@cleocode/core 2026.9.20 → 2026.9.22

package/dist/cloud/keys.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+import type { CreateDeviceRevocationRequest, DeviceTrust, PutDeviceWrappedKeyRequest, RevocationPins } from '@cleocode/contracts/cloud';
+import { type KdfParams, type KeyPair } from './crypto.js';
+/** What the server stores for a user (PutUserKeysRequest). Nothing here opens without a secret. */
+export interface StoredUserKeys {
+    passphraseWrappedMasterKey: string;
+    kdf: KdfParams;
+    recoveryWrappedMasterKey: string;
+    masterKeyVerifier: string;
+    keyVersion: number;
+}
+export declare const masterKeyVerifier: (mk: Uint8Array) => string;
+/**
+ * First-device setup: mint the master key and wrap it by passphrase and by a new recovery key.
+ * Show `recoveryKey` to the user exactly once.
+ */
+export declare function createUserKeys(userId: string, passphrase: string, keyVersion?: number): Promise<{
+    masterKey: Buffer;
+    recoveryKey: string;
+    stored: StoredUserKeys;
+}>;
+export declare function unlockWithPassphrase(userId: string, stored: StoredUserKeys, passphrase: string): Promise<Buffer<ArrayBufferLike>>;
+export declare function unlockWithRecoveryKey(userId: string, stored: StoredUserKeys, recoveryKey: string): Buffer;
+/** Re-wrap the master key under a new passphrase (for example after a recovery-key unlock). */
+export declare function rewrapPassphrase(userId: string, mk: Buffer, stored: StoredUserKeys, newPassphrase: string): Promise<StoredUserKeys>;
+/** A device's public identity, as raw key bytes. */
+export interface DevicePublicKeys {
+    deviceId: string;
+    encryptionPublicKey: Uint8Array;
+    signingPublicKey: Uint8Array;
+}
+/** A grant or certificate that does not come from a trusted master key holder. Never retry it blindly. */
+export declare class KeyTrustError extends Error {
+    constructor(message: string);
+}
+/**
+ * Certify a device under the master key: HMAC-SHA256 keyed by HKDF(MK, "device-cert"). Only a holder of
+ * the master key can make one, so the server cannot add a device of its own to the set a client trusts.
+ */
+export declare function deviceCertificate(mk: Uint8Array, userId: string, device: DevicePublicKeys, keyVersion: number): Buffer<ArrayBufferLike>;
+export declare function verifyDeviceCertificate(mk: Uint8Array, userId: string, device: DevicePublicKeys, keyVersion: number, certificate: Uint8Array): boolean;
+/**
+ * One signing key a client trusts for a device. `pin` is null for a live key. A revoked key keeps a pin:
+ * its signatures are accepted up to the pinned replicaSeq per replica and the pinned checkpoint coversSeq
+ * per stream, and refused past them. `pending` marks a certified key that is no longer live but has no
+ * revocation record yet (only returned with `includePending`, for writing that record).
+ */
+export interface SignerKey {
+    publicKey: Uint8Array;
+    pin: RevocationPins | null;
+    pending?: boolean;
+}
+/** Trusted signers by device id. A bare key stands for one live key (a device's own key, for example). */
+export type TrustedSigners = ReadonlyMap<string, Uint8Array | readonly SignerKey[]>;
+/** The keys trusted for `deviceId`, normalized. */
+export declare function signerKeys(trusted: TrustedSigners, deviceId: string): readonly SignerKey[];
+/** Keys that may vouch for new things (grants, endorsements): live and unpinned. */
+export declare const liveKeys: (trusted: TrustedSigners, deviceId: string) => SignerKey[];
+/** Master keys by key version. Certificates made under older versions verify under their own key. */
+export type MasterKeys = ReadonlyMap<number, Uint8Array>;
+/**
+ * What a client has learned about signer trust, persisted with the pull cursor (same local transaction)
+ * and passed back to every certifiedSigners call. Trust only ever tightens through it: the server can
+ * withhold a record or flip its `live` claims, but it cannot make the client forget what it has seen.
+ * Key ids are `${deviceId}/${hex of the Ed25519 public key}`.
+ */
+export interface TrustState {
+    /**
+     * The highest master key version this client holds or has proven (by unlocking it). Only such versions are
+     * persisted: a version the server merely declares is used for one call and never stored, so one bad
+     * response cannot brick the device. Live trust needs a certificate at the current version.
+     */
+    keyVersion: number;
+    /** The last pins seen per revoked key. A key seen pinned is never live again. */
+    pins: Record<string, RevocationPins>;
+    /** Every key seen as the target of a valid revocation record. Never live again. Sorted. */
+    revoked: string[];
+}
+export declare const initialTrustState: () => TrustState;
+/**
+ * How far a declared account key version may exceed the highest version this client holds or has proven.
+ * A rotation bumps the version by one, so an honest server is never more than one ahead of a device that
+ * has seen the previous rotation. A device that missed two rotations sees a server error (and fails closed);
+ * it needs a passphrase unlock anyway, to fetch the new master key.
+ */
+export declare const MAX_ROTATION_STEP = 1;
+export interface TrustEvaluation {
+    signers: Map<string, SignerKey[]>;
+    /** Persist this with the pull cursor, in the same local transaction. */
+    state: TrustState;
+    /**
+     * The account's key version is ahead of every master key this client holds: nothing is live. Tell the
+     * user "the account key was rotated: unlock with your passphrase to fetch the new master key".
+     */
+    keyRotated: boolean;
+    /**
+     * The server declared a key version no rotation can explain (more than MAX_ROTATION_STEP above what this
+     * client holds or has proven). Not a rotation: nothing is persisted, and nothing is live in this call.
+     */
+    serverError?: 'implausible-key-version';
+}
+/**
+ * Update TrustState after a successful passphrase or recovery-key unlock, the only proof of the account's
+ * real key version. It requires proof of possession: the unwrapped master key must match `stored`'s
+ * verifier (and the unwrap itself already checked the AAD, which binds the user and the version).
+ * - `keyVersion` becomes the proven version, if it is higher (an older genuine wrap never lowers it).
+ * - Seen pins are cleared **only** with `confirmedPinReset: true`, after the user explicitly confirms it (for
+ *   example, when a thief's record narrowed a pin while the stolen device was still live). The confirmation
+ *   prompt must tell the user to revoke the thief's device FIRST: while it is live, its records still count
+ *   and would narrow the pins again. The next
+ *   certifiedSigners call then takes pins from the records live devices have signed.
+ * - The seen-revoked set is never cleared: revocation is monotonic.
+ */
+export declare function resetTrustStateAfterUnlock(state: TrustState, proof: {
+    masterKey: Uint8Array;
+    stored: Pick<StoredUserKeys, 'masterKeyVerifier' | 'keyVersion'>;
+}, opts?: {
+    confirmedPinReset?: boolean;
+}): TrustState;
+/**
+ * The trusted signer set, built from `GET /v1/devices/trust`, the master keys the client holds and its
+ * persisted TrustState. Build the set for pulls, checkpoints and grants from this, never from the server's
+ * device list alone. Persist the returned state. The rules (docs/security/e2e-keys.md, "Revocation"):
+ * - A key is certified if a certificate for it verifies under the master key of the certificate's own
+ *   version (old history stays verifiable after rotation while the client keeps the old master keys).
+ * - **Current version only for liveness.** The current version is the highest the client holds or has
+ *   seen. Only a certificate at that version can make a key live, so a thief with a pre-rotation master key
+ *   cannot certify a fresh key into live trust. Older certificates carry pinned history only.
+ * - **Any valid record revokes its target.** A record whose signature verifies under a key certified at the
+ *   current version, live, pinned or pending, makes its target non-live for good (TrustState.revoked),
+ *   whatever the server claims. Records by old-version-only keys are ignored: such a key can never be live.
+ * - **Pins come only from live signers, and only ever narrow.** A record sets pins only if its signer is live
+ *   (a server claim at the current version) and not itself revoked. Several such records: the narrowest pins.
+ *   The result is always narrowed with the pins this client has seen (TrustState.pins), so neither a withheld
+ *   record nor a wider record served later can widen or drop a pin. A revoked key with no pins, now or ever,
+ *   is pending (untrusted; `includePending` returns it for the revocation flow).
+ * - **The current version** is the highest of: the versions the client has seen, the account version the
+ *   server declares, and the master keys held. When it is above every held master key, nothing is live and
+ *   `keyRotated` is true: tell the user "the account key was rotated: unlock with your passphrase to fetch
+ *   the new master key".
+ *
+ * **The caller MUST persist the returned `state`** in the same local transaction as the pull cursor, and pass
+ * it back next time. Nothing in core does this yet (the `cleo cloud` commands will); without it the monotonic
+ * guarantees above do not hold.
+ * - A live key: certified at the current version, called live by the server, never revoked.
+ */
+export declare function certifiedSigners(masterKeys: MasterKeys, userId: string, trust: DeviceTrust, state: TrustState, 
+/**
+ * The account's key version as the server declares it (`keyVersion` of GET /v1/account/keys), or null
+ * when the account has no keys yet. Used for this call only, never persisted. It may raise the current
+ * version by at most MAX_ROTATION_STEP above the highest held or proven version: a rotation bumps the
+ * version by one. A higher value is a server error (`serverError`), not a rotation.
+ */
+accountKeyVersion: number | null, opts?: {
+    includePending?: boolean;
+}): TrustEvaluation;
+/**
+ * Revoke one signing key of a device and pin its history (the POST /v1/devices/:id/revocations body).
+ * The signer must hold a certified key: after losing every other device, the device that just unlocked
+ * with the passphrase certifies itself (a self-grant) and signs this. Compute `pins` from segments and
+ * checkpoints this client has itself verified (revocationPins), never from numbers the server supplies.
+ */
+export declare function createDeviceRevocation(args: {
+    userId: string;
+    revoked: {
+        deviceId: string;
+        signingPublicKey: Uint8Array;
+    };
+    pins: RevocationPins;
+    signer: {
+        deviceId: string;
+        signing: KeyPair;
+    };
+}): CreateDeviceRevocationRequest;
+/**
+ * Grant the master key to a device: seal it to the recipient's X25519 key, certify the recipient under
+ * the master key, and sign the whole grant with the signer's Ed25519 key. The signer must hold the
+ * master key legitimately: a device that unlocked by passphrase or recovery key grants to itself, and a
+ * trusted device grants to another (key rotation). The result is the PUT /v1/devices/:id/key body.
+ */
+export declare function createDeviceGrant(args: {
+    masterKey: Buffer;
+    userId: string;
+    keyVersion: number;
+    recipient: DevicePublicKeys;
+    signer: {
+        deviceId: string;
+        signing: KeyPair;
+    };
+}): PutDeviceWrappedKeyRequest;
+/**
+ * Open a master key grant made to this device, after checking it came from a trusted signer. The checks,
+ * in order: the signer is in `trustedSigners` (the device's own signing key for a self-grant, or devices
+ * certified under a master key this device already holds); the signature verifies over a message rebuilt
+ * from this device's OWN keys, so a grant made for other keys fails; the sealed box opens; and the key
+ * inside certifies this device, so the key and the signer's intent agree. The server's verifier is not
+ * consulted: it is server-supplied and proves nothing.
+ */
+export declare function openDeviceGrant(args: {
+    userId: string;
+    device: {
+        deviceId: string;
+        encryption: KeyPair;
+        signingPublicKey: Uint8Array;
+    };
+    grant: PutDeviceWrappedKeyRequest;
+    trustedSigners: TrustedSigners;
+}): Buffer;
+export declare const newProjectKey: () => Buffer;
+export declare function wrapProjectKey(mk: Buffer, pdk: Buffer, projectId: string, keyVersion: number): string;
+export declare function unwrapProjectKey(mk: Buffer, wrapped: string, projectId: string, keyVersion: number): Buffer;
+/** Key for the personal home stream. It is derived, so it never needs storing or sharing. */
+export declare const homeStreamKey: (mk: Buffer) => Buffer<ArrayBufferLike>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=keys.d.ts.map

package/dist/cloud/keys.d.ts.map

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package/dist/cloud/keys.js

@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+import { constantTimeEqual, DecryptError, decodeRecoveryKey, deriveKey, encodeRecoveryKey, hmacSha256, newKdfParams, open, openSealed, passphraseKey, randomKey, seal, sealTo, sha256Hex, signEd25519, verifyEd25519, } from './crypto.js';
+import { deviceCertificateMessage, deviceGrantMessage, deviceRevocationMessage, revocationPinsCanonical, } from './signing.js';
+const mkContext = (userId, v) => `mk\n${userId}\n${v}`;
+const pdkContext = (projectId, v) => `pdk\n${projectId}\n${v}`;
+const deviceContext = (userId, deviceId, v) => `device-mk\n${userId}\n${deviceId}\n${v}`;
+export const masterKeyVerifier = (mk) => sha256Hex(deriveKey(mk, 'verifier'));
+/**
+ * First-device setup: mint the master key and wrap it by passphrase and by a new recovery key.
+ * Show `recoveryKey` to the user exactly once.
+ */
+export async function createUserKeys(userId, passphrase, keyVersion = 1) {
+    if (passphrase.length < 12)
+        throw new Error('passphrase must be at least 12 characters');
+    const masterKey = randomKey();
+    const recovery = randomKey();
+    const kdf = newKdfParams();
+    const pwk = await passphraseKey(passphrase, kdf);
+    const ctx = mkContext(userId, keyVersion);
+    return {
+        masterKey,
+        recoveryKey: encodeRecoveryKey(recovery),
+        stored: {
+            passphraseWrappedMasterKey: seal(pwk, masterKey, 'mk-wrap', ctx).toString('base64'),
+            kdf,
+            recoveryWrappedMasterKey: seal(recovery, masterKey, 'mk-wrap', ctx).toString('base64'),
+            masterKeyVerifier: masterKeyVerifier(masterKey),
+            keyVersion,
+        },
+    };
+}
+function checkVerifier(mk, stored) {
+    if (!constantTimeEqual(Buffer.from(masterKeyVerifier(mk)), Buffer.from(stored.masterKeyVerifier))) {
+        throw new DecryptError('master key does not match its verifier');
+    }
+    return mk;
+}
+export async function unlockWithPassphrase(userId, stored, passphrase) {
+    const pwk = await passphraseKey(passphrase, stored.kdf);
+    try {
+        const mk = open(pwk, Buffer.from(stored.passphraseWrappedMasterKey, 'base64'), 'mk-wrap', mkContext(userId, stored.keyVersion));
+        return checkVerifier(mk, stored);
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        if (err instanceof DecryptError)
+            throw new DecryptError('wrong passphrase');
+        throw err;
+    }
+}
+export function unlockWithRecoveryKey(userId, stored, recoveryKey) {
+    const rk = decodeRecoveryKey(recoveryKey);
+    const mk = open(rk, Buffer.from(stored.recoveryWrappedMasterKey, 'base64'), 'mk-wrap', mkContext(userId, stored.keyVersion));
+    return checkVerifier(mk, stored);
+}
+/** Re-wrap the master key under a new passphrase (for example after a recovery-key unlock). */
+export async function rewrapPassphrase(userId, mk, stored, newPassphrase) {
+    const kdf = newKdfParams();
+    const pwk = await passphraseKey(newPassphrase, kdf);
+    return {
+        ...stored,
+        kdf,
+        passphraseWrappedMasterKey: seal(pwk, mk, 'mk-wrap', mkContext(userId, stored.keyVersion)).toString('base64'),
+    };
+}
+/** A grant or certificate that does not come from a trusted master key holder. Never retry it blindly. */
+export class KeyTrustError extends Error {
+    constructor(message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = 'KeyTrustError';
+    }
+}
+const hex = (b) => Buffer.from(b).toString('hex');
+const certMessage = (userId, d, keyVersion) => deviceCertificateMessage({
+    userId,
+    deviceId: d.deviceId,
+    encryptionPublicKeyHex: hex(d.encryptionPublicKey),
+    signingPublicKeyHex: hex(d.signingPublicKey),
+    keyVersion,
+});
+/**
+ * Certify a device under the master key: HMAC-SHA256 keyed by HKDF(MK, "device-cert"). Only a holder of
+ * the master key can make one, so the server cannot add a device of its own to the set a client trusts.
+ */
+export function deviceCertificate(mk, userId, device, keyVersion) {
+    return hmacSha256(deriveKey(mk, 'device-cert'), certMessage(userId, device, keyVersion));
+}
+export function verifyDeviceCertificate(mk, userId, device, keyVersion, certificate) {
+    return constantTimeEqual(deviceCertificate(mk, userId, device, keyVersion), certificate);
+}
+/** The keys trusted for `deviceId`, normalized. */
+export function signerKeys(trusted, deviceId) {
+    const v = trusted.get(deviceId);
+    if (!v)
+        return [];
+    return v instanceof Uint8Array ? [{ publicKey: v, pin: null }] : v;
+}
+/** Keys that may vouch for new things (grants, endorsements): live and unpinned. */
+export const liveKeys = (trusted, deviceId) => signerKeys(trusted, deviceId).filter((k) => k.pin === null && !k.pending);
+const utf8 = (s) => Buffer.from(s, 'utf8');
+/** Where two pins agree: only entries in both, at the lower bound. Used when several records revoke one key. */
+function narrowerPins(a, b) {
+    const both = (x, y) => Object.fromEntries(Object.keys(x)
+        .filter((k) => k in y)
+        .map((k) => [k, Math.min(x[k], y[k])]));
+    return {
+        replicas: both(a.replicas, b.replicas),
+        checkpoints: both(a.checkpoints, b.checkpoints),
+    };
+}
+export const initialTrustState = () => ({ keyVersion: 0, pins: {}, revoked: [] });
+/**
+ * How far a declared account key version may exceed the highest version this client holds or has proven.
+ * A rotation bumps the version by one, so an honest server is never more than one ahead of a device that
+ * has seen the previous rotation. A device that missed two rotations sees a server error (and fails closed);
+ * it needs a passphrase unlock anyway, to fetch the new master key.
+ */
+export const MAX_ROTATION_STEP = 1;
+/**
+ * Update TrustState after a successful passphrase or recovery-key unlock, the only proof of the account's
+ * real key version. It requires proof of possession: the unwrapped master key must match `stored`'s
+ * verifier (and the unwrap itself already checked the AAD, which binds the user and the version).
+ * - `keyVersion` becomes the proven version, if it is higher (an older genuine wrap never lowers it).
+ * - Seen pins are cleared **only** with `confirmedPinReset: true`, after the user explicitly confirms it (for
+ *   example, when a thief's record narrowed a pin while the stolen device was still live). The confirmation
+ *   prompt must tell the user to revoke the thief's device FIRST: while it is live, its records still count
+ *   and would narrow the pins again. The next
+ *   certifiedSigners call then takes pins from the records live devices have signed.
+ * - The seen-revoked set is never cleared: revocation is monotonic.
+ */
+export function resetTrustStateAfterUnlock(state, proof, opts = {}) {
+    if (!constantTimeEqual(Buffer.from(masterKeyVerifier(proof.masterKey)), Buffer.from(proof.stored.masterKeyVerifier))) {
+        throw new KeyTrustError('the master key does not match its verifier: no proof of the key version');
+    }
+    return {
+        // Never lower: an older genuine wrap (a replayed pre-rotation one) proves only that older version.
+        keyVersion: Math.max(state.keyVersion, proof.stored.keyVersion),
+        pins: opts.confirmedPinReset === true ? {} : { ...state.pins },
+        revoked: [...state.revoked],
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * The trusted signer set, built from `GET /v1/devices/trust`, the master keys the client holds and its
+ * persisted TrustState. Build the set for pulls, checkpoints and grants from this, never from the server's
+ * device list alone. Persist the returned state. The rules (docs/security/e2e-keys.md, "Revocation"):
+ * - A key is certified if a certificate for it verifies under the master key of the certificate's own
+ *   version (old history stays verifiable after rotation while the client keeps the old master keys).
+ * - **Current version only for liveness.** The current version is the highest the client holds or has
+ *   seen. Only a certificate at that version can make a key live, so a thief with a pre-rotation master key
+ *   cannot certify a fresh key into live trust. Older certificates carry pinned history only.
+ * - **Any valid record revokes its target.** A record whose signature verifies under a key certified at the
+ *   current version, live, pinned or pending, makes its target non-live for good (TrustState.revoked),
+ *   whatever the server claims. Records by old-version-only keys are ignored: such a key can never be live.
+ * - **Pins come only from live signers, and only ever narrow.** A record sets pins only if its signer is live
+ *   (a server claim at the current version) and not itself revoked. Several such records: the narrowest pins.
+ *   The result is always narrowed with the pins this client has seen (TrustState.pins), so neither a withheld
+ *   record nor a wider record served later can widen or drop a pin. A revoked key with no pins, now or ever,
+ *   is pending (untrusted; `includePending` returns it for the revocation flow).
+ * - **The current version** is the highest of: the versions the client has seen, the account version the
+ *   server declares, and the master keys held. When it is above every held master key, nothing is live and
+ *   `keyRotated` is true: tell the user "the account key was rotated: unlock with your passphrase to fetch
+ *   the new master key".
+ *
+ * **The caller MUST persist the returned `state`** in the same local transaction as the pull cursor, and pass
+ * it back next time. Nothing in core does this yet (the `cleo cloud` commands will); without it the monotonic
+ * guarantees above do not hold.
+ * - A live key: certified at the current version, called live by the server, never revoked.
+ */
+export function certifiedSigners(masterKeys, userId, trust, state, 
+/**
+ * The account's key version as the server declares it (`keyVersion` of GET /v1/account/keys), or null
+ * when the account has no keys yet. Used for this call only, never persisted. It may raise the current
+ * version by at most MAX_ROTATION_STEP above the highest held or proven version: a rotation bumps the
+ * version by one. A higher value is a server error (`serverError`), not a rotation.
+ */
+accountKeyVersion, opts = {}) {
+    const held = Math.max(0, ...masterKeys.keys());
+    const proven = Math.max(state.keyVersion, held);
+    const implausible = accountKeyVersion !== null && accountKeyVersion > proven + MAX_ROTATION_STEP;
+    const current = Math.max(proven, implausible ? 0 : (accountKeyVersion ?? 0));
+    const certified = new Map();
+    for (const c of trust.certificates) {
+        const mk = masterKeys.get(c.keyVersion);
+        if (!mk)
+            continue;
+        const keys = {
+            deviceId: c.deviceId,
+            encryptionPublicKey: Buffer.from(c.encryptionPublicKey, 'base64'),
+            signingPublicKey: Buffer.from(c.signingPublicKey, 'base64'),
+        };
+        if (!verifyDeviceCertificate(mk, userId, keys, c.keyVersion, Buffer.from(c.certificate, 'base64')))
+            continue;
+        const id = `${c.deviceId}/${hex(keys.signingPublicKey)}`;
+        const prev = certified.get(id);
+        const atCurrent = c.keyVersion === current;
+        certified.set(id, {
+            deviceId: c.deviceId,
+            publicKey: keys.signingPublicKey,
+            // An implausible declaration fails closed: nothing is live in this call (nothing is persisted either).
+            live: (prev?.live ?? false) || (c.live && atCurrent && !implausible),
+            atCurrent: (prev?.atCurrent ?? false) || atCurrent,
+        });
+    }
+    // Every record whose signature verifies under a key of its signer that is certified at the current
+    // version, whatever that key's status (live, pinned or pending). An old-version-only key can never be
+    // live, and its records touch nothing: a thief with a pre-rotation master key cannot revoke live devices.
+    const valid = [];
+    for (const r of trust.revocations) {
+        const revokedKey = Buffer.from(r.signingPublicKey, 'base64');
+        const revokedId = `${r.deviceId}/${hex(revokedKey)}`;
+        if (!certified.has(revokedId))
+            continue;
+        const msg = revocationMessage(userId, r.deviceId, revokedKey, r.pins, r.signerDeviceId);
+        const signature = Buffer.from(r.signature, 'base64');
+        for (const [signerId, k] of certified) {
+            if (k.deviceId === r.signerDeviceId &&
+                k.atCurrent &&
+                verifyEd25519(k.publicKey, msg, signature)) {
+                valid.push({ signerId, revokedId, pins: r.pins });
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    const revoked = new Set([
+        ...state.revoked,
+        ...Object.keys(state.pins),
+        ...valid.map((x) => x.revokedId),
+    ]);
+    const pins = new Map();
+    for (const x of valid) {
+        const signer = certified.get(x.signerId);
+        if (!signer?.live || revoked.has(x.signerId))
+            continue;
+        const prev = pins.get(x.revokedId);
+        pins.set(x.revokedId, prev ? narrowerPins(prev, x.pins) : x.pins);
+    }
+    // Pins only ever narrow: a record served now, even a genuine one by another live signer, can never
+    // widen a pin this client has seen, and a withheld record leaves the seen pin in force.
+    for (const [id, p] of Object.entries(state.pins)) {
+        const now = pins.get(id);
+        pins.set(id, now ? narrowerPins(now, p) : p);
+    }
+    const signers = new Map();
+    for (const [id, k] of certified) {
+        const pin = pins.get(id);
+        const key = pin
+            ? { publicKey: k.publicKey, pin }
+            : k.live && !revoked.has(id)
+                ? { publicKey: k.publicKey, pin: null }
+                : opts.includePending
+                    ? { publicKey: k.publicKey, pin: null, pending: true }
+                    : null;
+        if (!key)
+            continue;
+        signers.set(k.deviceId, [...(signers.get(k.deviceId) ?? []), key]);
+    }
+    const next = {
+        keyVersion: proven,
+        pins: Object.fromEntries([...pins].sort(([a], [b]) => (a < b ? -1 : 1))),
+        revoked: [...revoked].sort(),
+    };
+    // The account moved to a key version this client has no master key for: nothing is live until it
+    // unlocks with the passphrase (or the recovery key) and fetches the new master key.
+    return {
+        signers,
+        state: next,
+        keyRotated: current > held,
+        ...(implausible ? { serverError: 'implausible-key-version' } : {}),
+    };
+}
+const revocationMessage = (userId, deviceId, revokedKey, pins, signerDeviceId) => deviceRevocationMessage({
+    userId,
+    revokedDeviceId: deviceId,
+    revokedSigningPublicKeyHex: hex(revokedKey),
+    pinsHash: sha256Hex(utf8(revocationPinsCanonical(pins))),
+    signerDeviceId,
+});
+/**
+ * Revoke one signing key of a device and pin its history (the POST /v1/devices/:id/revocations body).
+ * The signer must hold a certified key: after losing every other device, the device that just unlocked
+ * with the passphrase certifies itself (a self-grant) and signs this. Compute `pins` from segments and
+ * checkpoints this client has itself verified (revocationPins), never from numbers the server supplies.
+ */
+export function createDeviceRevocation(args) {
+    const { userId, revoked, pins, signer } = args;
+    const msg = revocationMessage(userId, revoked.deviceId, revoked.signingPublicKey, pins, signer.deviceId);
+    return {
+        signingPublicKey: Buffer.from(revoked.signingPublicKey).toString('base64'),
+        pins,
+        signerDeviceId: signer.deviceId,
+        signature: signEd25519(signer.signing, msg).toString('base64'),
+    };
+}
+const grantMessage = (userId, recipient, keyVersion, sealed, certificate, signerDeviceId) => deviceGrantMessage({
+    userId,
+    recipientDeviceId: recipient.deviceId,
+    recipientEncryptionPublicKeyHex: hex(recipient.encryptionPublicKey),
+    recipientSigningPublicKeyHex: hex(recipient.signingPublicKey),
+    keyVersion,
+    sealedMasterKeyHash: sha256Hex(sealed),
+    certificateHex: hex(certificate),
+    signerDeviceId,
+});
+/**
+ * Grant the master key to a device: seal it to the recipient's X25519 key, certify the recipient under
+ * the master key, and sign the whole grant with the signer's Ed25519 key. The signer must hold the
+ * master key legitimately: a device that unlocked by passphrase or recovery key grants to itself, and a
+ * trusted device grants to another (key rotation). The result is the PUT /v1/devices/:id/key body.
+ */
+export function createDeviceGrant(args) {
+    const { masterKey, userId, keyVersion, recipient, signer } = args;
+    const sealed = sealTo(recipient.encryptionPublicKey, masterKey, deviceContext(userId, recipient.deviceId, keyVersion));
+    const certificate = deviceCertificate(masterKey, userId, recipient, keyVersion);
+    const signature = signEd25519(signer.signing, grantMessage(userId, recipient, keyVersion, sealed, certificate, signer.deviceId));
+    return {
+        sealedMasterKey: sealed.toString('base64'),
+        keyVersion,
+        certificate: certificate.toString('base64'),
+        signerDeviceId: signer.deviceId,
+        grantSignature: signature.toString('base64'),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Open a master key grant made to this device, after checking it came from a trusted signer. The checks,
+ * in order: the signer is in `trustedSigners` (the device's own signing key for a self-grant, or devices
+ * certified under a master key this device already holds); the signature verifies over a message rebuilt
+ * from this device's OWN keys, so a grant made for other keys fails; the sealed box opens; and the key
+ * inside certifies this device, so the key and the signer's intent agree. The server's verifier is not
+ * consulted: it is server-supplied and proves nothing.
+ */
+export function openDeviceGrant(args) {
+    const { userId, device, grant, trustedSigners } = args;
+    // Only a live key vouches for a new grant: a revoked device's pin covers its history, not new keys.
+    const candidates = liveKeys(trustedSigners, grant.signerDeviceId);
+    if (candidates.length === 0)
+        throw new KeyTrustError(`key grant is signed by untrusted device ${grant.signerDeviceId}`);
+    const me = {
+        deviceId: device.deviceId,
+        encryptionPublicKey: device.encryption.publicKey,
+        signingPublicKey: device.signingPublicKey,
+    };
+    const sealed = Buffer.from(grant.sealedMasterKey, 'base64');
+    const certificate = Buffer.from(grant.certificate, 'base64');
+    const msg = grantMessage(userId, me, grant.keyVersion, sealed, certificate, grant.signerDeviceId);
+    const grantSignature = Buffer.from(grant.grantSignature, 'base64');
+    if (!candidates.some((k) => verifyEd25519(k.publicKey, msg, grantSignature))) {
+        throw new KeyTrustError('key grant signature does not verify');
+    }
+    const mk = openSealed(device.encryption, sealed, deviceContext(userId, device.deviceId, grant.keyVersion));
+    if (!verifyDeviceCertificate(mk, userId, me, grant.keyVersion, certificate)) {
+        throw new KeyTrustError('granted master key does not certify this device');
+    }
+    return mk;
+}
+export const newProjectKey = randomKey;
+export function wrapProjectKey(mk, pdk, projectId, keyVersion) {
+    return seal(mk, pdk, 'pdk-wrap', pdkContext(projectId, keyVersion)).toString('base64');
+}
+export function unwrapProjectKey(mk, wrapped, projectId, keyVersion) {
+    return open(mk, Buffer.from(wrapped, 'base64'), 'pdk-wrap', pdkContext(projectId, keyVersion));
+}
+/** Key for the personal home stream. It is derived, so it never needs storing or sharing. */
+export const homeStreamKey = (mk) => deriveKey(mk, 'home-stream');
+//# sourceMappingURL=keys.js.map

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package/dist/cloud/manifest-check.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+import type { Manifest, TableDeltas } from '@cleocode/contracts/cloud';
+export type ManifestVerdict = {
+    ok: true;
+} | {
+    ok: false;
+    code: 'E_REGRESSION';
+    tables: RegressionFinding[];
+} | {
+    ok: false;
+    code: 'E_SCHEMA_AHEAD';
+    schemaVersion: number;
+    maxAccepted: number;
+};
+export interface RegressionFinding {
+    table: string;
+    parentRows: number;
+    created: number;
+    deleted: number;
+    expectedRows: number;
+    actualRows: number;
+    reason: 'missing-table' | 'count-mismatch';
+}
+/** Sum the per-table deltas of every segment folded into a checkpoint. */
+export declare function sumDeltas(deltas: readonly TableDeltas[]): TableDeltas;
+/**
+ * Decide whether a new checkpoint manifest may replace its parent.
+ *
+ * The rule is exact, not a heuristic: for every table,
+ * `next.rows === parent.rows + created - deleted`, summed over the segments between the two
+ * checkpoints. Every shrink therefore needs a tombstone op to back it. A table present in the
+ * parent must still be present, even with 0 rows.
+ *
+ * With no parent (genesis), only the schema version is checked.
+ */
+export declare function checkManifest(parent: Manifest | null, next: Manifest, between: TableDeltas, maxAcceptedSchemaVersion: number): ManifestVerdict;
+//# sourceMappingURL=manifest-check.d.ts.map

package/dist/cloud/manifest-check.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"manifest-check.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/cloud/manifest-check.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAEvE,MAAM,MAAM,eAAe,GACvB;IAAE,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAA;CAAE,GACZ;IAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC;IAAC,IAAI,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAA;CAAE,GAChE;IAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC;IAAC,IAAI,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC;IAAC,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAAC,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,CAAC;AAEtF,MAAM,WAAW,iBAAiB;IAChC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACd,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACnB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACrB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACnB,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe,GAAG,gBAAgB,CAAC;CAC5C;AAED,0EAA0E;AAC1E,wBAAgB,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,WAAW,EAAE,GAAG,WAAW,CASrE;AAED;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,wBAAgB,aAAa,CAC3B,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,EACvB,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,EACd,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EACpB,wBAAwB,EAAE,MAAM,GAC/B,eAAe,CA+CjB"}