@clear-capabilities/agentic-security-scanner 0.184.0 → 0.186.1

package/dist/5439.index.js

@@ -1,301 +0,0 @@
-export const id = 5439;
-export const ids = [5439,119];
-export const modules = {
-
-/***/ 35439:
-/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
-
-/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
-/* harmony export */   analyzeLayerSecrets: () => (/* binding */ analyzeLayerSecrets)
-/* harmony export */ });
-/* unused harmony export DEFAULT_SECRET_SCAN_LIMITS */
-/* harmony import */ var _safe_tar_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(30119);
-// PRD 5 P0 §3 — Layer Secret Analysis: a secret added in one layer and later
-// deleted (via an overlay whiteout) is still sitting in that earlier layer's
-// raw tar bytes inside the image archive — recoverable by anyone who has the
-// archive, even though it is invisible in `docker run`'s final filesystem.
-//
-// The actual credential detection is INJECTED as `detectFn` (the exact
-// `(filePath, rawText) -> Finding[]` shape `src/posture/secret-history.js`
-// already uses for the git-history analog of this same idea), so this module
-// never imports `engine.js` and stays a pure, independently-testable
-// transform over the layer data `filesystem.js` already extracted. The
-// injected detector (`scanCredentials`) already returns only redacted/masked
-// values (`masked`, a redacted `snippet`) — this module never re-touches raw
-// file content once a finding exists, so there is no second place a value
-// could leak back in.
-
-
-const DEFAULT_SECRET_SCAN_LIMITS = Object.freeze({
-  maxFileBytes: 512 * 1024,
-});
-
-/**
- * `readLayersResult` is `filesystem.js#readLayers`'s output (ordered,
- * per-layer, pre-merge entries — the only shape that preserves "this path
- * existed in layer 3" even after a later layer's whiteout removes it from
- * the merged view). `deletedPaths` is `mergeLayers`'s output.
- *
- * Returns `{ findings, deletedButRecoverable, materializationSkipped }`:
- *   - `findings`: every detector hit across every layer's added files, each
- *     tagged with `path`/`layerIndex` and the detector's own (already
- *     redacted) finding fields — this is the full history sweep, not just
- *     the deleted-but-recoverable subset.
- *   - `deletedButRecoverable`: the subset of `findings` whose `path` was
- *     later removed by a whiteout in a LATER layer — PRD 5's named scenario.
- *   - `materializationSkipped`: paths whose content was too large to scan
- *     (disclosed, never silently treated as "no secret found").
- */
-function analyzeLayerSecrets({ readLayersResult, deletedPaths, detectFn, limits = DEFAULT_SECRET_SCAN_LIMITS }) {
-  if (typeof detectFn !== 'function') throw new TypeError('analyzeLayerSecrets requires a detectFn(filePath, rawText) -> Finding[]');
-  if (!readLayersResult || !Array.isArray(readLayersResult.layers)) throw new TypeError('analyzeLayerSecrets requires filesystem.js#readLayers output');
-
-  const deletedAtByPath = new Map(); // path -> earliest layer index that deleted it
-  for (const d of deletedPaths || []) {
-    if (d.opaque) continue; // opaque-directory deletions are reported separately below
-    if (!deletedAtByPath.has(d.path) || d.deletedAtLayer < deletedAtByPath.get(d.path)) {
-      deletedAtByPath.set(d.path, d.deletedAtLayer);
-    }
-  }
-  const opaqueDirs = (deletedPaths || []).filter((d) => d.opaque);
-
-  const findings = [];
-  const materializationSkipped = [];
-
-  for (const { layerIndex, entries } of readLayersResult.layers) {
-    for (const e of entries) {
-      if ((0,_safe_tar_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__/* .isWhiteoutName */ .l0)(e.name)) continue;
-      if (e.typeflag !== '0' && e.typeflag !== '') continue; // regular files only
-      if (e.size > limits.maxFileBytes) {
-        materializationSkipped.push({ path: e.name, layerIndex, sizeBytes: e.size });
-        continue;
-      }
-      let text;
-      try {
-        text = e.data.toString('utf8');
-      } catch {
-        continue; // not decodable as text — not a candidate for a text-pattern secret scan
-      }
-      let hits;
-      try {
-        hits = detectFn(e.name, text) || [];
-      } catch {
-        hits = []; // a detector failure on hostile/malformed content must never abort the sweep
-      }
-      for (const hit of hits) {
-        const deletedAtLayer = deletedAtByPath.has(e.name) && deletedAtByPath.get(e.name) > layerIndex
-          ? deletedAtByPath.get(e.name)
-          : null;
-        const underOpaqueDir = opaqueDirs.some((d) => d.deletedAtLayer > layerIndex && (e.name === d.path || e.name.startsWith(`${d.path}/`)));
-        findings.push({
-          ...hit,
-          path: e.name,
-          addedAtLayer: layerIndex,
-          deletedAtLayer: deletedAtLayer ?? (underOpaqueDir ? opaqueDirs.find((d) => d.deletedAtLayer > layerIndex && (e.name === d.path || e.name.startsWith(`${d.path}/`))).deletedAtLayer : null),
-          recoverable: deletedAtLayer != null || underOpaqueDir,
-        });
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  const deletedButRecoverable = findings.filter((f) => f.recoverable);
-
-  return { findings, deletedButRecoverable, materializationSkipped };
-}
-
-
-/***/ }),
-
-/***/ 30119:
-/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
-
-/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
-/* harmony export */   ET: () => (/* binding */ readTarEntries),
-/* harmony export */   Jn: () => (/* binding */ whiteoutTarget),
-/* harmony export */   TarSafetyError: () => (/* binding */ TarSafetyError),
-/* harmony export */   dR: () => (/* binding */ DEFAULT_LIMITS),
-/* harmony export */   l0: () => (/* binding */ isWhiteoutName),
-/* harmony export */   zr: () => (/* binding */ decompressIfGzip)
-/* harmony export */ });
-/* unused harmony export isSafeEntryName */
-/* harmony import */ var node_zlib__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(38522);
-// Hand-rolled, hardened POSIX/GNU tar reader for OCI/Docker image archives.
-//
-// Why hand-rolled instead of a dependency: this repo has no tar library (see
-// `src/artifact/CLAUDE.md`), and PRD 5's own Safety Requirements ask for exact
-// control over the failure modes a generic tar library treats as implementation
-// detail: malicious entry paths, decompression bombs, giant layers, oversized
-// archives. Rolling it ourselves means every one of those limits is a named,
-// tested constant in this file rather than a library default we'd have to audit.
-//
-// Scope: ustar + GNU longname ('L' typeflag) + base-256 size fields. PAX extended
-// headers ('x'/'g') and GNU longlink ('K') are structurally skipped (their data
-// block is consumed so offsets stay correct, but their content is not applied) —
-// a disclosed limitation, not a silent one. Real docker-save/oci-archive output
-// from Go's archive/tar for images in this size/complexity class essentially
-// never needs them; synthetic fixtures in this codebase never emit them either.
-
-
-const BLOCK = 512;
-
-const DEFAULT_LIMITS = Object.freeze({
-  maxEntries: 200_000,
-  maxEntrySize: 512 * 1024 * 1024, // 512MB per tar entry
-  maxTotalSize: 4 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024, // 4GB per archive (sum of entry sizes)
-  maxGunzipOutput: 4 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024, // decompression-bomb guard
-});
-
-class TarSafetyError extends Error {
-  constructor(message, code) {
-    super(message);
-    this.name = 'TarSafetyError';
-    this.code = code;
-  }
-}
-
-function parseSizeField(buf) {
-  if (buf[0] & 0x80) {
-    // GNU base-256 extension for sizes that don't fit in octal-ASCII.
-    let n = 0n;
-    for (let i = 1; i < buf.length; i++) n = (n << 8n) | BigInt(buf[i]);
-    return Number(n);
-  }
-  const s = buf.toString('ascii').replace(/\0.*$/, '').trim();
-  if (!s) return 0;
-  const n = parseInt(s, 8);
-  return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : 0;
-}
-
-function cstr(buf) {
-  return buf.toString('utf8').replace(/\0.*$/, '');
-}
-
-// A tar entry name is unsafe when it would escape a virtual extraction root:
-// absolute paths, `..` segments, embedded NULs, or an unreasonable length.
-// Because this module never writes to a real filesystem path (every caller
-// keeps extracted content in an in-memory Map keyed by this string), the
-// classic zip-slip *write* vulnerability cannot occur here — but a hostile
-// name must still never be silently treated as an ordinary path by downstream
-// manifest/package-DB matching, so unsafe entries are flagged, never dropped
-// silently and never accepted as-is.
-function isSafeEntryName(name) {
-  if (typeof name !== 'string' || name.length === 0 || name.length > 4096) return false;
-  if (name.includes('\0')) return false;
-  const norm = name.replace(/\\/g, '/');
-  if (norm.startsWith('/')) return false;
-  if (norm.split('/').some((p) => p === '..')) return false;
-  return true;
-}
-
-function isWhiteoutName(name) {
-  return (name.split('/').pop() || '').startsWith('.wh.');
-}
-
-// Resolves a whiteout entry name to what it deletes. `.wh..wh..opq` marks a
-// directory as "opaque" (everything from earlier layers under it is hidden,
-// not individually deleted) — reported distinctly so callers don't conflate
-// it with a single-file deletion.
-function whiteoutTarget(name) {
-  const parts = name.split('/');
-  const base = parts.pop();
-  if (base === '.wh..wh..opq') return { opaque: true, dir: parts.join('/') };
-  return { opaque: false, path: [...parts, base.slice(4)].join('/') };
-}
-
-// Decompresses a gzip member with a hard output-size cap (Node's native
-// ERR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE on overflow — no custom streaming counter needed).
-// Returns the input unchanged when it isn't gzip-magic (plain tar).
-function decompressIfGzip(buf, limits = DEFAULT_LIMITS) {
-  if (buf.length >= 2 && buf[0] === 0x1f && buf[1] === 0x8b) {
-    try {
-      return node_zlib__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.gunzipSync(buf, { maxOutputLength: limits.maxGunzipOutput });
-    } catch (err) {
-      if (err && err.code === 'ERR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE') {
-        throw new TarSafetyError('decompressed layer exceeds the decompression-bomb guard', 'gunzip_too_large');
-      }
-      throw new TarSafetyError(`gzip stream is malformed: ${err.message}`, 'gunzip_malformed');
-    }
-  }
-  return buf;
-}
-
-/**
- * Reads a decompressed tar buffer and yields one record per entry:
- *   { name, size, typeflag, linkname, data, unsafe }
- * `data` is a Buffer view into `buf` (never copied) for safe entries, `null`
- * for unsafe ones. Throws TarSafetyError (never returns a partial result) the
- * moment any configured limit is exceeded.
- */
-function* readTarEntries(buf, limits = DEFAULT_LIMITS) {
-  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(buf)) throw new TarSafetyError('tar input must be a Buffer', 'bad_input');
-  let offset = 0;
-  let count = 0;
-  let totalSize = 0;
-  let pendingLongName = null;
-
-  while (offset + BLOCK <= buf.length) {
-    const header = buf.subarray(offset, offset + BLOCK);
-    if (header.every((b) => b === 0)) {
-      offset += BLOCK;
-      continue; // end-of-archive zero-fill padding
-    }
-
-    count += 1;
-    if (count > limits.maxEntries) {
-      throw new TarSafetyError(`tar archive has more than ${limits.maxEntries} entries`, 'too_many_entries');
-    }
-
-    let name = cstr(header.subarray(0, 100));
-    const typeflag = String.fromCharCode(header[156] || 0);
-    const linkname = cstr(header.subarray(157, 257));
-    const magic = header.subarray(257, 263).toString('ascii');
-    const prefix = magic.startsWith('ustar') ? cstr(header.subarray(345, 500)) : '';
-    if (prefix) name = `${prefix}/${name}`;
-    const size = parseSizeField(header.subarray(124, 136));
-
-    offset += BLOCK;
-
-    if (size < 0 || !Number.isFinite(size)) {
-      throw new TarSafetyError(`tar entry "${name}" has an invalid size field`, 'bad_size');
-    }
-    if (size > limits.maxEntrySize) {
-      throw new TarSafetyError(`tar entry "${name}" (${size} bytes) exceeds the per-entry size limit`, 'entry_too_large');
-    }
-    totalSize += size;
-    if (totalSize > limits.maxTotalSize) {
-      throw new TarSafetyError('tar archive exceeds the total-size limit', 'archive_too_large');
-    }
-
-    const dataBlocks = Math.ceil(size / BLOCK);
-    if (offset + size > buf.length) {
-      throw new TarSafetyError(`tar entry "${name}" claims more data than the archive contains`, 'truncated');
-    }
-    const data = size > 0 ? buf.subarray(offset, offset + size) : Buffer.alloc(0);
-    offset += dataBlocks * BLOCK;
-
-    const resolvedName = pendingLongName ? pendingLongName : name;
-    pendingLongName = null;
-
-    if (typeflag === 'L') {
-      // GNU longname: this entry's data IS the next entry's real name.
-      pendingLongName = cstr(data);
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (typeflag === 'K' || typeflag === 'x' || typeflag === 'g') {
-      // GNU longlink / PAX extended header — structurally skipped (see header comment).
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (!isSafeEntryName(resolvedName)) {
-      yield { name: resolvedName, size, typeflag, linkname, data: null, unsafe: true };
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    yield { name: resolvedName.replace(/\\/g, '/'), size, typeflag, linkname, data, unsafe: false };
-  }
-}
-
-
-/***/ })
-
-};

package/dist/5443.index.js

@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-export const id = 5443;
-export const ids = [5443];
-export const modules = {
-
-/***/ 45443:
-/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
-
-/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
-/* harmony export */   buildDeletionReport: () => (/* binding */ buildDeletionReport),
-/* harmony export */   buildExportReport: () => (/* binding */ buildExportReport),
-/* harmony export */   writeDeletionReport: () => (/* binding */ writeDeletionReport),
-/* harmony export */   writeExportReport: () => (/* binding */ writeExportReport)
-/* harmony export */ });
-/* unused harmony exports DELETION_REPORT_FILE, EXPORT_REPORT_FILE */
-/* harmony import */ var _state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(69259);
-// FR-706 (assurance-hardening PRD): manifest-based export and deletion
-// reports — "Operators can prove what was exported, deleted, retained, or
-// failed."
-//
-// Two report kinds, one shared per-item shape ({name, status, ...}), each
-// written by its one real caller in bin/agentic-security.js:
-//   - `cmdReset` builds a deletion report from the SAME target/preserved
-//     data it already computes for its console output (see FR-702/FR-703),
-//     reshaped into a durable, structured artifact instead of only ever
-//     printed and lost. Written on BOTH a dry run (items carry status
-//     'planned') and a real run (status 'deleted'/'failed'), so an operator
-//     can prove either "what would happen" or "what did happen" depending
-//     on which they asked for — `dryRun` on the report says which.
-//   - `cmdExport` (new) builds an export report after copying every
-//     currently-present registered artifact to an operator-chosen
-//     destination, naming what was copied (with a hash) and what failed.
-//
-// Each report is a SINGLE OVERWRITTEN file per kind — the same "last
-// action" precedent as last-scan.json, not an ever-growing log. An
-// operator who needs a persistent audit trail across many runs should
-// retain these externally (commit them, forward to their own SIEM); this
-// module's job is only to make the LAST action's outcome durable and
-// provable, not to be the audit log itself.
-
-
-
-const DELETION_REPORT_FILE = 'deletion-report.json';
-const EXPORT_REPORT_FILE = 'export-report.json';
-
-function buildDeletionReport({ mode, dryRun, root, items, preserved }) {
-  const list = Array.isArray(items) ? items : [];
-  const preservedList = Array.isArray(preserved) ? preserved : [];
-  return {
-    schema: 'agentic-security/deletion-report@1',
-    generatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
-    mode: mode || 'reset',
-    dryRun: !!dryRun,
-    root: root || null,
-    items: list,
-    preserved: preservedList,
-    summary: {
-      planned: list.filter(i => i.status === 'planned').length,
-      deleted: list.filter(i => i.status === 'deleted').length,
-      failed: list.filter(i => i.status === 'failed').length,
-      preserved: preservedList.length,
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-function writeDeletionReport(scanRoot, report) {
-  try {
-    const fp = (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.statePath)(scanRoot, DELETION_REPORT_FILE);
-    return (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.safeWriteState)(fp, JSON.stringify(report, null, 2) + '\n') ? fp : null;
-  } catch { return null; }
-}
-
-function buildExportReport({ root, outDir, items }) {
-  const list = Array.isArray(items) ? items : [];
-  return {
-    schema: 'agentic-security/export-report@1',
-    generatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
-    root: root || null,
-    outDir: outDir || null,
-    items: list,
-    summary: {
-      exported: list.filter(i => i.status === 'exported').length,
-      failed: list.filter(i => i.status === 'failed').length,
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-function writeExportReport(scanRoot, report) {
-  try {
-    const fp = (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.statePath)(scanRoot, EXPORT_REPORT_FILE);
-    return (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.safeWriteState)(fp, JSON.stringify(report, null, 2) + '\n') ? fp : null;
-  } catch { return null; }
-}
-
-
-/***/ })
-
-};