@cclabsnz/sf-audit 1.16.0 → 1.18.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +172 -1
- package/PERMISSIONS.md +139 -0
- package/README.md +98 -26
- package/config/scoring.sample.json +104 -5
- package/docs/permissionset/SF_Audit_ReadOnly.permissionset-meta.xml +54 -0
- package/lib/apps/analyzeApps.d.ts +8 -2
- package/lib/apps/analyzeApps.js +7 -2
- package/lib/apps/apiLogSource.d.ts +39 -0
- package/lib/apps/apiLogSource.js +75 -0
- package/lib/apps/appResolver.js +30 -4
- package/lib/apps/grantedAccess.js +16 -3
- package/lib/apps/leastPrivilege.d.ts +3 -1
- package/lib/apps/leastPrivilege.js +7 -3
- package/lib/apps/permissionSetGenerator.d.ts +22 -0
- package/lib/apps/permissionSetGenerator.js +100 -0
- package/lib/apps/types.d.ts +6 -0
- package/lib/apps/usageCollector.d.ts +7 -1
- package/lib/apps/usageCollector.js +57 -26
- package/lib/chains/CapabilityRegistry.js +26 -0
- package/lib/chains/ChainEngine.js +11 -1
- package/lib/chains/namedChains.js +130 -24
- package/lib/checks/CheckEngine.d.ts +3 -1
- package/lib/checks/CheckEngine.js +65 -26
- package/lib/checks/impl/AgentUserPrivilegeCheck.js +5 -4
- package/lib/checks/impl/AnonymousApexAuditCheck.js +41 -8
- package/lib/checks/impl/ApexCrudFLSCheck.js +45 -10
- package/lib/checks/impl/ApexSharingCheck.js +19 -26
- package/lib/checks/impl/ApiClientPermissionCheck.js +21 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/AuditTrailCheck.js +23 -8
- package/lib/checks/impl/AuthProviderRegistrationHandlerCheck.d.ts +10 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/AuthProviderRegistrationHandlerCheck.js +131 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/CertificateExpiryCheck.js +2 -1
- package/lib/checks/impl/ConnectedAppScopeCheck.js +61 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/ConnectedAppsCheck.js +60 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/ContentLinksCheck.js +33 -9
- package/lib/checks/impl/CorsAllowlistCheck.js +3 -2
- package/lib/checks/impl/DataClassificationCheck.js +15 -13
- package/lib/checks/impl/DataCloudDataSpaceIsolationCheck.d.ts +10 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/DataCloudDataSpaceIsolationCheck.js +116 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/DebugLogAccessCheck.js +4 -4
- package/lib/checks/impl/DelegatedAdministrationGroupsCheck.d.ts +10 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/DelegatedAdministrationGroupsCheck.js +76 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/DelegatedAuthenticationExposureCheck.d.ts +10 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/DelegatedAuthenticationExposureCheck.js +105 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/DeploymentIdentityCheck.js +32 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/EmailSecurityCheck.d.ts +1 -1
- package/lib/checks/impl/EmailSecurityCheck.js +14 -34
- package/lib/checks/impl/EncryptionCoverageCheck.js +21 -15
- package/lib/checks/impl/EnhancedDomainsCheck.js +17 -2
- package/lib/checks/impl/EscalationPermsCheck.d.ts +2 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/EscalationPermsCheck.js +88 -21
- package/lib/checks/impl/ExperienceCloudSiteCheck.js +56 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/ExternalAccountHierarchyExposureCheck.d.ts +10 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/ExternalAccountHierarchyExposureCheck.js +65 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/ExternalCredentialsCheck.js +6 -3
- package/lib/checks/impl/FailedLoginCheck.js +36 -9
- package/lib/checks/impl/FieldHistoryTrackingCheck.js +14 -11
- package/lib/checks/impl/FlowHttpCalloutCredentialBypassCheck.d.ts +10 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/FlowHttpCalloutCredentialBypassCheck.js +115 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/GenAiPromptTemplateGroundingCheck.d.ts +10 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/GenAiPromptTemplateGroundingCheck.js +227 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/GuestExecutableApexCheck.d.ts +1 -1
- package/lib/checks/impl/GuestExecutableApexCheck.js +105 -14
- package/lib/checks/impl/GuestRecordAccessPolicyCheck.js +52 -11
- package/lib/checks/impl/HardcodedCredentialsCheck.js +7 -2
- package/lib/checks/impl/HealthCheckCheck.js +1 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/HighAssuranceSessionCheck.js +16 -11
- package/lib/checks/impl/InactiveUsersCheck.js +1 -1
- package/lib/checks/impl/InboundEmailHandlerExposureCheck.d.ts +10 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/InboundEmailHandlerExposureCheck.js +136 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/IntegrationLeastPrivilegeCheck.js +7 -6
- package/lib/checks/impl/InternalUserMfaCheck.js +26 -8
- package/lib/checks/impl/IpRestrictionsCheck.js +35 -16
- package/lib/checks/impl/LoginAccessPolicyCheck.js +5 -4
- package/lib/checks/impl/LoginAnomalyCheck.js +10 -7
- package/lib/checks/impl/LoginSessionCheck.js +2 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/MfaEnforcementCheck.js +23 -6
- package/lib/checks/impl/MfaMethodStrengthCheck.js +18 -3
- package/lib/checks/impl/MfaRegistrationCheck.js +4 -3
- package/lib/checks/impl/MyDomainLoginPolicyCheck.js +23 -10
- package/lib/checks/impl/OauthDeviceAndAssetTokenFlowsCheck.d.ts +10 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/OauthDeviceAndAssetTokenFlowsCheck.js +84 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/OrgWideEmailSpoofingCheck.d.ts +10 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/OrgWideEmailSpoofingCheck.js +106 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/OutboundMessagesCheck.js +48 -6
- package/lib/checks/impl/PackagePostInstallSupplyChainCheck.d.ts +10 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/PackagePostInstallSupplyChainCheck.js +89 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/PlatformEventSubscriberContextCheck.d.ts +10 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/PlatformEventSubscriberContextCheck.js +88 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/PrivilegedAccessCheck.js +12 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/ReleaseUpdatesCheck.js +18 -3
- package/lib/checks/impl/RemoteSitesCheck.js +4 -4
- package/lib/checks/impl/RestrictionRulesIntegrityCheck.d.ts +10 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/RestrictionRulesIntegrityCheck.js +105 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/SeparationOfDutiesCheck.js +14 -3
- package/lib/checks/impl/ShieldTenantSecretLifecycleCheck.d.ts +10 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/ShieldTenantSecretLifecycleCheck.js +90 -0
- package/lib/checks/impl/SoapLoginApiAuthCheck.js +20 -8
- package/lib/checks/impl/SsoEnforcementCheck.js +16 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/TransactionSecurityPolicyCheck.js +5 -5
- package/lib/checks/impl/TrustedIPRangesCheck.js +18 -9
- package/lib/checks/impl/UsersAndAdminsCheck.js +24 -4
- package/lib/checks/permCatalog.js +1 -1
- package/lib/checks/registry.js +30 -0
- package/lib/checks/support/apexAccess.d.ts +56 -0
- package/lib/checks/support/apexAccess.js +127 -0
- package/lib/checks/support/missingObject.d.ts +13 -0
- package/lib/checks/support/missingObject.js +37 -0
- package/lib/checks/support/schema.d.ts +17 -0
- package/lib/checks/support/schema.js +41 -0
- package/lib/commands/audit/apps.d.ts +1 -0
- package/lib/commands/audit/apps.js +86 -30
- package/lib/commands/audit/diff.js +2 -2
- package/lib/commands/audit/events/pull.js +3 -1
- package/lib/commands/audit/history.js +2 -2
- package/lib/commands/audit/incident/collect.js +3 -1
- package/lib/commands/audit/incident/report.js +2 -2
- package/lib/commands/audit/security.d.ts +3 -0
- package/lib/commands/audit/security.js +65 -10
- package/lib/commands/audit/timeline.js +2 -2
- package/lib/compliance/mapping.js +28 -7
- package/lib/findings/AuditResult.d.ts +10 -0
- package/lib/findings/CheckMeta.js +15 -0
- package/lib/findings/Finding.d.ts +4 -0
- package/lib/findings/ScoringConfig.d.ts +10 -8
- package/lib/findings/ScoringConfig.js +12 -5
- package/lib/findings/coverage.d.ts +34 -0
- package/lib/findings/coverage.js +42 -0
- package/lib/findings/exitCode.js +1 -1
- package/lib/findings/loadScoringConfig.js +51 -8
- package/lib/findings/scoring.js +61 -10
- package/lib/history/HistoryStore.js +9 -3
- package/lib/history/archivePolicy.d.ts +19 -0
- package/lib/history/archivePolicy.js +34 -0
- package/lib/incident/bundleIo.js +4 -3
- package/lib/incident/collect/collectBundle.d.ts +1 -1
- package/lib/incident/collect/collectBundle.js +4 -3
- package/lib/incident/collect/streamGuestLogs.d.ts +1 -1
- package/lib/incident/collect/streamGuestLogs.js +3 -2
- package/lib/incident/csv.js +4 -4
- package/lib/incident/render/evidence.js +3 -3
- package/lib/incident/render/html.js +2 -3
- package/lib/index.d.ts +2 -0
- package/lib/index.js +2 -0
- package/lib/lib/packageInfo.d.ts +6 -0
- package/lib/lib/packageInfo.js +19 -0
- package/lib/preflight/permissionMap.d.ts +2 -20
- package/lib/preflight/permissionMap.js +2 -43
- package/lib/preflight/permissions.d.ts +25 -0
- package/lib/preflight/permissions.js +50 -0
- package/lib/renderers/AttackChainDagRenderer.d.ts +7 -0
- package/lib/renderers/AttackChainDagRenderer.js +139 -0
- package/lib/renderers/ClientReportRenderer.d.ts +2 -0
- package/lib/renderers/ClientReportRenderer.js +34 -6
- package/lib/renderers/DiffHtmlRenderer.js +2 -7
- package/lib/renderers/HistoryRenderer.js +19 -11
- package/lib/renderers/HtmlRenderer.js +23 -6
- package/lib/renderers/MarkdownRenderer.js +11 -1
- package/lib/renderers/SarifRenderer.d.ts +43 -0
- package/lib/renderers/SarifRenderer.js +250 -0
- package/lib/report/ExecutivePriorities.js +1 -1
- package/lib/report/RemediationRoadmap.d.ts +5 -1
- package/lib/report/RemediationRoadmap.js +6 -2
- package/lib/waivers/WaiverLoader.d.ts +28 -0
- package/lib/waivers/WaiverLoader.js +103 -0
- package/lib/waivers/WaiverModel.d.ts +32 -0
- package/lib/waivers/WaiverModel.js +28 -0
- package/lib/waivers/applyWaivers.d.ts +22 -0
- package/lib/waivers/applyWaivers.js +85 -0
- package/package.json +6 -4
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import { ApexRepository } from '@cclabsnz/sf-core';
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import { declaresWithoutSharing, effectiveSharing, parentClass, usesSystemMode } from '../support/apexAccess.js';
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/**
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* The org-local classes a class calls, as its compiled SymbolTable records them. A reference with a
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* namespace is to packaged code, which the audit does not read, so it never resolves to a local
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* class that happens to share its name.
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*/
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function referencedClasses(symbolTable) {
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const refs = symbolTable
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?.externalReferences;
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if (!Array.isArray(refs))
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return [];
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return refs
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.filter((r) => !(typeof r?.namespace === 'string' && r.namespace !== ''))
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.map((r) => r?.name)
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.filter((n) => typeof n === 'string' && n !== '')
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// An inner class is referenced as Outer.Inner; its code lives in the outer class's body.
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.map((n) => n.split('.')[0]);
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}
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export class GuestExecutableApexCheck {
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id = 'guest-executable-apex';
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name = 'Guest-Executable Apex';
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category = 'Access Control';
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description = 'Finds Apex classes that unauthenticated guest profiles can execute, flagging those that run without sharing
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description = 'Finds Apex classes that unauthenticated guest profiles can execute, flagging those that run without sharing, call a without-sharing helper, or switch off CRUD/FLS with SYSTEM_MODE';
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// Use cached Apex bodies (from HardcodedCredentialsCheck) when available to classify sharing.
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dependsOnCache = ['apexBodies'];
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async run(ctx) {
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// fails the whole query with "invalid ID field", losing every good row with it.
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const nameById = await new ApexRepository(ctx.tooling).namesByIds(classIds);
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const bodies = ctx.cache.apexBodies ?? [];
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// Apex names are case-insensitive, and a SymbolTable may spell one differently from its declaration.
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const byName = new Map(bodies.map((b) => [b.name.toLowerCase(), b]));
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/**
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* Everything reachable from `start` through SymbolTable references: whichever class is declared
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* without sharing, at any depth, runs its own code without sharing (spec RULE-004), and SYSTEM_MODE
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* anywhere on the path lifts CRUD/FLS for the guest (RULE-003).
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*/
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const bodyOf = (n) => byName.get(n.toLowerCase())?.body;
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// A class reaches what its SymbolTable references, and the class it extends: inherited methods
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// run with the parent's own sharing.
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const neighbours = (n) => {
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const entry = byName.get(n.toLowerCase());
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const parent = entry?.body ? parentClass(n, entry.body) : undefined;
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return [...referencedClasses(entry?.symbolTable), ...(parent ? [parent] : [])];
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};
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const reach = (start) => {
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const seen = new Set([start.toLowerCase()]);
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const queue = neighbours(start);
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let systemModeAt;
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while (queue.length > 0) {
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const ref = queue.shift();
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if (seen.has(ref.toLowerCase()))
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continue;
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seen.add(ref.toLowerCase());
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const helper = byName.get(ref.toLowerCase());
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if (!helper?.body)
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continue;
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if (declaresWithoutSharing(helper.body))
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return { withoutSharing: helper.name };
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if (!systemModeAt && usesSystemMode(helper.body))
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systemModeAt = helper.name;
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queue.push(...neighbours(helper.name));
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}
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return { systemMode: systemModeAt };
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};
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// spec/apex-access-mode.md. A guest call is an entry point: no keyword means without sharing,
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// and inherited sharing means with sharing. SYSTEM_MODE bypasses CRUD/FLS only (RULE-003); a
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// helper declared without sharing bypasses sharing for whatever it does (RULE-004).
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const unprotected = [];
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const systemMode = [];
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const exposed = [];
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const name = nameById.get(id) ?? id;
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const entry = byName.get(name.toLowerCase());
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const body = entry?.body;
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// A class with no keyword takes the sharing of the class it extends (spec MN-001).
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const keyword = body ? effectiveSharing(name, body, bodyOf) : null;
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if (keyword === 'without' || (keyword !== null && body && declaresWithoutSharing(body))) {
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unprotected.push({
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name,
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note: keyword === 'without' ? 'Declared "without sharing": fix immediately' : 'Contains an inner class declared "without sharing"',
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});
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continue;
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}
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if (keyword === 'none') {
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unprotected.push({ name, note: 'No sharing declaration: runs without sharing when a guest calls it' });
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continue;
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}
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// No readable body (managed or hidden): its sharing cannot be judged.
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exposed.push(name);
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continue;
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}
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const path = reach(name);
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if (path.withoutSharing) {
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unprotected.push({ name, note: `Reaches "${path.withoutSharing}", which is declared "without sharing"` });
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systemMode.push({ name, via: usesSystemMode(body) ? undefined : path.systemMode });
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exposed.push(name);
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id: 'guest-executable-apex-unprotected',
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category: this.category,
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riskLevel: 'CRITICAL',
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title: `${unprotected.length} guest-executable Apex class(es) run without
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detail: 'These Apex classes can be invoked by unauthenticated guest users AND do not enforce record-level sharing
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title: `${unprotected.length} guest-executable Apex class(es) run without sharing, directly or through a helper`,
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detail: 'These Apex classes can be invoked by unauthenticated guest users AND do not enforce record-level sharing, ' +
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'either themselves or in a helper class they call that is declared "without sharing". ' +
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'This is the classic Salesforce guest-user exploit chain: an attacker calls the class and reads or writes ' +
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'business data in bulk with no login. Object-level guest permissions do not mitigate this: the class runs in system context.',
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remediation: 'Add "with sharing" to every guest-reachable Apex class, enforce CRUD/FLS, and remove guest execution access from any class that does not strictly need it.',
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affectedItems: unprotected.map((
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remediation: 'Add "with sharing" to every guest-reachable Apex class and to every helper it calls, enforce CRUD/FLS, and remove guest execution access from any class that does not strictly need it.',
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affectedItems: unprotected.map((u) => ({ label: u.name, url: apexUrl, note: u.note })),
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});
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}
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if (systemMode.length > 0) {
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findings.push({
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id: 'guest-executable-apex-system-mode',
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category: this.category,
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riskLevel: 'HIGH',
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title: `${systemMode.length} guest-executable Apex class(es) switch off CRUD/FLS with SYSTEM_MODE`,
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detail: 'Guest users can execute these classes, which enforce sharing but run queries or DML with WITH SYSTEM_MODE or ' +
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'AccessLevel.SYSTEM_MODE. Sharing still limits which records a guest reaches, but not which objects and fields: ' +
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'a guest can read or change fields the guest profile is denied on any record shared with guests.',
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remediation: 'Replace SYSTEM_MODE with USER_MODE in guest-reachable code, or strip fields with Security.stripInaccessible() before returning results. Remove guest access where unnecessary.',
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affectedItems: systemMode.map(({ name, via }) => ({
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label: name,
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url: apexUrl,
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note: via ? `Calls "${via}", which uses SYSTEM_MODE: guest CRUD/FLS not enforced` : 'SYSTEM_MODE: guest CRUD/FLS not enforced',
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})),
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}
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import { fieldsOf } from '../support/schema.js';
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/**
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* Whether a Tooling ReleaseUpdate status means the update is enabled. Invoked and Revocable
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* (enabled, can still be reverted) are on; Invocable (available) and Revoked are off; any other
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* status is unknown.
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*/
|
|
7
|
+
function releaseUpdateEnabled(status) {
|
|
8
|
+
if (status === 'Invoked' || status === 'Revocable')
|
|
9
|
+
return true;
|
|
10
|
+
if (status === 'Invocable' || status === 'Revoked')
|
|
11
|
+
return false;
|
|
12
|
+
return null;
|
|
13
|
+
}
|
|
1
14
|
/**
|
|
2
15
|
* Verifies the PREVENTIVE guardrail that stops the guest-ownership-defeats-OWD
|
|
3
16
|
* exfiltration vector: "Secure guest user record access".
|
|
@@ -41,8 +54,8 @@ export class GuestRecordAccessPolicyCheck {
|
|
|
41
54
|
try {
|
|
42
55
|
guests = await ctx.soql.queryAll("SELECT Id FROM User WHERE UserType = 'Guest' AND IsActive = true");
|
|
43
56
|
}
|
|
44
|
-
catch {
|
|
45
|
-
findings.push(this.inconclusive('guest-record-access-policy-inaccessible', 'Guest users could not be queried'));
|
|
57
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
58
|
+
findings.push(this.inconclusive('guest-record-access-policy-inaccessible', 'Guest users could not be queried', err));
|
|
46
59
|
return { findings };
|
|
47
60
|
}
|
|
48
61
|
if (guests.length === 0) {
|
|
@@ -59,14 +72,27 @@ export class GuestRecordAccessPolicyCheck {
|
|
|
59
72
|
}
|
|
60
73
|
let updates;
|
|
61
74
|
try {
|
|
62
|
-
|
|
75
|
+
// Current orgs serve Release Updates as Tooling ReleaseUpdate (Status 'Invocable' = available
|
|
76
|
+
// but not enabled); CriticalUpdate is the older object. Read whichever this org serves.
|
|
77
|
+
if (await fieldsOf(ctx, 'ReleaseUpdate', 'tooling')) {
|
|
78
|
+
const rows = await ctx.tooling.query('SELECT Id, DeveloperName, Title, Description, Status FROM ReleaseUpdate');
|
|
79
|
+
updates = rows.map((r) => ({
|
|
80
|
+
Id: r.Id,
|
|
81
|
+
Name: r.Title ?? r.DeveloperName,
|
|
82
|
+
Description: r.Description,
|
|
83
|
+
IsEnabled: releaseUpdateEnabled(r.Status),
|
|
84
|
+
}));
|
|
85
|
+
}
|
|
86
|
+
else {
|
|
87
|
+
updates = await ctx.tooling.query('SELECT Id, Name, Description, IsEnabled FROM CriticalUpdate');
|
|
88
|
+
}
|
|
63
89
|
}
|
|
64
|
-
catch {
|
|
65
|
-
findings.push(this.inconclusive('guest-record-access-policy-tooling-inaccessible', 'Release updates could not be queried'));
|
|
90
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
91
|
+
findings.push(this.inconclusive('guest-record-access-policy-tooling-inaccessible', 'Release updates could not be queried', err));
|
|
66
92
|
return { findings };
|
|
67
93
|
}
|
|
68
94
|
const match = updates.find((u) => this.matchesSecureGuestAccess(u));
|
|
69
|
-
if (match &&
|
|
95
|
+
if (match && match.IsEnabled === false) {
|
|
70
96
|
findings.push({
|
|
71
97
|
id: 'guest-record-access-policy-not-enforced',
|
|
72
98
|
category: this.category,
|
|
@@ -78,7 +104,7 @@ export class GuestRecordAccessPolicyCheck {
|
|
|
78
104
|
});
|
|
79
105
|
return { findings };
|
|
80
106
|
}
|
|
81
|
-
if (match && match.IsEnabled) {
|
|
107
|
+
if (match && match.IsEnabled === true) {
|
|
82
108
|
findings.push({
|
|
83
109
|
id: 'guest-record-access-policy-enforced',
|
|
84
110
|
category: this.category,
|
|
@@ -91,6 +117,20 @@ export class GuestRecordAccessPolicyCheck {
|
|
|
91
117
|
});
|
|
92
118
|
return { findings };
|
|
93
119
|
}
|
|
120
|
+
if (match) {
|
|
121
|
+
// Present, but its status says neither enabled nor available (e.g. a new status value):
|
|
122
|
+
// never read as enforced. MN-051.
|
|
123
|
+
findings.push({
|
|
124
|
+
id: 'guest-record-access-policy-verify-manually',
|
|
125
|
+
category: this.category,
|
|
126
|
+
riskLevel: 'LOW',
|
|
127
|
+
title: `Confirm guest record-access guardrails manually (${guests.length} active guest user(s))`,
|
|
128
|
+
detail: `The "Secure guest user record access" Release Update is present, but its status does not say whether it is enabled, so enforcement is not assumed.`,
|
|
129
|
+
remediation: 'In Setup → Release Updates and Setup → Sharing Settings, confirm "Secure guest user record access" is on and "Assign new records created by guest users to the default owner" is enabled.',
|
|
130
|
+
affectedItems: [{ label: match.Name, url: `${ctx.orgInfo.instanceUrl}/lightning/setup/ReleaseUpdates/home`, note: 'Status unknown' }],
|
|
131
|
+
});
|
|
132
|
+
return { findings };
|
|
133
|
+
}
|
|
94
134
|
// No matching update surfaced — typical of orgs where it was auto-activated in
|
|
95
135
|
// an earlier release and no longer appears in CriticalUpdate. We got data, so
|
|
96
136
|
// this is advisory (LOW), not inconclusive: point the operator at the manual toggles.
|
|
@@ -105,15 +145,16 @@ export class GuestRecordAccessPolicyCheck {
|
|
|
105
145
|
});
|
|
106
146
|
return { findings };
|
|
107
147
|
}
|
|
108
|
-
inconclusive(id, what) {
|
|
148
|
+
inconclusive(id, what, err) {
|
|
149
|
+
const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
109
150
|
return {
|
|
110
151
|
id,
|
|
111
152
|
category: this.category,
|
|
112
153
|
riskLevel: 'INFO',
|
|
113
154
|
inconclusive: true,
|
|
114
|
-
title:
|
|
115
|
-
detail:
|
|
116
|
-
remediation: '
|
|
155
|
+
title: what,
|
|
156
|
+
detail: `The audit user could not gather the data needed to evaluate guest record-access enforcement. The org returned: ${msg}`,
|
|
157
|
+
remediation: 'If the error is an access error, grant the audit user View Setup and Configuration (see PERMISSIONS.md) and re-run. Otherwise the area is unassessed, not clean.',
|
|
117
158
|
};
|
|
118
159
|
}
|
|
119
160
|
}
|
|
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { apexCode } from '../support/apexAccess.js';
|
|
1
2
|
import { ApexRepository } from '@cclabsnz/sf-core';
|
|
2
3
|
const HIGH_RISK_PATTERNS = [
|
|
3
4
|
/Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9\-_.~+/]{20,}=*/gi, // Bearer tokens (min length to avoid test stubs)
|
|
@@ -38,10 +39,14 @@ export class HardcodedCredentialsCheck {
|
|
|
38
39
|
Body: c.body ?? '',
|
|
39
40
|
LengthWithoutComments: (c.body ?? '').length,
|
|
40
41
|
NamespacePrefix: c.namespace,
|
|
42
|
+
SymbolTable: c.symbolTable,
|
|
41
43
|
}));
|
|
42
44
|
// Cache apex bodies for downstream checks — exclude test classes and filter null bodies
|
|
43
|
-
|
|
44
|
-
|
|
45
|
+
// @IsTest is read from code only: a production helper mentioning it in a comment must still
|
|
46
|
+
// reach the cache, or the checks that follow calls into it never see its sharing (spec MN-002).
|
|
47
|
+
const nonTestRecords = records.filter((r) => !IS_TEST_CLASS.test(apexCode(r.Body ?? '')));
|
|
48
|
+
// The SymbolTable travels with the body so GuestExecutableApexCheck can follow calls into helpers.
|
|
49
|
+
ctx.cache.apexBodies = nonTestRecords.map((r) => ({ name: r.Name, body: r.Body ?? '', symbolTable: r.SymbolTable }));
|
|
45
50
|
const namedCredentialEndpoints = (ctx.cache.namedCredentialEndpoints ?? []).filter(Boolean);
|
|
46
51
|
const remoteSiteUrls = (ctx.cache.remoteSiteUrls ?? []).filter(Boolean);
|
|
47
52
|
const classesWithCredentials = [];
|
|
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ export class HealthCheckCheck {
|
|
|
20
20
|
category: this.category,
|
|
21
21
|
riskLevel: scoreRisk,
|
|
22
22
|
title: `Salesforce Security Health Check Score: ${score}/100`,
|
|
23
|
+
passed: scoreRisk === 'LOW' || undefined,
|
|
23
24
|
detail: `The Salesforce Security Health Check scored ${score}/100. Scores below 85 indicate security configuration gaps that should be addressed.`,
|
|
24
25
|
remediation: 'Review the Security Health Check in Setup → Security Center → Health Check.',
|
|
25
26
|
});
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
//
|
|
2
|
-
|
|
3
|
-
|
|
1
|
+
// 8 hours, in minutes: the unit of ConnectedApplication.SessionTimeout.
|
|
2
|
+
const LONG_TIMEOUT_MINUTES = 8 * 60;
|
|
3
|
+
/** Minutes, or null when the app sets no timeout of its own. */
|
|
4
|
+
function timeoutMinutes(app) {
|
|
5
|
+
const n = app.SessionTimeout === null || app.SessionTimeout === '' ? NaN : Number(app.SessionTimeout);
|
|
6
|
+
return Number.isFinite(n) && n > 0 ? n : null;
|
|
7
|
+
}
|
|
4
8
|
// Patterns that suggest an app has elevated / admin capabilities
|
|
5
9
|
const ADMIN_APP_PATTERNS = [/admin/i, /manage/i, /setup/i, /deploy/i, /devops/i, /audit/i, /monitor/i];
|
|
6
10
|
export class HighAssuranceSessionCheck {
|
|
@@ -14,20 +18,20 @@ export class HighAssuranceSessionCheck {
|
|
|
14
18
|
const setupUrl = `${baseUrl}/lightning/setup/ConnectedApplication/home`;
|
|
15
19
|
let apps;
|
|
16
20
|
try {
|
|
17
|
-
|
|
21
|
+
// SessionTimeout is served only by the Tooling API; the standard API rejects the column.
|
|
22
|
+
apps = await ctx.tooling.query(`SELECT Id, Name, SessionTimeout, OptionsAllowAdminApprovedUsersOnly
|
|
18
23
|
FROM ConnectedApplication
|
|
19
24
|
ORDER BY Name
|
|
20
25
|
LIMIT 200`);
|
|
21
|
-
apps = result.records;
|
|
22
26
|
}
|
|
23
|
-
catch {
|
|
27
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
24
28
|
findings.push({
|
|
25
29
|
id: 'high-assurance-session-inaccessible',
|
|
26
30
|
category: this.category,
|
|
27
31
|
riskLevel: 'INFO',
|
|
28
32
|
inconclusive: true,
|
|
29
33
|
title: 'Connected app session settings could not be read',
|
|
30
|
-
detail:
|
|
34
|
+
detail: `ConnectedApplication session fields could not be read, so high assurance session configuration cannot be verified: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
|
|
31
35
|
remediation: 'Manually review connected apps in Setup → Connected Apps → Manage Connected Apps and verify session timeout policies.',
|
|
32
36
|
});
|
|
33
37
|
return { findings };
|
|
@@ -45,11 +49,12 @@ export class HighAssuranceSessionCheck {
|
|
|
45
49
|
return { findings };
|
|
46
50
|
}
|
|
47
51
|
// Identify apps with no session timeout (unlimited) — any session remains valid until logout
|
|
48
|
-
const noTimeout = apps.filter((a) => a
|
|
52
|
+
const noTimeout = apps.filter((a) => timeoutMinutes(a) === null);
|
|
49
53
|
// Identify admin-pattern apps with very long or no timeouts
|
|
50
54
|
const adminAppsLongTimeout = apps.filter((a) => {
|
|
51
55
|
const isAdminLike = ADMIN_APP_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(a.Name));
|
|
52
|
-
const
|
|
56
|
+
const minutes = timeoutMinutes(a);
|
|
57
|
+
const hasLongTimeout = minutes === null || minutes > LONG_TIMEOUT_MINUTES;
|
|
53
58
|
return isAdminLike && hasLongTimeout;
|
|
54
59
|
});
|
|
55
60
|
// Org-level risk: majority of apps have no timeout
|
|
@@ -65,9 +70,9 @@ export class HighAssuranceSessionCheck {
|
|
|
65
70
|
affectedItems: adminAppsLongTimeout.map((a) => ({
|
|
66
71
|
label: a.Name,
|
|
67
72
|
url: setupUrl,
|
|
68
|
-
note: a
|
|
73
|
+
note: timeoutMinutes(a) === null
|
|
69
74
|
? 'No session timeout: sessions never expire'
|
|
70
|
-
: `Session timeout: ${Math.round(a
|
|
75
|
+
: `Session timeout: ${Math.round(timeoutMinutes(a) / 60)}h, reduce to ≤2h`,
|
|
71
76
|
})),
|
|
72
77
|
});
|
|
73
78
|
}
|
|
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ export class InactiveUsersCheck {
|
|
|
14
14
|
const baseUrl = ctx.orgInfo.instanceUrl;
|
|
15
15
|
// Q1: true count — query with LIMIT returns totalSize = min(actual, LIMIT),
|
|
16
16
|
// so a separate COUNT query is required for an accurate number.
|
|
17
|
-
const countResult = await ctx.soql.query(`SELECT COUNT(Id)
|
|
17
|
+
const countResult = await ctx.soql.query(`SELECT COUNT(Id) FROM User WHERE ${BASE_FILTER}`);
|
|
18
18
|
const totalCount = countResult.records[0]?.expr0 ?? 0;
|
|
19
19
|
if (totalCount === 0) {
|
|
20
20
|
findings.push({
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import type { AuditContext } from '@cclabsnz/sf-core';
|
|
2
|
+
import type { SecurityCheck, CheckResult } from '../SecurityCheck.js';
|
|
3
|
+
export declare class InboundEmailHandlerExposureCheck implements SecurityCheck {
|
|
4
|
+
readonly id = "inbound-email-handler-exposure";
|
|
5
|
+
readonly name = "Inbound Email Handler Unauthenticated Execution";
|
|
6
|
+
readonly category = "External Connectivity";
|
|
7
|
+
readonly description = "Detects active inbound email services open to all senders without SPF/DKIM verification executing Apex under privileged users.";
|
|
8
|
+
run(ctx: AuditContext): Promise<CheckResult>;
|
|
9
|
+
}
|
|
10
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=InboundEmailHandlerExposureCheck.d.ts.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
export class InboundEmailHandlerExposureCheck {
|
|
2
|
+
id = 'inbound-email-handler-exposure';
|
|
3
|
+
name = 'Inbound Email Handler Unauthenticated Execution';
|
|
4
|
+
category = 'External Connectivity';
|
|
5
|
+
description = 'Detects active inbound email services open to all senders without SPF/DKIM verification executing Apex under privileged users.';
|
|
6
|
+
async run(ctx) {
|
|
7
|
+
const findings = [];
|
|
8
|
+
const baseUrl = ctx.orgInfo.instanceUrl;
|
|
9
|
+
const emailToApexUrl = `${baseUrl}/lightning/setup/EmailToApex/home`;
|
|
10
|
+
let functions = [];
|
|
11
|
+
try {
|
|
12
|
+
functions = await ctx.soql.queryAll('SELECT Id, FunctionName, IsActive, ApexClassId, AuthenticationFailureAction FROM EmailServicesFunction WHERE IsActive = true');
|
|
13
|
+
}
|
|
14
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
15
|
+
// This object exists in every org, so a failure is lack of access, never an absent feature.
|
|
16
|
+
findings.push({
|
|
17
|
+
id: 'inbound-email-handler-exposure-inaccessible',
|
|
18
|
+
category: this.category,
|
|
19
|
+
riskLevel: 'INFO',
|
|
20
|
+
inconclusive: true,
|
|
21
|
+
title: 'Email Services Functions could not be queried',
|
|
22
|
+
detail: `Query to EmailServicesFunction failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
|
|
23
|
+
remediation: 'Grant the audit user "View Setup and Configuration".',
|
|
24
|
+
});
|
|
25
|
+
return { findings };
|
|
26
|
+
}
|
|
27
|
+
if (functions.length === 0) {
|
|
28
|
+
findings.push({
|
|
29
|
+
id: 'inbound-email-handler-exposure-ok',
|
|
30
|
+
category: this.category,
|
|
31
|
+
riskLevel: 'LOW',
|
|
32
|
+
passed: true,
|
|
33
|
+
title: 'No active inbound Email-to-Apex services found',
|
|
34
|
+
detail: 'Zero active EmailServicesFunction records exist in the org.',
|
|
35
|
+
remediation: 'When creating inbound email services, enforce sender restrictions and SPF/DKIM verification.',
|
|
36
|
+
});
|
|
37
|
+
return { findings };
|
|
38
|
+
}
|
|
39
|
+
// Query active EmailServicesAddress records
|
|
40
|
+
let addresses = [];
|
|
41
|
+
addresses = await ctx.soql.queryAll('SELECT Id, FunctionId, LocalPart, EmailDomainName, IsActive, AuthorizedSenders, RunAsUserId FROM EmailServicesAddress WHERE IsActive = true');
|
|
42
|
+
const addressesByFunction = new Map();
|
|
43
|
+
for (const a of addresses) {
|
|
44
|
+
const list = addressesByFunction.get(a.FunctionId) ?? [];
|
|
45
|
+
list.push(a);
|
|
46
|
+
addressesByFunction.set(a.FunctionId, list);
|
|
47
|
+
}
|
|
48
|
+
// Query RunAs users
|
|
49
|
+
const runAsUserIds = [
|
|
50
|
+
...new Set(addresses.map((a) => a.RunAsUserId).filter((id) => Boolean(id))),
|
|
51
|
+
];
|
|
52
|
+
let adminUsers = new Set();
|
|
53
|
+
let userDetails = new Map();
|
|
54
|
+
if (runAsUserIds.length > 0) {
|
|
55
|
+
const users = await ctx.soql.queryAll(`SELECT Id, Username, Profile.Name FROM User WHERE Id IN ('${runAsUserIds.join("','")}')`);
|
|
56
|
+
for (const u of users) {
|
|
57
|
+
const prof = u.Profile?.Name ?? '';
|
|
58
|
+
userDetails.set(u.Id, `${u.Username} (${prof})`);
|
|
59
|
+
if (prof === 'System Administrator' || prof.toLowerCase().includes('admin')) {
|
|
60
|
+
adminUsers.add(u.Id);
|
|
61
|
+
}
|
|
62
|
+
}
|
|
63
|
+
}
|
|
64
|
+
// Query Apex Classes
|
|
65
|
+
const apexClassIds = [
|
|
66
|
+
...new Set(functions.map((f) => f.ApexClassId).filter((id) => Boolean(id))),
|
|
67
|
+
];
|
|
68
|
+
let classBodies = new Map();
|
|
69
|
+
let classNames = new Map();
|
|
70
|
+
if (apexClassIds.length > 0) {
|
|
71
|
+
const classes = await ctx.soql.queryAll(`SELECT Id, Name, Body FROM ApexClass WHERE Id IN ('${apexClassIds.join("','")}')`);
|
|
72
|
+
for (const c of classes) {
|
|
73
|
+
classNames.set(c.Id, c.Name);
|
|
74
|
+
classBodies.set(c.Id, c.Body ?? '');
|
|
75
|
+
}
|
|
76
|
+
}
|
|
77
|
+
const exposedFunctions = [];
|
|
78
|
+
for (const fn of functions) {
|
|
79
|
+
const funcAddresses = addressesByFunction.get(fn.Id) ?? [];
|
|
80
|
+
// Check 1: Any address with empty/blank AuthorizedSenders
|
|
81
|
+
const openAddress = funcAddresses.find((a) => !a.AuthorizedSenders || a.AuthorizedSenders.trim() === '');
|
|
82
|
+
// Check 2: AuthenticationFailureAction is 0 or '0' (None / accept even spoofed emails)
|
|
83
|
+
const authFailureAction = String(fn.AuthenticationFailureAction ?? '0');
|
|
84
|
+
const acceptsSpoofedEmail = authFailureAction === '0' || authFailureAction === '';
|
|
85
|
+
// Check 3: the open address runs as an admin, or the class runs without sharing / performs DML
|
|
86
|
+
const isRunAsAdmin = openAddress?.RunAsUserId ? adminUsers.has(openAddress.RunAsUserId) : false;
|
|
87
|
+
const classBody = fn.ApexClassId ? classBodies.get(fn.ApexClassId) ?? '' : '';
|
|
88
|
+
const isWithoutSharing = /without\s+sharing/i.test(classBody);
|
|
89
|
+
const hasDmlOrDynamicSoql = /insert\s+|update\s+|upsert\s+|delete\s+|Database\.execute/i.test(classBody);
|
|
90
|
+
if (openAddress && acceptsSpoofedEmail && (isRunAsAdmin || isWithoutSharing || hasDmlOrDynamicSoql)) {
|
|
91
|
+
const addrStr = `${openAddress.LocalPart}${openAddress.EmailDomainName ? '@' + openAddress.EmailDomainName : ''}`;
|
|
92
|
+
const reasons = [
|
|
93
|
+
'No sender restriction (AuthorizedSenders is blank)',
|
|
94
|
+
'AuthenticationFailureAction is set to None (accepts spoofed SPF/DKIM)',
|
|
95
|
+
isRunAsAdmin ? 'Runs as System Administrator' : '',
|
|
96
|
+
isWithoutSharing ? 'Apex runs without sharing' : '',
|
|
97
|
+
]
|
|
98
|
+
.filter(Boolean)
|
|
99
|
+
.join('; ');
|
|
100
|
+
exposedFunctions.push({
|
|
101
|
+
func: fn,
|
|
102
|
+
address: addrStr,
|
|
103
|
+
reason: reasons,
|
|
104
|
+
});
|
|
105
|
+
}
|
|
106
|
+
}
|
|
107
|
+
if (exposedFunctions.length > 0) {
|
|
108
|
+
findings.push({
|
|
109
|
+
id: 'inbound-email-handler-unauthenticated-execution',
|
|
110
|
+
category: this.category,
|
|
111
|
+
riskLevel: 'HIGH',
|
|
112
|
+
title: `${exposedFunctions.length} inbound email service(s) allow unauthenticated remote Apex execution`,
|
|
113
|
+
detail: 'Active EmailServicesFunction records accept messages from any internet sender with no SPF/DKIM authentication enforcement (AuthenticationFailureAction = 0 / None) and execute under a privileged System Administrator or in an Apex class running without sharing. An external attacker sending an email can trigger unauthenticated backend DML or privilege escalation.',
|
|
114
|
+
remediation: 'Configure "Accept Email From" with an authorized domain allowlist, set the Failure Action to "Bounce message" or "Discard message" upon SPF/DKIM verification failure, and run the service under a least-privileged execution user.',
|
|
115
|
+
affectedItems: exposedFunctions.map((item) => ({
|
|
116
|
+
label: `${item.func.FunctionName} (${item.address})`,
|
|
117
|
+
url: emailToApexUrl,
|
|
118
|
+
note: item.reason,
|
|
119
|
+
})),
|
|
120
|
+
});
|
|
121
|
+
}
|
|
122
|
+
else {
|
|
123
|
+
findings.push({
|
|
124
|
+
id: 'inbound-email-handler-exposure-ok',
|
|
125
|
+
category: this.category,
|
|
126
|
+
riskLevel: 'LOW',
|
|
127
|
+
passed: true,
|
|
128
|
+
title: 'Inbound email services enforce sender restrictions and authentication controls',
|
|
129
|
+
detail: `${functions.length} active inbound email service(s) inspected; all require authentication, enforce sender allowlists, or execute under constrained least-privilege contexts.`,
|
|
130
|
+
remediation: 'Continue enforcing sender allowlists and bounce/discard policies on SPF/DKIM failure.',
|
|
131
|
+
});
|
|
132
|
+
}
|
|
133
|
+
return { findings };
|
|
134
|
+
}
|
|
135
|
+
}
|
|
136
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=InboundEmailHandlerExposureCheck.js.map
|
|
@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ export class IntegrationLeastPrivilegeCheck {
|
|
|
112
112
|
psa = await ctx.soql.queryAll(`SELECT AssigneeId, PermissionSetId, PermissionSet.Name, PermissionSet.IsOwnedByProfile, ${permFields}
|
|
113
113
|
FROM PermissionSetAssignment WHERE AssigneeId IN (${idList})`);
|
|
114
114
|
}
|
|
115
|
-
catch {
|
|
116
|
-
findings.push(this.inconclusive('integration-least-privilege-permissions-inaccessible', 'Integration account permissions could not be queried'));
|
|
115
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
116
|
+
findings.push(this.inconclusive('integration-least-privilege-permissions-inaccessible', 'Integration account permissions could not be queried', err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)));
|
|
117
117
|
return { findings };
|
|
118
118
|
}
|
|
119
119
|
const grants = [];
|
|
@@ -452,15 +452,16 @@ export class IntegrationLeastPrivilegeCheck {
|
|
|
452
452
|
})),
|
|
453
453
|
});
|
|
454
454
|
}
|
|
455
|
-
inconclusive(id, what) {
|
|
455
|
+
inconclusive(id, what, orgError) {
|
|
456
456
|
return {
|
|
457
457
|
id,
|
|
458
458
|
category: this.category,
|
|
459
459
|
riskLevel: 'INFO',
|
|
460
460
|
inconclusive: true,
|
|
461
|
-
title:
|
|
462
|
-
detail: 'The audit user could not gather the data needed to evaluate integration account privilege.'
|
|
463
|
-
|
|
461
|
+
title: what,
|
|
462
|
+
detail: 'The audit user could not gather the data needed to evaluate integration account privilege, so it is unassessed.' +
|
|
463
|
+
(orgError ? ` The org said: ${orgError}` : ''),
|
|
464
|
+
remediation: 'If the cause is an access error, confirm the audit user has View Setup and Configuration and View All Users, then re-run.',
|
|
464
465
|
};
|
|
465
466
|
}
|
|
466
467
|
}
|
|
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { hasField } from '../support/schema.js';
|
|
1
2
|
export class InternalUserMfaCheck {
|
|
2
3
|
id = 'internal-user-mfa';
|
|
3
4
|
name = 'Internal User MFA Enforcement';
|
|
@@ -28,22 +29,38 @@ export class InternalUserMfaCheck {
|
|
|
28
29
|
}
|
|
29
30
|
let mfaUserIds = new Set();
|
|
30
31
|
try {
|
|
32
|
+
// The permission is absent from some orgs and API versions. Without it, per-user MFA
|
|
33
|
+
// enforcement cannot be read from permissions at all: MFA may still be enforced org-wide
|
|
34
|
+
// (Session Settings) or by an SSO provider, so this is unknown, never a gap or a pass.
|
|
35
|
+
if (!(await hasField(ctx, 'PermissionSet', 'PermissionsForceTwoFactor'))) {
|
|
36
|
+
findings.push({
|
|
37
|
+
id: 'internal-user-mfa-not-available',
|
|
38
|
+
category: this.category,
|
|
39
|
+
riskLevel: 'INFO',
|
|
40
|
+
inconclusive: true,
|
|
41
|
+
notAssessed: true,
|
|
42
|
+
title: 'MFA enforcement for internal users cannot be read from permissions in this org',
|
|
43
|
+
detail: `This org does not expose the "Multi-Factor Authentication for User Interface Logins" permission (PermissionSet.PermissionsForceTwoFactor), so whether its ${users.length} active internal user(s) have MFA enforced cannot be established from permission assignments. MFA may still be enforced org-wide in Session Settings or by an SSO identity provider.`,
|
|
44
|
+
remediation: 'Confirm "Require multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all direct UI logins" in Setup → Session Settings, and MFA at the identity provider for SSO users.',
|
|
45
|
+
});
|
|
46
|
+
return { findings };
|
|
47
|
+
}
|
|
31
48
|
const psaResult = await ctx.soql.query(`SELECT AssigneeId
|
|
32
49
|
FROM PermissionSetAssignment
|
|
33
|
-
WHERE PermissionSet.
|
|
50
|
+
WHERE PermissionSet.PermissionsForceTwoFactor = true
|
|
34
51
|
AND Assignee.IsActive = true
|
|
35
52
|
AND Assignee.UserType = 'Standard'`);
|
|
36
53
|
mfaUserIds = new Set(psaResult.records.map((r) => r.AssigneeId));
|
|
37
54
|
}
|
|
38
|
-
catch {
|
|
55
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
39
56
|
findings.push({
|
|
40
57
|
id: 'internal-user-mfa-inaccessible',
|
|
41
58
|
category: this.category,
|
|
42
59
|
riskLevel: 'INFO',
|
|
43
60
|
inconclusive: true,
|
|
44
61
|
title: 'MFA permission set assignments could not be queried',
|
|
45
|
-
detail:
|
|
46
|
-
remediation: '
|
|
62
|
+
detail: `Which users hold PermissionsForceTwoFactor could not be read, so MFA enforcement for internal users is unassessed. The org said: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
|
|
63
|
+
remediation: 'Check the error above. If it is an access error, confirm the audit user can read PermissionSetAssignment (View Setup and Configuration); otherwise review MFA enforcement manually in Setup → Users → Permission Sets.',
|
|
47
64
|
});
|
|
48
65
|
return { findings };
|
|
49
66
|
}
|
|
@@ -55,18 +72,19 @@ export class InternalUserMfaCheck {
|
|
|
55
72
|
riskLevel: 'LOW',
|
|
56
73
|
passed: true,
|
|
57
74
|
title: `All ${users.length} active internal user(s) have MFA explicitly enforced via permission`,
|
|
58
|
-
detail: 'All active, unfrozen standard users have the
|
|
75
|
+
detail: 'All active, unfrozen standard users have the PermissionsForceTwoFactor permission assigned. Salesforce auto-enforced MFA at the system level in Spring 2023; this explicit permission provides belt-and-suspenders assurance that MFA is enforced even if system-level enforcement has edge cases.',
|
|
59
76
|
remediation: 'Continue to ensure all new users are assigned MFA enforcement via their profile or a permission set.',
|
|
60
77
|
});
|
|
61
78
|
return { findings };
|
|
62
79
|
}
|
|
63
|
-
|
|
80
|
+
// Salesforce enforces MFA for UI logins at org level; the explicit permission is a second layer. RULE-078.
|
|
81
|
+
const riskLevel = usersWithoutMfa.length > 20 ? 'MEDIUM' : 'LOW';
|
|
64
82
|
findings.push({
|
|
65
83
|
id: 'internal-user-mfa-gaps',
|
|
66
84
|
category: this.category,
|
|
67
85
|
riskLevel,
|
|
68
|
-
title: `${usersWithoutMfa.length} of ${users.length} active internal user(s) lack explicit MFA
|
|
69
|
-
detail: `${usersWithoutMfa.length} active standard users do not have the
|
|
86
|
+
title: `${usersWithoutMfa.length} of ${users.length} active internal user(s) lack the explicit MFA permission (second layer over org-level MFA)`,
|
|
87
|
+
detail: `${usersWithoutMfa.length} active standard users do not have the PermissionsForceTwoFactor permission assigned. Salesforce auto-enforced MFA at the system level in Spring 2023, but the explicit permission provides belt-and-suspenders assurance. Users without it rely solely on system-level enforcement, which can have edge cases in API-heavy or SSO-integrated environments. Users without the explicit permission should be reviewed to confirm they are subject to effective MFA controls.`,
|
|
70
88
|
remediation: 'Assign the "Multi-Factor Authentication for User Interface Logins" permission to all internal standard users via their profile or a permission set. This ensures MFA is explicitly enforced regardless of system-level settings. Prioritise users with privileged access or access to sensitive data.',
|
|
71
89
|
affectedItems: usersWithoutMfa.slice(0, 50).map((u) => ({
|
|
72
90
|
label: u.Username,
|