@cclabsnz/sf-audit 1.16.0 → 1.18.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (170) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +172 -1
  2. package/PERMISSIONS.md +139 -0
  3. package/README.md +98 -26
  4. package/config/scoring.sample.json +104 -5
  5. package/docs/permissionset/SF_Audit_ReadOnly.permissionset-meta.xml +54 -0
  6. package/lib/apps/analyzeApps.d.ts +8 -2
  7. package/lib/apps/analyzeApps.js +7 -2
  8. package/lib/apps/apiLogSource.d.ts +39 -0
  9. package/lib/apps/apiLogSource.js +75 -0
  10. package/lib/apps/appResolver.js +30 -4
  11. package/lib/apps/grantedAccess.js +16 -3
  12. package/lib/apps/leastPrivilege.d.ts +3 -1
  13. package/lib/apps/leastPrivilege.js +7 -3
  14. package/lib/apps/permissionSetGenerator.d.ts +22 -0
  15. package/lib/apps/permissionSetGenerator.js +100 -0
  16. package/lib/apps/types.d.ts +6 -0
  17. package/lib/apps/usageCollector.d.ts +7 -1
  18. package/lib/apps/usageCollector.js +57 -26
  19. package/lib/chains/CapabilityRegistry.js +26 -0
  20. package/lib/chains/ChainEngine.js +11 -1
  21. package/lib/chains/namedChains.js +130 -24
  22. package/lib/checks/CheckEngine.d.ts +3 -1
  23. package/lib/checks/CheckEngine.js +65 -26
  24. package/lib/checks/impl/AgentUserPrivilegeCheck.js +5 -4
  25. package/lib/checks/impl/AnonymousApexAuditCheck.js +41 -8
  26. package/lib/checks/impl/ApexCrudFLSCheck.js +45 -10
  27. package/lib/checks/impl/ApexSharingCheck.js +19 -26
  28. package/lib/checks/impl/ApiClientPermissionCheck.js +21 -5
  29. package/lib/checks/impl/AuditTrailCheck.js +23 -8
  30. package/lib/checks/impl/AuthProviderRegistrationHandlerCheck.d.ts +10 -0
  31. package/lib/checks/impl/AuthProviderRegistrationHandlerCheck.js +131 -0
  32. package/lib/checks/impl/CertificateExpiryCheck.js +2 -1
  33. package/lib/checks/impl/ConnectedAppScopeCheck.js +61 -5
  34. package/lib/checks/impl/ConnectedAppsCheck.js +60 -5
  35. package/lib/checks/impl/ContentLinksCheck.js +33 -9
  36. package/lib/checks/impl/CorsAllowlistCheck.js +3 -2
  37. package/lib/checks/impl/DataClassificationCheck.js +15 -13
  38. package/lib/checks/impl/DataCloudDataSpaceIsolationCheck.d.ts +10 -0
  39. package/lib/checks/impl/DataCloudDataSpaceIsolationCheck.js +116 -0
  40. package/lib/checks/impl/DebugLogAccessCheck.js +4 -4
  41. package/lib/checks/impl/DelegatedAdministrationGroupsCheck.d.ts +10 -0
  42. package/lib/checks/impl/DelegatedAdministrationGroupsCheck.js +76 -0
  43. package/lib/checks/impl/DelegatedAuthenticationExposureCheck.d.ts +10 -0
  44. package/lib/checks/impl/DelegatedAuthenticationExposureCheck.js +105 -0
  45. package/lib/checks/impl/DeploymentIdentityCheck.js +32 -5
  46. package/lib/checks/impl/EmailSecurityCheck.d.ts +1 -1
  47. package/lib/checks/impl/EmailSecurityCheck.js +14 -34
  48. package/lib/checks/impl/EncryptionCoverageCheck.js +21 -15
  49. package/lib/checks/impl/EnhancedDomainsCheck.js +17 -2
  50. package/lib/checks/impl/EscalationPermsCheck.d.ts +2 -0
  51. package/lib/checks/impl/EscalationPermsCheck.js +88 -21
  52. package/lib/checks/impl/ExperienceCloudSiteCheck.js +56 -5
  53. package/lib/checks/impl/ExternalAccountHierarchyExposureCheck.d.ts +10 -0
  54. package/lib/checks/impl/ExternalAccountHierarchyExposureCheck.js +65 -0
  55. package/lib/checks/impl/ExternalCredentialsCheck.js +6 -3
  56. package/lib/checks/impl/FailedLoginCheck.js +36 -9
  57. package/lib/checks/impl/FieldHistoryTrackingCheck.js +14 -11
  58. package/lib/checks/impl/FlowHttpCalloutCredentialBypassCheck.d.ts +10 -0
  59. package/lib/checks/impl/FlowHttpCalloutCredentialBypassCheck.js +115 -0
  60. package/lib/checks/impl/GenAiPromptTemplateGroundingCheck.d.ts +10 -0
  61. package/lib/checks/impl/GenAiPromptTemplateGroundingCheck.js +227 -0
  62. package/lib/checks/impl/GuestExecutableApexCheck.d.ts +1 -1
  63. package/lib/checks/impl/GuestExecutableApexCheck.js +105 -14
  64. package/lib/checks/impl/GuestRecordAccessPolicyCheck.js +52 -11
  65. package/lib/checks/impl/HardcodedCredentialsCheck.js +7 -2
  66. package/lib/checks/impl/HealthCheckCheck.js +1 -0
  67. package/lib/checks/impl/HighAssuranceSessionCheck.js +16 -11
  68. package/lib/checks/impl/InactiveUsersCheck.js +1 -1
  69. package/lib/checks/impl/InboundEmailHandlerExposureCheck.d.ts +10 -0
  70. package/lib/checks/impl/InboundEmailHandlerExposureCheck.js +136 -0
  71. package/lib/checks/impl/IntegrationLeastPrivilegeCheck.js +7 -6
  72. package/lib/checks/impl/InternalUserMfaCheck.js +26 -8
  73. package/lib/checks/impl/IpRestrictionsCheck.js +35 -16
  74. package/lib/checks/impl/LoginAccessPolicyCheck.js +5 -4
  75. package/lib/checks/impl/LoginAnomalyCheck.js +10 -7
  76. package/lib/checks/impl/LoginSessionCheck.js +2 -0
  77. package/lib/checks/impl/MfaEnforcementCheck.js +23 -6
  78. package/lib/checks/impl/MfaMethodStrengthCheck.js +18 -3
  79. package/lib/checks/impl/MfaRegistrationCheck.js +4 -3
  80. package/lib/checks/impl/MyDomainLoginPolicyCheck.js +23 -10
  81. package/lib/checks/impl/OauthDeviceAndAssetTokenFlowsCheck.d.ts +10 -0
  82. package/lib/checks/impl/OauthDeviceAndAssetTokenFlowsCheck.js +84 -0
  83. package/lib/checks/impl/OrgWideEmailSpoofingCheck.d.ts +10 -0
  84. package/lib/checks/impl/OrgWideEmailSpoofingCheck.js +106 -0
  85. package/lib/checks/impl/OutboundMessagesCheck.js +48 -6
  86. package/lib/checks/impl/PackagePostInstallSupplyChainCheck.d.ts +10 -0
  87. package/lib/checks/impl/PackagePostInstallSupplyChainCheck.js +89 -0
  88. package/lib/checks/impl/PlatformEventSubscriberContextCheck.d.ts +10 -0
  89. package/lib/checks/impl/PlatformEventSubscriberContextCheck.js +88 -0
  90. package/lib/checks/impl/PrivilegedAccessCheck.js +12 -5
  91. package/lib/checks/impl/ReleaseUpdatesCheck.js +18 -3
  92. package/lib/checks/impl/RemoteSitesCheck.js +4 -4
  93. package/lib/checks/impl/RestrictionRulesIntegrityCheck.d.ts +10 -0
  94. package/lib/checks/impl/RestrictionRulesIntegrityCheck.js +105 -0
  95. package/lib/checks/impl/SeparationOfDutiesCheck.js +14 -3
  96. package/lib/checks/impl/ShieldTenantSecretLifecycleCheck.d.ts +10 -0
  97. package/lib/checks/impl/ShieldTenantSecretLifecycleCheck.js +90 -0
  98. package/lib/checks/impl/SoapLoginApiAuthCheck.js +20 -8
  99. package/lib/checks/impl/SsoEnforcementCheck.js +16 -5
  100. package/lib/checks/impl/TransactionSecurityPolicyCheck.js +5 -5
  101. package/lib/checks/impl/TrustedIPRangesCheck.js +18 -9
  102. package/lib/checks/impl/UsersAndAdminsCheck.js +24 -4
  103. package/lib/checks/permCatalog.js +1 -1
  104. package/lib/checks/registry.js +30 -0
  105. package/lib/checks/support/apexAccess.d.ts +56 -0
  106. package/lib/checks/support/apexAccess.js +127 -0
  107. package/lib/checks/support/missingObject.d.ts +13 -0
  108. package/lib/checks/support/missingObject.js +37 -0
  109. package/lib/checks/support/schema.d.ts +17 -0
  110. package/lib/checks/support/schema.js +41 -0
  111. package/lib/commands/audit/apps.d.ts +1 -0
  112. package/lib/commands/audit/apps.js +86 -30
  113. package/lib/commands/audit/diff.js +2 -2
  114. package/lib/commands/audit/events/pull.js +3 -1
  115. package/lib/commands/audit/history.js +2 -2
  116. package/lib/commands/audit/incident/collect.js +3 -1
  117. package/lib/commands/audit/incident/report.js +2 -2
  118. package/lib/commands/audit/security.d.ts +3 -0
  119. package/lib/commands/audit/security.js +65 -10
  120. package/lib/commands/audit/timeline.js +2 -2
  121. package/lib/compliance/mapping.js +28 -7
  122. package/lib/findings/AuditResult.d.ts +10 -0
  123. package/lib/findings/CheckMeta.js +15 -0
  124. package/lib/findings/Finding.d.ts +4 -0
  125. package/lib/findings/ScoringConfig.d.ts +10 -8
  126. package/lib/findings/ScoringConfig.js +12 -5
  127. package/lib/findings/coverage.d.ts +34 -0
  128. package/lib/findings/coverage.js +42 -0
  129. package/lib/findings/exitCode.js +1 -1
  130. package/lib/findings/loadScoringConfig.js +51 -8
  131. package/lib/findings/scoring.js +61 -10
  132. package/lib/history/HistoryStore.js +9 -3
  133. package/lib/history/archivePolicy.d.ts +19 -0
  134. package/lib/history/archivePolicy.js +34 -0
  135. package/lib/incident/bundleIo.js +4 -3
  136. package/lib/incident/collect/collectBundle.d.ts +1 -1
  137. package/lib/incident/collect/collectBundle.js +4 -3
  138. package/lib/incident/collect/streamGuestLogs.d.ts +1 -1
  139. package/lib/incident/collect/streamGuestLogs.js +3 -2
  140. package/lib/incident/csv.js +4 -4
  141. package/lib/incident/render/evidence.js +3 -3
  142. package/lib/incident/render/html.js +2 -3
  143. package/lib/index.d.ts +2 -0
  144. package/lib/index.js +2 -0
  145. package/lib/lib/packageInfo.d.ts +6 -0
  146. package/lib/lib/packageInfo.js +19 -0
  147. package/lib/preflight/permissionMap.d.ts +2 -20
  148. package/lib/preflight/permissionMap.js +2 -43
  149. package/lib/preflight/permissions.d.ts +25 -0
  150. package/lib/preflight/permissions.js +50 -0
  151. package/lib/renderers/AttackChainDagRenderer.d.ts +7 -0
  152. package/lib/renderers/AttackChainDagRenderer.js +139 -0
  153. package/lib/renderers/ClientReportRenderer.d.ts +2 -0
  154. package/lib/renderers/ClientReportRenderer.js +34 -6
  155. package/lib/renderers/DiffHtmlRenderer.js +2 -7
  156. package/lib/renderers/HistoryRenderer.js +19 -11
  157. package/lib/renderers/HtmlRenderer.js +23 -6
  158. package/lib/renderers/MarkdownRenderer.js +11 -1
  159. package/lib/renderers/SarifRenderer.d.ts +43 -0
  160. package/lib/renderers/SarifRenderer.js +250 -0
  161. package/lib/report/ExecutivePriorities.js +1 -1
  162. package/lib/report/RemediationRoadmap.d.ts +5 -1
  163. package/lib/report/RemediationRoadmap.js +6 -2
  164. package/lib/waivers/WaiverLoader.d.ts +28 -0
  165. package/lib/waivers/WaiverLoader.js +103 -0
  166. package/lib/waivers/WaiverModel.d.ts +32 -0
  167. package/lib/waivers/WaiverModel.js +28 -0
  168. package/lib/waivers/applyWaivers.d.ts +22 -0
  169. package/lib/waivers/applyWaivers.js +85 -0
  170. package/package.json +6 -4
@@ -55,34 +55,65 @@ function verbOf(method) {
55
55
  return 'write';
56
56
  return 'read';
57
57
  }
58
- export function collectUsage(restApiCsv, soapApiCsv) {
59
- const rows = parseCsv(restApiCsv);
58
+ export function collectUsage(restApiCsv, optsOrSoap) {
59
+ const opts = typeof optsOrSoap === 'string'
60
+ ? { soapApiCsv: optsOrSoap }
61
+ : optsOrSoap ?? {};
60
62
  const byApp = new Map();
63
+ let totalRows = 0;
61
64
  let attributed = 0;
62
- for (const row of rows) {
63
- const appId = row.CONNECTED_APP_ID ?? '';
64
- if (!appId)
65
- continue;
66
- attributed++;
67
- let a = byApp.get(appId);
68
- if (!a) {
69
- a = { objects: new Map(), requests: 0, rows: 0, users: new Set() };
70
- byApp.set(appId, a);
71
- }
72
- a.requests++;
73
- a.rows += Number(row.ROWS_PROCESSED) || 0;
74
- if (row.USER_ID)
75
- a.users.add(row.USER_ID);
76
- const entity = row.ENTITY_NAME;
77
- if (entity) {
78
- const verbs = a.objects.get(entity) ?? new Set();
79
- verbs.add(verbOf(row.METHOD ?? row.METHOD_NAME ?? 'GET'));
80
- a.objects.set(entity, verbs);
65
+ const processFile = (csvText, entityGetter, verbGetter, rowsGetter) => {
66
+ if (!csvText)
67
+ return;
68
+ const rows = parseCsv(csvText);
69
+ totalRows += rows.length;
70
+ for (const row of rows) {
71
+ const appId = row.CONNECTED_APP_ID ?? '';
72
+ if (!appId)
73
+ continue;
74
+ attributed++;
75
+ let a = byApp.get(appId);
76
+ if (!a) {
77
+ a = { objects: new Map(), requests: 0, rows: 0, users: new Set() };
78
+ byApp.set(appId, a);
79
+ }
80
+ a.requests++;
81
+ a.rows += rowsGetter(row);
82
+ if (row.USER_ID)
83
+ a.users.add(row.USER_ID);
84
+ const entity = entityGetter(row);
85
+ if (entity) {
86
+ // Support comma-separated entities if present
87
+ const entityNames = entity.split(',').map((e) => e.trim()).filter(Boolean);
88
+ for (const ent of entityNames) {
89
+ const verbs = a.objects.get(ent) ?? new Set();
90
+ verbs.add(verbGetter(row));
91
+ a.objects.set(ent, verbs);
92
+ }
93
+ }
81
94
  }
82
- }
95
+ };
96
+ // 1. RestApi logs
97
+ processFile(restApiCsv, (r) => r.ENTITY_NAME, (r) => verbOf(r.METHOD ?? r.METHOD_NAME ?? 'GET'), (r) => Number(r.ROWS_PROCESSED) || 0);
98
+ // 2. BulkApi2 logs
99
+ processFile(opts.bulkApi2Csv, (r) => r.ENTITY_NAME, (r) => {
100
+ const op = (r.OPERATION ?? r.OPERATION_TYPE ?? '').toLowerCase();
101
+ if (op === 'delete' || op === 'harddelete' || op === 'hard_delete')
102
+ return 'delete';
103
+ if (op === 'insert' || op === 'update' || op === 'upsert')
104
+ return 'write';
105
+ return 'read';
106
+ }, (r) => Number(r.ROWS_PROCESSED || r.NUMBER_RECORDS_PROCESSED || 0) || 0);
107
+ // 3. GraphQlQueryExecution logs
108
+ processFile(opts.graphQlCsv, (r) => r.ENTITY_NAME || r.TARGET_ENTITY, (r) => {
109
+ const op = (r.OPERATION_TYPE ?? r.OPERATION ?? '').toLowerCase();
110
+ return op.includes('mutation') ? 'write' : 'read';
111
+ }, (r) => Number(r.ROWS_PROCESSED || r.ROW_COUNT || 0) || 0);
112
+ // 4. AuraRequest logs
113
+ processFile(opts.auraCsv, (r) => r.ENTITY_NAME, (r) => verbOf(r.METHOD_NAME ?? r.METHOD ?? 'GET'), (r) => Number(r.ROWS_PROCESSED || 0) || 0);
83
114
  const soapUsers = new Set();
84
- if (soapApiCsv) {
85
- for (const row of parseCsv(soapApiCsv))
115
+ if (opts.soapApiCsv) {
116
+ for (const row of parseCsv(opts.soapApiCsv))
86
117
  if (row.USER_ID)
87
118
  soapUsers.add(row.USER_ID);
88
119
  }
@@ -96,9 +127,9 @@ export function collectUsage(restApiCsv, soapApiCsv) {
96
127
  }));
97
128
  return {
98
129
  usage: usage.sort((x, y) => y.requests - x.requests),
99
- totalRows: rows.length,
130
+ totalRows,
100
131
  attributedRows: attributed,
101
- attributionRatePct: rows.length ? Math.round((100 * attributed) / rows.length) : 0,
132
+ attributionRatePct: totalRows ? Math.round((100 * attributed) / totalRows) : 0,
102
133
  };
103
134
  }
104
135
  //# sourceMappingURL=usageCollector.js.map
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ export const CAPABILITY_REGISTRY = {
39
39
  // New checks (Tasks 8–10)
40
40
  'guest-executable-apex-unprotected': { grants: ['code-exec', 'data-read-bulk', 'data-write'] },
41
41
  'guest-executable-apex-exposed': { grants: ['code-exec'] },
42
+ // Sharing still bounds which records a guest reaches; SYSTEM_MODE lifts only CRUD/FLS on them.
43
+ 'guest-executable-apex-system-mode': { grants: ['code-exec', 'data-read'] },
42
44
  'cors-wildcard-origin': { grants: ['credential-theft'] },
43
45
  'cors-broad-origin': { grants: ['credential-theft'] },
44
46
  'escalation-perms-found': { grants: ['priv-esc'] },
@@ -115,6 +117,7 @@ export const CAPABILITY_REGISTRY = {
115
117
  'apex-rest-without-sharing': { grants: ['code-exec', 'data-read', 'data-write'] },
116
118
  'apex-crud-fls-without-sharing': { grants: ['data-read', 'data-write'] },
117
119
  'apex-crud-fls-missing': { grants: ['data-read'] },
120
+ 'apex-crud-fls-system-mode': { grants: ['data-read'] },
118
121
  // A live session ID posted to an external endpoint. This is a credential leaving the org through
119
122
  // a supported feature rather than a flaw, which is exactly why it is easy to leave in place: the
120
123
  // receiving endpoint can act as the running user until the session expires.
@@ -151,6 +154,29 @@ export const CAPABILITY_REGISTRY = {
151
154
  // so the model stays correct if that ever becomes an either/or, and because a CRITICAL finding
152
155
  // silently granting nothing is precisely the failure this registry exists to prevent.
153
156
  'connected-app-full-scope-infinite-token': { grants: ['data-read-bulk', 'data-write'] },
157
+ // 14 New Checks capability hooks
158
+ 'genai-prompt-template-grounding-flow': { grants: ['data-read'] },
159
+ 'genai-prompt-template-grounding-apex': { grants: ['data-read'] },
160
+ 'genai-prompt-template-grounding-untrusted': { grants: ['data-read'] },
161
+ 'data-cloud-data-space-default-overshared': { grants: ['data-read-bulk'] },
162
+ 'data-cloud-data-share-target-unconstrained': { grants: ['data-read-bulk'] },
163
+ 'platform-event-subscriber-escalation': { grants: ['priv-esc', 'data-write'] },
164
+ 'flow-http-callout-hardcoded-secret': { grants: ['credential-theft', 'external-egress'] },
165
+ 'flow-http-callout-uncredentialed-endpoint': { grants: ['external-egress'] },
166
+ 'oauth-device-flow-enabled': { grants: ['credential-theft'] },
167
+ 'oauth-password-flow-enabled': { grants: ['credential-theft'] },
168
+ 'delegated-authentication-admin-assigned': { grants: ['org-takeover'] },
169
+ 'delegated-authentication-insecure-gateway': { grants: ['org-takeover'] },
170
+ 'delegated-administration-groups-active': { grants: ['priv-esc'] },
171
+ 'auth-provider-registration-handler-admin-exec': { grants: ['priv-esc', 'org-takeover'] },
172
+ 'auth-provider-registration-handler-unverified-email-linking': { grants: ['priv-esc', 'org-takeover'] },
173
+ 'inbound-email-handler-unauthenticated-execution': { grants: ['unauth-foothold', 'code-exec'] },
174
+ 'org-wide-email-spoofing-all-profiles': { grants: ['external-egress'] },
175
+ 'org-wide-email-spoofing-no-dkim': { grants: ['external-egress'] },
176
+ 'external-account-hierarchy-super-users': { grants: ['data-read-bulk'] },
177
+ 'external-account-hierarchy-active': { grants: ['data-read-bulk'] },
178
+ 'restriction-rules-inactive': { grants: ['data-read-bulk'] },
179
+ 'restriction-rules-conflicting': { grants: ['data-read-bulk'] },
154
180
  };
155
181
  /** Resolve the effective capabilities for a finding (inline overrides registry; passed/inconclusive yield nothing). */
156
182
  export function capabilitiesFor(finding) {
@@ -12,9 +12,16 @@ const SINK_SEVERITY = {
12
12
  'credential-theft': 'MEDIUM',
13
13
  };
14
14
  const MAX_STEPS = 4;
15
+ // Population findings reported as passed at a healthy count (RULE-074) still name people who hold
16
+ // the power, so they keep their place in correlation while they list any holder.
17
+ const CHAIN_EVIDENCE_WHEN_PASSED = new Set(['users-modify-all-data', 'users-view-all-data']);
18
+ // Findings that only show a surface exists (a guest user, a live classic site). Every org with a
19
+ // site has them, so they never supply the entry point of a potential path on their own. RULE-071.
20
+ const SURFACE_ONLY = new Set(['guest-user-baseline', 'classic-sites-active']);
15
21
  export class ChainEngine {
16
22
  correlate(findings) {
17
- const active = findings.filter((f) => !f.passed && !f.inconclusive);
23
+ const active = findings.filter((f) => !f.inconclusive &&
24
+ (!f.passed || (CHAIN_EVIDENCE_WHEN_PASSED.has(f.id) && (f.affectedItems?.length ?? 0) > 0)));
18
25
  // Build present capability set + per-finding grants.
19
26
  const present = new Set();
20
27
  const grantsByFinding = new Map();
@@ -98,6 +105,9 @@ export class ChainEngine {
98
105
  for (const src of SOURCE_CAPS) {
99
106
  if (!present.has(src))
100
107
  continue;
108
+ const hasRealSource = active.some((f) => !SURFACE_ONLY.has(f.id) && (grantsByFinding.get(f) ?? []).includes(src));
109
+ if (!hasRealSource)
110
+ continue;
101
111
  for (const sink of HIGH_IMPACT_SINKS) {
102
112
  if (!present.has(sink))
103
113
  continue;
@@ -5,6 +5,33 @@ const byIds = (active, ids) => active.filter((f) => ids.includes(f.id));
5
5
  // The AI & Agents findings carry dynamic id suffixes (userId, agent dev name, channel slug,
6
6
  // domain), so their chain ingredients are matched by id prefix rather than exact id.
7
7
  const byPrefixes = (active, prefixes) => active.filter((f) => prefixes.some((p) => f.id === p || f.id.startsWith(p)));
8
+ // Findings that show an unauthenticated visitor can actually read, write or run something. A guest
9
+ // user existing (`guest-user-baseline`) or a site being live (`classic-sites-active`) is a surface,
10
+ // not an exposure: every org with a site has one. RULE-071.
11
+ const GUEST_EXPOSURE = [
12
+ 'guest-user-read-access', 'guest-user-write-access', 'guest-user-sharing-exposure',
13
+ 'guest-executable-apex-unprotected', 'guest-executable-apex-exposed', 'guest-executable-apex-system-mode',
14
+ 'guest-object-exposure-public-owd', 'guest-object-exposure-guest-owned',
15
+ 'guest-api-access-enabled', 'guest-api-hard-delete',
16
+ 'guest-user-visibility-view-all-users', 'guest-user-visibility-owd', 'guest-user-visibility-object-read',
17
+ 'guest-record-access-policy-not-enforced',
18
+ 'inbound-email-handler-unauthenticated-execution',
19
+ ];
20
+ // Ways in for a low-trust principal: external users with public sharing, social sign-on,
21
+ // self-registration, or a confirmed guest exposure. RULE-072.
22
+ const LOW_TRUST_ENTRY = [
23
+ 'sharing-model-external-read', 'sharing-model-external-write',
24
+ 'auth-providers-social', 'experience-cloud-site-self-registration',
25
+ ...GUEST_EXPOSURE,
26
+ ];
27
+ // Escalations a non-admin can use. Admins holding admin permissions (`users-super-admin-combo`,
28
+ // `users-author-apex`) are not an escalation: they already have the access. RULE-072.
29
+ const NON_ADMIN_ESCALATION = [
30
+ 'escalation-perms-found', 'privileged-access-shadow-admins',
31
+ 'separation-of-duties-self-escalation', 'separation-of-duties-identity-takeover', 'separation-of-duties-grant-self-data',
32
+ 'login-access-policy-delegated-admins',
33
+ 'integration-least-privilege-escalation-permissions',
34
+ ];
8
35
  export const NAMED_CHAINS = [
9
36
  {
10
37
  id: 'unauth-bulk-exfil',
@@ -27,9 +54,13 @@ export const NAMED_CHAINS = [
27
54
  return null;
28
55
  if (!hasAny(present, 'code-exec', 'data-read-bulk', 'data-write'))
29
56
  return null;
57
+ // A surface and internal weaknesses are not a path: an unauthenticated visitor must be shown
58
+ // to reach something.
59
+ if (byIds(active, GUEST_EXPOSURE).length === 0)
60
+ return null;
30
61
  const steps = byIds(active, [
31
62
  'guest-user-read-access', 'guest-user-write-access', 'guest-user-sharing-exposure', 'guest-user-baseline',
32
- 'guest-executable-apex-unprotected', 'guest-executable-apex-exposed',
63
+ 'guest-executable-apex-unprotected', 'guest-executable-apex-exposed', 'guest-executable-apex-system-mode',
33
64
  'guest-object-exposure-public-owd', 'guest-object-exposure-guest-owned',
34
65
  'guest-api-access-enabled', 'guest-api-hard-delete', 'classic-sites-active',
35
66
  'guest-user-visibility-view-all-users', 'guest-user-visibility-owd', 'guest-user-visibility-object-read',
@@ -39,8 +70,15 @@ export const NAMED_CHAINS = [
39
70
  // analogue of portal-exposed Apex running without sharing.
40
71
  'guest-record-access-policy-not-enforced',
41
72
  'flows-autolaunched-without-sharing', 'flows-screen-without-sharing',
73
+ // An open inbound email handler grants unauth-foothold, so it must appear whenever it
74
+ // is what opened the gate.
75
+ 'inbound-email-handler-unauthenticated-execution',
42
76
  ]);
43
- return steps.length >= 2 ? steps : null;
77
+ if (steps.length < 2)
78
+ return null;
79
+ // Internal-only weaknesses that widen what a foothold reaches. They join as evidence but
80
+ // never count toward the floor: without a guest-side step they describe no unauthenticated path.
81
+ return [...steps, ...byIds(active, ['data-cloud-data-space-default-overshared', 'restriction-rules-inactive'])];
44
82
  },
45
83
  },
46
84
  {
@@ -78,25 +116,25 @@ export const NAMED_CHAINS = [
78
116
  narrative: 'A low-trust authenticated user combines with a privilege-escalation permission ' +
79
117
  '(assign permission sets, manage users, author apex, modify metadata) to reach full org control.',
80
118
  remediation: 'Remove escalation permissions from non-admin profiles/permission sets and review who holds them.',
81
- match(present, active) {
82
- if (!hasAny(present, 'low-trust-authenticated', 'unauth-foothold'))
83
- return null;
84
- if (!hasAny(present, 'priv-esc', 'org-takeover'))
119
+ match(_present, active) {
120
+ // Both ends must be present: a way in for a low-trust principal, and an escalation that
121
+ // principal could use. Admin-held power and a guest user merely existing join only as evidence.
122
+ const entry = byIds(active, LOW_TRUST_ENTRY);
123
+ const escalation = byIds(active, NON_ADMIN_ESCALATION);
124
+ if (entry.length === 0 || escalation.length === 0)
85
125
  return null;
86
- const steps = byIds(active, [
87
- 'sharing-model-external-read', 'sharing-model-external-write', 'guest-user-baseline',
88
- 'escalation-perms-found', 'users-author-apex', 'users-super-admin-combo',
89
- 'login-access-policy-delegated-admins', 'login-access-policy-login-as-enabled',
90
- // Admin-equivalent users off the System Administrator profile, and the toxic combinations
91
- // that let one user grant themselves access, are escalation steps in their own right.
92
- 'privileged-access-shadow-admins',
93
- 'separation-of-duties-self-escalation', 'separation-of-duties-identity-takeover',
94
- 'separation-of-duties-grant-self-data',
95
- // An integration account holding Author Apex, Customize Application or user-management
96
- // permissions it does not use has the same escalation reach as users-author-apex above.
97
- 'integration-least-privilege-escalation-permissions',
98
- ]);
99
- return steps.length >= 2 ? steps : null;
126
+ return [
127
+ ...entry,
128
+ ...escalation,
129
+ ...byIds(active, [
130
+ // Admin powers: they widen what a takeover reaches but are not themselves the escalation.
131
+ 'users-super-admin-combo', 'users-author-apex', 'guest-user-baseline', 'login-access-policy-login-as-enabled',
132
+ 'separation-of-duties-code-and-data',
133
+ 'delegated-administration-groups-active',
134
+ 'auth-provider-registration-handler-admin-exec', 'auth-provider-registration-handler-unverified-email-linking',
135
+ 'delegated-authentication-admin-assigned', 'platform-event-subscriber-escalation',
136
+ ]),
137
+ ];
100
138
  },
101
139
  },
102
140
  {
@@ -113,6 +151,7 @@ export const NAMED_CHAINS = [
113
151
  'hardcoded-credentials-found', 'custom-labels-credential-value-match', 'custom-labels-credential-name-match',
114
152
  'debug-log-active-traces', 'cors-wildcard-origin', 'cors-broad-origin',
115
153
  'named-credentials-inventory', 'named-credentials-http-endpoint', 'remote-sites-inventory',
154
+ 'flow-http-callout-hardcoded-secret', 'oauth-device-flow-enabled', 'oauth-password-flow-enabled',
116
155
  // A user who can stand up connected apps and bypass API access control has provisioned
117
156
  // their own egress path.
118
157
  'separation-of-duties-external-exfil-channel',
@@ -194,18 +233,32 @@ export const NAMED_CHAINS = [
194
233
  title: 'SalesBleed pattern',
195
234
  severity: 'HIGH',
196
235
  narrative: 'An active agent can run open-ended record queries (the General CRM topic or Query Records action) and ' +
197
- 'the org has agent actions that send data out (Slack, email, external services) without user confirmation. ' +
236
+ 'the org has a way to send data out: agent actions that do so (Slack, email, external services) without ' +
237
+ 'user confirmation, or a CSP Trusted URL whose domain is parked or no longer resolves, which anyone can ' +
238
+ 'register and then receive whatever the agent puts in a link or image it returns. ' +
198
239
  'That is two of the three ingredients in SalesBleed (Zenity Labs, Sept 2026) and PipeLeak (Capsule ' +
199
240
  'Security, Apr 2026); the third, text an outsider wrote, arrives through Web-to-Lead, Web-to-Case, email or ' +
200
241
  'chat in almost every org. One injected instruction in a lead can query Accounts and send the result out.',
201
242
  remediation: 'Break any one link: remove open-ended querying from agents that read untrusted records, require user ' +
202
- 'confirmation on every outbound action, or keep the agent that queries separate from the agent that sends.',
243
+ 'confirmation on every outbound action, remove CSP Trusted URLs whose domains you no longer control, or ' +
244
+ 'keep the agent that queries separate from the agent that sends.',
203
245
  match(_present, active) {
204
246
  const reach = byPrefixes(active, ['agent-query-reach-']);
205
- const outbound = byIds(active, ['agent-outbound-actions-unconfirmed', 'agent-outbound-actions-unverified']);
247
+ // Egress: an outbound action that needs no confirmation, or a trusted domain anyone can claim.
248
+ const outbound = [
249
+ ...byIds(active, ['agent-outbound-actions-unconfirmed', 'agent-outbound-actions-unverified']),
250
+ ...byPrefixes(active, ['trusted-url-hygiene-parked-', 'trusted-url-hygiene-unresolvable-']),
251
+ ];
206
252
  if (reach.length === 0 || outbound.length === 0)
207
253
  return null;
208
- return [...reach, ...outbound];
254
+ // Where outsider text enters, when the org shows it. Evidence only: the chain fires without
255
+ // it, since Web-to-Lead, Web-to-Case and email exist in almost every org.
256
+ const untrusted = byIds(active, [
257
+ 'inbound-email-handler-unauthenticated-execution',
258
+ 'guest-user-write-access',
259
+ 'guest-object-exposure-guest-owned',
260
+ ]);
261
+ return [...untrusted, ...reach, ...outbound];
209
262
  },
210
263
  },
211
264
  {
@@ -402,6 +455,7 @@ export const NAMED_CHAINS = [
402
455
  'portal-exposed-apex-without-sharing',
403
456
  'flows-autolaunched-without-sharing', 'flows-screen-without-sharing',
404
457
  'apex-rest-without-sharing',
458
+ 'external-account-hierarchy-super-users', 'external-account-hierarchy-active',
405
459
  ]);
406
460
  if (reach.length === 0)
407
461
  return null;
@@ -544,5 +598,57 @@ export const NAMED_CHAINS = [
544
598
  return [...vector, ...weakened, ...targets];
545
599
  },
546
600
  },
601
+ {
602
+ id: 'inbound-email-rce',
603
+ title: 'Unauthenticated inbound email to privileged code execution',
604
+ severity: 'CRITICAL',
605
+ narrative: 'An unauthenticated inbound email service address with no sender allowlist and no SPF/DKIM verification ' +
606
+ 'accepts messages from any internet sender, executing Apex logic under a privileged running user or in a class ' +
607
+ 'that bypasses CRUD/FLS and sharing. Attackers can trigger unattended data manipulation or code execution without credentials.',
608
+ remediation: 'Populate AuthorizedSenders on each email service address, set AuthenticationFailureAction to reject spoofed email, ' +
609
+ 'and ensure email handler Apex classes enforce sharing, validate input, and execute as a dedicated least-privilege user.',
610
+ match(present, active) {
611
+ if (!has(present, 'unauth-foothold', 'code-exec'))
612
+ return null;
613
+ const vector = byIds(active, ['inbound-email-handler-unauthenticated-execution']);
614
+ if (vector.length === 0)
615
+ return null;
616
+ const followOn = byIds(active, [
617
+ 'apex-crud-fls-without-sharing', 'soql-injection-risk', 'portal-exposed-apex-without-sharing',
618
+ 'flows-autolaunched-without-sharing', 'users-modify-all-data', 'users-super-admin-combo',
619
+ 'privileged-access-shadow-admins',
620
+ ]);
621
+ return followOn.length > 0 ? [...vector, ...followOn] : null;
622
+ },
623
+ },
624
+ {
625
+ id: 'platform-event-priv-esc',
626
+ title: 'Guest or low-trust platform event publish to automated process escalation',
627
+ severity: 'CRITICAL',
628
+ narrative: 'A guest or portal user publishes a custom Platform Event that triggers an Apex trigger or Flow subscriber ' +
629
+ 'executing as the Automated Process system user or an administrator. This bypasses normal user sharing, CRUD, and FLS, ' +
630
+ 'providing an unauthenticated or low-trust path to system-context privilege escalation and state tampering.',
631
+ remediation: 'Revoke Create permissions on Platform Events from guest and Experience Cloud profiles. Configure ' +
632
+ 'PlatformEventSubscriberConfig to run event triggers as a dedicated least-privilege user rather than Automated Process or an admin.',
633
+ match(present, active) {
634
+ if (!hasAny(present, 'unauth-foothold', 'low-trust-authenticated'))
635
+ return null;
636
+ if (!hasAny(present, 'priv-esc', 'data-write'))
637
+ return null;
638
+ const escalation = byIds(active, ['platform-event-subscriber-escalation']);
639
+ if (escalation.length === 0)
640
+ return null;
641
+ const foothold = byIds(active, [
642
+ 'guest-user-read-access', 'guest-user-write-access', 'guest-user-sharing-exposure', 'guest-user-baseline',
643
+ 'sharing-model-external-read', 'sharing-model-external-write', 'experience-cloud-site-self-registration',
644
+ ]);
645
+ if (foothold.length === 0)
646
+ return null;
647
+ const targets = byIds(active, [
648
+ 'users-super-admin-combo', 'users-modify-all-data', 'privileged-access-shadow-admins',
649
+ ]);
650
+ return [...foothold, ...escalation, ...targets];
651
+ },
652
+ },
547
653
  ];
548
654
  //# sourceMappingURL=namedChains.js.map
@@ -2,11 +2,13 @@ import type { SecurityCheck } from './SecurityCheck.js';
2
2
  import type { AuditContext } from '@cclabsnz/sf-core';
3
3
  import type { AuditResult } from '../findings/AuditResult.js';
4
4
  import type { ScoringConfig } from '../findings/ScoringConfig.js';
5
+ import type { WaiverLoader } from '../waivers/WaiverLoader.js';
5
6
  export declare class CheckEngine {
6
7
  private readonly checks;
7
8
  private readonly ctx;
8
9
  private readonly scoringConfig?;
9
- constructor(checks: SecurityCheck[], ctx: AuditContext, scoringConfig?: ScoringConfig | undefined);
10
+ private readonly waiverLoader?;
11
+ constructor(checks: SecurityCheck[], ctx: AuditContext, scoringConfig?: ScoringConfig | undefined, waiverLoader?: WaiverLoader | undefined);
10
12
  run(onProgress?: (current: number, total: number, checkName: string) => void): Promise<AuditResult>;
11
13
  private validateCacheOrdering;
12
14
  }
@@ -1,50 +1,86 @@
1
1
  import { buildAuditResult } from '../findings/scoring.js';
2
2
  import { getComplianceTags } from '../compliance/resolve.js';
3
3
  import { ChainEngine } from '../chains/ChainEngine.js';
4
- const PERMISSION_ERROR_CODES = new Set([
4
+ import { applyWaivers } from '../waivers/applyWaivers.js';
5
+ import { permissionLabelsFor } from '../preflight/permissions.js';
6
+ const ACCESS_ERROR_CODES = new Set([
5
7
  'INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS_RIGHTS',
8
+ 'INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS_OR_READONLY',
6
9
  'INVALID_CROSS_REFERENCE_KEY',
7
10
  'ENTITY_IS_INACCESSIBLE',
8
- 'INVALID_FIELD',
9
- 'INVALID_TYPE',
10
11
  ]);
11
- function isPermissionError(err) {
12
+ const REJECTION_ERROR_CODES = new Set(['INVALID_FIELD', 'INVALID_TYPE', 'MALFORMED_QUERY']);
13
+ const PERMISSIONS_DOC = 'https://github.com/cclabsnz/sf-audit-plugin/blob/main/PERMISSIONS.md';
14
+ /**
15
+ * Why a check threw. A query the org rejects (unknown field or object, an unfilterable field,
16
+ * bad syntax) is not an access problem, even though a field hidden by field-level security is
17
+ * also reported as an unknown column: telling an admin to grant access sends them the wrong way.
18
+ */
19
+ function classifyError(err) {
12
20
  if (!(err instanceof Error))
13
- return false;
21
+ return 'failed';
14
22
  const code = err.errorCode ?? '';
15
23
  const msg = err.message ?? '';
16
- return (PERMISSION_ERROR_CODES.has(code) ||
17
- msg.includes('INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS') ||
18
- msg.includes('insufficient access') ||
19
- msg.includes('INVALID_FIELD') ||
20
- msg.includes('entity type cannot be queried'));
24
+ if (ACCESS_ERROR_CODES.has(code) || /INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS|insufficient access|entity type cannot be queried/i.test(msg)) {
25
+ return 'access';
26
+ }
27
+ if (REJECTION_ERROR_CODES.has(code) ||
28
+ /INVALID_FIELD|INVALID_TYPE|MALFORMED_QUERY|No such column|is not supported|can not be filtered|alias is reserved/i.test(msg)) {
29
+ return 'rejected';
30
+ }
31
+ return 'failed';
32
+ }
33
+ function accessRemediation(check) {
34
+ const labels = permissionLabelsFor(check);
35
+ const named = labels.length > 0 ? `This check needs ${labels.join(' and ')}. ` : '';
36
+ return (`${named}Run \`sf audit preflight\` to see which permissions the audit user is missing, and ` +
37
+ `assign the read-only permission set described in PERMISSIONS.md (${PERMISSIONS_DOC}), then re-run the audit.`);
21
38
  }
22
39
  function buildErrorFinding(check, err) {
23
40
  const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
24
- const inconclusive = isPermissionError(err);
41
+ const kind = classifyError(err);
42
+ const base = { id: `${check.id}-error`, checkId: check.id, category: check.category, riskLevel: 'INFO' };
43
+ // A check that threw gathered no evidence, whatever the cause.
44
+ if (kind === 'access') {
45
+ return {
46
+ ...base,
47
+ title: `${check.name}: insufficient permissions`,
48
+ detail: `This check could not gather evidence because the org denied the audit user access: ${msg}`,
49
+ remediation: accessRemediation(check),
50
+ inconclusive: true,
51
+ notAssessed: true,
52
+ };
53
+ }
54
+ if (kind === 'rejected') {
55
+ return {
56
+ ...base,
57
+ title: `${check.name}: query rejected by the org`,
58
+ detail: `The org rejected this check's query, so it gathered no evidence. Salesforce said: ${msg}. ` +
59
+ 'The object or field may not exist in this edition or API version, or field-level security may hide it from the audit user.',
60
+ remediation: 'If the audit user is a System Administrator, this is a defect in the check: please report it at ' +
61
+ 'https://github.com/cclabsnz/sf-audit-plugin/issues with the error above. The area this check covers is unassessed, not clean.',
62
+ inconclusive: true,
63
+ notAssessed: true,
64
+ };
65
+ }
25
66
  return {
26
- id: `${check.id}-error`,
27
- checkId: check.id,
28
- category: check.category,
29
- riskLevel: 'INFO',
30
- title: `${check.name}: ${inconclusive ? 'insufficient permissions' : 'check failed'}`,
31
- detail: inconclusive
32
- ? `This check could not gather evidence because the running user lacks the required permissions: ${msg}`
33
- : `This check encountered an error and could not complete: ${msg}`,
34
- remediation: inconclusive
35
- ? 'Grant the audit user the permissions listed in the tool documentation, then re-run the audit.'
36
- : 'Review the error message and verify the running user has the required permissions.',
37
- inconclusive: inconclusive || undefined,
67
+ ...base,
68
+ title: `${check.name}: check failed`,
69
+ detail: `This check encountered an error and could not complete: ${msg}`,
70
+ remediation: 'Review the error message and re-run the audit. The area this check covers is unassessed, not clean.',
71
+ notAssessed: true,
38
72
  };
39
73
  }
40
74
  export class CheckEngine {
41
75
  checks;
42
76
  ctx;
43
77
  scoringConfig;
44
- constructor(checks, ctx, scoringConfig) {
78
+ waiverLoader;
79
+ constructor(checks, ctx, scoringConfig, waiverLoader) {
45
80
  this.checks = checks;
46
81
  this.ctx = ctx;
47
82
  this.scoringConfig = scoringConfig;
83
+ this.waiverLoader = waiverLoader;
48
84
  this.validateCacheOrdering();
49
85
  }
50
86
  async run(onProgress) {
@@ -66,8 +102,11 @@ export class CheckEngine {
66
102
  findings.push(buildErrorFinding(check, err));
67
103
  }
68
104
  }
69
- const attackChains = new ChainEngine().correlate(findings);
70
- return buildAuditResult(this.ctx, findings, metrics, this.scoringConfig, attackChains);
105
+ // Waivers apply before correlation but do not remove findings from it: an accepted weakness
106
+ // still forms attack paths with the others.
107
+ const finalFindings = this.waiverLoader ? applyWaivers(findings, this.waiverLoader).findings : findings;
108
+ const attackChains = new ChainEngine().correlate(finalFindings);
109
+ return buildAuditResult(this.ctx, finalFindings, metrics, this.scoringConfig, attackChains);
71
110
  }
72
111
  validateCacheOrdering() {
73
112
  const populated = new Set();
@@ -188,12 +188,13 @@ export class AgentUserPrivilegeCheck {
188
188
  return new Set();
189
189
  const objList = readableObjects.map((o) => `'${o}'`).join(', ');
190
190
  try {
191
- const rows = await ctx.tooling.query(`SELECT EntityDefinition.QualifiedApiName objectName, COUNT(Id) classifiedCount
191
+ // FieldDefinition supports no aggregates (its Id is not aggregatable): list the classified
192
+ // fields and take their objects.
193
+ const rows = await ctx.tooling.query(`SELECT EntityDefinition.QualifiedApiName, QualifiedApiName
192
194
  FROM FieldDefinition
193
195
  WHERE EntityDefinition.QualifiedApiName IN (${objList})
194
- AND ComplianceGroup != null
195
- GROUP BY EntityDefinition.QualifiedApiName`);
196
- return new Set(rows.filter((r) => (r.classifiedCount ?? 0) > 0).map((r) => r.objectName));
196
+ AND ComplianceGroup != null`);
197
+ return new Set(rows.map((r) => r.EntityDefinition?.QualifiedApiName).filter((o) => Boolean(o)));
197
198
  }
198
199
  catch {
199
200
  // No classification feature / no Tooling access: skip the sub-signal silently.