@clear-capabilities/agentic-security-scanner 0.172.0 → 0.173.0

package/src/dataflow/summaries.js

@@ -116,9 +116,14 @@ export class SummaryCache {
   }
 
   get(qid, taintedParams, receiverType) {
-    return this._cache.get(this._key(qid, taintedParams, receiverType));
+    const r = this._cache.get(this._key(qid, taintedParams, receiverType));
+    if (r === undefined) this._misses = (this._misses || 0) + 1; else this._hits = (this._hits || 0) + 1;
+    return r;
   }
 
+  /** Lookups that found and did not find a summary (E6-01). */
+  stats() { return { hits: this._hits || 0, misses: this._misses || 0, size: this._cache.size }; }
+
   set(qid, taintedParams, summary, receiverType) {
     const k = this._key(qid, taintedParams, receiverType);
     this._cache.set(k, summary);
@@ -163,6 +168,7 @@ export class SummaryCache {
       return { returnTainted: false, mutatedParams: new Set(), taintedGlobals: new Set(), findings: [], _recursive: true };
     }
     if (++this._iter > this._maxIter) {
+      this._budgetHits = (this._budgetHits || 0) + 1;
       return { returnTainted: false, mutatedParams: new Set(), taintedGlobals: new Set(), findings: [], _budgetExceeded: true };
     }
     this._stack.add(qid);

package/src/discovery/judge.js

@@ -51,7 +51,8 @@ export function toFindingShape(candidate) {
     description: candidate.rationale
       ? `${candidate.rationale} (entry point: ${candidate.entryPoint || 'unstated'}; sink: ${candidate.sink || 'unstated'})`
       : `Proposed by the ${candidate.lens} lens; no rationale supplied.`,
-    remediation: `Review ${candidate.file}:${candidate.line}. Confirm whether ${candidate.entryPoint || 'attacker-controlled input'} can reach ${candidate.sink || 'this operation'}, and constrain it at the boundary if so.`,
+    // a candidate that carries its own concrete remediation (a deterministic finding with a known fix shape) keeps it; every other candidate gets the generic review text
+    remediation: (typeof candidate.remediation === 'string' && candidate.remediation) ? candidate.remediation : `Review ${candidate.file}:${candidate.line}. Confirm whether ${candidate.entryPoint || 'attacker-controlled input'} can reach ${candidate.sink || 'this operation'}, and constrain it at the boundary if so.`,
     parser: 'DISCOVERY',
     family: candidate.family || 'other',
     ruleId: `discovery:${candidate.lens}`,

package/src/engine.js

@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ import { proofCoverage } from './posture/proof-coverage.js';
 import { computeScanHealth, applyFreshness } from './pipeline/scan-health.js';
 import { computeCoverageLedger, summarizeCoverageForScanHealth } from './pipeline/coverage-ledger.js';
 import { runAnnotatorAsync } from './pipeline/annotator-runner.js';
-import { runDetector } from './pipeline/detector-runner.js';
+import { runDetector, setDetectorTimingSink } from './pipeline/detector-runner.js';
+import { createTelemetry, attributeErrors } from './pipeline/telemetry.js';
 import { registerProducer } from './pipeline/producer-registry.js';
 import { collectProducerResult } from './pipeline/producer-collector.js';
 import { completeEnrichment } from './pipeline/enrichment-completion.js';
@@ -129,6 +130,8 @@ import { scanClientSide } from './sast/client-side.js';
 import { scanPromptFirewall } from './sast/prompt-firewall.js';
 import { scanLlmRedteam } from './posture/llm-redteam.js';
 import { assessPrivacyFramework, persistPrivacyFramework } from './posture/privacy-framework.js';
+import { signLastScan } from './posture/integrity.js';
+import { secretCanaryHit } from './posture/runtime-trace-ingest.js';
 import { safeWriteState as _safeWriteState, statePath, statePath as _statePath } from './posture/state-dir.js';
 import { scanContainer } from './sca/container.js';
 import { detectDepConfusion } from './sca/dep-confusion.js';
@@ -210,6 +213,7 @@ import { applyPathConstraints } from './posture/path-predicates.js';
 import { buildProjectIR, buildProjectIRAsync } from './ir/index.js';
 import _v8 from 'node:v8';
 import _vm from 'node:vm';
+import { createStringMemo } from './util/string-memo.js';
 import { collectIrStats, irStatsTarget, writeIrStats } from './ir/ir-stats.js';
 import { runDeepAnalysis } from './dataflow/index.js';
 import { buildLineageGraph } from './lineage/index.js';
@@ -446,7 +450,11 @@ function _ruleAppliesIn(pat, ctx){
 // comments would put the second pass into a stuck string state, blanking the
 // rest of the file. Backtick `${...}` template expressions are preserved
 // verbatim because they contain real source/sink references.
-function stripNoiseAndStrings(code){
+// Called by several detectors per file with the same text; the result depends only on the text, so it is computed once per distinct text
+// (util/string-memo.js). AGENTIC_SECURITY_NO_STRING_MEMO=1 turns the memo off.
+const _stripNoiseAndStringsMemo = createStringMemo((c) => _stripNoiseAndStringsRaw(c), { version: 'stripNoiseAndStrings@1', disableEnv: 'AGENTIC_SECURITY_NO_STRING_MEMO' });
+function stripNoiseAndStrings(code){ return _stripNoiseAndStringsMemo(code); }
+function _stripNoiseAndStringsRaw(code){
   const out = code.split('');
   const n = code.length;
   let i = 0;
@@ -3134,6 +3142,27 @@ function getProjectConstant(name){
   return hit ? hit.value : null;
 }
 
+// E6-04: a digest of every input OUTSIDE a single file that the per-file detector cascade reads: the project index (constants, properties, the
+// e-commerce flag), the Java tainted-method index, and the operator's rules file with its signature. A cached per-file result is reused only when this
+// is unchanged, so a change to a constant in one file cannot leave another file's cached answer standing.
+const _ANALYSIS_CACHE_NEVER_RE = /(?:^|[\\/])\.?mcp(?:\.[a-z]+)?\.json$|(?:^|[\\/])\.mcp\.json$/i;
+function _analysisContextDigest(scanRoot){
+  const h = crypto.createHash('sha256');
+  const mapEntries = (m) => [...(m || new Map()).entries()].map(([k, v]) => [k, v]).sort((a, b) => (a[0] < b[0] ? -1 : a[0] > b[0] ? 1 : 0));
+  h.update(JSON.stringify({
+    ecommerce: !!_projectIndex.hasEcommerceModel,
+    byFile: mapEntries(_projectIndex.constantsByFile),
+    byExport: mapEntries(_projectIndex.constantsByExport),
+    props: mapEntries(_projectIndex.javaProperties),
+    javaTainted: [..._GLOBAL_JAVA_TAINTED_METHODS].sort(),
+  }));
+  for (const name of ['rules.yml', 'rules.yaml', 'rules.json', 'rules.yml.sig', 'rules.yaml.sig', 'rules.json.sig']) {
+    h.update(`\n${name}\0`);
+    try { h.update(fs.readFileSync(statePath(scanRoot, name))); } catch { h.update('absent'); }
+  }
+  return h.digest('hex');
+}
+
 const _COUPON_MUTATION_RE = /\b(?:apply|redeem|validate|use|deduct|decrement|increment|update|save|consume|create|destroy|remove|insert)\b/i;
 const _REAUTH_PRESENT_RE  = /\b(?:bcrypt\.compare|crypto\.timingSafeEqual|currentPassword|recentLogin|verifyTotp|verifyMfa|mfaToken|requireRecentLogin|requireFreshSession|step[-_]?up|requireFreshAuth|verifyPassword)\b/;
 
@@ -8859,7 +8888,12 @@ function _gcHint(minHeapMiB) {
   _gcFn();
 }
 
-async function runFullScan({fileContents={}, depFileContents={}, scanRoot=null, resume=undefined, deep=undefined, deepInCi=undefined, provenance=true, completeScan=true, skipAnnotators=false, policyExcluded=[], sizeSkipped=[]}, setProgress=()=>{}){_resetSuppressions();_buildProjectIndex(fileContents);await _loadCustomRules(scanRoot);
+async function runFullScan({fileContents={}, depFileContents={}, scanRoot=null, resume=undefined, deep=undefined, deepInCi=undefined, provenance=true, completeScan=true, skipAnnotators=false, policyExcluded=[], sizeSkipped=[]}, setProgress=()=>{}){
+  // E6-01: local, aggregate telemetry for this scan (see pipeline/telemetry.js). Nothing is sent anywhere; the snapshot is a field of the result.
+  const _tel = createTelemetry({ deterministic: isDeterministic() });
+  setDetectorTimingSink((name, ms) => _tel.detector(name, ms));
+  _tel.sample();
+  _resetSuppressions();_tel.time('index', () => _buildProjectIndex(fileContents));await _tel.timeAsync('custom-rules', () => _loadCustomRules(scanRoot));
   // Pre-pass: build cross-file Java tainted-method index so per-file taint
   // analysis can recognize calls to user-input-returning helper methods
   // defined in OTHER files (Juliet's DataflowThruInnerClass / Vector / Stream
@@ -8885,17 +8919,20 @@ function _deterministicFileTimings(timings) {
 }
 
   const _fileTimings = [];
-  let _filesSkipped = 0, _filesTimedOut = 0, _filesDenseSkipped = 0;
+  let _filesSkipped = 0, _filesTimedOut = 0, _filesDenseSkipped = 0, _filesOversizeSkipped = 0;
   const files=Object.keys(fileContents).filter(f=>(shouldScan(f) || isKubernetesManifest(f, fileContents[f]) || isCloudFormationTemplate(f, fileContents[f]) || isInstructionFile(f)) && !_isPathIgnored(f));const fc={},pfr={};const aR=[],aF=[],aSrc=[],aSink=[],aSan=[],aLogic=[],aSupply=[],aSecrets=[],aCiphersRest=[],aCiphersTransit=[];const _detectorErrors=[];
   // ---- R8: opt-in per-file checkpointing (AGENTIC_SECURITY_RESUME=1, or
   // runScan({resume:true})). Default OFF, so existing behaviour is untouched.
   // Only this loop is checkpointed; every cross-file pass below re-runs, so
   // nothing that depends on the whole tree can be stale on resume.
   const _ckptEnabled = (resume === undefined ? process.env.AGENTIC_SECURITY_RESUME === '1' : !!resume) && !!scanRoot;
+  // E6-04: opt-in cross-scan analysis cache (AGENTIC_SECURITY_ANALYSIS_CACHE=1). Same per-file record format as the resume checkpoint, but it is kept after
+  // a completed scan, its records are authenticated with the install key, and the global key also covers the cross-file inputs a file's cascade reads.
+  const _cacheEnabled = !_ckptEnabled && process.env.AGENTIC_SECURITY_ANALYSIS_CACHE === '1' && !!scanRoot;
   let _ckpt = null; const _ckptPayloads = new Map(); let _ckptDone = new Set(); let _ckptResumed = 0, _ckptWrites = 0;
   const _ckptAbortAfter = parseInt(process.env.AGENTIC_SECURITY_CHECKPOINT_ABORT_AFTER || '0', 10) || 0;
   let _ckptInvalidated = [];
-  if (_ckptEnabled) {
+  if (_ckptEnabled || _cacheEnabled) {
     try {
       const _ckptIdentity = {
         engineVersion: _ENGINE_VERSION,
@@ -8909,8 +8946,9 @@ function _deterministicFileTimings(timings) {
       // instead, so changing one file no longer discards every other file's
       // already-completed work — see scan-checkpoint.js's module header.
       _ckpt = openCheckpoint(scanRoot, {
-        globalKey: computeGlobalKey(_ckptIdentity),
+        globalKey: computeGlobalKey(_cacheEnabled ? { ..._ckptIdentity, extra: _analysisContextDigest(scanRoot) } : _ckptIdentity),
         meta: globalKeyMeta(_ckptIdentity),
+        ...(_cacheEnabled ? { persistent: true, fileName: 'analysis-cache.jsonl', sign: signLastScan } : {}),
         // Haskell/Nix sources hash with their import closure, so an imported
         // module's change invalidates its importers' checkpointed work too.
         fileContents: withLanguageClosure(fileContents, depFileContents),
@@ -8939,6 +8977,17 @@ function _deterministicFileTimings(timings) {
     for (const x of (d.ciphersRest || [])) aCiphersRest.push(x);
     for (const x of (d.ciphersTransit || [])) aCiphersTransit.push(x);
     for (const x of (d.suppressions || [])) _suppressionLog.push(x);
+    // A finding's `source` and `sink` ARE the entries of this file's source and sink lists (one object, two references), and later passes annotate them in
+    // place (flowStatus, riskStatus, ...). Reading a record back from JSON gives each reference its own copy, so the annotation would reach the list entry
+    // and not the finding. Re-pointing the finding at the matching list entry restores the sharing a fresh analysis has.
+    {
+      const srcByJson = new Map(); for (const x of aSrc.slice(s0)) srcByJson.set(JSON.stringify(x), x);
+      const sinkByJson = new Map(); for (const x of aSink.slice(k0)) sinkByJson.set(JSON.stringify(x), x);
+      for (const f of aF.slice(f0)) {
+        if (f && f.source && typeof f.source === 'object') { const m = srcByJson.get(JSON.stringify(f.source)); if (m) f.source = m; }
+        if (f && f.sink && typeof f.sink === 'object') { const m = sinkByJson.get(JSON.stringify(f.sink)); if (m) f.sink = m; }
+      }
+    }
     const ta = Object.assign({}, d.pfr || {});
     ta.findings = aF.slice(f0, f0 + (d.pfrFindings || 0));
     ta.sources = aSrc.slice(s0); ta.sinks = aSink.slice(k0); ta.sanitizers = aSan.slice(n0);
@@ -8947,9 +8996,10 @@ function _deterministicFileTimings(timings) {
     _ckptResumed++;
     return true;
   };
+  let _cacheSecretSkips = 0;
   const _ckptRecord = (p, mk, ms, ta) => {
     if (!_ckpt || !_ckpt.enabled) return;
-    recordFileDone(_ckpt, p, {
+    const _payload = {
       routes: aR.slice(mk.aR), findings: aF.slice(mk.aF),
       sources: aSrc.slice(mk.aSrc), sinks: aSink.slice(mk.aSink), sanitizers: aSan.slice(mk.aSan),
       logic: aLogic.slice(mk.aLogic), secrets: aSecrets.slice(mk.aSecrets),
@@ -8958,7 +9008,10 @@ function _deterministicFileTimings(timings) {
       pfr: _pfrMetaOnly(ta),
       pfrFindings: (ta && Array.isArray(ta.findings)) ? ta.findings.length : 0,
       ms,
-    });
+    };
+    // A cache that outlives the scan must not become a second copy of a secret: a file whose result contains a secret-shaped value is analysed afresh each time.
+    if (_cacheEnabled) { let _txt = ''; try { _txt = JSON.stringify(_payload); } catch { /* not serializable: recordFileDone refuses it too */ } if (secretCanaryHit(_txt)) { _cacheSecretSkips++; return; } }
+    recordFileDone(_ckpt, p, _payload);
     _ckptWrites++;
     // Fault injection for the resume test: a hard exit with no unwinding, which
     // is what the checkpoint format has to survive. Never set in normal use.
@@ -8978,12 +9031,13 @@ function _deterministicFileTimings(timings) {
     });
   }
   let i=0;
+  const _tDet = Date.now();
   try {
   for(const p of files){i++;const _ft0=Date.now();setProgress({current:i,total:files.length,file:p.split("/").pop(),phase:"Scanning"});
     if(_ckptDone.has(p)&&_ckptReplay(p))continue;
     const _mk={aR:aR.length,aF:aF.length,aSrc:aSrc.length,aSink:aSink.length,aSan:aSan.length,aLogic:aLogic.length,aSecrets:aSecrets.length,aCR:aCiphersRest.length,aCT:aCiphersTransit.length,sup:_suppressionLog.length};
-    try{const c=fileContents[p];if(!c||c.length>500000){_filesSkipped++;continue;}const _avgLine=c.length/Math.max(c.split('\n').length,1);if(_avgLine>400&&c.length>10000){_filesDenseSkipped++;continue;}
-      let _delta;
+    try{const c=fileContents[p];if(!c||c.length>500000){_filesSkipped++;if(c&&c.length>500000)_filesOversizeSkipped++;continue;}const _avgLine=c.length/Math.max(c.split('\n').length,1);if(_avgLine>400&&c.length>10000){_filesDenseSkipped++;continue;}
+      let _delta; const _errsBefore = _detectorErrors.length;
       if (_cascadePool) {
         const _res = await _cascadePool.runFile(p, c, scanRoot, _detectorErrors, { timeoutMs: _perFileTimeoutMs });
         if (_res.ok) { _delta = _res.result; }
@@ -8997,7 +9051,9 @@ function _deterministicFileTimings(timings) {
       const _ftElapsed=Date.now()-_ft0;
       if(_ftElapsed>_perFileTimeoutMs){aF.push({id:`file-timeout:${p}`,file:p,line:0,vuln:`File analysis exceeded ${_perFileTimeoutMs}ms (${_ftElapsed}ms)`,severity:'info',parser:'ENGINE',confidence:0.5,_timeout:true});_filesTimedOut++;}
       _fileTimings.push({file:p,ms:_ftElapsed});
-      _ckptRecord(p,_mk,_ftElapsed,_delta.pfr);
+      // The cache only keeps a file whose analysis finished cleanly: a detector that threw, a timeout, or a file whose analysis reads or writes state outside
+      // itself (the MCP rug-pull baseline) is analysed afresh every time so health reporting and side effects stay exactly as they are.
+      if (!_cacheEnabled || (_detectorErrors.length === _errsBefore && _ftElapsed <= _perFileTimeoutMs && !_ANALYSIS_CACHE_NEVER_RE.test(p))) _ckptRecord(p,_mk,_ftElapsed,_delta.pfr);
     }catch(_){_fileTimings.push({file:p,ms:Date.now()-_ft0,error:true});}
     if(i%5===0)await new Promise(r=>setTimeout(r,0));}
   } finally {
@@ -9146,6 +9202,8 @@ function _deterministicFileTimings(timings) {
     };
     filterArr(aF); filterArr(aLogic); filterArr(aSecrets); filterArr(aSupply);
   }
+  _tel.record('detectors-per-file', Date.now() - _tDet);
+  const _tLink = Date.now();
   setProgress({current:i,total:files.length,file:"Cross-file...",phase:"Linking"});const ii=buildImportGraph(fc);const cf=crossFileTaint(pfr,fc,ii);aF.push(...cf);
   setProgress({current:i,total:files.length,file:"Stored taint...",phase:"Linking"});const storedRegistry=buildStoredTaintRegistry(fc);const stf=crossStoredTaint(fc,storedRegistry);aF.push(...stf);
   setProgress({current:i,total:files.length,file:"Session taint...",phase:"Linking"});const sess=crossSessionTaint(fc);aF.push(...sess);
@@ -9153,6 +9211,7 @@ function _deterministicFileTimings(timings) {
   // R19 (PRD §5): cross-route BOLA/BFLA over the aggregated route inventory.
   // Convention deviation is PROJECT-scoped by design: the convention is a
   // property of the codebase, not of one file (see convention-deviation.js).
+  _tel.record('cross-file-linking', Date.now() - _tLink);
   aF.push(...(runDetector(_detectorErrors,'<project>','scanConventionDeviationProject',()=>scanConventionDeviationProject(fc))||[]));
   aF.push(...(runDetector(_detectorErrors,'<project>','scanApiBrokenAuthz',()=>scanApiBrokenAuthz(aR))||[]));
   // R22 (PRD §5): cross-service edges inferred from code (client call → matched route).
@@ -9432,6 +9491,7 @@ function _deterministicFileTimings(timings) {
   const _deepEnabled = _deepRequested && (!_inCi || _deepInCiAllowed);
   let _deepCallGraph = null;
   let _deepFailure = null;
+  let _deepIncomplete = null;
   if (_deepEnabled) {
     const budgetMs = parseInt(process.env.AGENTIC_SECURITY_DEEP_TIMEOUT_MS || '300000', 10);
     const t0 = Date.now();
@@ -9462,6 +9522,8 @@ function _deterministicFileTimings(timings) {
         }),
       });
       const elapsed = Date.now() - t0;
+      _tel.record('deep-analysis', elapsed);
+      if (irFindings.analysisIncomplete && irFindings._summaryCache && typeof irFindings._summaryCache.stats === 'function') { const st = irFindings._summaryCache.stats(); _tel.set('cache.summary.hits', st.hits); _tel.set('cache.summary.misses', st.misses); }
       if (elapsed > budgetMs) {
         // We exceeded budget — surface a single info finding so operators see it.
         aF.push({
@@ -9473,6 +9535,7 @@ function _deterministicFileTimings(timings) {
           confidence: 0.5,
         });
       }
+      if (Array.isArray(irFindings.analysisIncomplete) && irFindings.analysisIncomplete.length) _deepIncomplete = irFindings.analysisIncomplete;
       for (const f of irFindings) {
         f.unvalidated = true;
         f.validator_verdict = 'unvalidated';
@@ -9514,6 +9577,8 @@ function _deterministicFileTimings(timings) {
           ? (_inCi ? 'requested, but running in CI without AGENTIC_SECURITY_DEEP_IN_CI=1' : 'unknown')
           : (_inCi ? 'not requested (deep analysis defaults to off in CI)' : 'not requested')),
     failure: _deepFailure,
+    // E2-05: where the deep analysis stopped short (budget, deadline, function limit, a thrown analysis). Present only when something did.
+    ...(_deepIncomplete ? { incomplete: _deepIncomplete } : {}),
   };
   // Sub-project E, increment 5 — Data Flow Explorer lineage graph.
   // DELIBERATELY INDEPENDENT of AGENTIC_SECURITY_DEEP/_deepEnabled above
@@ -9861,7 +9926,7 @@ function _deterministicFileTimings(timings) {
   let _annotatorIdx = 0;
   const _runAnnotator = (phase, fn) => {
     setProgress({ phase: 'Annotating', current: ++_annotatorIdx, total: _ANNOTATOR_TOTAL_ESTIMATE, file: phase });
-    return runAnnotatorAsync(_annotatorErrors, phase, fn);
+    return _tel.timeAsync(`annotator:${phase}`, () => runAnnotatorAsync(_annotatorErrors, phase, fn));
   };
   await _runAnnotator('annotateStableIds', () => annotateStableIds(finalFindings));
   await _runAnnotator("clusterByRootCause", () => { finalFindings = clusterByRootCause(finalFindings); });
@@ -10740,7 +10805,7 @@ function _deterministicFileTimings(timings) {
   // seen when only N-of-those-candidates were actually analyzed.
   // checkpoint.total intentionally keeps files.length — that field means the
   // full candidate set for resume bookkeeping, a different, correct meaning.
-  _scanMeta={filesScanned:Object.keys(fc).length,filesSkipped:_filesSkipped,filesDenseSkipped:_filesDenseSkipped,filesTimedOut:_filesTimedOut,analysisTier:_analysisTier,unmodeledSinkCandidates:_unmodeledSinks,fileTimings:_deterministicFileTimings(_fileTimings),findingsBySeverity:{critical:finalFindings.filter(f=>f.severity==='critical').length,high:finalFindings.filter(f=>f.severity==='high').length,medium:finalFindings.filter(f=>f.severity==='medium').length,low:finalFindings.filter(f=>f.severity==='low').length,info:finalFindings.filter(f=>f.severity==='info').length},checkpoint:{enabled:!!(_ckpt&&_ckpt.enabled),resumed:_ckptResumed,total:files.length,discarded:!!(_ckpt&&_ckpt.discarded),discardReason:(_ckpt&&_ckpt.discarded)?(_ckpt.reason||null):null,invalidatedFileCount:_ckptInvalidated.length,invalidatedFiles:_ckptInvalidated.slice(0,20),invalidatedFilesTruncated:_ckptInvalidated.length>20}};
+  _scanMeta={filesScanned:Object.keys(fc).length,filesSkipped:_filesSkipped,filesOversizeSkipped:_filesOversizeSkipped,filesDenseSkipped:_filesDenseSkipped,filesTimedOut:_filesTimedOut,analysisTier:_analysisTier,unmodeledSinkCandidates:_unmodeledSinks,fileTimings:_deterministicFileTimings(_fileTimings),findingsBySeverity:{critical:finalFindings.filter(f=>f.severity==='critical').length,high:finalFindings.filter(f=>f.severity==='high').length,medium:finalFindings.filter(f=>f.severity==='medium').length,low:finalFindings.filter(f=>f.severity==='low').length,info:finalFindings.filter(f=>f.severity==='info').length},checkpoint:{enabled:!!(_ckpt&&_ckpt.enabled),...(_cacheEnabled?{kind:'analysis-cache',secretSkips:_cacheSecretSkips}:{}),resumed:_ckptResumed,total:files.length,discarded:!!(_ckpt&&_ckpt.discarded),discardReason:(_ckpt&&_ckpt.discarded)?(_ckpt.reason||null):null,invalidatedFileCount:_ckptInvalidated.length,invalidatedFiles:_ckptInvalidated.slice(0,20),invalidatedFilesTruncated:_ckptInvalidated.length>20}};
   // R8: the scan completed, so the checkpoint has been fully consumed — remove
   // it. Anything that threw before this point leaves it in place to resume from.
   try { closeCheckpoint(_ckpt, { complete: true }); } catch (_) {}
@@ -11163,7 +11228,10 @@ function _deterministicFileTimings(timings) {
     compliance: _complianceReport ? { stale: _complianceReport.summary?.stale || 0 } : null,
   });
   } // end if (!skipAnnotators) — FR-PROV-029
-  return{entrypointInventory:_entrypointInventory,rootCauseSweep:_rootCauseSweep,proofCoverage:_proofCoverage,kevCatalog:kevCatalogMeta(),routes:dd(aR,r=>`${r.method}:${r.path}:${r.file}:${r.line}`),findings:finalFindings,sources:aSrc,sinks:aSink,sanitizers:aSan,filesScanned:files.length,linesScanned:Object.values(fc).reduce((_n,_c)=>_n+(typeof _c==='string'?_c.split("\n").length:0),0),crossFileCount:cf.length,logicVulns:aLogic,supplyChain,components:annotatedComponents,secrets:aSecrets,ciphers:{atRest:aCiphersRest,inTransit:aCiphersTransit},pfr,fc,depFileContents,suppressions:_getSuppressions(),...(_stageEvidenceOn()?{stageEvidence:{dedupe:[..._stageEvidence.dedupe],guard:[..._stageEvidence.guard]}}:{}),_v3,_scanMeta,_engineErrors:{cppDataflowParseErrors:_cppDataflowParseErrors.value},annotatorErrors:_annotatorErrors,detectorErrors:_detectorErrors,executionProof:_executionProofSummary,logicClaims:_logicClaims,vulnHistory:_vulnHistory,threatModel:_threatModel,privacyFramework:_privacyFramework,privacyIrBacked:_privacyIrBacked,privacyTaxonomyVersion:_privacyTaxonomyVersion,sbomDiff:_sbomDiff,complianceReport:_complianceReport,exploitBundles:_exploitBundles,pqcPlan:_pqcPlan,licenseGraph:_licenseGraph,attributions:_attributions,attackTaxonomy:_taxonomySummary,scanHealth:_scanHealth,coverageLedger:_coverageLedger,lineageGraph:_lineageGraph,lineageStatus:_lineageStatus,languageBridges:_languageBridges,languageBom:_languageBom,aiAssistance:_aiAssistance};}
+  setDetectorTimingSink(null);
+  attributeErrors(_tel, { annotatorErrors: _annotatorErrors, detectorErrors: (typeof _detectorErrors !== 'undefined' ? _detectorErrors : []), deepFailure: _deepFailure, filesTimedOut: (_scanMeta && _scanMeta.filesTimedOut) || 0 });
+  _tel.set('files.scanned', (_scanMeta && _scanMeta.filesScanned) || 0); _tel.set('files.skipped', (_scanMeta && _scanMeta.filesSkipped) || 0);
+  return{telemetry:_tel.snapshot(),entrypointInventory:_entrypointInventory,rootCauseSweep:_rootCauseSweep,proofCoverage:_proofCoverage,kevCatalog:kevCatalogMeta(),routes:dd(aR,r=>`${r.method}:${r.path}:${r.file}:${r.line}`),findings:finalFindings,sources:aSrc,sinks:aSink,sanitizers:aSan,filesScanned:files.length,linesScanned:Object.values(fc).reduce((_n,_c)=>_n+(typeof _c==='string'?_c.split("\n").length:0),0),crossFileCount:cf.length,logicVulns:aLogic,supplyChain,components:annotatedComponents,secrets:aSecrets,ciphers:{atRest:aCiphersRest,inTransit:aCiphersTransit},pfr,fc,depFileContents,suppressions:_getSuppressions(),...(_stageEvidenceOn()?{stageEvidence:{dedupe:[..._stageEvidence.dedupe],guard:[..._stageEvidence.guard]}}:{}),_v3,_scanMeta,_engineErrors:{cppDataflowParseErrors:_cppDataflowParseErrors.value},annotatorErrors:_annotatorErrors,detectorErrors:_detectorErrors,executionProof:_executionProofSummary,logicClaims:_logicClaims,vulnHistory:_vulnHistory,threatModel:_threatModel,privacyFramework:_privacyFramework,privacyIrBacked:_privacyIrBacked,privacyTaxonomyVersion:_privacyTaxonomyVersion,sbomDiff:_sbomDiff,complianceReport:_complianceReport,exploitBundles:_exploitBundles,pqcPlan:_pqcPlan,licenseGraph:_licenseGraph,attributions:_attributions,attackTaxonomy:_taxonomySummary,scanHealth:_scanHealth,coverageLedger:_coverageLedger,lineageGraph:_lineageGraph,lineageStatus:_lineageStatus,languageBridges:_languageBridges,languageBom:_languageBom,aiAssistance:_aiAssistance};}
 
 // Post-aggregation classification: every source becomes "unsafe"|"safe"; every sink becomes "confirmed"|"safe".
 // Orphans (no finding linkage) are bucketed by file-local heuristic so the UI shows binary states only.

package/src/fix/apply-fix-service.js

@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ import * as fsp from 'node:fs/promises';
 import * as path from 'node:path';
 import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
 import { verifyLastScan } from '../posture/integrity.js';
+import { verifyPatch, additiveFields } from './verify-patch.js';
+import { decidePatchApplication } from './patch-policy.js';
+import { beginBatch, commitBatch, abandonBatch, recoverBatches, faultPoint } from './batch-journal.js';
+import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
 import { stateDir } from '../posture/state-dir.js';
 import { applyFix as applyFixHistory, revertEntryById as revertFixEntry } from '../posture/fix-history.js';
 import { classifyFixMaterialRisk } from '../posture/material-change.js';
@@ -209,7 +213,7 @@ async function getVerifyFixCore() {
  *   configured, tests when a runner is detected — genuinely ran and passed, not silently skipped.
  *   `verified:true, verifiedFull:false` is a real, honest state: applied, but on a degraded pass.
  */
-export async function applyVerifiedFix({ scanRoot, finding, files, fixMeta = null, dryRun = false, skipVerification = false, patchNegative = null, assuranceConfig } = {}) {
+export async function applyVerifiedFix({ scanRoot, finding, files, fixMeta = null, dryRun = false, skipVerification = false, patchNegative = null, assuranceConfig, applyMode = 'requested', policy } = {}) {
   if (!scanRoot) return { ok: false, applied: false, reason: 'scanRoot required' };
   if (!finding) return { ok: false, applied: false, reason: 'finding required' };
   if (!files || typeof files !== 'object' || !Object.keys(files).length) {
@@ -231,6 +235,9 @@ export async function applyVerifiedFix({ scanRoot, finding, files, fixMeta = nul
     return { ok: false, applied: false, reason: `last-scan.json integrity check failed: ${integrityStatus}` };
   }
 
+  // A previous run that died part-way through a multi-file write is settled first, so everything below sees the tree it was in before that run.
+  const settledBatches = dryRun ? [] : await recoverBatches(scanRoot);
+
   const confined = {};
   for (const [rel, content] of Object.entries(files)) {
     let abs;
@@ -253,6 +260,12 @@ export async function applyVerifiedFix({ scanRoot, finding, files, fixMeta = nul
     } catch (e) {
       return { ok: false, applied: false, reason: `could not read current content of ${rel} to detect concurrent changes: ${e.message}` };
     }
+    // Binary content cannot be patched as text: reading it as UTF-8 and writing it back would corrupt it.
+    if (String(content).includes('\0')) return { ok: false, applied: false, reason: `binary content refused: the replacement for ${rel} contains NUL bytes` };
+    if (fs.existsSync(abs)) {
+      const raw = fs.readFileSync(abs);
+      if (raw.includes(0) || Buffer.from(raw.toString('utf8'), 'utf8').compare(raw) !== 0) return { ok: false, applied: false, reason: `binary file refused: ${rel} is not valid UTF-8 text, so a text patch would corrupt it` };
+    }
     confined[rel] = { abs, content: String(content), baselineHash };
   }
 
@@ -323,6 +336,7 @@ export async function applyVerifiedFix({ scanRoot, finding, files, fixMeta = nul
   }
 
   let verify = null;
+  let fixVerification = null;
   let pn = null;
   let repairRecords = [];
   const pnView = (r) => ({ status: r.status, verifiedFix: r.verifiedFix, incompleteStep: r.incompleteStep, failureCode: r.failureCode, reason: r.reason, steps: r.steps, patchDigest: r.patchDigest, summary: r.summary, verificationRecord: r.verificationRecord });
@@ -332,14 +346,14 @@ export async function applyVerifiedFix({ scanRoot, finding, files, fixMeta = nul
     }
     let verdict;
     try {
-      const verifyFixCore = await getVerifyFixCore();
-      verdict = await verifyFixCore({
-        scanRoot,
-        originalFindingStableId: finding.stableId,
+      const central = await verifyPatch({
+        scanRoot, finding, route: 'apply-fix-service', mode: dryRun ? 'preview' : 'apply',
         files: Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(confined).map(([rel, v]) => [rel, v.content])),
-        fixMeta,
-        ...(patchNegative ? { patchNegative, assuranceConfig } : {}),
+        fixMeta, verify: await getVerifyFixCore(),
+        ...(patchNegative ? { extra: { patchNegative, assuranceConfig } } : {}),
       });
+      verdict = central.verdict;
+      fixVerification = central.fixVerification;
     } catch (e) {
       return { ok: false, applied: false, reason: `verification failed: ${e.message}` };
     }
@@ -357,12 +371,25 @@ export async function applyVerifiedFix({ scanRoot, finding, files, fixMeta = nul
         reason: `rejected by verifier: ${verdict.summary || verdict.rescan?.reason || 'did not verify'}`,
         verify: { rescan: verdict.rescan, lint: verdict.lint ? { runner: verdict.lint.runner, ok: verdict.lint.ok } : null, honesty: verdict.honesty || null },
         ...(pn ? { patchNegative: pnView(pn), repairRecords } : {}),
+        ...(fixVerification ? additiveFields(fixVerification) : {}),
       };
     }
   }
 
+  // E3-06: may this be written? `requested` (a person asked) proceeds on any verified tier and carries the warnings; `automatic` needs the
+  // policy to enable it and every required check to have passed, otherwise the patch is only proposed.
+  const uncommitted = uncommittedFiles(scanRoot, Object.keys(confined));
+  let policyDecision = fixVerification ? decidePatchApplication({ record: fixVerification, finding, materialClassification, mode: applyMode, policy }) : null;
+  if (policyDecision && uncommitted.length) {
+    policyDecision = { ...policyDecision, warnings: [...policyDecision.warnings, `uncommitted changes in ${uncommitted.join(', ')}`] };
+    if (applyMode === 'automatic' && policyDecision.decision === 'apply') policyDecision = { ...policyDecision, decision: 'propose', reasons: [`uncommitted changes in ${uncommitted.join(', ')}: an automatic write would mix with unsaved work`] };
+  }
+  if (policyDecision && policyDecision.decision !== 'apply' && !dryRun) {
+    return { ok: true, applied: false, proposed: policyDecision.decision === 'propose', reason: `not applied: ${policyDecision.reasons[0]}`, files: Object.keys(confined), verify, materialClassification, policyDecision, ...additiveFields(fixVerification) };
+  }
+
   if (dryRun) {
-    return { ok: true, applied: false, dryRun: true, verified: !skipVerification, files: Object.keys(confined), verify, materialClassification, ...(pn ? { patchNegative: pnView(pn), repairRecords } : {}) };
+    return { ok: true, applied: false, dryRun: true, ...(policyDecision ? { policyDecision } : {}), verified: !skipVerification, files: Object.keys(confined), verify, materialClassification, ...(pn ? { patchNegative: pnView(pn), repairRecords } : {}), ...(fixVerification ? additiveFields(fixVerification) : {}) };
   }
 
   // FR-304: re-check every file against its pre-verification baseline hash,
@@ -375,8 +402,11 @@ export async function applyVerifiedFix({ scanRoot, finding, files, fixMeta = nul
   }
 
   const written = [];
+  const batch = await beginBatch(scanRoot, { findingId: finding.id || finding.findingId, files: Object.entries(confined).map(([rel, v]) => ({ file: rel, content: v.content, existed: fs.existsSync(v.abs) })) });
   try {
+    let n = 0;
     for (const [rel, v] of Object.entries(confined)) {
+      faultPoint(`before-file-${n}`);
       const fileExisted = fs.existsSync(v.abs);
       const originalContent = fileExisted ? await fsp.readFile(v.abs, 'utf8') : '';
       const entry = await applyFixHistory({
@@ -388,7 +418,10 @@ export async function applyVerifiedFix({ scanRoot, finding, files, fixMeta = nul
         findingProvenance: finding.findingProvenance || null,
       });
       written.push({ file: rel, historyId: entry.id, backupPath: entry.backupPath, attemptOrdinal: entry.attemptOrdinal });
+      faultPoint(`after-file-${n}`);
+      n++;
     }
+    await commitBatch(scanRoot, batch);
   } catch (e) {
     // FR-306: "injected write failure restores all files" — applyFixHistory
     // already rolled back the ONE file that just failed; this rolls back
@@ -400,6 +433,7 @@ export async function applyVerifiedFix({ scanRoot, finding, files, fixMeta = nul
     for (const w of written) {
       try { await revertFixEntry(scanRoot, w.historyId); } catch { /* best-effort; original error still propagates below */ }
     }
+    await abandonBatch(scanRoot, batch).catch(() => {});
     // X-204: the rollback is its own record, after the promotion it undoes (a write that failed part-way)
     if (pn) {
       const rolled = appendRepairRecord(repairRecords, { kind: 'rolled-back', hypothesisId: finding.stableId, revision: pn.promotion?.revision ?? null, diffDigest: pn.patchDigest, reason: `the write failed and every file written in this batch was restored: ${String(e?.message || e).slice(0, 160)}` });
@@ -429,6 +463,19 @@ export async function applyVerifiedFix({ scanRoot, finding, files, fixMeta = nul
     written,
     verify: verify ? { summary: verify.summary, verifiedFull: verify.verifiedFull, degradedLegs: verify.degradedLegs || [] } : null,
     materialClassification,
+    ...(policyDecision ? { policyDecision } : {}),
+    ...(settledBatches.length ? { recoveredBatches: settledBatches } : {}),
     ...(pn ? { patchNegative: pnView(pn), repairRecords } : {}),
+    // the canonical record is the authority for verifiedFull and degradedLegs: it also knows when the tests ran before the patch existed
+    ...(fixVerification ? additiveFields(fixVerification) : {}),
   };
 }
+
+/** Files among `rels` with uncommitted changes in a git work tree. [] when not a git repo or git is unavailable (unknown is not clean, but is not blocking). */
+function uncommittedFiles(scanRoot, rels) {
+  try {
+    const r = spawnSync('git', ['status', '--porcelain', '--', ...rels], { cwd: scanRoot, encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 8000 });
+    if (r.status !== 0 || !r.stdout) return [];
+    return r.stdout.split('\n').filter(Boolean).map((l) => l.slice(3).trim()).filter((f) => rels.includes(f));
+  } catch { return []; }
+}

package/src/fix/batch-journal.js

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+// All-or-nothing multi-file application that survives a crash (E3-07).
+//
+// fix-history.js already makes ONE file's write crash-safe: backup, pending log entry, atomic rename, promote. A patch that touches
+// several files was only safe against an exception: if the process died after file A was promoted and before file B was written, A stayed
+// patched and B did not, with nothing that said so. This journal closes that gap. Before the first write the batch is recorded as
+// `writing`; after the last file is promoted it is `committed`. On the next run, `recoverBatches` finds any batch still `writing`, settles
+// the per-file history first, then reverts every file of the batch that reached its patched content, so the tree returns to what it was.
+//
+// A fault seam (`faultPoint`) lets a test kill the process at a named point. It does nothing unless BOTH environment variables are set,
+// so it cannot fire in normal use.
+import * as fs from 'node:fs';
+import * as fsp from 'node:fs/promises';
+import * as path from 'node:path';
+import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
+import { statePath } from '../posture/state-dir.js';
+import { readLog, recover, revertEntryById } from '../posture/fix-history.js';
+
+const dirOf = (root) => statePath(root, 'fix-batches');
+const sha = (s) => crypto.createHash('sha256').update(s).digest('hex');
+
+export function faultPoint(name) {
+  if (process.env.AGENTIC_SECURITY_TEST_FAULTS !== '1') return;
+  if (process.env.AGENTIC_SECURITY_FAULT_AT === name) process.kill(process.pid, 'SIGKILL');
+}
+
+async function writeJson(file, value) {
+  await fsp.mkdir(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
+  const tmp = `${file}.tmp-${process.pid}-${crypto.randomBytes(3).toString('hex')}`;
+  const h = await fsp.open(tmp, 'w');
+  try { await h.writeFile(JSON.stringify(value, null, 2)); await h.sync(); } finally { await h.close(); }
+  await fsp.rename(tmp, file);
+}
+
+export async function beginBatch(scanRoot, { files, findingId }) {
+  const id = `batch-${Date.now().toString(36)}-${crypto.randomBytes(3).toString('hex')}`;
+  const batch = { id, state: 'writing', findingId: findingId ?? null, startedAt: new Date().toISOString(), files: files.map((f) => ({ file: f.file, newSha: sha(f.content), existed: f.existed })) };
+  await writeJson(path.join(dirOf(scanRoot), `${id}.json`), batch);
+  return batch;
+}
+
+export async function commitBatch(scanRoot, batch) {
+  await writeJson(path.join(dirOf(scanRoot), `${batch.id}.json`), { ...batch, state: 'committed', committedAt: new Date().toISOString() });
+}
+
+export async function abandonBatch(scanRoot, batch, state = 'rolled-back') {
+  await writeJson(path.join(dirOf(scanRoot), `${batch.id}.json`), { ...batch, state, settledAt: new Date().toISOString() });
+}
+
+const STRAY_TMP = /^\..+\.tmp-\d+-[0-9a-f]{8}$/;
+
+/**
+ * Settle every batch that was still `writing` when a previous run stopped. Safe to call at any time; a no-op when nothing is pending.
+ * @returns {Promise<{batch:string, reverted:string[], untouched:string[], failed:string[]}[]>}
+ */
+export async function recoverBatches(scanRoot) {
+  const dir = dirOf(scanRoot);
+  let names = [];
+  try { names = (await fsp.readdir(dir)).filter((n) => n.endsWith('.json')); } catch { return []; }
+  const out = [];
+  let settled = false;
+  for (const n of names.sort()) {
+    let batch; try { batch = JSON.parse(await fsp.readFile(path.join(dir, n), 'utf8')); } catch { continue; }
+    if (batch.state !== 'writing') continue;
+    if (!settled) { await recover(scanRoot); settled = true; }
+    const log = readLog(scanRoot);
+    const reverted = []; const untouched = []; const failed = [];
+    for (const f of batch.files) {
+      const hits = log.filter((e) => e.file === f.file && !e.reverted && e.newSha === f.newSha.slice(0, 16) && e.appliedAt >= batch.startedAt && (e.status === 'applied' || e.status === 'applied-stale'));
+      if (!hits.length) { untouched.push(f.file); continue; }
+      for (const e of hits.reverse()) {
+        const r = await revertEntryById(scanRoot, e.id);
+        if (r && !r.error) reverted.push(f.file); else failed.push(f.file);
+      }
+    }
+    // an interrupted atomic write leaves a hidden temp file beside its target
+    for (const f of batch.files) {
+      const d = path.dirname(path.join(path.resolve(scanRoot), f.file));
+      try { for (const t of await fsp.readdir(d)) if (STRAY_TMP.test(t)) await fsp.unlink(path.join(d, t)).catch(() => {}); } catch { /* directory gone */ }
+    }
+    await abandonBatch(scanRoot, batch, failed.length ? 'rollback-incomplete' : 'rolled-back');
+    out.push({ batch: batch.id, reverted: [...new Set(reverted)], untouched, failed });
+  }
+  return out;
+}

package/src/fix/exploit-replay.js

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+// Controlled pre/post exploit replay for a candidate patch (E3-04).
+//
+// Runs the SAME local reproducer against the pristine code and then against the code with the patch overlaid, using the proof fabric's
+// confined runner (confined filesystem, scrubbed environment, bounded time and output, no external network, repository sources read-only
+// and confined to the scan root). It targets only files under `scanRoot`; there is no URL input.
+//
+// What each outcome means:
+//   before  every attempt completed and the oracle fired in all of them   -> the exploit is real on the original code
+//   after   every attempt completed and the oracle fired in none          -> the patch blocks it
+//   anything that did not complete (timeout, build failure, no sandbox, invalid reproducer) is `not_run`/inconclusive. It is NEVER read
+//   as "the exploit failed", so an unavailable replay cannot masquerade as a fix.
+//
+// `executionProven` is true only when the precondition held (before) AND the postcondition failed on completed runs (after). It says the
+// exploit stopped; whether the intended behaviour survived is a different question (functional preservation, E3-05).
+import { runAttempt as defaultAttempt } from '../posture/proof-fabric/runner.js';
+import { validateReproducer, reproducerDigest } from '../posture/proof-fabric/reproducer.js';
+
+const clampAttempts = (n) => Math.max(1, Math.min(5, Number.isInteger(n) ? n : 3));
+
+async function series(reproducer, n, opts, attemptFn) {
+  const rows = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+    if (opts.signal?.aborted) break;
+    const r = await attemptFn(structuredClone(reproducer), opts);
+    rows.push({ status: r.status, fired: r.oracle?.fired === true, inconclusive: r.oracle?.inconclusive === true || r.status !== 'completed', reasons: r.reasons || [], degraded: r.degraded || [] });
+  }
+  return rows;
+}
+
+const summarize = (rows) => ({ attempts: rows.length, completed: rows.filter((r) => !r.inconclusive).length, fired: rows.filter((r) => r.fired && !r.inconclusive).length, statuses: rows.map((r) => r.status), reasons: [...new Set(rows.flatMap((r) => r.reasons))].slice(0, 5) });
+
+/**
+ * @param {{scanRoot:string, reproducer:object, files:Record<string,string>, attempts?:number, timeoutMs?:number, signal?:AbortSignal, attemptFn?:Function}} o
+ */
+export async function replayExploit({ scanRoot, reproducer, files, attempts, timeoutMs, signal, attemptFn = defaultAttempt }) {
+  const base = { schema: 'agentic-security/exploit-replay', version: 1, reproducerDigest: null };
+  const errs = validateReproducer(reproducer);
+  if (errs.length) return { ...base, before: null, after: null, beforeStatus: 'not_run', afterStatus: 'not_run', executionProven: false, reason: `the reproducer is invalid: ${errs[0]}` };
+  base.reproducerDigest = reproducerDigest(reproducer);
+  const n = clampAttempts(attempts);
+  const common = { sourceRoot: scanRoot, requireContainer: false, signal, limits: timeoutMs ? { timeoutMs } : undefined };
+
+  const before = summarize(await series(reproducer, n, common, attemptFn));
+  if (before.completed < before.attempts || before.attempts === 0) return { ...base, before, after: null, beforeStatus: 'not_run', afterStatus: 'not_run', executionProven: false, reason: `the original-code replay did not complete (${before.reasons[0] || before.statuses.join(',')}), so nothing can be said about the patch` };
+  if (before.fired < before.attempts) return { ...base, before, after: null, beforeStatus: 'not_run', afterStatus: 'not_run', executionProven: false, reason: `the exploit did not succeed on the original code in all ${before.attempts} attempts (${before.fired}), so the precondition is not established` };
+
+  const after = summarize(await series(reproducer, n, { ...common, overlay: files }, attemptFn));
+  if (after.fired > 0) return { ...base, before, after, beforeStatus: 'passed', afterStatus: 'failed', executionProven: false, reason: `the exploit still succeeds against the patched code (${after.fired} of ${after.attempts})` };
+  if (after.completed < after.attempts || after.attempts === 0) return { ...base, before, after, beforeStatus: 'passed', afterStatus: 'not_run', executionProven: false, reason: `the patched replay did not complete (${after.reasons[0] || after.statuses.join(',')}); an incomplete replay is not a blocked exploit` };
+  return { ...base, before, after, beforeStatus: 'passed', afterStatus: 'passed', executionProven: true, mechanism: 'the oracle did not fire in any completed replay of the patched code', reason: null };
+}