@cclabsnz/sf-audit 1.17.0 → 1.18.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +54 -0
- package/PERMISSIONS.md +139 -0
- package/README.md +4 -2
- package/docs/permissionset/SF_Audit_ReadOnly.permissionset-meta.xml +54 -0
- package/lib/chains/ChainEngine.js +11 -1
- package/lib/chains/namedChains.js +42 -24
- package/lib/checks/CheckEngine.js +55 -24
- package/lib/checks/impl/AgentUserPrivilegeCheck.js +5 -4
- package/lib/checks/impl/AnonymousApexAuditCheck.js +41 -8
- package/lib/checks/impl/ApexSharingCheck.js +3 -1
- package/lib/checks/impl/ApiClientPermissionCheck.js +21 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/AuditTrailCheck.js +23 -8
- package/lib/checks/impl/CertificateExpiryCheck.js +2 -1
- package/lib/checks/impl/ConnectedAppScopeCheck.js +61 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/ConnectedAppsCheck.js +13 -4
- package/lib/checks/impl/ContentLinksCheck.js +33 -9
- package/lib/checks/impl/CorsAllowlistCheck.js +3 -2
- package/lib/checks/impl/DataClassificationCheck.js +15 -13
- package/lib/checks/impl/DebugLogAccessCheck.js +4 -4
- package/lib/checks/impl/DelegatedAdministrationGroupsCheck.js +3 -2
- package/lib/checks/impl/DelegatedAuthenticationExposureCheck.js +8 -1
- package/lib/checks/impl/DeploymentIdentityCheck.js +32 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/EmailSecurityCheck.d.ts +1 -1
- package/lib/checks/impl/EmailSecurityCheck.js +14 -34
- package/lib/checks/impl/EncryptionCoverageCheck.js +21 -15
- package/lib/checks/impl/EnhancedDomainsCheck.js +17 -2
- package/lib/checks/impl/EscalationPermsCheck.d.ts +2 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/EscalationPermsCheck.js +88 -21
- package/lib/checks/impl/ExperienceCloudSiteCheck.js +56 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/ExternalAccountHierarchyExposureCheck.js +7 -15
- package/lib/checks/impl/ExternalCredentialsCheck.js +6 -3
- package/lib/checks/impl/FailedLoginCheck.js +36 -9
- package/lib/checks/impl/FieldHistoryTrackingCheck.js +14 -11
- package/lib/checks/impl/FlowHttpCalloutCredentialBypassCheck.js +2 -2
- package/lib/checks/impl/GuestRecordAccessPolicyCheck.js +52 -11
- package/lib/checks/impl/HealthCheckCheck.js +1 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/HighAssuranceSessionCheck.js +16 -11
- package/lib/checks/impl/InactiveUsersCheck.js +1 -1
- package/lib/checks/impl/InboundEmailHandlerExposureCheck.js +5 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/IntegrationLeastPrivilegeCheck.js +7 -6
- package/lib/checks/impl/InternalUserMfaCheck.js +26 -8
- package/lib/checks/impl/IpRestrictionsCheck.js +35 -16
- package/lib/checks/impl/LoginAccessPolicyCheck.js +5 -4
- package/lib/checks/impl/LoginAnomalyCheck.js +10 -7
- package/lib/checks/impl/LoginSessionCheck.js +2 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/MfaEnforcementCheck.js +23 -6
- package/lib/checks/impl/MfaMethodStrengthCheck.js +18 -3
- package/lib/checks/impl/MfaRegistrationCheck.js +4 -3
- package/lib/checks/impl/MyDomainLoginPolicyCheck.js +23 -10
- package/lib/checks/impl/OutboundMessagesCheck.js +48 -6
- package/lib/checks/impl/PlatformEventSubscriberContextCheck.js +5 -1
- package/lib/checks/impl/PrivilegedAccessCheck.js +12 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/ReleaseUpdatesCheck.js +18 -3
- package/lib/checks/impl/RemoteSitesCheck.js +4 -4
- package/lib/checks/impl/RestrictionRulesIntegrityCheck.js +3 -3
- package/lib/checks/impl/SeparationOfDutiesCheck.js +14 -3
- package/lib/checks/impl/SoapLoginApiAuthCheck.js +20 -8
- package/lib/checks/impl/SsoEnforcementCheck.js +16 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/TransactionSecurityPolicyCheck.js +5 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/TrustedIPRangesCheck.js +18 -9
- package/lib/checks/impl/UsersAndAdminsCheck.js +24 -4
- package/lib/checks/permCatalog.js +1 -1
- package/lib/checks/support/missingObject.js +3 -1
- package/lib/checks/support/schema.d.ts +17 -0
- package/lib/checks/support/schema.js +41 -0
- package/lib/commands/audit/apps.js +3 -1
- package/lib/commands/audit/events/pull.js +3 -1
- package/lib/commands/audit/incident/collect.js +3 -1
- package/lib/commands/audit/security.js +9 -3
- package/lib/findings/AuditResult.d.ts +2 -0
- package/lib/findings/coverage.d.ts +6 -0
- package/lib/findings/coverage.js +12 -0
- package/lib/findings/scoring.js +51 -9
- package/lib/preflight/permissionMap.d.ts +2 -20
- package/lib/preflight/permissionMap.js +2 -43
- package/lib/preflight/permissions.d.ts +25 -0
- package/lib/preflight/permissions.js +50 -0
- package/lib/renderers/ClientReportRenderer.js +3 -3
- package/lib/renderers/HtmlRenderer.js +6 -2
- package/lib/renderers/MarkdownRenderer.js +6 -3
- package/lib/report/RemediationRoadmap.d.ts +5 -1
- package/lib/report/RemediationRoadmap.js +6 -2
- package/package.json +4 -2
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@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
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const MAX_OBJECTS = 25; // cap describe calls
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// FieldDefinition must be filtered by entity ("a filter on a reified column is required"), so the
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// scan covers these key standard objects, the same set data-classification checks.
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const SCANNED_OBJECTS = ['Account', 'Contact', 'Lead', 'Opportunity', 'Case', 'Contract', 'User', 'Individual'];
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/**
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* Cross-references data classification against ACTUAL field encryption. `data-
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* classification` confirms Shield is licensed and that fields are classified;
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@@ -18,20 +21,23 @@ export class EncryptionCoverageCheck {
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// 1. Sensitive fields = those with a ComplianceGroup (PII/PCI/HIPAA/GDPR/...).
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let classified;
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try {
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classified = await ctx.tooling.query(`SELECT EntityDefinition.QualifiedApiName
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FROM FieldDefinition
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classified = await ctx.tooling.query(`SELECT EntityDefinition.QualifiedApiName, QualifiedApiName
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FROM FieldDefinition
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WHERE EntityDefinition.QualifiedApiName IN (${SCANNED_OBJECTS.map((o) => `'${o}'`).join(', ')})
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AND ComplianceGroup != null`);
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}
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catch {
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findings.push(this.inconclusive('Classified fields could not be queried
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catch (err) {
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findings.push(this.inconclusive('Classified fields could not be queried', `The Tooling API FieldDefinition query failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`));
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return { findings };
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}
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const fieldsByObj = new Map();
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for (const c of classified) {
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-
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const obj = c.EntityDefinition?.QualifiedApiName;
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if (!obj || !c.QualifiedApiName)
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continue;
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const set = fieldsByObj.get(
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set.add(c.
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fieldsByObj.set(
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const set = fieldsByObj.get(obj) ?? new Set();
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set.add(c.QualifiedApiName);
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fieldsByObj.set(obj, set);
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}
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if (fieldsByObj.size === 0) {
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findings.push({
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@@ -39,8 +45,8 @@ export class EncryptionCoverageCheck {
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category: this.category,
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riskLevel: 'LOW',
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passed: true,
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title: 'No fields are classified as sensitive',
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detail:
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title: 'No fields are classified as sensitive on the key standard objects',
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detail: `No fields on ${SCANNED_OBJECTS.join(', ')} carry a ComplianceGroup (data classification), so encryption coverage cannot be assessed against a sensitivity baseline. Custom objects are not scanned. Classification is the prerequisite — see the data-classification check.`,
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remediation: 'Classify PII/PHI fields (Setup → Data Classification) first, then encrypt the sensitive ones with Shield Platform Encryption.',
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});
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return { findings };
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@@ -66,7 +72,7 @@ export class EncryptionCoverageCheck {
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}
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}
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if (!describedAny) {
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findings.push(this.inconclusive('Object describes were not accessible, so field encryption could not be confirmed'));
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findings.push(this.inconclusive('Object describes were not accessible, so field encryption could not be confirmed', 'The audit user could not describe the classified objects, so per-field encryption is unknown.'));
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return { findings };
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}
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if (unencrypted.length > 0) {
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@@ -87,21 +93,21 @@ export class EncryptionCoverageCheck {
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riskLevel: 'LOW',
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passed: true,
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title: 'All classified sensitive fields checked are encrypted at rest',
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detail: `Every classified field found across ${Math.min(fieldsByObj.size, MAX_OBJECTS)} object(s) is encrypted with Shield Platform Encryption.`,
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detail: `Every classified field found across ${Math.min(fieldsByObj.size, MAX_OBJECTS)} object(s) is encrypted with Shield Platform Encryption. Scanned: ${SCANNED_OBJECTS.join(', ')}; custom objects are not scanned.`,
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remediation: 'Keep encryption policy in sync as new sensitive fields are added and classified.',
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});
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}
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return { findings };
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}
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inconclusive(what) {
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inconclusive(what, detail) {
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return {
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id: 'encryption-coverage-inconclusive',
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category: this.category,
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riskLevel: 'INFO',
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inconclusive: true,
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title: `${what}`,
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detail:
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remediation: '
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detail: `${detail} Encryption coverage is unassessed, not clean.`,
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remediation: 'Check the error above. If it is an access error, confirm the audit user has API Enabled and View Setup and Configuration, then re-run.',
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};
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}
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}
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// Organization has no MyDomain field. Every org's My Domain is the subdomain of its instance URL
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// (<name>.my.salesforce.com, or a sandbox/develop/scratch variant); a legacy instance host such as
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// na1.salesforce.com means no My Domain.
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const MY_DOMAIN_HOST = /^(.+?)\.(?:(?:sandbox|develop|scratch|trailblaze)\.)?my\.(?:salesforce\.com|salesforce\.mil|sfcrmproducts\.cn)$/i;
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function myDomainOf(instanceUrl) {
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let host = instanceUrl;
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try {
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host = new URL(instanceUrl).hostname;
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}
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catch {
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// keep the raw string
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}
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return MY_DOMAIN_HOST.exec(host)?.[1] ?? null;
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}
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// Enhanced Domains changes the URL format for Salesforce org pages, Experience Cloud sites,
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// Visualforce pages, and Lightning apps. The new format uses org-specific subdomains
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// that prevent cross-org cookie and credential leakage.
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@@ -33,7 +47,7 @@ export class EnhancedDomainsCheck {
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const findings = [];
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const baseUrl = ctx.orgInfo.instanceUrl;
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const domainSetupUrl = `${baseUrl}/lightning/setup/MyDomain/home`;
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const orgResult = await ctx.soql.query(`SELECT
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const orgResult = await ctx.soql.query(`SELECT IsSandbox, InstanceName FROM Organization LIMIT 1`);
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const org = orgResult.records[0];
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if (!org) {
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findings.push({
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});
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return { findings };
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}
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const {
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const { IsSandbox: isSandbox } = org;
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const myDomain = myDomainOf(baseUrl);
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const instanceUrl = baseUrl;
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const instanceHost = hostnameOf(instanceUrl);
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// Check if Enhanced Domains is active based on the instance URL format
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readonly category = "Permissions";
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readonly description = "Flags users holding lateral-movement/persistence permissions (Manage Internal Users, Assign Permission Sets, Modify Metadata, Manage Auth Providers, etc.)";
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run(ctx: AuditContext): Promise<CheckResult>;
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/** Active, unfrozen users holding Modify All Data, View All Data and Manage Users across their assignments. */
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private superAdminIds;
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}
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//# sourceMappingURL=EscalationPermsCheck.d.ts.map
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import { presentFields } from '../support/schema.js';
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// Hygiene, not escalation: they weaken a credential or widen visibility, but give no way to grant
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// oneself more access. Reported apart so they never stand in for an escalation path. RULE-077.
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const HYGIENE = new Set(['Password Never Expires', 'View All Users']);
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const PERMS = [
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['PermissionsManageInternalUsers', 'Manage Internal Users'],
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['PermissionsAssignPermissionSets', 'Assign Permission Sets'],
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['PermissionsModifyMetadata', 'Modify Metadata'],
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['PermissionsManageAuthProviders', 'Manage Auth. Providers'],
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['PermissionsManageConnectedApps', 'Manage Connected Apps'],
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['
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['PermissionsManageSessionPermissionSets', 'Manage Session Permission Set Activations'],
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['PermissionsPasswordNeverExpires', 'Password Never Expires'],
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['PermissionsViewAllUsers', 'View All Users'],
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];
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async run(ctx) {
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const findings = [];
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const baseUrl = ctx.orgInfo.instanceUrl;
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const permFields = PERMS.map(([f]) => `PermissionSet.${f}`).join(', ');
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const permWhere = PERMS.map(([f]) => `PermissionSet.${f} = true`).join(' OR ');
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let rows;
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// Manage Connected Apps and similar exist only in some orgs; one absent field fails the whole
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// query. Select only those this org has: a permission it lacks cannot be held.
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let perms = PERMS;
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try {
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const present = new Set(await presentFields(ctx, 'PermissionSet', PERMS.map(([f]) => f)));
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perms = PERMS.filter(([f]) => present.has(f));
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const permFields = perms.map(([f]) => `PermissionSet.${f}`).join(', ');
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const permWhere = perms.map(([f]) => `PermissionSet.${f} = true`).join(' OR ');
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rows = await ctx.soql.queryAll(`SELECT AssigneeId, Assignee.Username, ${permFields}
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FROM PermissionSetAssignment
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WHERE (${permWhere}) AND Assignee.IsActive = true`);
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riskLevel: 'INFO',
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inconclusive: true,
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title: 'Privilege-escalation permission check could not be completed',
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detail: `
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remediation: '
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detail: `Who holds escalation permissions could not be read, so this is unassessed. The org said: ${msg}`,
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remediation: 'Check the error above. If it is an access error, confirm the audit user has "View Setup and Configuration", then re-run the audit.',
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});
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return { findings };
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}
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// A super-admin (Modify All Data + View All Data + Manage Users) already has unrestricted control,
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// rated by users-super-admin-combo. Escalation permissions matter on everyone else. RULE-077.
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let superAdmins = new Set();
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try {
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superAdmins = await this.superAdminIds(ctx);
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}
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catch {
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// Without the super-admin list, keep every holder: over-reporting beats hiding a holder.
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}
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const affected = [];
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let leftOut = 0;
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for (const row of rows) {
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if (superAdmins.has(row.AssigneeId)) {
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if (perms.some(([field]) => row.PermissionSet[field]))
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leftOut++;
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continue;
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}
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for (const [field, label] of perms) {
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if (row.PermissionSet[field]) {
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affected.push({ username: row.Assignee?.Username ?? row.AssigneeId, userId: row.AssigneeId, perm: label });
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}
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category: this.category,
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riskLevel: 'LOW',
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passed: true,
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title: 'No users hold privilege-escalation permissions',
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detail:
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title: leftOut > 0 ? 'Only super-admins hold privilege-escalation permissions' : 'No users hold privilege-escalation permissions',
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detail: leftOut > 0
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? 'Escalation permissions are held only by super-admins, who already have unrestricted control and are rated in the super-admin finding (users-super-admin-combo).'
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: 'No active users were found holding lateral-movement or persistence permissions.',
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remediation: 'Continue to review escalation permissions periodically.',
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});
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return { findings };
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}
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remediation: 'Remove these permissions from non-administrator profiles/permission sets and document who legitimately needs each one.',
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affectedItems: affected.map((a) => ({
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label: `${a.username}: ${a.perm}`,
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url: `${baseUrl}/${a.userId}`,
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note: 'Review and remove if not essential',
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72
|
-
})),
|
|
86
|
+
const leftOutNote = leftOut > 0
|
|
87
|
+
? ` ${new Set(rows.filter((r) => superAdmins.has(r.AssigneeId)).map((r) => r.AssigneeId)).size} super-admin(s) also hold them and are rated in the super-admin finding instead.`
|
|
88
|
+
: '';
|
|
89
|
+
const item = (a) => ({
|
|
90
|
+
label: `${a.username}: ${a.perm}`,
|
|
91
|
+
url: `${baseUrl}/${a.userId}`,
|
|
92
|
+
note: 'Review and remove if not essential',
|
|
73
93
|
});
|
|
94
|
+
const escalation = affected.filter((a) => !HYGIENE.has(a.perm));
|
|
95
|
+
const hygiene = affected.filter((a) => HYGIENE.has(a.perm));
|
|
96
|
+
if (escalation.length > 0) {
|
|
97
|
+
findings.push({
|
|
98
|
+
id: 'escalation-perms-found',
|
|
99
|
+
category: this.category,
|
|
100
|
+
riskLevel: 'HIGH',
|
|
101
|
+
title: `${escalation.length} escalation-permission grant(s) across active users`,
|
|
102
|
+
detail: 'These permissions let a user create accounts, reset passwords, assign permission sets, modify metadata, ' +
|
|
103
|
+
'or register auth providers: the primitives an attacker uses for lateral movement and persistence after an initial foothold.' +
|
|
104
|
+
leftOutNote,
|
|
105
|
+
remediation: 'Remove these permissions from non-administrator profiles/permission sets and document who legitimately needs each one.',
|
|
106
|
+
affectedItems: escalation.map(item),
|
|
107
|
+
});
|
|
108
|
+
}
|
|
109
|
+
if (hygiene.length > 0) {
|
|
110
|
+
findings.push({
|
|
111
|
+
id: 'escalation-perms-hygiene',
|
|
112
|
+
category: this.category,
|
|
113
|
+
riskLevel: 'MEDIUM',
|
|
114
|
+
title: `${hygiene.length} grant(s) of Password Never Expires or View All Users to non-administrators`,
|
|
115
|
+
detail: 'Password Never Expires keeps a leaked password valid indefinitely; View All Users exposes the full user roster for targeting. ' +
|
|
116
|
+
'Neither lets a user grant themselves more access.' +
|
|
117
|
+
leftOutNote,
|
|
118
|
+
remediation: 'Limit these to service accounts and administrators that need them, and document each.',
|
|
119
|
+
affectedItems: hygiene.map(item),
|
|
120
|
+
});
|
|
121
|
+
}
|
|
74
122
|
return { findings };
|
|
75
123
|
}
|
|
124
|
+
/** Active, unfrozen users holding Modify All Data, View All Data and Manage Users across their assignments. */
|
|
125
|
+
async superAdminIds(ctx) {
|
|
126
|
+
const rows = await ctx.soql.queryAll(`SELECT AssigneeId, PermissionSet.PermissionsModifyAllData, PermissionSet.PermissionsViewAllData, PermissionSet.PermissionsManageUsers
|
|
127
|
+
FROM PermissionSetAssignment
|
|
128
|
+
WHERE (PermissionSet.PermissionsModifyAllData = true OR PermissionSet.PermissionsViewAllData = true OR PermissionSet.PermissionsManageUsers = true)
|
|
129
|
+
AND Assignee.IsActive = true`);
|
|
130
|
+
const held = new Map();
|
|
131
|
+
for (const r of rows) {
|
|
132
|
+
const s = held.get(r.AssigneeId) ?? new Set();
|
|
133
|
+
if (r.PermissionSet.PermissionsModifyAllData)
|
|
134
|
+
s.add('mad');
|
|
135
|
+
if (r.PermissionSet.PermissionsViewAllData)
|
|
136
|
+
s.add('vad');
|
|
137
|
+
if (r.PermissionSet.PermissionsManageUsers)
|
|
138
|
+
s.add('mu');
|
|
139
|
+
held.set(r.AssigneeId, s);
|
|
140
|
+
}
|
|
141
|
+
return new Set([...held].filter(([, s]) => s.size === 3).map(([id]) => id));
|
|
142
|
+
}
|
|
76
143
|
}
|
|
77
144
|
//# sourceMappingURL=EscalationPermsCheck.js.map
|
|
@@ -1,3 +1,16 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* Network has no guest-user field: each Experience site's guest user is on its Site record
|
|
3
|
+
* (SiteType ChatterNetwork, or ChatterNetworkPicasso for Experience Builder sites). Site carries
|
|
4
|
+
* no network id, so a Site belongs to a network when its label is the network's name, or its path
|
|
5
|
+
* prefix is the network's, the network's followed by "/s", or (LWR sites) followed by "vforcesite".
|
|
6
|
+
*/
|
|
7
|
+
function siteBelongsTo(site, network) {
|
|
8
|
+
if (site.MasterLabel && site.MasterLabel === network.Name)
|
|
9
|
+
return true;
|
|
10
|
+
const net = network.UrlPathPrefix ?? '';
|
|
11
|
+
const sp = site.UrlPathPrefix ?? '';
|
|
12
|
+
return sp === net || sp === (net === '' ? 's' : `${net}/s`) || sp === `${net}vforcesite`;
|
|
13
|
+
}
|
|
1
14
|
export class ExperienceCloudSiteCheck {
|
|
2
15
|
id = 'experience-cloud-site';
|
|
3
16
|
name = 'Experience Cloud Site Security';
|
|
@@ -9,18 +22,18 @@ export class ExperienceCloudSiteCheck {
|
|
|
9
22
|
const setupUrl = `${baseUrl}/lightning/setup/SetupNetworks/home`;
|
|
10
23
|
let networks;
|
|
11
24
|
try {
|
|
12
|
-
networks = await ctx.soql.queryAll(`SELECT Id, Name, Status, UrlPathPrefix, SelfRegProfileId
|
|
25
|
+
networks = await ctx.soql.queryAll(`SELECT Id, Name, Status, UrlPathPrefix, SelfRegProfileId
|
|
13
26
|
FROM Network
|
|
14
27
|
WHERE Status = 'Live'`);
|
|
15
28
|
}
|
|
16
|
-
catch {
|
|
29
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
17
30
|
findings.push({
|
|
18
31
|
id: 'experience-cloud-site-inaccessible',
|
|
19
32
|
category: this.category,
|
|
20
33
|
riskLevel: 'INFO',
|
|
21
34
|
inconclusive: true,
|
|
22
35
|
title: 'Experience Cloud site configuration could not be queried',
|
|
23
|
-
detail:
|
|
36
|
+
detail: `The Network query failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}. If no Experience Cloud licence is active, this check is not applicable.`,
|
|
24
37
|
remediation: 'Grant "View Setup and Configuration" to the audit user and re-run. If no Experience Cloud licence is active, this check is not applicable.',
|
|
25
38
|
});
|
|
26
39
|
return { findings };
|
|
@@ -38,7 +51,45 @@ export class ExperienceCloudSiteCheck {
|
|
|
38
51
|
return { findings };
|
|
39
52
|
}
|
|
40
53
|
const selfRegSites = networks.filter((n) => n.SelfRegProfileId !== null);
|
|
41
|
-
|
|
54
|
+
let sites;
|
|
55
|
+
try {
|
|
56
|
+
sites = await ctx.soql.queryAll(`SELECT MasterLabel, UrlPathPrefix, GuestUserId, GuestUser.IsActive
|
|
57
|
+
FROM Site
|
|
58
|
+
WHERE SiteType IN ('ChatterNetwork', 'ChatterNetworkPicasso') AND Status = 'Active'`);
|
|
59
|
+
}
|
|
60
|
+
catch {
|
|
61
|
+
sites = null;
|
|
62
|
+
}
|
|
63
|
+
const guestSites = sites === null
|
|
64
|
+
? []
|
|
65
|
+
: networks.filter((n) => sites.some((s) => s.GuestUserId !== null && s.GuestUser?.IsActive !== false && siteBelongsTo(s, n)));
|
|
66
|
+
// A live network whose Site record could not be found has unknown guest access, not none.
|
|
67
|
+
const unmatched = sites === null ? [] : networks.filter((n) => !sites.some((s) => siteBelongsTo(s, n)));
|
|
68
|
+
if (unmatched.length > 0) {
|
|
69
|
+
findings.push({
|
|
70
|
+
id: 'experience-cloud-site-guest-unknown',
|
|
71
|
+
category: this.category,
|
|
72
|
+
riskLevel: 'INFO',
|
|
73
|
+
inconclusive: true,
|
|
74
|
+
title: `Guest access could not be determined for ${unmatched.length} live Experience Cloud site(s)`,
|
|
75
|
+
detail: 'No active Site record could be matched to these live networks by name or path prefix, so whether they allow unauthenticated access is unknown, not absent.',
|
|
76
|
+
remediation: 'Review each site\'s guest user in Setup → Digital Experiences.',
|
|
77
|
+
affectedItems: unmatched.map((n) => ({ label: n.Name, url: setupUrl, note: `URL prefix: ${n.UrlPathPrefix ?? '(default)'}` })),
|
|
78
|
+
});
|
|
79
|
+
}
|
|
80
|
+
if (sites === null) {
|
|
81
|
+
// Without the Site records, guest access is unknown, not absent.
|
|
82
|
+
findings.push({
|
|
83
|
+
id: 'experience-cloud-site-guest-unknown',
|
|
84
|
+
category: this.category,
|
|
85
|
+
riskLevel: 'INFO',
|
|
86
|
+
inconclusive: true,
|
|
87
|
+
title: 'Guest access on live Experience Cloud sites could not be determined',
|
|
88
|
+
detail: 'The Site records that carry each Experience site\'s guest user could not be read, so whether these sites allow unauthenticated access is unknown.',
|
|
89
|
+
remediation: 'Review each site\'s guest user in Setup → Digital Experiences, or grant "View Setup and Configuration" and re-run.',
|
|
90
|
+
affectedItems: networks.map((n) => ({ label: n.Name, url: setupUrl })),
|
|
91
|
+
});
|
|
92
|
+
}
|
|
42
93
|
if (selfRegSites.length > 0) {
|
|
43
94
|
findings.push({
|
|
44
95
|
id: 'experience-cloud-site-self-registration',
|
|
@@ -69,7 +120,7 @@ export class ExperienceCloudSiteCheck {
|
|
|
69
120
|
})),
|
|
70
121
|
});
|
|
71
122
|
}
|
|
72
|
-
if (selfRegSites.length === 0 && guestSites.length === 0) {
|
|
123
|
+
if (selfRegSites.length === 0 && guestSites.length === 0 && sites !== null && unmatched.length === 0) {
|
|
73
124
|
findings.push({
|
|
74
125
|
id: 'experience-cloud-site-ok',
|
|
75
126
|
category: this.category,
|
|
@@ -1,8 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { queryIfPresent } from '../support/missingObject.js';
|
|
2
|
-
|
|
3
|
-
const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
4
|
-
return /No such column 'IsPrmSuperUser'/i.test(msg);
|
|
5
|
-
}
|
|
2
|
+
import { hasField } from '../support/schema.js';
|
|
6
3
|
export class ExternalAccountHierarchyExposureCheck {
|
|
7
4
|
id = 'external-account-hierarchy-exposure';
|
|
8
5
|
name = 'External Account Hierarchy & Partner Super User Exposure';
|
|
@@ -13,17 +10,12 @@ export class ExternalAccountHierarchyExposureCheck {
|
|
|
13
10
|
const baseUrl = ctx.orgInfo.instanceUrl;
|
|
14
11
|
const usersUrl = `${baseUrl}/lightning/setup/ManageUsers/home`;
|
|
15
12
|
// 1. Active users with Partner Super User access. User.IsPrmSuperUser only exists in orgs
|
|
16
|
-
// with a partner (PRM) licence;
|
|
17
|
-
//
|
|
18
|
-
|
|
19
|
-
|
|
20
|
-
|
|
21
|
-
|
|
22
|
-
catch (err) {
|
|
23
|
-
if (!isMissingPrmField(err))
|
|
24
|
-
throw err;
|
|
25
|
-
superUsers = [];
|
|
26
|
-
}
|
|
13
|
+
// with a partner (PRM) licence; without it no user can be a super user, so the field is
|
|
14
|
+
// described first rather than queried blind. Query errors propagate so the check reports
|
|
15
|
+
// inconclusive rather than clean.
|
|
16
|
+
const superUsers = (await hasField(ctx, 'User', 'IsPrmSuperUser'))
|
|
17
|
+
? await ctx.soql.queryAll('SELECT Id, Username, IsActive, IsPrmSuperUser FROM User WHERE IsPrmSuperUser = true AND IsActive = true')
|
|
18
|
+
: [];
|
|
27
19
|
if (superUsers.length > 0) {
|
|
28
20
|
findings.push({
|
|
29
21
|
id: 'external-account-hierarchy-super-users',
|
|
@@ -18,17 +18,20 @@ export class ExternalCredentialsCheck {
|
|
|
18
18
|
const findings = [];
|
|
19
19
|
const baseUrl = ctx.orgInfo.instanceUrl;
|
|
20
20
|
let creds;
|
|
21
|
+
let error = '';
|
|
21
22
|
try {
|
|
22
|
-
|
|
23
|
+
// ExternalCredential is served by the Tooling API; the standard API does not support it.
|
|
24
|
+
creds = await ctx.tooling.query('SELECT Id, DeveloperName, AuthenticationProtocol FROM ExternalCredential');
|
|
23
25
|
}
|
|
24
|
-
catch {
|
|
26
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
27
|
+
error = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
25
28
|
findings.push({
|
|
26
29
|
id: 'external-credentials-inconclusive',
|
|
27
30
|
category: this.category,
|
|
28
31
|
riskLevel: 'INFO',
|
|
29
32
|
inconclusive: true,
|
|
30
33
|
title: 'External Credentials could not be queried (insufficient access or unsupported)',
|
|
31
|
-
detail:
|
|
34
|
+
detail: `The ExternalCredential Tooling query failed: ${error}`,
|
|
32
35
|
remediation: 'Grant the audit user View Setup and Configuration and re-run. Also review Setup → Named Credentials → External Credentials manually.',
|
|
33
36
|
});
|
|
34
37
|
return { findings };
|
|
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
// LoginHistory has no IsSuccess field, and Status cannot be filtered (not in WHERE, not in
|
|
2
|
+
// HAVING). It can be grouped, so failures are counted by grouping on Status and dropping the
|
|
3
|
+
// 'Success' group in code.
|
|
4
|
+
const SUCCESS = 'Success';
|
|
5
|
+
// An aggregate query returns at most 2,000 groups and cannot be paged.
|
|
6
|
+
const MAX_GROUPS = 2000;
|
|
1
7
|
// Thresholds for brute-force / credential stuffing detection (7-day window)
|
|
2
8
|
const BRUTE_FORCE_PER_USER = 20; // >20 failures for one user = targeted attack
|
|
3
9
|
const BULK_THRESHOLD_PER_USER = 50; // >50 = highly likely automated attack
|
|
@@ -14,17 +20,18 @@ export class FailedLoginCheck {
|
|
|
14
20
|
// Query 1: total failed logins in last 7 days
|
|
15
21
|
let totalFailures = 0;
|
|
16
22
|
try {
|
|
17
|
-
const
|
|
18
|
-
totalFailures =
|
|
23
|
+
const byStatus = await ctx.soql.query(`SELECT Status, COUNT(Id) FROM LoginHistory WHERE LoginTime > LAST_N_DAYS:7 GROUP BY Status`);
|
|
24
|
+
totalFailures = byStatus.records.filter((r) => r.Status !== SUCCESS).reduce((n, r) => n + r.expr0, 0);
|
|
19
25
|
}
|
|
20
|
-
catch {
|
|
26
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
21
27
|
findings.push({
|
|
22
28
|
id: 'failed-login-inaccessible',
|
|
23
29
|
category: this.category,
|
|
24
30
|
riskLevel: 'INFO',
|
|
25
31
|
inconclusive: true,
|
|
26
32
|
title: 'LoginHistory could not be queried: failed login analysis skipped',
|
|
27
|
-
detail:
|
|
33
|
+
detail: `The LoginHistory query failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}. ` +
|
|
34
|
+
'If the org denied access, the audit user may lack "View All Users".',
|
|
28
35
|
remediation: 'Grant "View All Users" to the audit user. For event-level access, enable Event Monitoring.',
|
|
29
36
|
});
|
|
30
37
|
return { findings };
|
|
@@ -45,13 +52,33 @@ export class FailedLoginCheck {
|
|
|
45
52
|
let perUserCounts = [];
|
|
46
53
|
let perUserUnavailable = false;
|
|
47
54
|
try {
|
|
48
|
-
const aggResult = await ctx.soql.query(`SELECT
|
|
55
|
+
const aggResult = await ctx.soql.query(`SELECT UserId, Status, COUNT(Id)
|
|
49
56
|
FROM LoginHistory
|
|
50
|
-
WHERE
|
|
51
|
-
GROUP BY
|
|
57
|
+
WHERE LoginTime > LAST_N_DAYS:7
|
|
58
|
+
GROUP BY UserId, Status
|
|
52
59
|
ORDER BY COUNT(Id) DESC
|
|
53
|
-
LIMIT
|
|
54
|
-
|
|
60
|
+
LIMIT ${MAX_GROUPS}`);
|
|
61
|
+
const failuresByUser = new Map();
|
|
62
|
+
for (const r of aggResult.records) {
|
|
63
|
+
if (r.Status === SUCCESS)
|
|
64
|
+
continue;
|
|
65
|
+
failuresByUser.set(r.UserId, (failuresByUser.get(r.UserId) ?? 0) + r.expr0);
|
|
66
|
+
}
|
|
67
|
+
const ranked = [...failuresByUser.entries()].sort((a, b) => b[1] - a[1]).slice(0, 50);
|
|
68
|
+
// LoginHistory has no Username field and no User relationship: resolve names separately.
|
|
69
|
+
const names = new Map();
|
|
70
|
+
if (ranked.length > 0) {
|
|
71
|
+
const inClause = ranked.map(([id]) => `'${id}'`).join(',');
|
|
72
|
+
const users = await ctx.soql.queryAll(`SELECT Id, Username FROM User WHERE Id IN (${inClause})`);
|
|
73
|
+
for (const u of users)
|
|
74
|
+
names.set(u.Id, u.Username);
|
|
75
|
+
}
|
|
76
|
+
perUserCounts = ranked.map(([id, n]) => ({ Username: names.get(id) ?? id, expr0: n }));
|
|
77
|
+
// Groups are ranked by size across every status, so a full page may have cut off smaller
|
|
78
|
+
// failure groups. Targets found stand; "no target" is then not a conclusion.
|
|
79
|
+
if (aggResult.records.length >= MAX_GROUPS && !perUserCounts.some((r) => r.expr0 >= BRUTE_FORCE_PER_USER)) {
|
|
80
|
+
perUserUnavailable = true;
|
|
81
|
+
}
|
|
55
82
|
}
|
|
56
83
|
catch {
|
|
57
84
|
// Recorded: without the per-user breakdown, "no brute-force pattern" is not a
|
|
@@ -14,16 +14,18 @@ export class FieldHistoryTrackingCheck {
|
|
|
14
14
|
const setupUrl = `${baseUrl}/lightning/setup/ObjectManager/home`;
|
|
15
15
|
const objectList = SENSITIVE_OBJECTS.map((o) => `'${o}'`).join(', ');
|
|
16
16
|
try {
|
|
17
|
-
// Tooling API:
|
|
18
|
-
//
|
|
19
|
-
|
|
17
|
+
// Tooling API: the tracked fields on each sensitive object, counted here. FieldDefinition
|
|
18
|
+
// supports no aggregates (its Id is not aggregatable), so COUNT/GROUP BY is rejected.
|
|
19
|
+
// Objects with zero tracked fields are absent from the result — those are violations.
|
|
20
|
+
const results = await ctx.tooling.query(`SELECT EntityDefinition.QualifiedApiName, QualifiedApiName
|
|
20
21
|
FROM FieldDefinition
|
|
21
22
|
WHERE EntityDefinition.QualifiedApiName IN (${objectList})
|
|
22
|
-
AND IsFieldHistoryTracked = true
|
|
23
|
-
GROUP BY EntityDefinition.QualifiedApiName`);
|
|
23
|
+
AND IsFieldHistoryTracked = true`);
|
|
24
24
|
const trackedMap = new Map();
|
|
25
25
|
for (const r of results) {
|
|
26
|
-
|
|
26
|
+
const obj = r.EntityDefinition?.QualifiedApiName;
|
|
27
|
+
if (obj)
|
|
28
|
+
trackedMap.set(obj, (trackedMap.get(obj) ?? 0) + 1);
|
|
27
29
|
}
|
|
28
30
|
const withTracking = SENSITIVE_OBJECTS.filter((o) => (trackedMap.get(o) ?? 0) > 0);
|
|
29
31
|
const withoutTracking = SENSITIVE_OBJECTS.filter((o) => (trackedMap.get(o) ?? 0) === 0);
|
|
@@ -42,8 +44,9 @@ export class FieldHistoryTrackingCheck {
|
|
|
42
44
|
findings.push({
|
|
43
45
|
id: 'field-history-tracking-missing',
|
|
44
46
|
category: this.category,
|
|
45
|
-
|
|
46
|
-
|
|
47
|
+
// Missing history limits investigation; it exposes nothing. RULE-078.
|
|
48
|
+
riskLevel: withoutTracking.length >= 3 ? 'MEDIUM' : 'LOW',
|
|
49
|
+
title: `${withoutTracking.length} sensitive object(s) have no field history tracking (investigation gap): SBS-DATA-004`,
|
|
47
50
|
detail: `SBS-DATA-004 requires field history tracking on sensitive objects to capture who changed what data and when, enabling post-incident investigation and audit evidence. The following objects have no tracked fields: ${withoutTracking.join(', ')}. ${withTracking.length > 0 ? `Objects already configured: ${withTracking.map((o) => `${o} (${trackedMap.get(o)} field(s))`).join(', ')}.` : ''}`,
|
|
48
51
|
remediation: 'Enable field history tracking on each listed object in Setup → Object Manager → [Object] → Fields & Relationships → Set History Tracking. At minimum track key sensitive fields: email addresses, phone numbers, revenue fields, owner changes, and status changes.',
|
|
49
52
|
affectedItems: withoutTracking.map((name) => ({
|
|
@@ -53,15 +56,15 @@ export class FieldHistoryTrackingCheck {
|
|
|
53
56
|
})),
|
|
54
57
|
});
|
|
55
58
|
}
|
|
56
|
-
catch {
|
|
59
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
57
60
|
findings.push({
|
|
58
61
|
id: 'field-history-tracking-inconclusive',
|
|
59
62
|
category: this.category,
|
|
60
63
|
riskLevel: 'INFO',
|
|
61
64
|
inconclusive: true,
|
|
62
65
|
title: 'Field history tracking status could not be determined',
|
|
63
|
-
detail:
|
|
64
|
-
remediation: '
|
|
66
|
+
detail: `SBS-DATA-004 requires field history tracking on sensitive objects. The Tooling API FieldDefinition query failed, so tracking is unassessed, not absent: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
|
|
67
|
+
remediation: 'Check the error above. If it is an access error, confirm the audit user has API Enabled and View Setup and Configuration; otherwise verify field history tracking manually in Setup → Object Manager for Account, Contact, Lead, Opportunity, Case, Contract, and User.',
|
|
65
68
|
});
|
|
66
69
|
}
|
|
67
70
|
return { findings };
|
|
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ export class FlowHttpCalloutCredentialBypassCheck {
|
|
|
17
17
|
async run(ctx) {
|
|
18
18
|
const findings = [];
|
|
19
19
|
const baseUrl = ctx.orgInfo.instanceUrl;
|
|
20
|
-
const externalServices = await queryIfPresent(() => ctx.tooling.query('SELECT Id, DeveloperName, MasterLabel,
|
|
21
|
-
const uncredentialedServices = externalServices.filter((s) => !s.
|
|
20
|
+
const externalServices = await queryIfPresent(() => ctx.tooling.query('SELECT Id, DeveloperName, MasterLabel, NamedCredential, NamedCredentialReferenceId FROM ExternalServiceRegistration'));
|
|
21
|
+
const uncredentialedServices = externalServices.filter((s) => !(s.NamedCredential ?? '').trim() && !(s.NamedCredentialReferenceId ?? '').trim());
|
|
22
22
|
// Credentials live in the flow definition (formulas, constants, text templates, action
|
|
23
23
|
// inputs), which only Flow.Metadata carries. Every string in it is scanned.
|
|
24
24
|
const repo = new FlowRepository(ctx.soql, ctx.tooling);
|