@capybara-hq/device 0.1.0-rc.18 → 0.1.0-rc.19
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +65 -33
- package/dist/api.d.ts +3 -3
- package/dist/args.d.ts +8 -3
- package/dist/args.js +27 -14
- package/dist/cli.js +1 -1
- package/dist/client.js +1 -1
- package/dist/commands/ceiling.d.ts +3 -2
- package/dist/commands/ceiling.js +39 -21
- package/dist/commands/login.d.ts +15 -11
- package/dist/commands/login.js +46 -33
- package/dist/commands/policy.js +16 -10
- package/dist/commands/start.d.ts +11 -3
- package/dist/commands/start.js +25 -9
- package/dist/commands/status.js +10 -6
- package/dist/exec/docker-operations.d.ts +14 -2
- package/dist/exec/docker-operations.js +32 -5
- package/dist/exec/linux-agent.d.ts +13 -3
- package/dist/exec/linux-agent.js +450 -43
- package/dist/exec/linux-operation-backend.d.ts +27 -6
- package/dist/exec/linux-operation-backend.js +30 -9
- package/dist/exec/linux-operation-worker.d.ts +51 -3
- package/dist/exec/linux-operation-worker.js +55 -3
- package/dist/exec/linux-runtime.d.ts +3 -2
- package/dist/exec/linux-runtime.js +4 -2
- package/dist/exec/mac-operation-backend.d.ts +7 -2
- package/dist/exec/mac-operation-backend.js +18 -10
- package/dist/exec/mac-write-policy.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/exec/mac-write-policy.js +1 -1
- package/dist/exec/operation-types.d.ts +35 -5
- package/dist/exec/operation-types.js +73 -23
- package/dist/exec/operation-worker.d.ts +80 -1
- package/dist/exec/operation-worker.js +197 -14
- package/dist/exec/protected-targets.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/exec/protected-targets.js +53 -0
- package/dist/exec/shared.d.ts +7 -3
- package/dist/exec/shared.js +7 -5
- package/dist/node_modules/@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime/CAPYBARA-MODIFICATIONS.patch +343 -7
- package/dist/node_modules/@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime/dist/sandbox/resolved-address-guard.js +220 -6
- package/dist/node_modules/@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime/dist/sandbox/sandbox-config.js +17 -0
- package/dist/node_modules/@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime/dist/sandbox/sandbox-manager.js +11 -0
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/device-protocol.d.ts +77 -46
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/device-protocol.js +206 -83
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/index.d.ts +3 -2
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/index.js +3 -2
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/network-classes.d.ts +98 -0
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/network-classes.js +291 -0
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/sandbox-linux-runtime-source.js +460 -28
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/sandbox-native-runtime-source.js +143 -3
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/sandbox-operation.d.ts +36 -4
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/sandbox-operation.js +21 -4
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/sandbox-runtime-source.js +2 -2
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/sandbox-write-denies.d.ts +87 -8
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/sandbox-write-denies.js +249 -10
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/dist/sandbox.d.ts +11 -22
- package/dist/node_modules/@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk/package.json +1 -1
- package/dist/owner-report.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/owner-report.js +5 -4
- package/dist/policy-store.d.ts +2 -1
- package/dist/policy-store.js +2 -1
- package/dist/policy.d.ts +23 -14
- package/dist/policy.js +28 -21
- package/dist/runtime-manifest.json +1 -1
- package/dist/server-ops.d.ts +30 -5
- package/dist/server-ops.js +105 -85
- package/dist/staged-connect.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/staged-connect.js +1 -1
- package/dist/staged-device.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/staged-device.js +7 -5
- package/dist/staged-session.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/state.d.ts +41 -21
- package/dist/state.js +102 -45
- package/package.json +2 -2
package/README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ and the platform rebuilds the device on its next use.
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Commands: `login --url <url> [--no-browser] [--dir <path>] [--mode os|docker]`, `logout`,
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`status [--json]`, `start`, `stop`,
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`drain [--wait] [--timeout <seconds>]`,
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`ceiling show | ceiling set --
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`ceiling show | ceiling set [--outside-sandbox on|off] [--network open|allowlist] [--project-reach workspace|os-user] [--yes]`,
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`policy [show | set <key> <value> | add|remove <key> <value>]` and
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`service install|uninstall|start|stop|restart|status`.
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`ceiling set` is the only way to change the owner ceiling (`policy set mode` points there); a
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@@ -82,32 +82,41 @@ and `tmp/`.
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## Permissions
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Every operation the deployment sends carries a scope: the
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in `policy.json`, which only you
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- **
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runs as you (in Docker mode, as the container's user): your
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Every operation the deployment sends carries a scope: the roots it may read and write, its network
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and the conversation's permission profile (for the record only: every profile runs in the sandbox,
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Full access included; a profile only decides who approves going beyond it). The device checks each
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scope against the **owner ceiling** in `policy.json`, which only you widen, on this machine:
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- **Outside the sandbox** `on|off`: whether one approved call may run outside the sandbox
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(`sandbox: "escalated"`). Such a call runs as you (in Docker mode, as the container's user): your
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files, credentials and network, with the program's environment minus every `CAPYBARA_*` variable.
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The person, the review model or a Full access auto-grant approves each one, and each is recorded.
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- **Network** `open|allowlist`: the sandbox network. `open` is the public internet (private, local
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and metadata addresses closed, below); `allowlist` is only the hosts in `allowedDomains` that the
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organization also allows, and the list is then this machine's ceiling for per-call host grants.
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- **Project reach** `workspace|os-user`: whether sandboxed work and project browsing may read
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projects outside the device's `workspace/`.
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A new login starts
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it; a widening prints the risk text and needs `--yes` or a `y`
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the
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A new login starts with outside-the-sandbox off, the open network and `workspace` reach. `login`
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prints the ceiling and how to widen it; a widening prints the risk text and needs `--yes` or a `y`
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at the prompt. The organization and the platform have their own settings; the narrowest wins. An
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older `policy.json` (protocol 3, `fullAccess`) is converted once on start, never wider: allowed
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becomes outside-the-sandbox on with the open network, denied keeps the allowlist (and `start` prints
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`capybara-device ceiling set --network open`). A logged-in machine without `policy.json` (set up
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before rc.58) ran with no reachable host and keeps that: `start` writes outside-the-sandbox off and
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the allowlist with no host, and prints the same command; a missing file never reads as open.
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```bash
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capybara-device ceiling show # the owner ceiling, network
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capybara-device ceiling show --json # {"
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capybara-device ceiling set --
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capybara-device ceiling set --
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capybara-device ceiling show # the owner ceiling, network, revision
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capybara-device ceiling show --json # {"outsideSandbox":…,"network":…,"allowedDomains":[…],"projectReach":…,"revision":…} (revision: string | null)
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capybara-device ceiling set --outside-sandbox off --network allowlist --project-reach workspace # narrow
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capybara-device ceiling set --outside-sandbox on --network open --yes # widen
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capybara-device policy add allowedDomains files.slack.com
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capybara-device policy remove allowedDomains files.slack.com
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capybara-device policy show
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```
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**
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**Sandboxed work** (every operation but an escalated call) runs each operation in its own sandbox: macOS uses
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`@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime` (Seatbelt); Linux and Docker mode use the SDK's restricted Linux
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runtime (Landlock plus a seccomp broker). Writes stay in the scope's roots; reads stay in them too,
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plus the system and developer tool directories (on macOS `/System`, `/usr`, `/bin`, `/sbin`,
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@@ -115,9 +124,25 @@ plus the system and developer tool directories (on macOS `/System`, `/usr`, `/bi
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installed JDKs) and the data of the version managers your home uses, read only; other files of the
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machine, such as the rest of your home, are not readable. Secret paths (`~/.ssh`, cloud CLI
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credentials, `~/.netrc`, `~/.gnupg`, browser profiles, this program's state directory) stay
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unreadable even inside those
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-
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-
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unreadable even inside those. Commands get a minimal environment (`PATH`, `LANG`,
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`HOME` set to the working root, a private temp directory, the tool homes, the proxy variables),
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never this program's. The network is the owner ceiling's: `open` reaches the public
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internet, `allowlist` only hosts in the local `allowedDomains` that the organization's allowlist
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also admits (plus a run's or a task's grants, within that allowlist). Either way traffic goes
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through the operation's own proxy, which decides each connection on the resolved address and dials
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the address it checked: loopback (another program's localhost port), private and LAN, CGNAT, IPv6
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ULA, link-local, cloud metadata and NAT64 addresses and this machine's own addresses stay closed,
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for names and IP literals alike. A client that ignores the proxy variables (plain `ssh`) does not
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connect. No sandboxed client connects to a loopback listener, its own included; on Linux a
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restricted command may listen on loopback for clients outside the sandbox, and on macOS it cannot
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listen at all (a dev server needs an approved call outside the sandbox). Behind a fake-IP resolver (a router or proxy in OpenClash-style fake-IP mode answers
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every name with an address in `198.18.0.0/15`), the proxy re-resolves such a name through
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DNS-over-HTTPS (RFC 8484) to Cloudflare (`1.1.1.1`, `1.0.0.1`) and then Google (`8.8.8.8`,
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`8.8.4.4`), reached by IP over verified TLS within 5 seconds, and judges the real answer; when that
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lookup fails the connection is refused with a reason naming the fake-IP resolver, never dialed to
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the fake address. The open network decides on the address, not on where it routes: a router's
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public WAN address reached by hairpin NAT, a VPN routing public addresses to an intranet, or an
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operator NAT64 prefix are not closed; such a machine should keep the allowlist. Restricted work also
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follows one write policy (below). On macOS each restricted command also gets its own empty temporary
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directory (`TMPDIR`, `TMP`, `TEMP`), removed when the command ends; `mktemp` without a template
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writes to the user's shared temporary directory instead, which stays closed, so give it one (`mktemp
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### Changes from the deployment
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The deployment changes the local policy only by narrowing it: it may
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change is written under `policy.json.lock`.
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The deployment changes the local policy only by narrowing it: it may remove `allowedDomains`,
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switch the network to `allowlist` and turn outside-the-sandbox off. It can never widen it: a
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`policy` request that adds hosts or carries a `mode` is refused and writes nothing (an approval's
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host grant lasts for its run instead). Every change is written under `policy.json.lock`.
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### The command log
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```text
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{"op":"exec","tag":"t1","actor":{"accountId":"acc_123","conversationId":"conv_1"},"exitCode":0,"isolation":"restricted",...}
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{"op":"policy","detail":"policy add files.slack.com by Ada Lovelace (acc_123) via web, approval apr_456",...}
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{"op":"policy","detail":"ceiling set
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{"op":"policy","detail":"ceiling set outsideSandbox on, network open by ada via cli",...}
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```
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Limits to know: the platform's `Grep` tool assumes GNU grep, so on macOS (BSD grep) in OS mode some
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Grep options behave differently or fail. In OS mode the `cpu` and `memoryMb` ceilings are not
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enforced yet, and `allowCredentials` is ignored (
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enforced yet, and `allowCredentials` is ignored (an escalated call already has your credentials,
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sandboxed work gets none).
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### Upgrading from a protocol 2 program
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`no-new-privileges`, and the policy's `cpu` and `memoryMb` as `--cpus`, `--memory` and an equal
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`--memory-swap`.
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The container is always on Docker's default bridge:
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The container is always on Docker's default bridge: an escalated call has the container's whole network.
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Restricted work inside it is confined by the Linux launcher (Landlock, the seccomp broker and the
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proxy with the allowlist above), on the container's paths. The hello reports no home directory, and
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browsing covers the container's `/workspace` only. The container is reused while its mounts, flags
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## Operation backend
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The program speaks device protocol
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The program speaks device protocol 4 only; the kernel and this program upgrade together (a
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protocol 4 program facing an older deployment says the deployment must be upgraded). It binds each instance generation the deployment creates
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to a verified, sealed runtime and reports restricted support only once a self-check on that runtime
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passed (macOS: a write in its root goes through, while a write outside it, reads of a denied secret
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and of an ordinary file it was never granted, and a local connection are refused) or the runtime's
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probe passed (Linux, Docker);
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probe passed (Linux, Docker); nothing falls back to running outside the sandbox.
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Each restricted operation has its own immutable sandbox-runtime process and proxy lifetime.
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Native methods use the SDK's hash-checked Python helper and pinned directory descriptors, with a
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private descriptor-identity handshake before dispatch.
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private descriptor-identity handshake before dispatch. An escalated call uses the existing OS
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user directly.
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Execution grants arrive separately over authenticated transport; scope hosts cannot manufacture
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an owner allowance. Strict fresh owner-policy reads fail closed on missing or malformed policy.
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Restricted operations follow one write policy on every platform (`sandbox-write-denies.ts` in
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the SDK): no shell, git-global, direnv, npm, editor, agent or hook-manager configuration; inside
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any `.git` only git's ordinary internals; no bare-repository lookalike; no `.git` moved away
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any `.git` only git's ordinary internals; no bare-repository lookalike; no `.git` moved away; no
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OS persistence location (launch agents, systemd user units, autostart, the crontab spool). At
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operation start each protected home location is resolved link by link (a dotfile manager's
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`~/.zshrc` chain), and every link on the way and the final target are denied, with no move of
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their ancestors. Names starting with `.capybara-staging-` (any case) are reserved for the Linux
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broker's staged directory moves and denied to every sandboxed write.
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As defence in depth, owners are advised to run
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git config --global safe.bareRepository explicit
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package/dist/api.d.ts
CHANGED
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/** The program uses 16 MiB when it is absent. */
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maxFrameBytes?: number;
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/**
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* Whether the platform and the organization allow
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* `login` prints the matching line. Absent counts as allowed.
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* Whether the platform and the organization allow running outside the sandbox (`allowed`) or not
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* (`off`): `login` prints the matching line. Absent counts as allowed.
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*/
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-
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outsideSandbox?: "allowed" | "off";
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}
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/** An error response of the kernel: `{ error: { code, message } }`. */
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export declare class ApiError extends Error {
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package/dist/args.d.ts
CHANGED
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import type { DeviceNetworkMode } from "@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk";
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import { type KeepAwakeMode, type RestrictedProjectReach } from "./state.js";
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export type DeviceMode = "os" | "docker";
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/** A parsed command line. */
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} | {
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command: "ceiling";
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action: "set";
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-
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-
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/** `--outside-sandbox on|off`; absent keeps the current value. */
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outsideSandbox?: boolean;
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/** `--network open|allowlist`; absent keeps the current value. */
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network?: DeviceNetworkMode;
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/** `--project-reach workspace|os-user`; absent keeps the current value. */
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projectReach?: RestrictedProjectReach;
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/** `--yes`: confirms a widening without asking. */
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yes?: true;
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} | {
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@@ -62,7 +67,7 @@ export type Command = {
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|
} | {
|
|
63
68
|
command: "help";
|
|
64
69
|
};
|
|
65
|
-
export declare const USAGE = "Usage:\n capybara-device login --url <url> [--no-browser] [--dir <path>] [--mode os|docker] [--json]\n Connect this machine: approve the code in the browser;\n --json prints one JSON event per line (no browser)\n capybara-device logout Forget the credential on this machine\n capybara-device status [--json] Show whether this machine is logged in\n capybara-device start Connect and serve the device\n capybara-device stop Stop the running program\n capybara-device drain [--wait] [--timeout <seconds>]\n Finish running commands, accept no new ones, then stop;\n --wait returns once it has stopped (default limit 600 s)\n capybara-device ceiling show [--json]\n Show this machine's owner ceiling (
|
|
70
|
+
export declare const USAGE = "Usage:\n capybara-device login --url <url> [--no-browser] [--dir <path>] [--mode os|docker] [--json]\n Connect this machine: approve the code in the browser;\n --json prints one JSON event per line (no browser)\n capybara-device logout Forget the credential on this machine\n capybara-device status [--json] Show whether this machine is logged in\n capybara-device start Connect and serve the device\n capybara-device stop Stop the running program\n capybara-device drain [--wait] [--timeout <seconds>]\n Finish running commands, accept no new ones, then stop;\n --wait returns once it has stopped (default limit 600 s)\n capybara-device ceiling show [--json]\n Show this machine's owner ceiling (outside the sandbox, network,\n project reach)\n capybara-device ceiling set [--outside-sandbox on|off] [--network open|allowlist]\n [--project-reach workspace|os-user] [--yes]\n Change the owner ceiling (at least one field; the others stay);\n widening needs --yes or a y at the prompt\n capybara-device keep-awake [show | off | while-busy | connected] [--yes] [--json]\n Show or set when this computer is kept awake; raising it\n needs --yes or a y at the prompt\n capybara-device policy [show] Show the local policy\n capybara-device policy set <key> <value>\n Replace one field (cpu, memoryMb, allowCredentials)\n capybara-device policy add|remove allowedDomains <host>\n Allow or stop allowing a domain on the sandbox allowlist\n capybara-device policy add|remove allowCredentials <name>\n Allow or stop allowing a credential for restricted work\n capybara-device service install|uninstall\n Run at login as a user service, or remove it\n capybara-device service start|stop|restart\n Start, stop or restart the login service\n capybara-device service status [--json]\n Report whether the login service is loaded, what is running,\n and whether it is older than the installed program";
|
|
66
71
|
/** Thrown for a bad command line; the message is shown with the usage. */
|
|
67
72
|
export declare class UsageError extends Error {
|
|
68
73
|
}
|
package/dist/args.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -12,9 +12,12 @@ export const USAGE = `Usage:
|
|
|
12
12
|
Finish running commands, accept no new ones, then stop;
|
|
13
13
|
--wait returns once it has stopped (default limit 600 s)
|
|
14
14
|
capybara-device ceiling show [--json]
|
|
15
|
-
Show this machine's owner ceiling (
|
|
16
|
-
|
|
17
|
-
|
|
15
|
+
Show this machine's owner ceiling (outside the sandbox, network,
|
|
16
|
+
project reach)
|
|
17
|
+
capybara-device ceiling set [--outside-sandbox on|off] [--network open|allowlist]
|
|
18
|
+
[--project-reach workspace|os-user] [--yes]
|
|
19
|
+
Change the owner ceiling (at least one field; the others stay);
|
|
20
|
+
widening needs --yes or a y at the prompt
|
|
18
21
|
capybara-device keep-awake [show | off | while-busy | connected] [--yes] [--json]
|
|
19
22
|
Show or set when this computer is kept awake; raising it
|
|
20
23
|
needs --yes or a y at the prompt
|
|
@@ -22,7 +25,7 @@ export const USAGE = `Usage:
|
|
|
22
25
|
capybara-device policy set <key> <value>
|
|
23
26
|
Replace one field (cpu, memoryMb, allowCredentials)
|
|
24
27
|
capybara-device policy add|remove allowedDomains <host>
|
|
25
|
-
Allow or stop allowing a domain
|
|
28
|
+
Allow or stop allowing a domain on the sandbox allowlist
|
|
26
29
|
capybara-device policy add|remove allowCredentials <name>
|
|
27
30
|
Allow or stop allowing a credential for restricted work
|
|
28
31
|
capybara-device service install|uninstall
|
|
@@ -128,17 +131,25 @@ export function parseCommandLine(argv) {
|
|
|
128
131
|
}
|
|
129
132
|
case "ceiling": {
|
|
130
133
|
const { values, positionals } = parse(rest, {
|
|
131
|
-
"
|
|
134
|
+
"outside-sandbox": { type: "string" },
|
|
135
|
+
network: { type: "string" },
|
|
132
136
|
"project-reach": { type: "string" },
|
|
137
|
+
"full-access": { type: "string" },
|
|
133
138
|
yes: { type: "boolean", short: "y" },
|
|
134
139
|
json: { type: "boolean" },
|
|
135
140
|
});
|
|
136
141
|
const [action, ...extra] = positionals;
|
|
137
|
-
const usage = "usage: ceiling show | ceiling set --
|
|
142
|
+
const usage = "usage: ceiling show | ceiling set [--outside-sandbox on|off] [--network open|allowlist] " +
|
|
143
|
+
"[--project-reach workspace|os-user] [--yes]";
|
|
144
|
+
if (values["full-access"] !== undefined)
|
|
145
|
+
throw new UsageError(`--full-access is gone: Full access always runs in the sandbox now; use --outside-sandbox on|off. ${usage}`);
|
|
138
146
|
if (extra.length > 0)
|
|
139
147
|
throw new UsageError(usage);
|
|
148
|
+
const outside = values["outside-sandbox"];
|
|
149
|
+
const network = values.network;
|
|
150
|
+
const reach = values["project-reach"];
|
|
140
151
|
if (action === "show" || action === undefined) {
|
|
141
|
-
if (
|
|
152
|
+
if (outside !== undefined || network !== undefined || reach !== undefined)
|
|
142
153
|
throw new UsageError(usage);
|
|
143
154
|
return {
|
|
144
155
|
command: "ceiling",
|
|
@@ -150,18 +161,20 @@ export function parseCommandLine(argv) {
|
|
|
150
161
|
throw new UsageError(usage);
|
|
151
162
|
if (values.json === true)
|
|
152
163
|
throw new UsageError(usage);
|
|
153
|
-
|
|
154
|
-
|
|
155
|
-
|
|
156
|
-
|
|
164
|
+
if (outside === undefined && network === undefined && reach === undefined)
|
|
165
|
+
throw new UsageError(usage);
|
|
166
|
+
if (outside !== undefined && outside !== "on" && outside !== "off")
|
|
167
|
+
throw new UsageError(usage);
|
|
168
|
+
if (network !== undefined && network !== "open" && network !== "allowlist")
|
|
157
169
|
throw new UsageError(usage);
|
|
158
|
-
if (reach !== "workspace" && reach !== "os-user")
|
|
170
|
+
if (reach !== undefined && reach !== "workspace" && reach !== "os-user")
|
|
159
171
|
throw new UsageError(usage);
|
|
160
172
|
return {
|
|
161
173
|
command: "ceiling",
|
|
162
174
|
action: "set",
|
|
163
|
-
|
|
164
|
-
|
|
175
|
+
...(outside !== undefined && { outsideSandbox: outside === "on" }),
|
|
176
|
+
...(network !== undefined && { network }),
|
|
177
|
+
...(reach !== undefined && { projectReach: reach }),
|
|
165
178
|
...(values.yes === true && { yes: true }),
|
|
166
179
|
};
|
|
167
180
|
}
|
package/dist/cli.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ async function askOnTerminal(question) {
|
|
|
23
23
|
}
|
|
24
24
|
}
|
|
25
25
|
/**
|
|
26
|
-
* The program's parts (device protocol
|
|
26
|
+
* The program's parts (device protocol 4): the binder with one operation backend per bound
|
|
27
27
|
* generation, built for this host (macOS, Linux) or the device's container (docker mode). Loaded
|
|
28
28
|
* on demand: only start needs them.
|
|
29
29
|
*/
|
package/dist/client.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
/**
|
|
2
2
|
* What the device program's connection shares: the messages it ends with, the reconnect backoff
|
|
3
|
-
* and the running connection's interface. The connection itself is the protocol
|
|
3
|
+
* and the running connection's interface. The connection itself is the protocol 4 one
|
|
4
4
|
* (`staged-connect.ts`).
|
|
5
5
|
*/
|
|
6
6
|
import { DEVICE_PROTOCOL_VERSION } from "@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk";
|
|
@@ -16,8 +16,9 @@ export interface CeilingDeps {
|
|
|
16
16
|
/** True when `next` allows anything `cur` does not. */
|
|
17
17
|
export declare function widens(cur: OwnerCeilingPolicy, next: OwnerCeilingPolicy): boolean;
|
|
18
18
|
/**
|
|
19
|
-
* `ceiling show` prints the owner ceiling, the
|
|
20
|
-
*
|
|
19
|
+
* `ceiling show` prints the owner ceiling, the sandbox allowlist and the revision; `ceiling set`
|
|
20
|
+
* changes the named fields under the policy lock, the others as they are then (converting an
|
|
21
|
+
* old-format file).
|
|
21
22
|
* Narrowing applies directly; widening needs --yes or a confirmed terminal answer. Only the
|
|
22
23
|
* machine's owner widens it: the deployment may only narrow.
|
|
23
24
|
*/
|
package/dist/commands/ceiling.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -3,10 +3,14 @@ import { readStrictOwnerCeilingSync } from "../exec/operation-types.js";
|
|
|
3
3
|
import { PolicyStore } from "../policy-store.js";
|
|
4
4
|
import { policyPath, readCredential } from "../state.js";
|
|
5
5
|
/** Printed before a widening is applied (by --yes or a confirmed prompt). */
|
|
6
|
-
export const CEILING_WIDENING_TEXT = "Widening this machine's owner ceiling lets the deployment ask for more here.
|
|
7
|
-
"
|
|
8
|
-
"
|
|
9
|
-
"
|
|
6
|
+
export const CEILING_WIDENING_TEXT = "Widening this machine's owner ceiling lets the deployment ask for more here. Commands always " +
|
|
7
|
+
"run in the sandbox under every profile, Full access included. Allowing outside the sandbox " +
|
|
8
|
+
"lets one approved call run as you, with your files, credentials and any network: the person, " +
|
|
9
|
+
"the review model, or a Full access auto-grant approves each such call, and each one is " +
|
|
10
|
+
"recorded. The open network lets sandboxed commands reach the public internet (private, local " +
|
|
11
|
+
"and metadata addresses stay closed). The os-user project reach lets sandboxed work and " +
|
|
12
|
+
"project browsing read projects outside the device's workspace. Conversations need fresh Full " +
|
|
13
|
+
"access consent either way.";
|
|
10
14
|
export const CEILING_NEEDS_YES = "Nothing changed. To widen the owner ceiling, add --yes (or answer y at the prompt).";
|
|
11
15
|
export const CEILING_PROMPT = "Widen this machine's owner ceiling? [y/N] ";
|
|
12
16
|
/** The strict reader's revision for the logged-in device, or null (logged out, unreadable). */
|
|
@@ -26,17 +30,28 @@ function strictRevision(stateDir, home) {
|
|
|
26
30
|
class WideningNeedsConfirmation extends Error {
|
|
27
31
|
}
|
|
28
32
|
const describe = (c) => [
|
|
29
|
-
`
|
|
33
|
+
`Outside the sandbox: ${c.outsideSandbox ? "on" : "off"}`,
|
|
34
|
+
`Network: ${c.network}`,
|
|
30
35
|
`Project reach: ${c.restrictedProjectReach}`,
|
|
31
36
|
];
|
|
32
37
|
/** True when `next` allows anything `cur` does not. */
|
|
33
38
|
export function widens(cur, next) {
|
|
34
|
-
return ((!cur.
|
|
39
|
+
return ((!cur.outsideSandbox && next.outsideSandbox) ||
|
|
40
|
+
(cur.network === "allowlist" && next.network === "open") ||
|
|
35
41
|
(cur.restrictedProjectReach === "workspace" && next.restrictedProjectReach === "os-user"));
|
|
36
42
|
}
|
|
43
|
+
/** The target ceiling: the fields the command names, the others as they are in `cur`. */
|
|
44
|
+
function target(cmd, cur) {
|
|
45
|
+
return {
|
|
46
|
+
outsideSandbox: cmd.outsideSandbox ?? cur.outsideSandbox,
|
|
47
|
+
network: cmd.network ?? cur.network,
|
|
48
|
+
restrictedProjectReach: cmd.projectReach ?? cur.restrictedProjectReach,
|
|
49
|
+
};
|
|
50
|
+
}
|
|
37
51
|
/**
|
|
38
|
-
* `ceiling show` prints the owner ceiling, the
|
|
39
|
-
*
|
|
52
|
+
* `ceiling show` prints the owner ceiling, the sandbox allowlist and the revision; `ceiling set`
|
|
53
|
+
* changes the named fields under the policy lock, the others as they are then (converting an
|
|
54
|
+
* old-format file).
|
|
40
55
|
* Narrowing applies directly; widening needs --yes or a confirmed terminal answer. Only the
|
|
41
56
|
* machine's owner widens it: the deployment may only narrow.
|
|
42
57
|
*/
|
|
@@ -53,7 +68,9 @@ export async function ceilingCommand(cmd, deps) {
|
|
|
53
68
|
const cur = store.current();
|
|
54
69
|
if (cmd.action === "show" && cmd.json === true) {
|
|
55
70
|
out(JSON.stringify({
|
|
56
|
-
|
|
71
|
+
outsideSandbox: cur.ownerCeiling.outsideSandbox,
|
|
72
|
+
network: cur.ownerCeiling.network,
|
|
73
|
+
allowedDomains: cur.allowedDomains,
|
|
57
74
|
projectReach: cur.ownerCeiling.restrictedProjectReach,
|
|
58
75
|
// the strict reader's digest of the policy generation; null while logged out
|
|
59
76
|
revision: strictRevision(stateDir, deps.home),
|
|
@@ -63,7 +80,8 @@ export async function ceilingCommand(cmd, deps) {
|
|
|
63
80
|
if (cmd.action === "show") {
|
|
64
81
|
for (const line of describe(cur.ownerCeiling))
|
|
65
82
|
out(line);
|
|
66
|
-
out(`
|
|
83
|
+
out(`Sandbox allowlist: ${cur.allowedDomains.length > 0 ? cur.allowedDomains.join(", ") : "none"}` +
|
|
84
|
+
(cur.ownerCeiling.network === "open" ? " (used while the network is an allowlist)" : ""));
|
|
67
85
|
const cred = (() => {
|
|
68
86
|
try {
|
|
69
87
|
return readCredential(stateDir);
|
|
@@ -86,16 +104,12 @@ export async function ceilingCommand(cmd, deps) {
|
|
|
86
104
|
out(`Revision: unavailable (${e.message})`);
|
|
87
105
|
}
|
|
88
106
|
}
|
|
89
|
-
out("The platform and organization
|
|
90
|
-
"
|
|
107
|
+
out("The platform and organization sandbox settings and this machine's runtime support apply " +
|
|
108
|
+
"separately; the deployment's device page shows the effective permissions.");
|
|
91
109
|
return 0;
|
|
92
110
|
}
|
|
93
|
-
const next = {
|
|
94
|
-
fullAccess: cmd.fullAccess,
|
|
95
|
-
restrictedProjectReach: cmd.projectReach,
|
|
96
|
-
};
|
|
97
111
|
let confirmed = cmd.yes === true;
|
|
98
|
-
if (widens(cur.ownerCeiling,
|
|
112
|
+
if (widens(cur.ownerCeiling, target(cmd, cur.ownerCeiling))) {
|
|
99
113
|
out(CEILING_WIDENING_TEXT);
|
|
100
114
|
if (!confirmed) {
|
|
101
115
|
if (deps.ask === undefined) {
|
|
@@ -116,9 +130,10 @@ export async function ceilingCommand(cmd, deps) {
|
|
|
116
130
|
// decided again on the policy under the lock: a narrowing that landed since the read above
|
|
117
131
|
// makes this a widening, which needs its own confirmation
|
|
118
132
|
written = store.update((p) => {
|
|
133
|
+
const next = target(cmd, p.ownerCeiling);
|
|
119
134
|
if (!confirmed && widens(p.ownerCeiling, next))
|
|
120
135
|
throw new WideningNeedsConfirmation();
|
|
121
|
-
return { ...p, ownerCeiling:
|
|
136
|
+
return { ...p, ownerCeiling: next };
|
|
122
137
|
}).ownerCeiling;
|
|
123
138
|
}
|
|
124
139
|
catch (e) {
|
|
@@ -130,12 +145,15 @@ export async function ceilingCommand(cmd, deps) {
|
|
|
130
145
|
err(`Cannot change ${policyPath(stateDir)}: ${e.message}`);
|
|
131
146
|
return 1;
|
|
132
147
|
}
|
|
133
|
-
noteCliPolicyChange(stateDir, `ceiling set
|
|
134
|
-
written.restrictedProjectReach);
|
|
148
|
+
noteCliPolicyChange(stateDir, `ceiling set outsideSandbox ${written.outsideSandbox ? "on" : "off"}, network ` +
|
|
149
|
+
`${written.network}, projectReach ${written.restrictedProjectReach}`);
|
|
135
150
|
out("This machine's owner ceiling is now:");
|
|
136
151
|
for (const line of describe(written))
|
|
137
152
|
out(line);
|
|
153
|
+
if (written.network === "allowlist")
|
|
154
|
+
out("Sandboxed commands reach only the sandbox allowlist (capybara-device policy add " +
|
|
155
|
+
"allowedDomains <host>).");
|
|
138
156
|
if (written.restrictedProjectReach === "os-user")
|
|
139
|
-
out("
|
|
157
|
+
out("Sandboxed work may reach selected projects outside the device's workspace.");
|
|
140
158
|
return 0;
|
|
141
159
|
}
|
package/dist/commands/login.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import type { DeviceNetworkMode } from "@capybara-hq/plugin-sdk";
|
|
1
2
|
import { type FetchFn } from "../api.js";
|
|
2
3
|
import type { Command } from "../args.js";
|
|
3
4
|
/**
|
|
4
|
-
* Shown once at login when the owner ceiling allows
|
|
5
|
-
* it:
|
|
5
|
+
* Shown once at login when the owner ceiling allows running outside the sandbox in an organization
|
|
6
|
+
* that allows it: an escalated call's trust model is its approval and the command review, not the
|
|
7
|
+
* OS sandbox.
|
|
6
8
|
*/
|
|
7
|
-
export declare const
|
|
9
|
+
export declare const OUTSIDE_SANDBOX_RISK_TEXT: string;
|
|
8
10
|
/** The OS sandbox check `login` uses (default: the runtime's, loaded on demand). */
|
|
9
11
|
export type SandboxCheck = () => {
|
|
10
12
|
ok: true;
|
|
@@ -14,16 +16,18 @@ export type SandboxCheck = () => {
|
|
|
14
16
|
};
|
|
15
17
|
/** How the owner widens the ceiling, on this machine only (the deployment may only narrow it). */
|
|
16
18
|
export declare const WIDEN_CEILING_HINT: string;
|
|
19
|
+
/** The sandbox network line of the login output. */
|
|
20
|
+
export declare function networkLoginLine(network: DeviceNetworkMode): string;
|
|
17
21
|
/**
|
|
18
|
-
* The line `login` prints
|
|
19
|
-
*
|
|
22
|
+
* The line `login` prints when the owner ceiling keeps every call in the sandbox (the default of a
|
|
23
|
+
* new setup): commands run in the sandbox under every profile, Full access included.
|
|
20
24
|
*/
|
|
21
|
-
export declare const
|
|
22
|
-
/** The line `login` prints when the owner ceiling allows
|
|
23
|
-
export declare const
|
|
24
|
-
/** Added when the organization does not allow
|
|
25
|
-
export declare const
|
|
26
|
-
/** The line `login` prints when
|
|
25
|
+
export declare const SANDBOX_ONLY_LOGIN_LINE: string;
|
|
26
|
+
/** The line `login` prints when the owner ceiling allows running outside the sandbox. */
|
|
27
|
+
export declare const OUTSIDE_SANDBOX_LOGIN_LINE: string;
|
|
28
|
+
/** Added when the organization does not allow running outside the sandbox while the owner does. */
|
|
29
|
+
export declare const OUTSIDE_SANDBOX_NOT_ALLOWED_LOGIN_LINE: string;
|
|
30
|
+
/** The line `login` prints when sandboxed work cannot run here (no OS sandbox). */
|
|
27
31
|
export declare function restrictedUnavailableLoginLine(reason: string): string;
|
|
28
32
|
export interface LoginDeps {
|
|
29
33
|
stateDir: string;
|