@clipform/mcp-server 2.10.5 → 2.10.7

package/README.md

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ Your MCP client lists these automatically on connect (via `tools/list`). Full re
 | `clipform_create_form` | Create a new Clipform (interactive video-style form). |
 | `clipform_import_form` | Convert a public Google Form, Typeform, or Tally form into a new Clipform. |
 | `clipform_list_forms` | List forms in your workspace with optional filtering. |
-| `clipform_whoami` | Show the current identity: auth mode (api key, session, or anonymous), active workspace, and plan limits. |
+| `clipform_whoami` | Show the current identity: auth mode (api key, oauth, session, or anonymous), active workspace, and plan limits. |
 | `clipform_get_form` | Retrieve a form's details including all nodes in sequential order and their routing. |
 | `clipform_update_form` | Update a form's title, publish status, settings, or tags. |
 | `clipform_delete_form` | Move a form and all its nodes to the trash. |

package/dist/auth-context.d.ts

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ interface McpAuthContext {
     tool_name?: string;
     api_key?: string;
     is_anonymous?: boolean;
+    auth_via?: "oauth";
     mcp_mint_proof?: string;
 }
 /**
@@ -29,6 +30,18 @@ interface McpAuthContext {
  * never use it to gain anonymous-JWT privileges it doesn't already have.
  */
 declare const MCP_ANONYMOUS_HEADER = "x-clipform-anonymous";
+/**
+ * Marker header the in-process MCP tool layer sets on its outgoing API
+ * requests (api-client.ts) when `auth_via` is "oauth", so /v1/me can report
+ * `auth_mode: "oauth"` for an OAuth-connected user instead of the generic
+ * "api_key" the bot-key lane would otherwise get (#3716). Label-only: it
+ * changes nothing but the reported string. Trusting it from the wire is
+ * safe because a direct API-key caller who sets this header on their own
+ * request only mislabels their own whoami output - they gain no privilege,
+ * exactly the same reasoning as MCP_ANONYMOUS_HEADER above (except that
+ * header can only restrict, and this one can only relabel).
+ */
+declare const MCP_AUTH_VIA_HEADER = "x-clipform-auth-via";
 /**
  * Carries `mcp_mint_proof` on the same outgoing bot-key request. Unlike
  * MCP_ANONYMOUS_HEADER (a boolean that can only ever RESTRICT), this header's
@@ -43,4 +56,4 @@ declare function runWithMcpAuth<T>(ctx: McpAuthContext, fn: () => Promise<T> | T
 declare function getMcpAuth(): McpAuthContext | undefined;
 declare function runWithMcpTool<T>(toolName: string, fn: () => Promise<T> | T): Promise<T> | T;
 
-export { MCP_ANONYMOUS_HEADER, MCP_MINT_PROOF_HEADER, type McpAuthContext, getMcpAuth, runWithMcpAuth, runWithMcpTool };
+export { MCP_ANONYMOUS_HEADER, MCP_AUTH_VIA_HEADER, MCP_MINT_PROOF_HEADER, type McpAuthContext, getMcpAuth, runWithMcpAuth, runWithMcpTool };

package/dist/auth-context.js

@@ -1,13 +1,15 @@
 import {
   MCP_ANONYMOUS_HEADER,
+  MCP_AUTH_VIA_HEADER,
   MCP_MINT_PROOF_HEADER,
   getMcpAuth,
   runWithMcpAuth,
   runWithMcpTool
-} from "./chunk-ENHVQDSI.js";
+} from "./chunk-HZMMOSEM.js";
 import "./chunk-G3PMV62Z.js";
 export {
   MCP_ANONYMOUS_HEADER,
+  MCP_AUTH_VIA_HEADER,
   MCP_MINT_PROOF_HEADER,
   getMcpAuth,
   runWithMcpAuth,

package/dist/{chunk-A5RVUIGS.js → chunk-6FVQBVKW.js}

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import {
   FULL_CAPS,
   callApi,
   getSessionContext
-} from "./chunk-O35IVA4L.js";
+} from "./chunk-SAAH4U7O.js";
 
 // src/lib/guides.ts
 var guidesPromise = null;
@@ -143,4 +143,4 @@ export {
   getGuideUri,
   registerResources
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-A5RVUIGS.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-6FVQBVKW.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-ENHVQDSI.js → chunk-HZMMOSEM.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // src/lib/auth-context.ts
 import { AsyncLocalStorage } from "async_hooks";
 var MCP_ANONYMOUS_HEADER = "x-clipform-anonymous";
+var MCP_AUTH_VIA_HEADER = "x-clipform-auth-via";
 var MCP_MINT_PROOF_HEADER = "x-clipform-mcp-mint-proof";
 var storage = new AsyncLocalStorage();
 function runWithMcpAuth(ctx, fn) {
@@ -17,9 +18,10 @@ function runWithMcpTool(toolName, fn) {
 
 export {
   MCP_ANONYMOUS_HEADER,
+  MCP_AUTH_VIA_HEADER,
   MCP_MINT_PROOF_HEADER,
   runWithMcpAuth,
   getMcpAuth,
   runWithMcpTool
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ENHVQDSI.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-HZMMOSEM.js.map

package/dist/chunk-HZMMOSEM.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/lib/auth-context.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { AsyncLocalStorage } from \"node:async_hooks\";\n\n/**\n * Identity of the end-user a given MCP request is acting on behalf of.\n *\n * Populated by the in-process host (apps/api) after validating an OAuth\n * Bearer on /mcp. The MCP tool layer reads it to decide which workspace\n * forms should land in and which plan tier gates apply.\n *\n * NOT populated when the server runs as a local stdio process (npx) - in\n * that mode tools fall back to edit-token based auth.\n */\nexport interface McpAuthContext {\n  user_id: string;\n  workspace_id: string;\n  scopes: string[];\n  tool_name?: string;\n  api_key?: string;\n  // Set when the human behind this tool call is an anonymous Supabase\n  // session (apps/api's app-chat lane, #2983/#2984) - api-client.ts's\n  // getAuthHeaders reads it to mark the outgoing bot-key HTTP request so the\n  // API can propagate the restriction even though the request itself\n  // authenticates with an API key, not a JWT.\n  is_anonymous?: boolean;\n  // Set on the OAuth branch of apps/api's mcp/handler.ts when this request's\n  // bot API key was resolved on behalf of an OAuth-connected user (#3716) -\n  // api-client.ts's getAuthHeaders reads it to mark the outgoing request so\n  // /v1/me can report auth_mode \"oauth\" instead of the generic \"api_key\" the\n  // bot-key lane would otherwise get, even though the request itself\n  // authenticates with an API key, not an OAuth token.\n  auth_via?: \"oauth\";\n  // #3330 review fix (blocker 1): an HMAC proof (apps/api's mcp-mint-proof.ts)\n  // that THIS exact request's #1415 anon lane freshly minted a brand-new anon\n  // identity for `workspace_id` - set only on the mint branch of\n  // resolveAnonymousMcpAuth, never when auth was resolved via an inbound\n  // form_id (even the caller's own). Lets create-form.ts safely offer a\n  // same-UID claim link without ever deriving \"who to bind it to\" from a\n  // body-supplied id, which would let a batch smuggling another tenant's\n  // form_id alongside a create_form call mint a claim token for THAT\n  // tenant's identity instead of the caller's own.\n  mcp_mint_proof?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Marker header the in-process MCP tool layer sets on its outgoing API\n * requests (api-client.ts) when `is_anonymous` is true, so an anonymous\n * app-chat session can't launder itself into an unrestricted API-key caller\n * by asking the bot to publish/mint credentials on its behalf. apps/api's\n * authMiddleware / workspaceAccessMiddleware / requireWorkspaceWriteAuth\n * read this on the API-key path and set isAnonymous accordingly - trusting\n * it is safe because it can only RESTRICT a caller: a real integration that\n * sets this header on its own API-key requests only denies itself, it can\n * never use it to gain anonymous-JWT privileges it doesn't already have.\n */\nexport const MCP_ANONYMOUS_HEADER = \"x-clipform-anonymous\";\n\n/**\n * Marker header the in-process MCP tool layer sets on its outgoing API\n * requests (api-client.ts) when `auth_via` is \"oauth\", so /v1/me can report\n * `auth_mode: \"oauth\"` for an OAuth-connected user instead of the generic\n * \"api_key\" the bot-key lane would otherwise get (#3716). Label-only: it\n * changes nothing but the reported string. Trusting it from the wire is\n * safe because a direct API-key caller who sets this header on their own\n * request only mislabels their own whoami output - they gain no privilege,\n * exactly the same reasoning as MCP_ANONYMOUS_HEADER above (except that\n * header can only restrict, and this one can only relabel).\n */\nexport const MCP_AUTH_VIA_HEADER = \"x-clipform-auth-via\";\n\n/**\n * Carries `mcp_mint_proof` on the same outgoing bot-key request. Unlike\n * MCP_ANONYMOUS_HEADER (a boolean that can only ever RESTRICT), this header's\n * VALUE matters - it names an identity a claim token gets bound to - so its\n * value is HMAC-signed (mcp-mint-proof.ts) rather than trusted raw: a direct\n * external caller reaching `POST /v1/forms` with any valid workspace API key\n * could otherwise hand-set an unsigned \"mint uid\" header to an arbitrary\n * victim's uid themselves (#3330 review).\n */\nexport const MCP_MINT_PROOF_HEADER = \"x-clipform-mcp-mint-proof\";\n\nconst storage = new AsyncLocalStorage<McpAuthContext>();\n\nexport function runWithMcpAuth<T>(ctx: McpAuthContext, fn: () => Promise<T> | T): Promise<T> | T {\n  return storage.run(ctx, fn);\n}\n\nexport function getMcpAuth(): McpAuthContext | undefined {\n  return storage.getStore();\n}\n\nexport function runWithMcpTool<T>(toolName: string, fn: () => Promise<T> | T): Promise<T> | T {\n  const parent = storage.getStore();\n  if (!parent) return fn();\n  return storage.run({ ...parent, tool_name: toolName }, fn);\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAAA,SAAS,yBAAyB;AAsD3B,IAAM,uBAAuB;AAa7B,IAAM,sBAAsB;AAW5B,IAAM,wBAAwB;AAErC,IAAM,UAAU,IAAI,kBAAkC;AAE/C,SAAS,eAAkB,KAAqB,IAA0C;AAC/F,SAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE;AAC5B;AAEO,SAAS,aAAyC;AACvD,SAAO,QAAQ,SAAS;AAC1B;AAEO,SAAS,eAAkB,UAAkB,IAA0C;AAC5F,QAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,SAAS;AAChC,MAAI,CAAC,OAAQ,QAAO,GAAG;AACvB,SAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG,EAAE;AAC3D;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-44LRAJJ3.js → chunk-JCCGDVUH.js}

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import {
   getWorkflowText,
   objectType,
   registerPrompts
-} from "./chunk-QZO6MGNN.js";
+} from "./chunk-RMMQVPZN.js";
 import {
   GUIDE_TYPES,
   QUIZ_VARIANTS,
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import {
   getGuideUri,
   guideFallbackText,
   registerResources
-} from "./chunk-A5RVUIGS.js";
+} from "./chunk-6FVQBVKW.js";
 import {
   ACTIVE_NODE_TYPES,
   CONTACT_FIELDS,
@@ -39,11 +39,11 @@ import {
   resolveFormType,
   structuredResult,
   textResult
-} from "./chunk-O35IVA4L.js";
+} from "./chunk-SAAH4U7O.js";
 import {
   getMcpAuth,
   runWithMcpTool
-} from "./chunk-ENHVQDSI.js";
+} from "./chunk-HZMMOSEM.js";
 import {
   __commonJS,
   __export,
@@ -18259,11 +18259,11 @@ function registerWhoamiTool(server) {
     "clipform_whoami",
     {
       title: "Who Am I",
-      description: `Show the current identity: auth mode (api key, session, or anonymous), active workspace, and plan limits.`,
+      description: `Show the current identity: auth mode (api key, oauth, session, or anonymous), active workspace, and plan limits.`,
       inputSchema: {},
       outputSchema: {
-        auth_mode: external_exports.enum(["api_key", "session", "anonymous"]).describe("How this session is authenticated"),
-        is_authenticated: external_exports.boolean().describe("True for api_key or session auth; false for anonymous"),
+        auth_mode: external_exports.enum(["api_key", "oauth", "session", "anonymous"]).describe("How this session is authenticated"),
+        is_authenticated: external_exports.boolean().describe("True for api_key, oauth, or session auth; false for anonymous"),
         workspace: external_exports.object({ id: external_exports.string(), name: external_exports.string() }).nullable().describe("Active workspace, or null when anonymous"),
         plan: external_exports.object({
           name: external_exports.string(),
@@ -18874,7 +18874,7 @@ function registerSetNodeLogicTool(server) {
     "clipform_set_logic",
     {
       title: "Set Node Logic",
-      description: `Set the next node for one or more nodes, wiring a linear route (A to B to C). Pass multiple nodes in one call instead of separate tool calls. Each node routes to exactly one target node; conditional branching by which option was picked is not yet supported.
+      description: `Set the next node for one or more nodes, wiring a linear route (A to B to C). Pass multiple nodes in one call instead of separate tool calls. Each node routes to exactly one target node; conditional branching by which option was picked is not yet supported here - to route by which choice a respondent picks, point the user to the form's Build tab in the dashboard (the builder URL from clipform_get_form / clipform_create_form).
 
 A call replaces that node's routing entirely - it does not merge with any prior target.
 
@@ -18926,6 +18926,12 @@ Example:
         allLines.push(`Node ${node_id}: logic set (${rulesCount} rules)`);
         results.push({ node_id, ok: true, rules_count: rulesCount });
       }
+      if (results.some((r) => r.ok)) {
+        allLines.push(
+          `
+To branch by which option a respondent picks (not yet supported here), open the form's Build tab in the dashboard - use the builder URL from clipform_get_form or clipform_create_form.`
+        );
+      }
       return structuredResult(allLines.join("\n"), { results });
     }
   );
@@ -20672,4 +20678,4 @@ export {
   buildInstructions,
   createServer
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-44LRAJJ3.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-JCCGDVUH.js.map