@clear-capabilities/agentic-security-scanner 0.184.0 → 0.186.1

package/dist/6972.index.js

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-export const id = 6972;
-export const ids = [6972];
-export const modules = {
-
-/***/ 16972:
-/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
-
-/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
-/* harmony export */   describeTarget: () => (/* binding */ describeTarget),
-/* harmony export */   loadTargetManifest: () => (/* binding */ loadTargetManifest),
-/* harmony export */   validateTarget: () => (/* binding */ validateTarget)
-/* harmony export */ });
-/* unused harmony export _internals */
-/* harmony import */ var node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(73024);
-/* harmony import */ var node_path__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__ = __webpack_require__(76760);
-// Verifier target harness (FR-LIVE-HARNESS).
-//
-// Customer projects describe how to bring up the app they want the verifier
-// to execute PoCs against. The manifest lives at
-// `.agentic-security/verifier-target.yaml` and the verifier reads it before
-// running `--live` mode. v1 supports two manifest shapes:
-//
-//   shape: docker-compose
-//   compose: docker-compose.yml
-//   service: web
-//   port: 3000
-//   wait-for: http://localhost:3000/healthz
-//
-//   ─── or ───
-//
-//   shape: command
-//   start: npm run dev
-//   port: 3000
-//   wait-for: http://localhost:3000/healthz
-//   stop: pkill -f "npm run dev"
-//
-// We DO NOT execute the manifest in this module — that's the verifier
-// sandbox's job (and the customer's explicit opt-in via --live). This
-// module parses, validates, and surfaces a structured object the verifier
-// can act on (or refuse to act on).
-
-
-
-
-const MANIFEST_PATH = node_path__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__.join('.agentic-security', 'verifier-target.yaml');
-
-// Minimal YAML subset parser — keep parity with the polyglot bench parser,
-// scoped to the small set of keys this manifest uses. Standalone here to
-// avoid a runtime dep.
-function _parse(text) {
-  const out = {};
-  for (const raw of String(text || '').split(/\r?\n/)) {
-    const line = raw.replace(/#.*$/, '').trim();
-    if (!line) continue;
-    const m = line.match(/^([\w-]+)\s*:\s*(.*)$/);
-    if (!m) continue;
-    const [, key, val] = m;
-    out[key] = _coerce(val);
-  }
-  return out;
-}
-
-function _coerce(v) {
-  if (v === undefined || v === null) return null;
-  v = String(v).trim();
-  if (/^".*"$/.test(v)) return v.slice(1, -1);
-  if (/^'.*'$/.test(v)) return v.slice(1, -1);
-  if (/^-?\d+$/.test(v)) return parseInt(v, 10);
-  return v;
-}
-
-/**
- * Read the verifier-target manifest from scanRoot. Returns:
- *   { ok: true, target } — successfully parsed and validated
- *   { ok: false, reason } — manifest missing or invalid
- *
- * Never throws.
- */
-function loadTargetManifest(scanRoot) {
-  const fp = node_path__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__.join(scanRoot || process.cwd(), MANIFEST_PATH);
-  if (!node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.existsSync(fp)) return { ok: false, reason: 'no-manifest' };
-  let raw;
-  try { raw = node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.readFileSync(fp, 'utf8'); }
-  catch (e) { return { ok: false, reason: `read-error:${e.message}` }; }
-  const parsed = _parse(raw);
-  const shape = parsed.shape;
-  if (shape !== 'docker-compose' && shape !== 'command') {
-    return { ok: false, reason: `unknown-shape:${shape || 'missing'}` };
-  }
-  if (shape === 'docker-compose') {
-    if (!parsed.compose || !parsed.service) {
-      return { ok: false, reason: 'docker-compose-shape-needs-compose-and-service' };
-    }
-  }
-  if (shape === 'command') {
-    if (!parsed.start) {
-      return { ok: false, reason: 'command-shape-needs-start' };
-    }
-  }
-  const target = {
-    shape,
-    compose: parsed.compose || null,
-    service: parsed.service || null,
-    start:   parsed.start   || null,
-    stop:    parsed.stop    || null,
-    port:    parsed.port    || null,
-    waitFor: parsed['wait-for'] || parsed.waitFor || null,
-    url:     parsed.url || (parsed.port ? `http://localhost:${parsed.port}` : null),
-  };
-  return { ok: true, target };
-}
-
-/**
- * Render a quick summary for human consumption (CLI output, logs).
- */
-function describeTarget(target) {
-  if (!target) return '(none)';
-  if (target.shape === 'docker-compose') {
-    return `docker-compose service ${target.service} from ${target.compose} on ${target.url || `:${target.port}`}`;
-  }
-  if (target.shape === 'command') {
-    return `command "${target.start}" on ${target.url || `:${target.port}`}`;
-  }
-  return `unknown-shape ${target.shape}`;
-}
-
-/**
- * Pre-flight safety check: refuse to bring up a target whose start command
- * looks dangerous. Curated allowlist of common shapes; everything else
- * requires AGENTIC_SECURITY_VERIFY_TARGET_OK=1 to opt in explicitly.
- */
-function validateTarget(target) {
-  if (!target) return { ok: false, reason: 'no-target' };
-  if (target.shape === 'docker-compose') {
-    // docker-compose is safe-ish by design.
-    return { ok: true };
-  }
-  if (target.shape === 'command') {
-    const SAFE_HINTS = [
-      /^npm\s+(?:run\s+)?(?:dev|start|serve)/,
-      /^yarn\s+(?:dev|start|serve)/,
-      /^pnpm\s+(?:run\s+)?(?:dev|start|serve)/,
-      /^node\s+/,
-      /^python(?:\d?)\s+-m\s+/,
-      /^python(?:\d?)\s+\S+\.py/,
-      /^uvicorn\s+/,
-      /^gunicorn\s+/,
-      /^flask\s+run/,
-      /^go\s+run\s+/,
-      /^java\s+-jar\s+/,
-      /^cargo\s+run/,
-    ];
-    if (process.env.AGENTIC_SECURITY_VERIFY_TARGET_OK === '1') return { ok: true, escaped: true };
-    if (!SAFE_HINTS.some(re => re.test(target.start))) {
-      return { ok: false, reason: `start-command-not-in-safe-allowlist (set AGENTIC_SECURITY_VERIFY_TARGET_OK=1 to override)` };
-    }
-    return { ok: true };
-  }
-  return { ok: false, reason: `unknown-shape:${target.shape}` };
-}
-
-const _internals = { MANIFEST_PATH };
-
-
-/***/ })
-
-};

package/dist/6995.index.js

@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
-export const id = 6995;
-export const ids = [6995];
-export const modules = {
-
-/***/ 66995:
-/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
-
-/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
-/* harmony export */   addLegalHold: () => (/* binding */ addLegalHold),
-/* harmony export */   isUnderHold: () => (/* binding */ isUnderHold),
-/* harmony export */   listLegalHolds: () => (/* binding */ listLegalHolds),
-/* harmony export */   loadLegalHolds: () => (/* binding */ loadLegalHolds),
-/* harmony export */   removeLegalHold: () => (/* binding */ removeLegalHold)
-/* harmony export */ });
-/* unused harmony export LEGAL_HOLD_FILE */
-/* harmony import */ var node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(73024);
-/* harmony import */ var _state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__ = __webpack_require__(69259);
-/* harmony import */ var _artifact_registry_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__ = __webpack_require__(81734);
-// FR-707 (assurance-hardening PRD): "Support legal hold and policy-
-// authorized retention exceptions | Legal hold is identity-bound, reasoned,
-// time-bounded where applicable, and auditable."
-//
-// A third instance of the recurring {owner, reason, expires_at} exception
-// shape this codebase already uses twice — `posture/suppressions.js`'s
-// pro-tier exception (scoped to a FINDING) and `posture/compliance-policy.js`'s
-// structured `not-applicable` (scoped to a COMPLIANCE CONTROL). Per D-0025,
-// these are deliberately distinct mechanisms serving different subjects, not
-// one shared module — this file is the third subject: a STATE ARTIFACT.
-//
-// Field naming matches the existing two schemas' snake_case convention
-// (`owner`, `reason`, `expires_at`) rather than inventing a fourth style.
-//
-//   identity-bound   -> `owner` (required, who placed the hold and is
-//                        accountable for lifting it)
-//   reasoned         -> `reason` (required — "we might need this later" is
-//                        not a reason; same discipline suppressions.js
-//                        already enforces for its own exceptions)
-//   time-bounded
-//     where applicable -> `expires_at` is OPTIONAL: a null/absent value is
-//                        an INDEFINITE hold, which the acceptance
-//                        criterion's own "where applicable" phrase
-//                        explicitly allows (a genuine legal matter may have
-//                        no known end date) — an ISO date value behaves
-//                        exactly like FR-506/FR-1004's own expiring
-//                        exceptions: once past, the hold is no longer
-//                        active and the artifact is exposed to its normal
-//                        retention TTL again.
-//   auditable        -> persisted as a single JSON array under
-//                        `.agentic-security/legal-holds.json` (itself
-//                        registered as operator-config — an operator/legal
-//                        team's own input, never scanner-written from scan
-//                        results), readable via `listLegalHolds`.
-//
-// Consulted from TWO places, not one: `retention-policy.js#findExpiredArtifacts`
-// (defense in depth for any caller reaching it directly) AND `cmdReset`
-// itself for its PLAIN (non-`--expired`) path, which deletes every
-// registered 'generated' artifact unconditionally and would otherwise blow
-// through a hold that only gated TTL expiry.
-
-
-
-
-
-const LEGAL_HOLD_FILE = 'legal-holds.json';
-
-function _loadRaw(scanRoot) {
-  let fp;
-  try { fp = (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__.statePath)(scanRoot, LEGAL_HOLD_FILE); } catch { return []; }
-  let raw;
-  try { raw = node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.readFileSync(fp, 'utf8'); } catch { return []; }
-  try {
-    const doc = JSON.parse(raw);
-    return Array.isArray(doc) ? doc : [];
-  } catch { return []; }
-}
-
-/**
- * All legal holds ever recorded for this project, malformed entries
- * dropped rather than throwing. Never filters by expiry — see
- * `isUnderHold`/`listLegalHolds` for that.
- */
-function loadLegalHolds(scanRoot) {
-  return _loadRaw(scanRoot).filter(h => h && typeof h === 'object' && typeof h.artifact === 'string' && typeof h.owner === 'string' && typeof h.reason === 'string');
-}
-
-/**
- * Is `artifactName` currently protected by an active (non-expired) hold?
- * Returns the matching hold record, or null. Multiple holds on the same
- * artifact are permitted (e.g. two independent legal matters); the first
- * still-active one found is returned.
- */
-function isUnderHold(artifactName, holds, now = Date.now()) {
-  for (const h of holds) {
-    if (h.artifact !== artifactName) continue;
-    if (!h.expires_at) return h; // indefinite hold — always active
-    const t = Date.parse(h.expires_at);
-    if (!Number.isFinite(t) || t >= now) return h;
-  }
-  return null;
-}
-
-/**
- * Active (non-expired) holds only, unless `includeExpired`. For
- * `legal-hold list` / auditing.
- */
-function listLegalHolds(scanRoot, { includeExpired = false, now = Date.now() } = {}) {
-  const holds = loadLegalHolds(scanRoot);
-  if (includeExpired) return holds;
-  return holds.filter(h => {
-    if (!h.expires_at) return true;
-    const t = Date.parse(h.expires_at);
-    return !Number.isFinite(t) || t >= now;
-  });
-}
-
-/**
- * Add a legal hold. Validates identity-bound + reasoned up front (both
- * required, non-empty) and that `expires_at`, if given, is a parseable
- * date in the future — an already-expired hold would be a hold that
- * protects nothing, which is never a legitimate request. `artifact` must
- * name a real registered artifact (artifact-registry.js) — a hold on an
- * unrecognised name can never protect anything and almost always means a
- * typo. Returns `{ok:true, hold}` or `{ok:false, reason}`; never throws.
- */
-function addLegalHold(scanRoot, { artifact, owner, reason, expires_at } = {}) {
-  if (!artifact || typeof artifact !== 'string') return { ok: false, reason: '--artifact is required' };
-  if (!(0,_artifact_registry_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__/* .isRegisteredArtifact */ .Jl)(artifact)) return { ok: false, reason: `"${artifact}" is not a registered state artifact` };
-  if (!owner || typeof owner !== 'string') return { ok: false, reason: '--owner is required (identity-bound)' };
-  if (!reason || typeof reason !== 'string') return { ok: false, reason: '--reason is required (reasoned)' };
-  if (expires_at) {
-    const t = Date.parse(expires_at);
-    if (!Number.isFinite(t)) return { ok: false, reason: 'expires_at must be a parseable date' };
-    if (t < Date.now()) return { ok: false, reason: 'expires_at is in the past — a hold that already expired protects nothing' };
-  }
-  const hold = { artifact, owner, reason, expires_at: expires_at || null, created_at: new Date().toISOString() };
-  const holds = _loadRaw(scanRoot);
-  holds.push(hold);
-  const fp = (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__.statePath)(scanRoot, LEGAL_HOLD_FILE);
-  if (!(0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__.safeWriteState)(fp, JSON.stringify(holds, null, 2) + '\n')) {
-    return { ok: false, reason: 'state writes are disabled (--no-state) or this is not a safe state directory' };
-  }
-  return { ok: true, hold };
-}
-
-/**
- * Remove every hold on `artifact` (lifting a hold, not letting it expire).
- * Returns the number removed. A no-op (0) if none existed — never an error.
- */
-function removeLegalHold(scanRoot, artifact) {
-  const holds = _loadRaw(scanRoot);
-  const remaining = holds.filter(h => !(h && h.artifact === artifact));
-  const removedCount = holds.length - remaining.length;
-  if (removedCount > 0) {
-    const fp = (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__.statePath)(scanRoot, LEGAL_HOLD_FILE);
-    (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__.safeWriteState)(fp, JSON.stringify(remaining, null, 2) + '\n');
-  }
-  return removedCount;
-}
-
-
-/***/ })
-
-};

package/dist/7249.index.js

@@ -1,191 +0,0 @@
-export const id = 7249;
-export const ids = [7249];
-export const modules = {
-
-/***/ 27249:
-/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
-
-/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
-/* harmony export */   renderPrComment: () => (/* binding */ renderPrComment)
-/* harmony export */ });
-/* unused harmony export _internal */
-/* harmony import */ var _util_untrusted_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(11274);
-// Advisor-tone PR comment renderer (v0.72).
-//
-// Replaces the typical "12 findings detected, see SARIF" wall of text
-// with a single security-advisor's note:
-//
-//   "I noticed you added /api/admin/users in this PR. I checked 4 things:
-//    ✓ auth (route is behind requireAdmin)
-//    ⚠ rate-limit (no rateLimit() middleware found)
-//    ✓ input validation (express-validator chain present)
-//    ✓ audit log (logger.security() called on success path)
-//
-//    The rate-limit gap matters because /admin endpoints are common
-//    credential-stuffing targets. A 5-line fix:
-//
-//    ```js
-//    import rateLimit from 'express-rate-limit';
-//    app.use('/api/admin', rateLimit({ windowMs: 15*60_000, max: 30 }));
-//    ```"
-//
-// The pure-narrative format optimizes for SCREENSHOTABILITY — engineers
-// share security-tool comments that read like a person, not a table.
-//
-// Generation is deterministic (no LLM) for the v1: we render from the
-// delta + a per-CWE narrative template. A future v2 could optionally
-// route through an LLM for richer prose when AGENTIC_SECURITY_LLM_ENDPOINT
-// is configured.
-
-
-
-const SEVERITY_GLYPH = {
-  critical: '🟥',
-  high:     '🟧',
-  medium:   '🟨',
-  low:      '🟦',
-  info:     '⬜',
-};
-
-const CWE_NARRATIVE = {
-  'CWE-89':   { name: 'SQL injection',          why: 'A malicious payload like `1\' OR 1=1--` would dump every row.' },
-  'CWE-79':   { name: 'XSS',                    why: 'An attacker who controls this string can execute JavaScript in another user\'s browser.' },
-  'CWE-78':   { name: 'Command injection',      why: 'A `;rm -rf /` style payload would run with the privileges of your service account.' },
-  'CWE-22':   { name: 'path traversal',         why: 'A `../../etc/passwd` style payload would read files outside the intended directory.' },
-  'CWE-918':  { name: 'SSRF',                   why: 'An attacker can pivot to the cloud metadata endpoint (`169.254.169.254`) or internal services.' },
-  'CWE-502':  { name: 'insecure deserialization', why: 'A crafted payload triggers gadget chains — typically remote code execution.' },
-  'CWE-611':  { name: 'XXE',                    why: 'A malicious DOCTYPE can exfiltrate local files or trigger SSRF via entity expansion.' },
-  'CWE-94':   { name: 'template injection',     why: 'A `{{7*7}}` style payload escapes to the template engine\'s expression evaluator (often RCE).' },
-  'CWE-1321': { name: 'prototype pollution',    why: 'A `__proto__` injection can alter the behavior of every downstream object check.' },
-  'CWE-352':  { name: 'CSRF',                   why: 'A cross-origin form can trigger authenticated state changes without the user\'s knowledge.' },
-  'CWE-601':  { name: 'open redirect',          why: 'Trusted-domain bouncer for phishing — credentials get harvested on the second hop.' },
-  'CWE-113':  { name: 'HTTP response splitting', why: 'CR/LF injection lets an attacker forge an entire response, including cache poisoning.' },
-  'CWE-798':  { name: 'hardcoded secret',       why: 'Committed credentials are scraped by automated scanners minutes after a push.' },
-  'CWE-327':  { name: 'weak crypto',            why: 'Modern adversaries can crack MD5/SHA-1/RC4/3DES at practical cost.' },
-  'CWE-1333': { name: 'regex DoS',              why: 'A pathological input freezes the worker for seconds — DoS without much effort.' },
-  'CWE-90':   { name: 'LDAP injection',         why: 'An attacker can extend the filter to enumerate users or bypass auth.' },
-  'CWE-643':  { name: 'XPath injection',        why: 'A `\' or \'1\'=\'1` payload can return data the query never intended to expose.' },
-  'CWE-1336': { name: 'prompt injection',       why: 'Untrusted text in the LLM context can override your system prompt.' },
-  'CWE-269':  { name: 'privilege escalation',   why: 'A low-privilege actor can reach a higher-privilege capability through this surface.' },
-};
-
-function _topCwes(findings, n = 3) {
-  const counts = new Map();
-  for (const f of findings) {
-    const k = f.cwe || 'unknown';
-    counts.set(k, (counts.get(k) || 0) + 1);
-  }
-  return [...counts.entries()].sort((a, b) => b[1] - a[1]).slice(0, n);
-}
-
-function _route(f) {
-  // Best-effort: pull a route-ish string from the file path / vuln text.
-  // Many SAST findings carry the route via `f.route` or in the vuln name.
-  if (f.route) return f.route;
-  const m = (f.vuln || '').match(/\b(GET|POST|PUT|DELETE|PATCH)\s+([\/\w:-]+)/i);
-  if (m) return `${m[1].toUpperCase()} ${m[2]}`;
-  return null;
-}
-
-/**
- * Top-level renderer. Takes a delta produced by `computePrDelta` and
- * emits a Markdown string suitable for posting as a single PR comment.
- *
- * Mode is chosen automatically:
- *   - "clean":     no introduced + (resolved > 0 || persistent > 0)
- *   - "trivial":   no introduced + nothing resolved
- *   - "needs-work": one or more introduced findings
- */
-function renderPrComment(delta, { repoName, prNumber, prTitle } = {}) {
-  if (!delta) return '_no security delta available_';
-  const intro = delta.introduced || [];
-  const resolved = delta.resolved || [];
-  const shifted = delta.shifted || [];
-  const heading = repoName && prNumber
-    ? `### 🛡 agentic-security on ${repoName}#${prNumber}`
-    : `### 🛡 agentic-security`;
-  if (intro.length === 0 && resolved.length === 0 && shifted.length === 0) {
-    return [
-      heading,
-      ``,
-      `No security delta from \`${delta.baseRef}\` → \`${delta.headRef}\`. ` +
-      `${delta.changedFiles.length} file${delta.changedFiles.length === 1 ? '' : 's'} touched; ` +
-      `nothing in those changes introduced or resolved a finding. **Safe to merge.**`,
-      ``,
-      `<sub>Scanned ${delta.head?.summary?.total ?? 0} pre-existing findings on the head ref ` +
-      `(${delta.base?.summary?.total ?? 0} on base) — none of them moved in this PR.</sub>`,
-    ].join('\n');
-  }
-  if (intro.length === 0 && (resolved.length || shifted.length)) {
-    const r = delta.summary?.resolved || {};
-    return [
-      heading,
-      ``,
-      `This PR **resolves** ${resolved.length} finding${resolved.length === 1 ? '' : 's'}` +
-      (r.critical || r.high ? ` (including ${r.critical} critical + ${r.high} high)` : '') +
-      ` and introduces **none**. Nice cleanup work — safe to merge. ✨`,
-      ``,
-      `<sub>${delta.changedFiles.length} file${delta.changedFiles.length === 1 ? '' : 's'} ` +
-      `touched between \`${delta.baseRef}\` and \`${delta.headRef}\`.</sub>`,
-    ].join('\n');
-  }
-  // needs-work mode: narrative + per-finding paragraphs.
-  const lines = [];
-  lines.push(heading);
-  lines.push('');
-  const topCwes = _topCwes(intro);
-  const cweSummary = topCwes.map(([cwe, n]) => {
-    const meta = CWE_NARRATIVE[cwe];
-    return meta ? `${n} ${meta.name}` : `${n} ${cwe}`;
-  }).join(', ');
-  const hint = prTitle ? ` in "${prTitle}"` : '';
-  lines.push(`I looked at the ${delta.changedFiles.length} file${delta.changedFiles.length === 1 ? '' : 's'} ` +
-    `you changed${hint} and noticed **${intro.length} new finding${intro.length === 1 ? '' : 's'}** ` +
-    `that wasn't on \`${delta.baseRef}\`. Top concerns: ${cweSummary}.`);
-  lines.push('');
-  // Per-introduced-finding paragraph (cap at 5 for readability).
-  const SHOW = intro.slice(0, 5);
-  for (const f of SHOW) {
-    const meta = CWE_NARRATIVE[f.cwe];
-    const sev = SEVERITY_GLYPH[f.severity] || '⬜';
-    const route = _route(f);
-    const where = route ? `\`${route}\` (\`${f.file}:${f.line}\`)` : `\`${f.file}:${f.line}\``;
-    lines.push(`${sev} **${meta?.name || (0,_util_untrusted_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__/* .escapeMarkdown */ .FV)(f.vuln)}** — ${where}`);
-    if (meta) lines.push(`  > ${meta.why}`);
-    if (f.remediation) {
-      const onelineFix = String(f.remediation).split('\n')[0].slice(0, 240);
-      lines.push(`  Suggested fix: ${onelineFix}`);
-    }
-    if (f.confidence != null && f.confidence < 0.7) {
-      lines.push(`  <sub>Lower confidence (${(f.confidence * 100).toFixed(0)}%) — may be a false positive worth a quick look.</sub>`);
-    }
-    lines.push('');
-  }
-  if (intro.length > SHOW.length) {
-    lines.push(`<sub>+${intro.length - SHOW.length} more new finding${intro.length - SHOW.length === 1 ? '' : 's'} — see the scan output for the full list.</sub>`);
-    lines.push('');
-  }
-  if (resolved.length) {
-    lines.push(`On the bright side: this PR **resolved ${resolved.length} pre-existing finding${resolved.length === 1 ? '' : 's'}**. 👏`);
-    lines.push('');
-  }
-  const i = delta.summary?.introduced || {};
-  const blockMerge = (i.critical || 0) + (i.high || 0) > 0;
-  if (blockMerge) {
-    lines.push(`---`);
-    lines.push(`**Blocking merge:** ${i.critical || 0} critical + ${i.high || 0} high severity ` +
-      `finding${(i.critical || 0) + (i.high || 0) === 1 ? '' : 's'} introduced. ` +
-      `Fix or suppress with \`// agentic-security-ignore: <rule-id>\` before merging.`);
-  } else {
-    lines.push(`---`);
-    lines.push(`Non-blocking: no critical/high severity findings introduced — but consider addressing the items above before this becomes harder to revisit.`);
-  }
-  return lines.join('\n');
-}
-
-const _internal = { CWE_NARRATIVE, SEVERITY_GLYPH, _topCwes };
-
-
-/***/ })
-
-};