@clear-capabilities/agentic-security-scanner 0.168.0 → 0.170.0

package/dist/5206.index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+export const id = 5206;
+export const ids = [5206];
+export const modules = {
+
+/***/ 15206:
+/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+/* harmony export */   correlateImageVulnerabilities: () => (/* binding */ correlateImageVulnerabilities)
+/* harmony export */ });
+// PRD 5 P0 §4 — Container Vulnerability Analysis. "Reuse current SCA
+// semantics where technically valid": this module does nothing but hand an
+// image's OS + application package inventory to the engine's existing
+// OSV/KEV/EPSS query path (`queryOSV`, imported via `src/sca/index.js`),
+// exactly as every other SCA finding in this codebase gets its CVE data.
+// `queryOSVFn` is injected (not imported directly) so this module's own
+// tests never make a real network call and stay independent of engine.js's
+// load cost; the CLI wiring passes the real `queryOSV`.
+async function correlateImageVulnerabilities({ inventory, fileContents, queryOSVFn }) {
+  if (typeof queryOSVFn !== 'function') throw new TypeError('correlateImageVulnerabilities requires queryOSVFn(components, allFileContents)');
+  if (!inventory || !Array.isArray(inventory.osPackages) || !Array.isArray(inventory.appPackages)) {
+    throw new TypeError('correlateImageVulnerabilities requires an inventory with osPackages/appPackages arrays');
+  }
+  const components = [...inventory.osPackages, ...inventory.appPackages];
+  const vulnerabilities = await queryOSVFn(components, fileContents || {});
+  return { components, vulnerabilities };
+}
+
+
+/***/ })
+
+};

package/dist/642.index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+export const id = 642;
+export const ids = [642];
+export const modules = {
+
+/***/ 90642:
+/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+/* harmony export */   ET: () => (/* binding */ readTarEntries),
+/* harmony export */   Jn: () => (/* binding */ whiteoutTarget),
+/* harmony export */   TarSafetyError: () => (/* binding */ TarSafetyError),
+/* harmony export */   dR: () => (/* binding */ DEFAULT_LIMITS),
+/* harmony export */   l0: () => (/* binding */ isWhiteoutName),
+/* harmony export */   zr: () => (/* binding */ decompressIfGzip)
+/* harmony export */ });
+/* unused harmony export isSafeEntryName */
+/* harmony import */ var node_zlib__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(38522);
+// Hand-rolled, hardened POSIX/GNU tar reader for OCI/Docker image archives.
+//
+// Why hand-rolled instead of a dependency: this repo has no tar library (see
+// `src/artifact/CLAUDE.md`), and PRD 5's own Safety Requirements ask for exact
+// control over the failure modes a generic tar library treats as implementation
+// detail: malicious entry paths, decompression bombs, giant layers, oversized
+// archives. Rolling it ourselves means every one of those limits is a named,
+// tested constant in this file rather than a library default we'd have to audit.
+//
+// Scope: ustar + GNU longname ('L' typeflag) + base-256 size fields. PAX extended
+// headers ('x'/'g') and GNU longlink ('K') are structurally skipped (their data
+// block is consumed so offsets stay correct, but their content is not applied) —
+// a disclosed limitation, not a silent one. Real docker-save/oci-archive output
+// from Go's archive/tar for images in this size/complexity class essentially
+// never needs them; synthetic fixtures in this codebase never emit them either.
+
+
+const BLOCK = 512;
+
+const DEFAULT_LIMITS = Object.freeze({
+  maxEntries: 200_000,
+  maxEntrySize: 512 * 1024 * 1024, // 512MB per tar entry
+  maxTotalSize: 4 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024, // 4GB per archive (sum of entry sizes)
+  maxGunzipOutput: 4 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024, // decompression-bomb guard
+});
+
+class TarSafetyError extends Error {
+  constructor(message, code) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = 'TarSafetyError';
+    this.code = code;
+  }
+}
+
+function parseSizeField(buf) {
+  if (buf[0] & 0x80) {
+    // GNU base-256 extension for sizes that don't fit in octal-ASCII.
+    let n = 0n;
+    for (let i = 1; i < buf.length; i++) n = (n << 8n) | BigInt(buf[i]);
+    return Number(n);
+  }
+  const s = buf.toString('ascii').replace(/\0.*$/, '').trim();
+  if (!s) return 0;
+  const n = parseInt(s, 8);
+  return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : 0;
+}
+
+function cstr(buf) {
+  return buf.toString('utf8').replace(/\0.*$/, '');
+}
+
+// A tar entry name is unsafe when it would escape a virtual extraction root:
+// absolute paths, `..` segments, embedded NULs, or an unreasonable length.
+// Because this module never writes to a real filesystem path (every caller
+// keeps extracted content in an in-memory Map keyed by this string), the
+// classic zip-slip *write* vulnerability cannot occur here — but a hostile
+// name must still never be silently treated as an ordinary path by downstream
+// manifest/package-DB matching, so unsafe entries are flagged, never dropped
+// silently and never accepted as-is.
+function isSafeEntryName(name) {
+  if (typeof name !== 'string' || name.length === 0 || name.length > 4096) return false;
+  if (name.includes('\0')) return false;
+  const norm = name.replace(/\\/g, '/');
+  if (norm.startsWith('/')) return false;
+  if (norm.split('/').some((p) => p === '..')) return false;
+  return true;
+}
+
+function isWhiteoutName(name) {
+  return (name.split('/').pop() || '').startsWith('.wh.');
+}
+
+// Resolves a whiteout entry name to what it deletes. `.wh..wh..opq` marks a
+// directory as "opaque" (everything from earlier layers under it is hidden,
+// not individually deleted) — reported distinctly so callers don't conflate
+// it with a single-file deletion.
+function whiteoutTarget(name) {
+  const parts = name.split('/');
+  const base = parts.pop();
+  if (base === '.wh..wh..opq') return { opaque: true, dir: parts.join('/') };
+  return { opaque: false, path: [...parts, base.slice(4)].join('/') };
+}
+
+// Decompresses a gzip member with a hard output-size cap (Node's native
+// ERR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE on overflow — no custom streaming counter needed).
+// Returns the input unchanged when it isn't gzip-magic (plain tar).
+function decompressIfGzip(buf, limits = DEFAULT_LIMITS) {
+  if (buf.length >= 2 && buf[0] === 0x1f && buf[1] === 0x8b) {
+    try {
+      return node_zlib__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.gunzipSync(buf, { maxOutputLength: limits.maxGunzipOutput });
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (err && err.code === 'ERR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE') {
+        throw new TarSafetyError('decompressed layer exceeds the decompression-bomb guard', 'gunzip_too_large');
+      }
+      throw new TarSafetyError(`gzip stream is malformed: ${err.message}`, 'gunzip_malformed');
+    }
+  }
+  return buf;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reads a decompressed tar buffer and yields one record per entry:
+ *   { name, size, typeflag, linkname, data, unsafe }
+ * `data` is a Buffer view into `buf` (never copied) for safe entries, `null`
+ * for unsafe ones. Throws TarSafetyError (never returns a partial result) the
+ * moment any configured limit is exceeded.
+ */
+function* readTarEntries(buf, limits = DEFAULT_LIMITS) {
+  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(buf)) throw new TarSafetyError('tar input must be a Buffer', 'bad_input');
+  let offset = 0;
+  let count = 0;
+  let totalSize = 0;
+  let pendingLongName = null;
+
+  while (offset + BLOCK <= buf.length) {
+    const header = buf.subarray(offset, offset + BLOCK);
+    if (header.every((b) => b === 0)) {
+      offset += BLOCK;
+      continue; // end-of-archive zero-fill padding
+    }
+
+    count += 1;
+    if (count > limits.maxEntries) {
+      throw new TarSafetyError(`tar archive has more than ${limits.maxEntries} entries`, 'too_many_entries');
+    }
+
+    let name = cstr(header.subarray(0, 100));
+    const typeflag = String.fromCharCode(header[156] || 0);
+    const linkname = cstr(header.subarray(157, 257));
+    const magic = header.subarray(257, 263).toString('ascii');
+    const prefix = magic.startsWith('ustar') ? cstr(header.subarray(345, 500)) : '';
+    if (prefix) name = `${prefix}/${name}`;
+    const size = parseSizeField(header.subarray(124, 136));
+
+    offset += BLOCK;
+
+    if (size < 0 || !Number.isFinite(size)) {
+      throw new TarSafetyError(`tar entry "${name}" has an invalid size field`, 'bad_size');
+    }
+    if (size > limits.maxEntrySize) {
+      throw new TarSafetyError(`tar entry "${name}" (${size} bytes) exceeds the per-entry size limit`, 'entry_too_large');
+    }
+    totalSize += size;
+    if (totalSize > limits.maxTotalSize) {
+      throw new TarSafetyError('tar archive exceeds the total-size limit', 'archive_too_large');
+    }
+
+    const dataBlocks = Math.ceil(size / BLOCK);
+    if (offset + size > buf.length) {
+      throw new TarSafetyError(`tar entry "${name}" claims more data than the archive contains`, 'truncated');
+    }
+    const data = size > 0 ? buf.subarray(offset, offset + size) : Buffer.alloc(0);
+    offset += dataBlocks * BLOCK;
+
+    const resolvedName = pendingLongName ? pendingLongName : name;
+    pendingLongName = null;
+
+    if (typeflag === 'L') {
+      // GNU longname: this entry's data IS the next entry's real name.
+      pendingLongName = cstr(data);
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (typeflag === 'K' || typeflag === 'x' || typeflag === 'g') {
+      // GNU longlink / PAX extended header — structurally skipped (see header comment).
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (!isSafeEntryName(resolvedName)) {
+      yield { name: resolvedName, size, typeflag, linkname, data: null, unsafe: true };
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    yield { name: resolvedName.replace(/\\/g, '/'), size, typeflag, linkname, data, unsafe: false };
+  }
+}
+
+
+/***/ })
+
+};

package/dist/6447.index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+export const id = 6447;
+export const ids = [6447];
+export const modules = {
+
+/***/ 46447:
+/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+/* harmony export */   buildArtifactProvenanceGraph: () => (/* binding */ buildArtifactProvenanceGraph),
+/* harmony export */   traceArtifactProvenanceGraph: () => (/* binding */ traceArtifactProvenanceGraph)
+/* harmony export */ });
+// PRD 5 P0 §6 — Provenance Graph: Git Commit -> Build -> OCI Digest -> SBOM
+// Component -> Finding -> Deployment.
+//
+// Naming: the exported field is `artifactProvenanceGraph` and the builder is
+// `buildArtifactProvenanceGraph` — never a bare `.provenance`/`*Provenance`,
+// per this repo's own naming discipline (5 unrelated existing uses of
+// "provenance"; see docs/implementation-status/source-to-artifact-provenance.md).
+//
+// This function does no new detection — every node/edge is assembled from
+// evidence `inventory.js`/`vuln-correlate.js` already computed. The one
+// exception is the Git-Commit edge, whose only evidence source is the
+// standard `org.opencontainers.image.revision` build label; when absent the
+// commit node is explicitly `known: false`, never inferred from git history
+// (an image's build label is the only trustworthy claim of "which commit
+// built this" — matching it against local git history by heuristic would be
+// a confident-looking guess, the exact failure mode PRD 5's signature-state
+// discipline exists to prevent elsewhere in this same PRD).
+const REVISION_LABEL = 'org.opencontainers.image.revision';
+
+function componentId(c) {
+  return c.purl || `${c.ecosystem}:${c.name}@${c.version}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * `inventory` is `inventory.js#buildImageInventory`'s `inventory`.
+ * `vulnerabilities` is `vuln-correlate.js`'s `queryOSVFn` result (only
+ * `type: 'vulnerable_dep'` entries become Finding nodes — the no_lockfile",
+ * "unpinned_dep" structural checks don't bind to a specific component and
+ * are not part of this graph). `deployment`, if supplied, is an
+ * OPERATOR-DECLARED record (`{ id, environment, evidence }`) — this codebase
+ * has no mechanism anywhere that discovers "which digest is running where"
+ * on its own (`lineage/deployment/` models topology, not running digests),
+ * so a missing `deployment` argument means the graph simply stops at the
+ * OCI Digest / SBOM Component / Finding nodes, never a fabricated edge.
+ */
+function buildArtifactProvenanceGraph({ inventory, vulnerabilities = [], deployment = null }) {
+  if (!inventory || typeof inventory.digest !== 'string') {
+    throw new TypeError('buildArtifactProvenanceGraph requires an inventory with a digest');
+  }
+  const nodes = [];
+  const edges = [];
+
+  const commitSha = inventory.buildLabels ? inventory.buildLabels[REVISION_LABEL] || null : null;
+  const commitId = `commit:${commitSha || 'unknown'}`;
+  const buildId = `build:${inventory.digest}`;
+  const digestId = `digest:${inventory.digest}`;
+
+  nodes.push({ id: commitId, kind: 'gitCommit', sha: commitSha, known: !!commitSha });
+  nodes.push({ id: buildId, kind: 'build', digest: inventory.digest, labels: inventory.buildLabels || {} });
+  nodes.push({ id: digestId, kind: 'ociDigest', digest: inventory.digest, digestKind: inventory.digestKind, repoTags: inventory.repoTags || [] });
+
+  edges.push({
+    from: commitId, to: buildId,
+    evidence: commitSha ? `label:${REVISION_LABEL}` : 'none',
+  });
+  edges.push({ from: buildId, to: digestId, evidence: 'same-archive' });
+
+  const components = [...(inventory.osPackages || []), ...(inventory.appPackages || [])];
+  for (const c of components) {
+    const compId = `component:${componentId(c)}`;
+    nodes.push({ id: compId, kind: 'sbomComponent', purl: c.purl || null, name: c.name, version: c.version, ecosystem: c.ecosystem });
+    edges.push({ from: digestId, to: compId, evidence: 'inventory' });
+  }
+
+  const vulnDeps = (vulnerabilities || []).filter((v) => v.type === 'vulnerable_dep');
+  for (const v of vulnDeps) {
+    const compId = `component:${v.purl || `${v.ecosystem}:${v.name}@${v.version}`}`;
+    const findingId = `finding:${v.osvId}:${v.purl || `${v.ecosystem}:${v.name}@${v.version}`}`;
+    nodes.push({ id: findingId, kind: 'finding', osvId: v.osvId, cveAliases: v.cveAliases || [], severity: v.severity });
+    edges.push({ from: compId, to: findingId, evidence: 'osv' });
+  }
+
+  if (deployment) {
+    if (typeof deployment.id !== 'string') throw new TypeError('a supplied deployment record requires an "id"');
+    const deploymentId = `deployment:${deployment.id}`;
+    nodes.push({ id: deploymentId, kind: 'deployment', environment: deployment.environment || null, declaredDigest: deployment.digest || null });
+    edges.push({
+      from: digestId, to: deploymentId,
+      evidence: deployment.evidence || 'operator-declared',
+      digestMatches: deployment.digest ? deployment.digest === inventory.digest : null,
+    });
+  }
+
+  return { nodes, edges };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Walks the graph from a commit or digest to every reachable Finding/Deployment
+ * node — the `provenance trace` CLI command's query surface.
+ */
+function traceArtifactProvenanceGraph(graph, fromId) {
+  if (!graph || !Array.isArray(graph.nodes) || !Array.isArray(graph.edges)) {
+    throw new TypeError('traceArtifactProvenanceGraph requires a graph with nodes/edges arrays');
+  }
+  const byId = new Map(graph.nodes.map((n) => [n.id, n]));
+  if (!byId.has(fromId)) return { found: false, path: [] };
+  const adjacency = new Map();
+  for (const e of graph.edges) {
+    if (!adjacency.has(e.from)) adjacency.set(e.from, []);
+    adjacency.get(e.from).push(e);
+  }
+  const visited = new Set([fromId]);
+  const queue = [fromId];
+  const reached = [];
+  while (queue.length) {
+    const cur = queue.shift();
+    for (const e of adjacency.get(cur) || []) {
+      if (visited.has(e.to)) continue;
+      visited.add(e.to);
+      reached.push({ node: byId.get(e.to), via: e });
+      queue.push(e.to);
+    }
+  }
+  return { found: true, root: byId.get(fromId), reached };
+}
+
+
+/***/ })
+
+};

package/dist/6645.index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+export const id = 6645;
+export const ids = [6645];
+export const modules = {
+
+/***/ 36645:
+/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+/* harmony export */   detectSourceArtifactMismatch: () => (/* binding */ detectSourceArtifactMismatch)
+/* harmony export */ });
+// PRD 5 P0 §7 — Source vs Artifact Mismatch. This is the PRD's own "Killer
+// Demonstration": a developer fixes a vulnerability in source on Monday, but
+// production is still serving Friday's image.
+//
+// Scenario A — "Git: fixed / Production image: vulnerable": an OSV advisory
+// the DEPLOYED ARTIFACT's own vuln-correlate.js result reports against the
+// version it actually has installed, that the CURRENT source scan does NOT
+// report against the version source has installed/declared — i.e. source
+// has moved past this specific advisory (patched, upgraded) but the
+// artifact's installed version has not.
+//
+// Scenario B — "Git: vulnerable / Built artifact: affected component
+// absent": the current source scan flags an advisory against some package,
+// but that PACKAGE (by ecosystem+name, independent of version) is not
+// present anywhere in the artifact's own component inventory at all — a
+// dev-only/optional dependency that never actually shipped in this build.
+//
+// The matching key for a scenario-A/B pair is the OSV advisory id ALONE
+// (`osvId`) — never the purl, which bakes the VERSION into the key. Keying
+// on purl was tried first and is wrong: source and artifact are, by this
+// comparison's entire premise, usually running DIFFERENT versions of the
+// same package, so a purl-based key would make every version difference
+// look like two independent mismatches instead of comparing "does this
+// specific advisory affect each side's own installed version". An OSV
+// advisory id already uniquely identifies one vulnerability against one
+// package, so comparing by id alone correctly asks "is THIS advisory
+// present on one side and absent on the other", regardless of which exact
+// version is installed on either side.
+//
+// Pure comparison only — no new detection. `sourceVulnerabilities` is the
+// output of a normal source-tree SCA scan (queryOSV-shaped `vulnerable_dep`
+// entries); `artifactVulnerabilities`/`artifactComponents` are
+// vuln-correlate.js's/inventory.js's output for one specific image.
+function advisoryKey(v) {
+  return v.osvId || `no-osv-id:${v.ecosystem}:${v.name}`;
+}
+
+function packageIdentity(c) {
+  return `${c.ecosystem}:${c.name}`;
+}
+
+function detectSourceArtifactMismatch({ sourceVulnerabilities, artifactVulnerabilities, artifactComponents }) {
+  if (!Array.isArray(sourceVulnerabilities) || !Array.isArray(artifactVulnerabilities) || !Array.isArray(artifactComponents)) {
+    throw new TypeError('detectSourceArtifactMismatch requires sourceVulnerabilities/artifactVulnerabilities/artifactComponents arrays');
+  }
+
+  const sourceKeyed = new Map();
+  for (const v of sourceVulnerabilities) {
+    if (v.type && v.type !== 'vulnerable_dep') continue;
+    sourceKeyed.set(advisoryKey(v), v);
+  }
+  const artifactKeyed = new Map();
+  for (const v of artifactVulnerabilities) {
+    if (v.type && v.type !== 'vulnerable_dep') continue;
+    artifactKeyed.set(advisoryKey(v), v);
+  }
+  const artifactPackageIdentities = new Set(artifactComponents.map(packageIdentity));
+
+  const scenarioA = [...artifactKeyed.entries()]
+    .filter(([key]) => !sourceKeyed.has(key))
+    .map(([, v]) => v);
+
+  const scenarioB = [...sourceKeyed.entries()]
+    .filter(([, v]) => !artifactPackageIdentities.has(packageIdentity(v)))
+    .map(([, v]) => v);
+
+  return {
+    scenarioA,
+    scenarioB,
+    hasMismatch: scenarioA.length > 0 || scenarioB.length > 0,
+  };
+}
+
+
+/***/ })
+
+};

package/dist/6730.index.js

@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ function addLegalHold(scanRoot, { artifact, owner, reason, expires_at } = {}) {
   const holds = _loadRaw(scanRoot);
   holds.push(hold);
   const fp = (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__.statePath)(scanRoot, LEGAL_HOLD_FILE);
-  if (!(0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .safeWriteState */ .Ep)(fp, JSON.stringify(holds, null, 2) + '\n')) {
+  if (!(0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__.safeWriteState)(fp, JSON.stringify(holds, null, 2) + '\n')) {
     return { ok: false, reason: 'state writes are disabled (--no-state) or this is not a safe state directory' };
   }
   return { ok: true, hold };
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ function removeLegalHold(scanRoot, artifact) {
   const removedCount = holds.length - remaining.length;
   if (removedCount > 0) {
     const fp = (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__.statePath)(scanRoot, LEGAL_HOLD_FILE);
-    (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .safeWriteState */ .Ep)(fp, JSON.stringify(remaining, null, 2) + '\n');
+    (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__.safeWriteState)(fp, JSON.stringify(remaining, null, 2) + '\n');
   }
   return removedCount;
 }

package/dist/6932.index.js

@@ -851,9 +851,9 @@ async function cmdScan(args, root, { resumeOnly = false } = {}) {
   });
   if (resumeOnly && result.skipped.length === manifest.repositories.length) console.error('[fleet] nothing to resume — every repository was already complete.');
 
-  (0,state_dir/* safeWriteState */.Ep)(prevRollupFile, JSON.stringify(result.rollup, null, 2));
+  (0,state_dir.safeWriteState)(prevRollupFile, JSON.stringify(result.rollup, null, 2));
   const graph = buildFleetDependencyGraph(manifest.repositories);
-  (0,state_dir/* safeWriteState */.Ep)(graphPath(root), JSON.stringify({ organization: manifest.organization, builtAt: new Date().toISOString(), ...graph }, null, 2));
+  (0,state_dir.safeWriteState)(graphPath(root), JSON.stringify({ organization: manifest.organization, builtAt: new Date().toISOString(), ...graph }, null, 2));
 
   console.log(renderFleetSummary(result.rollup));
   console.log(`\nRepositories requested: ${manifest.repositories.length}`);