@clear-capabilities/agentic-security-scanner 0.168.0 → 0.170.0

package/dist/7055.index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
+export const id = 7055;
+export const ids = [7055,642];
+export const modules = {
+
+/***/ 57055:
+/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+/* harmony export */   ImageArchiveError: () => (/* binding */ ImageArchiveError),
+/* harmony export */   t: () => (/* binding */ parseImageArchive)
+/* harmony export */ });
+/* harmony import */ var node_crypto__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(77598);
+/* harmony import */ var _safe_tar_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__ = __webpack_require__(90642);
+// Parses a Docker-save ("docker-archive") or OCI-layout ("oci-archive") tar
+// into one normalized shape, without executing or daemon-mounting the image
+// (PRD 5 Safety Requirements: "OCI inspection should not require executing
+// the image"). Built entirely on `safe-tar.js` — every byte read here passes
+// through the same entry-count/size/path/decompression guards.
+
+
+
+class ImageArchiveError extends Error {
+  constructor(message, code) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = 'ImageArchiveError';
+    this.code = code;
+  }
+}
+
+function safeJsonParse(buf, what) {
+  try {
+    return JSON.parse(buf.toString('utf8'));
+  } catch (err) {
+    throw new ImageArchiveError(`${what} is not valid JSON: ${err.message}`, 'malformed_manifest');
+  }
+}
+
+function readOuterEntries(buf, limits) {
+  const outer = (0,_safe_tar_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .decompressIfGzip */ .zr)(buf, limits);
+  const byName = new Map();
+  const unsafeEntries = [];
+  for (const e of (0,_safe_tar_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .readTarEntries */ .ET)(outer, limits)) {
+    if (e.unsafe) {
+      unsafeEntries.push({ name: e.name });
+      continue;
+    }
+    byName.set(e.name, e);
+  }
+  return { byName, unsafeEntries };
+}
+
+function extractConfigShape(configObj) {
+  const cfg = (configObj && configObj.config) || {};
+  return {
+    architecture: configObj.architecture || null,
+    os: configObj.os || null,
+    labels: (cfg.Labels && typeof cfg.Labels === 'object') ? { ...cfg.Labels } : {},
+    entrypoint: Array.isArray(cfg.Entrypoint) ? [...cfg.Entrypoint] : null,
+    cmd: Array.isArray(cfg.Cmd) ? [...cfg.Cmd] : null,
+    history: Array.isArray(configObj.history)
+      ? configObj.history.map((h) => ({ createdBy: h.created_by || null, created: h.created || null, emptyLayer: !!h.empty_layer }))
+      : [],
+    rootfsDiffIds: (configObj.rootfs && Array.isArray(configObj.rootfs.diff_ids)) ? [...configObj.rootfs.diff_ids] : [],
+  };
+}
+
+function parseDockerArchive(byName, outerUnsafe, limits) {
+  const manifestEntry = byName.get('manifest.json');
+  const manifestArr = safeJsonParse(manifestEntry.data, 'manifest.json');
+  if (!Array.isArray(manifestArr) || manifestArr.length === 0) {
+    throw new ImageArchiveError('manifest.json contains no images', 'empty_manifest');
+  }
+  if (manifestArr.length > 1) {
+    throw new ImageArchiveError(`manifest.json describes ${manifestArr.length} images; image scan expects exactly one`, 'multi_image_archive');
+  }
+  const m = manifestArr[0];
+  if (typeof m.Config !== 'string' || !Array.isArray(m.Layers)) {
+    throw new ImageArchiveError('manifest.json entry is missing Config or Layers', 'malformed_manifest');
+  }
+  const configEntry = byName.get(m.Config);
+  if (!configEntry) throw new ImageArchiveError(`manifest.json references missing config "${m.Config}"`, 'missing_blob');
+  const configObj = safeJsonParse(configEntry.data, m.Config);
+  const configDigest = `sha256:${node_crypto__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.createHash('sha256').update(configEntry.data).digest('hex')}`;
+
+  const layers = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < m.Layers.length; i++) {
+    const layerPath = m.Layers[i];
+    const entry = byName.get(layerPath);
+    if (!entry) throw new ImageArchiveError(`manifest.json references missing layer "${layerPath}"`, 'missing_blob');
+    const tar = (0,_safe_tar_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .decompressIfGzip */ .zr)(entry.data, limits);
+    layers.push({ index: i, path: layerPath, diffId: configObj?.rootfs?.diff_ids?.[i] || null, tar, sizeBytes: entry.size });
+  }
+
+  return {
+    format: 'docker-archive',
+    digest: configDigest,
+    digestKind: 'config',
+    repoTags: Array.isArray(m.RepoTags) ? m.RepoTags : [],
+    config: extractConfigShape(configObj),
+    layers,
+    unsafeEntries: outerUnsafe,
+  };
+}
+
+function parseOciArchive(byName, outerUnsafe, limits) {
+  const indexObj = safeJsonParse(byName.get('index.json').data, 'index.json');
+  const manifests = Array.isArray(indexObj.manifests) ? indexObj.manifests : [];
+  if (manifests.length === 0) throw new ImageArchiveError('index.json lists no manifests', 'empty_manifest');
+  if (manifests.length > 1) {
+    throw new ImageArchiveError(`index.json describes ${manifests.length} manifests; image scan expects exactly one`, 'multi_image_archive');
+  }
+  const manifestDigest = manifests[0].digest;
+  if (typeof manifestDigest !== 'string' || !manifestDigest.startsWith('sha256:')) {
+    throw new ImageArchiveError('index.json manifest entry has no sha256 digest', 'malformed_manifest');
+  }
+  const manifestBlobPath = `blobs/sha256/${manifestDigest.slice('sha256:'.length)}`;
+  const manifestEntry = byName.get(manifestBlobPath);
+  if (!manifestEntry) throw new ImageArchiveError(`index.json references missing manifest blob "${manifestBlobPath}"`, 'missing_blob');
+  const manifestObj = safeJsonParse(manifestEntry.data, manifestBlobPath);
+
+  const configDigest = manifestObj.config && manifestObj.config.digest;
+  if (typeof configDigest !== 'string' || !configDigest.startsWith('sha256:')) {
+    throw new ImageArchiveError('image manifest has no config digest', 'malformed_manifest');
+  }
+  const configBlobPath = `blobs/sha256/${configDigest.slice('sha256:'.length)}`;
+  const configEntry = byName.get(configBlobPath);
+  if (!configEntry) throw new ImageArchiveError(`manifest references missing config blob "${configBlobPath}"`, 'missing_blob');
+  const configObj = safeJsonParse(configEntry.data, configBlobPath);
+
+  const layerDescs = Array.isArray(manifestObj.layers) ? manifestObj.layers : [];
+  const layers = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < layerDescs.length; i++) {
+    const d = layerDescs[i];
+    if (typeof d.digest !== 'string' || !d.digest.startsWith('sha256:')) {
+      throw new ImageArchiveError(`layer ${i} has no sha256 digest`, 'malformed_manifest');
+    }
+    const blobPath = `blobs/sha256/${d.digest.slice('sha256:'.length)}`;
+    const entry = byName.get(blobPath);
+    if (!entry) throw new ImageArchiveError(`manifest references missing layer blob "${blobPath}"`, 'missing_blob');
+    const tar = (0,_safe_tar_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .decompressIfGzip */ .zr)(entry.data, limits);
+    layers.push({ index: i, path: blobPath, diffId: d.digest, mediaType: d.mediaType || null, tar, sizeBytes: entry.size });
+  }
+
+  return {
+    format: 'oci-archive',
+    digest: manifestDigest,
+    digestKind: 'manifest',
+    repoTags: [],
+    config: extractConfigShape(configObj),
+    layers,
+    unsafeEntries: outerUnsafe,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parses an in-memory tar buffer (already read from disk/stdin by the
+ * caller — this module never touches the filesystem or network) as either a
+ * `docker save`-shaped archive or an OCI-layout archive. Throws
+ * ImageArchiveError for anything it cannot recognize or whose manifest
+ * references a blob that isn't present — never guesses or substitutes a
+ * default.
+ */
+function parseImageArchive(buf, limits = _safe_tar_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .DEFAULT_LIMITS */ .dR) {
+  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(buf)) throw new ImageArchiveError('image archive input must be a Buffer', 'bad_input');
+  const { byName, unsafeEntries } = readOuterEntries(buf, limits);
+  if (byName.has('manifest.json')) return parseDockerArchive(byName, unsafeEntries, limits);
+  if (byName.has('index.json') && byName.has('oci-layout')) return parseOciArchive(byName, unsafeEntries, limits);
+  throw new ImageArchiveError(
+    'archive is neither a docker-archive (manifest.json) nor an oci-archive (oci-layout + index.json)',
+    'unrecognized_format',
+  );
+}
+
+
+/***/ }),
+
+/***/ 90642:
+/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+/* harmony export */   ET: () => (/* binding */ readTarEntries),
+/* harmony export */   Jn: () => (/* binding */ whiteoutTarget),
+/* harmony export */   TarSafetyError: () => (/* binding */ TarSafetyError),
+/* harmony export */   dR: () => (/* binding */ DEFAULT_LIMITS),
+/* harmony export */   l0: () => (/* binding */ isWhiteoutName),
+/* harmony export */   zr: () => (/* binding */ decompressIfGzip)
+/* harmony export */ });
+/* unused harmony export isSafeEntryName */
+/* harmony import */ var node_zlib__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(38522);
+// Hand-rolled, hardened POSIX/GNU tar reader for OCI/Docker image archives.
+//
+// Why hand-rolled instead of a dependency: this repo has no tar library (see
+// `src/artifact/CLAUDE.md`), and PRD 5's own Safety Requirements ask for exact
+// control over the failure modes a generic tar library treats as implementation
+// detail: malicious entry paths, decompression bombs, giant layers, oversized
+// archives. Rolling it ourselves means every one of those limits is a named,
+// tested constant in this file rather than a library default we'd have to audit.
+//
+// Scope: ustar + GNU longname ('L' typeflag) + base-256 size fields. PAX extended
+// headers ('x'/'g') and GNU longlink ('K') are structurally skipped (their data
+// block is consumed so offsets stay correct, but their content is not applied) —
+// a disclosed limitation, not a silent one. Real docker-save/oci-archive output
+// from Go's archive/tar for images in this size/complexity class essentially
+// never needs them; synthetic fixtures in this codebase never emit them either.
+
+
+const BLOCK = 512;
+
+const DEFAULT_LIMITS = Object.freeze({
+  maxEntries: 200_000,
+  maxEntrySize: 512 * 1024 * 1024, // 512MB per tar entry
+  maxTotalSize: 4 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024, // 4GB per archive (sum of entry sizes)
+  maxGunzipOutput: 4 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024, // decompression-bomb guard
+});
+
+class TarSafetyError extends Error {
+  constructor(message, code) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = 'TarSafetyError';
+    this.code = code;
+  }
+}
+
+function parseSizeField(buf) {
+  if (buf[0] & 0x80) {
+    // GNU base-256 extension for sizes that don't fit in octal-ASCII.
+    let n = 0n;
+    for (let i = 1; i < buf.length; i++) n = (n << 8n) | BigInt(buf[i]);
+    return Number(n);
+  }
+  const s = buf.toString('ascii').replace(/\0.*$/, '').trim();
+  if (!s) return 0;
+  const n = parseInt(s, 8);
+  return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : 0;
+}
+
+function cstr(buf) {
+  return buf.toString('utf8').replace(/\0.*$/, '');
+}
+
+// A tar entry name is unsafe when it would escape a virtual extraction root:
+// absolute paths, `..` segments, embedded NULs, or an unreasonable length.
+// Because this module never writes to a real filesystem path (every caller
+// keeps extracted content in an in-memory Map keyed by this string), the
+// classic zip-slip *write* vulnerability cannot occur here — but a hostile
+// name must still never be silently treated as an ordinary path by downstream
+// manifest/package-DB matching, so unsafe entries are flagged, never dropped
+// silently and never accepted as-is.
+function isSafeEntryName(name) {
+  if (typeof name !== 'string' || name.length === 0 || name.length > 4096) return false;
+  if (name.includes('\0')) return false;
+  const norm = name.replace(/\\/g, '/');
+  if (norm.startsWith('/')) return false;
+  if (norm.split('/').some((p) => p === '..')) return false;
+  return true;
+}
+
+function isWhiteoutName(name) {
+  return (name.split('/').pop() || '').startsWith('.wh.');
+}
+
+// Resolves a whiteout entry name to what it deletes. `.wh..wh..opq` marks a
+// directory as "opaque" (everything from earlier layers under it is hidden,
+// not individually deleted) — reported distinctly so callers don't conflate
+// it with a single-file deletion.
+function whiteoutTarget(name) {
+  const parts = name.split('/');
+  const base = parts.pop();
+  if (base === '.wh..wh..opq') return { opaque: true, dir: parts.join('/') };
+  return { opaque: false, path: [...parts, base.slice(4)].join('/') };
+}
+
+// Decompresses a gzip member with a hard output-size cap (Node's native
+// ERR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE on overflow — no custom streaming counter needed).
+// Returns the input unchanged when it isn't gzip-magic (plain tar).
+function decompressIfGzip(buf, limits = DEFAULT_LIMITS) {
+  if (buf.length >= 2 && buf[0] === 0x1f && buf[1] === 0x8b) {
+    try {
+      return node_zlib__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.gunzipSync(buf, { maxOutputLength: limits.maxGunzipOutput });
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (err && err.code === 'ERR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE') {
+        throw new TarSafetyError('decompressed layer exceeds the decompression-bomb guard', 'gunzip_too_large');
+      }
+      throw new TarSafetyError(`gzip stream is malformed: ${err.message}`, 'gunzip_malformed');
+    }
+  }
+  return buf;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reads a decompressed tar buffer and yields one record per entry:
+ *   { name, size, typeflag, linkname, data, unsafe }
+ * `data` is a Buffer view into `buf` (never copied) for safe entries, `null`
+ * for unsafe ones. Throws TarSafetyError (never returns a partial result) the
+ * moment any configured limit is exceeded.
+ */
+function* readTarEntries(buf, limits = DEFAULT_LIMITS) {
+  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(buf)) throw new TarSafetyError('tar input must be a Buffer', 'bad_input');
+  let offset = 0;
+  let count = 0;
+  let totalSize = 0;
+  let pendingLongName = null;
+
+  while (offset + BLOCK <= buf.length) {
+    const header = buf.subarray(offset, offset + BLOCK);
+    if (header.every((b) => b === 0)) {
+      offset += BLOCK;
+      continue; // end-of-archive zero-fill padding
+    }
+
+    count += 1;
+    if (count > limits.maxEntries) {
+      throw new TarSafetyError(`tar archive has more than ${limits.maxEntries} entries`, 'too_many_entries');
+    }
+
+    let name = cstr(header.subarray(0, 100));
+    const typeflag = String.fromCharCode(header[156] || 0);
+    const linkname = cstr(header.subarray(157, 257));
+    const magic = header.subarray(257, 263).toString('ascii');
+    const prefix = magic.startsWith('ustar') ? cstr(header.subarray(345, 500)) : '';
+    if (prefix) name = `${prefix}/${name}`;
+    const size = parseSizeField(header.subarray(124, 136));
+
+    offset += BLOCK;
+
+    if (size < 0 || !Number.isFinite(size)) {
+      throw new TarSafetyError(`tar entry "${name}" has an invalid size field`, 'bad_size');
+    }
+    if (size > limits.maxEntrySize) {
+      throw new TarSafetyError(`tar entry "${name}" (${size} bytes) exceeds the per-entry size limit`, 'entry_too_large');
+    }
+    totalSize += size;
+    if (totalSize > limits.maxTotalSize) {
+      throw new TarSafetyError('tar archive exceeds the total-size limit', 'archive_too_large');
+    }
+
+    const dataBlocks = Math.ceil(size / BLOCK);
+    if (offset + size > buf.length) {
+      throw new TarSafetyError(`tar entry "${name}" claims more data than the archive contains`, 'truncated');
+    }
+    const data = size > 0 ? buf.subarray(offset, offset + size) : Buffer.alloc(0);
+    offset += dataBlocks * BLOCK;
+
+    const resolvedName = pendingLongName ? pendingLongName : name;
+    pendingLongName = null;
+
+    if (typeflag === 'L') {
+      // GNU longname: this entry's data IS the next entry's real name.
+      pendingLongName = cstr(data);
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (typeflag === 'K' || typeflag === 'x' || typeflag === 'g') {
+      // GNU longlink / PAX extended header — structurally skipped (see header comment).
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (!isSafeEntryName(resolvedName)) {
+      yield { name: resolvedName, size, typeflag, linkname, data: null, unsafe: true };
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    yield { name: resolvedName.replace(/\\/g, '/'), size, typeflag, linkname, data, unsafe: false };
+  }
+}
+
+
+/***/ })
+
+};

package/dist/7232.index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+export const id = 7232;
+export const ids = [7232];
+export const modules = {
+
+/***/ 77232:
+/***/ ((__webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+__webpack_require__.a(__webpack_module__, async (__webpack_handle_async_dependencies__, __webpack_async_result__) => { try {
+/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+/* harmony export */   parseManifests: () => (/* reexport safe */ _engine_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.Ye),
+/* harmony export */   queryOSV: () => (/* reexport safe */ _engine_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.Vk)
+/* harmony export */ });
+/* harmony import */ var _engine_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(67198);
+var __webpack_async_dependencies__ = __webpack_handle_async_dependencies__([_engine_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__]);
+_engine_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = (__webpack_async_dependencies__.then ? (await __webpack_async_dependencies__)() : __webpack_async_dependencies__)[0];
+// SCA submodule view of the engine — dependency vulnerability + reachability.
+
+
+__webpack_async_result__();
+} catch(e) { __webpack_async_result__(e); } });
+
+/***/ })
+
+};

package/dist/7552.index.js

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ function buildDeletionReport({ mode, dryRun, root, items, preserved }) {
 function writeDeletionReport(scanRoot, report) {
   try {
     const fp = (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.statePath)(scanRoot, DELETION_REPORT_FILE);
-    return (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__/* .safeWriteState */ .Ep)(fp, JSON.stringify(report, null, 2) + '\n') ? fp : null;
+    return (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.safeWriteState)(fp, JSON.stringify(report, null, 2) + '\n') ? fp : null;
   } catch { return null; }
 }
 
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ function buildExportReport({ root, outDir, items }) {
 function writeExportReport(scanRoot, report) {
   try {
     const fp = (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.statePath)(scanRoot, EXPORT_REPORT_FILE);
-    return (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__/* .safeWriteState */ .Ep)(fp, JSON.stringify(report, null, 2) + '\n') ? fp : null;
+    return (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.safeWriteState)(fp, JSON.stringify(report, null, 2) + '\n') ? fp : null;
   } catch { return null; }
 }