@bookedsolid/rea 0.34.0 → 0.35.0

package/dist/hooks/protected-paths-bash-gate/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+/**
+ * Node-binary port of `hooks/protected-paths-bash-gate.sh`.
+ *
+ * 0.35.0 Phase 3 port (paired tier-1 scanner-shim). Like blocked-paths-
+ * bash-gate but uses `runProtectedScan` against the
+ * `policy.protected_writes` / `policy.protected_paths_relax` resolved
+ * set. The bash gate was already a thin shim over the parser-backed
+ * scanner; this port drops the shim → CLI → scanner subprocess hop.
+ *
+ * Behavioral contract — preserves the bash hook byte-for-byte:
+ *
+ *   1. HALT check → exit 2 with shared banner.
+ *   2. Read stdin via `parseHookPayload`. Empty/missing command → exit 0.
+ *   3. Non-Bash tool calls bypass.
+ *   4. REA_HOOK_PATCH_SESSION-class bypass: when the env var is set with
+ *      a non-empty reason, the scanner's protected-set is RELAXED for
+ *      .claude/hooks/ — the patch-session pattern. Implemented by
+ *      appending `.claude/hooks/` to the relax list when the env var is
+ *      live (this mirrors the bash gate's §6b semantics for the Bash
+ *      tier).
+ *   5. Load policy permissively (same lesson as 0.34.0 round-2 P2).
+ *   6. Run `runProtectedScan` with the resolved policy context.
+ *   7. Verdict `block` → exit 2; `allow` → exit 0.
+ *
+ * Audit-log parity: emits a `rea.hook.protected-paths-bash-gate` entry.
+ */
+import path from 'node:path';
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import { parse as parseYaml } from 'yaml';
+import { checkHalt, formatHaltBanner } from '../_lib/halt-check.js';
+import { parseHookPayload, MalformedPayloadError, TypePayloadError, readStdinWithTimeout, } from '../_lib/payload.js';
+import { runProtectedScan } from '../bash-scanner/index.js';
+import { appendAuditRecord, InvocationStatus, Tier } from '../../audit/append.js';
+function loadPolicyPermissive(reaRoot) {
+    const policyPath = path.join(reaRoot, '.rea', 'policy.yaml');
+    const empty = { protectedRelax: [] };
+    if (!fs.existsSync(policyPath))
+        return empty;
+    let raw;
+    try {
+        raw = fs.readFileSync(policyPath, 'utf8');
+    }
+    catch {
+        return empty;
+    }
+    let parsed;
+    try {
+        parsed = parseYaml(raw);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return empty;
+    }
+    if (parsed === null || typeof parsed !== 'object' || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+        return empty;
+    }
+    const obj = parsed;
+    const out = { protectedRelax: [] };
+    if (Array.isArray(obj['protected_writes'])) {
+        out.protectedWrites = [];
+        for (const e of obj['protected_writes']) {
+            if (typeof e === 'string' && e.length > 0)
+                out.protectedWrites.push(e);
+        }
+    }
+    if (Array.isArray(obj['protected_paths_relax'])) {
+        for (const e of obj['protected_paths_relax']) {
+            if (typeof e === 'string' && e.length > 0)
+                out.protectedRelax.push(e);
+        }
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+export async function runProtectedPathsBashGate(options = {}) {
+    const reaRoot = options.reaRoot ?? process.env['CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR'] ?? process.cwd();
+    let stderr = '';
+    const writeStderr = (s) => {
+        stderr += s;
+        if (options.stderrWrite)
+            options.stderrWrite(s);
+    };
+    // 1. HALT check.
+    const halt = checkHalt(reaRoot);
+    if (halt.halted) {
+        writeStderr(formatHaltBanner(halt.reason));
+        return { exitCode: 2, stderr, verdict: { verdict: 'block', reason: 'rea HALT active' } };
+    }
+    // 2. Read + parse stdin.
+    const stdinRaw = options.stdinOverride !== undefined
+        ? options.stdinOverride
+        : await readStdinWithTimeout(5_000);
+    let toolName = '';
+    let cmd = '';
+    try {
+        const payload = parseHookPayload(stdinRaw);
+        toolName = payload.toolName;
+        cmd = payload.command;
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        if (err instanceof MalformedPayloadError || err instanceof TypePayloadError) {
+            writeStderr(`protected-paths-bash-gate: ${err.message} — refusing on uncertainty.\n`);
+            return { exitCode: 2, stderr, verdict: { verdict: 'block', reason: err.message } };
+        }
+        throw err;
+    }
+    // 3. Non-Bash tool calls bypass.
+    if (toolName !== '' && toolName !== 'Bash') {
+        return { exitCode: 0, stderr, verdict: null };
+    }
+    // 4. Empty command → allow.
+    if (cmd.length === 0) {
+        return { exitCode: 0, stderr, verdict: null };
+    }
+    // 5. Load policy permissively.
+    const policy = loadPolicyPermissive(reaRoot);
+    const relax = [...policy.protectedRelax];
+    // 6. REA_HOOK_PATCH_SESSION — relax .claude/hooks/ when env var is
+    //    set with a non-empty reason. Mirrors settings-protection.sh §6b
+    //    posture (the Bash-tier counterpart wasn't enforcing this against
+    //    .claude/hooks/ until 0.35.0 — that gap is closed here).
+    const patchSession = options.patchSessionOverride ?? process.env['REA_HOOK_PATCH_SESSION'] ?? '';
+    if (patchSession.length > 0) {
+        relax.push('.claude/hooks/');
+    }
+    // 7. Scan.
+    const verdict = runProtectedScan({
+        reaRoot,
+        policy: {
+            ...(policy.protectedWrites !== undefined
+                ? { protected_writes: policy.protectedWrites }
+                : {}),
+            protected_paths_relax: relax,
+        },
+        stderr: (line) => writeStderr(line),
+    }, cmd);
+    // 8. Audit.
+    try {
+        await appendAuditRecord(reaRoot, {
+            tool_name: 'rea.hook.protected-paths-bash-gate',
+            server_name: 'rea',
+            tier: Tier.Read,
+            status: verdict.verdict === 'allow' ? InvocationStatus.Allowed : InvocationStatus.Denied,
+            metadata: {
+                verdict: verdict.verdict,
+                ...(verdict.detected_form !== undefined ? { detected_form: verdict.detected_form } : {}),
+                ...(verdict.hit_pattern !== undefined ? { hit_pattern: verdict.hit_pattern } : {}),
+                ...(patchSession.length > 0 ? { patch_session: true } : {}),
+                command_preview: cmd.slice(0, 256),
+            },
+        });
+    }
+    catch {
+        /* best-effort */
+    }
+    if (verdict.verdict === 'block') {
+        if (typeof verdict.reason === 'string' && verdict.reason.length > 0) {
+            writeStderr(verdict.reason + '\n');
+        }
+        return { exitCode: 2, stderr, verdict };
+    }
+    return { exitCode: 0, stderr, verdict };
+}
+export async function runHookProtectedPathsBashGate(options = {}) {
+    const result = await runProtectedPathsBashGate({
+        ...options,
+        stderrWrite: (s) => process.stderr.write(s),
+    });
+    process.exit(result.exitCode);
+}

package/dist/hooks/settings-protection/index.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/**
+ * Node-binary port of `hooks/settings-protection.sh`.
+ *
+ * 0.35.0 Phase 4 port. The LARGEST hook in the repo at 582 LOC of
+ * bash — this is the gate that protects `.claude/settings.json`,
+ * `.claude/hooks/*`, `.husky/*`, `.rea/policy.yaml`, and `.rea/HALT`
+ * from agent writes. Without it the entire governance layer can be
+ * disabled by an agent's own Write tool.
+ *
+ * Behavioral contract — preserves the bash hook section by section:
+ *
+ *   1. HALT check → exit 2 with shared banner.
+ *   2. Read stdin, extract `tool_input.file_path` (or `notebook_path`
+ *      via the shared Write payload parser). Missing → exit 0.
+ *
+ *   §5a Path-traversal reject (`..` segment in raw OR normalized form).
+ *   §5a-bis Interior `/./` segment reject (NORMALIZED form only).
+ *
+ *   §5b Extension-surface allow-list. `.husky/{commit-msg,pre-push,
+ *       pre-commit,prepare-commit-msg}.d/*` is the documented consumer
+ *       extension surface — fragments here are NOT protected, with
+ *       two defense-in-depth checks:
+ *         (a) Final-component symlink refusal (`fs.lstatSync().isSymbolicLink()`).
+ *         (b) Intermediate-directory symlink resolution — the parent's
+ *             realpath must STILL end in `/.husky/<surface>.d/` or
+ *             `/.husky/<surface>.d` (directory-boundary anchored per
+ *             0.20.1 helix-021 #3).
+ *
+ *   §6  Default-protected list resolution. Sourced from
+ *       `_lib/protected-paths.ts`'s `resolveProtectedPatterns` which
+ *       honors `protected_writes` (full override) and
+ *       `protected_paths_relax` (subtractor). Match runs case-insensitive.
+ *
+ *   §6c Intermediate-symlink resolution against the hard-protected list
+ *       (helix-016 H.1 fix). Parallel to §5b's surface-only check, this
+ *       runs against ANY protected pattern.
+ *
+ *   §6b REA_HOOK_PATCH_SESSION unlock for `.claude/hooks/` (the only
+ *       patch-session pattern). When the env var is set with a non-
+ *       empty reason, audit-log the edit (via the shared TS audit
+ *       primitive — directly, no shell-out gymnastics) and allow.
+ *       Audit-append failure is fail-closed — block the edit and
+ *       surface the failure. This preserves hash-chain integrity.
+ *
+ *   §6c-bis Patch-session patterns blocked when env var is NOT set.
+ *
+ * Stderr formatting is preserved verbatim from the bash hook so
+ * existing log-parsing consumers (if any) keep working.
+ */
+import type { Buffer } from 'node:buffer';
+export interface SettingsProtectionOptions {
+    reaRoot?: string;
+    stdinOverride?: string | Buffer;
+    stderrWrite?: (s: string) => void;
+    /** Test seam — overrides `process.env.REA_HOOK_PATCH_SESSION`. */
+    patchSessionOverride?: string;
+    /** Test seam — overrides `process.env.CLAUDE_SESSION_ID`. */
+    sessionIdOverride?: string;
+}
+export interface SettingsProtectionResult {
+    exitCode: number;
+    stderr: string;
+    /**
+     * When the gate blocks: the matched pattern (one of PROTECTED_PATTERNS,
+     * PATCH_SESSION_PATTERNS, or a §5a/§5a-bis sentinel string).
+     */
+    matched: string | null;
+    /** When the gate blocks via §5b extension-surface symlink refusal. */
+    surfaceSymlinkRefused: boolean;
+    /** When the gate allows under REA_HOOK_PATCH_SESSION. */
+    patchSessionAllowed: boolean;
+}
+export declare function runSettingsProtection(options?: SettingsProtectionOptions): Promise<SettingsProtectionResult>;
+export declare function runHookSettingsProtection(options?: SettingsProtectionOptions): Promise<void>;