@cclabsnz/sf-audit 1.17.0 → 1.18.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +54 -0
- package/PERMISSIONS.md +139 -0
- package/README.md +4 -2
- package/docs/permissionset/SF_Audit_ReadOnly.permissionset-meta.xml +54 -0
- package/lib/chains/ChainEngine.js +11 -1
- package/lib/chains/namedChains.js +42 -24
- package/lib/checks/CheckEngine.js +55 -24
- package/lib/checks/impl/AgentUserPrivilegeCheck.js +5 -4
- package/lib/checks/impl/AnonymousApexAuditCheck.js +41 -8
- package/lib/checks/impl/ApexSharingCheck.js +3 -1
- package/lib/checks/impl/ApiClientPermissionCheck.js +21 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/AuditTrailCheck.js +23 -8
- package/lib/checks/impl/CertificateExpiryCheck.js +2 -1
- package/lib/checks/impl/ConnectedAppScopeCheck.js +61 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/ConnectedAppsCheck.js +13 -4
- package/lib/checks/impl/ContentLinksCheck.js +33 -9
- package/lib/checks/impl/CorsAllowlistCheck.js +3 -2
- package/lib/checks/impl/DataClassificationCheck.js +15 -13
- package/lib/checks/impl/DebugLogAccessCheck.js +4 -4
- package/lib/checks/impl/DelegatedAdministrationGroupsCheck.js +3 -2
- package/lib/checks/impl/DelegatedAuthenticationExposureCheck.js +8 -1
- package/lib/checks/impl/DeploymentIdentityCheck.js +32 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/EmailSecurityCheck.d.ts +1 -1
- package/lib/checks/impl/EmailSecurityCheck.js +14 -34
- package/lib/checks/impl/EncryptionCoverageCheck.js +21 -15
- package/lib/checks/impl/EnhancedDomainsCheck.js +17 -2
- package/lib/checks/impl/EscalationPermsCheck.d.ts +2 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/EscalationPermsCheck.js +88 -21
- package/lib/checks/impl/ExperienceCloudSiteCheck.js +56 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/ExternalAccountHierarchyExposureCheck.js +7 -15
- package/lib/checks/impl/ExternalCredentialsCheck.js +6 -3
- package/lib/checks/impl/FailedLoginCheck.js +36 -9
- package/lib/checks/impl/FieldHistoryTrackingCheck.js +14 -11
- package/lib/checks/impl/FlowHttpCalloutCredentialBypassCheck.js +2 -2
- package/lib/checks/impl/GuestRecordAccessPolicyCheck.js +52 -11
- package/lib/checks/impl/HealthCheckCheck.js +1 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/HighAssuranceSessionCheck.js +16 -11
- package/lib/checks/impl/InactiveUsersCheck.js +1 -1
- package/lib/checks/impl/InboundEmailHandlerExposureCheck.js +5 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/IntegrationLeastPrivilegeCheck.js +7 -6
- package/lib/checks/impl/InternalUserMfaCheck.js +26 -8
- package/lib/checks/impl/IpRestrictionsCheck.js +35 -16
- package/lib/checks/impl/LoginAccessPolicyCheck.js +5 -4
- package/lib/checks/impl/LoginAnomalyCheck.js +10 -7
- package/lib/checks/impl/LoginSessionCheck.js +2 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/MfaEnforcementCheck.js +23 -6
- package/lib/checks/impl/MfaMethodStrengthCheck.js +18 -3
- package/lib/checks/impl/MfaRegistrationCheck.js +4 -3
- package/lib/checks/impl/MyDomainLoginPolicyCheck.js +23 -10
- package/lib/checks/impl/OutboundMessagesCheck.js +48 -6
- package/lib/checks/impl/PlatformEventSubscriberContextCheck.js +5 -1
- package/lib/checks/impl/PrivilegedAccessCheck.js +12 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/ReleaseUpdatesCheck.js +18 -3
- package/lib/checks/impl/RemoteSitesCheck.js +4 -4
- package/lib/checks/impl/RestrictionRulesIntegrityCheck.js +3 -3
- package/lib/checks/impl/SeparationOfDutiesCheck.js +14 -3
- package/lib/checks/impl/SoapLoginApiAuthCheck.js +20 -8
- package/lib/checks/impl/SsoEnforcementCheck.js +16 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/TransactionSecurityPolicyCheck.js +5 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/TrustedIPRangesCheck.js +18 -9
- package/lib/checks/impl/UsersAndAdminsCheck.js +24 -4
- package/lib/checks/permCatalog.js +1 -1
- package/lib/checks/support/missingObject.js +3 -1
- package/lib/checks/support/schema.d.ts +17 -0
- package/lib/checks/support/schema.js +41 -0
- package/lib/commands/audit/apps.js +3 -1
- package/lib/commands/audit/events/pull.js +3 -1
- package/lib/commands/audit/incident/collect.js +3 -1
- package/lib/commands/audit/security.js +9 -3
- package/lib/findings/AuditResult.d.ts +2 -0
- package/lib/findings/coverage.d.ts +6 -0
- package/lib/findings/coverage.js +12 -0
- package/lib/findings/scoring.js +51 -9
- package/lib/preflight/permissionMap.d.ts +2 -20
- package/lib/preflight/permissionMap.js +2 -43
- package/lib/preflight/permissions.d.ts +25 -0
- package/lib/preflight/permissions.js +50 -0
- package/lib/renderers/ClientReportRenderer.js +3 -3
- package/lib/renderers/HtmlRenderer.js +6 -2
- package/lib/renderers/MarkdownRenderer.js +6 -3
- package/lib/report/RemediationRoadmap.d.ts +5 -1
- package/lib/report/RemediationRoadmap.js +6 -2
- package/package.json +4 -2
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@@ -9,9 +9,10 @@ export class MfaRegistrationCheck {
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const baseUrl = ctx.orgInfo.instanceUrl;
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const setupUrl = `${baseUrl}/lightning/setup/SetupOneIdEntityManagement/home`;
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const frozenFilter = `Id NOT IN (SELECT UserId FROM UserLogin WHERE IsFrozen = true)`;
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// COUNT(Id)
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// COUNT(Id) with no alias puts the result in records[0].expr0 (an explicit expr0 alias is
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// reserved and rejected); COUNT() without a field puts it in
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// totalSize which is not exposed on the typed return value.
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const countResult = await ctx.soql.query(`SELECT COUNT(Id)
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const countResult = await ctx.soql.query(`SELECT COUNT(Id) FROM User
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WHERE IsActive = true
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AND UserType = 'Standard'
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AND ${frozenFilter}`);
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@@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ export class MfaRegistrationCheck {
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LIMIT 2000`);
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}
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catch {
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-
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// Leave the cache unset: an empty list would read downstream as "nobody registered MFA".
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findings.push({
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id: 'mfa-registration-inaccessible',
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category: this.category,
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@@ -1,3 +1,17 @@
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// Organization has no MyDomain field. Every org's My Domain is the subdomain of its instance URL
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// (<name>.my.salesforce.com, or a sandbox/develop/scratch variant); a legacy instance host such as
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// na1.salesforce.com means no My Domain.
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const MY_DOMAIN_HOST = /^(.+?)\.(?:(?:sandbox|develop|scratch|trailblaze)\.)?my\.(?:salesforce\.com|salesforce\.mil|sfcrmproducts\.cn)$/i;
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function myDomainOf(instanceUrl) {
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let host = instanceUrl;
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try {
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host = new URL(instanceUrl).hostname;
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}
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catch {
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// keep the raw string
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}
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return MY_DOMAIN_HOST.exec(host)?.[1] ?? null;
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}
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export class MyDomainLoginPolicyCheck {
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id = 'my-domain-login-policy';
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name = 'My Domain Login Policy';
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@@ -8,11 +22,10 @@ export class MyDomainLoginPolicyCheck {
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const baseUrl = ctx.orgInfo.instanceUrl;
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const ssoSetupUrl = `${baseUrl}/lightning/setup/SingleSignOn/home`;
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const domainSetupUrl = `${baseUrl}/lightning/setup/MyDomain/home`;
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// Q1
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const orgResult = await ctx.soql.query(`SELECT
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const
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const
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const isSandbox = org?.IsSandbox ?? false;
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// Q1: is My Domain configured (from the instance URL), and is this a sandbox
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const orgResult = await ctx.soql.query(`SELECT IsSandbox FROM Organization LIMIT 1`);
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const myDomain = myDomainOf(baseUrl);
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const isSandbox = orgResult.records[0]?.IsSandbox ?? ctx.orgInfo.isSandbox;
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if (!myDomain) {
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findings.push({
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id: 'my-domain-not-configured',
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@@ -33,13 +46,13 @@ export class MyDomainLoginPolicyCheck {
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detail: `The org has a custom My Domain (${myDomain}) configured, which is a prerequisite for SSO enforcement and Enhanced Domains.`,
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remediation: 'Verify the login policy in Setup → My Domain prevents login from login.salesforce.com.',
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});
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// Q2
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// Q2: check AuthConfig (a standard-API object) for login options.
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// If AuthOptionsUsernamePassword is false in the AuthConfig for the org domain,
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// users cannot log in with Salesforce credentials — they must go through SSO.
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try {
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const authConfigs = await ctx.
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const authConfigs = await ctx.soql.queryAll(`SELECT DeveloperName, AuthOptionsSaml, AuthOptionsUsernamePassword, IsActive
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FROM AuthConfig
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WHERE
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WHERE IsActive = true`);
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if (authConfigs.length === 0) {
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findings.push({
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id: 'my-domain-auth-config-empty',
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@@ -88,14 +101,14 @@ export class MyDomainLoginPolicyCheck {
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}
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}
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}
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catch {
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catch (err) {
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findings.push({
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id: 'my-domain-auth-config-inaccessible',
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category: this.category,
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riskLevel: 'MEDIUM',
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inconclusive: true,
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title: 'My Domain login policy could not be verified: AuthConfig not accessible',
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detail:
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detail: `The AuthConfig query failed, so the My Domain login policy (credential login vs SSO-only) cannot be automatically verified: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
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remediation: 'Manually verify in Setup → My Domain → Authentication Configuration that "Login Page" is disabled and "Prevent Login from login.salesforce.com" is enabled.',
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});
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}
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// The endpoint and the session-ID flag live only in the Metadata column, which the Tooling API
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// returns one record at a time, so each message is fetched by id, up to this many.
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const MAX_RECORD_READS = 100;
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export class OutboundMessagesCheck {
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id = 'outbound-messages';
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name = 'Workflow Outbound Messages';
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async run(ctx) {
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const findings = [];
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const setupUrl = `${ctx.orgInfo.instanceUrl}/lightning/setup/WorkflowOutboundMessaging/home`;
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let
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let listed;
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try {
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listed = await ctx.tooling.query('SELECT Id, Name FROM WorkflowOutboundMessage');
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}
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catch (err) {
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const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
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riskLevel: 'INFO',
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inconclusive: true,
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title: 'Workflow outbound messages could not be read',
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detail: `The WorkflowOutboundMessage Tooling query
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detail: `The WorkflowOutboundMessage Tooling query failed: ${msg}`,
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remediation: 'Grant the audit user "View Setup and Configuration", then re-run the audit.',
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});
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return { findings };
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}
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const rows = [];
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const unread = [];
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for (const [i, row] of listed.entries()) {
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let meta;
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if (i < MAX_RECORD_READS) {
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try {
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const rec = await ctx.tooling.getRecord('WorkflowOutboundMessage', row.Id);
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meta = rec?.Metadata ?? undefined;
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}
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catch {
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meta = undefined;
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}
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}
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if (meta && typeof meta.endpointUrl === 'string') {
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rows.push({
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...row,
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EndpointUrl: meta.endpointUrl,
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IncludeSessionId: meta.includeSessionId === true || meta.includeSessionId === 'true',
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});
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}
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else
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unread.push(row);
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}
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// A message whose definition could not be read is unassessed, and keeps the inventory from passing.
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if (unread.length > 0) {
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findings.push({
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id: 'outbound-messages-unread',
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category: this.category,
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riskLevel: 'INFO',
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inconclusive: true,
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title: `${unread.length} outbound message(s) could not be read`,
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detail: 'Their endpoint and Include Session ID settings were not returned by the Tooling API ' +
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`(reads stop after ${MAX_RECORD_READS} messages), so they are unassessed, not clean.`,
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remediation: 'Review these outbound messages in Setup → Outbound Messages.',
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affectedItems: unread.map((r) => ({ label: r.Name, url: setupUrl })),
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});
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if (rows.length === 0)
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return { findings };
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}
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if (listed.length === 0) {
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findings.push({
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id: 'outbound-messages-none',
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findings.push({
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id: 'outbound-messages-inventory',
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category: this.category,
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riskLevel: sessionId.length === 0 && cleartext.length === 0 ? 'LOW' : 'INFO',
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passed: sessionId.length === 0 && cleartext.length === 0 ? true : undefined,
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riskLevel: sessionId.length === 0 && cleartext.length === 0 && unread.length === 0 ? 'LOW' : 'INFO',
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passed: sessionId.length === 0 && cleartext.length === 0 && unread.length === 0 ? true : undefined,
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title: `${rows.length} workflow outbound message(s) configured (${sessionId.length} include session ID, ${cleartext.length} cleartext)`,
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detail: 'Outbound messages POST record data to external endpoints automatically. Each destination should be a reviewed, currently-used HTTPS integration.',
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remediation: 'Audit each outbound message endpoint to confirm it is still used and points to a trusted HTTPS destination. Remove unused entries.',
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@@ -42,7 +42,11 @@ export class PlatformEventSubscriberContextCheck {
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const profileNameById = new Map(profiles.map((p) => [p.Id, p.Name]));
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const owned = await ctx.soql.queryAll(`SELECT Id, ProfileId FROM PermissionSet WHERE IsOwnedByProfile = true AND ProfileId IN (${profiles.map((p) => `'${p.Id}'`).join(', ')})`);
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const profileByPermSet = new Map(owned.map((ps) => [ps.Id, ps.ProfileId]));
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// SobjectType does not accept LIKE ("invalid operator on id field"): select these profiles'
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// Create grants and keep the platform events (__e) in code.
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const objectPerms = owned.length === 0
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? []
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: await ctx.soql.queryAll(`SELECT Id, ParentId, SobjectType, PermissionsCreate FROM ObjectPermissions WHERE PermissionsCreate = true AND ParentId IN (${owned.map((ps) => `'${ps.Id}'`).join(', ')})`);
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for (const op of objectPerms) {
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const profileId = profileByPermSet.get(op.ParentId);
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if (profileId && eventObjectNames.has(op.SobjectType)) {
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import { DANGEROUS_PERMS } from '../permCatalog.js';
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import { presentFields } from '../support/schema.js';
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const ADMIN_PROFILE = 'System Administrator';
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/** Admin-equivalent = holds Modify All Data, OR can self-escalate to it (Manage Users + Assign Permission Sets). */
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function isAdminEquivalent(perms) {
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@@ -13,10 +14,16 @@ export class PrivilegedAccessCheck {
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async run(ctx) {
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const findings = [];
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const setupUrl = `${ctx.orgInfo.instanceUrl}/lightning/setup/ManageUsers/home`;
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const permFields = DANGEROUS_PERMS.map((p) => `PermissionSet.${p.field}`).join(', ');
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const permWhere = DANGEROUS_PERMS.map((p) => `PermissionSet.${p.field} = true`).join(' OR ');
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let rows;
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// Some catalogued permissions exist only with a licence or feature (Event Monitoring, API
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// Access Control). One absent field fails the whole query, so select only those this org
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// has. A permission the org lacks cannot be held, so leaving it out loses nothing.
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let perms = DANGEROUS_PERMS;
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try {
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const present = new Set(await presentFields(ctx, 'PermissionSet', DANGEROUS_PERMS.map((p) => p.field)));
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perms = DANGEROUS_PERMS.filter((p) => present.has(p.field));
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const permFields = perms.map((p) => `PermissionSet.${p.field}`).join(', ');
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const permWhere = perms.map((p) => `PermissionSet.${p.field} = true`).join(' OR ');
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rows = await ctx.soql.queryAll(`SELECT AssigneeId, Assignee.Username, Assignee.Name, Assignee.Profile.Name, ${permFields}
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FROM PermissionSetAssignment
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WHERE (${permWhere}) AND Assignee.IsActive = true`);
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@@ -29,8 +36,8 @@ export class PrivilegedAccessCheck {
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riskLevel: 'INFO',
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inconclusive: true,
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title: 'Effective-permission resolution could not be completed',
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detail: `
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remediation: '
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+
detail: `Effective permissions could not be read, so privileged access is unassessed. The org said: ${msg}`,
|
|
40
|
+
remediation: 'Check the error above. If it is an access error, confirm the audit user has "View Setup and Configuration" and "View All Users", then re-run the audit.',
|
|
34
41
|
});
|
|
35
42
|
return { findings };
|
|
36
43
|
}
|
|
@@ -39,7 +46,7 @@ export class PrivilegedAccessCheck {
|
|
|
39
46
|
const byUser = new Map();
|
|
40
47
|
for (const row of rows) {
|
|
41
48
|
const ps = row.PermissionSet ?? {};
|
|
42
|
-
const held =
|
|
49
|
+
const held = perms.filter((p) => ps[p.field]).map((p) => p.key);
|
|
43
50
|
if (held.length === 0)
|
|
44
51
|
continue;
|
|
45
52
|
let g = byUser.get(row.AssigneeId);
|
|
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { fieldsOf } from '../support/schema.js';
|
|
1
2
|
export class ReleaseUpdatesCheck {
|
|
2
3
|
id = 'release-updates';
|
|
3
4
|
name = 'Pending Release Updates';
|
|
@@ -9,16 +10,30 @@ export class ReleaseUpdatesCheck {
|
|
|
9
10
|
const today = new Date();
|
|
10
11
|
let pendingUpdates = [];
|
|
11
12
|
try {
|
|
12
|
-
|
|
13
|
+
// Current orgs expose Release Updates as Tooling ReleaseUpdate; CriticalUpdate is the older
|
|
14
|
+
// object, absent from current releases. Use whichever this org serves.
|
|
15
|
+
if (await fieldsOf(ctx, 'ReleaseUpdate', 'tooling')) {
|
|
16
|
+
const rows = await ctx.tooling.query("SELECT Id, DeveloperName, Title, Description, DueDate, Status FROM ReleaseUpdate WHERE Status IN ('Invocable', 'Revoked')");
|
|
17
|
+
pendingUpdates = rows.map((r) => ({
|
|
18
|
+
Id: r.Id,
|
|
19
|
+
Name: r.Title || r.DeveloperName,
|
|
20
|
+
Description: r.Description,
|
|
21
|
+
AutoActivationDate: r.DueDate,
|
|
22
|
+
IsEnabled: false,
|
|
23
|
+
}));
|
|
24
|
+
}
|
|
25
|
+
else {
|
|
26
|
+
pendingUpdates = await ctx.tooling.query('SELECT Id, Name, Description, AutoActivationDate, IsEnabled FROM CriticalUpdate WHERE IsEnabled = false');
|
|
27
|
+
}
|
|
13
28
|
}
|
|
14
|
-
catch {
|
|
29
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
15
30
|
findings.push({
|
|
16
31
|
id: 'release-updates-inconclusive',
|
|
17
32
|
category: this.category,
|
|
18
33
|
riskLevel: 'INFO',
|
|
19
34
|
inconclusive: true,
|
|
20
35
|
title: 'Pending release updates check could not be completed',
|
|
21
|
-
detail:
|
|
36
|
+
detail: `Pending release updates could not be read, so this is unassessed, not clean. The org said: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
|
|
22
37
|
remediation: 'Review pending Release Updates manually in Setup → Release Updates.',
|
|
23
38
|
});
|
|
24
39
|
return { findings };
|
|
@@ -9,13 +9,13 @@ export class RemoteSitesCheck {
|
|
|
9
9
|
const baseUrl = ctx.orgInfo.instanceUrl;
|
|
10
10
|
const setupUrl = `${baseUrl}/lightning/setup/SecurityRemoteProxy/home`;
|
|
11
11
|
// Query active remote site settings using Tooling API
|
|
12
|
-
const records = await ctx.tooling.query('SELECT Id, SiteName, EndpointUrl, IsActive,
|
|
12
|
+
const records = await ctx.tooling.query('SELECT Id, SiteName, EndpointUrl, IsActive, ProtocolMismatch FROM RemoteProxy WHERE IsActive = true');
|
|
13
13
|
const count = records.length;
|
|
14
14
|
// Cache the URLs for use by HardcodedCredentialsCheck
|
|
15
15
|
ctx.cache.remoteSiteUrls = records.map((r) => r.EndpointUrl);
|
|
16
16
|
// Flag sites with protocol security disabled — these allow insecure HTTP callouts
|
|
17
|
-
const insecureSites = records.filter((r) => r.
|
|
18
|
-
const secureSites = records.filter((r) => !r.
|
|
17
|
+
const insecureSites = records.filter((r) => r.ProtocolMismatch);
|
|
18
|
+
const secureSites = records.filter((r) => !r.ProtocolMismatch);
|
|
19
19
|
if (insecureSites.length > 0) {
|
|
20
20
|
findings.push({
|
|
21
21
|
id: 'remote-sites-protocol-security-disabled',
|
|
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ export class RemoteSitesCheck {
|
|
|
44
44
|
affectedItems: records.map((r) => ({
|
|
45
45
|
label: r.SiteName,
|
|
46
46
|
url: setupUrl,
|
|
47
|
-
note: `${r.EndpointUrl}${r.
|
|
47
|
+
note: `${r.EndpointUrl}${r.ProtocolMismatch ? ' ⚠ Protocol security disabled' : ''}`,
|
|
48
48
|
})),
|
|
49
49
|
});
|
|
50
50
|
}
|
|
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ export class RestrictionRulesIntegrityCheck {
|
|
|
10
10
|
const rulesUrl = `${baseUrl}/lightning/setup/ObjectManager/home`;
|
|
11
11
|
let rules = [];
|
|
12
12
|
try {
|
|
13
|
-
rules = await ctx.tooling.query('SELECT Id, TargetEntity,
|
|
13
|
+
rules = await ctx.tooling.query('SELECT Id, MasterLabel, TargetEntity, IsActive, EnforcementType FROM RestrictionRule');
|
|
14
14
|
}
|
|
15
15
|
catch (err) {
|
|
16
16
|
if (isMissingObjectError(err)) {
|
|
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ export class RestrictionRulesIntegrityCheck {
|
|
|
49
49
|
return { findings };
|
|
50
50
|
}
|
|
51
51
|
// 1. Check for inactive restriction rules
|
|
52
|
-
const inactiveRules = rules.filter((r) => r.
|
|
52
|
+
const inactiveRules = rules.filter((r) => r.IsActive === false);
|
|
53
53
|
if (inactiveRules.length > 0) {
|
|
54
54
|
findings.push({
|
|
55
55
|
id: 'restriction-rules-inactive',
|
|
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ export class RestrictionRulesIntegrityCheck {
|
|
|
67
67
|
}
|
|
68
68
|
// 2. Check for multiple active rules on the same TargetEntity (Salesforce anti-pattern)
|
|
69
69
|
const activeRulesByEntity = new Map();
|
|
70
|
-
for (const r of rules.filter((r) => r.
|
|
70
|
+
for (const r of rules.filter((r) => r.IsActive === true)) {
|
|
71
71
|
const list = activeRulesByEntity.get(r.TargetEntity) ?? [];
|
|
72
72
|
list.push(r);
|
|
73
73
|
activeRulesByEntity.set(r.TargetEntity, list);
|
|
@@ -72,12 +72,20 @@ export class SeparationOfDutiesCheck {
|
|
|
72
72
|
});
|
|
73
73
|
return { findings };
|
|
74
74
|
}
|
|
75
|
+
// A super-admin (Modify All Data + View All Data + Manage Users) already has unrestricted control,
|
|
76
|
+
// rated by users-super-admin-combo; a combination adds nothing for them. Rate the others, so the
|
|
77
|
+
// same users are not counted towards the grade again.
|
|
78
|
+
const isSuperAdmin = (g) => ['ModifyAllData', 'ViewAllData', 'ManageUsers'].every((p) => g.perms.includes(p));
|
|
75
79
|
let anyViolation = false;
|
|
80
|
+
let superAdminHolders = 0;
|
|
76
81
|
for (const combo of COMBOS) {
|
|
77
|
-
const
|
|
82
|
+
const all = grants.filter((g) => {
|
|
78
83
|
const s = new Set(g.perms);
|
|
79
84
|
return combo.perms.every((p) => s.has(p));
|
|
80
85
|
});
|
|
86
|
+
const holders = all.filter((g) => !isSuperAdmin(g));
|
|
87
|
+
const leftOut = all.length - holders.length;
|
|
88
|
+
superAdminHolders = Math.max(superAdminHolders, leftOut);
|
|
81
89
|
if (holders.length === 0)
|
|
82
90
|
continue;
|
|
83
91
|
anyViolation = true;
|
|
@@ -86,7 +94,8 @@ export class SeparationOfDutiesCheck {
|
|
|
86
94
|
category: this.category,
|
|
87
95
|
riskLevel: combo.risk,
|
|
88
96
|
title: `${holders.length} user(s) hold a toxic permission combination: ${combo.label}`,
|
|
89
|
-
detail: `${combo.why} Each permission may look acceptable in isolation, which is why combination review matters
|
|
97
|
+
detail: `${combo.why} Each permission may look acceptable in isolation, which is why combination review matters.` +
|
|
98
|
+
(leftOut > 0 ? ` ${leftOut} super-admin(s) also hold it and are rated in the super-admin finding instead.` : ''),
|
|
90
99
|
remediation: combo.fix,
|
|
91
100
|
affectedItems: holders.map((g) => ({
|
|
92
101
|
label: g.username,
|
|
@@ -104,7 +113,9 @@ export class SeparationOfDutiesCheck {
|
|
|
104
113
|
title: 'No toxic permission combinations detected',
|
|
105
114
|
detail: grants.length === 0
|
|
106
115
|
? 'No active users hold catalogued high-risk permissions, so no separation-of-duties conflicts arise.'
|
|
107
|
-
:
|
|
116
|
+
: superAdminHolders > 0
|
|
117
|
+
? `Only super-admins hold flagged combinations; they already have unrestricted control and are rated in the super-admin finding (users-super-admin-combo). No other active user holds a flagged combination.`
|
|
118
|
+
: 'No active user holds a flagged combination of permissions that would violate separation of duties.',
|
|
108
119
|
remediation: 'Continue to separate user administration, code authorship, identity, and data-access duties across roles.',
|
|
109
120
|
});
|
|
110
121
|
}
|
|
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { hasField } from '../support/schema.js';
|
|
1
2
|
/**
|
|
2
3
|
* Ninety days rather than thirty. SOAP callers are disproportionately the least routine
|
|
3
4
|
* things in an org: a quarterly reconciliation job, a backup tool, a device switched on
|
|
@@ -48,7 +49,21 @@ export class SoapLoginApiAuthCheck {
|
|
|
48
49
|
// grant paths, because a profile's own permissions live on a PermissionSet with
|
|
49
50
|
// IsOwnedByProfile = true. Orgs on a release without the field will throw here.
|
|
50
51
|
let holders = [];
|
|
52
|
+
const notYet = {
|
|
53
|
+
id: 'soap-login-api-auth-inconclusive-field',
|
|
54
|
+
category: this.category,
|
|
55
|
+
riskLevel: 'INFO',
|
|
56
|
+
inconclusive: true,
|
|
57
|
+
title: '"Use Any API Auth" permission is not queryable in this org yet',
|
|
58
|
+
detail: 'The PermissionsUseAnyApiAuth field is not available. That is expected on orgs not yet upgraded to a release that carries it, and it means readiness for the Winter \'27 SOAP login() change cannot be assessed here. Note this permission is not the same as "Use Any API Client", which is covered separately by the api-client-permission check.',
|
|
59
|
+
remediation: `Re-run this audit after the org takes Winter '27, or check Setup → Permission Sets for "Use Any API Auth" directly: ${permSetUrl}`,
|
|
60
|
+
};
|
|
51
61
|
try {
|
|
62
|
+
// Describe first: on a release without the field, filtering on it is rejected outright.
|
|
63
|
+
if (!(await hasField(ctx, 'PermissionSet', 'PermissionsUseAnyApiAuth'))) {
|
|
64
|
+
findings.push(notYet);
|
|
65
|
+
return { findings };
|
|
66
|
+
}
|
|
52
67
|
const result = await ctx.soql.query(`SELECT Assignee.Id, Assignee.Username, Assignee.Profile.Name,
|
|
53
68
|
PermissionSet.Name, PermissionSet.IsOwnedByProfile
|
|
54
69
|
FROM PermissionSetAssignment
|
|
@@ -56,15 +71,12 @@ export class SoapLoginApiAuthCheck {
|
|
|
56
71
|
AND Assignee.IsActive = true`);
|
|
57
72
|
holders = result.records;
|
|
58
73
|
}
|
|
59
|
-
catch {
|
|
74
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
60
75
|
findings.push({
|
|
61
|
-
|
|
62
|
-
|
|
63
|
-
|
|
64
|
-
|
|
65
|
-
title: '"Use Any API Auth" permission is not queryable in this org yet',
|
|
66
|
-
detail: 'The PermissionsUseAnyApiAuth field was not available. That is expected on orgs not yet upgraded to a release that carries it, and it means readiness for the Winter \'27 SOAP login() change cannot be assessed here. Note this permission is not the same as "Use Any API Client", which is covered separately by the api-client-permission check.',
|
|
67
|
-
remediation: `Re-run this audit after the org takes Winter '27, or check Setup → Permission Sets for "Use Any API Auth" directly: ${permSetUrl}`,
|
|
76
|
+
...notYet,
|
|
77
|
+
title: '"Use Any API Auth" holders could not be read',
|
|
78
|
+
detail: `Who holds "Use Any API Auth" could not be read, so readiness for the Winter '27 SOAP login() change is unassessed. The org said: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
|
|
79
|
+
remediation: 'Check the error above. If it is an access error, confirm the audit user can read PermissionSetAssignment (View Setup and Configuration), then re-run.',
|
|
68
80
|
});
|
|
69
81
|
return { findings };
|
|
70
82
|
}
|
|
@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ export class SsoEnforcementCheck {
|
|
|
10
10
|
// Single query: recent credential logins over the past 30 days.
|
|
11
11
|
// Presence of 'Username-Password' logins is direct evidence that SBS-AUTH-001
|
|
12
12
|
// (org-wide SSO enforcement) is not fully applied.
|
|
13
|
-
const result = await ctx.soql.queryAll(
|
|
13
|
+
const result = await ctx.soql.queryAll(
|
|
14
|
+
// LoginHistory carries no Username field and no User relationship; names are resolved below.
|
|
15
|
+
`SELECT Id, UserId, LoginType, LoginTime
|
|
14
16
|
FROM LoginHistory
|
|
15
17
|
WHERE LoginTime > LAST_N_DAYS:30
|
|
16
18
|
AND LoginType = 'Username-Password'
|
|
@@ -37,9 +39,17 @@ export class SsoEnforcementCheck {
|
|
|
37
39
|
existing.count++;
|
|
38
40
|
}
|
|
39
41
|
else {
|
|
40
|
-
byUser.set(r.UserId, { username: r.
|
|
42
|
+
byUser.set(r.UserId, { username: r.UserId, count: 1, latest: r.LoginTime });
|
|
41
43
|
}
|
|
42
44
|
}
|
|
45
|
+
// At most 300 logins, so at most 300 distinct users: one bounded lookup.
|
|
46
|
+
const inClause = [...byUser.keys()].map((id) => `'${id}'`).join(',');
|
|
47
|
+
const users = await ctx.soql.queryAll(`SELECT Id, Username FROM User WHERE Id IN (${inClause})`);
|
|
48
|
+
for (const u of users) {
|
|
49
|
+
const entry = byUser.get(u.Id);
|
|
50
|
+
if (entry)
|
|
51
|
+
entry.username = u.Username;
|
|
52
|
+
}
|
|
43
53
|
const uniqueUsers = [...byUser.entries()];
|
|
44
54
|
findings.push({
|
|
45
55
|
id: 'sso-password-logins-detected',
|
|
@@ -72,14 +82,15 @@ export class SsoEnforcementCheck {
|
|
|
72
82
|
});
|
|
73
83
|
}
|
|
74
84
|
}
|
|
75
|
-
catch {
|
|
85
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
86
|
+
const reason = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
76
87
|
findings.push({
|
|
77
88
|
id: 'sso-enforcement-inconclusive',
|
|
78
89
|
category: this.category,
|
|
79
90
|
riskLevel: 'INFO',
|
|
80
91
|
inconclusive: true,
|
|
81
|
-
title: 'SSO enforcement status could not be determined: LoginHistory not
|
|
82
|
-
detail:
|
|
92
|
+
title: 'SSO enforcement status could not be determined: LoginHistory could not be read',
|
|
93
|
+
detail: `SBS-AUTH-001/002 require SSO enforcement configuration to be verified. LoginHistory could not be read: ${reason}`,
|
|
83
94
|
remediation: 'Manually verify in Setup → Single Sign-On Settings that "Prevent Login with Salesforce Credentials" is enabled.',
|
|
84
95
|
});
|
|
85
96
|
}
|
|
@@ -9,17 +9,17 @@ export class TransactionSecurityPolicyCheck {
|
|
|
9
9
|
const setupUrl = `${baseUrl}/lightning/setup/TransactionSecurityPolicies/home`;
|
|
10
10
|
let policies;
|
|
11
11
|
try {
|
|
12
|
-
policies = await ctx.tooling.query(`SELECT Id,
|
|
12
|
+
policies = await ctx.tooling.query(`SELECT Id, DeveloperName, MasterLabel, EventType, State FROM TransactionSecurityPolicy WHERE State = 'Enabled'`);
|
|
13
13
|
}
|
|
14
|
-
catch {
|
|
14
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
15
15
|
findings.push({
|
|
16
16
|
id: 'transaction-security-policy-inaccessible',
|
|
17
17
|
category: this.category,
|
|
18
18
|
riskLevel: 'INFO',
|
|
19
19
|
inconclusive: true,
|
|
20
20
|
title: 'Transaction Security Policies could not be queried',
|
|
21
|
-
detail:
|
|
22
|
-
remediation: '
|
|
21
|
+
detail: `The Tooling API TransactionSecurityPolicy query failed, so whether automated threat response exists is unassessed, not absent: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
|
|
22
|
+
remediation: 'Check the error above. If it is an access error, confirm the audit user has API Enabled and View Setup and Configuration, then re-run.',
|
|
23
23
|
});
|
|
24
24
|
return { findings };
|
|
25
25
|
}
|
|
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ export class TransactionSecurityPolicyCheck {
|
|
|
51
51
|
detail: `Active Transaction Security Policies covering: ${eventTypes.join(', ')}. Automated threat detection and response is in place for these event types.`,
|
|
52
52
|
remediation: 'Periodically review policies to ensure coverage includes login anomalies, bulk data exports, and high-volume API usage. Verify that policy actions (Block/Notify) are appropriate for each event type.',
|
|
53
53
|
affectedItems: policies.map((p) => ({
|
|
54
|
-
label: p.
|
|
54
|
+
label: p.MasterLabel || p.DeveloperName,
|
|
55
55
|
url: setupUrl,
|
|
56
56
|
note: `EventType: ${p.EventType}`,
|
|
57
57
|
})),
|
|
@@ -13,27 +13,36 @@ export class TrustedIPRangesCheck {
|
|
|
13
13
|
const findings = [];
|
|
14
14
|
const baseUrl = ctx.orgInfo.instanceUrl;
|
|
15
15
|
const setupUrl = `${baseUrl}/lightning/setup/SecurityNetworkAccess/home`;
|
|
16
|
-
let
|
|
17
|
-
|
|
18
|
-
|
|
19
|
-
|
|
20
|
-
|
|
21
|
-
|
|
22
|
-
|
|
16
|
+
let settings = null;
|
|
17
|
+
let error = 'this run has no Metadata API client';
|
|
18
|
+
if (ctx.metadata) {
|
|
19
|
+
try {
|
|
20
|
+
settings = await ctx.metadata.read('SecuritySettings', 'Security');
|
|
21
|
+
if (!settings)
|
|
22
|
+
error = 'the Security settings were not returned';
|
|
23
|
+
}
|
|
24
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
25
|
+
error = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
26
|
+
}
|
|
23
27
|
}
|
|
24
|
-
|
|
28
|
+
if (!settings) {
|
|
25
29
|
findings.push({
|
|
26
30
|
id: 'trusted-ip-inaccessible',
|
|
27
31
|
category: this.category,
|
|
28
32
|
riskLevel: 'INFO',
|
|
29
33
|
inconclusive: true,
|
|
30
34
|
title: 'Trusted IP ranges could not be retrieved',
|
|
31
|
-
detail:
|
|
35
|
+
detail: `Trusted IP ranges are read from the Security settings in the Metadata API, and could not be: ${error}.`,
|
|
32
36
|
remediation: 'Review trusted IP ranges manually in Setup → Security → Network Access. Ensure the audit user has "View Setup and Configuration" permission.',
|
|
33
37
|
affectedItems: [{ label: 'Network Access Setup', url: setupUrl }],
|
|
34
38
|
});
|
|
35
39
|
return { findings };
|
|
36
40
|
}
|
|
41
|
+
// The Metadata API returns a single range as an object, several as an array.
|
|
42
|
+
const raw = settings.networkAccess?.ipRanges;
|
|
43
|
+
const ranges = (raw === undefined ? [] : Array.isArray(raw) ? raw : [raw])
|
|
44
|
+
.filter((r) => r.start && r.end)
|
|
45
|
+
.map((r) => ({ StartAddress: r.start, EndAddress: r.end, Description: r.description ?? null }));
|
|
37
46
|
if (ranges.length === 0) {
|
|
38
47
|
findings.push({
|
|
39
48
|
id: 'trusted-ip-none',
|
|
@@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ export class UsersAndAdminsCheck {
|
|
|
43
43
|
const viewAllCount = viewAllIds.size;
|
|
44
44
|
const customizeAppCount = uniqueIds(customizeAppUsers).size;
|
|
45
45
|
const authorApexCount = uniqueIds(authorApexUsers).size;
|
|
46
|
+
// In a sandbox, developers routinely hold admin: cap admin-count findings at HIGH, and say so.
|
|
47
|
+
const isSandbox = ctx.orgInfo.isSandbox;
|
|
48
|
+
const sandboxCap = (level) => isSandbox && level === 'CRITICAL' ? 'HIGH' : level;
|
|
49
|
+
const sandboxNote = isSandbox
|
|
50
|
+
? ' Rated at most HIGH because this org is a sandbox, where developers commonly hold admin; treat it as CRITICAL if this sandbox holds production data.'
|
|
51
|
+
: '';
|
|
46
52
|
// SBS-ACS-004: flag users with ALL THREE super-admin permissions simultaneously
|
|
47
53
|
const superAdminIds = [...modifyAllIds].filter((id) => viewAllIds.has(id) && manageUsersIds.has(id));
|
|
48
54
|
if (superAdminIds.length > 0) {
|
|
@@ -53,20 +59,33 @@ export class UsersAndAdminsCheck {
|
|
|
53
59
|
findings.push({
|
|
54
60
|
id: 'users-super-admin-combo',
|
|
55
61
|
category: this.category,
|
|
56
|
-
|
|
62
|
+
// Every org needs an administrator: grade on how many hold unrestricted control.
|
|
63
|
+
riskLevel: sandboxCap(superAdminIds.length > 5 ? 'CRITICAL' : superAdminIds.length > 3 ? 'HIGH' : 'LOW'),
|
|
57
64
|
title: `${superAdminIds.length} user(s) hold the super-admin permission combination (ViewAllData + ModifyAllData + ManageUsers)`,
|
|
58
|
-
detail: 'SBS-ACS-004 requires documented justification for any user holding all three of ViewAllData, ModifyAllData, and ManageUsers simultaneously. This combination is equivalent to unrestricted org control.'
|
|
65
|
+
detail: 'SBS-ACS-004 requires documented justification for any user holding all three of ViewAllData, ModifyAllData, and ManageUsers simultaneously. This combination is equivalent to unrestricted org control.' +
|
|
66
|
+
(superAdminIds.length > 5 ? sandboxNote : ''),
|
|
59
67
|
remediation: 'Reduce to the minimum necessary permissions. Document justification for each user in the system of record. Consider breaking this into role-specific permission sets.',
|
|
60
68
|
affectedItems: superAdminItems,
|
|
61
69
|
});
|
|
62
70
|
}
|
|
63
|
-
|
|
71
|
+
// Rate Modify All Data on the holders the super-admin finding does not already cover, so the
|
|
72
|
+
// same users are not counted towards the grade twice. The finding still lists every holder.
|
|
73
|
+
const superAdminSet = new Set(superAdminIds);
|
|
74
|
+
const otherModifyAll = [...modifyAllIds].filter((id) => !superAdminSet.has(id)).length;
|
|
75
|
+
const modifyRisk = sandboxCap(otherModifyAll > 5 ? 'CRITICAL' : otherModifyAll > 3 ? 'HIGH' : 'LOW');
|
|
76
|
+
const coveredNote = superAdminSet.size > 0
|
|
77
|
+
? ` ${superAdminSet.size} of them also hold the super-admin combination and are rated in that finding; this severity reflects the other ${otherModifyAll}.`
|
|
78
|
+
: '';
|
|
64
79
|
findings.push({
|
|
65
80
|
id: 'users-modify-all-data',
|
|
66
81
|
category: this.category,
|
|
67
82
|
riskLevel: modifyRisk,
|
|
68
83
|
title: `${modifyAllCount} user(s) have Modify All Data permission`,
|
|
69
|
-
|
|
84
|
+
// The population is always reported; at the lowest band it asks for no change.
|
|
85
|
+
passed: modifyRisk === 'LOW' || undefined,
|
|
86
|
+
detail: 'Modify All Data grants unrestricted write access across all objects. This is one of the most powerful permissions in Salesforce.' +
|
|
87
|
+
coveredNote +
|
|
88
|
+
(modifyRisk === 'HIGH' && otherModifyAll > 5 ? sandboxNote : ''),
|
|
70
89
|
remediation: 'Limit Modify All Data to essential system administrators only. Review each user and remove the permission from any non-essential accounts.',
|
|
71
90
|
affectedItems: modifyAllUsers.map((r) => userItem(r)),
|
|
72
91
|
});
|
|
@@ -76,6 +95,7 @@ export class UsersAndAdminsCheck {
|
|
|
76
95
|
category: this.category,
|
|
77
96
|
riskLevel: viewRisk,
|
|
78
97
|
title: `${viewAllCount} user(s) have View All Data permission`,
|
|
98
|
+
passed: viewRisk === 'LOW' || undefined,
|
|
79
99
|
detail: 'View All Data grants unrestricted read access across all objects, bypassing sharing rules and record-level security.',
|
|
80
100
|
remediation: 'Limit View All Data to essential users. Consider using permission sets scoped to specific objects instead.',
|
|
81
101
|
affectedItems: viewAllUsers.map((r) => userItem(r)),
|
|
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ export const DANGEROUS_PERMS = [
|
|
|
31
31
|
why: 'Bypass API Access Control to reach the org from any tool.' },
|
|
32
32
|
{ key: 'ManageEventLogFiles', field: 'PermissionsManageEventLogFiles', label: 'Manage Event Log Files', tier: 'MEDIUM',
|
|
33
33
|
why: 'Access detailed monitoring/event data across the org.' },
|
|
34
|
-
{ key: 'ManageSession', field: '
|
|
34
|
+
{ key: 'ManageSession', field: 'PermissionsManageSessionPermissionSets', label: 'Manage Session Permission Set Activations', tier: 'MEDIUM',
|
|
35
35
|
why: 'Activate session-based permission sets, elevating access on demand.' },
|
|
36
36
|
{ key: 'ViewAllUsers', field: 'PermissionsViewAllUsers', label: 'View All Users', tier: 'MEDIUM',
|
|
37
37
|
why: 'Enumerate every user in the org: reconnaissance for targeting.' },
|