@brainervirus/workit-core 0.6.0 → 0.7.0

package/src/core/flow-state.ts

@@ -1,18 +1,115 @@
-import { mkdirSync, readFileSync, renameSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
+import { mkdirSync, readFileSync, renameSync, rmSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
 import path from "node:path";
-import { parseTasksFromPlan, qualitySpec, stripFences } from "./docs-validate";
+import { docsValidate, parseTasksFromPlan, qualitySpec, stripFences } from "./docs-validate";
+import { resolveCanonicalLayout } from "./docs-layout";
 
+export type FlowHost = "opencode" | "cursor";
 export type FlowStatus = "draft" | "self_reviewed" | "approved";
-export type FlowDocState = { path: string; status: FlowStatus };
+export type FlowRole = "coordinator" | "delegated";
+
+/**
+ * Host-bound identity for every flow/product mutation (FG-05, CA-20, CA-21):
+ * the authoritative host workspace, the coordinator/delegated role, the host
+ * session, and the authenticated task identity a delegated worker carries.
+ * Cursor has no per-session identity, so it derives a deterministic session
+ * from the workspace root; OpenCode derives it from the tool context.
+ * Delegation is host-derived (Task 30, AR-12): callers never supply `role`.
+ */
+export type MutationContext = {
+  hostWorkspace: string;
+  role: FlowRole;
+  sessionId: string;
+  taskIdentity?: string;
+};
+
+/** Recovery guidance surfaced on a blocked coordinator mutation (FG-07). */
+export const COORDINATOR_RECOVERY_TEXT =
+  "A subagent-driven plan is active: coordinator product edits are blocked. " +
+  "Delegate product mutations (task briefs, progress, review packages) to an " +
+  "authenticated delegated worker via `task` / `wk-implement` instead of " +
+  "editing in the coordinator session.";
+
+/**
+ * Cursor recovery guidance for the unsupported subagent-driven mutation path
+ * (CA-42): the Cursor MCP has no child sessions, so it cannot run a
+ * subagent-driven plan and must not enter that flow state.
+ */
+export const CURSOR_SUBAGENT_UNSUPPORTED_TEXT =
+  "Cursor cannot execute subagent-driven plans: the MCP has no child-session " +
+  "support. Choose Inline, Handoff, or a review option in this session, or " +
+  "run the plan in OpenCode with `wk-implement`.";
+
+/**
+ * The only acceptable approval / execution-menu evidence (FG-04, CA-19, AR-12).
+ * Trust comes from HOST CAPABILITIES, never from caller-supplied fields:
+ *
+ * - OpenCode: a one-use receipt the plugin records when it observes the
+ *   answered native `question` tool (host-observed, `attested: true`). The
+ *   approval/menu tool schemas expose no evidence argument; the receipt is
+ *   consumed from the in-memory store bound to sessionID + callID + exact
+ *   selected label + timestamp.
+ * - Cursor: a policy-only constant (`attested: false`). The MCP cannot observe
+ *   the AskQuestion result, so it records an unauthenticated confirmation and
+ *   never claims a host-observed answer. The constant carries no caller data.
+ */
+export type OpenCodeChoiceEvidence = {
+  host: "opencode";
+  attested: true;
+  /** Host question-tool call id observed by the plugin hook. */
+  callID: string;
+  /** The exact label the user selected. */
+  selectedLabel: string;
+  recordedAt: number;
+};
+
+export type CursorConfirmation = {
+  host: "cursor";
+  attested: false;
+  confirmation: "contract";
+};
+
+export type NativeChoiceEvidence = OpenCodeChoiceEvidence | CursorConfirmation;
+
+export type FlowDocState = {
+  path: string;
+  status: FlowStatus;
+  evidence?: NativeChoiceEvidence | null;
+};
+
+export type FlowMenuState = {
+  presented: boolean;
+  chosen: string;
+  evidence?: NativeChoiceEvidence | null;
+};
+
 export type FlowState = {
   slug: string;
+  /** Recorded when flow preparation began (FG-01): canonical paths + activation. */
+  activated: boolean;
   spec: FlowDocState;
   plan: FlowDocState;
-  menu: { presented: boolean; chosen: string };
+  menu: FlowMenuState;
   updated_at: number;
 };
 
-type Result = { ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string };
+/** One shared result shape for every flow transition and mutation gate (FG-09). */
+export type FlowError = { ok: false; error: string; code: string };
+export type FlowGateResult = { ok: true } | FlowError;
+export type EvidenceResult =
+  | { ok: true; evidence: NativeChoiceEvidence }
+  | { ok: false; error: string };
+export type StatusTransition = { ok: true; next: FlowStatus } | FlowError;
+
+export const MENU_CHOICES = [
+  "subagent-driven",
+  "inline",
+  "handoff",
+  "review-spec",
+  "review-plan",
+] as const;
+export type MenuChoice = (typeof MENU_CHOICES)[number];
+
+const err = (code: string, error: string): FlowError => ({ ok: false, code, error });
 
 const SLUG_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*$/;
 
@@ -21,173 +118,768 @@ const flowPath = (root: string, slug: string) => {
   return path.join(root, "docs", slug, "sdd", "flow.json");
 };
 
+// Resolve one spec/plan doc path under the shared contained contract (DC-01,
+// DC-02): the caller-supplied slug must match the slug derived from the path.
+const resolveDoc = (
+  root: string,
+  slug: string,
+  docPath: string,
+  kind: "spec" | "plan",
+): { ok: true; path: string } | { ok: false; error: string } => {
+  const resolved = resolveCanonicalLayout({
+    workspace_root: root,
+    ...(slug ? { slug } : {}),
+    [kind === "spec" ? "spec_path" : "plan_path"]: docPath,
+  });
+  if (!resolved.ok) return { ok: false, error: resolved.error };
+  return { ok: true, path: resolved.layout[kind === "spec" ? "spec" : "plan"] };
+};
+
+// A flow.json that exists was activated when preparation began; the field is
+// kept for forward compatibility but a present file is always treated as
+// activated. Missing state is NOT silently activated (FG-01).
+const normalizeState = (parsed: unknown, slug: string): FlowState => {
+  const p = (parsed ?? {}) as Partial<FlowState>;
+  const spec = (p.spec ?? {}) as Partial<FlowDocState>;
+  const plan = (p.plan ?? {}) as Partial<FlowDocState>;
+  const menu = (p.menu ?? {}) as Partial<FlowMenuState>;
+  return {
+    slug: p.slug ?? slug,
+    activated: p.activated ?? true,
+    spec: {
+      path: spec.path ?? "",
+      status: spec.status ?? "draft",
+      evidence: spec.evidence ?? null,
+    },
+    plan: {
+      path: plan.path ?? "",
+      status: plan.status ?? "draft",
+      evidence: plan.evidence ?? null,
+    },
+    menu: {
+      presented: Boolean(menu.presented),
+      chosen: menu.chosen ?? "",
+      evidence: menu.evidence ?? null,
+    },
+    updated_at: p.updated_at ?? Date.now(),
+  };
+};
+
+const emptyState = (slug: string): FlowState => ({
+  slug,
+  activated: false,
+  spec: { path: "", status: "draft", evidence: null },
+  plan: { path: "", status: "draft", evidence: null },
+  menu: { presented: false, chosen: "", evidence: null },
+  updated_at: Date.now(),
+});
+
 export const readFlowState = (root: string, slug: string): FlowState => {
+  const file = flowPath(root, slug);
+  if (!existsSync(file)) return emptyState(slug);
+  try {
+    return normalizeState(JSON.parse(readFileSync(file, "utf8")), slug);
+  } catch {
+    return emptyState(slug);
+  }
+};
+
+// Strict read for transitions and guards: missing or corrupt state is a
+// structured error, never a silent draft fallback (CA-18).
+type StrictRead = { ok: true; state: FlowState } | { ok: false; error: string; code: string };
+
+const readFlowStrict = (root: string, slug: string): StrictRead => {
   const file = flowPath(root, slug);
   if (!existsSync(file)) {
-    return {
-      slug,
-      spec: { path: "", status: "draft" },
-      plan: { path: "", status: "draft" },
-      menu: { presented: false, chosen: "" },
-      updated_at: Date.now(),
-    };
+    return err(
+      "flow_not_activated",
+      `flow not activated for ${slug} — run workflow_flow_status first`,
+    );
   }
   try {
-    const parsed = JSON.parse(readFileSync(file, "utf8")) as Partial<FlowState>;
-    return {
-      slug: parsed.slug ?? slug,
-      spec: { path: parsed.spec?.path ?? "", status: parsed.spec?.status ?? "draft" },
-      plan: { path: parsed.plan?.path ?? "", status: parsed.plan?.status ?? "draft" },
-      menu: { presented: Boolean(parsed.menu?.presented), chosen: parsed.menu?.chosen ?? "" },
-      updated_at: parsed.updated_at ?? Date.now(),
-    };
-  } catch {
-    return {
-      slug,
-      spec: { path: "", status: "draft" },
-      plan: { path: "", status: "draft" },
-      menu: { presented: false, chosen: "" },
-      updated_at: Date.now(),
-    };
+    return { ok: true, state: normalizeState(JSON.parse(readFileSync(file, "utf8")), slug) };
+  } catch (error) {
+    return err(
+      "flow_corrupt",
+      `corrupt flow state at ${file}: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`,
+    );
   }
 };
 
+// Unique per-write temporary buffer so two concurrent writers never share the
+// same `<file>.tmp` (FG-08, CA-21). Pattern mirrors docs-migration.ts:597.
+const uniqueTempPath = (file: string) =>
+  `${file}.${process.pid}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2)}.tmp`;
+
 export const writeFlowState = (root: string, state: FlowState) => {
   const file = flowPath(root, state.slug);
   mkdirSync(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
-  const tmp = `${file}.tmp`;
+  const tmp = uniqueTempPath(file);
   writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify(state, null, 2) + "\n", "utf8");
   renameSync(tmp, file);
 };
 
-const nextStatus = (
-  current: FlowStatus,
-  confirmed: boolean,
-): { ok: false; error: string } | { ok: true; next: FlowStatus } => {
-  if (!confirmed) return { ok: false, error: "confirmed: true required" };
-  if (current === "draft") return { ok: true, next: "self_reviewed" };
-  if (current === "self_reviewed") return { ok: true, next: "approved" };
-  return { ok: false, error: "already approved; no further transitions" };
-};
+const MAX_WRITE_ATTEMPTS = 5;
 
-export const transitionSpec = (
+export type FlowWriteResult =
+  | { ok: true }
+  | { ok: false; conflict: true }
+  | { ok: false; io_error: string };
+
+/**
+ * Compare-and-write (FG-08): write `next` only if the on-disk content still
+ * equals the version this writer read (`expected`). A stale writer gets
+ * `conflict` instead of clobbering a concurrent newer write; the caller re-reads
+ * and retries the transition (bounded). Unique per-write temp names keep the
+ * write buffer from being shared between writers.
+ *
+ * The first compare happens before the buffer is staged; the file is re-read
+ * immediately before the rename so a writer that committed between the two
+ * points still wins. Without the re-read, two writers holding the same expected
+ * text would both pass the compare and both rename — a lost update.
+ * ponytail: the re-read shrinks but cannot close the cross-process window (a
+ * writer can still commit between this re-read and the rename). Upgrade path:
+ * hold an O_EXCL advisory lock on `<file>.lock` across the read-modify-write,
+ * or move to renameat2(RENAME_EXCHANGE)/an OS-level CAS when a second
+ * concurrent process becomes a supported topology.
+ *
+ * A thrown error here is a real IO/permission failure (EACCES, ENOSPC, ...),
+ * not a conflict: it is returned as `io_error` so callers surface it instead of
+ * advising a pointless re-read-and-retry. Any unique `.tmp` staged by this
+ * writer is removed on every non-success path so crashed writers don't
+ * accumulate temp buffers.
+ */
+export const writeFlowStateIfCurrent = (
   root: string,
-  slug: string,
-  specPath: string,
-  confirmed: boolean,
-): Result => {
-  let state: FlowState;
+  expected: FlowState,
+  next: FlowState,
+): FlowWriteResult => {
+  const file = flowPath(root, next.slug);
+  const expectedText = JSON.stringify(expected, null, 2) + "\n";
+  const nextText = JSON.stringify(next, null, 2) + "\n";
+  if (expectedText === nextText) return { ok: true };
+  const tmp = uniqueTempPath(file);
   try {
-    state = readFlowState(root, slug);
+    const currentText = existsSync(file) ? readFileSync(file, "utf8") : null;
+    if (currentText !== expectedText) return { ok: false, conflict: true };
+    mkdirSync(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(tmp, nextText, "utf8");
+    const reRead = existsSync(file) ? readFileSync(file, "utf8") : null;
+    if (reRead !== expectedText) return { ok: false, conflict: true };
+    renameSync(tmp, file);
+    return { ok: true };
   } catch (error) {
-    return { ok: false, error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "invalid flow state" };
+    return { ok: false, io_error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error) };
+  } finally {
+    // On success the rename moved the buffer into place; on any other exit the
+    // unique temp is orphaned — remove it so crashed writers don't accumulate
+    // `<file>.<pid>-<rand>.tmp` buffers.
+    try {
+      if (existsSync(tmp)) rmSync(tmp, { force: true });
+    } catch {
+      // best effort: a leftover temp is preferable to masking the real error
+    }
+  }
+};
+
+type MutateResult = { ok: true; next: FlowState } | FlowError;
+
+// Unlocked read-modify-write made safe (FG-08): read strict, mutate in memory,
+// then commit only if the on-disk state still matches what was read; otherwise
+// re-read and retry the transition, bounded.
+const readModifyWrite = (
+  root: string,
+  slug: string,
+  mutate: (state: FlowState) => MutateResult,
+): FlowGateResult => {
+  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < MAX_WRITE_ATTEMPTS; attempt++) {
+    const strict = readFlowStrict(root, slug);
+    if (!strict.ok) return strict;
+    const result = mutate(strict.state);
+    if (!result.ok) return result;
+    const commit = writeFlowStateIfCurrent(root, strict.state, result.next);
+    if (commit.ok) return { ok: true };
+    if ("io_error" in commit) {
+      return err("flow_io_error", `flow state write failed for ${slug}: ${commit.io_error}`);
+    }
+    // a concurrent writer won the race — re-read and retry the transition
+  }
+  return err(
+    "flow_concurrent_conflict",
+    `concurrent flow update detected for ${slug}: re-read the flow state and retry the transition`,
+  );
+};
+
+// The caller-supplied workspace must be the host workspace the context names
+// (CA-21): a context built for another repo must not drive writes here.
+const assertMutationWorkspace = (root: string, ctx?: MutationContext): FlowGateResult => {
+  if (ctx && ctx.hostWorkspace !== root) {
+    return err(
+      "workspace_mismatch",
+      `mutation context workspace ${JSON.stringify(ctx.hostWorkspace)} does not match flow workspace ${JSON.stringify(root)}`,
+    );
+  }
+  return { ok: true };
+};
+
+/**
+ * Coordinator boundary (FG-05, CA-20): once a plan is subagent-driven, the
+ * coordinator session cannot mutate product state — only authenticated
+ * delegated workers can. A delegated worker without a task identity is blocked.
+ */
+export const assertCoordinatorBoundary = (
+  ctx: MutationContext | undefined,
+  menu: FlowMenuState,
+): FlowGateResult => {
+  if (ctx?.role === "coordinator" && menu.chosen === "subagent-driven") {
+    return err("coordinator_blocked", COORDINATOR_RECOVERY_TEXT);
   }
-  if (!existsSync(path.isAbsolute(specPath) ? specPath : path.join(root, specPath))) {
-    return { ok: false, error: `spec not found: ${specPath}` };
+  if (ctx?.role === "delegated" && !ctx.taskIdentity) {
+    return err(
+      "delegated_unauthenticated",
+      "delegated mutations require an authenticated task identity (taskIdentity) — re-run inside the delegated worker session",
+    );
   }
-  if (state.spec.status === "draft" && confirmed) {
-    const specFile = path.isAbsolute(specPath) ? specPath : path.join(root, specPath);
-    let text: string;
-    try {
-      text = readFileSync(specFile, "utf8");
-    } catch (error) {
+  return { ok: true };
+};
+
+/**
+ * The shared transition matrix (FG-09): draft -> approved in one receipt; a
+ * legacy self_reviewed state still advances to approved. The self-review
+ * validation runs automatically inside the draft transition.
+ */
+export const nextFlowStatus = (current: FlowStatus): StatusTransition => {
+  if (current === "draft") return { ok: true, next: "approved" };
+  if (current === "self_reviewed") return { ok: true, next: "approved" };
+  return err("flow_already_approved", "already approved; no further transitions");
+};
+
+const MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_MS = 60_000;
+const MAX_RECEIPTS_PER_SESSION = 10;
+
+/**
+ * Freshness window for receipts (FINDING 2): an answer older than this can no
+ * longer be taken as the user's current intent. ponytail: fixed constant, not
+ * config — the consume path runs per approval-tool call, so a knob would buy
+ * surface area, not security.
+ */
+const RECEIPT_FRESHNESS_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
+
+/**
+ * Independent belt-and-suspenders age gate for evidence objects passed to the
+ * transition functions (receipts are already capped at RECEIPT_FRESHNESS_MS at
+ * consume time; this defends direct library callers that fabricate a shape).
+ */
+const EVIDENCE_WINDOW_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+
+/**
+ * Case-insensitive negative-answer denylist (FINDING 3): a user answering
+ * "No"/"Reject"/"Cancel" can never be recorded as consent for an approval or
+ * a menu choice. The boundary closes the laundering case (negative answer ->
+ * approval); a prefix variant ("no, thanks") is covered too.
+ */
+const NEGATIVE_ANSWER_LABELS = [
+  "no",
+  "nope",
+  "nah",
+  "reject",
+  "cancel",
+  "decline",
+  "not now",
+  "not yet",
+  "skip",
+  "back",
+  "deny",
+];
+
+const isNegativeLabel = (label: string): boolean => {
+  const normalized = label.trim().toLowerCase();
+  return NEGATIVE_ANSWER_LABELS.some((entry) => {
+    const firstWord = normalized.split(/\s+/)[0] ?? "";
+    if (entry.includes(" ")) {
+      // multi-word entries ("not now", "not yet"): whole-answer match,
+      // punctuation-insensitive ("not yet, let me check" -> "not yet")
+      const plain = normalized.replace(/[^a-z ]/g, "");
+      return plain === entry || plain.startsWith(`${entry} `);
+    }
+    // single-word entries ("no", "reject", ...): match the first word,
+    // ignoring punctuation ("no, thanks" -> "no"); "notebook" stays allowed
+    return firstWord.replace(/[^a-z]/g, "") === entry;
+  });
+};
+
+/**
+ * One-use host-observed receipt (AR-12, CA-41): recorded by the OpenCode
+ * plugin when the answered `question` tool completes, bound to the session,
+ * the question tool call id, the exact selected label, and the timestamp.
+ * The model has no way to inject a receipt — `record` is only reachable from
+ * the plugin's `tool.execute.after` hook.
+ */
+export type HostReceipt = {
+  sessionId: string;
+  callID: string;
+  selectedLabel: string;
+  recordedAt: number;
+  /** The question text the user answered (plugin-observed, best effort), so
+   *  the consuming tool can report WHICH question authorized a transition
+   *  (FINDING 2). */
+  question?: string;
+};
+
+export type ReceiptConsumeResult = { ok: true; receipt: HostReceipt } | FlowError;
+
+/**
+ * In-memory per-session receipt queue. `record` simulates the host hook; the
+ * OpenCode plugin is the only production caller. Unconsumed receipts are
+ * bounded per session (oldest dropped) so a session that asks questions
+ * without approving cannot grow memory without limit.
+ *
+ * Correlation (FINDING 2): on a real host the model first calls the native
+ * `question` (user answers), THEN calls the approval/menu tool — the tools
+ * never run a question internally, so a before/after execution window can
+ * never capture the answer. Consumption therefore takes the session's MOST
+ * RECENT unconsumed receipt and verifies: one-use (atomic take), freshness
+ * (RECEIPT_FRESHNESS_MS), NOT a negative label (isNegativeLabel), and session
+ * match. Menu tools additionally pin the expected choice label. CallID and
+ * the exact selected label stay bound at record time.
+ *
+ * Residual risk (honest boundary): any recent POSITIVE host answer (e.g. a
+ * "proceed with stash?" -> "yes, proceed") plus the model's choice to call an
+ * approval tool authorizes the transition. The laundering case — a negative
+ * answer recorded as an approval — is closed by the negative-label denylist.
+ *
+ * ponytail: in-memory only — receipts die with the plugin process, which is
+ * correct: a host-observed answer cannot survive a restart. Upgrade path:
+ * persist to the host session store when cross-restart approvals are required.
+ */
+export class HostReceiptStore {
+  #bySession = new Map<string, HostReceipt[]>();
+
+  record(
+    sessionId: string,
+    callID: string,
+    selectedLabel: string,
+    recordedAt: number = Date.now(),
+    question?: string,
+  ): void {
+    const label = selectedLabel.trim();
+    if (!label) return;
+    if (recordedAt > Date.now() + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_MS) return; // forged future receipt
+    const queue = this.#bySession.get(sessionId) ?? [];
+    if (queue.length >= MAX_RECEIPTS_PER_SESSION) queue.shift();
+    queue.push({ sessionId, callID, selectedLabel: label, recordedAt, question });
+    this.#bySession.set(sessionId, queue);
+  }
+
+  count(sessionId: string): number {
+    return this.#bySession.get(sessionId)?.length ?? 0;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Non-destructive consume: same checks as `consume`, but a positive receipt
+   * stays queued. The tools no longer use peek — FINDING 5 (round 3) moved the
+   * approval/menu tools to consume-before-transition (the atomic take gates
+   * the transition and is spent on any attempt, closing the concurrent-call
+   * race). Peek remains for tests and read-only callers. A NEGATIVE receipt is
+   * the exception: it is spent by peek too (consumed-and-rejected, FINDING 3)
+   * so it cannot poison the top of the queue.
+   */
+  peek(sessionId: string, opts: { label?: string } = {}): ReceiptConsumeResult {
+    return this.#take(sessionId, opts, false);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * One-use consumption of the session's most recent receipt (FINDING 2).
+   * The atomic take gates the transition at the tool layer (FINDING 5, round
+   * 3): a stale receipt, a wrong pinned label (menu), or a negative label
+   * fails the transition; the receipt is removed on take, staleness, or
+   * negativity (fail-closed). A wrong label (menu) is NOT spent — it stays
+   * queued for the choice it actually matched.
+   */
+  consume(sessionId: string, opts: { label?: string } = {}): ReceiptConsumeResult {
+    return this.#take(sessionId, opts, true);
+  }
+
+  #take(sessionId: string, opts: { label?: string }, remove: boolean): ReceiptConsumeResult {
+    const queue = this.#bySession.get(sessionId);
+    if (!queue || queue.length === 0) {
+      return err(
+        "receipt_missing",
+        "no host-observed native-question receipt for this session — ask the native " +
+          "`question` tool and have the user answer before calling this tool",
+      );
+    }
+    const index = queue.length - 1;
+    const receipt = queue[index];
+    if (isNegativeLabel(receipt.selectedLabel)) {
+      // Consumed-and-rejected: a negative answer is still an answer, and it
+      // can never authorize a transition (FINDING 3). The whole session queue
+      // is revoked too: the user's most recent intent is negative, so an
+      // older positive answer must not come back to life on a retry.
+      this.#bySession.delete(sessionId);
+      return err(
+        "receipt_rejected",
+        `the user's most recent answer (${JSON.stringify(receipt.selectedLabel)}) is a ` +
+          "negative answer — it cannot authorize an approval; ask the native question again",
+      );
+    }
+    if (opts.label !== undefined && !sameChoiceLabel(receipt.selectedLabel, opts.label)) {
+      // FINDING 6: a wrong-label answer is not spent — it stays queued for
+      // the choice it actually matched (or expires via freshness/bounds).
+      return err(
+        "evidence_mismatch",
+        `receipt selectedLabel does not match ${JSON.stringify(opts.label)} — fabricated menu choice rejected`,
+      );
+    }
+    if (Date.now() - receipt.recordedAt > RECEIPT_FRESHNESS_MS) {
+      if (remove) {
+        queue.splice(index, 1);
+        if (queue.length === 0) this.#bySession.delete(sessionId);
+      }
+      return err(
+        "receipt_stale",
+        "the question receipt is too old — ask the native question again and re-answer",
+      );
+    }
+    if (remove) {
+      queue.splice(index, 1);
+      if (queue.length === 0) this.#bySession.delete(sessionId);
+    }
+    return { ok: true, receipt };
+  }
+}
+
+/** Menu labels compare case-insensitively: the host presents "Inline", the
+ *  enum stores "inline" (FINDING 3). */
+const sameChoiceLabel = (a: string, b: string): boolean => a.toLowerCase() === b.toLowerCase();
+
+/** Derive the evidence record from a consumed host receipt (AR-12). */
+export const createOpenCodeEvidence = (receipt: HostReceipt): OpenCodeChoiceEvidence => ({
+  host: "opencode",
+  attested: true,
+  callID: receipt.callID,
+  selectedLabel: receipt.selectedLabel,
+  recordedAt: receipt.recordedAt,
+});
+
+/** The Cursor policy-only constant: unauthenticated, no caller data (CA-42). */
+export const createCursorConfirmation = (): EvidenceResult => ({
+  ok: true,
+  evidence: { host: "cursor", attested: false, confirmation: "contract" },
+});
+
+const CURSOR_KEYS = ["attested", "confirmation", "host"];
+
+/**
+ * Strict shape validation for every flow transition (CA-41): OpenCode evidence
+ * must be a host-attested receipt record; Cursor evidence must be exactly the
+ * policy-only constant and carries no caller-supplied question data. A Cursor
+ * object claiming an observed answer (`attested: true`) is rejected as forged.
+ */
+export const assertEvidenceShape = (input: unknown): EvidenceResult => {
+  if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      error:
+        "native choice evidence required — bare booleans and other primitives are not approval evidence",
+    };
+  }
+  const record = input as Record<string, unknown>;
+  if (record.host === "cursor") {
+    if (record.attested !== false || record.confirmation !== "contract") {
       return {
         ok: false,
-        error: `spec self-review failed: unreadable spec: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`,
+        error:
+          'cursor confirmations are policy-only: exactly { host: "cursor", attested: false, confirmation: "contract" } — Cursor cannot attest a host-observed answer',
       };
     }
-    const hard = qualitySpec(text).filter((f) => f.severity === "hard");
-    const missing: string[] = [];
-    if (!/^\s*\*+Branch:\*+/im.test(stripFences(text))) missing.push("**Branch:** header missing");
-    if (hard.length > 0 || missing.length > 0) {
+    const keys = Object.keys(record).sort();
+    if (keys.length !== CURSOR_KEYS.length || !CURSOR_KEYS.every((key) => keys.includes(key))) {
       return {
         ok: false,
         error:
-          "spec self-review failed: " +
-          hard.map((f) => `${f.code} — ${f.message}`).concat(missing).join("; ") +
-          " — see templates/spec-template.md for the required structure",
+          "cursor confirmations carry no caller-supplied question data — the attested: false constant only",
       };
     }
+    return { ok: true, evidence: { host: "cursor", attested: false, confirmation: "contract" } };
+  }
+  if (record.host !== "opencode") {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      error: `evidence host must be 'opencode' or 'cursor', got ${JSON.stringify(record.host)}`,
+    };
+  }
+  if (record.attested !== true) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      error:
+        "opencode evidence requires host attestation (attested: true) — only host-observed question receipts are accepted",
+    };
+  }
+  const { callID, selectedLabel, recordedAt } = record;
+  if (typeof callID !== "string" || callID.trim() === "") {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      error: "opencode evidence callID must be a non-empty string (host question tool call)",
+    };
+  }
+  if (typeof selectedLabel !== "string" || selectedLabel.trim() === "") {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      error:
+        "opencode evidence selectedLabel must be the exact label the user selected on the native question",
+    };
+  }
+  if (typeof recordedAt !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(recordedAt) || recordedAt <= 0) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      error: "opencode evidence recordedAt must be a positive epoch-ms timestamp",
+    };
   }
-  const step = nextStatus(state.spec.status, confirmed);
-  if (!step.ok) return { ok: false, error: step.error };
-  writeFlowState(root, {
-    ...state,
-    spec: { path: specPath, status: step.next },
-    updated_at: Date.now(),
+  const now = Date.now();
+  if (recordedAt > now + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_MS) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      error: "opencode evidence recordedAt is in the future — forged evidence is rejected",
+    };
+  }
+  if (now - recordedAt > EVIDENCE_WINDOW_MS) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      error:
+        "opencode evidence recordedAt is too old — ask the native question again and re-record the answer",
+    };
+  }
+  return {
+    ok: true,
+    evidence: {
+      host: "opencode",
+      attested: true,
+      callID: callID.trim(),
+      selectedLabel: selectedLabel.trim(),
+      recordedAt,
+    },
+  };
+};
+
+/** Host provenance binding: OpenCode only accepts opencode evidence, and vice versa. */
+export const assertHostEvidence = (host: FlowHost, evidence: unknown): FlowGateResult => {
+  const shaped = assertEvidenceShape(evidence);
+  if (!shaped.ok) return err("evidence_invalid", shaped.error);
+  if (shaped.evidence.host !== host) {
+    return err(
+      "evidence_host_mismatch",
+      `evidence was recorded on ${JSON.stringify(shaped.evidence.host)}, not ${host} — forged or misattributed evidence is rejected`,
+    );
+  }
+  return { ok: true };
+};
+
+/**
+ * Record flow activation and the canonical spec/plan paths when preparation
+ * begins. The flow store lives under the canonical docs/<slug>/sdd/ layout
+ * (Task 18 contract). Re-runs keep existing statuses while recording paths.
+ */
+export const prepareFlowState = (
+  root: string,
+  slug: string,
+  opts: { spec_path?: string; plan_path?: string } = {},
+  ctx?: MutationContext,
+): FlowGateResult => {
+  const bound = assertMutationWorkspace(root, ctx);
+  if (!bound.ok) return bound;
+  const resolved = resolveCanonicalLayout({
+    workspace_root: root,
+    slug,
+    spec_path: opts.spec_path,
+    plan_path: opts.plan_path,
   });
+  if (!resolved.ok) return err("flow_prepare_failed", resolved.error);
+  const specPath = path.posix.join("docs", slug, "spec.md");
+  const planPath = path.posix.join("docs", slug, "plan.md");
+  const current = readFlowState(root, slug);
+  const state: FlowState = current.activated
+    ? {
+        ...current,
+        spec: { ...current.spec, path: specPath },
+        plan: { ...current.plan, path: planPath },
+        updated_at: Date.now(),
+      }
+    : {
+        slug,
+        activated: true,
+        spec: { path: specPath, status: "draft", evidence: null },
+        plan: { path: planPath, status: "draft", evidence: null },
+        menu: { presented: false, chosen: "", evidence: null },
+        updated_at: Date.now(),
+      };
+  writeFlowState(root, state);
   return { ok: true };
 };
 
+export const transitionSpec = (
+  root: string,
+  slug: string,
+  specPath: string,
+  evidence: unknown,
+  ctx?: MutationContext,
+): FlowGateResult => {
+  const bound = assertMutationWorkspace(root, ctx);
+  if (!bound.ok) return bound;
+  const recorded = assertEvidenceShape(evidence);
+  if (!recorded.ok) return err("evidence_invalid", recorded.error);
+  const doc = resolveDoc(root, slug, specPath, "spec");
+  if (!doc.ok) return err("path_invalid", doc.error);
+  return readModifyWrite(root, slug, (state) => {
+    if (!existsSync(doc.path)) return err("spec_missing", `spec not found: ${specPath}`);
+    if (state.spec.status === "draft") {
+      let text: string;
+      try {
+        text = readFileSync(doc.path, "utf8");
+      } catch (error) {
+        return err(
+          "spec_self_review_failed",
+          `spec self-review failed: unreadable spec: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`,
+        );
+      }
+      const hard = qualitySpec(text).filter((f) => f.severity === "hard");
+      const missing: string[] = [];
+      if (!/^\s*\*+Branch:\*+/im.test(stripFences(text)))
+        missing.push("**Branch:** header missing");
+      if (hard.length > 0 || missing.length > 0) {
+        return err(
+          "spec_self_review_failed",
+          "spec self-review failed: " +
+            hard
+              .map((f) => `${f.code} — ${f.message}`)
+              .concat(missing)
+              .join("; ") +
+            " — see templates/spec-template.md for the required structure",
+        );
+      }
+    }
+    const step = nextFlowStatus(state.spec.status);
+    if (!step.ok) return step;
+    return {
+      ok: true,
+      next: {
+        ...state,
+        spec: {
+          path: path.posix.join("docs", slug, "spec.md"),
+          status: step.next,
+          evidence: recorded.evidence,
+        },
+        updated_at: Date.now(),
+      },
+    };
+  });
+};
+
 export const transitionPlan = (
   root: string,
   slug: string,
   planPath: string,
-  confirmed: boolean,
-): Result => {
-  let state: FlowState;
-  try {
-    state = readFlowState(root, slug);
-  } catch (error) {
-    return { ok: false, error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "invalid flow state" };
-  }
-  if (!existsSync(path.isAbsolute(planPath) ? planPath : path.join(root, planPath))) {
-    return { ok: false, error: `plan not found: ${planPath}` };
-  }
-  if (state.spec.status !== "approved") {
-    return { ok: false, error: "spec must be approved before the plan can be approved" };
-  }
-  if (state.plan.status === "draft" && confirmed) {
-    const planFile = path.isAbsolute(planPath) ? planPath : path.join(root, planPath);
-    let text: string;
-    try {
-      text = readFileSync(planFile, "utf8");
-    } catch (error) {
-      return {
-        ok: false,
-        error: `plan self-review failed: unreadable plan: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`,
-      };
+  evidence: unknown,
+  ctx?: MutationContext,
+): FlowGateResult => {
+  const bound = assertMutationWorkspace(root, ctx);
+  if (!bound.ok) return bound;
+  const recorded = assertEvidenceShape(evidence);
+  if (!recorded.ok) return err("evidence_invalid", recorded.error);
+  const doc = resolveDoc(root, slug, planPath, "plan");
+  if (!doc.ok) return err("path_invalid", doc.error);
+  return readModifyWrite(root, slug, (state) => {
+    if (!existsSync(doc.path)) return err("plan_missing", `plan not found: ${planPath}`);
+    if (state.spec.status !== "approved") {
+      return err("spec_not_approved", "spec must be approved before the plan can be approved");
     }
-    const missing: string[] = [];
-    const stripped = stripFences(text);
-    if (parseTasksFromPlan(text).length === 0) missing.push("no ### Task N: sections outside fences");
-    if (!/^\s*\*+Spec:\*+/im.test(stripped)) missing.push("**Spec:** header missing");
-    if (!/^\s*\*+Branch:\*+/im.test(stripped)) missing.push("**Branch:** header missing");
-    if (missing.length > 0) {
-      return { ok: false, error: "plan self-review failed: " + missing.join("; ") };
-    }
-  }
-  const step = nextStatus(state.plan.status, confirmed);
-  if (!step.ok) return { ok: false, error: step.error };
-  writeFlowState(root, {
-    ...state,
-    plan: { path: planPath, status: step.next },
-    updated_at: Date.now(),
+    if (state.plan.status === "draft") {
+      let text: string;
+      try {
+        text = readFileSync(doc.path, "utf8");
+      } catch (error) {
+        return err(
+          "plan_self_review_failed",
+          `plan self-review failed: unreadable plan: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`,
+        );
+      }
+      const missing: string[] = [];
+      const stripped = stripFences(text);
+      if (parseTasksFromPlan(text).length === 0)
+        missing.push("no ### Task N: sections outside fences");
+      if (!/^\s*\*+Spec:\*+/im.test(stripped)) missing.push("**Spec:** header missing");
+      if (!/^\s*\*+Branch:\*+/im.test(stripped)) missing.push("**Branch:** header missing");
+      if (missing.length > 0)
+        return err("plan_self_review_failed", "plan self-review failed: " + missing.join("; "));
+    }
+    const step = nextFlowStatus(state.plan.status);
+    if (!step.ok) return step;
+    return {
+      ok: true,
+      next: {
+        ...state,
+        plan: {
+          path: path.posix.join("docs", slug, "plan.md"),
+          status: step.next,
+          evidence: recorded.evidence,
+        },
+        updated_at: Date.now(),
+      },
+    };
   });
-  return { ok: true };
 };
 
 export const recordMenuChoice = (
   root: string,
   slug: string,
   planPath: string,
-  choice: string,
-  confirmed: boolean,
-): Result => {
-  if (!confirmed) return { ok: false, error: "confirmed: true required" };
-  let state: FlowState;
-  try {
-    state = readFlowState(root, slug);
-  } catch (error) {
-    return { ok: false, error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "invalid flow state" };
+  choice: unknown,
+  evidence: unknown,
+  ctx?: MutationContext,
+): FlowGateResult => {
+  const bound = assertMutationWorkspace(root, ctx);
+  if (!bound.ok) return bound;
+  const recorded = assertEvidenceShape(evidence);
+  if (!recorded.ok) return err("evidence_invalid", recorded.error);
+  if (typeof choice !== "string" || !MENU_CHOICES.includes(choice as MenuChoice)) {
+    return err("menu_choice_invalid", `invalid menu choice: ${JSON.stringify(choice)}`);
   }
-  writeFlowState(root, {
-    ...state,
-    plan: state.plan.path ? state.plan : { path: planPath, status: state.plan.status },
-    menu: { presented: true, chosen: choice },
-    updated_at: Date.now(),
+  // Cursor cannot run subagent-driven plans (no child sessions): entering that
+  // flow state on Cursor is rejected with recovery guidance (CA-42).
+  if (recorded.evidence.host === "cursor" && choice === "subagent-driven") {
+    return err("unsupported_mode", CURSOR_SUBAGENT_UNSUPPORTED_TEXT);
+  }
+  // The execution-menu evidence must be the label the user selected on the
+  // native question; a mismatched choice is fabricated (FG-04). Comparison is
+  // case-insensitive: the host presents "Inline", the enum stores "inline"
+  // (FINDING 3). Cursor evidence is the policy-only constant (no label), so
+  // the check applies to host-observed OpenCode receipts only.
+  if (
+    recorded.evidence.host === "opencode" &&
+    !sameChoiceLabel(recorded.evidence.selectedLabel, choice)
+  ) {
+    return err(
+      "evidence_mismatch",
+      `evidence selectedLabel ${JSON.stringify(recorded.evidence.selectedLabel)} does not match choice ${JSON.stringify(choice)}`,
+    );
+  }
+  const doc = resolveDoc(root, slug, planPath, "plan");
+  if (!doc.ok) return err("path_invalid", doc.error);
+  return readModifyWrite(root, slug, (state) => {
+    if (state.spec.status !== "approved")
+      return err("spec_not_approved", "spec must be approved before the execution menu");
+    if (state.plan.status !== "approved")
+      return err("plan_not_approved", "plan must be approved before the execution menu");
+    return {
+      ok: true,
+      next: {
+        ...state,
+        plan: state.plan.path ? state.plan : { path: planPath, status: state.plan.status },
+        menu: { presented: true, chosen: choice, evidence: recorded.evidence },
+        updated_at: Date.now(),
+      },
+    };
   });
-  return { ok: true };
 };
 
 export const slugFromPath = (p: string) => {
@@ -195,31 +887,781 @@ export const slugFromPath = (p: string) => {
   return dirName === "." || dirName === "/" || dirName === "" ? "" : dirName;
 };
 
+/** Derive a slug from a canonical docs/<slug>/sdd/... path (SDD write gates). */
+export const slugFromSddPath = (p: string): string => {
+  const match = p
+    .split(path.sep)
+    .join("/")
+    // The sdd dir name may be followed by a separator, end-of-string, or a
+    // quote char part of a quote-bearing dir name; `sdd-attack` (hyphen/letter
+    // continuation) is still rejected.
+    .match(/^docs\/([^/]+)\/sdd(\/|$|['"])/);
+  return match?.[1] ?? "";
+};
+
 export const assertFlowGates = (
   root: string,
   planPath: string,
   opts: { requireMenu?: boolean } = {},
-): Result => {
+): FlowGateResult => {
+  const doc = resolveDoc(root, "", planPath, "plan");
+  if (!doc.ok) return err("path_invalid", doc.error);
   const slug = slugFromPath(planPath);
   const state = readFlowState(root, slug);
   if (state.spec.status !== "approved") {
-    return {
-      ok: false,
-      error: `spec not approved (status: ${state.spec.status}). Run workflow_spec_approve after the user's approval.`,
-    };
+    return err(
+      "spec_not_approved",
+      `spec not approved (status: ${state.spec.status}). Run workflow_spec_approve after the user's approval.`,
+    );
   }
   if (state.plan.status !== "approved") {
-    return {
-      ok: false,
-      error: `plan not approved (status: ${state.plan.status}). Run workflow_plan_approve after the user's approval.`,
-    };
+    return err(
+      "plan_not_approved",
+      `plan not approved (status: ${state.plan.status}). Run workflow_plan_approve after the user's approval.`,
+    );
   }
   if (opts.requireMenu && !state.menu.presented) {
-    return {
-      ok: false,
-      error:
-        "post-plan menu not presented. Ask the native question menu (Subagent-driven/Inline/Handoff/Review spec/Review plan) and record the answer with workflow_plan_menu.",
-    };
+    return err(
+      "menu_not_presented",
+      "post-plan menu not presented. Ask the native question menu (Subagent-driven/Inline/Handoff/Review spec/Review plan) and record the answer with workflow_plan_menu.",
+    );
+  }
+  return { ok: true };
+};
+
+/**
+ * Shared mutation guard for non-document product writes (FG-03, CA-18): a write
+ * is blocked until the spec is approved, the plan is approved, the execution
+ * menu has been recorded (when required), and the canonical docs validate.
+ * The optional MutationContext adds the coordinator boundary (FG-05, CA-20).
+ */
+export const assertProductGates = (
+  root: string,
+  slug: string,
+  opts: { requireMenu?: boolean; requireDocs?: boolean } = {},
+  ctx?: MutationContext,
+): FlowGateResult => {
+  const bound = assertMutationWorkspace(root, ctx);
+  if (!bound.ok) return bound;
+  // Strict read (CA-18): missing or corrupt state surfaces flow_not_activated /
+  // flow_corrupt, never a misleading spec_not_approved from a silent draft
+  // fallback. Fail-closed is preserved — no gate ever passes on absent state.
+  const strict = readFlowStrict(root, slug);
+  if (!strict.ok) return strict;
+  const state = strict.state;
+  if (state.spec.status !== "approved") {
+    return err(
+      "spec_not_approved",
+      `spec not approved (status: ${state.spec.status}). Run workflow_spec_approve after the user's approval.`,
+    );
+  }
+  if (state.plan.status !== "approved") {
+    return err(
+      "plan_not_approved",
+      `plan not approved (status: ${state.plan.status}). Run workflow_plan_approve after the user's approval.`,
+    );
+  }
+  if (opts.requireMenu && !state.menu.presented) {
+    return err(
+      "menu_not_presented",
+      "post-plan menu not presented. Record the native question answer with workflow_plan_menu.",
+    );
+  }
+  if (opts.requireDocs) {
+    // Canonical relative form of the docs pair (DC-01/DC-02): docsValidate
+    // resolves the contained paths itself.
+    const validated = docsValidate({
+      spec_path: path.posix.join("docs", slug, "spec.md"),
+      plan_path: path.posix.join("docs", slug, "plan.md"),
+      workspace_root: root,
+    });
+    if (validated.ok === false) return err("docs_invalid", validated.error);
+  }
+  return assertCoordinatorBoundary(ctx, state.menu);
+};
+
+/**
+ * Delegated status derives from host session parentage (AR-12, CA-20): a
+ * session whose host record has a parent is a child (delegated worker); a root
+ * session (no parent) is the coordinator. Caller-supplied role fields are
+ * removed from every tool schema — this pure function is the only source.
+ */
+export const roleFromParentage = (parentID?: string | null): FlowRole =>
+  parentID ? "delegated" : "coordinator";
+
+/**
+ * Root-session write interception while a subagent-driven plan is active
+ * (CA-18, AR-13): known mutation tools are denied outright. Host-native write
+ * tools (write/edit/apply_patch/patch/rename/delete/…) plus the workit
+ * mutation tools are listed here so the plugin hook can deny them before any
+ * file is touched. Read-only host tools (read/grep/glob/list/question/task/…)
+ * are intentionally absent. The list is the audited boundary: adding a write
+ * tool here without a test is the escape hatch the audit checks for.
+ */
+export const COORDINATOR_WRITE_TOOLS: readonly string[] = [
+  // host-native file/command mutation tools
+  "write",
+  "edit",
+  "apply_patch",
+  "patch",
+  "rename",
+  "delete",
+  "mkdir",
+  "mv",
+  "cp",
+  "rm",
+  "touch",
+  "chmod",
+  "chown",
+  // workit product/config/external mutation tools
+  "workflow_commit",
+  "workflow_pr_create",
+  "workflow_rule_edit",
+  "workflow_template_edit",
+  "workflow_changelog_apply",
+  "workflow_branch_setup",
+  "workflow_toolkit_init_apply",
+  "workflow_docs_promote",
+  "workflow_docs_layout",
+  "workflow_docs_repo_link",
+  "workflow_sdd_task_brief",
+  "workflow_sdd_review_package",
+  "workflow_sdd_append_progress",
+  "workflow_youtrack_post",
+  "workflow_youtrack_log_time",
+];
+
+/**
+ * Bounded coordinator shell allowlist (CA-18, AR-13): while a subagent-driven
+ * plan is active, the coordinator may run ONLY read/review/test/verify
+ * commands — never anything that mutates files, git state, the system clock,
+ * or the network.
+ *
+ * DENY matrix (every check below is asserted by the adversarial test table):
+ * - Denied fragments, checked on the raw command before tokenizing:
+ *   `>` `>>` `2>` `&>` `<>` (any `>` — redirection), `|` (pipes, incl. `2>|`),
+ *   `&` (backgrounding), `;` (chains), `$(` (command substitution),
+ *   `${` (parameter expansion — `${IFS}` can smuggle whitespace past the
+ *   tokenizer), `$'` (ANSI-C quoting — can embed `\t`/`\n` escapes that are
+ *   real whitespace to the shell), `` ` `` (backticks), newline (multi-line
+ *   scripts), `<(` (process substitution input — `>(` dies on `>` already).
+ *   Heredocs `<<` are stdin-only and allowed (a heredoc cannot write without
+ *   a `>`). Literal `\t`/`\n` backslash escapes OUTSIDE `$'...'` are plain
+ *   `t`/`n` characters to the shell — they cannot create whitespace
+ *   (documented, FINDING 4).
+ * - `(` `)` are denied per-token (process substitution `<(`, `>(`, subshells
+ *   `(cmd)`, and `awk system(...)` all need them) — EXCEPT as git `--format`
+ *   placeholders (`--format='%(refname)'`): a `--format` value is display
+ *   text (the shell already consumed the quotes) and `$(`/`<(`/`>`/backticks
+ *   are denied raw regardless (FINDING 3, round 4). Multi-token format
+ *   values (a space inside the quoted format) stay denied — fail-closed.
+ *   Pure-stdout verbs (`echo printf jq`) may print parens as display text:
+ *   a shell-quote-state scan allows the command iff every paren lies inside
+ *   a quoted region — any unquoted paren (subshell syntax, bash-verified
+ *   syntax error) denies the whole command, fail-closed (FINDING 3, round 5).
+ * - Denied command heads: `curl`, `sudo`, `tee`, `wget` (privilege/network/
+ *   tee writes). These words are ONLY denied as the first token — as argument
+ *   text (`grep curl README.md`, `cat sudo-config.txt`) they pass (FINDING 5).
+ * - Every other first token must be one of the allowlisted sets below.
+ * - Tokens are UNQUOTED (every `'`/`"` character stripped — the shell's word
+ *   parsing removes quote characters entirely, so `--out'put=x'` IS
+ *   `--output=x`, `-de'lete'` IS `-delete`, `cu'rl'` IS `curl`, `awk -'f x'`
+ *   IS `awk -f x`) before every check (FINDING 2, round 5).
+ * - `--output` and `--output=` (git log/diff and any other verb) are denied
+ *   on every command: both forms write a file.
+ * - Write-capable `-o`/attached `-oFILE`/`--output`/`--output=FILE` are
+ *   denied on `sort`, `tree`, `comm`, `diff`, `jq` (grep/rg keep `-o` — it
+ *   only prints the matching part, read-only; find's `-o` is the logical-OR
+ *   operator and stays allowed).
+ * - `--compress-program` (any form, every verb): GNU sort EXECUTES the given
+ *   program with the sorted data on its stdin — `sh` runs that data as a
+ *   script (bash-verified, FINDING 1, round 6). Only sort has the flag, but
+ *   the deny is global so no flag surface needs tracking.
+ * - `date -s`/`--set` (any attached/separate/`=` form): mutates the system
+ *   clock (bash-verified setter, FINDING 3, round 6). `date -d`/`--date`
+ *   (display) stays allowed.
+ * - `sort -T`/`--temporary-directory` (any form): writes sort's own temp
+ *   files into an arbitrary directory (bash/strace-verified, FINDING 4,
+ *   round 6). `sort -t:` (field separator) stays allowed.
+ * - Read-only tool heads (`cat head tail less more grep rg ag find ls stat wc
+ *   file diff sort uniq cut tr fold printf echo pwd date which type du df tree
+ *   jq basename dirname realpath readlink rev comm paste nl od xxd awk gawk
+ *   mawk test [`):
+ *   `find` is denied every destructive/file-writing form: `-delete -exec
+ *   -execdir -ok -okdir` and `-fprint* -fls` (prefix).
+ *   `sed` is NOT allowlisted at all (round 5, decision: deny outright). GNU
+ *   sed 4.9 executes arbitrary commands through the `e` command (`sed 'e
+ *   touch x' f`) and the `s///e` flag (bash-verified: both ran `touch` —
+ *   e.g. `sed 's/.+/touch x/e' f`); closing the class needs a full sed script
+ *   grammar, and five review rounds of sed escapes (`w`/`W`/`-f`/attached
+ *   forms/quote joins) show a token parser cannot close it. sed reads are a
+ *   nice-to-have — `cat`/`grep`/`awk` cover them.
+ *   `awk`/`gawk`/`mawk` are denied every script file form (`-f`/`--file`,
+ *   attached or separate — the script may contain `system(...)`/file
+ *   redirects); `-F` (field separator, read-only) stays allowed.
+ * - `tsc` with `--noEmit` (bare `tsc` can emit build artifacts).
+ * - `git` with a read-only subcommand (`status log diff show branch rev-parse
+ *   merge-base remote ls-files blame shortlog describe check-ignore name-rev
+ *   stash grep tag`); `git stash` only as `git stash list`; the mutable
+ *   listing subcommands (`branch tag remote`) are bare or one of their
+ *   whitelisted read flags only — `branch` `-a -r -v -vv --all --remotes
+ *   --verbose --show-current -l --list --merged --no-merged --contains
+ *   --points-at --format --sort`, `tag` `-l --list --sort --contains
+ *   --points-at --merged --no-merged --format --column`, `remote` `-v
+ *   --verbose`. The value-taking flags (`--contains --points-at --merged
+ *   --no-merged --sort --format`) accept AT MOST ONE following value token
+ *   (a commit/tag name, a sort key, a format string — or glued
+ *   `--flag=value`; verified read-only in bash). Every other flag
+ *   (`-d -D -m -c -f -a -s ...`) is denied, a trailing NAME after a value
+ *   is denied (it would CREATE a branch/tag), and non-listed subcommands
+ *   (`config`, `var`, `push`, `commit`, `checkout`, `stash push`, ...) are
+ *   denied outright.
+ * - git exec-trigger flags are denied on every allowlisted subcommand
+ *   (FINDING 2, round 6): `grep --open-files-in-pager[=<pager>]`/`-O[<pager>]`
+ *   executes the pager with each matched file (`sh` executes the file —
+ *   bash-verified), `log/diff/show --ext-diff` runs repo gitattributes
+ *   external diff drivers, `log/diff/show/blame/grep --textconv` runs
+ *   repo-configured textconv drivers, `--show-signature` runs gpg
+ *   (core.gpg.program), `--remerge-diff` runs the merge machinery
+ *   (external merge drivers). `-O` on log/diff/show is `--diff-order`
+ *   (a read flag) and stays allowed; `--no-ext-diff`/`--no-textconv`
+ *   disable the drivers and stay allowed. Global `-p`/`--paginate` (before
+ *   the subcommand) are already denied by the subcommand-position rule;
+ *   `git log -p` is `--patch` (read-only) and stays allowed.
+ * - `git --no-pager <sub>` (global pager-disable, BEFORE the subcommand) is
+ *   allowed and behaves exactly like `git <sub>` for every rule below — it
+ *   never lifts a mutable/exec deny (FINDING 3, round 7). Combined
+ *   read-only short flags (`-av`, `-ar`, `-avv` on `branch` — every char
+ *   from the per-subcommand read set `branch: a r v l`, `tag: l`, `remote:
+ *   v`) are allowed on the mutable listing subcommands; a combined form
+ *   containing any write char (`git tag -av` creates an annotated tag,
+ *   `git branch -adv` deletes) is denied (FINDING 4, round 7).
+ * - A test runner head (`bun|npm|pnpm|yarn|npx`) with one of the test/check/
+ *   lint/typecheck/verify/validate verbs (`vitest jest mocha` are runner
+ *   verbs too, e.g. `npx jest`; `tsc` as a runner verb requires `--noEmit`).
+ *   The FULL enumerated runner-write surface is denied on every runner verb
+ *   (FINDING 1, round 7, bash-verified): `--fix*` (lint autofix), `--write*`
+ *   (prettier), `--update*`/`-u` (snapshot updates — `bun test -u` rewrote
+ *   the snapshot, verified), `-w` (write-capable short form in some runners;
+ *   vitest/mocha watch is over-denied — the `--watch` long form stays
+ *   allowed), `--coverage*` plus camelCase `--collectCoverage*` AND kebab
+ *   `--collect-coverage*` (all write coverage/), `--outputFile`/`=` (jest
+ *   JSON report — bash-verified, also
+ *   denied globally as an output flag), `--cache*` (eslint/jest cache files;
+ *   `--cache=false` is read-only but over-denied — the coordinator never
+ *   needs cache control), and the tsc build-info flags (`-b`/`--build`,
+ *   `--incremental`, `--tsBuildInfoFile`, `--composite` — they write
+ *   .tsbuildinfo/outputs even with `--noEmit`). Matching is
+ *   case-insensitive-prefix on lowercased tokens (camelCase cannot dodge
+ *   the prefixes). Direct-head tools (`jest vitest eslint prettier oxlint
+ *   oxfmt mocha ...`) are NOT allowlisted at all — head denial, so their
+ *   write flags never reach the runner rules.
+ * - `command` is allowed ONLY as `command -v <name>` / `command -V <name>`
+ *   (path lookup — read-only); bare `command` EXECUTES and is denied.
+ *   `test`/`[` evaluate expressions only and are read-only (FINDING 3,
+ *   round 4).
+ *
+ * Test runner flags write nothing — exact statement (FINDING 1, round 7 +
+ * round 8): the allowed verbs are `test check lint typecheck verify validate`
+ * (plus the `vitest jest mocha` runner verbs and `tsc --noEmit`), and every
+ * write-capable runner flag family is denied (snapshot updates
+ * `-u`/`--update*`, autofix `--fix*`, `--write*`, `-w`, coverage
+ * `--coverage*`/`--collectCoverage*`/`--collect-coverage*` (camel AND kebab),
+ * jest JSON reports `--outputFile`, caches `--cache*`, tsc build-info
+ * `-b`/`--incremental`/`--tsBuildInfoFile`/`--composite`), so no RUNNER
+ * WRITE FLAG inside the boundary can write a file — that is the exact scope
+ * of this claim. A test run itself can still write by design (inherent
+ * allowance, stated here as the documented boundary): a first-run jest
+ * creates new `__snapshots__` WITHOUT `-u`, and test code runs with
+ * coordinator permissions — the test runner is admitted to the boundary as
+ * a runner, not sandboxed. `bun run format` (writes) and `bun run build`
+ * (dist) are NOT allowed. This allowlist is an audited security boundary (asserted by the
+ * adversarial table). The EXACT deny statement (FINDING 3, round 6 — the old
+ * "every WRITE form of the listed verbs" claim was false while `date -s` and
+ * `sort -T` were unguarded): redirections, pipes, chains, substitution,
+ * parens; `sed` denied outright (round 5 — its `e`/`s///e` commands execute);
+ * awk/gawk/mawk `-f`/`--file` script files; `--output`/`--output-file`/`-o`
+ * on output-flag verbs; `--compress-program` on EVERY verb (executes PROG
+ * with data on stdin — `sh` runs sorted data as a script, bash-verified,
+ * round 6); git mutable-subcommand mutations AND git exec-trigger flags
+ * (`--open-files-in-pager`/`-O` on grep — executes the pager on matched
+ * files, bash-verified; `--ext-diff`; `--textconv`; `--show-signature`;
+ * `--remerge-diff`; global `-p`/`--paginate` denied by the subcommand-
+ * position rule); `date -s`/`--set` (system-clock mutation, round 6);
+ * `sort -T`/`--temporary-directory` (writes sort's temporaries into the
+ * given directory, round 6); find's delete/exec/fprint family; runner
+ * mutating flags (round 7: `-u`/`-w`/`--cache*`/`--collectCoverage*`/
+ * `--outputFile`/tsc build-info added to the `--fix`/`--write`/`--coverage`/
+ * `--update` families); `command` without `-v`/`-V` — and every head not
+ * listed above is denied outright (unlisted write/exec/network commands
+ * never enter the allowlist at all).
+ */
+const BASH_READ_TOKENS = new Set([
+  "cat",
+  "head",
+  "tail",
+  "less",
+  "more",
+  "grep",
+  "rg",
+  "ag",
+  "find",
+  "ls",
+  "stat",
+  "wc",
+  "file",
+  "diff",
+  "sort",
+  "uniq",
+  "cut",
+  "tr",
+  "fold",
+  "printf",
+  "echo",
+  "pwd",
+  "date",
+  "which",
+  "type",
+  "du",
+  "df",
+  "tree",
+  "jq",
+  "basename",
+  "dirname",
+  "realpath",
+  "readlink",
+  "rev",
+  "comm",
+  "paste",
+  "nl",
+  "od",
+  "xxd",
+  "awk",
+  "gawk",
+  "mawk",
+  "test",
+  "[",
+]);
+
+const BASH_GIT_READ_SUBCOMMANDS = new Set([
+  "status",
+  "log",
+  "diff",
+  "show",
+  "branch",
+  "rev-parse",
+  "merge-base",
+  "remote",
+  "ls-files",
+  "blame",
+  "shortlog",
+  "describe",
+  "check-ignore",
+  "name-rev",
+  "stash",
+  "grep",
+  "tag",
+]);
+
+const BASH_GIT_MUTABLE_SUBCOMMANDS = new Set(["branch", "remote", "tag"]);
+
+// Exact read-only flag forms per mutable git subcommand: every other flag or
+// argument (a branch/tag name, `-d -D -m -c -f -a -s ...`) is a write and is
+// denied (FINDING 1).
+const BASH_GIT_READ_FLAGS: Record<string, Set<string>> = {
+  branch: new Set([
+    "-a",
+    "--all",
+    "-r",
+    "--remotes",
+    "-v",
+    "--verbose",
+    "-vv",
+    "--show-current",
+    "-l",
+    "--list",
+    "--merged",
+    "--no-merged",
+    "--contains",
+    "--points-at",
+    "--format",
+    "--sort",
+  ]),
+  tag: new Set([
+    "-l",
+    "--list",
+    "--sort",
+    "--contains",
+    "--points-at",
+    "--merged",
+    "--no-merged",
+    "--format",
+    "--column",
+  ]),
+  remote: new Set(["-v", "--verbose"]),
+};
+
+// Read-only SHORT flags per mutable git subcommand (FINDING 4, round 7):
+// `branch` `-a -r -v -l` (+ `-vv` = `-v -v`), `tag` `-l` ONLY (`-a` creates
+// an annotated tag), `remote` `-v` ONLY. Git combines short flags into one
+// token (`-av` = `-a -v`), so a single-dash all-letter token is allowed iff
+// EVERY character is a read char for that subcommand — any write char
+// (`git tag -av` → `-a` creates; `git branch -adv` → `-d` deletes) denies.
+const BASH_GIT_READ_SHORT_FLAGS: Record<string, string> = {
+  branch: "arvl",
+  tag: "l",
+  remote: "v",
+};
+
+const isCombinedReadShortFlag = (sub: string, token: string): boolean => {
+  if (!/^-[a-z]+$/.test(token)) return false;
+  const allowed = BASH_GIT_READ_SHORT_FLAGS[sub] ?? "";
+  for (let i = 1; i < token.length; i++) {
+    if (!allowed.includes(token[i])) return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+};
+
+// find's destructive and file-writing forms: `-delete` deletes, `-exec/
+// -execdir/-ok/-okdir` execute arbitrary commands, `-fprint/-fprintf/
+// -fprint0/-fls` write files (FINDING 1).
+const BASH_FIND_DENIED_FLAGS = new Set(["-delete", "-exec", "-execdir", "-ok", "-okdir"]);
+
+const BASH_FIND_DENIED_PREFIXES = ["-fprint", "-fls"];
+
+const BASH_TEST_RUNNERS = ["bun", "npm", "pnpm", "yarn", "npx"];
+
+const BASH_TEST_VERBS = new Set([
+  "test",
+  "check",
+  "lint",
+  "typecheck",
+  "verify",
+  "validate",
+  "vitest",
+  "jest",
+  "mocha",
+]);
+
+// Mutating flag families on test/lint verbs — the FULL enumerated
+// runner-write surface (FINDING 1, round 7): `--fix*` (lint autofix),
+// `--write*` (prettier), `--update*`/`-u` (snapshot updates — `bun test -u`,
+// `npm test -u`, `jest -u`/`--updateSnapshot`), `-w` (write-capable short
+// form in some runners; vitest/mocha watch is over-denied — the `--watch`
+// long form stays allowed), `--coverage*` plus the camelCase
+// `--collectCoverage*` AND the kebab `--collect-coverage*` (all write
+// coverage/ — the kebab form escapes the camelCase entry because the dash
+// breaks the prefix match, FINDING 1, round 8), `--cache*` (eslint/jest
+// cache files; `--cache=false` is read-only but over-denied — the
+// coordinator never needs cache control). Matching is
+// case-insensitive-prefix on lowercased tokens so camelCase spellings cannot
+// dodge the prefixes.
+const BASH_MUTATING_TEST_FLAGS = [
+  "--fix",
+  "--write",
+  "--update",
+  "-u",
+  "-w",
+  "--coverage",
+  "--collectcoverage",
+  "--collect-coverage",
+  "--cache",
+];
+
+// Privilege/network/tee-write heads: denied ONLY as the first token, so the
+// words themselves stay legal as argument text (FINDING 5).
+const BASH_DENIED_HEADS = new Set(["curl", "sudo", "tee", "wget"]);
+
+// Write-capable -o/-oFILE/--output/--output=FILE on allowlisted read verbs
+// (FINDING 1). grep/rg keep `-o` (read-only match printing); find keeps `-o`
+// (logical OR). `--output` is denied globally for every command. jq `-o` is
+// `--output-file` (round 3 audit — same write class as sort -o).
+const BASH_OUTPUT_FLAG_VERBS = new Set(["sort", "tree", "comm", "diff", "jq"]);
+
+const BASH_FORBIDDEN_FRAGMENTS = [">", "|", "&", ";", "$(", "${", "$'", "`", "\n", "<("];
+
+// Pure-stdout verbs exempt from the per-token paren denial, but only for
+// parens inside a fully-quoted token (display text). Unquoted parens stay
+// denied. jq qualifies: its only write paths (`-o`/`--output-file`) are
+// denied separately. awk is NOT exempt (`system(...)` executes). (FINDING 3,
+// round 5)
+const BASH_PAREN_EXEMPT_HEADS = new Set(["echo", "printf", "jq"]);
+
+// Value-taking READ flags on the mutable git listing subcommands (FINDING 3,
+// round 4): `--contains|--points-at|--merged|--no-merged [<commit>]`,
+// `--sort <key>`, `--format <format>` — each takes AT MOST ONE following
+// value token (the value may also be glued: `--sort=-x`, `--format='%(x)'`).
+// The value is display/list filtering only — verified read-only in bash. A
+// trailing NAME after a value would create a branch/tag (`git branch --sort=
+// -x y`, `git tag --format=x y` both create), so anything that is neither a
+// whitelisted flag nor the single value of a value flag is denied.
+const BASH_GIT_VALUE_FLAGS = new Set([
+  "--contains",
+  "--points-at",
+  "--merged",
+  "--no-merged",
+  "--sort",
+  "--format",
+]);
+
+const gitGluedValueFlag = (token: string): boolean =>
+  /^--(contains|points-at|merged|no-merged|sort|format)=.+/.test(token);
+
+const hasMutatingTestFlag = (tokens: string[]): boolean => {
+  const lower = tokens.map((t) => t.toLowerCase());
+  return lower.some((t) => BASH_MUTATING_TEST_FLAGS.some((flag) => t.startsWith(flag)));
+};
+
+// Script FILE forms for awk/gawk/mawk (FINDING 2/3, round 3): the option may
+// carry its value ATTACHED (`-fscript.awk`, `-f/tmp/evil.awk`, `--file=x`) —
+// GNU awk accepts the attached short-option form, so any token starting with
+// `-f`/`--file` is a script file. The script may contain `system(...)`/
+// redirections. `-F` (awk field separator, read-only, uppercase) is NOT
+// matched. sed is not allowlisted at all (round 5), so no sed -f rule exists.
+const scriptFileForm = (token: string): boolean =>
+  token === "-f" || token.startsWith("-f") || token.startsWith("--file");
+
+const findDenied = (token: string): boolean =>
+  BASH_FIND_DENIED_FLAGS.has(token) ||
+  BASH_FIND_DENIED_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => token.startsWith(prefix));
+
+// Any command may write via --output/--output=FILE (git log/diff, sort, ...)
+// or --output-file/--output-file=FILE (jq). `--outputFile`/`--outputFile=`
+// is jest's JSON-report flag (writes the report file — bash-verified,
+// FINDING 1, round 7: `npx jest --json --outputFile=out.json` created the
+// file); it is denied globally for the same reason as `--output-file`.
+const outputFlagDenied = (token: string): boolean =>
+  token === "--output" ||
+  token.startsWith("--output=") ||
+  token === "--output-file" ||
+  token.startsWith("--output-file=") ||
+  token === "--outputFile" ||
+  token.startsWith("--outputFile=");
+
+// `--compress-program` (GNU sort; any verb — global deny) EXECUTES PROG with
+// the sorted data on its stdin: `sh` runs the data as a script (bash-verified,
+// FINDING 1, round 6: `sort --buffer-size=1M --compress-program=sh` created
+// PWNED_COMPRESS). The space form dies at the flag token; the `=` form here.
+const compressProgramDenied = (token: string): boolean =>
+  token === "--compress-program" || token.startsWith("--compress-program=");
+
+// git flags that TRIGGER external program execution (FINDING 2, round 6):
+// `grep --open-files-in-pager[=<pager>]` and its short form `-O[<pager>]`
+// open each matched file with a pager — `sh` executes the file (bash-verified:
+// `git grep --open-files-in-pager=sh -e x -- f` and `git grep -Osh` both
+// created GITPWNED files); `log/diff/show --ext-diff` runs repo gitattributes
+// external diff drivers; `log/diff/show/blame/grep --textconv` runs
+// repo-configured textconv drivers; `--show-signature` runs gpg
+// (core.gpg.program); `--remerge-diff` runs the merge machinery on merge
+// commits (external merge drivers) — same driver-execution class, denied
+// fail-closed. `-O` on grep is open-files-in-pager, but `-O` on log/diff/show
+// is `--diff-order=<orderfile>` (a read flag) — the short form is scoped to
+// grep. `--no-ext-diff`/`--no-textconv` DISABLE the drivers and stay allowed.
+// Global `-p`/`--paginate` (before the subcommand) never reach this check —
+// the subcommand-position rule already denies them (pinned in the matrix).
+const gitExecFlagDenied = (sub: string, token: string): boolean => {
+  if (sub === "grep" && (token === "-O" || token.startsWith("-O"))) return true;
+  if (token === "--open-files-in-pager" || token.startsWith("--open-files-in-pager=")) return true;
+  if (token === "--ext-diff" || token.startsWith("--ext-diff=")) return true;
+  if (token === "--textconv" || token.startsWith("--textconv=")) return true;
+  if (token === "--show-signature" || token.startsWith("--show-signature=")) return true;
+  if (token === "--remerge-diff" || token.startsWith("--remerge-diff=")) return true;
+  return false;
+};
+
+// `date -s`/`--set` (and attached `-sVALUE`, `--set=VALUE`) MUTATE the system
+// clock (bash-verified: `date -s` attempts the set — "cannot set date:
+// Operation not permitted", FINDING 3, round 6). No other GNU date flag
+// starts with `-s`; `-d`/`--date` (display) stays allowed.
+const dateSetDenied = (token: string): boolean =>
+  token === "-s" || token.startsWith("-s") || token === "--set" || token.startsWith("--set=");
+
+// `sort -T`/`--temporary-directory` writes sort's own temp files into an
+// arbitrary directory (bash/strace-verified: `sort -T <dir>` created
+// sortGdvlHf, sortV2VyNF, ..., FINDING 4, round 6). `-t:` (field separator,
+// lowercase) is NOT matched. The space form dies at the flag token.
+const sortTempDirDenied = (token: string): boolean =>
+  token === "-T" ||
+  token.startsWith("-T") ||
+  token === "--temporary-directory" ||
+  token.startsWith("--temporary-directory=");
+
+// tsc build-info flags (FINDING 1, round 7): `-b`/`--build` (build mode
+// writes outputs), and `--incremental`/`--tsBuildInfoFile`/`--composite`
+// write `.tsbuildinfo` even WITH `--noEmit` — so `--noEmit` alone is not a
+// sufficient read guarantee. Denied on BOTH the direct `tsc` head and the
+// runner verb (`bun run tsc`); `tsc --noEmit` remains the only admitted form.
+const tsBuildDenied = (token: string): boolean =>
+  token === "-b" ||
+  token.startsWith("-b") ||
+  token === "--build" ||
+  token.startsWith("--build=") ||
+  token === "--incremental" ||
+  token.startsWith("--incremental=") ||
+  token === "--tsBuildInfoFile" ||
+  token.startsWith("--tsBuildInfoFile=") ||
+  token === "--composite" ||
+  token.startsWith("--composite=");
+
+export const isCoordinatorBashAllowed = (command: string): boolean => {
+  const trimmed = command.trim();
+  if (!trimmed) return false;
+  for (const fragment of BASH_FORBIDDEN_FRAGMENTS) {
+    if (trimmed.includes(fragment)) return false;
+  }
+  // FINDING 2 (round 5): the shell's word parsing REMOVES every quote
+  // character when building argv — `'w'out` IS `wout`, `--out'put=x'` IS
+  // `--output=x`, `-de'lete'` IS `-delete`, `awk -'f x'` IS `awk -f x`.
+  // Strip ALL `'`/`"` from each token before every check so mid-token
+  // quote joins cannot smuggle a deny-listed flag past the rules. Stripping
+  // only removes characters, so a deny rule can never be evaded by it.
+  const unquote = (token: string): string => token.replace(/['"]/g, "");
+  const rawTokens = trimmed.split(/\s+/);
+  const tokens = rawTokens.map(unquote);
+  const head = tokens[0] ?? "";
+  // `(`/`)` are denied per-token (process substitution `<(`, `>(`, subshells
+  // `(cmd)`, and `awk system(...)` all need them) — EXCEPT as git `--format`
+  // placeholders (`--format='%(refname)'`): the shell has already consumed
+  // the quotes, so a `--format` value is display text, and `$(`/`<(`/`>`/
+  // backticks are denied raw regardless (FINDING 3, round 4). A value token
+  // AFTER a bare `--format` is likewise display text. Pure-stdout verbs
+  // (`echo printf jq`) may print parens as display text: a shell-quote-state
+  // scan of the RAW command allows the command iff every paren lies inside a
+  // quoted region; any unquoted paren (subshell/syntax forms — bash-verified
+  // syntax errors) denies the whole command, fail-closed. jq's only write
+  // paths (`-o`/`--output-file`) are denied separately (FINDING 3, round 5).
+  const parenExempt = BASH_PAREN_EXEMPT_HEADS.has(head);
+  let parensSafe = true;
+  if (parenExempt) {
+    let state = 0; // 0 = unquoted, 1 = '...', 2 = "..."
+    for (let i = 0; i < trimmed.length; i++) {
+      const ch = trimmed[i];
+      if (state === 0) {
+        if (ch === "'") state = 1;
+        else if (ch === '"') state = 2;
+        else if (ch === "(" || ch === ")") parensSafe = false;
+      } else if (state === 1) {
+        if (ch === "'") state = 0;
+      } else if (ch === "\\") {
+        i++; // escaped char inside "..."
+      } else if (ch === '"') {
+        state = 0;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  let formatValue = false;
+  for (let i = 0; i < tokens.length; i++) {
+    const t = tokens[i];
+    if (formatValue) {
+      formatValue = false;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (t.includes("(") || t.includes(")")) {
+      if (parenExempt && parensSafe) continue;
+      if (t.startsWith("--format=") && !t.includes("<(")) continue;
+      return false;
+    }
+    formatValue = t === "--format";
+  }
+  if (BASH_DENIED_HEADS.has(head)) return false;
+  if (tokens.some(outputFlagDenied) || tokens.some(compressProgramDenied)) return false;
+  if (head === "git") {
+    // FINDING 3 (round 7): `--no-pager` is a GLOBAL pager-disable that sits
+    // BEFORE the subcommand (`git --no-pager log ...`) — read-only, the
+    // exact counterpart of the already-allowed post-subcommand form. It only
+    // shifts the subcommand position; every rule below (exec flags, mutable
+    // subcommands, stash list, value walk) still applies to the real
+    // subcommand. `git --no-pager` alone (no subcommand) falls through to
+    // the subcommand-position deny.
+    let subIndex = 1;
+    if (tokens[1] === "--no-pager") subIndex = 2;
+    const sub = tokens[subIndex] ?? "";
+    const flagTokens = tokens.slice(subIndex + 1);
+    if (flagTokens.some((t) => gitExecFlagDenied(sub, t))) return false;
+    if (sub === "stash") return flagTokens[0] === "list";
+    if (!BASH_GIT_READ_SUBCOMMANDS.has(sub)) return false;
+    if (!BASH_GIT_MUTABLE_SUBCOMMANDS.has(sub)) return true;
+    if (flagTokens.length === 0) return true; // bare listing (`git branch`)
+    const flags = BASH_GIT_READ_FLAGS[sub];
+    if (!flags) return false;
+    // exact read flags, plus AT MOST ONE value after each value-taking flag,
+    // plus combined read-only short flags (FINDING 4, round 7)
+    let valuePending = false;
+    for (const t of flagTokens) {
+      if (flags.has(t) || gitGluedValueFlag(t)) {
+        valuePending = BASH_GIT_VALUE_FLAGS.has(t);
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (valuePending) {
+        valuePending = false;
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (isCombinedReadShortFlag(sub, t)) continue;
+      return false;
+    }
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (head === "command") {
+    // `command` EXECUTES its argument; only `command -v`/`-V` (lookup) is
+    // read-only — exactly one name, no more (FINDING 3, round 4).
+    return (tokens[1] === "-v" || tokens[1] === "-V") && tokens.length === 3;
+  }
+  if (head === "tsc") return tokens.includes("--noEmit") && !tokens.some(tsBuildDenied);
+  if (BASH_READ_TOKENS.has(head)) {
+    if (head === "find") return !tokens.some(findDenied);
+    // awk/gawk/mawk: only the script-file form is denied (`-f`/`--file`,
+    // attached or separate); `-F` (field separator) and reads stay allowed.
+    if (head === "awk" || head === "gawk" || head === "mawk") {
+      return !tokens.some(scriptFileForm);
+    }
+    // date: only `-s`/`--set` (clock mutation) is denied (FINDING 3, round 6).
+    if (head === "date") return !tokens.some(dateSetDenied);
+    // sort: `-T`/`--temporary-directory` (temp files in arbitrary dirs) is
+    // denied; the `-o`/`--output` write forms are denied by the output-flag
+    // check below (FINDING 4, round 6).
+    if (head === "sort" && tokens.some(sortTempDirDenied)) return false;
+    if (BASH_OUTPUT_FLAG_VERBS.has(head)) {
+      return !tokens.some((t) => t === "-o" || t.startsWith("-o") || outputFlagDenied(t));
+    }
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (BASH_TEST_RUNNERS.includes(head)) {
+    if (hasMutatingTestFlag(tokens)) return false;
+    const verbIndex = tokens[1] === "run" ? 2 : 1;
+    const verb = tokens[verbIndex] ?? "";
+    if (verb === "tsc") return tokens.includes("--noEmit") && !tokens.some(tsBuildDenied);
+    return BASH_TEST_VERBS.has(verb);
+  }
+  return false;
+};
+
+export const COORDINATOR_SHELL_DENIED_TEXT =
+  "Coordinator shell commands are restricted while a subagent-driven plan is " +
+  "active: only bounded read/test/review commands are allowed (the exact " +
+  "allowlist is in flow-state.ts, isCoordinatorBashAllowed). " +
+  COORDINATOR_RECOVERY_TEXT;
+
+/**
+ * The plugin hook's decision function (AR-13): a delegated child session
+ * (host parentage) is never intercepted; the root session is intercepted only
+ * while at least one subagent-driven plan is active in its workspace. Returns
+ * the denial error to throw from `tool.execute.before`, or `{ ok: true }`.
+ */
+export const subagentDrivenInterception = (input: {
+  tool: string;
+  command?: string;
+  parentID?: string | null;
+  active: boolean;
+}): FlowGateResult => {
+  if (input.parentID) return { ok: true }; // delegated child — the worker
+  if (!input.active) return { ok: true };
+  if (COORDINATOR_WRITE_TOOLS.includes(input.tool)) {
+    return err("coordinator_write_denied", COORDINATOR_RECOVERY_TEXT);
+  }
+  if (input.tool === "bash") {
+    if (!input.command || !isCoordinatorBashAllowed(input.command)) {
+      return err("coordinator_shell_denied", COORDINATOR_SHELL_DENIED_TEXT);
+    }
   }
   return { ok: true };
 };