@clipform/mcp-server 2.10.5 → 2.10.7

package/dist/index.js

@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@
 import {
   JSONRPCMessageSchema,
   createServer
-} from "./chunk-44LRAJJ3.js";
-import "./chunk-QZO6MGNN.js";
-import "./chunk-A5RVUIGS.js";
-import "./chunk-O35IVA4L.js";
-import "./chunk-ENHVQDSI.js";
+} from "./chunk-JCCGDVUH.js";
+import "./chunk-RMMQVPZN.js";
+import "./chunk-6FVQBVKW.js";
+import "./chunk-SAAH4U7O.js";
+import "./chunk-HZMMOSEM.js";
 import {
   setMcpVersion
 } from "./chunk-PBQ5BQWD.js";

package/dist/prompts.js

@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ import {
   buildDiscovery,
   getWorkflowText,
   registerPrompts
-} from "./chunk-QZO6MGNN.js";
-import "./chunk-O35IVA4L.js";
-import "./chunk-ENHVQDSI.js";
+} from "./chunk-RMMQVPZN.js";
+import "./chunk-SAAH4U7O.js";
+import "./chunk-HZMMOSEM.js";
 import "./chunk-PBQ5BQWD.js";
 import "./chunk-G3PMV62Z.js";
 export {

package/dist/resources.js

@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ import {
   QUIZ_VARIANTS,
   getGuideUri,
   registerResources
-} from "./chunk-A5RVUIGS.js";
-import "./chunk-O35IVA4L.js";
-import "./chunk-ENHVQDSI.js";
+} from "./chunk-6FVQBVKW.js";
+import "./chunk-SAAH4U7O.js";
+import "./chunk-HZMMOSEM.js";
 import "./chunk-PBQ5BQWD.js";
 import "./chunk-G3PMV62Z.js";
 export {

package/dist/server.js

@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ import {
   RENDER_TIMING,
   buildInstructions,
   createServer
-} from "./chunk-44LRAJJ3.js";
-import "./chunk-QZO6MGNN.js";
-import "./chunk-A5RVUIGS.js";
-import "./chunk-O35IVA4L.js";
-import "./chunk-ENHVQDSI.js";
+} from "./chunk-JCCGDVUH.js";
+import "./chunk-RMMQVPZN.js";
+import "./chunk-6FVQBVKW.js";
+import "./chunk-SAAH4U7O.js";
+import "./chunk-HZMMOSEM.js";
 import "./chunk-PBQ5BQWD.js";
 import "./chunk-G3PMV62Z.js";
 export {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@clipform/mcp-server",
-  "version": "2.10.5",
+  "version": "2.10.7",
   "mcpName": "io.github.Clipform/mcp-server",
   "description": "MCP server for building and managing Clipform video forms",
   "license": "MIT",

package/dist/chunk-ENHVQDSI.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/lib/auth-context.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { AsyncLocalStorage } from \"node:async_hooks\";\n\n/**\n * Identity of the end-user a given MCP request is acting on behalf of.\n *\n * Populated by the in-process host (apps/api) after validating an OAuth\n * Bearer on /mcp. The MCP tool layer reads it to decide which workspace\n * forms should land in and which plan tier gates apply.\n *\n * NOT populated when the server runs as a local stdio process (npx) - in\n * that mode tools fall back to edit-token based auth.\n */\nexport interface McpAuthContext {\n  user_id: string;\n  workspace_id: string;\n  scopes: string[];\n  tool_name?: string;\n  api_key?: string;\n  // Set when the human behind this tool call is an anonymous Supabase\n  // session (apps/api's app-chat lane, #2983/#2984) - api-client.ts's\n  // getAuthHeaders reads it to mark the outgoing bot-key HTTP request so the\n  // API can propagate the restriction even though the request itself\n  // authenticates with an API key, not a JWT.\n  is_anonymous?: boolean;\n  // #3330 review fix (blocker 1): an HMAC proof (apps/api's mcp-mint-proof.ts)\n  // that THIS exact request's #1415 anon lane freshly minted a brand-new anon\n  // identity for `workspace_id` - set only on the mint branch of\n  // resolveAnonymousMcpAuth, never when auth was resolved via an inbound\n  // form_id (even the caller's own). Lets create-form.ts safely offer a\n  // same-UID claim link without ever deriving \"who to bind it to\" from a\n  // body-supplied id, which would let a batch smuggling another tenant's\n  // form_id alongside a create_form call mint a claim token for THAT\n  // tenant's identity instead of the caller's own.\n  mcp_mint_proof?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Marker header the in-process MCP tool layer sets on its outgoing API\n * requests (api-client.ts) when `is_anonymous` is true, so an anonymous\n * app-chat session can't launder itself into an unrestricted API-key caller\n * by asking the bot to publish/mint credentials on its behalf. apps/api's\n * authMiddleware / workspaceAccessMiddleware / requireWorkspaceWriteAuth\n * read this on the API-key path and set isAnonymous accordingly - trusting\n * it is safe because it can only RESTRICT a caller: a real integration that\n * sets this header on its own API-key requests only denies itself, it can\n * never use it to gain anonymous-JWT privileges it doesn't already have.\n */\nexport const MCP_ANONYMOUS_HEADER = \"x-clipform-anonymous\";\n\n/**\n * Carries `mcp_mint_proof` on the same outgoing bot-key request. Unlike\n * MCP_ANONYMOUS_HEADER (a boolean that can only ever RESTRICT), this header's\n * VALUE matters - it names an identity a claim token gets bound to - so its\n * value is HMAC-signed (mcp-mint-proof.ts) rather than trusted raw: a direct\n * external caller reaching `POST /v1/forms` with any valid workspace API key\n * could otherwise hand-set an unsigned \"mint uid\" header to an arbitrary\n * victim's uid themselves (#3330 review).\n */\nexport const MCP_MINT_PROOF_HEADER = \"x-clipform-mcp-mint-proof\";\n\nconst storage = new AsyncLocalStorage<McpAuthContext>();\n\nexport function runWithMcpAuth<T>(ctx: McpAuthContext, fn: () => Promise<T> | T): Promise<T> | T {\n  return storage.run(ctx, fn);\n}\n\nexport function getMcpAuth(): McpAuthContext | undefined {\n  return storage.getStore();\n}\n\nexport function runWithMcpTool<T>(toolName: string, fn: () => Promise<T> | T): Promise<T> | T {\n  const parent = storage.getStore();\n  if (!parent) return fn();\n  return storage.run({ ...parent, tool_name: toolName }, fn);\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAAA,SAAS,yBAAyB;AA+C3B,IAAM,uBAAuB;AAW7B,IAAM,wBAAwB;AAErC,IAAM,UAAU,IAAI,kBAAkC;AAE/C,SAAS,eAAkB,KAAqB,IAA0C;AAC/F,SAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE;AAC5B;AAEO,SAAS,aAAyC;AACvD,SAAO,QAAQ,SAAS;AAC1B;AAEO,SAAS,eAAkB,UAAkB,IAA0C;AAC5F,QAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,SAAS;AAChC,MAAI,CAAC,OAAQ,QAAO,GAAG;AACvB,SAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG,EAAE;AAC3D;","names":[]}