@clear-capabilities/agentic-security-scanner 0.172.0 → 0.173.0

package/dist/1387.index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+export const id = 1387;
+export const ids = [1387];
+export const modules = {
+
+/***/ 91387:
+/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+
+// EXPORTS
+__webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+  buildViews: () => (/* binding */ buildViews),
+  renderHtml: () => (/* binding */ renderHtml),
+  renderText: () => (/* binding */ renderText)
+});
+
+// UNUSED EXPORTS: buildCanonicalFindings
+
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: external "node:crypto"
+var external_node_crypto_ = __webpack_require__(77598);
+;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./src/posture/assurance/release-verdict.js
+// The release verdict (E7-08): a deterministic function from a release package to one of three answers, with every reason in plain words.
+//
+//   not_deployable   a condition the policy treats as blocking is present: an unfinished scan, files that were not scanned, an analyzer that timed out or failed,
+//                    a fix that was claimed and not verified, an open finding that is proven exploitable, an open high or critical finding
+//   needs_review     nothing blocks, but something is unknown and a person has to decide: a signal the context analysis could not settle, runtime evidence that
+//                    came from a different build, a finding of unproven exploitability that is high or critical
+//   deployable       none of the above. This is NOT a statement that the release is safe; it says no blocking or unknown condition was found in the evidence the package holds
+//
+// The word "safe" is never produced. The verdict is a function of the package alone (no clock, no environment), so the same package gives the same verdict and the same
+// reasons in the same order, and a stated verdict that differs from the one recomputed here is refused (`verifyStatedVerdict`).
+//
+// WHAT COUNTS AS A BLOCKER is the policy below, not a judgement made per release. Waived findings (a waiver the package lists as honoured) do not block but are listed.
+const SEV_BLOCK = new Set(['critical', 'high']);
+
+const asArray = (v) => (Array.isArray(v) ? v : []);
+const by = (pkg, kind) => asArray(pkg && pkg.evidence).filter((e) => e && e.ref && e.ref.kind === kind);
+
+/**
+ * @param {object} pkg a release package
+ * @param {{waivedIds?:string[]}} [opts] finding ids covered by an honoured waiver
+ * @returns {{verdict:'not_deployable'|'needs_review'|'deployable', blockers:{code:string, message:string, evidence:string[]}[], unknowns:{code:string, message:string, evidence:string[]}[], waived:string[], statement:string}}
+ */
+function releaseVerdict(pkg, { waivedIds = [] } = {}) {
+  const blockers = []; const unknowns = [];
+  const block = (code, message, evidence = []) => blockers.push({ code, message, evidence });
+  const unk = (code, message, evidence = []) => unknowns.push({ code, message, evidence });
+  const waived = new Set(waivedIds);
+
+  // ---- the scan itself
+  const health = by(pkg, 'scan-health')[0];
+  if (!health) block('NO_SCAN_HEALTH', 'the package holds no scan health, so nothing says the scan finished');
+  else {
+    const h = health.payload || {}; const ev = [health.ref.digest];
+    if (h.status !== 'complete') block('SCAN_INCOMPLETE', `the scan did not finish cleanly (status ${JSON.stringify(h.status ?? 'unknown')}): ${asArray(h.conditions).join('; ') || 'no reason was recorded'}`, ev);
+    const f = h.files || {};
+    if (Number.isFinite(f.expected) && Number.isFinite(f.scanned) && f.scanned < f.expected) block('FILES_NOT_SCANNED', `${f.expected - f.scanned} of ${f.expected} files were not scanned`, ev);
+    else if (Number.isFinite(f.unanalysed) ? f.unanalysed > 0 : (Number.isFinite(f.skipped) && f.skipped > 0)) block('FILES_SKIPPED', `${Number.isFinite(f.unanalysed) ? f.unanalysed : f.skipped} file(s) were skipped (too large or too dense to analyse)`, ev);
+    if (Number.isFinite(f.timedOut) && f.timedOut > 0) block('FILES_TIMED_OUT', `${f.timedOut} file(s) exceeded the per-file analysis time`, ev);
+    const a = h.analyzers || {};
+    if (Number.isFinite(a.timedOut) && a.timedOut > 0) block('ANALYZER_TIMED_OUT', `${a.timedOut} analyzer(s) timed out, so what they would have found is not in this result`, ev);
+    if (Number.isFinite(a.failed) && a.failed > 0 && !(Number.isFinite(a.timedOut) && a.failed === a.timedOut)) block('ANALYZER_FAILED', `${a.failed} analyzer(s) failed, so what they would have found is not in this result`, ev);
+    if (h.deepAnalysis && Array.isArray(h.deepAnalysis.incomplete) && h.deepAnalysis.incomplete.length) unk('DEEP_ANALYSIS_INCOMPLETE', `deep analysis stopped short: ${h.deepAnalysis.incomplete.map((x) => `${x.reason} x${x.count}`).join(', ')}`, ev);
+  }
+
+  // ---- findings and fixes
+  const fixes = by(pkg, 'fix-verification');
+  const fixFor = (id) => fixes.filter((x) => x.payload && (x.payload.findingStableId === id || x.payload.findingId === id));
+  for (const e of by(pkg, 'finding')) {
+    const f = e.payload || {}; const id = e.ref.payloadId || f.stableId || f.id; const ev = [e.ref.digest];
+    const triage = f.triage && f.triage.state;
+    const falsePositive = triage === 'false_positive' || f.falsePositive === true;
+    const myFixes = fixFor(id); const fixed = myFixes.find((x) => x.payload.verifiedFull === true);
+    if (waived.has(id)) continue;
+    if (falsePositive) {
+      if (!(f.triage && f.triage.by && f.triage.reason)) unk('FALSE_POSITIVE_UNJUSTIFIED', `finding ${id} is marked a false positive without a named person and a reason`, ev);
+      continue;
+    }
+    for (const x of myFixes) if (x.payload.verifiedFull !== true) block('FIX_NOT_VERIFIED', `a fix for ${id} is claimed but was not fully verified (${asArray(x.payload.degradedLegs).map((d) => (typeof d === 'string' ? d : d && d.leg)).filter(Boolean).join(', ') || 'checks did not all pass'})`, [...ev, x.ref.digest]);
+    if (fixed) continue;
+    const sev = String(f.severity || 'info'); const tier = typeof f.proofTier === 'string' ? f.proofTier : 'unproven';
+    const ci = f.contextIntelligence && (f.contextIntelligence.counterexample && f.contextIntelligence.counterexample.state || f.contextIntelligence.state);
+    if (tier === 'execution-proven') block('PROVEN_OPEN_FINDING', `finding ${id} (${sev}) is proven exploitable and is open`, ev);
+    else if (SEV_BLOCK.has(sev)) {
+      if (ci === 'unresolved' || ci === 'plausible') unk('CONTEXT_SIGNAL_UNSETTLED', `finding ${id} (${sev}) rests on a context signal the analysis could not settle (${ci}); a person has to decide whether it is real`, ev);
+      else block('OPEN_HIGH_FINDING', `finding ${id} is open at severity ${sev}`, ev);
+    } else if (ci === 'unresolved' || ci === 'plausible') unk('CONTEXT_SIGNAL_UNSETTLED', `finding ${id} rests on a context signal the analysis could not settle (${ci})`, ev);
+  }
+
+  // ---- runtime evidence from another build
+  for (const e of by(pkg, 'runtime-explanation')) {
+    const edges = asArray(e.payload && e.payload.runtime && e.payload.runtime.edges); const bad = edges.filter((x) => Number(x.mismatchedRecords) > 0);
+    if (bad.length) unk('RUNTIME_BUILD_MISMATCH', `runtime records for ${bad.length} edge(s) of ${e.ref.payloadId || 'a finding'} came from a different build than the one released, so they say nothing about this release and are not counted as corroboration`, [e.ref.digest]);
+    const miss = asArray(e.payload && e.payload.runtime && e.payload.runtime.missingObservations);
+    if (!bad.length && miss.length && e.payload.compare && e.payload.compare.state !== 'corroborated') unk('RUNTIME_NOT_CORROBORATED', `runtime evidence for ${e.ref.payloadId || 'a finding'} does not corroborate the path: ${miss[0]}`, [e.ref.digest]);
+  }
+
+  blockers.sort((a, b) => (a.code + a.message < b.code + b.message ? -1 : 1)); unknowns.sort((a, b) => (a.code + a.message < b.code + b.message ? -1 : 1));
+  const verdict = blockers.length ? 'not_deployable' : unknowns.length ? 'needs_review' : 'deployable';
+  const statement = verdict === 'deployable'
+    ? 'No blocking or unknown condition was found in the evidence this package holds. That is not a statement that the release is safe.'
+    : verdict === 'needs_review' ? `Nothing blocks the release, but ${unknowns.length} thing(s) are unknown and a person has to decide.` : `${blockers.length} condition(s) block the release.`;
+  return { verdict, blockers, unknowns, waived: [...waived].sort(), statement };
+}
+
+/** Is the verdict a package states the one its own contents give? @returns {{ok:boolean, stated:string|null, computed:string, message:string|null}} */
+function verifyStatedVerdict(pkg, opts) {
+  const computed = releaseVerdict(pkg, opts).verdict;
+  const decisions = asArray(pkg && pkg.policy && pkg.policy.decisions);
+  const d = decisions.find((x) => x && x.id === 'release-verdict');
+  const stated = d ? d.outcome : null;
+  if (stated === null) return { ok: false, stated, computed, message: 'the package states no release verdict' };
+  if (stated !== computed) return { ok: false, stated, computed, message: `the package states "${stated}" but its own contents give "${computed}"` };
+  return { ok: true, stated, computed, message: null };
+}
+
+;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./src/report/perspectives.js
+// Three views of one release (E7-07): what a developer needs, what a CISO needs, what an auditor needs, all built from the SAME canonical list of findings so they
+// cannot disagree.
+//
+//   developer  where the problem is, why it is one, how to fix it, and whether a fix was verified
+//   CISO       what is proven and what is not, what changed since the previous release, how risky and how complete
+//   auditor    for each assertion and each unknown, the evidence it rests on (by digest) and why anything is unknown; the issuer and what the signature does not prove
+//
+// One list, three projections. `canonicalFindings` is computed once from the release package; every view only selects and arranges its fields, and each entry
+// carries the same finding id, status, evidence hash and confidence wherever it appears. Nothing is recomputed per view.
+//
+// The package is DATA from a repository we do not control: every string is escaped before it reaches HTML, the page loads nothing from anywhere and runs no script, and a
+// content security policy says so.
+
+
+
+const esc = (v) => String(v ?? '').replace(/[&<>"'`]/g, (c) => ({ '&': '&amp;', '<': '&lt;', '>': '&gt;', '"': '&quot;', "'": '&#39;', '`': '&#96;' }[c]));
+const sevRank = { critical: 4, high: 3, medium: 2, low: 1, info: 0 };
+
+function confidenceOf(f) {
+  if (typeof f.confidence === 'number') return f.confidence >= 0.8 ? 'high' : f.confidence >= 0.5 ? 'medium' : 'low';
+  return typeof f.confidenceTier === 'string' ? f.confidenceTier : 'unknown';
+}
+
+/**
+ * @param {object} pkg a release package (E7-03). It is assumed to have been verified by the caller; the views carry `verification` as the caller states it.
+ * @param {{previous?:object, ranking?:object, verification?:{ok:boolean, errors?:object[]}}} opts `previous` is the previous release's package; `ranking` is a result of rankFleetExposure
+ */
+function buildCanonicalFindings(pkg) {
+  const entries = Array.isArray(pkg && pkg.evidence) ? pkg.evidence : [];
+  const byKind = (k) => entries.filter((e) => e.ref && e.ref.kind === k);
+  const fixes = byKind('fix-verification');
+  const out = [];
+  for (const e of byKind('finding')) {
+    const f = e.payload || {};
+    const id = e.ref.payloadId || f.stableId || f.id;
+    const fixesFor = fixes.filter((x) => x.payload && (x.payload.findingStableId === id || x.payload.findingId === id || x.payload.findingId === f.id) );
+    const fix = fixesFor.find((x) => x.payload.verifiedFull === true) || fixesFor[0] || null;
+    const status = !fix ? 'open' : fix.payload.verifiedFull === true ? 'fix-verified' : 'fix-unverified';
+    out.push({
+      id, evidenceHash: e.ref.digest, status, confidence: confidenceOf(f), severity: f.severity || 'info', proofTier: typeof f.proofTier === 'string' ? f.proofTier : 'unproven',
+      where: { file: f.file ?? null, line: Number.isInteger(f.line) ? f.line : null }, title: f.vuln || f.title || 'finding', cwe: f.cwe || null,
+      why: f.description || f.reason || null, how: f.remediation || null,
+      fix: fix ? { evidenceHash: fix.ref.digest, verifiedFull: fix.payload.verifiedFull === true, completeness: fix.payload.fixCompleteness || null, degradedLegs: Array.isArray(fix.payload.degradedLegs) ? fix.payload.degradedLegs.map((d) => (typeof d === 'string' ? d : d && d.leg) ).filter(Boolean) : [] } : null,
+    });
+  }
+  return out.sort((a, b) => (sevRank[b.severity] - sevRank[a.severity]) || (a.id < b.id ? -1 : a.id > b.id ? 1 : 0));
+}
+
+function buildViews(pkg, { previous = null, ranking = null, verification = null } = {}) {
+  const findings = buildCanonicalFindings(pkg);
+  const packageDigest = `sha256:${(0,external_node_crypto_.createHash)('sha256').update(JSON.stringify(pkg && pkg.lineageOrder || [])).digest('hex')}`;
+  const prev = previous ? buildCanonicalFindings(previous) : null;
+  const prevById = prev ? new Map(prev.map((f) => [f.id, f])) : null;
+  const ids = new Set(findings.map((f) => f.id));
+  const change = prev ? {
+    new: findings.filter((f) => !prevById.has(f.id)).map((f) => f.id),
+    resolved: prev.filter((f) => !ids.has(f.id)).map((f) => f.id),
+    statusChanged: findings.filter((f) => prevById.has(f.id) && prevById.get(f.id).status !== f.status).map((f) => ({ id: f.id, from: prevById.get(f.id).status, to: f.status })),
+    unchanged: findings.filter((f) => prevById.has(f.id) && prevById.get(f.id).status === f.status).length,
+  } : null;
+  const rankById = ranking ? new Map(ranking.ranked.map((r) => [r.id, r])) : null;
+  const tier = (t) => findings.filter((f) => f.proofTier === t).length;
+  const completeness = pkg && pkg.completeness ? { verdict: pkg.completeness.verdict, scanStatus: pkg.completeness.scanStatus, conditions: pkg.completeness.conditions || [] } : { verdict: 'unknown', scanStatus: 'unknown', conditions: [] };
+  const unknowns = [];
+  if (completeness.verdict !== 'complete') for (const c of completeness.conditions.length ? completeness.conditions : ['the scan did not report that it finished']) unknowns.push({ about: 'scan completeness', reason: c, evidence: pkg.completeness && pkg.completeness.source ? [pkg.completeness.source] : [] });
+  for (const a of (pkg && pkg.assertions) || []) if (a.status !== 'supported') unknowns.push({ about: a.text, reason: a.reason || `the assertion is ${a.status}`, evidence: a.evidence || [] });
+  for (const f of findings) if (f.proofTier !== 'execution-proven') unknowns.push({ about: `exploitability of ${f.id}`, reason: `proof tier is ${f.proofTier}: it has not been shown to be exploitable`, evidence: [f.evidenceHash] });
+
+  const developer = findings.map((f) => ({ id: f.id, evidenceHash: f.evidenceHash, status: f.status, confidence: f.confidence, severity: f.severity, where: f.where, why: f.why, how: f.how, title: f.title, cwe: f.cwe, fix: f.fix }));
+  const verdict = releaseVerdict(pkg);
+  const ciso = {
+    verdict: { verdict: verdict.verdict, statement: verdict.statement, blockers: verdict.blockers.map((b) => b.message), unknowns: verdict.unknowns.map((u) => u.message) },
+    verified: verification ? verification.ok === true : null,
+    scan: completeness,
+    proven: { executionProven: tier('execution-proven'), taintProven: tier('taint-proven'), unproven: findings.length - tier('execution-proven') - tier('taint-proven'), total: findings.length },
+    bySeverity: Object.fromEntries(['critical', 'high', 'medium', 'low', 'info'].map((s) => [s, findings.filter((f) => f.severity === s).length])),
+    fixes: { verified: findings.filter((f) => f.status === 'fix-verified').length, unverified: findings.filter((f) => f.status === 'fix-unverified').length, open: findings.filter((f) => f.status === 'open').length },
+    changeSinceLast: change,
+    risk: ranking ? { byPriority: ranking.summary.byPriority, incompleteCoverage: ranking.summary.incompleteCoverage, top: ranking.ranked.slice(0, 5).map((r) => ({ id: r.id, priority: r.priority, rule: r.rule })) } : null,
+    findings: findings.map((f) => ({ id: f.id, evidenceHash: f.evidenceHash, status: f.status, confidence: f.confidence, severity: f.severity, proofTier: f.proofTier, priority: rankById && rankById.get(f.id) ? rankById.get(f.id).priority : null })),
+  };
+  const auditor = {
+    package: { lineageDigest: packageDigest, snapshot: pkg && pkg.snapshot ? { commit: pkg.snapshot.commit, immutable: pkg.snapshot.immutable, digest: pkg.snapshot.digest } : null },
+    issuer: pkg && pkg.issuance ? { trustBasis: pkg.issuance.trustBasis, independentlyCertified: pkg.issuance.independentlyCertified, keyFingerprint: pkg.issuance.issuer && pkg.issuance.issuer.keyFingerprint } : null,
+    verification: verification ? { ok: verification.ok === true, errors: (verification.errors || []).map((e) => `${e.code}: ${e.message}`) } : { ok: null, errors: ['no verification was performed by this view'] },
+    proves: pkg && pkg.proves || null, doesNotProve: pkg && pkg.doesNotProve || null,
+    assertions: ((pkg && pkg.assertions) || []).map((a) => ({ id: a.id, text: a.text, status: a.status, evidence: a.evidence || [], reason: a.reason || null })),
+    unknowns,
+    findings: findings.map((f) => ({ id: f.id, evidenceHash: f.evidenceHash, status: f.status, confidence: f.confidence, proofTier: f.proofTier, fixEvidence: f.fix ? f.fix.evidenceHash : null })),
+    policyDecisions: (pkg && pkg.policy && pkg.policy.decisions) || [],
+  };
+  return { canonical: findings, developer, ciso, auditor };
+}
+
+// ---- text ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function renderText(views, view = 'all') {
+  const L = [];
+  const dev = () => { L.push('DEVELOPER VIEW'); for (const f of views.developer) { L.push(`  [${f.severity}] ${f.title}  ${f.where.file ?? '?'}:${f.where.line ?? '?'}  id=${f.id}  status=${f.status}  confidence=${f.confidence}  evidence=${f.evidenceHash.slice(0, 19)}`); if (f.why) L.push(`      why: ${String(f.why).slice(0, 300)}`); if (f.how) L.push(`      fix: ${String(f.how).slice(0, 300)}`); if (f.fix) L.push(`      fix check: ${f.fix.verifiedFull ? 'verified' : 'not fully verified'}${f.fix.degradedLegs.length ? ` (not passed: ${f.fix.degradedLegs.join(', ')})` : ''}`); } if (!views.developer.length) L.push('  no findings'); };
+  const ciso = () => { const c = views.ciso; L.push('CISO VIEW'); L.push(`  release verdict: ${c.verdict.verdict}. ${c.verdict.statement}`); for (const b of c.verdict.blockers) L.push(`    blocks: ${b}`); for (const u of c.verdict.unknowns) L.push(`    unknown: ${u}`); L.push(`  scan: ${c.scan.verdict} (${c.scan.scanStatus})${c.scan.conditions.length ? ' - ' + c.scan.conditions.join('; ') : ''}`); L.push(`  proven: ${c.proven.executionProven} executed, ${c.proven.taintProven} taint path, ${c.proven.unproven} unproven, of ${c.proven.total}`); L.push(`  fixes: ${c.fixes.verified} verified, ${c.fixes.unverified} unverified, ${c.fixes.open} open`); if (c.changeSinceLast) L.push(`  since last release: ${c.changeSinceLast.new.length} new, ${c.changeSinceLast.resolved.length} resolved, ${c.changeSinceLast.statusChanged.length} changed status`); else L.push('  since last release: no previous release was supplied'); if (c.risk) L.push(`  risk: ${JSON.stringify(c.risk.byPriority)}; ${c.risk.incompleteCoverage} with incomplete coverage`); L.push(`  verification: ${c.verified === null ? 'not performed here' : c.verified ? 'signature and contents verified' : 'FAILED'}`); };
+  const aud = () => { const a = views.auditor; L.push('AUDITOR VIEW'); L.push(`  snapshot: ${a.package.snapshot ? `${a.package.snapshot.commit ?? 'no commit'} (${a.package.snapshot.immutable ? 'immutable' : 'NOT immutable'})` : 'none'}`); L.push(`  issuer: ${a.issuer ? `${a.issuer.trustBasis}, independently certified: ${a.issuer.independentlyCertified}` : 'none'}`); L.push(`  verification: ${a.verification.ok === null ? 'not performed here' : a.verification.ok ? 'ok' : 'FAILED: ' + a.verification.errors.join('; ')}`); for (const x of a.assertions) L.push(`  assertion ${x.id} [${x.status}]: ${x.text}  evidence=${x.evidence.map((d) => d.slice(0, 19)).join(',') || 'none'}`); for (const u of a.unknowns) L.push(`  unknown: ${u.about} - ${u.reason}`); L.push(`  does not prove: ${a.doesNotProve}`); };
+  if (view === 'developer' || view === 'all') dev();
+  if (view === 'ciso' || view === 'all') ciso();
+  if (view === 'auditor' || view === 'all') aud();
+  return L.join('\n') + '\n';
+}
+
+// ---- html ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/** One self-contained page, no script, nothing loaded from elsewhere. Every value is escaped. */
+function renderHtml(views, { title = 'Release assurance report' } = {}) {
+  const c = views.ciso; const a = views.auditor;
+  const row = (f, cols) => `<tr data-finding="${esc(f.id)}" data-evidence="${esc(f.evidenceHash)}" data-status="${esc(f.status)}" data-confidence="${esc(f.confidence)}">${cols.map((x) => `<td>${x}</td>`).join('')}</tr>`;
+  return `<!doctype html>
+<html lang="en"><head><meta charset="utf-8"><meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
+<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; img-src data:">
+<title>${esc(title)}</title>
+<style>
+:root{--bg:#fff;--fg:#1a1a1a;--muted:#555;--line:#d0d0d0;--bad:#a40000;--ok:#0a6b2b}
+@media (prefers-color-scheme: dark){:root{--bg:#14161a;--fg:#e8e8e8;--muted:#a0a0a0;--line:#3a3d44;--bad:#ff8080;--ok:#6fd48e}}
+body{background:var(--bg);color:var(--fg);font:15px/1.5 system-ui,sans-serif;margin:0 auto;max-width:72rem;padding:1rem 16px}
+h1,h2{line-height:1.2}table{border-collapse:collapse;width:100%;overflow-wrap:anywhere}th,td{border:1px solid var(--line);padding:.35rem .5rem;text-align:left;vertical-align:top}
+code{font-family:ui-monospace,monospace;font-size:.9em}.muted{color:var(--muted)}.bad{color:var(--bad)}.ok{color:var(--ok)}details{margin:1rem 0}summary{cursor:pointer;font-weight:600}
+</style></head><body>
+<h1>${esc(title)}</h1>
+<p class="muted">Snapshot ${esc(a.package.snapshot ? a.package.snapshot.commit : 'none')} (${a.package.snapshot && a.package.snapshot.immutable ? 'immutable' : 'not immutable'}). Verification: <span class="${a.verification.ok === true ? 'ok' : 'bad'}">${esc(a.verification.ok === null ? 'not performed by this page' : a.verification.ok ? 'passed' : 'FAILED')}</span>.</p>
+<details open><summary>Developer: where, why, how to fix</summary>
+<table><thead><tr><th>Finding</th><th>Where</th><th>Why</th><th>How to fix</th><th>Status</th><th>Confidence</th></tr></thead><tbody>
+${views.developer.map((f) => row(f, [`<code>${esc(f.id)}</code> ${esc(f.title)}<br><span class="muted">${esc(f.severity)}${f.cwe ? ' ' + esc(f.cwe) : ''}</span>`, `<code>${esc(f.where.file ?? '?')}:${esc(f.where.line ?? '?')}</code>`, esc(f.why ?? ''), esc(f.how ?? ''), esc(f.status), esc(f.confidence)])).join('\n') || '<tr><td colspan="6">No findings.</td></tr>'}
+</tbody></table></details>
+<details open><summary>CISO: what is proven, what changed, risk and coverage</summary>
+<p><strong>Release verdict: ${esc(c.verdict.verdict)}.</strong> ${esc(c.verdict.statement)}</p>
+<ul>${c.verdict.blockers.map((b) => `<li class="bad">Blocks: ${esc(b)}</li>`).join('')}${c.verdict.unknowns.map((u) => `<li>Unknown: ${esc(u)}</li>`).join('')}</ul>
+<p>Scan: <strong>${esc(c.scan.verdict)}</strong> (${esc(c.scan.scanStatus)}). ${c.scan.conditions.map((x) => esc(x)).join('; ')}</p>
+<p>Proven: ${esc(c.proven.executionProven)} by execution, ${esc(c.proven.taintProven)} by a taint path, ${esc(c.proven.unproven)} unproven, of ${esc(c.proven.total)}. Fixes: ${esc(c.fixes.verified)} verified, ${esc(c.fixes.unverified)} unverified, ${esc(c.fixes.open)} open.</p>
+<p>${c.changeSinceLast ? `Since the previous release: ${esc(c.changeSinceLast.new.length)} new, ${esc(c.changeSinceLast.resolved.length)} resolved, ${esc(c.changeSinceLast.statusChanged.length)} changed status.` : 'No previous release was supplied, so no change is reported.'}</p>
+<table><thead><tr><th>Finding</th><th>Severity</th><th>Proof</th><th>Priority</th><th>Status</th><th>Confidence</th></tr></thead><tbody>
+${c.findings.map((f) => row(f, [`<code>${esc(f.id)}</code>`, esc(f.severity), esc(f.proofTier), esc(f.priority ?? 'not ranked'), esc(f.status), esc(f.confidence)])).join('\n') || '<tr><td colspan="6">No findings.</td></tr>'}
+</tbody></table></details>
+<details open><summary>Auditor: evidence behind each statement, and what is unknown</summary>
+<p>Issuer: ${esc(a.issuer ? a.issuer.trustBasis : 'none')}; independently certified: ${esc(a.issuer ? a.issuer.independentlyCertified : 'n/a')}.</p>
+<p class="muted">Proves: ${esc(a.proves)}<br>Does not prove: ${esc(a.doesNotProve)}</p>
+<table><thead><tr><th>Finding</th><th>Evidence hash</th><th>Fix evidence</th><th>Status</th><th>Confidence</th></tr></thead><tbody>
+${a.findings.map((f) => row(f, [`<code>${esc(f.id)}</code>`, `<code>${esc(f.evidenceHash)}</code>`, `<code>${esc(f.fixEvidence ?? 'none')}</code>`, esc(f.status), esc(f.confidence)])).join('\n') || '<tr><td colspan="5">No findings.</td></tr>'}
+</tbody></table>
+<h2>Assertions</h2><ul>${a.assertions.map((x) => `<li><strong>${esc(x.status)}</strong>: ${esc(x.text)} <span class="muted">(${x.evidence.length ? x.evidence.map((d) => `<code>${esc(d)}</code>`).join(', ') : 'no evidence cited'}${x.reason ? '; ' + esc(x.reason) : ''})</span></li>`).join('') || '<li>None.</li>'}</ul>
+<h2>Unknowns</h2><ul>${a.unknowns.map((u) => `<li>${esc(u.about)}: ${esc(u.reason)}</li>`).join('') || '<li>None.</li>'}</ul>
+</details></body></html>
+`;
+}
+
+
+/***/ })
+
+};

package/dist/1437.index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+export const id = 1437;
+export const ids = [1437];
+export const modules = {
+
+/***/ 1437:
+/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+__webpack_require__.r(__webpack_exports__);
+/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+/* harmony export */   BaseJavaCstVisitor: () => (/* reexport safe */ _node_modules_java_parser_src_index_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.ak),
+/* harmony export */   BaseJavaCstVisitorWithDefaults: () => (/* reexport safe */ _node_modules_java_parser_src_index_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.C5),
+/* harmony export */   "default": () => (/* reexport safe */ _node_modules_java_parser_src_index_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.Ay),
+/* harmony export */   lexAndParse: () => (/* reexport safe */ _node_modules_java_parser_src_index_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.Ch),
+/* harmony export */   parse: () => (/* reexport safe */ _node_modules_java_parser_src_index_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.qg)
+/* harmony export */ });
+/* harmony import */ var _node_modules_java_parser_src_index_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(6818);
+
+
+
+
+/***/ })
+
+};

package/dist/1445.index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+export const id = 1445;
+export const ids = [1445];
+export const modules = {
+
+/***/ 41445:
+/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+/* harmony export */   deriveVexStatus: () => (/* binding */ deriveVexStatus)
+/* harmony export */ });
+/* unused harmony export VEX_STATUSES */
+// PRD 5 P0 §8 — VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange). Statuses are the
+// PRD's own four. The PRD's one explicit rule — "`not affected` requires
+// positive evidence" — is enforced structurally: `not_affected` is only ever
+// returned from one of two named, checked evidence paths below; there is no
+// code path that reaches it by default or by absence of information.
+// Justification strings follow the CISA VEX vocabulary this repo's other VEX
+// output (`toVex` in `src/posture/sbom.js`'s neighborhood) already uses,
+// where applicable.
+//
+// `affected` likewise requires positive evidence (confirmed reachability),
+// not just "OSV lists this version as vulnerable" — a scanner result alone
+// only tells you the CVE/version pair matches; it doesn't tell you the
+// vulnerable code path is reachable in THIS artifact. Absent that
+// confirmation, the honest status is `under_investigation`, never a
+// confident `affected` the evidence doesn't support.
+const VEX_STATUSES = Object.freeze(['affected', 'not_affected', 'fixed', 'under_investigation']);
+
+// Loose dotted-numeric version comparison. Returns -1/0/1, or null when
+// either side isn't a clean dotted-numeric form — a "fixed" verdict is only
+// ever returned when this does NOT return null; an unparseable version
+// means that evidence path is skipped, never guessed through.
+function compareVersions(a, b) {
+  const pa = String(a).split(/[.-]/).map((s) => (/^\d+$/.test(s) ? parseInt(s, 10) : null));
+  const pb = String(b).split(/[.-]/).map((s) => (/^\d+$/.test(s) ? parseInt(s, 10) : null));
+  if (pa.some((n) => n === null) || pb.some((n) => n === null)) return null;
+  const len = Math.max(pa.length, pb.length);
+  for (let i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+    const x = pa[i] ?? 0;
+    const y = pb[i] ?? 0;
+    if (x !== y) return x < y ? -1 : 1;
+  }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+function componentKeyOf(c) {
+  return c.purl || (c.ecosystem && c.name && c.version ? `${c.ecosystem}:${c.name}@${c.version}` : null);
+}
+
+/**
+ * `vulnerability` is one `vulnerable_dep`-shaped entry already confirmed
+ * present via `vuln-correlate.js` against THIS artifact. `artifactComponents`
+ * is the artifact's own inventory (`osPackages`/`appPackages` concatenated).
+ * `reachability`, if supplied, is `{ reachable: true|false, reason }` from
+ * this codebase's existing dataflow/reachability evidence (never computed
+ * here — this module does no new analysis, only statuses the evidence it's
+ * handed).
+ */
+function deriveVexStatus({ vulnerability, artifactComponents, reachability = null }) {
+  if (!vulnerability || typeof vulnerability !== 'object') {
+    throw new TypeError('deriveVexStatus requires a vulnerability object');
+  }
+  if (!Array.isArray(artifactComponents)) {
+    throw new TypeError('deriveVexStatus requires an artifactComponents array');
+  }
+
+  const vulnKey = vulnerability.purl
+    || (vulnerability.ecosystem && vulnerability.name && vulnerability.version ? `${vulnerability.ecosystem}:${vulnerability.name}@${vulnerability.version}` : null);
+  const present = vulnKey != null && artifactComponents.some((c) => componentKeyOf(c) === vulnKey);
+
+  if (!present) {
+    return {
+      status: 'not_affected',
+      justification: 'component_not_present',
+      evidence: 'the affected component (by purl/ecosystem+name+version) is not present in this artifact\'s inventory',
+    };
+  }
+
+  if (reachability && reachability.reachable === false) {
+    return {
+      status: 'not_affected',
+      justification: 'vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_path',
+      evidence: reachability.reason || 'static reachability analysis found no path to the vulnerable function in this artifact',
+    };
+  }
+
+  if (Array.isArray(vulnerability.fixedVersions) && vulnerability.fixedVersions.length && vulnerability.version) {
+    for (const fv of vulnerability.fixedVersions) {
+      const cmp = compareVersions(vulnerability.version, fv);
+      if (cmp !== null && cmp >= 0) {
+        return { status: 'fixed', justification: null, evidence: `installed version ${vulnerability.version} is >= the fixed version ${fv}` };
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (reachability && reachability.reachable === true) {
+    return { status: 'affected', justification: null, evidence: reachability.reason || 'static reachability analysis confirmed a path to the vulnerable function in this artifact' };
+  }
+
+  return {
+    status: 'under_investigation',
+    justification: null,
+    evidence: 'the affected component is present and not confirmed fixed, but reachability has not been established — not a confident "affected" claim',
+  };
+}
+
+
+/***/ })
+
+};

package/dist/1505.index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+export const id = 1505;
+export const ids = [1505];
+export const modules = {
+
+/***/ 61505:
+/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+/* harmony export */   computeRuntimeAssurance: () => (/* binding */ computeRuntimeAssurance)
+/* harmony export */ });
+/* unused harmony export RUNTIME_STATUS_VALUES */
+// runtime-assurance.js — PRD "Runtime-Corroborated Security Twin" P0-8
+// (Runtime Assurance). A pure aggregation over already-loaded observation
+// imports and an already-computed `correlateObservations` result — never
+// re-reads a file, never re-runs the match ladder. Honest by construction:
+// the one rule this module exists to enforce is that a MISSING or STALE
+// telemetry source can never collapse into "no runtime risk" — the
+// `runtimeStatus` field is always exactly one of `'complete'`, `'partial'`,
+// or `'unavailable'`, and `'unavailable'` is the answer whenever no
+// observation store was consulted at all, never a silent empty report.
+//
+// `parseFailures` is always reported as 0, with an explicit note why:
+// `dataflow observations import` REFUSES the whole import the moment any
+// record fails to parse or validate (AC-29 clause 5) — a failed import is
+// never persisted, so there is no on-disk history of parse failures for
+// this module to read. This is a real, disclosed limitation, not a false
+// "zero failures ever happened" claim.
+
+const RUNTIME_STATUS_VALUES = Object.freeze(['complete', 'partial', 'unavailable']);
+
+function _isPlainObject(v) {
+  return typeof v === 'object' && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v);
+}
+
+function _maxIso(list) {
+  let best = null;
+  let bestT = -Infinity;
+  for (const s of list) {
+    const t = Date.parse(s);
+    if (Number.isFinite(t) && t > bestT) { bestT = t; best = s; }
+  }
+  return best;
+}
+
+function _minIso(list) {
+  let best = null;
+  let bestT = Infinity;
+  for (const s of list) {
+    const t = Date.parse(s);
+    if (Number.isFinite(t) && t < bestT) { bestT = t; best = s; }
+  }
+  return best;
+}
+
+/**
+ * `computeRuntimeAssurance(opts) -> RuntimeAssurance`
+ *
+ * `opts`:
+ *   - `importRecords`: the `ObservationImport[]` read back from the store
+ *     (`loadObservationImports`), or `null`/`undefined` when the store was
+ *     never consulted at all (mirrors `correlateObservations`'s own
+ *     `observations === null` convention).
+ *   - `correlation`: the `CorrelationResult` from `correlateObservations`
+ *     for the SAME graph/observations/window this call is reporting on.
+ *   - `now`: an ISO-8601 string (defaults to `new Date().toISOString()`,
+ *     injectable for deterministic tests).
+ *   - `staleAfterHours`: how old the most recent observed event can be
+ *     before freshness is reported stale (default 24 * 30 = 720, i.e. 30
+ *     days — telemetry windows in this package's own fixtures/CLI default
+ *     to month-long exports, so a 30-day staleness bar is the honest
+ *     "this is still describing roughly the current system" line, not an
+ *     arbitrary short window).
+ *
+ * Never throws.
+ */
+function computeRuntimeAssurance(opts) {
+  const o = opts && typeof opts === 'object' ? opts : {};
+  const now = typeof o.now === 'string' && Number.isFinite(Date.parse(o.now)) ? o.now : new Date().toISOString();
+  const staleAfterHours = Number.isFinite(o.staleAfterHours) ? o.staleAfterHours : 720;
+
+  const importRecords = Array.isArray(o.importRecords) ? o.importRecords : null;
+  const correlation = _isPlainObject(o.correlation) ? o.correlation : null;
+
+  const base = {
+    runtimeStatus: 'unavailable',
+    telemetryWindow: { start: null, end: null },
+    freshness: { lastObservedAt: null, lastImportedAt: null, staleHours: null, stale: true },
+    parseFailures: 0,
+    parseFailuresNote: 'A failed import is refused in full and never persisted (AC-29 clause 5) — '
+      + 'this count reflects the import store, not the history of every attempt. Check `runtime ingest`\'s '
+      + 'own exit code/stderr at import time for parse failures.',
+    mappingPercentage: null,
+    unmatchedObservationCount: 0,
+    totalObservationCount: 0,
+    missingTelemetry: true,
+    limitations: [],
+  };
+
+  // No store was ever consulted — the honest 'unavailable' case, never a
+  // fabricated empty-but-fine report.
+  if (importRecords === null || importRecords.length === 0 || !correlation || correlation.evaluated !== true) {
+    base.limitations.push(
+      'No runtime observation import exists for this scan — runtimeStatus is \'unavailable\', never \'complete\' '
+      + 'or a silent absence of risk. Import telemetry with `runtime ingest` before relying on this report.',
+    );
+    return base;
+  }
+
+  const windowStart = _minIso(importRecords.map((r) => r?.windowStart));
+  const windowEnd = _maxIso(importRecords.map((r) => r?.windowEnd));
+  base.telemetryWindow = { start: windowStart, end: windowEnd };
+  base.missingTelemetry = false;
+
+  const allObservations = importRecords.flatMap((r) => (Array.isArray(r?.observations) ? r.observations : []));
+  const total = allObservations.length;
+  const unmatched = allObservations.filter((obs) => obs && obs.matchMethod === 'unmatched').length;
+  base.totalObservationCount = total;
+  base.unmatchedObservationCount = unmatched;
+  base.mappingPercentage = total > 0 ? Math.round(((total - unmatched) / total) * 10000) / 100 : null;
+
+  const lastObservedAt = _maxIso(allObservations.map((obs) => obs?.lastObservedAt));
+  const lastImportedAt = _maxIso(importRecords.map((r) => r?.importedAt));
+  base.freshness.lastObservedAt = lastObservedAt;
+  base.freshness.lastImportedAt = lastImportedAt;
+  if (lastObservedAt !== null) {
+    const ageMs = Date.parse(now) - Date.parse(lastObservedAt);
+    const ageHours = Math.round((ageMs / 3600000) * 100) / 100;
+    base.freshness.staleHours = ageHours;
+    base.freshness.stale = ageHours > staleAfterHours;
+  }
+
+  if (total === 0) {
+    base.limitations.push('The import store exists but carries zero observation records.');
+  }
+  if (unmatched > 0) {
+    base.limitations.push(`${unmatched} of ${total} imported observation(s) never matched any graph node (matchMethod 'unmatched') — these contribute no corroboration to any flow.`);
+  }
+  if (base.freshness.stale) {
+    base.limitations.push(`The most recent observed event is ${base.freshness.staleHours} hour(s) old (beyond the ${staleAfterHours}-hour staleness bar) — this twin may no longer describe current production behavior.`);
+  }
+
+  const complete = total > 0 && unmatched === 0 && !base.freshness.stale;
+  base.runtimeStatus = complete ? 'complete' : 'partial';
+
+  return base;
+}
+
+
+/***/ })
+
+};