@capybara-hq/device 0.1.0-rc.18 → 0.1.0-rc.19

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (72) hide show
  1. package/README.md +65 -33
  2. package/dist/api.d.ts +3 -3
  3. package/dist/args.d.ts +8 -3
  4. package/dist/args.js +27 -14
  5. package/dist/cli.js +1 -1
  6. package/dist/client.js +1 -1
  7. package/dist/commands/ceiling.d.ts +3 -2
  8. package/dist/commands/ceiling.js +39 -21
  9. package/dist/commands/login.d.ts +15 -11
  10. package/dist/commands/login.js +46 -33
  11. package/dist/commands/policy.js +16 -10
  12. package/dist/commands/start.d.ts +11 -3
  13. package/dist/commands/start.js +25 -9
  14. package/dist/commands/status.js +10 -6
  15. package/dist/exec/docker-operations.d.ts +14 -2
  16. package/dist/exec/docker-operations.js +32 -5
  17. package/dist/exec/linux-agent.d.ts +13 -3
  18. package/dist/exec/linux-agent.js +450 -43
  19. package/dist/exec/linux-operation-backend.d.ts +27 -6
  20. package/dist/exec/linux-operation-backend.js +30 -9
  21. package/dist/exec/linux-operation-worker.d.ts +51 -3
  22. package/dist/exec/linux-operation-worker.js +55 -3
  23. package/dist/exec/linux-runtime.d.ts +3 -2
  24. package/dist/exec/linux-runtime.js +4 -2
  25. package/dist/exec/mac-operation-backend.d.ts +7 -2
  26. package/dist/exec/mac-operation-backend.js +18 -10
  27. package/dist/exec/mac-write-policy.d.ts +2 -0
  28. package/dist/exec/mac-write-policy.js +1 -1
  29. package/dist/exec/operation-types.d.ts +35 -5
  30. package/dist/exec/operation-types.js +73 -23
  31. package/dist/exec/operation-worker.d.ts +80 -1
  32. package/dist/exec/operation-worker.js +197 -14
  33. package/dist/exec/protected-targets.d.ts +16 -0
  34. package/dist/exec/protected-targets.js +53 -0
  35. package/dist/exec/shared.d.ts +7 -3
  36. package/dist/exec/shared.js +7 -5
  37. package/dist/node_modules/@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime/CAPYBARA-MODIFICATIONS.patch +343 -7
  38. package/dist/node_modules/@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime/dist/sandbox/resolved-address-guard.js +220 -6
  39. package/dist/node_modules/@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime/dist/sandbox/sandbox-config.js +17 -0
  40. package/dist/node_modules/@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime/dist/sandbox/sandbox-manager.js +11 -0
  41. package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/device-protocol.d.ts +77 -46
  42. package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/device-protocol.js +206 -83
  43. package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/index.d.ts +3 -2
  44. package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/index.js +3 -2
  45. package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/network-classes.d.ts +98 -0
  46. package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/network-classes.js +291 -0
  47. package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/sandbox-linux-runtime-source.js +460 -28
  48. package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/sandbox-native-runtime-source.js +143 -3
  49. package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/sandbox-operation.d.ts +36 -4
  50. package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/sandbox-operation.js +21 -4
  51. package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/sandbox-runtime-source.js +2 -2
  52. package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/sandbox-write-denies.d.ts +87 -8
  53. package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/sandbox-write-denies.js +249 -10
  54. package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/sandbox.d.ts +11 -22
  55. package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/package.json +1 -1
  56. package/dist/owner-report.d.ts +1 -1
  57. package/dist/owner-report.js +5 -4
  58. package/dist/policy-store.d.ts +2 -1
  59. package/dist/policy-store.js +2 -1
  60. package/dist/policy.d.ts +23 -14
  61. package/dist/policy.js +28 -21
  62. package/dist/runtime-manifest.json +1 -1
  63. package/dist/server-ops.d.ts +30 -5
  64. package/dist/server-ops.js +105 -85
  65. package/dist/staged-connect.d.ts +1 -1
  66. package/dist/staged-connect.js +1 -1
  67. package/dist/staged-device.d.ts +1 -1
  68. package/dist/staged-device.js +7 -5
  69. package/dist/staged-session.d.ts +1 -1
  70. package/dist/state.d.ts +41 -21
  71. package/dist/state.js +102 -45
  72. package/package.json +2 -2
@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
2
2
  import { realpathSync, statSync } from "node:fs";
3
3
  import { homedir } from "node:os";
4
4
  import { basename, dirname, join, resolve } from "node:path";
5
- import { SandboxScopeDeniedError, validateAllowHost, } from "@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk";
5
+ import { SandboxScopeDeniedError, sandboxRuntimeDirectoryOf, validateAllowHost, } from "@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk";
6
6
  import { covers, deniedSecretPaths, effectiveEgress } from "../policy.js";
7
- import { policyPath, readPolicyFile, SANDBOX_OWNER_CEILING } from "../state.js";
7
+ import { policyPath, readPolicyFile } from "../state.js";
8
8
  import { osRoots } from "./shared.js";
9
9
  export function within(path, root) {
10
10
  return root === "/" || path === root || path.startsWith(`${root}/`);
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ export async function readStrictOwnerCeiling(input) {
18
18
  }
19
19
  /**
20
20
  * {@link readStrictOwnerCeiling}, synchronously (the owner report issues it under the policy lock).
21
- * Only a version-2 policy file is authority: an old format is refused until it is converted.
21
+ * Only a version-3 policy file is authority: an old format is refused until it is converted.
22
22
  */
23
23
  export function readStrictOwnerCeilingSync(input) {
24
24
  const file = policyPath(input.stateDir);
@@ -38,16 +38,16 @@ export function readStrictOwnerCeilingSync(input) {
38
38
  const roots = Object.freeze(osRoots(resolve(input.dir)));
39
39
  return Object.freeze({
40
40
  revision: digest({ generation: version(after), policy, roots, deviceId: input.deviceId }),
41
- fullAccess: policy.ownerCeiling.fullAccess,
41
+ outsideSandbox: policy.ownerCeiling.outsideSandbox,
42
+ network: policy.ownerCeiling.network,
43
+ allowedDomains: Object.freeze([...policy.allowedDomains]),
42
44
  roots,
43
45
  restrictedProjectReach: policy.ownerCeiling.restrictedProjectReach,
44
- restrictedAllowedDomains: Object.freeze([...policy.allowedDomains]),
45
46
  restrictedDeniedReadRoots: Object.freeze(withCanonicalForms([...deniedSecretPaths(input.home ?? homedir()), resolve(input.stateDir)])),
46
47
  preparation: Object.freeze({
47
48
  skillsRoot: roots.skills,
48
49
  attachmentsBase: join(roots.workspace, "attachments"),
49
50
  }),
50
- fullNetwork: "environment",
51
51
  });
52
52
  }
53
53
  /**
@@ -87,6 +87,14 @@ export function checkRoots(read, write, ceiling, preparation = false) {
87
87
  if (ceiling.restrictedDeniedReadRoots.some((r) => within(root, r)))
88
88
  throw new SandboxScopeDeniedError("Root is denied by the owner");
89
89
  }
90
+ // the kernel's candidate builder and admission refuse the same roots: another process's socket
91
+ // there would let a sandboxed command act outside the sandbox. Checked before the skills rule so
92
+ // the refusal names the real reason wherever the skills root lives (under /tmp on Linux)
93
+ for (const root of write) {
94
+ const runtime = sandboxRuntimeDirectoryOf(root);
95
+ if (runtime !== null)
96
+ throw new SandboxScopeDeniedError(`Write root ${root} is a system runtime or socket directory (${runtime}), where other programs keep their sockets; grant a directory of its own (such as /tmp/<name>) or one inside the project instead`);
97
+ }
90
98
  if (!preparation &&
91
99
  write.some((r) => within(r, ceiling.roots.skills) || within(ceiling.roots.skills, r)))
92
100
  throw new SandboxScopeDeniedError("Skills remain read only");
@@ -118,13 +126,23 @@ export function freezeAuthority(a) {
118
126
  : {}),
119
127
  });
120
128
  }
129
+ /** The refusal of an escalated call the owner ceiling does not allow. */
130
+ export const OUTSIDE_SANDBOX_REFUSAL = "Running outside the sandbox is outside the current owner ceiling; the owner allows it on " +
131
+ "this machine with capybara-device ceiling set --outside-sandbox on";
132
+ /**
133
+ * One operation's scope intersected with the owner ceiling now (approval-only profiles design).
134
+ * Every profile's ordinary call is sandboxed: scoped roots, the owner's denied read roots and the
135
+ * sandbox network. Only an escalated call (`filesystem: device` with `network: environment`) runs
136
+ * outside the sandbox, and only while the owner ceiling allows `outsideSandbox`. The profile in the
137
+ * scope is audit only: it never widens anything here.
138
+ */
121
139
  export function intersectOperation(scope, ceiling, authority, native = false) {
122
140
  if (authority && authority.operationId !== scope.operationId)
123
141
  throw new SandboxScopeDeniedError("Execution authority operation ID mismatch");
124
- const full = scope.filesystem.kind === "device" && scope.network.kind === "environment";
125
- if (full) {
126
- if (!ceiling.fullAccess)
127
- throw new SandboxScopeDeniedError("Full access is outside the current owner ceiling");
142
+ const escalated = scope.filesystem.kind === "device" && scope.network.kind === "environment";
143
+ if (escalated) {
144
+ if (!ceiling.outsideSandbox)
145
+ throw new SandboxScopeDeniedError(OUTSIDE_SANDBOX_REFUSAL);
128
146
  return Object.freeze({
129
147
  full: true,
130
148
  readRoots: Object.freeze(["/"]),
@@ -135,26 +153,43 @@ export function intersectOperation(scope, ceiling, authority, native = false) {
135
153
  });
136
154
  }
137
155
  if (scope.filesystem.kind !== "scoped" || scope.network.kind === "environment")
138
- throw new SandboxScopeDeniedError("Expanded device/environment authority requires the independent Full ceiling");
156
+ throw new SandboxScopeDeniedError("The device filesystem and the environment network come only together, as one escalated call");
139
157
  checkRoots(scope.filesystem.readRoots, scope.filesystem.writeRoots, ceiling);
140
158
  if (!native && !authority)
141
159
  throw new SandboxScopeDeniedError("Restricted execution requires authenticated authority");
160
+ let openNetwork = false;
142
161
  const hosts = new Set();
143
- if (authority && !native && scope.network.kind === "allowlist") {
144
- const baseline = effectiveEgress({
145
- ownerCeiling: SANDBOX_OWNER_CEILING,
146
- allowedDomains: [...ceiling.restrictedAllowedDomains],
147
- }, { mode: "sandbox", network: authority.orgNetwork }, authority.grants);
148
- for (const a of baseline)
149
- for (const b of scope.network.hosts) {
150
- if (covers(a, b))
151
- hosts.add(b);
152
- else if (covers(b, a))
153
- hosts.add(a);
154
- }
162
+ if (authority && !native) {
163
+ const egress = effectiveEgress({ ownerCeiling: { network: ceiling.network }, allowedDomains: [...ceiling.allowedDomains] }, authority.orgNetwork, authority.grants);
164
+ if (scope.network.kind === "open-public") {
165
+ // asked for the open network: open only where the owner and the kernel both allow it,
166
+ // otherwise narrowed to the allowlist they do allow
167
+ if (egress.kind === "open-public")
168
+ openNetwork = true;
169
+ else
170
+ for (const h of egress.hosts)
171
+ hosts.add(h);
172
+ }
173
+ else if (scope.network.kind !== "allowlist") {
174
+ // `none`: no network at all
175
+ }
176
+ else if (egress.kind === "open-public") {
177
+ for (const h of scope.network.hosts)
178
+ hosts.add(h.toLowerCase());
179
+ }
180
+ else {
181
+ for (const a of egress.hosts)
182
+ for (const b of scope.network.hosts) {
183
+ if (covers(a, b))
184
+ hosts.add(b);
185
+ else if (covers(b, a))
186
+ hosts.add(a);
187
+ }
188
+ }
155
189
  }
156
190
  return Object.freeze({
157
191
  full: false,
192
+ ...(openNetwork && { openNetwork: true }),
158
193
  readRoots: Object.freeze([...scope.filesystem.readRoots]),
159
194
  writeRoots: Object.freeze([...scope.filesystem.writeRoots]),
160
195
  hosts: Object.freeze([...hosts]),
@@ -162,3 +197,18 @@ export function intersectOperation(scope, ceiling, authority, native = false) {
162
197
  revision: ceiling.revision,
163
198
  });
164
199
  }
200
+ /**
201
+ * Whether a live operation's grant still holds against the grant the fresh owner ceiling gives the
202
+ * same scope (owner reconcile): a full grant only while the next one is full; a sandboxed grant
203
+ * only while every host, the open network if it had one, and exactly the same denied read roots
204
+ * remain. Anything narrower revokes the operation.
205
+ */
206
+ export function grantStillHolds(grant, next) {
207
+ if (grant.full)
208
+ return next.full;
209
+ return (!next.full &&
210
+ (!grant.openNetwork || next.openNetwork === true) &&
211
+ grant.hosts.every((h) => next.hosts.includes(h)) &&
212
+ grant.deniedReadRoots.every((r) => next.deniedReadRoots.includes(r)) &&
213
+ next.deniedReadRoots.every((r) => grant.deniedReadRoots.includes(r)));
214
+ }
@@ -55,6 +55,12 @@ interface Common {
55
55
  home: string;
56
56
  env: Record<string, string | undefined>;
57
57
  };
58
+ /**
59
+ * A test seam (trusted construction, like the Linux forwarder's `allow_private`): the proxy's
60
+ * address rules are lifted so a fixture listening on loopback can be granted. Never set in
61
+ * production.
62
+ */
63
+ allowPrivateProxyTargets?: boolean;
58
64
  }
59
65
  export type MacWorkerRequest = Common & ({
60
66
  kind: "exec";
@@ -83,6 +89,76 @@ export declare function createCancellationAttempt(attempt: (graceMs: number) =>
83
89
  * beneath it and break ordinary git work.
84
90
  */
85
91
  export declare function mandatoryDenyPatterns(root: string): string[];
92
+ /**
93
+ * The sandbox runtime's network configuration for one restricted grant (approval-only profiles
94
+ * design, "Open network"), and whether the worker answers the runtime's ask callback with allow.
95
+ *
96
+ * Both networks decide every connection on the resolved address in the operation's own proxy,
97
+ * which dials the address it checked (no second resolution: DNS rebinding cannot swap it).
98
+ * `deniedResolvedAddresses` is the SDK's whole closed set ({@link OPEN_PUBLIC_DENIED_CIDRS}:
99
+ * private, CGNAT, ULA, link-local, metadata, loopback, NAT64, multicast, reserved, embedded forms
100
+ * expanded); the runtime adds loopback, link-local, the cloud metadata endpoints and this host's
101
+ * own interface addresses itself. The patched runtime's `resolvedAddressStrict` judges an IP
102
+ * literal by the same rules (upstream skips literals), gives `localhost` no loopback carve-out and
103
+ * an allow-listed literal none over the closed classes: a private destination needs the
104
+ * escalation, never a host grant.
105
+ *
106
+ * - The allowlist (no `openNetwork`): exactly the grant's hosts, by the runtime's own matching.
107
+ * - The open network: no host list and an allow-all ask callback, so the address rules alone
108
+ * decide. The grant's hosts are not used.
109
+ *
110
+ * In both networks a name the system resolver answers with a fake-IP address
111
+ * ({@link SANDBOX_FAKE_IP_DNS}: 198.18.0.0/15, an OpenClash-style router) is re-resolved through
112
+ * DNS-over-HTTPS at the SDK's IP-literal endpoints (the patched runtime's `fakeIpDoh`; the SDK's
113
+ * timeout is the whole lookup, shared among the endpoints) and the real answer judged and dialed as
114
+ * above; when that lookup fails the connection is refused with a reason naming the fake-IP
115
+ * resolver, never dialed to the fake address.
116
+ *
117
+ * Listening stays refused (`allowLocalBinding: false`) under every profile: Seatbelt cannot limit a
118
+ * bind to loopback (spec "Known limitations"), and with it the command could reach every local
119
+ * port. `allowPrivate` is a trusted test seam (like the Linux forwarder's): it lifts the address
120
+ * rules so a fixture on loopback can be granted; nothing in production sets it.
121
+ *
122
+ * TLS trust needs one Mach service, `com.apple.TrustEvaluationAgent` (the per-user agent, not its
123
+ * `.system` sibling): Apple's LibreSSL in `/usr/bin/curl`, `/usr/bin/openssl` and the Command
124
+ * Line Tools' `python3` checks a chain against `/etc/ssl/cert.pem` (readable) and, when that
125
+ * bundle lacks the anchor (a newer root, such as example.com's SSL.com 2022 chain), asks this
126
+ * agent, which evaluates it against the system keychain and the admin's trust settings. Without
127
+ * it such a site fails with "unable to get local issuer certificate". The agent only evaluates
128
+ * the chain the client hands it: it fetched no issuer named in a certificate (checked on macOS
129
+ * 26 with a leaf whose AIA URL pointed at a local listener). `trustd` stays closed.
130
+ */
131
+ export declare function macNetworkConfig(grant: Pick<LocalOperationGrant, "hosts" | "openNetwork">, options?: {
132
+ allowPrivate?: boolean;
133
+ }): {
134
+ askAll: boolean;
135
+ network: Record<string, unknown>;
136
+ };
137
+ /**
138
+ * Absolute write denies a restricted macOS operation gets besides each write root's policy:
139
+ *
140
+ * - `subtrees`, denied with everything beneath them: the system persistence paths
141
+ * ({@link SANDBOX_SYSTEM_WRITE_DENIES}: the crontab and at spools) in each spelling Seatbelt may
142
+ * see, and the final target of every protected location under `home` (the
143
+ * {@link SANDBOX_MANDATORY_WRITE_DENIES} entries: `~/Library/LaunchAgents`, `~/.config/systemd`,
144
+ * the shell startup files, …) reached through a symbolic link, and each
145
+ * {@link SANDBOX_HOME_WRITE_DENIES} entry (`~/bin`) always, with the target of its link;
146
+ * - `links`, denied exactly (the link itself cannot be removed, renamed or replaced): every
147
+ * symbolic link on the way to such a location. A dotfile manager links `~/.zshrc` to
148
+ * `~/code/dotfiles-current/zshrc`, and `dotfiles-current` may itself be a link inside a write
149
+ * root; swapping any hop for a real directory would redirect the protected location into
150
+ * writable space (SDK `sandbox-write-denies.ts`, constraint on consumers).
151
+ *
152
+ * Resolved at operation start: a link changed later is seen by the next operation. A hard link to
153
+ * a protected file that already exists inside a write root is not caught (it is the same file,
154
+ * under an ordinary name).
155
+ */
156
+ export declare function macProtectedWriteDenies(home: string): {
157
+ subtrees: string[];
158
+ links: string[];
159
+ };
160
+ /** The environment of an escalated call: the device program's, minus every `CAPYBARA_` variable. */
161
+ export declare function escalatedEnvironment(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, own: Record<string, string> | undefined): Record<string, string>;
86
162
  /** The JVM proxy agent the sandbox runtime points sandboxed JVMs at, inside its package. */
87
163
  export declare const JAVA_PROXY_AGENT_JAR = "vendor/java-proxy-agent/srt-proxy-agent.jar";
88
164
  /**
@@ -95,8 +171,11 @@ export declare const JAVA_PROXY_AGENT_JAR = "vendor/java-proxy-agent/srt-proxy-a
95
171
  * Darwin answers a group signal with EPERM (not ESRCH) while the group holds only dead members
96
172
  * (zombies not yet reaped, or processes exiting), so `signalGroup` counts EPERM as gone when a
97
173
  * process snapshot shows no live member of the group; EPERM with a live member still fails.
174
+ * A runtime without the network patch (`resolvedAddressStrict`, `fakeIpDoh` in its schema) is
175
+ * refused before it starts: its proxy would skip the address rules, so the bind self-check fails
176
+ * and the device reports no restricted support (and so no open network).
98
177
  */
99
- export declare const WORKER = "import {pathToFileURL} from 'node:url';\nimport {spawn,spawnSync} from 'node:child_process';\nimport {randomUUID} from 'node:crypto';\nlet manager,initialized=false,wrapped=false,closing=false,full=false,child,childClosed,timer,timedOut=false,killed=false,exited=false,forced=false,settling=false,settleTimer;\nconst owned=new Map(),signaled=new Set();\nlet credit,sequence=0,outputFailed=false,outputDone=Promise.resolve();\nasync function collect(stream){\n try{for await(const chunk of stream){\n for(let offset=0;offset<chunk.length;offset+=65536){\n if(outputFailed)continue;\n const data=chunk.subarray(offset,offset+65536);const seq=sequence++;\n const bufferedBytes=chunk.length+stream.readableLength;if(bufferedBytes>262144)throw Error('Managed producer buffer exceeded bound');\n send({event:'output-flow',frameBytes:data.length,bufferedBytes,producerLimit:262144});\n await new Promise((resolve,reject)=>{credit={seq,resolve,reject};send({event:'output',stream:'stdout',seq,data:data.toString('base64')});});\n }\n }}catch(error){if(forced)return;const alreadyFailed=outputFailed;outputFailed=true;stream.resume();if(!alreadyFailed)send({event:'error',message:'Managed producer failed'});}\n}\nconst send=value=>{if(process.connected)process.send(value,()=>{});};\nfunction stopTree(){\n if(!child?.pid||child.exitCode!==null||child.signalCode!==null)return [];\n try{process.kill(child.pid,'SIGSTOP');}catch{return [];}\n const tree=new Set([child.pid]);\n for(let round=0;round<64;round++){\n const ps=spawnSync('/bin/ps',['-axo','pid=,ppid='],{encoding:'utf8',timeout:5000});\n if(ps.status!==0){send({event:'diagnostic',text:'Descendant snapshot failed'});break;}\n const found=[];\n for(const line of ps.stdout.split('\\n')){const [pid,ppid]=line.trim().split(/\\s+/).map(Number);if(pid>1&&tree.has(ppid)&&!tree.has(pid))found.push(pid);}\n if(!found.length)break;\n for(const pid of found)try{process.kill(pid,'SIGSTOP');tree.add(pid);}catch{}\n }\n return [...tree];\n}\nfunction deadGroup(pgid){\n const ps=spawnSync('/bin/ps',['-axo','pgid=,stat='],{encoding:'utf8',timeout:5000});\n if(ps.status!==0)return false;\n for(const line of ps.stdout.split('\\n')){const [group,stat='']=line.trim().split(/\\s+/);if(Number(group)===pgid&&!stat.startsWith('Z')&&!stat.includes('E'))return false;}\n return true;\n}\nfunction signalGroup(pgid,signal){try{process.kill(-pgid,signal);return true;}catch(error){if(error.code==='ESRCH'||(error.code==='EPERM'&&deadGroup(pgid)))return false;throw error;}}\nfunction signalOwned(signal='SIGKILL'){if(signal==='SIGKILL')for(const pid of stopTree())try{process.kill(pid,'SIGKILL');}catch{}for(const pid of owned.keys()){if(signaled.has(pid))continue;if(!signalGroup(pid,signal)||signal==='SIGKILL')signaled.add(pid);}}\nfunction settle(){\n if(!child||settling||!exited||!(killed||timedOut||closing))return;settling=true;\n const started=Date.now();let goneAt=0;\n const tick=()=>{\n let gone=false;try{gone=!signalGroup(child.pid,0);}catch{}\n const now=Date.now();if(gone&&!goneAt)goneAt=now;\n if((goneAt&&now-goneAt>=250)||now-started>=5000){\n forced=true;if(credit){const pending=credit;credit=undefined;pending.reject(Error('Owned output closed after cancellation'));}\n child.stdout.destroy();child.stderr.destroy();return;\n }\n settleTimer=setTimeout(tick,50);\n };\n settleTimer=setTimeout(tick,50);\n}\nasync function stop(){\n if(closing)return;closing=true;\n if(credit){outputFailed=true;const pending=credit;credit=undefined;pending.reject(Error('Owned output channel closed'));child?.stdout.resume();}\n try{signalOwned();}catch(error){closing=false;send({event:'error',message:'Owned cancellation remains pending: '+error.code});return;}\n settle();await childClosed;owned.clear();await manager?.reset();process.disconnect?.();\n}\nprocess.on('disconnect',stop);process.on('SIGTERM',stop);\nprocess.on('message',async message=>{try{\n if(message.type==='output-ack'){\n if(credit && credit.seq===message.seq){const pending=credit;credit=undefined;if(message.ok)pending.resolve();else{outputFailed=true;pending.reject(Error('Managed sink failed'));child?.stdout.resume();}}\n }else if(message.type==='init'){\n if(initialized)throw Error('Worker initialization is immutable');initialized=true;full=message.full;\n if(!full){({SandboxManager:manager}=await import(pathToFileURL(message.runtime)));const deps=manager.checkDependencies();if(!manager.isSupportedPlatform()||deps.errors?.length)throw Error('Unsupported macOS sandbox runtime');await manager.initialize(message.config,undefined,false);}\n send({event:'ready',proxyUrl:full?'':'http://srt:'+manager.getProxyAuthToken()+'@127.0.0.1:'+manager.getProxyPort()});\n }else if(message.type==='wrap'){\n if(!initialized||wrapped)throw Error('One command per worker');wrapped=true;\n const script=full?message.script:await manager.wrapWithSandbox(message.script,'/bin/bash');send({event:'wrapped',script});\n }else if(message.type==='execute'){\n if(!wrapped||child||closing)throw Error('Immutable worker already consumed');\n child=spawn('/bin/bash',['-c',message.script],{cwd:message.cwd,env:message.env,detached:true,stdio:['ignore','pipe','pipe']});\n const identity={pid:child.pid,token:randomUUID()};if(!identity.pid)throw Error('Missing trusted launch identity');\n owned.set(identity.pid,identity.token);\n childClosed=new Promise(resolve=>child.once('close',async code=>{clearTimeout(timer);clearTimeout(settleTimer);await outputDone;send({event:'completed',code,timedOut,killed,outputFailed});resolve();}));\n child.once('error',error=>send({event:'error',message:String(error)}));\n child.once('exit',code=>{exited=true;send({event:'process-exit',code,timedOut,killed});try{signalOwned();}catch(error){send({event:'error',message:'Owned group cleanup pending: '+error.code});}settle();});\n if(message.managed){\n if(child.stdout.readableHighWaterMark>65536)throw Error('Unbounded managed producer buffer');\n outputDone=collect(child.stdout);let diagnosticBytes=0;child.stderr.on('data',bytes=>{diagnosticBytes+=bytes.length;if(diagnosticBytes<=65536)send({event:'diagnostic',text:bytes.toString()});});\n }else for(const stream of ['stdout','stderr'])child[stream].on('data',bytes=>{child[stream].pause();if(!process.connected){child[stream].resume();return;}process.send({event:'output',stream,data:bytes.toString('base64')},()=>child[stream].resume());});\n timer=setTimeout(()=>{timedOut=true;try{signalOwned();}catch(error){send({event:'error',message:'Owned timeout cancellation pending: '+error.code});}settle();},message.timeoutMs);\n send({event:'launched',...identity});\n }else if(message.type==='cancel'){\n killed=true;try{if(message.graceMs>0&&child){signalOwned('SIGTERM');const force=setTimeout(()=>{try{signalOwned();}catch(error){send({event:'error',message:'Owned graceful cancellation pending: '+error.code});}},message.graceMs);childClosed.finally(()=>clearTimeout(force));}else signalOwned();send({event:'cancelled',ok:true});}catch(error){send({event:'cancelled',ok:false,message:'Owned cancellation pending: '+error.code});}settle();\n }else if(message.type==='register'){\n if(!Number.isSafeInteger(message.pid)||message.pid<=1||typeof message.token!=='string')throw Error('Invalid trusted launch identity');\n owned.set(message.pid,message.token);send({event:'registered'});\n }else if(message.type==='release'){\n if(owned.get(message.pid)!==message.token)throw Error('Owned launch identity mismatch');owned.delete(message.pid);send({event:'released'});\n }else if(message.type==='stop')await stop();\n}catch(error){send({event:'error',message:String(error)});await stop();}});";
178
+ export declare const WORKER = "import {pathToFileURL} from 'node:url';\nimport {spawn,spawnSync} from 'node:child_process';\nimport {randomUUID} from 'node:crypto';\nlet manager,initialized=false,wrapped=false,closing=false,full=false,child,childClosed,timer,timedOut=false,killed=false,exited=false,forced=false,settling=false,settleTimer;\nconst owned=new Map(),signaled=new Set();\nlet credit,sequence=0,outputFailed=false,outputDone=Promise.resolve();\nasync function collect(stream){\n try{for await(const chunk of stream){\n for(let offset=0;offset<chunk.length;offset+=65536){\n if(outputFailed)continue;\n const data=chunk.subarray(offset,offset+65536);const seq=sequence++;\n const bufferedBytes=chunk.length+stream.readableLength;if(bufferedBytes>262144)throw Error('Managed producer buffer exceeded bound');\n send({event:'output-flow',frameBytes:data.length,bufferedBytes,producerLimit:262144});\n await new Promise((resolve,reject)=>{credit={seq,resolve,reject};send({event:'output',stream:'stdout',seq,data:data.toString('base64')});});\n }\n }}catch(error){if(forced)return;const alreadyFailed=outputFailed;outputFailed=true;stream.resume();if(!alreadyFailed)send({event:'error',message:'Managed producer failed'});}\n}\nconst send=value=>{if(process.connected)process.send(value,()=>{});};\nfunction stopTree(){\n if(!child?.pid||child.exitCode!==null||child.signalCode!==null)return [];\n try{process.kill(child.pid,'SIGSTOP');}catch{return [];}\n const tree=new Set([child.pid]);\n for(let round=0;round<64;round++){\n const ps=spawnSync('/bin/ps',['-axo','pid=,ppid='],{encoding:'utf8',timeout:5000});\n if(ps.status!==0){send({event:'diagnostic',text:'Descendant snapshot failed'});break;}\n const found=[];\n for(const line of ps.stdout.split('\\n')){const [pid,ppid]=line.trim().split(/\\s+/).map(Number);if(pid>1&&tree.has(ppid)&&!tree.has(pid))found.push(pid);}\n if(!found.length)break;\n for(const pid of found)try{process.kill(pid,'SIGSTOP');tree.add(pid);}catch{}\n }\n return [...tree];\n}\nfunction deadGroup(pgid){\n const ps=spawnSync('/bin/ps',['-axo','pgid=,stat='],{encoding:'utf8',timeout:5000});\n if(ps.status!==0)return false;\n for(const line of ps.stdout.split('\\n')){const [group,stat='']=line.trim().split(/\\s+/);if(Number(group)===pgid&&!stat.startsWith('Z')&&!stat.includes('E'))return false;}\n return true;\n}\nfunction signalGroup(pgid,signal){try{process.kill(-pgid,signal);return true;}catch(error){if(error.code==='ESRCH'||(error.code==='EPERM'&&deadGroup(pgid)))return false;throw error;}}\nfunction signalOwned(signal='SIGKILL'){if(signal==='SIGKILL')for(const pid of stopTree())try{process.kill(pid,'SIGKILL');}catch{}for(const pid of owned.keys()){if(signaled.has(pid))continue;if(!signalGroup(pid,signal)||signal==='SIGKILL')signaled.add(pid);}}\nfunction settle(){\n if(!child||settling||!exited||!(killed||timedOut||closing))return;settling=true;\n const started=Date.now();let goneAt=0;\n const tick=()=>{\n let gone=false;try{gone=!signalGroup(child.pid,0);}catch{}\n const now=Date.now();if(gone&&!goneAt)goneAt=now;\n if((goneAt&&now-goneAt>=250)||now-started>=5000){\n forced=true;if(credit){const pending=credit;credit=undefined;pending.reject(Error('Owned output closed after cancellation'));}\n child.stdout.destroy();child.stderr.destroy();return;\n }\n settleTimer=setTimeout(tick,50);\n };\n settleTimer=setTimeout(tick,50);\n}\nasync function stop(){\n if(closing)return;closing=true;\n if(credit){outputFailed=true;const pending=credit;credit=undefined;pending.reject(Error('Owned output channel closed'));child?.stdout.resume();}\n try{signalOwned();}catch(error){closing=false;send({event:'error',message:'Owned cancellation remains pending: '+error.code});return;}\n settle();await childClosed;owned.clear();await manager?.reset();process.disconnect?.();\n}\nprocess.on('disconnect',stop);process.on('SIGTERM',stop);\nprocess.on('message',async message=>{try{\n if(message.type==='output-ack'){\n if(credit && credit.seq===message.seq){const pending=credit;credit=undefined;if(message.ok)pending.resolve();else{outputFailed=true;pending.reject(Error('Managed sink failed'));child?.stdout.resume();}}\n }else if(message.type==='init'){\n if(initialized)throw Error('Worker initialization is immutable');initialized=true;full=message.full;\n if(!full){let schema;({SandboxManager:manager,NetworkConfigSchema:schema}=await import(pathToFileURL(message.runtime)));const net=message.config.network;if((net.resolvedAddressStrict||net.fakeIpDoh)&&!(schema?.shape?.resolvedAddressStrict&&schema?.shape?.fakeIpDoh))throw Error('The sandbox runtime lacks the network patch');const deps=manager.checkDependencies();if(!manager.isSupportedPlatform()||deps.errors?.length)throw Error('Unsupported macOS sandbox runtime');await manager.initialize(message.config,message.askAll?async()=>true:undefined,false);}\n send({event:'ready',proxyUrl:full?'':'http://srt:'+manager.getProxyAuthToken()+'@127.0.0.1:'+manager.getProxyPort()});\n }else if(message.type==='wrap'){\n if(!initialized||wrapped)throw Error('One command per worker');wrapped=true;\n const script=full?message.script:await manager.wrapWithSandbox(message.script,'/bin/bash');send({event:'wrapped',script});\n }else if(message.type==='execute'){\n if(!wrapped||child||closing)throw Error('Immutable worker already consumed');\n child=spawn('/bin/bash',['-c',message.script],{cwd:message.cwd,env:message.env,detached:true,stdio:['ignore','pipe','pipe']});\n const identity={pid:child.pid,token:randomUUID()};if(!identity.pid)throw Error('Missing trusted launch identity');\n owned.set(identity.pid,identity.token);\n childClosed=new Promise(resolve=>child.once('close',async code=>{clearTimeout(timer);clearTimeout(settleTimer);await outputDone;send({event:'completed',code,timedOut,killed,outputFailed});resolve();}));\n child.once('error',error=>send({event:'error',message:String(error)}));\n child.once('exit',code=>{exited=true;send({event:'process-exit',code,timedOut,killed});try{signalOwned();}catch(error){send({event:'error',message:'Owned group cleanup pending: '+error.code});}settle();});\n if(message.managed){\n if(child.stdout.readableHighWaterMark>65536)throw Error('Unbounded managed producer buffer');\n outputDone=collect(child.stdout);let diagnosticBytes=0;child.stderr.on('data',bytes=>{diagnosticBytes+=bytes.length;if(diagnosticBytes<=65536)send({event:'diagnostic',text:bytes.toString()});});\n }else for(const stream of ['stdout','stderr'])child[stream].on('data',bytes=>{child[stream].pause();if(!process.connected){child[stream].resume();return;}process.send({event:'output',stream,data:bytes.toString('base64')},()=>child[stream].resume());});\n timer=setTimeout(()=>{timedOut=true;try{signalOwned();}catch(error){send({event:'error',message:'Owned timeout cancellation pending: '+error.code});}settle();},message.timeoutMs);\n send({event:'launched',...identity});\n }else if(message.type==='cancel'){\n killed=true;try{if(message.graceMs>0&&child){signalOwned('SIGTERM');const force=setTimeout(()=>{try{signalOwned();}catch(error){send({event:'error',message:'Owned graceful cancellation pending: '+error.code});}},message.graceMs);childClosed.finally(()=>clearTimeout(force));}else signalOwned();send({event:'cancelled',ok:true});}catch(error){send({event:'cancelled',ok:false,message:'Owned cancellation pending: '+error.code});}settle();\n }else if(message.type==='register'){\n if(!Number.isSafeInteger(message.pid)||message.pid<=1||typeof message.token!=='string')throw Error('Invalid trusted launch identity');\n owned.set(message.pid,message.token);send({event:'registered'});\n }else if(message.type==='release'){\n if(owned.get(message.pid)!==message.token)throw Error('Owned launch identity mismatch');owned.delete(message.pid);send({event:'released'});\n }else if(message.type==='stop')await stop();\n}catch(error){send({event:'error',message:String(error)});await stop();}});";
100
179
  /** A separate process owns each immutable SRT manager; Full never enters that process. */
101
180
  export declare function startMacOperationWorker(request: MacWorkerRequest, signal: AbortSignal): Promise<MacWorkerHandle>;
102
181
  export {};
@@ -4,12 +4,13 @@ import { constants, realpathSync } from "node:fs";
4
4
  import { mkdtemp, open, readdir, realpath, rm, stat } from "node:fs/promises";
5
5
  import { homedir, tmpdir } from "node:os";
6
6
  import { basename, dirname, join } from "node:path";
7
- import { SANDBOX_GIT_DENIED_INTERNALS, SANDBOX_MANDATORY_WRITE_DENIES, SandboxPermissionUnsupportedError, SandboxScopeDeniedError, } from "@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk";
7
+ import { OPEN_PUBLIC_DENIED_CIDRS, SANDBOX_FAKE_IP_DNS, SANDBOX_GIT_DENIED_INTERNALS, SANDBOX_HOME_WRITE_DENIES, SANDBOX_MANDATORY_WRITE_DENIES, SANDBOX_RESERVED_NAME_PREFIX, SANDBOX_SYSTEM_WRITE_DENIES, SandboxPermissionUnsupportedError, SandboxScopeDeniedError, } from "@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk";
8
8
  import { implicitWritePaths } from "../policy.js";
9
9
  import { macReadAllows } from "./mac-read-policy.js";
10
- import { macWriteRegexRules, macWriteRootSpellings } from "./mac-write-policy.js";
10
+ import { ci, macWriteRegexRules, macWriteRootSpellings, } from "./mac-write-policy.js";
11
11
  import { runNativeHelper, } from "./native-helper-client.js";
12
12
  import { withCanonicalForms } from "./operation-types.js";
13
+ import { onDisk, protectedChain } from "./protected-targets.js";
13
14
  import { acquireSealedRuntime, stagePrivateSource, stageRuntimeSource, } from "./runtime-source.js";
14
15
  import { ENV_NAME_RE, OutputCap, restrictedToolHomes, shellQuote } from "./shared.js";
15
16
  import { recordTransferTiming } from "./transfer-timing.js";
@@ -50,6 +51,162 @@ export function mandatoryDenyPatterns(root) {
50
51
  ]),
51
52
  ];
52
53
  }
54
+ /** The Mach services a restricted macOS command may look up for TLS trust ({@link macNetworkConfig}). */
55
+ const MAC_TLS_TRUST_SERVICES = Object.freeze(["com.apple.TrustEvaluationAgent"]);
56
+ /**
57
+ * The sandbox runtime's network configuration for one restricted grant (approval-only profiles
58
+ * design, "Open network"), and whether the worker answers the runtime's ask callback with allow.
59
+ *
60
+ * Both networks decide every connection on the resolved address in the operation's own proxy,
61
+ * which dials the address it checked (no second resolution: DNS rebinding cannot swap it).
62
+ * `deniedResolvedAddresses` is the SDK's whole closed set ({@link OPEN_PUBLIC_DENIED_CIDRS}:
63
+ * private, CGNAT, ULA, link-local, metadata, loopback, NAT64, multicast, reserved, embedded forms
64
+ * expanded); the runtime adds loopback, link-local, the cloud metadata endpoints and this host's
65
+ * own interface addresses itself. The patched runtime's `resolvedAddressStrict` judges an IP
66
+ * literal by the same rules (upstream skips literals), gives `localhost` no loopback carve-out and
67
+ * an allow-listed literal none over the closed classes: a private destination needs the
68
+ * escalation, never a host grant.
69
+ *
70
+ * - The allowlist (no `openNetwork`): exactly the grant's hosts, by the runtime's own matching.
71
+ * - The open network: no host list and an allow-all ask callback, so the address rules alone
72
+ * decide. The grant's hosts are not used.
73
+ *
74
+ * In both networks a name the system resolver answers with a fake-IP address
75
+ * ({@link SANDBOX_FAKE_IP_DNS}: 198.18.0.0/15, an OpenClash-style router) is re-resolved through
76
+ * DNS-over-HTTPS at the SDK's IP-literal endpoints (the patched runtime's `fakeIpDoh`; the SDK's
77
+ * timeout is the whole lookup, shared among the endpoints) and the real answer judged and dialed as
78
+ * above; when that lookup fails the connection is refused with a reason naming the fake-IP
79
+ * resolver, never dialed to the fake address.
80
+ *
81
+ * Listening stays refused (`allowLocalBinding: false`) under every profile: Seatbelt cannot limit a
82
+ * bind to loopback (spec "Known limitations"), and with it the command could reach every local
83
+ * port. `allowPrivate` is a trusted test seam (like the Linux forwarder's): it lifts the address
84
+ * rules so a fixture on loopback can be granted; nothing in production sets it.
85
+ *
86
+ * TLS trust needs one Mach service, `com.apple.TrustEvaluationAgent` (the per-user agent, not its
87
+ * `.system` sibling): Apple's LibreSSL in `/usr/bin/curl`, `/usr/bin/openssl` and the Command
88
+ * Line Tools' `python3` checks a chain against `/etc/ssl/cert.pem` (readable) and, when that
89
+ * bundle lacks the anchor (a newer root, such as example.com's SSL.com 2022 chain), asks this
90
+ * agent, which evaluates it against the system keychain and the admin's trust settings. Without
91
+ * it such a site fails with "unable to get local issuer certificate". The agent only evaluates
92
+ * the chain the client hands it: it fetched no issuer named in a certificate (checked on macOS
93
+ * 26 with a leaf whose AIA URL pointed at a local listener). `trustd` stays closed.
94
+ */
95
+ export function macNetworkConfig(grant, options = {}) {
96
+ const closed = options.allowPrivate
97
+ ? {}
98
+ : { deniedResolvedAddresses: [...OPEN_PUBLIC_DENIED_CIDRS], resolvedAddressStrict: true };
99
+ const doh = {
100
+ fakeIpDoh: { ...SANDBOX_FAKE_IP_DNS, endpoints: [...SANDBOX_FAKE_IP_DNS.endpoints] },
101
+ };
102
+ return {
103
+ askAll: grant.openNetwork === true,
104
+ network: {
105
+ allowedDomains: grant.openNetwork ? [] : [...grant.hosts],
106
+ deniedDomains: [],
107
+ ...closed,
108
+ ...doh,
109
+ allowLocalBinding: false,
110
+ allowMachLookup: [...MAC_TLS_TRUST_SERVICES],
111
+ },
112
+ };
113
+ }
114
+ /**
115
+ * Absolute write denies a restricted macOS operation gets besides each write root's policy:
116
+ *
117
+ * - `subtrees`, denied with everything beneath them: the system persistence paths
118
+ * ({@link SANDBOX_SYSTEM_WRITE_DENIES}: the crontab and at spools) in each spelling Seatbelt may
119
+ * see, and the final target of every protected location under `home` (the
120
+ * {@link SANDBOX_MANDATORY_WRITE_DENIES} entries: `~/Library/LaunchAgents`, `~/.config/systemd`,
121
+ * the shell startup files, …) reached through a symbolic link, and each
122
+ * {@link SANDBOX_HOME_WRITE_DENIES} entry (`~/bin`) always, with the target of its link;
123
+ * - `links`, denied exactly (the link itself cannot be removed, renamed or replaced): every
124
+ * symbolic link on the way to such a location. A dotfile manager links `~/.zshrc` to
125
+ * `~/code/dotfiles-current/zshrc`, and `dotfiles-current` may itself be a link inside a write
126
+ * root; swapping any hop for a real directory would redirect the protected location into
127
+ * writable space (SDK `sandbox-write-denies.ts`, constraint on consumers).
128
+ *
129
+ * Resolved at operation start: a link changed later is seen by the next operation. A hard link to
130
+ * a protected file that already exists inside a write root is not caught (it is the same file,
131
+ * under an ordinary name).
132
+ */
133
+ export function macProtectedWriteDenies(home) {
134
+ const subtrees = new Set();
135
+ const links = new Set();
136
+ for (const path of SANDBOX_SYSTEM_WRITE_DENIES)
137
+ for (const spelling of macWriteRootSpellings(path))
138
+ subtrees.add(spelling);
139
+ const add = (location, always) => {
140
+ const chain = protectedChain(location);
141
+ if (always)
142
+ subtrees.add(location);
143
+ if (!always && !chain.links.length)
144
+ return;
145
+ subtrees.add(chain.target);
146
+ for (const link of chain.links) {
147
+ links.add(link);
148
+ // the link's location with its parent in on-disk form
149
+ links.add(join(onDisk(dirname(link)), basename(link)));
150
+ }
151
+ };
152
+ for (const entry of SANDBOX_MANDATORY_WRITE_DENIES)
153
+ add(join(home, ...entry), false);
154
+ // the home-anchored entries (`~/bin`) exist nowhere else in the policy: always denied here
155
+ for (const entry of SANDBOX_HOME_WRITE_DENIES)
156
+ add(join(home, ...entry), true);
157
+ return { subtrees: [...subtrees], links: [...links] };
158
+ }
159
+ /**
160
+ * {@link macProtectedWriteDenies} as ordered write rules the patched runtime appends after every
161
+ * other rule, so they decide last (over the per-root git allowlist too), case-insensitively: each
162
+ * subtree with everything beneath it, each link exactly, and the removal or move of any of their
163
+ * ancestors. Fails closed when a path cannot be
164
+ * expressed (a control character, or too long for a Seatbelt rule).
165
+ */
166
+ function protectedWriteRules(denies) {
167
+ const rule = (path, beneath) => {
168
+ if ([...path].some((ch) => ch.codePointAt(0) < 0x20 || ch === "\u007f"))
169
+ throw new Error("A protected path with a control character cannot be expressed as a policy");
170
+ const regex = `^${ci(path)}${beneath ? "(/.*)?" : ""}$`;
171
+ if (regex.length > 1000)
172
+ throw new Error("A protected path is too long for the macOS policy");
173
+ return {
174
+ action: "deny",
175
+ operations: ["file-write*", "file-write-create", "file-write-unlink"],
176
+ regex,
177
+ };
178
+ };
179
+ // no ancestor of an anchored deny moves away (Seatbelt checks file-write-unlink on a rename's
180
+ // source, and on rmdir): moved, it would take the anchor with it and leave its path free
181
+ const ancestors = new Set();
182
+ for (const path of [...denies.subtrees, ...denies.links])
183
+ for (let up = dirname(path); up !== dirname(up); up = dirname(up))
184
+ ancestors.add(up);
185
+ return [
186
+ // a component starting with the reserved staging prefix (the Linux broker's staging and
187
+ // quarantine names; SDK `sandbox-write-denies.ts` rule 6), with everything beneath it, at any
188
+ // depth and in any case: nothing sandboxed creates, writes, removes or renames one
189
+ {
190
+ action: "deny",
191
+ operations: ["file-write*", "file-write-create", "file-write-unlink"],
192
+ regex: `^/(.*/)?${ci(SANDBOX_RESERVED_NAME_PREFIX)}[^/]*(/.*)?$`,
193
+ },
194
+ ...denies.subtrees.map((path) => rule(path, true)),
195
+ ...denies.links.map((path) => rule(path, false)),
196
+ ...[...ancestors].map((path) => ({
197
+ ...rule(path, false),
198
+ operations: ["file-write-unlink"],
199
+ })),
200
+ ];
201
+ }
202
+ /** The environment of an escalated call: the device program's, minus every `CAPYBARA_` variable. */
203
+ export function escalatedEnvironment(env, own) {
204
+ const out = {};
205
+ for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(env))
206
+ if (value !== undefined && !/^CAPYBARA_/i.test(key))
207
+ out[key] = value;
208
+ return { ...out, ...own };
209
+ }
53
210
  /**
54
211
  * Removes empty git sequencer directories (`.git/sequencer`, and those of the gitdirs below
55
212
  * `.git/modules`) under each write root, descriptor-relative and never following a link, after a
@@ -127,6 +284,9 @@ export const JAVA_PROXY_AGENT_JAR = "vendor/java-proxy-agent/srt-proxy-agent.jar
127
284
  * Darwin answers a group signal with EPERM (not ESRCH) while the group holds only dead members
128
285
  * (zombies not yet reaped, or processes exiting), so `signalGroup` counts EPERM as gone when a
129
286
  * process snapshot shows no live member of the group; EPERM with a live member still fails.
287
+ * A runtime without the network patch (`resolvedAddressStrict`, `fakeIpDoh` in its schema) is
288
+ * refused before it starts: its proxy would skip the address rules, so the bind self-check fails
289
+ * and the device reports no restricted support (and so no open network).
130
290
  */
131
291
  export const WORKER = `import {pathToFileURL} from 'node:url';
132
292
  import {spawn,spawnSync} from 'node:child_process';
@@ -194,7 +354,7 @@ process.on('message',async message=>{try{
194
354
  if(credit && credit.seq===message.seq){const pending=credit;credit=undefined;if(message.ok)pending.resolve();else{outputFailed=true;pending.reject(Error('Managed sink failed'));child?.stdout.resume();}}
195
355
  }else if(message.type==='init'){
196
356
  if(initialized)throw Error('Worker initialization is immutable');initialized=true;full=message.full;
197
- if(!full){({SandboxManager:manager}=await import(pathToFileURL(message.runtime)));const deps=manager.checkDependencies();if(!manager.isSupportedPlatform()||deps.errors?.length)throw Error('Unsupported macOS sandbox runtime');await manager.initialize(message.config,undefined,false);}
357
+ if(!full){let schema;({SandboxManager:manager,NetworkConfigSchema:schema}=await import(pathToFileURL(message.runtime)));const net=message.config.network;if((net.resolvedAddressStrict||net.fakeIpDoh)&&!(schema?.shape?.resolvedAddressStrict&&schema?.shape?.fakeIpDoh))throw Error('The sandbox runtime lacks the network patch');const deps=manager.checkDependencies();if(!manager.isSupportedPlatform()||deps.errors?.length)throw Error('Unsupported macOS sandbox runtime');await manager.initialize(message.config,message.askAll?async()=>true:undefined,false);}
198
358
  send({event:'ready',proxyUrl:full?'':'http://srt:'+manager.getProxyAuthToken()+'@127.0.0.1:'+manager.getProxyPort()});
199
359
  }else if(message.type==='wrap'){
200
360
  if(!initialized||wrapped)throw Error('One command per worker');wrapped=true;
@@ -374,6 +534,12 @@ export async function startMacOperationWorker(request, signal) {
374
534
  const preparedAt = performance.now();
375
535
  const completion = (async () => {
376
536
  try {
537
+ // only an escalated call (the device filesystem with the environment network) is unwrapped
538
+ if (request.grant.full &&
539
+ !("profile" in request.scope &&
540
+ request.scope.filesystem.kind === "device" &&
541
+ request.scope.network.kind === "environment"))
542
+ throw new SandboxScopeDeniedError("Only an escalated call (the device filesystem with the environment network) runs outside the sandbox");
377
543
  // Restricted workers import only the sealed private copy of the verified runtime closure
378
544
  // the binding attested; anything else is refused here, before anything is spawned.
379
545
  if (!request.grant.full)
@@ -424,7 +590,8 @@ export async function startMacOperationWorker(request, signal) {
424
590
  // Version managers (asdf, nvm, pyenv, ...) read their data under the real home, while HOME
425
591
  // is the working directory: this trusted process has the real home and the device's own
426
592
  // environment (the forked worker runs with a reduced one), so it picks the variables and
427
- // grants their directories read only. Full access inherits this process's environment.
593
+ // grants their directories read only. An escalated call inherits this process's environment
594
+ // minus every CAPYBARA_ variable (escalatedEnvironment).
428
595
  const toolHomes = request.kind === "exec" && !request.grant.full
429
596
  ? restrictedToolHomes(request.toolHome?.home ?? homedir(), request.toolHome?.env ?? process.env, request.grant.deniedReadRoots)
430
597
  : undefined;
@@ -499,6 +666,13 @@ export async function startMacOperationWorker(request, signal) {
499
666
  return firstMissing;
500
667
  })
501
668
  : [];
669
+ // the protected locations as they resolve now, and the system persistence paths
670
+ const protectedDenies = request.grant.full
671
+ ? { subtrees: [], links: [] }
672
+ : macProtectedWriteDenies(request.toolHome?.home ?? homedir());
673
+ const network = macNetworkConfig(request.grant, {
674
+ allowPrivate: request.allowPrivateProxyTargets === true,
675
+ });
502
676
  const config = {
503
677
  filesystem: {
504
678
  denyRead: ["/", ...request.grant.deniedReadRoots],
@@ -516,6 +690,9 @@ export async function startMacOperationWorker(request, signal) {
516
690
  // approved `cd ~`), and the runtime turns each deny into write, move and creation
517
691
  // denies on the path and moves of its ancestors.
518
692
  ...withCanonicalForms(request.grant.deniedReadRoots),
693
+ // the subtrees only: a link given to the runtime would be resolved to its target
694
+ // (for `/var`, all of `/private/var`); links are exact regex rules below
695
+ ...protectedDenies.subtrees,
519
696
  // Per-root deny entries pin every ancestor against creation in SRT.
520
697
  // The fixed helper has no rename API; retain global Git content denies
521
698
  // while it establishes a missing root without those ancestor pins.
@@ -526,15 +703,14 @@ export async function startMacOperationWorker(request, signal) {
526
703
  ],
527
704
  // the shared policy exactly (case-insensitive, gitdir allowlist, HEAD rules), as
528
705
  // ordered regex rules the patched runtime appends last (mac-write-policy.ts)
529
- writeRegexRules: establishmentRoots.length
530
- ? macWriteRegexRules("")
531
- : writeRoots.flatMap((r) => macWriteRootSpellings(r).flatMap(macWriteRegexRules)),
532
- },
533
- network: {
534
- allowedDomains: [...request.grant.hosts],
535
- deniedDomains: [],
536
- allowLocalBinding: false,
706
+ writeRegexRules: [
707
+ ...(establishmentRoots.length
708
+ ? macWriteRegexRules("")
709
+ : writeRoots.flatMap((r) => macWriteRootSpellings(r).flatMap(macWriteRegexRules))),
710
+ ...protectedWriteRules(protectedDenies),
711
+ ],
537
712
  },
713
+ network: network.network,
538
714
  ...(javaAgent ? { javaAgentJarPath: javaAgent } : {}),
539
715
  };
540
716
  const initialized = message(runtime, "ready");
@@ -543,6 +719,7 @@ export async function startMacOperationWorker(request, signal) {
543
719
  full: request.grant.full,
544
720
  runtime: runtimeEntry,
545
721
  config,
722
+ askAll: network.askAll,
546
723
  });
547
724
  const initializedInfo = await initialized;
548
725
  // the worker has imported the runtime: the copy may be pruned from now on
@@ -628,7 +805,13 @@ export async function startMacOperationWorker(request, signal) {
628
805
  const exports = Object.entries(args.env ?? {})
629
806
  .map(([key, value]) => `export ${key}=${shellQuote(value)}`)
630
807
  .join("; ");
631
- const script = await wrap(`${temp}${!request.grant.full && exports ? `${exports}; ` : ""}exec /bin/bash -c ${shellQuote(args.command)}${request.managedOutput ? " 2>&1" : ""}`);
808
+ // The runtime's NO_PROXY sends loopback, link-local and the private ranges direct, where
809
+ // Seatbelt refuses the connect and the client prints only "Couldn't connect to server".
810
+ // Every one of them is closed here (no own listener exists: listening is refused), so a
811
+ // restricted command sends them to the operation's proxy, whose refusal names the reason.
812
+ // The call's own environment comes after, so a NO_PROXY it sets still applies.
813
+ const direct = request.grant.full ? "" : "unset NO_PROXY no_proxy; ";
814
+ const script = await wrap(`${temp}${direct}${!request.grant.full && exports ? `${exports}; ` : ""}exec /bin/bash -c ${shellQuote(args.command)}${request.managedOutput ? " 2>&1" : ""}`);
632
815
  await request.beforeLaunch();
633
816
  controller.signal.throwIfAborted();
634
817
  const cap = new OutputCap(args.maxOutputBytes);
@@ -689,7 +872,7 @@ export async function startMacOperationWorker(request, signal) {
689
872
  type: "execute",
690
873
  script,
691
874
  cwd: args.cwd,
692
- env: request.grant.full ? { ...process.env, ...args.env } : outerEnv,
875
+ env: request.grant.full ? escalatedEnvironment(process.env, args.env) : outerEnv,
693
876
  timeoutMs: args.timeoutMs,
694
877
  managed: request.managedOutput !== undefined,
695
878
  });
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
1
+ /** `path` in on-disk form when it exists (case and Unicode normalization as stored). */
2
+ export declare function onDisk(path: string): string;
3
+ /**
4
+ * How `path` resolves, one component at a time with `lstat` and `readlink`: every symbolic link
5
+ * met on the way (each link's own location, wherever in the chain it sits) and the final target
6
+ * (its existing part in on-disk form, the missing names appended). A dangling link is followed to
7
+ * the location it names. A link loop stops the walk; the links met so far are still returned.
8
+ *
9
+ * Shared by the device workers (macOS and Linux): each link and the target become anchored denies
10
+ * (the SDK `sandbox-write-denies.ts` constraint on consumers), so no hop of a dotfile manager's
11
+ * chain can be swapped for a real directory.
12
+ */
13
+ export declare function protectedChain(path: string): {
14
+ links: string[];
15
+ target: string;
16
+ };