  // Also resolves the in-flight exec the instant its sentinel is buffered.
+  #append(d: string): void {
+    this.#buf += d;
+    if (this.#buf.length > BASH_OUTPUT_LIMIT) {
+      this.#buf = this.#buf.slice(this.#buf.length - BASH_OUTPUT_LIMIT);
+      this.#truncated = true;
+    }
+    if (this.#waiting && this.#buf.indexOf(this.#waiting.sentinel) >= 0) {
+      const w = this.#waiting;
+      this.#waiting = null;
+      w.resolve();
+    }
+  }
+
+  async exec(
+    command: string,
+    opts: { timeoutMs?: number; signal?: AbortSignal | null | undefined } = {},
+  ): Promise<{ output: string; exitCode: number }> {
+    if (this.#closed) {
+      throw new AnthropicError('bash session terminated');
+    }
+    const timeoutMs = opts.timeoutMs ?? BASH_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS;
+    const signal = opts.signal;
+    // Reject with the signal's own reason, so a caller telling a user cancel
+    // apart from an `AbortSignal.timeout()` sees the platform's name intact.
+    signal?.throwIfAborted();
+    this.#buf = '';
+    this.#truncated = false;
+    // Per-call nonce so a command that prints a fixed marker can't spoof the
+    // exit-code framing. The `''` split keeps the literal out of what we write
+    // to stdin — only the shell's printf reassembles it.
+    const sentinel = `__ANT_CMD_${crypto.randomUUID()}_DONE__`;
+    const sentinelSplit = `${sentinel.slice(0, 8)}''${sentinel.slice(8)}`;
+    // </dev/null: a stdin-reading command (`cat`, `read`) gets EOF instead of
+    // blocking on the shared pipe until the timeout.
+    const wrapped = `{ ${command}\n} </dev/null 2>&1; printf '\\n${sentinelSplit}%d\\n' $?\n`;
+    this.#proc.stdin.write(wrapped);
+
+    if (this.#buf.indexOf(sentinel) < 0) {
+      // Park until the sentinel lands, the deadline passes, the caller aborts,
+      // or the shell dies — whichever comes first. `#append` (and the `close`
+      // handler) resolve `sentinelSeen`; the deadline / abort reject.
+      const { promise: sentinelSeen, resolve } = promiseWithResolvers<void>();
+      this.#waiting = { sentinel, resolve };
+      let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
+      let onAbort: (() => void) | undefined;
+      try {
+        await Promise.race([
+          sentinelSeen,
+          new Promise<never>((_, reject) => {
+            timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new BashTimeoutError(timeoutMs)), timeoutMs);
+          }),
+          new Promise<never>((_, reject) => {
+            if (!signal) return;
+            onAbort = () => reject(signal.reason);
+            signal.addEventListener('abort', onAbort, { once: true });
+          }),
+        ]);
+      } finally {
+        if (timer) clearTimeout(timer);
+        if (onAbort && signal) signal.removeEventListener('abort', onAbort);
+        this.#waiting = null;
+      }
+    }
+
+    const idx = this.#buf.indexOf(sentinel);
+    if (idx < 0) {
+      // The shell closed (or was killed) before emitting the sentinel.
+      throw new AnthropicError('bash session terminated');
+    }
+    const tail = this.#buf.slice(idx + sentinel.length);
+    const m = tail.match(/^(-?\d+)/);
+    const exitCode = m ? parseInt(m[1]!, 10) : -1;
+    let out = this.#buf.slice(0, idx).replace(ANSI_RE, '').replace(/\n+$/, '');
+    if (this.#truncated) {
+      out = `[output truncated]\n${out}`;
+    }
+    return { output: out, exitCode };
+  }
+
+  close(): void {
+    if (this.#closed) return;
+    this.#closed = true;
+    const w = this.#waiting;
+    this.#waiting = null;
+    w?.resolve();
+    this.#proc.stdout.destroy();
+    this.#proc.stderr.destroy();
+    this.#proc.stdin.destroy();
+    try {
+      // Negative PID targets the process group so foreground jobs (e.g. a
+      // hung sleep) die with the shell.
+      process.kill(-this.#proc.pid!, 'SIGKILL');
+    } catch {
+      this.#proc.kill('SIGKILL');
+    }
+    this.#proc.unref();
+  }
+}
+
+export function betaBashTool(ctx: AgentToolContext): BetaRunnableTool {
+  rejectUnrestrictedPaths(ctx.unrestrictedPaths);
+  let session: BashSession | undefined;
+  // Concurrent run() callers chain onto this promise so writes to the shared
+  // shell's stdin can't interleave (which would corrupt the sentinel-match
+  // exit-code parsing in BashSession.exec). Each call replaces `tail` with a
+  // promise that resolves only after its own exec settles.
+  let tail: Promise<unknown> = Promise.resolve();
+  return betaTool({
+    name: 'bash',
+    description: 'Run a bash command in a persistent shell. State (cwd, env vars) persists across calls.',
+    inputSchema: {
+      type: 'object',
+      properties: {
+        command: { type: 'string', description: 'The command to run' },
+        restart: { type: 'boolean', description: 'Restart the persistent shell before running' },
+        timeout_ms: { type: 'integer', description: 'Per-call timeout in milliseconds' },
+      },
+    },
+    run: async ({ command, restart, timeout_ms }, context) => {
+      const prev = tail;
+      const gate = promiseWithResolvers<void>();
+      tail = gate.promise;
+      // Swallow prior rejections — earlier callers got their own error path;
+      // we just need to wait for the shell to be free.
+      try {
+        await prev;
+      } catch {
+        // ignore
+      }
+      try {
+        if (restart) {
+          session?.close();
+          session = undefined;
+        }
+        if (!command) {
+          if (restart) return 'bash session restarted';
+          throw new ToolError('bash: command is required');
+        }
+        session ??= new BashSession(ctx.workdir, ctx.env);
+        try {
+          const { output, exitCode } = await session.exec(command, {
+            timeoutMs: timeout_ms ?? BASH_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS,
+            signal: context?.signal,
+          });
+          if (exitCode !== 0) throw new ToolError(output || `exit ${exitCode}`);
+          return output;
+        } catch (e) {
+          if (e instanceof ToolError) throw e;
+          // Timeout, abort, or terminated: the still-running command will emit
+          // a stale sentinel, so discard this session and let the next call
+          // start fresh.
+          session.close();
+          session = undefined;
+          throw new ToolError(`bash: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}`);
+        }
+      } finally {
+        gate.resolve();
+      }
+    },
+    close: () => {
+      session?.close();
+      session = undefined;
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+// ---- fs ------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+export function betaReadTool(ctx: AgentToolContext): BetaRunnableTool {
+  rejectUnrestrictedPaths(ctx.unrestrictedPaths);
+  return betaTool({
+    name: 'read',
+    description: 'Read a UTF-8 text file relative to the workdir.',
+    inputSchema: {
+      type: 'object',
+      properties: {
+        file_path: { type: 'string' },
+        view_range: {
+          type: 'array',
+          items: { type: 'integer' },
+          description: '[start_line, end_line] 1-indexed inclusive',
+        },
+      },
+      required: ['file_path'],
+    },
+    run: async ({ file_path, view_range }) => {
+      if (!file_path) throw new ToolError('read: file_path is required');
+      const abs = await resolvePath(ctx, file_path);
+      let data: string;
+      try {
+        // stat() before any open(): the size cap stops a multi-GB file from
+        // OOM'ing the runner, and isFile() rejects FIFOs/devices/dirs without
+        // opening them (open() on an unconnected FIFO blocks indefinitely).
+        const st = await fs.stat(abs);
+        if (!st.isFile()) {
+          throw new ToolError(`read: ${file_path} is not a regular file`);
+        }
+        const limit = resolveMaxBytes(ctx.maxFileBytes);
+        if (limit !== null && st.size > limit) {
+          throw new ToolError(
+            `read: ${file_path} is ${st.size} bytes, exceeds ${limit}-byte limit. ` +
+              'Use bash (head/tail/sed) to read a slice.',
+          );
+        }
+        data = await fs.readFile(abs, 'utf8');
+      } catch (e) {
+        if (e instanceof ToolError) throw e;
+        throw new ToolError(`read: ${fsErrorMessage(e, file_path)}`);
+      }
+      if (!view_range?.length) return data;
+      if (view_range.length !== 2) throw new ToolError('read: view_range must be [start_line, end_line]');
+      const [startLine, endLine] = view_range as [number, number];
+      const lines = data.split('\n');
+      const start = Math.max(0, startLine - 1);
+      const end = endLine > 0 ? endLine : lines.length;
+      return lines.slice(start, end).join('\n');
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+export function betaWriteTool(ctx: AgentToolContext): BetaRunnableTool {
+  rejectUnrestrictedPaths(ctx.unrestrictedPaths);
+  return betaTool({
+    name: 'write',
+    description: 'Write a UTF-8 text file relative to the workdir, creating parent directories as needed.',
+    inputSchema: {
+      type: 'object',
+      properties: { file_path: { type: 'string' }, content: { type: 'string' } },
+      required: ['file_path', 'content'],
+    },
+    run: async ({ file_path, content }) => {
+      if (!file_path) throw new ToolError('write: file_path is required');
+      const abs = await resolvePath(ctx, file_path);
+      const ro = await readOnlyRootFor(ctx, abs);
+      if (ro !== undefined) {
+        throw new ToolError(`write: ${file_path} is inside read-only directory ${ro}`);
+      }
+      try {
+        await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(abs), { recursive: true, mode: DIR_CREATE_MODE });
+        await atomicWriteFile(abs, content ?? '');
+      } catch (e) {
+        throw new ToolError(`write: ${fsErrorMessage(e, file_path)}`);
+      }
+      return `wrote ${Buffer.byteLength(content ?? '')} bytes to ${file_path}`;
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+export function betaEditTool(ctx: AgentToolContext): BetaRunnableTool {
+  rejectUnrestrictedPaths(ctx.unrestrictedPaths);
+  return betaTool({
+    name: 'edit',
+    description:
+      'Replace old_string with new_string in a file. old_string must be unique unless replace_all.',
+    inputSchema: {
+      type: 'object',
+      properties: {
+        file_path: { type: 'string' },
+        old_string: { type: 'string' },
+        new_string: { type: 'string' },
+        replace_all: { type: 'boolean' },
+      },
+      required: ['file_path', 'old_string', 'new_string'],
+    },
+    run: async ({ file_path, old_string, new_string, replace_all }) => {
+      if (!file_path) throw new ToolError('edit: file_path is required');
+      if (!old_string) throw new ToolError('edit: old_string is required');
+      const abs = await resolvePath(ctx, file_path);
+      const ro = await readOnlyRootFor(ctx, abs);
+      if (ro !== undefined) {
+        throw new ToolError(`edit: ${file_path} is inside read-only directory ${ro}`);
+      }
+      let data: string;
+      try {
+        // stat() before any open() — same guard as `read`: the size cap stops a
+        // multi-GB file from OOM'ing the runner, and isFile() rejects
+        // FIFOs/devices/dirs without opening them (open() on an unconnected FIFO
+        // blocks indefinitely). The edit path is model-controlled, so it needs
+        // the same bound `read` already has.
+        const st = await fs.stat(abs);
+        if (!st.isFile()) {
+          throw new ToolError(`edit: ${file_path} is not a regular file`);
+        }
+        const limit = resolveMaxBytes(ctx.maxFileBytes);
+        if (limit !== null && st.size > limit) {
+          throw new ToolError(
+            `edit: ${file_path} is ${st.size} bytes, exceeds ${limit}-byte limit. ` +
+              'Use bash (sed/awk) to edit a large file.',
+          );
+        }
+        data = await fs.readFile(abs, 'utf8');
+      } catch (e) {
+        if (e instanceof ToolError) throw e;
+        throw new ToolError(`edit: ${fsErrorMessage(e, file_path)}`);
+      }
+      const count = data.split(old_string).length - 1;
+      if (count === 0) throw new ToolError(`edit: old_string not found in ${file_path}`);
+      let updated: string;
+      if (replace_all) {
+        updated = data.split(old_string).join(new_string);
+      } else {
+        if (count > 1)
+          throw new ToolError(`edit: old_string appears ${count} times in ${file_path} (must be unique)`);
+        // Callback form so `$&`/`$1`/`` $` `` in new_string are inserted
+        // literally instead of expanded as replacement patterns.
+        updated = data.replace(old_string, () => new_string);
+      }
+      try {
+        await atomicWriteFile(abs, updated);
+      } catch (e) {
+        throw new ToolError(`edit: write: ${fsErrorMessage(e, file_path)}`);
+      }
+      return `edited ${file_path} (${replace_all ? count : 1} replacement(s))`;
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+// ---- search --------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Best-effort: stops `fs.glob` from walking out of the root via a literal or
+ * brace-expanded `..`. The realpath post-filter in {@link betaGlobTool} is the
+ * boundary; this only avoids the walk.
+ */
+function patternCanAscend(pattern: string): boolean {
+  return pattern.split(/[\\/{},]/).includes('..');
+}
+
+export function betaGlobTool(ctx: AgentToolContext): BetaRunnableTool {
+  rejectUnrestrictedPaths(ctx.unrestrictedPaths);
+  return betaTool({
+    name: 'glob',
+    description:
+      'Match files under the workdir against a glob pattern. Results are mtime-sorted, newest first.',
+    inputSchema: {
+      type: 'object',
+      properties: {
+        pattern: { type: 'string' },
+        path: { type: 'string', description: 'Directory to search in. Defaults to the workdir.' },
+      },
+      required: ['pattern'],
+    },
+    run: async ({ pattern, path: searchPath }) => {
+      if (!pattern) throw new ToolError('glob: pattern is required');
+      if (path.isAbsolute(pattern)) {
+        throw new ToolError(
+          'glob: absolute pattern not permitted; pass a relative pattern (and optionally path)',
+        );
+      }
+      if (patternCanAscend(pattern)) {
+        throw new ToolError('glob: ".." is not permitted in the pattern');
+      }
+      const root = searchPath ? await resolvePath(ctx, searchPath) : path.resolve(ctx.workdir);
+      // Compare canonical against canonical: a workdir that is itself a
+      // symlink would otherwise falsely reject every realpath'd match below.
+      const realRoot = searchPath ? root : await canonicalize(root);
+      const matches: { path: string; mtime: number }[] = [];
+      // Bounds the walk for patterns that match, or brace-expand into,
+      // enormous trees.
+      let remaining = WALK_MAX_ENTRIES;
+      try {
+        // Native `fs.glob` (Node 22+). `exclude` prunes the noisy dirs the
+        // legacy walker skipped; only regular files are collected.
+        for await (const entry of fsGlob(pattern, {
+          cwd: root,
+          withFileTypes: true,
+          exclude: (d) => d.name === '.git' || d.name === 'node_modules',
+        })) {
+          if (remaining-- <= 0) break;
+          if (!entry.isFile()) continue;
+          const full = path.join(entry.parentPath, entry.name);
+          // Drop any match that resolves outside the search root. A pattern
+          // that *names* a symlinked directory (the model controls the
+          // pattern, and the bash tool in the same session can plant the
+          // link) makes `fs.glob` descend through it and report entries with
+          // the raw parent path, so a lexical check on `full` alone would
+          // pass `root/link_out/secret` even though it lives outside the
+          // jail. Resolve-failure (ELOOP, EACCES, a racing unlink) is a deny.
+          let real: string;
+          try {
+            real = await fs.realpath(full);
+          } catch {
+            continue;
+          }
+          if (!isWithin(realRoot, real)) continue;
+          let mtime = 0;
+          try {
+            mtime = (await fs.stat(full)).mtimeMs;
+          } catch {
+            // unreadable — keep it in the list with mtime 0
+          }
+          matches.push({ path: full, mtime });
+        }
+      } catch (e) {
+        throw new ToolError(`glob: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}`);
+      }
+      if (matches.length === 0) return 'no matches';
+      matches.sort((a, b) => b.mtime - a.mtime);
+      return matches
+        .slice(0, GLOB_RESULT_LIMIT)
+        .map((m) => m.path)
+        .join('\n');
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+export function betaGrepTool(ctx: AgentToolContext): BetaRunnableTool {
+  rejectUnrestrictedPaths(ctx.unrestrictedPaths);
+  return betaTool({
+    name: 'grep',
+    description: 'Search file contents for a regex. Uses ripgrep if available, otherwise a built-in walker.',
+    inputSchema: {
+      type: 'object',
+      properties: { pattern: { type: 'string' }, path: { type: 'string' } },
+      required: ['pattern'],
+    },
+    run: async ({ pattern, path: p }, context) => {
+      if (!pattern) throw new ToolError('grep: pattern is required');
+      let searchPath = path.resolve(ctx.workdir);
+      if (p) searchPath = await resolvePath(ctx, p);
+      const rg = await findRg();
+      return rg ?
+          runRipgrep(rg, pattern, searchPath, context?.signal)
+        : runWalkGrep(pattern, searchPath, context?.signal);
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+function runRipgrep(
+  rg: string,
+  pattern: string,
+  searchPath: string,
+  signal?: AbortSignal | null | undefined,
+): Promise<string> {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const proc = cp.spawn(rg, ['-n', '--no-heading', '-e', pattern, '--', searchPath], {
+      ...(signal ? { signal } : {}),
+    });
+    let out = '';
+    let errOut = '';
+    let truncated = false;
+    proc.stdout.on('data', (d) => {
+      if (truncated) return;
+      out += d;
+      if (out.length > GREP_OUTPUT_LIMIT) {
+        truncated = true;
+        out = out.slice(0, GREP_OUTPUT_LIMIT);
+        proc.kill('SIGKILL');
+      }
+    });
+    proc.stderr.on('data', (d) => (errOut += d));
+    proc.on('close', (code) => {
+      if (signal?.aborted) return reject(new ToolError('grep: aborted'));
+      if (truncated) return resolve(out + `\n[output truncated at ${GREP_OUTPUT_LIMIT} bytes]`);
+      if (code === 0) return resolve(out);
+      if (code === 1) return resolve('no matches');
+      reject(new ToolError(`grep: rg failed: ${errOut || `exit ${code}`}`));
+    });
+    proc.on('error', (e) => {
+      if (signal?.aborted) return reject(new ToolError('grep: aborted'));
+      reject(new ToolError(`grep: rg failed: ${e.message}`));
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+async function runWalkGrep(
+  pattern: string,
+  root: string,
+  signal?: AbortSignal | null | undefined,
+): Promise<string> {
+  let re: RegExp;
+  try {
+    re = new RegExp(pattern);
+  } catch (e) {
+    throw new ToolError(`grep: invalid regex: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}`);
+  }
+  const hits: string[] = [];
+  let budget = GREP_OUTPUT_LIMIT;
+  const push = (line: string): boolean => {
+    budget -= line.length + 1;
+    if (budget < 0) {
+      hits.push(`[output truncated at ${GREP_OUTPUT_LIMIT} bytes]`);
+      return false;
+    }
+    hits.push(line);
+    return true;
+  };
+  const stat = await fs.stat(root).catch(() => null);
+  if (stat?.isFile()) {
+    await grepFile(root, re, push);
+  } else {
+    await walk(root, '', (rel) => grepFile(path.join(root, rel), re, push), signal);
+  }
+  if (signal?.aborted) throw new ToolError('grep: aborted');
+  if (hits.length === 0) return 'no matches';
+  return hits.join('\n');
+}
+
+async function grepFile(file: string, re: RegExp, push: (line: string) => boolean): Promise<boolean> {
+  const stream = fssync.createReadStream(file, { encoding: 'utf8' });
+  const rl = readline.createInterface({ input: stream, crlfDelay: Infinity });
+  let i = 0;
+  try {
+    for await (const line of rl) {
+      i++;
+      // Cap line length: `pattern` is model-supplied and JS regexes backtrack,
+      // so a pathological pattern against a very long line is a ReDoS.
+      if (line.length > GREP_MAX_LINE_LENGTH) continue;
+      if (re.test(line) && !push(`${file}:${i}:${line}`)) return false;
+    }
+  } catch {
+    // unreadable / binary
+  } finally {
+    stream.destroy();
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+// ---- utils ---------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const WALK_MAX_DEPTH = 40;
+const WALK_MAX_ENTRIES = 50_000;
+
+/**
+ * Bounded recursive walk. `fn` may return `false` to abort. Only real
+ * directories are descended into and only real files are handed to `fn` —
+ * symlinks (and devices/fifos/sockets) are skipped entirely so a symlink inside
+ * the root cannot be followed out of it.
+ */
+async function walk(
+  root: string,
+  rel: string,
+  fn: (rel: string) => boolean | void | Promise<boolean | void>,
+  signal?: AbortSignal | null | undefined,
+): Promise<void> {
+  let remaining = WALK_MAX_ENTRIES;
+  async function inner(rel: string, depth: number): Promise<boolean> {
+    if (depth > WALK_MAX_DEPTH) return true;
+    if (signal?.aborted) return false;
+    let entries: fssync.Dirent[];
+    try {
+      entries = await fs.readdir(path.join(root, rel), { withFileTypes: true });
+    } catch {
+      return true;
+    }
+    for (const e of entries) {
+      if (e.name === '.git' || e.name === 'node_modules') continue;
+      if (remaining-- <= 0) return false;
+      if (signal?.aborted) return false;
+      const childRel = rel ? path.join(rel, e.name) : e.name;
+      if (e.isDirectory()) {
+        if (!(await inner(childRel, depth + 1))) return false;
+      } else if (e.isFile()) {
+        if ((await fn(childRel)) === false) return false;
+      }
+      // Symlinks, devices, fifos and sockets are intentionally skipped.
+    }
+    return true;
+  }
+  await inner(rel, 0);
+}
+
+async function findRg(): Promise<string | null> {
+  const dirs = (process.env['PATH'] ?? '').split(path.delimiter);
+  for (const d of dirs) {
+    const candidate = path.join(d, 'rg');
+    try {
+      await fs.access(candidate, fssync.constants.X_OK);
+      return candidate;
+    } catch {
+      // not here
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}